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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 09443

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EAID, ECON, EG, US, SA
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, APRIL 20, 1988
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THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS (GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION) AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF

THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISMMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HEAD AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION TO VISIT IRAQ.

-- ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD TRIGGERS MORE PRESS COMMENTS.

-- CRITICISM OF US CONTRADICTORY STANDS AND BLIND SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

-- THE MINISTER OF ELECTRICITY ADMITS SHORTAGE OF ELECTRICITY IS GRAVE.

-- CRITICISM OF MANAGEMENT OF TOURIST INDUSTRY.

-- OPPOSITION PAPERS SPECULATE ON THE EXPECTED SALARY HIKE.
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ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS
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1. US/IRAN. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL PAPERS REPORTS A GRAVE CONFRONTATION IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN IN THE GULF. TEHRAN THREATENED TO ATTACK US INTERESTS IN THE WORLD, WHILE PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT IRAN WOULD PAY DEARLY FOR ITS THREATS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT TRANQUILITY WOULD BE RESTORED TO THE GULF.

2. EGYPT/IRAQ. ALL PAPERS REPORT PRIME MINISTER SEDKY WILL VISIT IRAQ EARLY IN MAY AT THE HEAD OF AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION, CARRYING A MESSAGE FROM MUBARAK TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. A LONG TERM AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION OF BILATERAL COOPERATION WILL BE SIGNED. MOREOVER, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT EGYPTIAN-IRAQI HIGHER COMMITTEE HEADED BY THE PRIME MINISTERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE ANNOUNCED DURING THE VISIT.

3. EGYPTIAN-ARAB COMPANIES. AHRAM REPORTS THREE EGYPTIAN-ARAB HOLDING COMPANIES WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN DAYS. THE CAPITAL OF THE COMPANIES AMOUNTS TO LE 600

MILLION, WHICH INCLUDES AN INDUSTRIAL COMPANY WITH CAPITAL OF LE 300 MILLION, AN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY WITH LE 200 MILLION, AND A TOURIST AND REAL ESTATE COMPANY WITH LE 100 MILLION. AHRAM NOTES THAT ARAB INVESTMENTS IN EGYPT HAVE EXCEEDED LE 3 BILLION.

4. EGYPT/TUNISIA. ALL PAPERS REPORT A JOINT STATEMENT

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WAS ISSUED ON THE RESULT OF THE VISIT OF TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER AL-BACCOUCHE. THE TWO COUNTRIES EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AND DENOUNCED THE ARBITRARY PRACTICES OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES. THEY CALLED UPON IRAQ AND IRAN TO WORK TO STOP THE GULF WAR. THREE NEW AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED FOR EXCHANGING CUSTOMS PRIVILEGES AND INCREASING TRADE, PREVENTING DOUBLE TAXATION, AND PROMOTING INVESTMENTS.

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5. ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. AN UNSIGNED EDITORIAL IN AHRAM WRITES THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION OF ABU JIHAD CARRIED OUT BY ISRAEL IS AIMED AT TWO THINGS: EXTINGUISHING OR UNDERMINING THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, AND KEEPING EACH ARAB COUNTRY BUSY WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS, THEREBY CURBING ANY ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE ARAB RANKS OR UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF THE ARABS. AKHBAR'S COLUMNIST MUSTAFA AMIN WRITES THAT THE KILLERS OF ABU JIHAD WILL BE SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THE ASSASSINATION ONLY MADE THE UPRISING STRONGER. NOW ALL THE WORLD KNOWS THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT PEACE. HOWEVER, NOTES AMIN, THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD REMAIN RESTRICTED TO ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND NOT OUTSIDE THEM.

6. EGYPT/US. FOR THE SECOND DAY IN A ROW, AN UNSIGNED EDITORIAL IN AKHBAR CRITICIZES THE CONTRADICTORY STANDS OF THE US GOVERNMENT AND WRITES THAT HAD EINSTEIN BEEN ALIVE, EVEN HE WOULD HAVE BEEN PERPLEXED BY THESE CONFLICTING STANDS, FOR AT A TIME WHEN SHULTZ IS EXERTING PEACE EFFORTS, WASHINGTON INSISTS ON VETOING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, AND CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE
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ISRAELI TERRORISTS WHO ASSASSINATED ABU JIHAD. THIS CONTRADICTORY POLICY IS THE REASON FOR THE LOSS OF WASHINGTON'S CREDIBILITY.

7. MAHGOUB IN WASHINGTON. AHRAM, IN A FRONT-PAGE STORY, REPORTS THAT DERWINSKI TOLD ASSEMBLY SPEAKER RIFAAT AL-MAHGOUB DURING A MEETING AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT US ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT WILL NOT BE REDUCED DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES. AHRAM ALSO REPORTS THAT MAHGOUB DISCUSSED EGYPT'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM AND EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER POWELL AND AID ADMINISTRATOR WOODS.

8. EGYPT/YUGOSLAVIA. AHRAM REPORTS A COOPERATION PROTOCOL WILL BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE YUGOSLAV CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

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DOMESTIC NEWS

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9. INTERVIEW WITH THE MINISTER OF ELECTRICITY. AHRAM CARRIES A LONG INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER OF ELECTRICITY MAHER ABAZA, WHO SAYS THAT THE EXPECTED SHORTAGE OF ELECTRICITY, ESPECIALLY HIGH DAM ELECTRICITY, IS VERY GRAVE AND THE SITUATION IS VERY CRUCIAL THIS YEAR. THE ONLY HOPE LEFT IS BUILDING 13 THERMAL POWER PLANTS, WHICH WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL BEFORE MARCH 1989. THE MINISTER NOTES THAT ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION HAS INCREASED BY 20 PER CENT DURING THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF RAMADAN.

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10. CRITICISM OF MALADMINISTRATION OF EGYPTAIR. AKHBAR'S COLUMNIST MUSA SABRY CRITICIZES THE LACK OF MAINTENANCE OF EGYPTAIR PLANES, WHICH RESULTED IN KEEPING 2000 TOURISTS WHO WANTED TO LEAVE FOR HOME FOR TWO NIGHTS IN ASWAN AND LUXOR. EGYPTAIR HAD TO PAY THE EXPENSES OF THESE TOURISTS DUE TO THE INEFFICIENCY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION. SABRY ATTACKS EGYPTAIR'S BAD MANAGEMENT, WHICH WILL DEFINITELY HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON EGYPT'S REPUTATION AND REVENUES.

11. STUDENTS EXPELLED. ALL PAPERS REPORT THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT SUPPORTED THE DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF AL-MENOUFIA UNIVERSITY EXPELLING 15 STUDENTS FROM 1 TO 3 MONTHS FOR DEMONSTRATING AND DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS.

12. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR APRIL 20 IS PT 226.0 FOR BUYING AND PT 226.6 FOR SELLING.

OPPOSITI
ON NEWS

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13. PRIVATE SECTOR SALARY INCREASE. AL-WAFD REPORTS THE GOVERNMENT IS HOLDING TALKS WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ORDER TO INCREASE SALARIES LIKE THE PUBLIC SECTOR. REPORTEDLY, MORE BANKNOTES WILL BE PRINTED AND SUBSIDIES WILL BE REDUCED TO FINANCE THE NEW SALARY HIKE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AL-AHALI REPORTS THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE NEW SALARY INCREASE AND THERE IS A
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TENDENCY TO GIVE ONLY THE MAY DAY BONUS FOR THE TIME BEING. PRIME MINISTER SEDKY REPORTEDLY CLASHED WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NDP, WHICH WANTED TO RAISE WAGES BY ANY
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MEANS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. SEDKY WAS FORCED TO SEEK PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S INTERVENTION TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT TO ANNOUNCE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE SALARY HIKE BECAUSE IT IS VERY SMALL WHEN COMPARED TO THE PRESENT INFLATION RATES. THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE PROPOSES A HIKE OF 25 PER CENT OVER FIVE YEARS.

14. OPPOSITION BOYCOTTS THE GOVERNMENT. AL-AHALI REPORTS LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES STATED THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF RESUMING THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE NDP BEFORE THE CANCELLATION OF THE EMERGENCY LAW. THE LEADERS AFFIRMED THERE WAS NO DIVISION IN THEIR RANKS OVER THAT ISSUE. THE LABOR PARTY CALLED UPON THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO TAKE MORE HARDLINE STANDS THAN JUST STOPPING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE NDP.

15. AHALI ON ABU JIHAD. AL-AHALI'S UNSIGNED EDITORIAL CHARGES ISRAEL AND THE US WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD IN TUNIS. NOTING THAT HIS LOSS IS PAINFUL, THE EDITORIAL ASSERTS THAT THE ASSASSINATION PROVES THAT THE PLO IS THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING; THAT ISRAEL AND AMERICA HAVE FAILED TO PUT THE UPRISING DOWN; AND THAT ISRAEL AND AMERICA HAVE FAILED TO CONVINCE THE WORLD THAT THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT IS TERRORIST SINCE THE WORLD KNOWS THAT ISRAEL IS THE DEN OF STATE TERRORISM ALONG WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH BOMBED LIBYA AND HIJACKED THE EGYPTAIR PLANE.
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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/19/85 (RICH, ROBERT G., JR.)

TAGS: EGEN, SHUM, ETRD, ETEL, KS, PEPR, KN, JA, US, TECH,
SUBJ: WEEKLY STATUS REPORT - KOREA

TO: EA - MR. HOLBROOKE

FROM: EA/K - ROBERT G. RICH, JR.

[redacted] "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT" ROLLS FORWARD

DESPITE LAST WEEK'S MILITARY POWER GRAB, THE PROGRAM OF "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT" ENVISIONED BY THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MOVED FORWARD IN THE SHORT RUN AT LEAST. THE PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOW:

DEC. 14 - ROKG ANNOUNCED NEW CABINET CONSISTING MOSTLY OF

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POLITICALLY NEUTRAL TECHNOCRATS, WITH TWO OBVIOUS CONCESSIONS TO THE DISSIDENTS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION.

DEC. 14 - NEW PRIME MINISTER SHIN PUBLICLY PLEDGED THAT THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE WOULD NOT BE SET BACK.

DEC. 15 - EM-9 CHARGES WERE DROPPED AGAINST OPPOSITION LEADER KIM YONG-SAM AND TWO OF THE NDP OFFICIALS RELEASED EARLIER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9003669 IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date. 9/13/93

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DEC. 17 - NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ACCEPTED RESIGNATION OF CONTROVERSIAL PARK-APPOINTED SPEAKER.

DEC. 17 - ROKG PUBLICLY SET INAUGURATION OF NEW PRESIDENT FOR DEC. 21 AND ANNOUNCED AN ASSOCIATED AMNESTY OF SEVERAL HUNDRED EM-9 VIOLATORS.

DEC. 17 - CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMITTEE VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO HAVE NEW CONSTITUTION SUBMITTED TO PUBLIC REFERENDUM AFTER COMPLETION OF DRAFT.

DEC. 18 - NEW MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER GENERAL LEE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENT PLEDGING MILITARY WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN POLITICS.

DEC. 18 - ROKG CONVEYED TO USG IN WASHINGTON AN OFFICIAL ASSURANCE THAT ITS PROGRAM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WILL PROCEED.

PRESIDENT CH'OE HAS MADE A HABIT OF KEEPING HIS POLITICAL PROMISES, AND WE EXPECT HIM TO ANNOUNCE A TIMETABLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND ELECTIONS AT HIS INAUGURATION ON DECEMBER 21. (DBM)

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[redacted] MAJOR CONTRACT LANDED

CULMINATING PROTRACTED EFFORT WHICH AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER INVOLVED NEARLY EVERY PART OF THE EMBASSY IN SEOUL, THE OUTGOING MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS INFORMED BILL GLEYSTEEN LAST WEEK OF AN ROKG DECISION TO AWARD A LARGE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS CONTRACT TO AT&T. THIS DECISION, WHICH NO DOUBT REFLECTS IN PART THE ROKG TENDENCY TO TURN TOWARD THE US IN TIMES OF DIFFICULTY, WOULD MAKE AN EXCELLENT CASE STUDY OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE TO COMMERCIAL PROMOTION ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS. (DB)

[redacted] CHRISTMAS IS A FAMILY TIME (SO WHY COME HERE...?)

THE FAMILIES OF SEVEN POLITICAL PRISONERS BORN IN JAPAN AND NOW INCARCERATED IN THE ROK UNDER ANTI-COMMUNIST OR ESPIONAGE LAWSARE PLANNING TO VISIT SEVERAL COUNTRIES TO GENERATE PRESSURE FOR THE PRISONERS' RELEASES. IN THE U.S. THE GROUP PLANS TO SEEK OUT SYG WALDHEIM, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, U.S. POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS, AND WHOEVER ELSE WILL SEE THEM; THE FAMILIES' WILL ARGUE THAT THE DETAINEES ARE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, AND INNOCENT OF THE SEDITION AND ESPIONAGE CHARGES FOR WHICH THEY WERE TRIED. THE FAMILIES, ALL OF WHOM ARE STILL RESIDENT IN JAPAN, HAVE RED CROSS TRAVELING PAPERS, AND THE GOJ HAS

REPORTEDLY PROVIDED THEM WITH RE-ENTRY PERMITS. THE ROKG HAS PRESSED US, BOTH HERE AND IN SEOUL, NOT TO ISSUE VISAS, CITING THE "IRREGULARITY" OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND CLAIMING THAT THE PRISONERS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED "NORMAL" POLITICAL DETAINEES. BOTH EMBASSY SEOUL AND THE DEPARTMENT HAVE RESPONDED THAT VISA DENIAL IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN SUCH A CASE, AND WE POINTED OUT THAT KEEPING THE FAMILIES OUT WOULD PROVIDE AMMUNITION FOR PUBLICITY IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD. WE ALSO TRIED TO CONSOLE THEM THAT ANY OFFICER WHO [redacted] AGREE TO SEE THEM WOULD SURELY POINT OUT THAT THIS

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MATTER INVOLVES THE ROK AND PERHAPS GOJ, BUT THAT THE USG IS NOT INVOLVED. (JG)

[redacted]KOREA AND IRAN

SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS I HAVE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE ROK POLITICAL COUNSELOR HERE TO THE PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF JAPAN'S ACTIONS IN THE IRANIAN CRISIS AND HAVE CAUTIONED THAT THE ROKG BE CAREFUL IN ITS DEALINGS WITH IRAN IN ITS SEARCH FOR NEEDED OIL. MEANWHILE, OUR ICA POSTS IN KOREA HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE CAUTIOUS U.S. HANDLING OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS HAS DIMINISHED AMERICAN PRESTIGE AMONG OTHER KOREANS, WHO ALLEGE THEY SEE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN IMPOTENCE WHICH HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROK RELIANCE ON U.S. SECURITY TIES. (RGR)

5. [redacted] LEVINE CONSULTS

MEL LEVINE SPENT A FRUITFUL WEEK IN WASHINGTON DECEMBER 11-14 MAKING HIS FIRST ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS IN A KOREA ROLE, FOLLOWING HIS DIRECT TRANSFER FROM TAIPEI TO SEOUL IN SEPTEMBER. HIS DISCUSSIONS EMPHASIZED TRADE ISSUES MOST HEAVILY, ALTHOUGH HE OF COURSE TOUCHED ON FINANCIAL, TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES AS WELL. THE TIMING WAS FORTUITOUS. WASHINGTON INTEREST IN THE NEAR TERM ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR KOREA IS RUNNING VERY HIGH IN VIEW OF RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PESSIMISTIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS. WHILE BEARISH ON IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS, MEL EXPRESSED A BASIC CONFIDENCE IN THE RESILIENCE AND UNDERLYING STRENGTH OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY. (DB)

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6. (U) DIALOGUE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

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ON DECEMBER 7 DAVID BLAKEMORE PARTICIPATED IN A SEMINAR IN NEW YORK, SPONSORED JOINTLY BY THE FORD FOUNDATION AND

HARVARD, ON THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN KOREA. THERE WERE SOME 25 PARTICIPANTS IN ALL, INCLUDING ADRIAN DEWIND, GREGORY HENDERSON AND DON RANARD, NEARLY ALL OF WHOM ARE IMPATIENT (TO SAY THE LEAST) WITH USG PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES IN KOREA. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, THE GROUP SHOWED TOLERANCE AND COURTESY IN HEARING VIEWS DIFFERENT FROM THEIR OWN. NO AGREED CONCLUSIONS WERE POSSIBLE, BUT FEEDBACK AFTER THE SESSION CONVINCED DAVID THAT AT LEAST THE KEY MEMBERS OF THE GROUP FELT THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED AN ATTENTIVE (AND EXTENDED) HEARING FROM AN OFFICIAL USG REPRESENTATIVE. (DB)

[redacted] KOREAN PROPOSALS ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND THIRD-COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT

THE ROK MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MOST) HAS PRESENTED TO BEN HUBERMAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP) PROPOSALS FOR U.S.-ROK COOPERATION IN SCIENTIFIC-ASSISTANCE AREAS, AND BEN CALLED A MEETING OF NSF, AID, ICA, AND STATE REPS TO DISCUSS IT. ALL AGREED THAT THE BRIGHTEST IDEA AMONG THE FIVE PRESENTED IS A JOINT TRAINING CENTER TO TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE BENEFITS OF ROK SUCCESS UNDER THE U.S. AID PROGRAM (IN SEOUL PRESIDENTS CARTER AND PARK HAD AGREED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES). THE OTHER IDEAS INVOLVE EITHER GREATER FORMALIZATION TO EXISTING BILATERAL SCIENCE COOPERATION (WHICH WE DONOT WANT) OR DIRECT LOANS BY THE USG TO KOREAN ADVANCED-TECHNOLOGY STUDENTS (FOR WHICH WE HAVE NO LEGAL AUTHORITY). AS A STEP PERHAPS ANTICIPATING A JOINT TRAINING CENTER, WE'VE SUGGESTED THAT THE KOREANS EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES OF EXPERTS IN EXISTING THIRD-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. WE'VE ALSO WORKED WITH AID TO MAKE OUR OTHER NEGATIVE RESPONSES AS PALATABLE AS POSSIBLE. IN-

[redacted]

TERESTINGLY, MOST PRESENTED THEIR DRAFT TO OSTP BEFORE CIRCULATING IT IN THE ROKG. (JG)

8. (U) BUSINESSMEN BRIEFED

ON DECEMBER 10 BLAKEMORE SHARED ANOTHER NEW YORK PODIUM WITH VISITING SEOUL ECON COUNSELOR MEL LEVINE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL HAD ASSEMBLED A GROUP OF ABOUT 30 REPRESENTATIVES OF MAJOR FIRMS ACTIVE IN KOREA WHO WERE INTERESTED IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE GROUP WAS HEAVILY WEIGHTED IN FAVOR OF BANKS AND OIL COMPANIES, BUT SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT CORPORATIONS WERE REPRESENTED AS WELL. AFTER A SPIRITED DISCUSSION, WHICH REVEALED AN IMPRESSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF KOREAN POLITICS AS WELL AS ECONOMICS AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS, BLAKEMORE AND LEVINE WERE PLEASED TO BE INFORMED BY ONE EXECUTIVE IN ATTENDANCE

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THAT HE WOULD URGE HIS FIRM TO PROCEED WITH A SIZEABLE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN KOREA. (DB)

9[redacted]INSURANCE COMPLAINT FILED

ON DECEMBER 14 STR ACCEPTED A COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 THAT THE ROKG IS INTERFERING IN THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES BY DENYING/LIMITING ACCESS OF U.S. FIRMS TO VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF THE INSURANCE MARKET IN KOREA. THIS ACTION, WHICH CAPS A LONG AND OFTEN ACRIMONIOUS DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE US FIRM AND THE ROKG'S INSURANCE REGULATORS, COULD SET AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT WHICH OTHER US INDUSTRIES WOULD FOLLOW IF STR SHOULD RULE THAT RETALIATORY ACTION IS JUSTIFIED. SOME USG EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST A PART OF THE COMPLAINT, THAT DEALING WITH FIRE INSURANCE, IS VALID. (DB)

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10. A FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUENCY? (U)

WE HAVE SEEN A REPORT THAT 75 PERCENT OF ALL TEXTBOOKS USED IN U.S. SCHOOLS DO NOT EVEN MENTION KOREA. NO WONDER WE OFTEN HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS NO FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUENCY. (DB)

11. CHRISTMAS FESTIVITIES[redacted]

COUNSELOR PARK AND THE ENTIRE ROK EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION HOSTED THE EA/K STAFF FOR AN ANNUAL PRE-HOLIDAY GATHERING AT DINNER AND THE KENNEDY CENTER (THE MESSIAH) LAST SATURDAY EVENING. ON FRIDAY, I SOUNDED OUT PARK AS TO WHETHER HE WANTED TO PROCEED AT THIS JUNCTURE WITH A VISIBLE FETE, BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW CABINET HAD RESTORED FLAGGING SPIRITS AT THE ROK EMBASSY AND HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES VOTED TO PROCEED. HE HAS AN IMPRESSIVE STAFF OF ABLE YOUNGER OFFICERS HERE AT THIS TIME. (RGR) VANCE

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CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= GS 19880727 BREER, WILLIAM T

SUBJECT= PRESIDENT CHUN'S FORTHCOMING AFRICAN TRIP

REFERENCE= 82 SEOUL 7090

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, VISITS

TAGS= PEPR, OVIP, US, XF, LE, KS, XA, GB, NI, SG, SO, XJ, (CHUN DOO HWAN)

[redacted]

PAGE 01 STATE 208540
ORIGIN EA-12

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 AF-10 CIAE-00
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DRAFTED BY EA/K: F. M. DAVENPORT FM, MP
APPROVED BY EA/K: W. T. BREER, ACTING
AF/I: SUE PATRICK
NEA/RA: N. WALKER
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P R 272040Z JUL 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

[redacted] STATE 208540

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/27/88 (BREER, WILLIAM T.)
TAGS: PEPR, GB, KE, NI, SG, SO, XA, XJ, XF, KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHUN'S FORTHCOMING AFRICAN TRIP

REF: SEOUL 7090

1. [redacted] HERE AS REQUESTED ARE BRIEF POLICY STATEMENTS WHICH EMBASSY CAN PASS TO BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY LEE (M R: YI CHONG-CH'UN) AS BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR PRESIDENT CHUN'S FORTHCOMING AFRICAN TRIP. IN ADDITION TO THE BRIEFING TOPICS SUGGESTED REFTEL, WE HAVE INCLUDED MATERIAL ON THE HORN OF AFRICA PROBLEM. BRIEFING STATEMENTS FOLLOW:

2. [redacted] KEY ELEMENTS OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

PEACE PROCESS. THE U.S. SEEKS A JUST AND LASTING

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 208540

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH TO PEACE IS THE ONLY PROVEN AND WORKABLE OPTION AT THIS POINT.

LEBANON. IN LEBANON THE U.S. SEEKS AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE FIGHTING AND A FORMULA THAT WILL PERMIT THE

WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FIGHTERS AND ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. WE SEEK A SOLUTION THAT WILL ENHANCE LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL

INTEGRITY AND ALSO PROTECTS THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL..

IRAQ-IRAN. THE U.S. IS NEUTRAL IN THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT. WE HAVE SUPPORTED UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH CALL FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH GUARANTEES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THE CONFLICT IS DESTABILIZING TO THE AREA, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES.

PALESTINIANS. IN THE CONTEXT OF SEEKING AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PEACE, THE U.S. IS RESOLVED TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WE HAVE CALLED UPON THE PLO TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND TO ACCEPT UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 IF IT WISHES TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S.

AFGHANISTAN. THE U.S. CONDEMNS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM THAT COUNTRY THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

[redacted]

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WESTERN SAHARA. THE U.S. SEEKS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU TOWARD THAT END.

REGIONAL SECURITY. THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO ASSIST FRIENDLY STATES IN THE AREA TO MEET THEIR LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS.

3. [redacted] SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS

EARLY LAST YEAR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED A THREE-PHASED APPROACH AIMED AT OBTAINING AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE INDEPENDENCE SETTLEMENT FOR NAMIBIA BASED ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. ON JULY 12 A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, WITH THE APPROVAL OF ALL PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, ANNOUNCING THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE. WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN AN INTENSE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL PARTIES ON

PHASE TWO ISSUES; WE ARE WORKING TO A TIMETABLE THAT WOULD PRODUCE IMPLEMENTATON OF UNSCR 435 WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS AND ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA IN EARLY 1983. ALL PARTIES ARE WORKING DILIGENTLY TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, FOR THIS TIMETABLE TO BE ACHIEVED, IT IS NECESSARY THAT

THERE ALSO BE SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN COMBAT FORCES FROM ANGOLA.

4. [redacted] HORN OF AFRICA.

THE HORN OF AFRICA IS STRATEGICALLY LOCATED WITH RESPECT TO THE PERSIAN GULF/SOUTHWEST ASIA REGION. IT HAS ASSUMED INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. IN OUR SOUTHWEST ASIA STRATEGY. WE CONCLUDED MILITARY ACCESS AGREEMENTS WITH KENYA AND SOMALIA IN 1980.

[redacted]

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THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA AS WELL AS IN NEIGHBORING SOUTH YEMEN IS A SERIOUS CONCERN TO US. THE AUGUST 1981 TRIPARTITE PACT AMONG ETHIOPIA, LIBYA AND SOUTH YEMEN HAS LED TO ACTIVE LIBYAN AND ETHIOPIAN DESTABILIZATION EFFORTS AGAINST SUDAN AND SOMALIA.

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN THE HORN IS COMPLICATED BY BOTH INTERNAL AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INSTABILITIES AND TANGLED EXTERNAL ALLIANCES. SOMALI IRREDENTISM LED TO AN UNDECLARED SOMALI-KENYAN WAR IN THE LATE 1960S AND A FULL-SCALE SOMALI INVASION OF THE OGADEN REGION OF ETHIOPIA IN 1977-78 WHICH WAS DEFEATED ONLY BY MASSIVE INFUSIONS OF SOVIET AID AND CUBAN TROOPS ON THE ETHIOPIAN SIDE. OTHER CONTINUING PROBLEMS INCLUDE THE 20-YEAR-OLD SECESSIONIST REBELLION IN ETHIOPIA'S PROVINCE OF ERITREA ON THE RED SEA COAST BORDERING SUDAN, AND THE LEGACY OF SUDAN'S 17-YEAR NORTH-SOUTH CIVIL WAR, SETTLED IN 1972. ETHIOPIA'S LATEST EFFORT TO CRUSH THE ERITREAN REBELLION, A MASSIVE OFFENSIVE BEGUN IN DECEMBER 1981, HAS NOT RESOLVED THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM WHICH ULTIMATELY CAN ONLY BE SETTLED POLITICALLY.

THESE REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INSTABILITIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT FIGHTING ON THE ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA BORDER. DESPITE CONFLICTING CLAIMS, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INCURSION INTOSOMALIAIN SEVERALAREASBY ETHIOPIANAND

ETHIOPIAN SUPPORTED FORCES. THESE INCURSIONS ARE

[redacted]

PAGE 05 STATE 208540

GREATER IN SCALE AND DEPTH THAN PREVIOUS SUCH INCIDENTS, AND APPEAR DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT.

THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED U.S. ASSISTANCE AS IT ATTEMPTS TO MEET THESE MULTIPLE ATTACKS. IN RESPONSE, WE ARE TAKING SEVERAL STEPS, INCLUDING ACCELERATED DELIVERY OF CERTAIN MILITARY SUPPLIES AS WELL AS VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT OUR MEASURED ACTION AND DIPLOMACY WILL HELP PERSUADE THE ETHIOPIANS TO WITHDRAW WITH A MINIMUM OF FURTHER COMBAT. SHULTZ

[redacted]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 KUWAIT 00486 290820Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 OES-09 NASA-02 NSF-02 DOE-15
SOE-02 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 NAS-01 /095 W
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R 290606Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2864
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR
USICA WASHDC

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: MPOL, PINS, MASS, SOPN, TGEN, KU
SUBJECT: "UFO" SIGHTINGS CAUSE SECURITY CONCERN IN KUWAIT

1. A SERIES OF "UFO"SIGHTINGS ON NOVEMBER 9 CAUSED THE GOK TO APPOINT AN INVESTIGATORY COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FROM THE KUWAIT INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (KISR). THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT WHICH WAS RELEASED JANUARY 20 DESCRIBED EIGHT SIGHTINGS FROM NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER 14. A NUMBER OF THE EARLY SIGHTINGS TOOK PLACE NEAR A KUWAIT OIL COMPANY GATHERING CENTER NORTH OF KUWAIT CITY. RELEASE OF THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT WAS SOMETHING OF A MEDIA EVENT AS IT COINCIDED WITH JAN 21 FRONT PAGE STORIES OF YET ANOTHER "UFO" SIGHTING OVER KUWAIT CITY, WHICH INCLUDED PHOTOGRAPHS IN LOCAL NEWSPAPERS.

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PAGE 02 KUWAIT 00486 290820Z

2. THE KISR COMMITTEE REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THE

"UFO'S" WERE ESPIONAGE DEVICES BUT REMAINED EQUIVOCAL ABOUT WHETHER THEY WERE OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL ORIGIN. THE KISR COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE, RATIB ABU ID, TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE SCIENTISTS DID NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE PHENOMENA TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY THAT THEY WEREN'T "SPACESHIPS." THE REPORT WENT ON TO RECOMMEND THAT THE GOVERNMENT TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO PROTECT KUWAIT'S AIR SPACE AND TERRITORY AS WELL AS THE COUNTRY'S OIL RESOURCES.

3. SOME LOCAL WAGS HAVE MADE LIGHT OF THE FIRST UFO SIGHTINGS WHICH CAME NEAR THE END OF THE LONG AND TRADITIONALLY EXUBERANT HOLIDAY CELEBRATIONS OF ID-AL-ADHA. HOWEVER WE HAVE LEARNED RECENTLY OF AN EVENT COINCIDENT WITH ONE OF THE UFO SIGHTINGS WHICH HAS CONFOUNDED SOME OF OUR MOST LEVEL-HEADED KUWAITI FRIENDS, AND MAY HAVE BEEN WHAT PERSUADED THE GOK TO MAKE A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER. A SENIOR KUWAIT OIL COMPANY (KOC) OFFICIAL TOLD US THE THE "UFO" WHICH FIRST APPEARED OVER THE NORTHERN OIL FIELDS SEEMINGLY DID STRANGE THINGS TO KOC'S AUTOMATIC PUMPING EQUIPMENT. THIS EQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED TO SHUT ITSELF DOWN WHEN THERE IS SOME FAILURE WHICH MAY SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE PETROLEUM GATHERING AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND IT CAN ONLY BERESTARTED MANUALLY. AT THE TIME OF THE "UFO'S" APPEARANCE THE PUMPING SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY SHUT ITSELF DOWN AND WHEN THE "UFO" VANISHED THE SYSTEM STARTED ITSELF UP AGAIN. THIS EVENT WAS NOT ADDRESSED BY THE KISR COMMITTEE REPORT.

4. EVEN THOSE WHO ARE NOT INCLINED TO BELIEVE IN

VISITORS FROM OUTER SPACE DO TEND TO THINK SOMETHING STRANGE HAS BEEN GOING ON IN KUWAITI AIRSPACE. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT HELICOPTERS OR HOVERCRAFT BRINGING REFUGEES OR MONEY OUT OF BELEAGUERED IRAN. AT THE LEAST, THE PHENOMENA HAVE STIMULATED A NEW DEGREE OF INTEREST AMONG TOP KUWAITI OFFICIALS IN THE COUNTRY'S AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, WHICH DID NOT REACT IN ANY WAY TO THE "EVENTS" IN THE KOC NORTH FIELD BECAUSE IT WAS CLOSED DOWN FOR THE NIGHT (SEPTEL).
MAESTRONE

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88ADANA 000612

[redacted]

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PAGE 01 ADANA 00612 121557Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NEA-06	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	PM-10	PA-01
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FM AMCONSUL ADANA
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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

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[redacted] ADANA 0612

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PGOV, TU, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: GOT ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE REFUGEE CAMPS

REF: ANKARA 12507

1[redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE GOT IS KEEPING ORDER IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

PAGE 02 RUFTWPA6815 C O N F I D E N T I A L ADANA 0612
DESPITE FLARE-UPS AMONG THE IRAQI KURDS WHICH CAUSED AT LEAST ONE DEATH (REFTEL) AND NUMEROUS INJURIES. GOT SECURITY FORCES MAY FACE EVEN GREATER RESTIVENESS AMONG THE REFUGEES AS THE KURDS BECOME MORE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR SURROUNDINGS AND LESS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE STRICTURES OF AUTHORITY. AN OCTOBER 12 WARNING TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ABOUT REPORTING ON THE REFUGEES

[redacted]

PAGE 02 ADANA 00612 121557Z

MAY BE A HARBINGER OF GREATER RESTRICTIVENESS IN ACCESS TO THE CAMPS AND IS CERTAINLY AN INDICATION OF HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY ABOUT CLASHES BETWEEN GROUPS OF KURDS WITHIN THE CAMPS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE GOT HAS FACED DIFFICULTIES IN KEEPING ORDER IN THE KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS BUT HAS GENERALLY MANAGED TO MAINTAIN CALM DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS DEALING WITH A POPULATION NOT USED TO TIGHT CONTROLS. THE SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLI-

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ATED BY THE FACT THAT THE REFUGEE POPULATION CONTAINS MANY
STRONG SYMPATHIZERS WITH THE TURKISH KURDISH SEPARATIST PKK.
SOME PKK MILITANTS MAY HAVE INFILTRATED INTO THE REFUGEE
POPULATION, BUT GOT SUSPICIONS OF THE NUMBER OF INFILTRATIONS
ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED. BELIEVES THAT

GE 03 RUFTWPA6815 C O N F I D E N T I A L ADANA 0612
NUMBER OF PKK AMONG THE REFUGEES IS ACTUALLY VERY LOW.
ARGUES THAT NEARLY ALL OF THE PKK MILITANTS ARE TURKISH
RDS AND AS SUCH COULD BE EASILY SPOTTED BY GOT SECURITY
RSONNEL.

ONE SERIOUS EXAMPLE OF REFUGEE UNREST (REFTEL) OCCURRED 9/16
THE UZUN SIRT CAMP NEAR YUKSEKOVA IN HAKKARI. PESHMERGES
HELD THE SUBGOVERNOR AND MAYOR OF YUKSEKOVA CAPTIVE FOR
ERAL HOURS TO PROTEST THE REMOVAL OF TWO SUSPECTED PKK
LITANTS (INCLUDING A PESHMERGE LEADER) FROM THE CAMP BY
CURITY FORCES. TWELVE PESHMERGES WERE LATER CHARGED WITH
TIVOLY RESISTING SECURITY FORCES.

5. THE OCTOBER 12 PRESS REPORTED THAT 10,362 INHABITANFS OF
THE UZUN SIRT CAMP AND THE NEIGHBORING CAMP AT SU USTU HAVE

[redacted]

PAGE 03 ADANA 00612 121557Z

LEFT FOR IRAN AND IRAQ. (AN ESTIMATED 9,000 WENT TO IRAN.)
THE GOT REPORTEDLY PLANS TO CLOSE THE SU USTU CAMP AND CON-
CENTRATE THE REMAINING PESHMERGES AT UZUN SIRT.

6. ALTHOUGH CONDITIONS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN MARDIN,

GE 04 RUFTWPA6815 C O N F I D E N T I A L ADANA 0612
LOPI, AND DIYARBAKIR ARE REPORTEDLY GOOD, THE MORE PRIMITIVE
AND RELATIVELY ISOLATED CAMPS NEAR YUKSEKOVA (SU USTU AND UZUN
T) HAVE BEEN ALLEGEDLY PLAGUED BY A SCARCITY OF SUPPLIES.
E SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE ONSET OF WINTER.
HTTIME TEMPERATURES AT YEKSEKOVA ARE ALREADY FALLING BELOW
REEZING.

7. IN VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE CAMPS THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES
OF FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDS WHO HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE
AQI OFFER OF AMNESTY AND THOSE WHO PLAN TO GO ELSEWHERE.
RLIER PRESS REPORTS CLAIMED THE CLASHES RESULTED IN 2
ATHS. MORE RECENTLY, "EKSPRES" ON OCTOBER 8, REPORTED THAT
CLASH IN THE DIYARBAKIR CAMP RESULTED IN INJURIES TO 40
HMERGES AND 6 TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP). ANOTHER 20
SHMERGES WERE REPORTEDLY TREATED FOR INJURIES AFTER
MILAR INCIDENTS IN THE YUKSEKOVA AREA. IT IS IN REACTION
THIS LATTER CONFRONTATION AND PERHAPS TO DETERIORATING

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CONDITIONS AT THE YUKSEKOVA CAMPS THAT, ACCORDING TO OCTOBER 12 "HURRIYET," AREA REPORTERS WERE SUMMONED TO THE HAKKARI POLICE STATION AND ASKED NOT TO REPORT ANYTHING REGARDING

THE PESHMERGES UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

8. COMMENT: THE GOT HAS TAKEN ON A DIFFICULT TASK IN ATTEMPT-

[redacted]

ING TO CONFINE AND CONTROL A POPULATION USED TO GOING VERY MUCH ITS OWN WAY AND ONE THAT HAS, IN ADDITION, A LONG TRADITION OF RESISTENCE TO ANY AUTHORITY BEYOND THAT OF THE TRIBE. THE IRAQI KURDS IN THE CAMPS, MOREOVER, NOW HAVE NO ANIMALS TO TEND AND LITTLE TO OCCUPY THEIR TIME. SQUABBLING IN SUCH A SITUATION IS ALMOST INEVITABLE, EVEN WITHOUT THE EMOTIONAL ISSUE OF RETURNING TO IRAQ OR REMAINING IN TURKEY, TO FOMENT QUARRELS. THE GOT HAS UNTIL NOW ALLOWED THE PRESS TO REPORT FAIRLY FREELY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CAMPS. IF TENSION WITHIN THE CAMPS CONTINUES, HOWEVER, SECURITY FORCES ARE LIKELY TO BE LESS WILLING TO ALLOW JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS ACCESS EXCEPT UNDER FAIRLY STRICT CONDITIONS.
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ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	AF-00	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	NEA-06	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09
	L-03	PM-10	EAP-00	NRRC-01	INRE-00	OES-09	ACDA-12
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INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
GULFWAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
?MISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

[redacted] USUN NEW YORK 02700

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, TU
SUBJECT: IRAQI CW USE AGAINST KURDS

REF: USUN 2685

(C) [ ] INFORMED MISOFF SEPTEMBER 14TH THAT SYG HAD ASKED THE IRAQI CHARGE ON SEPTEMBER 13TH FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO RECEIVE A TEAM TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE. AS OF COB SEPTEMBER 14TH IRAQIS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE SYG. THE SECRETARIAT HAS A CONTINGENCY PLAN TO PURSUE THE SUBJECT WITH A THIRD COUNTRY (TURKEY) BUT HAS NOT DONE SO, PENDING THE IRAQI RESPONSE. OKUN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date 8/27/92

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88GENEVA010083

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 10083 130902Z
ACTION RP-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 CIO-02 CIAE-00
IO-19 NEA-06 NSAE-00 HA-09 INRE-00 SR-06 /062 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7911
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[redacted] GENEVA 10083

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date 8/23/92
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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: UNHCR AND IRAQI KURDS

[redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT.

1. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, UNHCR ADVISED THE MISSION SEPTEMBER 12 THAT ITS "ONE-WEEK, UNOFFICIAL, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT TEAM" WOULD ARRIVE IN TURKEY SEPTEMBER 12 TO ASSESS THE SITUATION OF THE IRAQI KURDS. THE MISSION, CONSISTING OF THE DEPUTY OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, A LEGAL ADVISER AND A PROGRAM OFFICER, WILL FOCUS ON MEDICAL, FOOD, TRANSPORTATION AND SHELTER NEEDS. HCR HAS A COMMITMENT FROM THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED TO GO TO THE SITES WHERE THE REFUGEES ARE.

2. THE UNHCR OFFICER SAID THAT THE ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT WAS UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN A SPECIAL APPEAL. ITS PURPOSE WAS, INSTEAD, TO ALLOW UNHCR TO SATISFY ITSELF THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL AS REPORTS FROM VARIOUS INDEPENDENT SOURCES INDICATE AND TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO QUERIES WITH

[redacted]

PAGE 02 GENEVA 10083 130902Z

FIRST-HAND INFORMATION. [redacted]

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] THE MISSION WILL REMAIN IN TURKEY UNTIL SEPTEMBER 18.

5. IN IRAN, A TEAM FROM UNHCR'S TEHERAN OFFICE WENT TO THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER IN THE AFFECTED AREA. THEY FOUND 6,000 IRAQI KURDS, 4,000 OF WHOM HAD COME VIA TURKEY AND 2,000 DIRECTLY FROM IRAN. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS BUILDING GUEST VILLAGES WITH HOUSING SUBSTANTIAL TO WITHSTAND THE COMING COLD.

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T OF TELEGRAM 88BAGHDA004832

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	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	RP-10
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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
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MISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

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PA Exemptions

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04832

9203981

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, UNHCR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: DETENTION CAMPS FOR KURDISH POPULATION

REF: STATE 289901

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN IT FIRST BECAME APPARENT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DETERMINED ON THE KURDISH VILLAGE DESTRUCTION CAMPAIGN, IN THE SPRING OF 1987, WE BEGAN RECEIVING REPORTS THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF KURDS WERE BEING TRANSPORTED FROM THE MOUNTAINS EITHER INTO THE DESERT AROUND THE JORDAN BORDER STATION OF RUTBA, TO CAMPS NEAR FALLUJA AND RAMADI, OR TO THE SOUTH (UNSPECIFIED). THESE REPORTS FIT WITH THE PATTERN ESTABLISHED IN EARLIER ANTI-KURDISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FIRST-HAND CONFIRMATION ABOUT NUMBERS INVOLVED OR

[redacted]

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 04832 01 OF 02 041302Z

LOCALITIES. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT LARGE NUMBERS ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THESE LENGTHY TRANSFERS AND THEY PROBABLY INVOLVE IMMEDIATE FAMILIES OF MEN KNOWN TO SERVE AS PESHMERGAS.

3. OUR OWN TRAVEL IN KURDISTAN HAS CONFIRMED THE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES AND EVEN SEVERAL SIZEABLE TOWNS ALONG ALL THE MAIN HIGHWAYS OF THE

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ROVINCES OF SULAYMANIYYA, ARBIL, AND DOHUK. MOSUL PROVINCE BY COMPARISON HAS BEEN SPARED, BUT ITS OUTLYING VILLAGES ARE PRINCIPALLY CHRISTIAN, SUNNI-ARAB, TURKOMEN, AND YAZIDI; AND THE KURDISH PRESENCE WEST OF MOSUL WAS LARGELY EXPELLED IN THE 1970'S (PERHAPS BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY TO SYRIA).

4. WE HAVE OBSERVED THREE LARGE AREAS OF CONSTRUCTION IN SULAYMANIYYA PROVINCE WHERE NEW TOWNS ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED TO HOUSE KURDS BEING REMOVED FROM ADJACENT AREAS: 1. BAVIAN VALLEY BETWEEN THE TWO MOUNTAIN RIDGES WHICH LIE BETWEEN KIRKUK AND SULAYMANIYYA. 2. THE PLAIN SOUTHEAST OF ARBAT, SOUTH OF SULAYMANIYYA. 3. THE HILLS EAST OF KILAR IN THE DIYALA VALLEY, SOUTHERNMOST IRAQI KURDISTAN. THESE NEW TOWNS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE FENCED OR GUARDED IN THE STYLE OF DETENTION CAMPS BUT RATHER SEEM SIMPLY TO BE NEW TOWNS. THE TRADITIONAL AGRARIAN LIVELIHOOD OF THE KURDS IN THESE NEW TOWNS IS OF COURSE NOT PROVIDED FOR.

5. IN JUNE THREE POSSIBLY NEW VILLAGES LAID OUT IN GRID

[redacted]

PATTERN IN WESTERN DOHUK PROVINCE BETWEEN THE TIGRIS AND THE WESTERNMOST RIDGELINE POINTING TOWARD THE SYRIAN BORDER AT FAYSHKHABUR. THESE VILLAGES ARE SURROUNDED BY A FENCE AND GUARD TOWERS AND HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DETENTION CENTERS, BUT WITHIN WHICH KURDISH FAMILY LIFE--WOMEN IN COLORFUL DRESS, MEN IN BAGGY PANTS, GEESE STRUTTING, CHILDREN PLAYING IN THE MUCK--GOES ON.

6. NO WESTERN OBSERVERS THAT WE KNOW OF HAVE TRAVELED IN RECENT YEARS NORTH OF ARBIL OR EAST OF AMADIYYA, I.E., INTO THE KDP/BARZANI HEARTLAND THAT LIES ALONG THE MOUNTAINOUS BORDER WITH TURKEY EAST TO IRAN. IT HAS BEEN OUR UNCONFIRMED IMPRESSION THAT THE TRADITIONALLY PRO-REGIME TRIBES OF THE SURCHI AND HERKI JUST TO THE NORTH OF ARBIL --THE TRIBES THAT ALSO HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN PROTECTING WORKERS BUILDING THE BEKHME DAM WHERE THE GREATER ZAB BREAKS OUT OF THE MAIN RIDGELINES --HAVE NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO MASSIVE VILLAGE DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE TAKEN IT AS GIVEN THAT THE REGIME WOULD ERADICATE BARZANI'S PLACES OF REFUGE AT ANY OPPORTUNITY. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH DESTRUCTION IN BARZANI TERRAIN TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE LATEST PERIOD, BUT IT IS CLEAR, ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM THE

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KURDS AND REPORTS FROM TURKEY THAT WHAT PREVIOUS- OCCURRED IN SOUTHERN AND NORTHWESTERN KURDISTAN NOW TAKING PLACE COMPREHENSIVELY IN NORTHEAST- .N KURDISTAN. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW TOWNS OR DETENTION CAMPS IN THE NORTHEASTERN ZONE, SINCE TRAVEL EVEN FROM ..BIL TO SHAQLAWA AND ROWANDUZ HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88BAGHDA004832

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 04832 02 OF 02 041302Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
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	SCT-02	P-02	T-01	/101 W			

------------------150246 041307Z /41

P 041259Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8084
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04832

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, UNHCR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: DETENTION CAMPS FOR KURDISH POPULATION

UP TO THE PRESENT.

7. THE NORTHERN CITIES OF MOSUL, DOHUK, ARBIL, AND SULAYMANIYYA ARE ALL TEEMING WITH POPULATION AND EXPANDING VERY RAPIDLY INTO THEIR HINTERLANDS. MOSUL WHICH WAS NEVER PREVIOUSLY A CITY WITH A LARGE KURDISH POPULATION IS NOW FULL OF KURDS IN ADDITION TO ITS TRADITIONAL SUNNI-ARAB AND CHRISTIAN POPULATIONS. WE SURMISE THAT MANY KURDS DISPLACED FROM VILLAGES HAVE MOVED TO THESE CITIES.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 87BAGHDA003265

UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED EXCISE

ADP731 [redacted]

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03265 091225Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 PM-10 INRE-00 RP-10 SP-02
C-01 P-02 /056 W
------------------174012 091349Z /40

P 091220Z JUL 87
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4427
INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0019

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TKR Date: 9/23/96
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[redacted] BAGHDAD 03265

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PHUM, IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH SITUATION UPDATE: MOVING THEM OUT

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1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHILE WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF MAJOR TROUBLES IN KURDISH TOWNS AND CITIES RECENTLY, GOVERNMENT FORCES THERE APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. TROUBLE CONTINUES IN OUTLYING AREAS WITH MORE KURDISH TRIBESMEN RESISTING DESTRUCTION OF THEIR VILLAGES OR TAKING UP ARMS AS GUERRILLAS. IRAQI OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE AND EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT THE IRAQI ARMY CAN HANDLE EVEN A LARGER NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS.

IF THE ARMY FINDS KURDISH MEN ABSENT FROM THE VILLAGES, IT PRESUMES THEM TO BE GUERRILLAS AND TURNS THE FAMILY OUT INTO THE ROAD AND TELLS THEM TO FIND THEIR MEN IN THE HILLS. IF THEY MAKE IT, THEY WOULD BE A BURDEN ON THE GUERRILLA UNITS.

[redacted]

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03265 091225Z

3. WHILE NO DIPLOMATS HAVE YET ACTUALLY SEEN LOWLAND KURDS WHO ARE BEING SETTLED OUTSIDE KURDISTAN, WE HAVE INDIRECT EVIDENCE THAT THE REGIME MAY BE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THEM. VARIOUS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SOME HAVE BEEN SENT TO JUDAYDAT AR'AR, A POST ON THE SAUDI BORDER.

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(JUDAYDAT AR'AR IS IN ONE OF THE
TEST AND MOST DESOLATE PLACES IN THE ARAB
RLD AND APPARENTLY KURDS ARE BEING PUT THERE
TENTS AT THE HEIGHT OF SUMMER.) EMBASSY
ERICANS WERE REFUSED MFA PERMISSION LAST
DAY TO VISIT HIT ON THE UPPER EUPHRATES,
ERE REFUGEES ARE ALSO REPORTEDLY BEING SETTLED.
EFUSAL OF TRAVEL PERMISSION HAS BEEN A VERY
RE OCCURRENCE IN RECENT YEARS.) OTHER
STLY DESERT AREAS TO WHICH KURDS REPORTEDLY
VE BEEN SENT INCLUDE RUTBA (THE BORDER POST
R JORDAN), LAKE THARATHAR NEAR RAMADI, AND
SIRIYA. ALL ARE FAR FROM KURDISTAN AND EX-
CEPTIONALLY HOT AREAS AT THE PEAK OF SUMMER.

. AS THE DATT WILL BE REPORTING IN MORE DETAIL,
IGHTING HAS INTENSIFIED NORTHEAST AND SOUTHEAST
F SULAIMANIYA, WITH DISSIDENT IRAQI KURDS JOIN-
ING IRANIANS IN THE ATTACK. [ ]
UNDED FOR A SECOND TIME, REPORTS HIS REGULAR
UNIT DROPPED THEIR GUNS AND RAN IN FIERCE
IGHTING. THE FIGHTING WHILE RELATIVELY HEAVY
PPEARS TO BE LOCALIZED AND NOT LIKELY TO RE-
ULT IN MAJOR IRANIAN GAINS. THE ARMY ALSO

[redacted]

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PEARS TO BE STRENGTHENING ITS FORCES IN THE
AREA, AN INDICATION THAT MORE FIGHTING IS LIKELY.

. OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS WE HAVE ALSO HEARD
STORIES OF BODIES OF MUTILATED SOLDIERS
MING BACK FROM THE NORTH, WITHOUT HEADS OR
HER PARTS OR CUT INTO PIECES. THE BODY OF THE
SBAND [ ]
CAME BACK RECENTLY WITH HIS THROAT CUT. RE-
PORTEDLY HIS FOURTEEN-MAN POPULAR ARMY UNIT
MOVED INTO A KURDISH VILLAGE THE REGULAR ARMY
HAD JUST LEFT. THEY WERE SURPRISED AND EXE-
CUTED BY THROAT CUTTING.
[ ] REPORTS THAT FOUR FOUR-MAN
PULAR ARMY OUTPOSTS NEAR DOHUK WHO FELL ASLEEP
NIGHT WERE FOUND CUT INTO PIECES. MANY
THE STORIES ARE, OF COURSE, IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY,
BUT OUR IMPRESSION IS ONE OF BRUTALITY AND
COUNTER-BRUTALITY. THE GOVERNMENT IS OFFERING
NO QUARTER AND EVEN LEADING PRO-REGIME KURDS
SEEM TO HAVE QUIT TRYING TO APPEAL TO SADDAM.
THE NEED FOR MORE POPULAR ARMY UNITS TO PARTOL
"PACIFIED" AREAS WHILE THE ARMY MOVES ON, AFTER
PERIOD OF DECLINING RECRUITMENT, HAS LED TO THE
APPEARANCE OF FLYING ROAD BLOCKS IN AND
AROUND BAGHDAD AND TO REPORTS OF RESISTANCE TO

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BEING TAKEN FOR SUCH DANGEROUS DUTY. NEWTON.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 87ANKARA005939

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 05939 141528Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 /020 W
------------------256306 141548Z /43

O 141528Z MAY 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9421
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL IZMIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TKB Date: 5/23/96
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[redacted] ANKARA 05939

9203981

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, OTRA, CSCE, TU
SUBJECT: GOT REFUSES APPOINTMENTS TO HELSINKI WATCH
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JERI LABER

REF: STATE 142600

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARA. 5.

3. ON MAY 14, POLOFF TELEPHONED MFA TO SEEK APPOINTMENT TO PRESENT JERI LABER'S REQUESTS FOR CALLS ON GOT OFFICIALS. LATER IN THE DAY, POLCOUNS RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM UMUR APAYDIN, MFA OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR COE AFFAIRS, THE OFFICE WHICH HANDLES HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

4.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 87ANKARA005896

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ADP883
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PAGE 01 ANKARA 05896 01 OF 02 160459Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
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	M-01	SNP-01	FAIM-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/058 W

------------------042624 171556Z /40

R 140846Z MAY 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9393
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TKR Date: 8/23/96
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[redacted]SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 05896

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DTG)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PTER, ASEC, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH LEFT DIVIDES ON KURDISH ISSUE

[redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY: BEFORE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1980, KURDS IN TURKEY -- OF ALL POLITICAL STRIPES -- TENDED TO SUPPORT BULENT ECEVIT'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHP). THE CHP, INCREASINGLY LEFTIST, ALSO CAME CLOSEST TO RECOGNIZING THE EXISTENCE OF A KURDISH ETHNIC MINORITY. IN THE ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 6, 1983, THE LEFT WAS UNABLE TO HOLD ON TO KURDISH VOTES, WHICH WENT FOR THE MOST PART TO THE VICTORIOUS MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP). ELEMENTS ON THE LEFT ARE TRYING TO RECAPTURE THOSE VOTES, BUT THE ISSUE REMAINS

[redacted]

PAGE 02 ANKARA 05896 01 OF 02 160459Z

SENSITIVE. BOTH BULENT ECEVIT AND ERDAL INONU ARE STEERING CLEAR OF AN APPEAL TO KURDISH VOTES, BUT SOME MEMBERS OF INONU'S SHP ARE OUTSPOKEN ON THE ISSUE. END BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY.

3. BULENT ECEVIT, SHADOW LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT PARTY (DSP), SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF RECOVERING THE KURDISH VOTE. IN A STATEMENT SUMMARIZED IN DAILY "CUMHURIYET" OF MAY 12, ECEVIT

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DEFENDED THE VIEW THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ARE ECONOMIC, NOT ETHNIC. ANY MOVEMENT IN TURKEY BASED ON RACISM IS DOOMED TO FAILURE." HE HAS MADE THIS POINT BEFORE, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP), THE SECOND PARTY OF THE LEFT AND LED BY ERDAL INONU, APPEARS TO BE SPLIT OVER THE KURDISH ISSUE. SHP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER TURGUT ATALAY CALLED FOR KURDISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION AT A PUBLIC SHP MEETING IN SIIRT ON APRIL 21. IN REACTION, INONU ASKED THE PARTY'S DISCIPLINARY BOARD TO STRIP ATALAY OF HIS POST. SEVERAL DSP POLITICIANS

PREDICTED THE SHP WOULD "BREAK UP" OVER THE ISSUE.

5. AN EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER CALLED ON SHP DEPUTY FOR MARDIN KENAN NEHROZOGLU, A KURD FROM MIDYAT, ON MAY 13. NEHROZOGLU HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN IN HIS DENUNCIATION OF ARMY AND POLICE TREATMENT OF VILLAGERS IN THE SOUTHEAST. MOST RECENTLY HE CHARGED THE ARMY WITH BEATING UP ALL THE MEN AND STRIP-SEARCHING ALL THE WOMEN IN A VILLAGE NEAR

[redacted]

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MIDYAT SUSPECTED OF HARBORING TERRORISTS.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 87ANKARA005896

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ADP317 [redacted]

PAGE 01 ANKARA 05896 02 OF 02 140851Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
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	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INM-07	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02
	M-01	SNP-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/057 W	

------------------023263 161615Z /40

R 210846Z MAY 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9394
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 05896

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PTER, ASEC, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH LEFT DIVIDES ON KURDISH ISSUE

9. BAGHDAD: MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

STRAUSZ-HUPE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88STOCKH007631

ADP483
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PAGE 01 STOCKH 07631 171541Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
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	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	RP-10	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02
	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/070 W	

------------------115730 180107Z /60

R 171542Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2410
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07631

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PARM, IZ, SW
SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADER VISITS SWEDEN

1. JALAL TALABANI, LEADER OF THE KURDISH PATRIOTIC UNION (PUK), HAS VISITED SWEDEN IN THE COURSE OF HIS TRAVELS TO SEVERAL WESTERN COUNTRIES. HE TOLD THE SWEDISH PRESS THAT SOME 5,000 KURDISH VILLAGES IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAVE BEEN DEMOLISHED. SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ HAS BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS ITS ENTIRE ARMED FORCES AGAINST THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THE KURDS HAVE CREATED LARGE "LIBERATED AREAS," TALABANI TOLD REPORTERS. IRAQI TANKS TRIED TO ATTACK THESE AREAS IN LATE AUGUST, BUT WHEN THEY FAILED DUE TO KURDISH GUERRILLA RESISTANCE, THE AIR FORCE WAS CALLED IN AND CHEMICAL GAS BOMBS WERE DROPPED OVER THE AREA. THE MOST RECENT MAJOR GAS BOMB ATTACK TOOK PLACE ON OCTOBER 5, NEAR THE TOWN OF TUZ BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND
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PAGE 02 STOCKH 07631 171541Z

KIRKUK, TALABANI SAID.

2. TALABANI ALSO TOLD THE PRESS THAT WHEN 200,000 KURDS WALKED ACROSS THE BORDER INTO TURKEY, MANY RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS REACTED AND TRIED TO SEND HELP. TURKEY REQUESTED 300 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE REFUGEES, BUT THE TURKS REFUSED TO ALLOW RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO COME TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS. "TURKEY SHOWS TWO FACES," TALABANI SAID. "THEY WANT TO APPEAR AS HUMANITARIANS TO THE

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WESTERN WORLD BY ACCEPTING THE KURDISH REFUGEES, BUT THEY MADE SURE NO OBSERVERS COULD MEET THE VICTIMS OF THE GAS BOMBS. IN THIS WAY TURKEY COULD HELP IRAQ."
TALABANI, WHO SAID HE KEEPS HIMSELF UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS ON HIS HOME FRONT VIA TELEPHONE CONTACTS IN IRAN, INFORMED THE SWEDISH PRESS THAT IRAN ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 15 THAT THE KURDISH REFUGEES IN TURKEY ARE WELCOME TO COME TO IRAN.

3. TALABANI DECLARED TO THE PPESS THAT THE KURDS HAVE MANY MORE FRIENDS TODAY THAN IN 1975. AMONG THESE NEWLY WON FRIENDS, TALABANI MENTIONED THE U.S., WHICH HAD CONDEMNED IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE MORE STRONGLY THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. TALABANI MADE SPECIFIC MENTION OF AN AMERICAN SENATE REPORT ABOUT KURDISH REFUGEES IN TURKEY WHICH HE SAID MADE IT CLEAR "WITHOUT A DOUBT" THAT THEY WERE VICTIMS OF IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE. NEWELL

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PAGE 01 ADANA 00618 141259Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
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	PRS-01	DS-01	SCT-02	P-02	T-01	/058 W	

------------------340074 141315Z /41

P 141050Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL ADANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4549
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MR Cases Only:
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9203981

[redacted] ADANA 0618

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, PTER, KPRP, TU
SUBJECT: EX-DIYARBAKIR MAYOR SENTENCED TO PRISON

1. (U) THIS IS A SPOT REPORT SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MISSION REPORTING PLAN.

2. (U) SUMMARY: THE DIYARBAKIR MARTIAL LAW COURT OCTOBER 12 CONCLUDED ITS SERIES OF TRIALS, ACQUITTED 23 DEFENDANTS, AND SENTENCED 32 TO PRISON TERMS. THE LENGTHY SENTENCE FOR THE FORMER MAYOR OF DIYARBAKIR IS LIKELY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) THE DIYARBAKIR MARTIAL LAW COURT ON OCTOBER 12 SENTENCED FORMER DIYARBAKIR MAYOR MEHDI ZANA TO 22 AND A HALF YEARS IN PRISON AS IT DISPOSED OF ITS LAST MAJOR CASE INVOLVING PRE-1980 ACTIVITIES. ZANA WAS SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS FOR HIS ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP IN OZGURLUK YOLU (FREEDOM PATH), A PRE-1980 ILLEGAL LEFTIST AND KURDISH SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION WITH A HISTORY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. HE RECEIVED AN ADDITIONAL 7.5 YEARS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN SMUGGLING ARMS. OF THE

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PAGE 02 ADANA 00618 141259Z

OTHER 54 DEFENDANTS, 23 WERE ACQUITTED, 27 RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES OF BETWEEN 7 AND 12 YEARS, AND 4, LIKE ZANA, WERE GIVEN LENGTHIER TERMS. (FYI: MOST OF THE DEFENDANTS, INCLUDING ZANA, WILL GET CREDIT FOR 8 YEARS ALREADY SERVED IN PRISON. END FYI.)

4. (U) ZANA THRUST HIMSELF ONCE AGAIN INTO THE PUBLIC EYE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. AT THAT TIME, DURING HIS TRIAL, HE ATTEMPTED SEVERAL TIMES TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN KURDISH. THE

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COURT REFUSED TO PERMIT THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE COULD SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND TURKISH. AFTER ZANA CONTINUED TO USE KURDISH, THE JUDGE EXPELLED HIM FROM THE COURTROOM. ZANA WAS NOT PRESENT IN THE COURT TO HEAR THE SENTENCE; HE HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE ESKISEHIR PRISON SOME MONTHS AGO.

5. (C) COMMENT: ZANA HAS LONG BEEN A THORN IN THE SIDE OF THE GOT. ELECTED DIYARBAKIR'S MAYOR IN THE LATE 1970'S AS AN INDEPENDENT AND REMOVED BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN 1980, HE STANDS AS A STRIDENT SYMBOL OF KURDISH NATIONALISM. HE WAS REPORTEDLY ACTIVE AMONG INMATES IN THE DIYARBAKIR MILITARY PRISON WHO SUCCESSFULLY AGITATED FOR THE RIGHT TO USE KURDISH IN CONVERSING WITH THEIR FAMILIES, VISITORS, AND AMONG THEMSELVES. HIS WIFE, LEYLA ZANA, WHO IS CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE A SHOO-IN FOR THE DIYARBAKIR MAYORALTY IN 1989 LOCAL ELECTIONS, WAS ALSO ACTIVE IN THESE EFFORTS AND WORKED WITH THE INMATES' FAMILIES. (SEE ADANA 97, 115, AND 146 AND ANKARA 2391.) LEYLA ZANA'S CAMPAIGN WILL NO DOUBT FOCUS FURTHER ATTENTION ON HER HUSBAND AND OTHERS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES FOR POLITICALLY-RELATED CRIMES OR SEPARATIST ACTIVITY. THE CONCLUSION OF THIS CASE MARKS THE END OF THE WORK OF THE DIYARBAKIR MARTIAL LAW COURT. HOWEVER, STATE SECURITY COURTS IN MALATYA AND DIYARBAKIR CONTINUE HOLDING TRIALS FOR SIMILAR

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ACTIONS OCCURRING AFTER 1980, AND THIS WILL ALSO PROVIDE AMMUNITION IN WHAT COULD BE AN EMOTION-CHARGED CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL RECEIVE MUCH PUBLICITY IN TURKEY AND ABROAD.
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88ANKARA013277

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 13277 121034Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	NEA-06
	NSAE-00	PA-01	INRE-00	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	PRS-01
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P 120933Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0668

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TKR Date 5/27/92
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FOIA Exemptions
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MR Cases Only:
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TS authority
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[redacted] ANKARA 13277

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PREF, OPRC, TU, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI KURDS: DERWINSKI REMARKS

REF: STATE 330436

TURKISH MFA, AT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAS LEVEL, CALLED IN POLCOUNSELOR OCTOBER 12 TO "EXPRESS CONCERN" OVER REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO UNDER SECRETARY DERWINSKI BY THE TURKISH PRESS WITH REGARD TO THE IRAQI KURD ISSUE. POLCOUNSELOR ASSURED MFA THAT THE TURKISH PRESS HAD SENSATIONALIZED THE UNDER SECRETARY'S COMMENTS. DRAWING ON REFTEL, POLCOUNSELOR SAID MR. DERWINSKI'S REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE READ AS CONTAINING EVEN A HINT OF U.S. ENDORSEMENT FOR A SEPARATE KURDISH POLITICAL ENTITY. POLCOUNSELOR POINTED OUT THIS HAS BEEN A LONG-TERM U.S. POLICY WHICH HAS NOT, AND WILL NOT, CHANGE.

STRAUSZ-HUPE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88STATE 318035

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PAGE 01 STATE 318035
ORIGIN RP-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 OIC-02 IO-19 NEA-06 HA-09
/046 R

DRAFTED BY: RP/ENA:JCHAVCHAVADZE:LMG
APPROVED BY: RP/IA:WGARLAND, ACTING
RP/ENA:RJREDMOND EUR/SE:CHUGGINS
IO/UNP:KLOKEN (INFO) HA/HRR:DRABADAN (INFO)
NEA/NGA:PREMLER (INFO)
------------------115062 282247Z /72

O P 282236Z SEP 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY

[redacted] STATE 318035

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date 8/23/96
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9203981

E.O. 12365: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, TU, IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES IN TURKEY-ROLE OF UNHCR

REF: (A) GENEVA 10083, (B) ANKARA 12507, (C) ANKARA 12098

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE DEPARTMENT AND INFO ADDRESSEES FINDINGS OF UNHCR TEAM WHICH RECENTLY VISITED TURKEY (REF A).

3. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS WHETHER OR NOT THE GOT HAS REQUESTED UNHCR ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE INFLUX OF THE IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES. (RP/ENA: 0036T)
WHITEHEAD

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88BAGHDA005241

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GE 01 BAGHDA 05241 250846Z
TION HA-09

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250845Z SEP 88
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8268
EMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
FO USMISSION GENEVA
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[redacted] BAGHDAD 05241

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TTCB Date 8/23/96
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UNSC, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: ICRC ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY

REFS: (A) GENEVA 10574, (B) STATE 310371,
(C) BAGHDAD 5172

1. [redacted]- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR IS MEETING ICRC CHIEF IN BAGHDAD, ANDREAS KUHN, AT HIS REQUEST, TOMORROW AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 26. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE IN ADVANCE THE LATEST READOUT ON TURKISH-ICRC ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF KURDISH REFUGEES BACK TO IRAQ. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANKARA'S REPORTING TO DATE ON THIS SUBJECT BUT WE GATHER FROM REF B THAT THE TURKS ARE ACTIVELY PRESSING THE ICRC TO HELP OUT IN GETTING THE REFUGEES TO GO BACK TO IRAQ (AS WE ALSO SUSPECTED REF C). IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW MORE SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE TURKS THINK THEY CAN GET THE ICRC TO DO AND HOW FAR THEY THINK THE ICRC WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH THE IRAQIS AND

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WITH THE KURDS.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88ANKARA012124

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 12124 210754Z
ACTION SCT-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
HA-09 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 DS-01
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------------------000365 210841Z /10

R 210754Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0258
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TLCS Date 8/28/92
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[redacted] ANKARA 12124

9203981

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, GE, TU
SUBJECT: GERMANS AND PKK

REF: (A) BONN 31258 (B) ANKARA 11311

1. POST THANKS EMBASSY BONN FOR ITS HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION IN REF A. IT PROVIDES USEFUL DETAILS OF PKK ACTIVITIES IN THE FRG WHICH HELP US IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING. WE CAN ALWAYS USE MORE SUCH INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF TURKISH AND KURDISH ACTIVISTS IN THE FRG AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88STATE 289901

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PAGE 01 STATE 289901
ORIGIN NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
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APPROVED BY: NEA/NGA:LEPOPE
IO/UNP:BSCHRAGE RF/RAP:JBUDEIT
IO/SR:FARIGGS
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P 031040Z SEP 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TTCB Date 8/23/96
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[redacted] STATE 289901

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, UNHCR
SUBJECT: DETENTION CAMPS FOR KURDISH POPULATION

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION EMBASSY CAN PROVIDE FROM KNOWLEDGE ON HAND REGARDING THE CAMPS/VILLAGES TO WHICH KURDS ARE BEING RELOCATED, AS WELL AS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD GRANT UNHCR OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODY ACCESS TO THE CAMPS IF IT WERE ASKED TO DO SO. WHITEHEAD

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 11311 020724Z
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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
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PRS-01 /041 W
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O 020723Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9923
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//

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9203981

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, GE, TU
SUBJECT: HAS THE FRG CHANGED ITS VIEW OF THE PKK?

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. A COLUMNIST IN THE SEPTEMBER 1 EDITION OF "TERCUMAN" CLAIMS THAT FRG AUTHORITIES NOW CONSIDER THE KURDISH WORKERS PARTY (PKK) TO BE A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. EARLIER, HE NOTES, THEY HAD JUDGED THE ORGANIZATION FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE AND OFFERED PKK MEMBERS POLITICAL ASYLUM.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION EMBASSY BONN COULD DEVELOP ON CURRENT FRG ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PKK. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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CONCEPTS= REFUGEE, KURDS, PRESS CONFERENCE, POLICY, SANCTION, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

TAGS= PHUM, PREL, TU, IR

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 10378 120940Z
ACTION RP-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 H-01 MSC-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /081 W
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R 120939Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9519
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USMISSION USNATO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//

[redacted] ANKARA 10378

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, TU, IR
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL REFUGEE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY

[redacted] ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSY WISHES TO ALERT DEPARTMENT TO A POTENTIAL KURDISH REFUGEE PROBLEM WHICH COULD DEVELOP IN TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN REGION AS THE IRAQI MILITARY TURNS ITS ATTENTION FROM THE IRANIAN FRONT TO THE NORTH. NEWSPAPERS ALREADY ARE REPORTING THAT SMALL GROUPS OF KURDS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER TO ESCAPE RECENT

[redacted]

ESCALATION OF FIGHTING IN THE AREA.

3. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN INAL BATU AT HIS WEEKLY PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 10. BATU IMPLIED THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO OFFER TEMPORARY SANCTUARY FOR LIMITED NUMBERS OF "PESHMERGES," BUT WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANY LONG TERM ARRANGEMENT. BATU TOLD REPORTERS "WE NEVER RECEIVED SUCH A DEMAND." THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE "HOT PURSUIT" AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ REMAINS IN FORCE, BUT HE SAID IRAQ HAD NOT AVAILED ITSELF OF THIS RIGHT SINCE ACCEPTING THE CEASE FIRE WITH IRAN.

4. COMMENT: AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS LITTLE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CAN DO TO CONTROL CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST. TRIBES SPREAD ACROSS TURKISH, IRAQI, AND IRANIAN TERRITORY, AND LOCAL INHABITANTS HISTORICALLY HAVE TENDED TO IGNORE BORDER FORMALITIES. SO LONG AS MOVEMENT IS LIMITED, THIS SHOULD POSE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTY FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

5. IF THERE IS A MAJOR MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, HOWEVER, TURKISH CONCERN IS LIKELY TO BE MAGNIFIED. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CONFRONTING SIGNIFICANT SEPARATIST ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHEAST AND WOULD RESIST ANY MEANINGFUL ADDITION TO ITS DOMESTIC KURDISH POPULATION. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, TURKEY HAS LONG INSISTED THAT ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES UNDER EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS DOES NOT EXTEND TO THOSE EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. END COMMENT.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88ANKARA003291

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03291 01 OF 03 091434Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-04 NSAE-00
HA-09 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 SIL-01 INRE-00 SP-02
PRS-01 SDEL-03 /043 W
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O 091431Z MAR 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6104
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
USDOC WASHDC
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//IN//
TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
628MAS INCIRLIK TU
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
USNMR SHAPE BE//P10//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 03291

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03291 01 OF 03 091434Z

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, NATO, ELAB, PLO, EEC, US, PK, GR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 9, 1988
....
1. U.S.

DERWINSKI DEFENDS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IN "TERCUMAN" INTERVIEW: IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH "TERCUMAN"...

U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EDWARD DERWINSKI SAID THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT PREPARED BY RICHARD SCHIFTER WAS BASED ON STATE DEPARTMENT STUDIES. ACCORDING TO THE DAILY, DERWINSKI REGARDS PRESIDENT KENAN EVREN'S U.S. VISIT AS AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT, AND ADDS THAT PM TURGUT OZAL SHOWED "POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY" BY MEETING WITH HIS GREEK COUNTERPART ANDREAS PAPANDREOU. DERWINSKI REPORTEDLY AGREES WITH TURKISH VIEWS CONCERNING CYPRUS, AND SAID A SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN "TRNC" PRESIDENT RAUF DENKTASH AND HIS GREEK CYPRIOT COUNTERPART GEORGE VASSILIOU.

TURKISH GUARANTEE NOT TO SELL "INVERTER" TO PAKISTAN: "GUNES" RELIES ON TURKISH DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN WASHINGTON WHEN REPORTING THAT TURKEY ASSURED THE U.S. IT WOULD NOT SELL "INVERTER" COMPUTER COMPONENTS THAT COULD BE USED IN PRODUCING NUCLEAR BOMBS TO PAKISTAN.

VURALHAN: NATO ALLIES AID PACKAGE: DEFENSE MINISTER ERCAN VURALHAN TOLD "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" THAT, SINCE U.S. MILITARY AID TO TURKEY WAS BEING REDUCED, NATO ALLIES SHOULD ASSIST ANKARA IN MODERNIZING ITS ARMED FORCES. HE SAID THAT TURKEY HAD SOLICITED THIS ALLIED SUPPORT DURING NUMEROUS BILATERAL CONTACTS AT THE NATO

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SUMMIT EARLIER THIS MONTH. VURALHAN ALSO SAID TURKEY WANTS TO DEVELOP ITS OWN DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN ORDER TO EXPORT MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO OTHER NATIONS. VURALHAN ADDED THE FMS DEBT REPAYMENT PROGRAM NOW BEING WORKED OUT WOULD EASE TURKEY'S U.S. DEBT BURDEN.

IKLE: EUROPE'S DEFENSE BEGINS IN ANATOLIA: "CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT FORMER U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY FRED IKLE SAID TURKEY HAD A VITAL ROLE IN DEFENDING WESTERN EUROPE, AS EUROPE'S LINE OF DEFENSE BEGINS IN EASTERN ANATOLIA.

....

2. EC

TURKEY EXPECTS THATCHER SUPPORT FOR EC MEMBERSHIP: "CUMHURIYET" WRITES THAT FOLLOWING AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY FRENCH PM JACQUES CHIRAC IN WHICH HE SAID FRANCE WILL NOT OPPOSE TURKEY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC, ANKARA NOW EXPECTS FULL SUPPORT FROM BRITISH PM MARGARET THATCHER. THATCHER IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT TURKEY IN APRIL. THE DAILY OPINES THAT IF THE FRG, FRANCE, OR THE U.K. OPENLY SUPPORTS TURKEY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP, THE REMAINING TWO WOULD GIVE THEIR SUPPORT SO AS NOT TO ENDANGER THEIR STATUS IN TURKISH MARKETS.

3. GREECE

OZAL-PAPANDREOU "SECRET AGREEMENTS" AT BRUSSELS:
"CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT TURKISH PM OZAL AND GREEK PM

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PRS-01 SDEL-03 /043 W
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.. AMEMBASSY ANKARA
.. SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6105
..FO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
..CONSUL ADANA
..EMBASSY ATHENS
..CONSUL ISTANBUL
..CONSUL IZMIR
..EMBASSY NICOSIA
..MISSION USNATO
..EMBASSY ISLAMABAD
..DOC WASHDC
..16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
..DELMC BRUSSELS BE
..TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//IN//
..SLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
..RSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
..OSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
..DOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
..9MAS INCIRLIK TU
..USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
..NMR SHAPE BE//P10//
..NCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
..CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
..DOCO6ATAF IZMIR TU
..DOCOLSE IZMIR TU

..CLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 03291

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..GE 02 ANKARA 03291 02 OF 03 091434Z

..O. 12356: N/A
..GS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, NATO, ELAB, PLO, EEC, US,
.., GR, IZ, TU
..BJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 9, 1988

..PANDREOU WILL RETRACT VETOES LEVIED AGAINST EACH OTHER
.. NATO COUNCILS, AND ATHENS WILL ACCORD ADDITIONAL
..GHTS TO THE TURKISH ETHNIC MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE.

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OZAL, PAPANDREOU NOMINATED FOR NOBEL PEACE PRIZE: ALL DAILIES REPORT THAT PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, PROF. KLAUSS SCHWAB, PROPOSED THAT PM OZAL AND PM PAPANDREOU BE NOMINATED FOR THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR THEIR GREAT EFFORT AND SINCERE DESIRE TO SOLVE EXISTING PROBLEMS.

....
4. IRAQ

TALABANI WARNS ANKARA ON KIRKUK AND MOSUL: "MILLIYET" CARRIES A FRONT PAGE INTERVIEW WITH THE LEADER OF THE "KURDISH PATRIOTIC UNION" ORGANIZATION, CELAL TALABANI, WHO WARNS TURKEY NOT TO INTERFERE MILITARILY IN KIRKUK AND MOSUL. TALABANI SAYS THAT TURKEY COULD SEND A MAXIMUM OF 15 DIVISIONS TO KIRKUK-MOSUL, WHICH COULD CREATE A NEW "VIETNAM" IN THE REGION RESULTING FROM IRAQI KURDS JOINING KURDS IN TURKEY.

....
5. PLO

YILMAZ: TIME IS NO ONE'S ALLY IN MIDDLE EAST: "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" REPORTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER YILMAZ, WHILE
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EXPRESSING UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, WARNED THAT TIME IS WORKING AGAINST ALL INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. "CUMHURIYET" WRITES THAT PLO NUMBER TWO MAN KHADDOUMI SAID TURKEY CAN CHANGE THE BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND PRAISED PM OZAL FOR BELIEVING IN THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

....
6. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

PARLIAMENT REJECTS DEBATE ON "MIT REPORT": ALL DAILIES REPORT THAT A MOTION BY THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) ASKING FOR A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY ON THE "MIT REPORT" THAT ALLEGEDLY LINKED FORMER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF URUG WITH UNDERGROUND LEADERS WAS REJECTED AT THE PARLIAMENT BY A BLOCK OF MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) VOTES.

TURK-IS PLANS TO LAUNCH A SERIES OF BOYCOTTS: ACCORDING TO "CUMHURIYET," TURKISH LABOR UNIONS CONFEDERATION (TURK-IS) WILL LAUNCH A SERIES OF LUNCH BOYCOTTS THROUGHOUT TURKEY AND RALLIES IN MAJOR CITIES TO ASCERTAIN WORKERS' OPINIONS. SENIOR TURK-IS EXECUTIVES BLASTED LABOR MINISTER IMREN AYKUT FOR HER REMARKS AGAINST TURK-IS INITIATIVES. "HURRIYET" REPORTS THAT LABOR UNION CHIEFS IN BALIKESIR HAD GONE ON A HUNGER

STRIKE TO PROTEST THE COST OF LIVING AND ENDLESS PRICE
INCREASES.

DEMIREL: OZAL INVITES COMMUNISM THROUGH PRICE
INCREASES: "MILLIYET" REPORTS THAT DYP LEADER SULEYMAN
DEMIREL HARSHLY CRITICIZED RECENT PRICE INCERASES AND
HIGH INFLATION RATES, AND ACCUSED THE OZAL GOVERNMENT OF
INVITING COMMUNISM AND DISTURBING THE INTERNAL PEACE IN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88ANKARA003291

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03291 03 OF 03 091435Z
ACTION EUR-00

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	PRS-01	SDEL-03	/043 W				

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O 091431Z MAR 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6106
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 ANKARA 03291

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03291 03 OF 03 091435Z

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, NATO, ELAB, PLO, EEC, US, PK, GR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 9, 1988

THE COUNTRY.

VURALHAN CRITICIZED AT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE:
"HURRIYET" REPORTS THAT SHP MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT'S...

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BUDGET COMMITTEE CRITICIZED DEFMIN VURALHAN, AND
EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT VURALHAN WOULD NOT CONTINUE HIS
"IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS" DURING HIS TERM IN OFFICE.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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CONGRESSMAN BEILENSON ALSO INTERESTED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS INQUIRY - SHP MEMBERS ARRESTED IN BATMAN AND SIIRT

REF: A) STATE 50331 NOTAL; B) ANKARA 1971

PAGE 02 RUFTWPA6120 UNCLAS ADANA 0135
1. SUMMARY: THE SHP MEMBERS ARRESTED IN SIIRT AND BATMAN, NOW THE SUBJECT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL URGENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, WERE APPARENTLY ARRESTED BECAUSE OF ALLEGED LINKS TO THE TERRORIST PKK ORGANIZATION AND WERE NOT REPEAT NOT ARRESTED FOR ANY SHP-RELATED ACTIVITIES. SEVERAL OF THE DETAINEES HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN RELEASED. SIIRT GOVERNOR TEKER HAS DENIED CHARGES OF TORTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN AN EFFORT TO LEARN MORE ABOUT A SERIES OF RECENT ARRESTS OR
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PAGE 02 ADANA 00135 221627Z

DETENTIONS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) MEMBERS AND OTHERS IN SIIRT PROVINCE, CONSULATE ADANA ON FEBRUARY 19 CONTACTED SHP CHAIRMAN MAHFUZ ERTEN IN SIIRT REGARDING THE PERSONS LISTED IN THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) "URGENT ACTION" CIRCULAR AND ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT FURTHER ARRESTS OF SHP SUPPORTERS REPORTED IN THE FEBRUARY 17 "CUMHURIYET."

3. ERTEN CONFIRMED THE ARRESTS BUT ADDED THAT IT WAS ONLY COINCIDENTAL THAT SOME OF THE DETAINEES WERE SHP MEMBERS. HE DENIED THE

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ARRESTS WERE RELATED TO SHP POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND CLAIMED THAT THOSE ARRESTED WERE BEING QUESTIONED BY POLICE FOR POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS WITH AND SUPPORT OF THE KURDISH WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), AN ILLEGAL

PAGE 03 RUFTWPA6120 UNCLAS ADANA 0135

MARXIST-LENINIST GROUP CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. (THE PKK HAS CARRIED OUT NUMEROUS ATTACKS AGAINST TURKISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, SECURITY FORCES AND VILLAGERS IN THE SOUTHEAST SINCE 1984.) ERTEN CLAIMED THAT A RECENTLY ARRESTED PKK MEMBER HAD SUPPLIED THE NAMES OF SEVERAL PERSONS TO SECURITY FORCES AND THAT POLICE HAD ARRESTED THESE INDIVIDUALS AND WERE QUESTIONING THEM. ERTEN NOTED THAT NOT ALL OF THOSE ARRESTED OR DETAINED WERE MEMBERS OF THE SHP; SOME MEMBERS OF THE RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY WERE REPORTEDLY UNDER SUSPICION, AS WELL. SEVERAL OF THE DETAINEES HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AND ERTEN EXPECTS THAT OTHERS WILL BE RELEASED SHORTLY.

4. THE FEBRUARY 22 "CUMHURIYET" CARRIED A SHORT STORY QUOTING ERTEN IN WHICH HE AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE RECENT ARRESTS ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE SHP. ERTEN INDICATED THAT A CONSULATE REPRESENTATIVE HAD CONTACTED HIM ABOUT THE SITUATION AND THAT AN AI OFFICIAL IN LONDON HAD PLACED CALLS TO THE RELATIVES OF THE PRIS-

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ONERS. PRESS TREATMENT WAS FACTUAL AND INNOCUOUS.

5. SIIRT GOVERNOR SELAMI TEKER WAS ALSO QUOTED IN THE FEBRUARY 22 "CUMHURIYET" AS SAYING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM ABROAD CONDEMNING THE ARRESTS. TEKER DECLARED THAT THE DETAINEES HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN TORTURED AND CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE IN CUSTODY FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES. AFTER THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETED, HE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE COURTS FOR PROSECUTION (IF THERE IS SUBSTANCE TO THE CHARGES).

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS COVERS SCHIFTER, MFA STATEMENTS
ON HR REPORT

REF: (A) ANKARA 1972 (B) STATE 38621

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: SECOND DAY PRESS COVERAGE OF THE 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON TURKEY VARIED IN PROMINENCE AND SCOPE BUT HIGHLIGHTED AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S PRESS

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CONFERENCE AND MFA'S REACTION TO THE REPORT. THE MASS-CIRCULATION AND NATIONALIST TABLOIDS IN PARTICULAR POUNCED ON THE PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE REPORTED DESCRIPTION OF KURDS AS A "NATIONAL MINORITY." ALTHOUGH HEADLINES AND LEAD-INS WERE UNQUESTIONABLY CRITICAL, THE BODY OF PRESS ARTICLES COMPRISED BASICALLY STRAIGHT REPORTING. EDITORIAL ASSAULTS ARE LIKELY YET TO COME. END SUMMARY.

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3. PRESS REPORTING TWO DAYS AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON TURKEY VARIED FROM PAPER TO PAPER IN THE PROMINENCE AND SCOPE OF COVERAGE. WHILE SEVERAL SMALLER TABLOIDS OMITTED IT AND LEFT-OF-CENTER "CUMHURIYET" BURIED A SMALL PIECE ON THE DCM'S MEETING AT THE MFA, THE MASS-CIRCULATION "HURRIYET" AND RIGHT-WING "TERCUMAN" SPLASHED ACROSS THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINES DECRYING U.S. "IMPERTINENCE/INSOLENCE" (TURKISH: KUHSTAHLIK) ON THE KURDISH ISSUE.

4. THE REPORT'S TREATMENT OF TORTURE RECEIVED SCANT ATTENTION FEB. 12. MOST COVERAGE FOCUSED ON AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND MFA SPOKESMAN INAL BATU'S SHARP BLAST AT THE REPORT (SEE PARA 5). "HURRIYET" WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SEDAT ERGIN, COMMENTING ON THE PRESS CONFERENCE, OPINED THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND IMPORTANT EVENT IN RECENT STATE DEPARTMENT TREATMENT OF THE KURDISH ISSUE. THE FIRST, ACCORDING TO ERGIN, WAS A DECEMBER REPLY TO A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY TO THE EFFECT THAT WITH RESPECT TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, THE KURDS SHOULD BENEFIT FROM THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ERGIN CONTINUED THAT, WITH THE 1987 REPORT AND PRESS CONFERENCE, THE USG HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME DESCRIBED THE

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KURDS AS A "NATIONAL MINORITY" DESERVING OF EQUAL TREAMENT UNDER THE LAUSANNE TREATY.

5. JUXTAPOSED AGAINST EXCERPTS OF THE SCHIFTER PRESS CONFERENCE, PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE HAD BEEN CALLED IN ON FEBRUARY 9 TO RECEIVE TURKISH VIEWS OF THE REPORT (REF A). THE PRESS REPORTS THAT BATU TOLD THE CHARGE HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE REPORT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE PAPERS ALSO CARRIED BATU'S PRESS STATEMENT, IN WHICH HE SAID THAT, AS IN PAST YEARS, THE REPORT HAD FOCUSED ON MINORITY ISSUES IN A PREJUDICED MANNER "WHICH HAD NO CONNECTION WITH REALITY... THE FIRM, DETERMINED POSITION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH ONLY A SHORT WHILE AGO SIGNED THE AGREEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST TORTURE, WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT, IS APPARENT. EVERYONE IS AWARE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES EXERCISED IN THE FORMATION OF THE TURKSH REPUBLIC AND THE STRIDES WHICH THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY HAS MADE IN THE IMPLANTATION OF DEMOCRACY IN OUR COUNTRY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL UNITY AND INTEGRITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THE FACTORS WHICH UNDERLIE THE PREPARATION OF A REPORT SUCH AS THIS, WHICH OVERLOOKS THESE POINTS, ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF A FRIENDLY AND ALLIED NATION. IT IS A

FACT THAT THIS REPORT, FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, HAS CREATED DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN EVERY SEGMENT OF TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION."

6. COMMENT: WHILE THE HEADLINES WERE CLEARLY SENSATIONALIST AND THE LEAD-INS CRITICAL OF THE REPORT AND THE SCHIFTER PRESS CONFERENCE, THE BODY OF ARTICLES

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS COVERS SCHIFTER, MFA STATEMENTS

IS COMPRISED BASICALLY OF FACTUAL REPORTAGE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TURKISH PRESS' MORE PROMINENT EDITORIAL WRITERS ARE STILL DIGESTING THE REPORT AND GOT REACTIONS, AND THAT A BARRAGE OF NEGATIVE COMMENTARY IS PROBABLY YET TO COME. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 01934 01 OF 03 101457Z

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, SCOM, TU, GR, LY

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SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: FEBRUARY 10, 1988

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1. U.S.

PENTAGON OFFICIAL, SENATORS VISIT TURKEY: "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED ASSTSECDEF RONALD LEHMAN WILL VISIT ANKARA FEB. 10. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL LEADING SENATORS, INCLUDING ROBERT BYRD, SAM NUNN AND CLAIBORNE PELL WILL ARRIVE IN ANKARA FEB. 11 TO "FEEL THE PULSE" IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE INF TREATY. THE REPORT QUOTED SENATOR NUNN IN LONDON AS REMARKING THAT TURKEY IS LOCATED ON THE FRONT LINE, A FACT WHICH IS OCCASIONALLY FORGOTTEN.

U.S. TO GIVE TURKEY TWO F-4 SQUADRONS: "HURRIYET" REPORTED SENATE APPROPRIATIONS FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF DIRECTOR RICHARD COLLINS HAD ANNOUNCED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL GRANT TWO F-4 SQUADRONS TO TURKEY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE "SOUTHERN REGION AMENDMENT."

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2. GREECE

POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE WITH GREECE: "TERCUMAN" REPORTED MFA UNDERSECRETARY NUZHET KANDEMIR'S VISIT TO ATHENS, COMMENTING THAT GREEK PM PAPANDREOU HAD REACTED FAVORABLY TO PM OZAL'S MESSAGE URGING THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF A
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FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. MEANWHILE "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED PAPANDREOU EMPHASIZED TO HIS PARTY GROUP MEETING THAT GREECE IS OBLIGED (SIC) TO APPROVE TURKEY'S APPLICATION FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. HE OPINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REAL OBSTACLE TO TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP WOULD COME FROM THE FRG.

EVREN SUSPENDS CYPRUS VISIT: QUOTING A HIGH LEVEL TURKISH OFFICIAL, "MILLIYET" REPORTED

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PRESIDENT EVREN HAD POSTPONED A SCHEDULED VISIT TO CYPRUS IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE ESTABLISHED AT DAVOS.

TURCO-GREEK FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION: "HURRIYET" REPORTED A TURKISH GOVERNMENT DECREE OF FEB. 9 AUTHORIZED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TURKISH-GREEK FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION.

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3. LIBYA

LIBYA APPOINTS AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY: "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" REPORTED LIBYA HAS UPGRADED ITS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN TURKEY TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AND APPOINTED ABDULHAMIT AL-ATRASH AS AMBASSADOR.

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4. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 01934

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, SCOM, TU, GR, LY
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: FEBRUARY 10, 1988

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NUMBER OF STATE MINISTERS INCREASED: ALL DAILIES REPORTED PARLIAMENT HAD APPROVED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF STATE MINISTERS FROM TEN TO FIFTEEN.

REACTION TO MIT REPORT ON GENERAL URUG: ALL DAILIES REPORTED THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) HAD RESPONDED SHARPLY TO ALLEGATIONS OF A MIT (TURKISH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION) REPORT LINKING FORMER TGS CHIEF NECDET URUG TO THE TURKISH UNDERGROUND. THE STATEMENT SAID THE ALLEGATIONS ARE OUT OF LINE AND AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY AND THE NATION. MEANWHILE, URUG REPORTEDLY INSISTED THAT AN INVESTIGATION BE LAUNCHED INTO THE AFFAIR.

BOEING VS AIRBUS: ACCORDING TO "HURRIYET," TURKEY WILL MAINTAIN A BALANCE BETWEEN PURCHASES OF BOEING AND AIRBUS AIRCRAFT FOR ITS COMMERCIAL LINES.

OZAL ON ECONOMIC MEASURES: ALL PAPERS COVERED PM OZAL'S STATEMENT ADMITTING THE ANAP GOVERNMENT HAD MADE MISTAKES ON THE ECONOMY. SPEAKING AT A PARTY GROUP MEETING, OZAL REFERRED TO EXCESSIVELY RAPID DEVELOPMENT AND PERSISTENT TAX EVASION, AND HE MENTIONED THAT NEW BUDGETARY TARGETS WILL INCLUDE LOWER LEVELS OF INVESTMENT IN ALL AREAS EXCEPT HEALTH AND EDUCATION.
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LOCAL ELECTION REFORM DEBATED WITHIN ANAP: DAILIES ALSO REPORTED ANAP HAD SUBMITTED A DRAFT BILL MANDATING THAT LOCAL ELECTIONS BE HELD IN OCTOBER EVERY FIVE YEARS. THE DRAFT BILL ALSO MANDATES THAT, IN TURKEY'S SEVERAL "METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES," THE PARTY WINNING THE METROPOLITAN MAYORALTY FILL ALL THE DISTRICT MAYORAL POSTS AS WELL.

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5. HUMAN RIGHTS

2000 PRISONERS ON HUNGER STRIKE: ACCORDING TO A REPORT IN "CUMHURIYET," 2000 PRISONERS IN THE DIYARBAKIR MILITARY PRISON HAVE LAUNCHED A HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST PRISON CONDITIONS AND THE BAN ON SPEAKING KURDISH WITH VISITING RELATIVES.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM PROPOSED: "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" REPORTED ANAP HAS SUBMITTED A DRAFT BILL TO PARLIAMENT THAT WOULD COMMUTE TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT DEATH SENTENCES NOT APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF SUBMISSION. THE BILL WOULD BE RETROACTIVE.

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6. INSURGENCY/TERRORISM:

FIVE PKK MILITANTS KILLED IN SIIRT: ALL DAILIES REPORTED A SECURITY OPERATION IN SIIRT PROVINCE RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF FIVE PKK MILITANTS.

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SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: FEBRUARY 10, 1988

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MEANWHILE, "MILLIYET" REPORTED A GROUP OF UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS BRIEFLY CLASHED WITH A MILITARY UNIT IN SAPANCA, NEAR ISTANBUL. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88STATE 033260

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR TURKEY

REF: STATE 5999

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL VERSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR TURKEY AS IT WAS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS. AS STATED REFTEL, THE REPORT REMAINS EMBARGOED UNTIL POST IS NOTIFIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE RELEASE DATE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: TURKEY IS A REPUBLIC WITH A MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND A STRONG PRESIDENCY. IN 1987 TURKEY COMPLETED A RETURN TO A FULL FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY. A REFERENDUM, PASSED ON SEPTEMBER 6, RESTORED ALL POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THOSE FORMER POLITICIANS WHO HAD

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BEEN BANNED FROM POLITICS BY A PROVISIONAL ARTICLE OF THE 1982 CONSTITUTION. ALL CHARGES AGAINST THE FORMERLY BANNED POLITICIANS FOR ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO THE REFERENDUM WERE DROPPED. PRIME MINISTER TURGUT OZAL CALLED FOR EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON NOVEMBER 29. THESE WERE THE FIRST NATIONAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1980 TO INCLUDE ALL PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADERS. PRIME

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MINISTER OZAL'S MOTHERLAND PARTY WON THE ELECTIONS FROM A

FIELD OF SEVEN LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES.

THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE IN THE CITIES AND THE JANDARMA IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER. ON JULY 19, THE GOVERNMENT LIFTED MARTIAL LAW IN THE LAST FIVE PROVINCES WHERE IT HAD BEEN IN EFFECT. AT PRESENT NINE PROVINCES (ISTANBUL, PLUS EIGHT PROVINCES IN THE SOUTHEAST WHERE THE GOVERNMENT FACES ARMED KURDISH GUERRILLAS) REMAIN UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH EMPOWERS THEIR CIVILIAN GOVERNORS TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE POWERS OF MARTIAL LAW COMMANDERS. IN ADDITION, A SPECIALLY EMPOWERED "SUPERGOVERNOR" OVERSEES AND COORDINATES THE ACTIONS OF ALL GOVERNORS IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY (INCLUDING THE 8 SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY).

SINCE 1980 TURKEY HAS BEEN MOVING FROM A CLOSED ECONOMY, DOMINATED BY THE STATE SECTOR, TO A FREE MARKET, EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH THE RATES OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT ARE STILL HIGH, THE ECONOMY UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCES. IN APRIL TURKEY APPLIED FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

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PROGRESS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUED IN 1987. THE END OF MARTIAL LAW IN JULY 1987, THE LIFTING OF POLITICAL BANS IN THE SEPTEMBER REFERENDUM, AND RECENT COURT RULINGS REMOVED MANY RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. IN JANUARY THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED, IN PRINCIPLE, THE RIGHT OF TURKISH CITIZENS TO APPEAL TO THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ALTHOUGH IT HAS YET TO APPROVE APPEALS TO THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT, WHOSE DECISIONS ARE BINDING. IN JANUARY 1988, TURKEY SIGNED THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SIGN A SIMILAR U.N. AGREEMENT. BY SIGNING, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ACCEPTED OFFICIAL OUTSIDE MONITORING OF PLACES OF DETENTION, A STEP HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS HAD LONG BEEN ADVOCATING. APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS PROVIDED AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS FOR BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES INTO CONFORMITY WITH GENERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN NORMS.

THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTED MANY PERSONS ACCUSED OF TORTURING DETAINEES. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR TORTURE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO IMPROVING PRISON CONDITIONS BY BUILDING NEW FACILITIES AND RESPONDING TO

PRISONER DEMANDS. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DATE, SERIOUS AND REPEATED INCIDENCES OF TORTURE CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED.

SOME MINORITY PROBLEMS PERSIST. THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL CITIZENS AS TURKS BUT, EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIAL STATUS GRANTED TO NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES BY THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE (1923), TURKEY DOES NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ETHNIC MINORITIES.

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TRADE UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS ARE PROHIBITED BY THE 1982 CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OR HAVING ORGANIC LINKS OR TIES WITH POLITICAL PARTIES.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL KILLING

THERE WERE NO ACCUSATIONS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES IN 193' A TERRORIST BOMBING IN ISTANBUL DURING OCTOBER KILLED ONE PERSON. ALSO, AN ATTACK ON A POLICE STATION IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE POLICEMAN.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE NO KNOWN DISAPPEARANCES CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

IN JANUARY 1988, TURKEY SIGNED THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SIGN A SIMILAR U.N. AGREEMENT. ACCESSION TO THE COE CONVENTION ALLOWS AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COE MEMBER STATES TO VISIT ALL PLACES OF DETENTION (POLICE STATIONS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONS, AND

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MENTAL HOSPITALS) AT ANY TIME, FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION OF THE VISIT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY. IN ANNOUNCING ITS

INTENTION TO SIGN THE COE CONVENTION, THE GOVERNMENT STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF TURKEY'S DESIRE TO ERADICATE TORTURE.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT "NO ONE SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR ILL-TREATMENT INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY," TURKISH POLITICIANS, THE TURKISH PRESS, AND OUTSIDE MONITORING GROUPS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT PRISONERS ARE SUBJECT TO MISTREATMENT AND TORTURE DURING INITIAL INTERROGATION OR IMPRISONMENT. IN ITS SEPTEMBER 1987 FILE ON TORTURE, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CHARGED THAT TORTURE WAS "WIDESPREAD" AND "SYSTEMATIC," CLAIMING THAT "ALMOST 4 YEARS AFTER A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN NOVEMBER 1983, NO EFFECTIVE MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT TORTURE." THE AMNESTY FILE INCLUDED ACCOUNTS OF TORTURE METHODS, CENTERS OF TORTURE, SEXUAL ABUSE, AND DEATH IN CUSTODY. HELSINKI WATCH IN ITS LATEST REPORT CONCLUDED THAT "TORTURE IS STILL PRACTICED IN TURKEY ON A LARGE SCALE." IT ALSO STATED, HOWEVER, THAT ABUSE OR TORTURE IN PRISONS, APART FROM THE INITIAL DETENTION PERIOD, HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DECREASED.

SOME ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE CONCERN TREATMENT THAT COULD BE DEFINED AS POLICE BRUTALITY, SUCH AS ROUGH HANDLING BY POLICE OFFICIALS AIMED AT INTIMIDATING A SUSPECT OR PRISONER OR RESULTING FROM PERSONAL ANIMOSITY. IN OTHER CASES THE MISTREATMENT APPEARS TO INVOLVE SYSTEMATIC TORTURE. NEARLY ALL OF THE NUMEROUS ASSERTIONS HAVE DERIVED FROM TREATMENT DURING INITIAL PERIODS OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION, BEFORE CHARGES WERE FILED AND BEFORE THE ACCUSED WAS ABLE TO CONTACT AN ATTORNEY. MANY CASES WERE DOCUMENTED BY MEDICAL EVIDENCE. GREATER FREEDOM OF THE PRESS HAS YIELDED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN TURKEY OF SUCH INSTANCES OF TORTURE, INCLUDING PHOTOS OF

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VICTIMS, DESCRIPTIONS OF METHODS, AND SKETCHES OF PREMISES WHERE TORTURE IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

EVEN BEFORE SIGNING THE COE CONVENTION, THE GOVERNMENT HAD CONDEMNED TORTURE AND EXPRESSED ITS DETERMINATION TO ERADICATE IT BY PROMPT AND SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS. FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, THE NEWLY APPOINTED DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SECURITY, WHO SERVES AS HEAD OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE, FLATLY CONDEMNED THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE AND PLEDGED TO ERADICATE IT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE AND TO PROSECUTE THE OFFENDERS. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE FIGURES FOR THE NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, THE PRESS CONTINUES TO REPORT SENTENCES OF THOSE CONVICTED OF TORTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN OCTOBER, FOLLOWING A JUDICIAL MEDICAL BOARD'S

DETERMINATION THAT A PRISONER IN BINGOL DIED AS THE RESULT OF TORTURE, THE GOVERNMENT OPENED A CASE AGAINST A NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING ONE OFFICER. THIS SAME OFFICER WAS LATER CONVICTED OF TORTURE IN A SEPARATE CASE. NONETHELESS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT MANY ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE ARE NOT FULLY INVESTIGATED AND THAT SOME CONVICTED OFFENDERS CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES EVEN WHILE THEIR CASES ARE BEING APPEALED.

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, INCLUDING THE TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION, HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PREVENT TORTURE OR ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE IS TO ALLOW LAWYERS ACCESS TO PRISONERS DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF DETENTION. SUCH ACCESS IS BEING CONSIDERED AMONG PROPOSED REVISIONS TO

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THE CRIMINAL CODE. THE REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, IF ADOPTED, WOULD ALSO INCREASE THE PUNISHMENT FOR TORTURE. THE CURRENT CRIMINAL CODE CATEGORIZES MURDER BY TORTURE AS MANSLAUGHTER AND PUNISHES IT WITH AN 8-YEAR SENTENCE. PENALTIES FOR TORTURE WHICH DOES NOT RESULT IN DEATH RANGE FROM 3 TO 5 YEARS. IN 1986 THE PARLIAMENT DEFEATED A BILL WHICH WOULD HAVE INCREASED THIS PENALTY TO A RANGE OF 5 TO 10 YEARS. THE NEW CRIMINAL CODE WOULD INCREASE THE PENALTY FOR MURDER BY TORTURE TO UP TO 16 YEARS.

IN AUGUST, FOLLOWING WIDESPREAD HUNGER STRIKES BY PRISONERS AND PARALLEL DEMONSTRATIONS BY THEIR FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OUTSIDE THE PRISONS, TURKISH REPORTERS WERE PERMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO VISIT PRISONS AND TO REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON PRISON CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS PRESS ATTENTION, CONDITIONS IN MANY PRISONS APPEAR TO HAVE IMPROVED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED TO MANY PRISONER DEMANDS AND HAS BEEN BUILDING NEW PRISONS TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE CLAIMED IN SEPTEMBER THAT PRISON CONDITIONS HAD IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN THE LAST 3 YEARS WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 93 NEW PLACES OF DETENTION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT, MOST PUBLIC FACILITIES IN TURKEY, INCLUDING PRISONS, ARE STILL SUBSTANDARD WHEN JUDGED AGAINST THOSE OF MANY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, EXILE, OR FORCED LABOR

EXCEPT IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS WHEN A PERSON IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME, A JUDGE MUST ISSUE A DETENTION WARRANT TO THE PROSECUTOR IF A PRISONER IS TO BE INCARCERATED. THE POLICE OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HOWEVER, CAN HOLD PERSONS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

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COMMUNICADO AND WITHOUT CHARGE FOR UP TO 24 HOURS. BY
URT ORDER, THE PERIOD OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION MAY BE

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ENTENDED TO 15 DAYS. IN CASES OF "OFFENSES COMMITTED LLECTIVELY BY THREE OR MORE PERSONS, DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE FOR UP TO 15 DAYS IS PERMITTED WITHOUT URT ORDER.

THE NINE PROVINCES UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE VERNOR (OR SUPERGOVERNOR) MAY AUTHORIZE DETENTION OF A RSON FOR UP TO 30 DAYS WITHOUT CHARGE. UNDER EMERGENCY LE, AUTHORITIES DO NOT NEED WARRANTS TO DETAIN SUSPECTS. ONCE IN FORMAL CUSTODY, A DETAINEE IS TAKEN BEFORE A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO BE INFORMED OF PENDING CHARGES. IF THE PROSECUTOR DECIDES TO PURSUE THE CASE, THE DETAINEE IS ARRAIGNED BEFORE A JUDGE AND SUBSEQUENTLY LOWED TO RETAIN A LAWYER.

RLIAMENT IN 1986 DEFEATED A BILL REQUIRING IMMEDIATE CESS TO A LAWYER. A PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL DE UNDER WHICH A PERSON, UPON BEING DETAINED, WOULD AVE THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN A LAWYER IS STILL UNDER ISCUSSION. A DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF BAIL; HE ARRAIGNING JUDGE, HOWEVER, MAY RELEASE THE ACCUSED ON ROVISIONAL LIBERTY ON PRESENTATION OF AN APPROPRIATE ARANTEE, OR ORDER HIM HELD IN PREVENTIVE DETENTION IF HE COURT DETERMINES THAT HE MAY FLEE OR DESTROY IDENCE. THE CONSTITUTION SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF TAINEES TO REQUEST SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF ARRAIGNMENT AND IAL. IN ALL CASES, THE AUTHORITIES MAY HOLD A DETAINEE COMMUNICADO WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME LIMITS UNTIL HE IS CHARGED OR RELEASED. ACCORDING TO THE POLICE POWERS T OF 1975, A DETAINEE'S NEXT OF KIN MUST NORMALLY BE TIFIED "IN THE SHORTEST TIME."

APRIL 15, THE PARLIAMENT PASSED A LAW RESCINDING A

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OVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF SENTENCES ACT OF 1986 THAT ERMITTED TURKISH JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE SENTENCES OF "SECURITY OBSERVATION," KNOWN COMMONLY AS INTERNAL EXILE.

THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS FORCED LABOR, AND THERE IS NE IN PRACTICE.

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E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

DEFENDANTS NORMALLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN TRIAL. IN SOME TRIALS, SUCH AS THOSE HELD IN MILITARY PRISONS OR ON MILITARY COMPOUNDS, MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MUST SEEK PERMISSION TO ATTEND, BUT SUCH PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GRANTED. ALTHOUGH TURKEY IS PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM, ITS COURT SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES ARE MODELED ON THE

ITALIAN (CRIMINAL) AND SWISS (CIVIL) LAW CODES. AS IN MANY OTHER CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES, TRIALS IN WHICH LAYMAN JURIES RENDER VERDICTS DO NOT FORM PART OF THE TURKISH JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

THE CONSTITUTION DECLARES THAT JUDGES SHALL BE INDEPENDENT IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES AND PROVIDES FOR THEIR SECURE TENURE. IT ALSO PROHIBITS AUTHORITIES FROM GIVING ORDERS OR RECOMMENDATIONS TO JUDGES CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY WAS DEMONSTRATED WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL TWO PROVISIONS OF THE 1985 POLICE POWERS ACT WHICH WERE WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE OPPRESSIVE. COURTS HAVE ALSO ACQUITTED MANY DEFENDANTS IN CASES INVOLVING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS ARE ALSO INDEPENDENT; TO PURSUE A CASE IS THEIR DECISION ALONE. IT IS THEY WHO DETERMINE

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WHETHER TO PURSUE INVESTIGATIONS OF ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE. THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTORS, APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, SELECTS JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS FOR THE HIGHER COURTS AND OVERSEES THOSE OF THE LOWER COURTS.

ALL DEFENDANTS ACCUSED OF TERRORISM OR OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST THE SECURITY OF THE STATE, INCLUDING DRUG SMUGGLING, ARE TRIED IN ONE OF EIGHT STATE SECURITY COURTS. THE JUDGES IN THESE COURTS OBSERVE THE SAME STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE AS JUDGES PRESIDING OVER REGULAR CIVILIAN COURTS. THREE JUDGES PRESIDE OVER STATE SECURITY COURTS: A CIVILIAN JUDGE AS CHAIRMAN, ONE ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN JUDGE, AND ONE MILITARY JUDGE. CIVILIAN AND SECURITY COURTS GENERALLY CONDUCT TRIALS UNDER THE SAME RULES OF PROCEDURE, BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION AND EMERGENCY LAW REGULATIONS.

A CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL IN EITHER SYSTEM MAY BE APPEALED. IF AN APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS A LOWER COURT'S GUILTY VERDICT, THE CASE IS SENT BACK TO THE LOWER COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION. IF THE LOWER COURT INSISTS ON ITS ORIGINAL VERDICT, THE CASE IS RETURNED TO THE APPEALS

COURT FOR A BINDING OPINION. IN SOME CASES, PARTICULARLY CAPITAL CASES, APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OR TO THE HIGH COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS ARE MANDATORY AND AUTOMATIC. IF A DEATH SENTENCE IS CONFIRMED BY AN APPEALS COURT, IT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THEN BY PARLIAMENT, AND FINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT.

AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT KURDISH-SPEAKING DEFENDANTS STANDING TRIAL IN THE SOUTHEAST OFTEN SUFFER

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FROM HAVING ONLY A PARTIAL, OR IN SOME CASES TOTAL, LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH TURKISH, THE OFFICIAL AND ONLY LANGUAGE PERMITTED IN COMMUNICATION WITH ATTORNEYS OR JUDICIAL OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH TRANSLATORS ARE PERMITTED, THE QUALITY OF THE TRANSLATIONS FROM KURDISH INTO TURKISH IS REPORTEDLY POOR.

ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD IN TURKISH JAILS VARY GREATLY, DEPENDING ON THE SOURCE AND THE SOURCE'S DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PRISONER. THE GOVERNMENT DENIES THAT IT HOLDS ANY POLITICAL PRISONERS BUT POINTS OUT THAT MANY PERSONS HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR TERRORIST ACTS OR FOR OTHER CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF PURSUING OSTENSIBLY POLITICAL GOALS DURING THE 1970'S. HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVE THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED UNDER STATUTES PROSCRIBING "MEMBERSHIP IN ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS," PROHIBITING PROPAGANDA AIMED AT PROMOTING THE HEGEMONY OF ONE CLASS OR ETHNIC GROUP, AND ADVOCATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. THEY ESTIMATE THAT PERSONS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED FOR NONVIOLENT ACTIVITY UNDER THESE STATUTES NUMBER SEVERAL HUNDRED.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE INVIOLABILITY OF A PERSON'S DOMICILE AND THE PRIVACY OF CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATION. ENTRY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND INTERCEPTION OR MONITORING OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE ARE PERMITTED ONLY UPON ISSUANCE OF A JUDICIAL WARRANT.

IN THE NINE PROVINCES STILL UNDER STATE-OF-EMERGENCY LAW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNOR (OR SUPERGOVERNOR) MAY EMPOWER AUTHORITIES TO SEARCH RESIDENCES OR THE PREMISES OF

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POLITICAL PARTIES, BUSINESSES, ASSOCIATIONS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT OBTAINING A WARRANT. THEY MAY ALSO SEARCH, HOLD, OR SEIZE WITHOUT WARRANT PERSONS, LETTERS, TELEGRAMS, AND DOCUMENTS.

G. VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

SINCE AUGUST 1984, THE GOVERNMENT HAS FACED IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY AN INCREASINGLY BLOODY CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY KURDISH GUERRILLA GROUPS RESIDENT BOTH IN TURKEY AND SEVERAL NEARBY COUNTRIES, WHOSE PROFESSED AIM IS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE--INCORPORATING PARTS OF PRESENT-DAY TURKEY, IRAQ, AND IRAN--BY DESTABILIZING THE CENTRAL TURKISH GOVERNMENT. ARMED KURDISH REBELS IN TURKEY RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND MATERIEL.

GUERRILLA ATTACKS APPEAR TO HAVE INCREASED IN BOTH NUMBER AND GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT IN 1987. RECENT CHANGES IN GUERRILLA TACTICS INCLUDE THE FORMATION OF LARGER BANDS FOR ARMED ATTACKS, STRIKES AT THE ECONOMIC AND TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE REGION, AND BRUTAL, TERRORIST-STYLE MASSACRES OF VILLAGERS, MANY OF THE VICTIMS BEING WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

THE ATTACKS BY SUPPORTERS OF THE MARXIST-ORIENTED KURDISH WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), THE MAIN INSURGENT GROUP, ON GOVERNMENT AND CIVILIAN TARGETS HAS RESULTED IN AT LEAST 500 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DEATHS. A TURKISH PAPER IN JULY REPORTED THE 3-YEAR DEATH TOLL AT 715, OF WHICH 289 WERE CIVILIANS, MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, 159 MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND 267 GUERRILLAS. THERE HAVE BEEN

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ADDITIONAL KILLINGS, PARTICULARLY OF CIVILIANS, SINCE THEN. DESPITE MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PKK, GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES CONTINUE IN MANY REMOTE AND RELATIVELY INACCESSIBLE PARTS OF THE SOUTHEAST.

TURKISH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, AND THE TURKISH PRESS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACTIVITIES BY SECURITY FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. REPORTEDLY, FAMILY MEMBERS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN ABUSED OR TORTURED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE TERRORISTS' WHEREABOUTS. IN SOME CASES, THE POPULATIONS OF ENTIRE VILLAGES HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED OR EVEN DETAINED. IN OTHER CASES, VILLAGERS SUSPECTED OF PROVIDING FOOD TO TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH AIDING THE SEPARATISTS.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND COURT RULINGS HAVE REMOVED MOST RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. THE CRIMINAL CODE, HOWEVER, PROHIBITS SPEECH OR WRITINGS CONSIDERED THREATENING TO STATE SECURITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. THE PROSCRIPTION APPLIES TO ADVOCACY OF CLASS OR RACIAL DOMINATION (E.G., COMMUNISM OR FASCISM), THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A THEOCRATIC STATE (E.G., ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM), OR THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE STATE ON ETHNIC LINES (E.G., KURDISH SEPARATISM). THESE PROVISIONS ARE LONGSTANDING, DATING FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC.

THE TURKISH PRESS IS ROBUST AND VIGOROUS. IT IS PRIVATELY OWNED AND REFLECTS A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL VIEWS. THERE IS NO "GOVERNMENT" PAPER; TO A GREATER OR

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LESSER EXTENT, ALL NEWSPAPERS PRESENT OPPOSITION VIEWS. FURTHERMORE, THE RECENT TREND IN JUDICIAL RULINGS AFFECTING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY IN FAVOR OF MORE FREEDOM DESPITE STILL EXISTING STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTION PROBABLY INDUCES SOME CAUTION BY THE PRESS IN ITS SELECTION OF SUBJECT MATTER FOR REPORTING.

TURKISH RADIO AND TELEVISION (TRT) IS A GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY. OPPOSITION LEADERS COMPLAIN THAT IT IS BIASED TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS COVERAGE, ALTHOUGH ALL PARTIES WERE PERMITTED TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS DURING THE NOVEMBER ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WORKS OF CERTAIN LEFTIST AND KURDISH PERFORMERS AND WRITERS ARE RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE BANNED FROM BROADCAST ON TRT FOR POLITICAL OR CULTURAL REASONS.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES ARE PERMITTED WITH PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORITIES. SUCH REQUESTS ARE GENERALLY GRANTED. ACCORDING TO CURRENT REGULATIONS, MARCHING ROUTES, RALLY AREAS, CROWD DISPERSION ROUTES, AND POSTER HANGING LOCATIONS ARE TO BE FIXED FOR EACH CITY EVERY JANUARY. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED POLITICAL RALLIES DURING THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN AND DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING FOR THE NOVEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, WHICH REFLECTED GOVERNMENT CONCERN OVER THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOME ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRECEDING THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF

;O, PROHIBITS ASSOCIATIONS FROM HAVING TIES TO
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LITICAL PARTIES OR ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. SOCIATION ACTIVITY IS CLOSELY MONITORED BY THE GOVERNMENT. ASSOCIATIONS MUST SUBMIT THEIR CHARTERS FOR THE APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES BEFORE THEY ARE ALLOWED TO FORM. TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, FORMED IN JULY 1986, DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION TO OPERATE AS A LEGAL ASSOCIATION UNTIL 1 YEAR LATER, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ABLE TO HOLD MEETINGS AND SEMINARS IN THE INTERIM.

AS A REACTION TO THE UNIVERSITIES' INVOLVEMENT IN PRE-1980 VIOLENCE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW PROSCRIBE STUDENT AND FACULTY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. POLITICAL PARTIES ARE FORBIDDEN TO FORM YOUTH BRANCHES. STUDENTS MUST OBTAIN THEIR UNIVERSITY RECTOR'S PERMISSION BEFORE JOINING AN ASSOCIATION. AFTER STUDENT PROTESTS, THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW IN APRIL A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT WHICH WOULD HAVE LIMITED STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS TO ONE PER UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. NEVERTHELESS, 143 STUDENTS WHO PROTESTED THE DRAFT LAW WENT ON TRIAL FOR UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY. THIS TRIAL IS STILL GOING ON. OF APPROXIMATELY 100 FACULTY MEMBERS DISMISSED UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS--AS MANY AS 1,000 RESIGNED OF THEIR OWN WILL EITHER OUT OF DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OR FOR OTHER, MAINLY ECONOMIC, REASONS--A NUMBER HAVE PETITIONED FOR REINSTATEMENT, AND AT LEAST ONE PROFESSOR HAS BEEN REINSTATED FOLLOWING A COURT DECISION IN HIS FAVOR.

MEMBERSHIP IN, OR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO, AN ORGANIZATION ADVOCATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BASED ON CLASS (E.G., COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION) ARE ILLEGAL UNDER TURKISH LAW. AUTHORITIES DETAINED FOUR PERSONS IN OCTOBER AND ARRAIGNED THEM ON CHARGES OF BEING ACTIVE
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MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S UNION, WHICH IS CLAIMED TO BE SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

TRADE UNIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS WHICH CONTINUED TO OPERATE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1983 LABOR LAW HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ORGANIZE WORKPLACES FREELY AND TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. ALTHOUGH ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S TOTAL WORK FORCE OF SOME 16

MILLION IS ORGANIZED, OVER 60 PERCENT OF INDUSTRIALIZED WORKERS ARE UNION MEMBERS COVERED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. AS A RESULT, UNIONS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY ON ITS WORK RULES AND WAGE STRUCTURE. THE 1983 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, STRIKE, AND LOCK-OUT LAW STRICTLY REGULATES THE BARGAINING PROCESS AND MAKES STRIKES OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS (GENERAL STRIKES, POLITICAL STRIKES, AND SOLIDARITY STRIKES) ILLEGAL. UNIONS ARE ABLE TO REPRESENT THEIR MEMBERS, ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND RESPOND TO THEIR MEMBERS' INTERESTS.

UNDER MARTIAL LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF TRADE UNIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS WERE SEVERELY RESTRICTED. NOTWITHSTANDING

THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW, POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY TRADE UNIONS IS BANNED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE TRADE UNION LAW. UNIONS CAN THEORETICALLY NEITHER ENDORSE CANDIDATES AND PARTIES NOR MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR CAMPAIGNS. NEVERTHELESS, THE TURKISH CONFEDERATION OF LABOR, TURK-IS, OPENLY CAMPAIGNED AGAINST THE RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY BOTH IN THE 1986 BYELECTIONS AND THE 1987 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. TRADE UNION ACTIVITY IN DEFENSE OF WORKERS' SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IS NOT REGARDED AS

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POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE UNIONS HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THAT DISTINCTION TO MOUNT STRENUOUS PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST VARIOUS GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND TO LOBBY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS IN SUPPORT OF LABOR POSITIONS.

THESE CAMPAIGNS INCLUDED CONTINUING EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE PARLIAMENT TO BRING THE LAWS RESTRICTING UNION ACTIVITY INTO HARMONY WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTIONS. A MARCH 24 "MARCH ON PARLIAMENT" WAS PREVENTED BY THE POLICE, WHO CHARGED THAT TURK-IS HAD NOT APPLIED FOR A PARADE PERMIT.

A DECEMBER 1986 COURT DECISION ORDERED THE PERMANENT CLOSING OF DISK (CONFEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNIONS), WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE SUSPENDED UNDER MARTIAL LAW FOLLOWING THE 1980 MILITARY TAKEOVER. THE TRIAL IS IN THE APPEALS STAGE. THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS FUNDS REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF COURT-APPOINTED TRUSTEES. THREE FORMER LEADERS OF DISK WERE ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER. THE PEACE ASSOCIATION TRIALS ARE ALSO AT THE APPEALS STAGE, AND ALL DEFENDANTS ARE FREE ON BAIL.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT, UNION, AND EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ILO. THE

RGEST CONFEDERATION, TURK-IS, IS AN AFFILIATE OF THE
ERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU).
ST TURK-IS MEMBER UNIONS ARE AFFILIATED WITH THEIR
ESPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS. THE
VERNMENT OF TURKEY WAS ELECTED A DEPUTY MEMBER OF THE
GOVERNING BODY IN 1987.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) HAS ALLEGED THAT THE
RKISH WORKERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ORGANIZE IS
MPERED BY THE LABOR CODE AND BY GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYER

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LICIES AND PRACTICES, THAT THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS
AVILY ENCUMBERED, AND THAT OBSERVANCE OF MINIMAL SAFETY
D HEALTH STANDARDS IS LAX. THE MINISTER OF LABOR HAS

NOUNCED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING LEGISLATION
ICH WILL ADDRESS SOME OF THE WORKER RIGHTS ISSUES
ISED BY THE AFL-CIO AND OTHERS. THE NEW LEGISLATION
EPORTEDLY WILL MODIFY OR ELIMINATE SOME RESTRICTIONS
LACED ON TRADE UNIONS, EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT OF
IONS, AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING THEIR FREE CHOICE OF
FICERS. NEW LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE RIGHT
F CIVIL SERVANTS AND TEACHERS TO ORGANIZE, AS WELL AS
E STRICT REQUIREMENTS A UNION CURRENTLY MUST SATISFY IN
DER TO BECOME A BARGAINING AGENT.

C, FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF TURKS ARE SUNNI MUSLIMS.
"ALEVIS," ADHERENTS OF DIFFERENT HETERODOX VARIETIES OF
SHI'ISM, CONSTITUTE FROM 10 TO 15 PERCENT OF THE
POPULATION. THERE ARE ALSO VARIOUS SMALL CHRISTIAN
RELIGIOUS GROUPS, AND A SMALL JEWISH COMMUNITY.

TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC
HAVE REGARDED SECULARISM AS AN ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE OF A
MODERN, WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, AND THE
CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMS IT TO BE A BASIC CHARACTERISTIC OF
THE STATE. ACCORDINGLY IT DISTINGUISHES CAREFULLY
BETWEEN A PERSON'S PRIVATE RIGHT TO "FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND CONVICTION" AND PUBLIC
PROSELYTIZING OF ANY KIND. SINCE OTTOMAN TIMES, PERSONAL
IDENTITY IN TURKISH SOCIETY HAS CORRELATED WITH
LIGION. THE 1923 TREATY OF LAUSANNE DEFINES MINORITIES

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ACCORDING TO RELIGION, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY IS STILL

LARGELY SYNONYMOUS WITH RELIGIOUS IDENTITY EVEN IN THE MODERN SECULAR TURKISH STATE. PROSELYTIZATION IS THEREFORE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, "INSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND MORAL EDUCATION" IN ACCORDANCE WITH A STATE-PREPARED CURRICULUM IS COMPULSORY FOR ALL STUDENTS. THE EDUCATION MINISTRY CONFIRMED IN 1986 THAT NON-MUSLIMS WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND CLASSES IN GENERAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION BUT WOULD BE EXCUSED FROM THE "PRACTICAL" SECTIONS, WHICH INCLUDE MEMORIZATION OF KORANIC VERSES AND INSTRUCTIONS IN PRAYER. THE COURSES--2 HOURS PER WEEK--ARE TAUGHT BY LAY TEACHERS. EXTRACURRICULAR KORAN COURSES USING GOVERNMENT-APPROVED TEXTS ARE PERMITTED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED KORAN COURSES RUN BY FUNDAMENTALIST SECTS TEACHING A MORE RADICAL BRAND OF ISLAM.

AMONG OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SMALL NUMBERS OF ARMENIAN ORTHODOX AND ARMENIAN CATHOLIC, GREEK ORTHODOX AND GREEK

CATHOLIC, BULGARIAN ORTHODOX, ROMAN CATHOLIC, SYRIAN AND ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN, CHALDEAN UNIATES, PROTESTANTS, AND JEWISH BELIEVERS ARE FOUND IN TURKEY, PRIMARILY IN ISTANBUL. IN ADDITION TO THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION, THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE GUARANTEES THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES. THESE GROUPS OPERATE CHURCHES, MONASTERIES, SYNAGOGUES, SCHOOLS (WHERE STUDENTS MAY BE TAUGHT IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE), AND CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS SUCH AS HOSPITALS AND ORPHANAGES.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITY GROUPS HAVE REPEATEDLY COMPLAINED ABOUT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, THE FORMATION OF PARISH COUNCILS, AND THE REGISTRATION AND REPAIR OF CHURCH PROPERTY. GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF

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PROPERTY TO RELIGIOUS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS IS ALSO A MATTER OF CONTENTION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO RESOLVE SEVERAL ISSUES OF CONCERN TO NON-MUSLIM GROUPS. IT GRANTED PERMISSION TO THE GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE IN APRIL 1987 TO REBUILD ITS ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, DESTROYED BY FIRE IN 1941. IT INCREASED THE VALUE OF REPAIRS WHICH CAN BE MADE WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION TO HISTORICAL BUILDINGS, THEREBY REMOVING ANOTHER ISSUE OF CONTENTION. IT PERMITTED THE FREE CIRCULATION OF BIBLES. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT YET GRANTED PERMISSION TO BUILD CHURCHES TO SUCH COMMUNITIES AS THE CHALDEAN UNIATES WHO HAVE EMIGRATED TO ISTANBUL FROM THE SOUTHEAST, OR TO THE ARMENIAN COMMUNITY OF ANKARA.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

THERE IS GENERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN TURKEY. TURKS GENERALLY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND INCREASING NUMBERS HAVE DONE SO SINCE THE RELAXATION OF CURRENCY CONTROLS. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, A CITIZEN'S FREEDOM TO LEAVE MAY BE RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, CIVIC OBLIGATIONS (GENERALLY MILITARY SERVICE), OR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION. SOME TURKS INVOLVED IN LENGTHY MASS TRIALS DATING FROM THE EARLY 1980'S HAVE BEEN DENIED PASSPORTS, ALTHOUGH OTHERS HAVE BEEN GRANTED PASSPORTS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME CITIZENS NOT UNDER INDICTMENT WERE DENIED PASSPORTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. TURKISH LAW PROVIDES THAT THOSE DENIED PASSPORTS WHILE UNDER INDICTMENT MAY NEVERTHELESS BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL IF THE

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JUSTICE MINISTRY AND OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

APPROVE. RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN EASED AS A MATTER OF PRACTICE, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN ORDER TO BRING TURKISH PASSPORT POLICIES MORE INTO CONFORMITY WITH EUROPEAN NORMS.

TURKISH LAW GRANTS CITIZENS PROTECTION AGAINST DEPORTATION, EXTRADITION, OR DENIAL OF REENTRY. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT OF TURKS LIVING ABROAD TO RETURN HOME. UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE TURKISH CITIZENSHIP LAW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT MAY STRIP CITIZENSHIP FROM THOSE WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN HOME TO FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES, OR WHO HAVE COMMITTED ACTS EXPATRIATING THEMSELVES, INCLUDING FAILING TO RETURN TO PERFORM MILITARY SERVICE. ACCORDING TO A TURKISH PRESS REPORT IN APRIL, 13,788 TURKS LIVING ABROAD HAVE BEEN STRIPPED OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP SINCE 1980.

TURKEY HAS PERMANENTLY RESETTLED APPROXIMATELY 4,500 AFGHAN REFUGEES OF TURKIC ETHNICITY IN RECENT YEARS AND PROVIDES A TEMPORARY HAVEN FOR EAST EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN TWO TEMPORARY SETTLEMENT FACILITIES. SINCE TURKEY LIMITS THE DEFINITION OF REFUGEES TO EAST EUROPEANS, THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT GRANT REFUGEE STATUS TO IRANIANS. NEVERTHELESS, AS A COUNTRY OF FIRST ASYLUM, TURKEY SERVES AS A SAFE HAVEN FOR MANY IRANIAN REFUGEES BEING PROCESSED FOR RESETTLEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR). IT DOES NOT GENERALLY DEPORT TO IRAN THOSE WHO ENTERED TURKEY ILLEGALLY OR WHO OVERSTAYED THEIR PERMITTED TIME AS "TOURISTS." IN CONSEQUENCE, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIANS ARE NOW LIVING IN TURKEY, MANY

OF THEM IN ISTANBUL AND OTHER LARGE CITIES.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS

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TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT EXISTS BOTH IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE. TURKEY HAS A MULTIPARTY, PRESIDENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. THE PRESIDENT IS ELECTED BY PARLIAMENT FOR A SINGLE 7-YEAR TERM. THE CURRENT PRESIDENT, WHOSE ELECTION WAS AUTOMATIC WITH THE APPROVAL OF TURKEY'S NEW CONSTITUTION IN THE 1982 REFERENDUM, IS RETIRED GENERAL KENAN EVREN, FORMER CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF AND HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH GOVERNED TURKEY DURING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1980-83).

ELECTIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE ARE ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. THE UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENT HAS 450 SEATS

ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THE ELECTION LAW REQUIRES THAT A PARTY WIN AT LEAST 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL VOTE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. THE 10 PERCENT THRESHOLD IS INTENDED TO PREVENT POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND RECURRENCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARALYSIS OF THE LATE 1970'S. OF THE SEVEN LEGAL PARTIES WHICH FIELDED SLATES OF CANDIDATES FOR THE NOVEMBER NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THREE RECEIVED MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE.

PARTIES ADVOCATING A THEOCRATIC STATE, THE SUPERIORITY OR DICTATORSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL CLASS OR GROUP, OR "EXCLUSIVE" OR "ELITIST" POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES ARE PROHIBITED. NO PARTY MAY BE FORMED AROUND A PARTICULAR ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP. AMONG THE PROHIBITED POLITICAL GROUPINGS ARE COMMUNIST AND OTHER MARXIST PARTIES, WHICH ARE BASED ON CLASS, AND FASCIST "ELITIST" PARTIES. THESE

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ARE REGARDED AS INIMICAL TO A WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THREATENING TO TURKEY'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEGRITY. FASCISTS AND COMMUNISTS SIMILARLY ARE BANNED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN OTHER PARTIES. MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS MAY NOT JOIN ANY POLITICAL PARTY.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR

MEN AND WOMEN. TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO GRANT WOMEN FULL AND EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 11 FEMALE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, ONE OF WHOM IS A CABINET MINISTER, AND SEVERAL WOMEN HOLD IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN THE PARTY HIERARCHIES. MEMBERS OF MINORITIES, MUSLIM AND NON-MUSLIM, FACE NO LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS LONG AS THEY ACCEPT TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY. DESPITE OTHER LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON KURDS AS AN ETHNIC GROUP, MANY TURKS OF KURDISH DESCENT SERVE OR HAVE SERVED IN THE PARLIAMENT, THE CABINET, AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSTS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED VISITS TO TURKEY BY FOREIGNERS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS DURING 1987 AND, IN MOST CASES, FACILITATED CONTACTS FOR BOTH OFFICIAL AND NONOFFICIAL VISITORS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS LESS HELPFUL TO VISITORS INVESTIGATING THE KURDISH ISSUE. SINCE THE 1983 SETTLEMENT OF A FIVE-NATION COMPLAINT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TURKEY HAS UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE REGULAR CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND

TO PERMIT SITE VISITS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PERMITTED PRISON VISITS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE COE TORTURE CONVENTION

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WILL MEAN FUTURE VISITS BY THE COE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE.

A NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION WAS PROVISIONALLY FORMED IN JULY 1986 AND HAD ITS CHARTER OFFICIALLY APPROVED IN 1987. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY, THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY, ALSO HAS A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND HAS ACTIVELY PURSUED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN PARLIAMENT.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL TURKISH CITIZENS AS EQUAL AND PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON ETHNIC GROUNDS. IN THE LAUSANNE TREATY, THE GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK "TO ASSURE FULL AND COMPLETE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND LIBERTY TO ALL INHABITANTS OF TURKEY WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO BIRTH, NATIONALITY, LANGUAGE, RACE, OR RELIGION." AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN THE LONGSTANDING POLICY OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK ASSIMILATION OF PERSONS OF NON-TURKISH ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF

SOCIETY. THE SIZE OF THE NON-MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITIES HAS DECLINED STEADILY OVER THE YEARS.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITY GROUPS CONTINUE TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGULATING THE OPERATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF COMMUNITY REAL ESTATE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHURCH PROPERTIES, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF PARISH COUNCILS. THE PROHIBITION ON MOST CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST ACCEPTING BEQUESTS ALSO CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR CONCERN.

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KURDS CAN BE FOUND THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BOTH AS A RESULT OF OTTOMAN SETTLEMENT POLICY AND MORE RECENT MIGRATION TO METROPOLITAN CENTERS. THOSE LIVING OUTSIDE OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN ASSIMILATED MORE COMPLETELY INTO NATIONAL LIFE. MOST KURDISH SPEAKERS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED SOUTHEAST, AND MANY LIVE A TRIBAL EXISTENCE. THROUGH LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO INTEGRATE FULLY BOTH THE REGION AND ITS PEOPLE INTO MODERN TURKEY.

THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY ASSERTION

OF A KURDISH ETHNIC IDENTITY WHICH COULD BRING INTO QUESTION THE UNITY OF THE TURKISH STATE. PUBLICATION OF BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS IN KURDISH IS FORBIDDEN, AS ARE BOOKS OR ANY OTHER MATERIALS DEALING WITH KURDISH HISTORY, CULTURE, OR ETHNIC IDENTITY. THE KURDISH LANGUAGE IS NOT PERMITTED FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES, E.G., IN THE COURTS, NOR IS IT ALLOWED IN CERTAIN PRIVATE SITUATIONS SUCH AS RECEIVING VISITORS IN PRISON, EVEN WHEN THE PRISONER OR VISITOR DOES NOT SPEAK TURKISH. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON THE USE OF KURDISH IN NONOFFICIAL SETTINGS.

AS NOTED ABOVE, THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUPS TO USE THEIR OWN LANGUAGES IS LIMITED. ALTHOUGH THE LAUSANNE TREATY STATES THAT "NO RESTRICTIONS SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE FREE USE BY ANY TURKISH NATIONAL OF ANY LANGUAGE IN PRIVATE INTERCOURSE, IN COMMERCE, RELIGION, IN THE PRESS, OR IN PUBLICATIONS OF ANY KIND OR AT PUBLIC MEETINGS," THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY IS TURKISH. ONE ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION BANS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF LANGUAGE, WHILE OTHERS PROHIBIT THE PUBLIC USE OF

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"LANGUAGES PROHIBITED BY LAW." WHILE THERE IS NO LEGISLATION DEFINING PROHIBITED LANGUAGES, THE ...OADCASTING AND PUBLISHING LAWS DO DEFINE "LEGAL ...GUAGES." PERSONS HAVE BEEN TRIED ON A VARIETY OF CHARGES RELATING TO THE USE OF KURDISH. ALL RECENT SUCH TRIALS HAVE RESULTED IN ACQUITTALS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THE INTENT OF ITS BANS ON PUBLISHING IN ...RDISH (AND ITS DISCOURAGING OF LANGUAGES SUCH AS GEORGIAN AND LAZ) IS TO FOSTER TURKISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF ALL CITIZENS FOR ALL USES. THIS IS PART OF AN EFFORT TO INCULCATE IN ALL TURKISH CITIZENS A SENSE OF IDENTITY WITH THE TURKISH STATE AND NATION AS OPPOSED TO IDENTIFICATION WITH ANY PARTICULAR GROUP WITHIN THE NATION. IN PRACTICE, THE SEVERITY OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF A MINORITY LANGUAGE APPEARS TO DEPEND ON THE PERCEIVED THREAT THE GROUP IN QUESTION PRESENTS TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT FACES ARMED KURDISH SEPARATISTS AND BELIEVES THE USE OF KURDISH FOSTERS SEPARATISM. THE USE OF ARABIC, ABOUT WHICH THERE ARE NO SUCH CONCERNS, IS NOT SIMILARLY RESTRICTED.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN A LEADER IN PROMOTING AND PROTECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS. WOMEN HAVE FULL SUFFRAGE AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS, HAVE ATTAINED HIGH OFFICE, AND ARE REPRESENTED IN ALL PROFESSIONS AND INSTITUTIONS. WOMEN HAVE SERVED OR ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN SENIOR POSITIONS

AS UNIVERSITY RECTOR AND DEAN, AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL PARTY PRESIDENT, AND ARMY COLONEL. TURKISH BUSINESSWOMEN PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLES IN MANY INDUSTRIES AND SIT ON THE BOARDS OF SOME OF TURKEY'S LARGEST PRIVATE FIRMS. FEMALE LAWYERS AND JUDGES ARE RELATIVELY MORE COMMON THAN IN THE

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UNITED STATES, AND FEMALE DOCTORS DOMINATE IN SOME SPECIALTIES.

NONETHELESS, THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SMALLER COMMUNITIES AND RURAL AREAS--ESPECIALLY IN THE EAST--IS STILL CIRCUMSCRIBED BY CENTURIES OF PATRIARCHAL TRADITION. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS IN THESE AREAS LIMIT WOMEN'S EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, THE CONSTITUTION AND BODY OF LAW NOTWITHSTANDING.

CONDITIONS OF LABOR

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT TO REASONABLE CONDITIONS OF LABOR SUITED TO THE WORKER'S AGE, SEX, AND

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CAPACITY, AND GRANTS THE RIGHT TO REST AND LEISURE AND A FAIR WAGE. THE LABOR LAW FORBIDS THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 13 YEARS OF AGE AND RESTRICTS CHILDREN UNDER 15 TO "LIGHT WORK WHICH WILL NOT HARM THEIR HEALTH AND PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT, PREVENT THEIR ATTENDANCE AT OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMS, OR THEIR ABILITY TO BENEFIT FROM EDUCATION." CHILDREN BETWEEN 15 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, NOR MAY THEY BE EMPLOYED AT NIGHT. GIRLS AND WOMEN MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, BUT, IF OVER THE AGE OF 18, MAY WORK NIGHT SHIFTS UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED JOINTLY BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE.

A BOARD COMPOSED OF GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND LABOR REPRESENTATIVES ESTABLISHES NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS. THE LABOR LAW PROVIDES FOR A 7 1/2-HOUR DAY AND A 45-HOUR WORKWEEK.

IN SPITE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, SPECIFIC LEGAL

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REQUIREMENTS, AND LABOR UNION EFFORTS, A CONSIDERABLE GAP REMAINS BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITIES OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY LEVELS. TRADE UNIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY COMPLAINED THAT EXISTING REGULATIONS GOVERNING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WORKING CONDITIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ENFORCED. OUTSIDE THE INDUSTRIALIZED SECTOR WHERE UNIONS EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ARE GENERALLY IGNORED BOTH ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY

AND ON CHILD AND FEMALE EMPLOYMENT. IN GENERAL, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CHILD LABOR AND ITS PRACTICE IS NARROWING. BUT IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO A LARGE DEGREE, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN FAMILY-OPERATED COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, YOUNG CHILDREN STILL WORK AT THEIR PARENTS' SIDE. DURING 1987 AN ILLEGAL MARKET IN THE SERVICES OF CHILDREN IN A PROVINCIAL TOWN, IN WHICH CHILDREN FROM VILLAGES WERE LEASED TO WORK FOR NONRELATIVES DURING THE SCHOOL VACATION MONTHS, RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE AND WAS CLOSED IMMEDIATELY BY THE GOVERNMENT.

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PTER, TU
SUBJECT: SUPER GOVERNOR COMMENTS ON KURDS AND SOUTHEAST

1. NOFORN.

2. SUMMARY: THE EMERGENCY RULE "SUPER GOVERNOR" RESPONSIBLE FOR COMBATTING KURDISH SEPARATISTS IN TURKEY'S TEN SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES, HAYRI KOZAKCIOGLU, GAVE AN EXTENSIVE INTERVIEW TO THE "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" PUBLISHED DECEMBER 1. KOZAKCIOGLU TERMED THE SEPARATISTS TERRORISTS SUPPORTED BY THE EASTERN BLOC AND BY NEIGHBORS (I.E., SYRIA) FEARFUL THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP) WILL REDUCE THEIR WATER SUPPLIES. WHILE HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS KURDISH CULTURAL AUTONOMY, AS OPPOSED TO ARMED EFFORTS BY KURDISH SEPARATISTS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE,

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KOZAKCIOGLU NEVERTHELESS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KURDISH IS BOTH A DISTINCT AND WIDELY SPOKEN LANGUAGE, EVEN AS HE SUGGESTED THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT CULTURAL AUTONOMY UNTIL GOT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS HAD DONE MORE TO INTEGRATE THE REGION INTO MODERN TURKEY. END SUMMARY.

3. HAYRI KOZAKCIOGLU, THE "SUPER GOVERNOR" RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING GOT EFFORTS TO COMBAT KURDISH

SEPARATISTS IN THE TEN SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES STILL UNDER EMERGENCY RULE, GAVE AN EXTENSIVE INTERVIEW TO THE "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" PUBLISHED ON DECEMBER 1 UNDER THE TITLE, "SEPARATIST THREAT LINGERS IN EAST." SAYING THAT KURDISH SEPARATISTS ARE AIDED BOTH BY EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES AND SOME, UNNAMED, NEIGHBORING STATES, KOZAKCIOGLU CLAIMED THEIR PRIMARY GOAL IS TO PREVENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTHEAST AND THE CONCOMITANT INTEGRATION OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS INTO A MODERN TURKEY WHICH SUCH DEVELOPMENT IS BOUND TO ENGENDER.

4. KOZAKCIOGLU SAID EASTERN BLOC SUPPORT FOR SEPARATIST KURDS IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT PREVENTING TURKEY FROM BECOMING A STRONGER MEMBER OF EUROPE AND A MORE IMPORTANT BRIDGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. AS PROOF OF EASTERN BLOC INVOLVEMENT, KOZAKCIOGLU NOTED THAT ALL THE WEAPONS SEIZED FROM THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN MANUFACTURED IN EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES. AS FOR "NEIGHBORING COUNTRY" SUPPORT FOR KURDISH SEPARATISTS, KOZAKCIOGLU CITED THEIR FEAR THAT THE EXTENSIVE IRRIGATION OF THE SOUTHEAST TO BE MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIAN PROJECT (GAP) WOULD REDUCE THEIR WATER SUPPLIES. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THE SUPER GOVERNOR MEANT TO SINGLE OUT SYRIA HERE, ALTHOUGH GAP

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COULD HAVE AN EVEN GREATER EFFECT ON IRAQ'S WATER SUPPLIES.)

5. SAYING SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY IS NO DIFFERENT THAN ANY OTHER UNDERDEVELOPED REGION OF TURKEY, AND INSISTING THAT ALL TURKISH CITIZENS ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW, KOZAKCIOGLU DENIED THAT KURDS INCURRED DISCRIMINATION BASED ON THEIR LANGUAGE. IN A RARE OFFICIAL ADMISSION, KOZAKCIOGLU CALLED IT "A FACT" THAT KURDISH IS WIDELY SPOKEN IN THE SOUTHEAST, BUT ADDED THAT TURKEY HAS MANY DIFFERENT LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS. WHILE HE AVOIDED THE QUESTION OF CULTURAL AUTONOMY, KOZAKCIOGLU ASSERTED THAT SPEAKING KURDISH DOES NOT TRANSLATE INTO KURDISH DESIRE FOR A SEPARATE KURDISH STATE. THE ORDINARY VILLAGE FEARS THE SEPARATISTS, HE SAID, BUT BASICALLY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT AFFORDS MORE SECURITY AND, ULTIMATELY, MORE PROSPERITY.

6. COMMENT: KOZAKCIOGLU'S REMARKS ARE CONSISTENT WITH OTHER RECENT GOT STATEMENTS THAT THE KEY TO ASSIMILATING KURDS INTO TURKISH SOCIETY LIES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THAT TURKEY'S NEIGHBORS OPPOSE SUCH DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAD TO A STRONGER WEST EUROPEAN ALLY AND MIDDLE EAST PLAYER. OF PERHAPS MORE BEARING ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IS THE SUPER GOVERNOR'S ADMISSION THAT KURDISH IS A SEPARATE AND WIDELY SPOKEN LANGUAGE IN

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THE SOUTHEAST. KOZAKCIOGLU NONETHELESS MADE IT CLEAR
THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF CULTURAL AUTONOMY MUST AWAIT
COMPLETION OF THE GOT'S AMBITIOUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS IN THE REGION. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PREL, TU, US
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT MAKES THE PRESS - TWO MONTHS LATE

REF: A) ANKARA 03777 B) ANKARA 04239

1. (U) "CUMHURIYET" FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTER SEDAT ERGIN PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE APRIL 9 ENTITLED, "WARNING ON KURDS TO U.S." THE REPORT'S LARGE-TYPE CAPTIONS FOCUSSED ON MFA "WARNINGS" TO THE USG ON THE REPORT, AND STATED THE REPORT "CRITICIZES TURKEY FOR SUPPRESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A KURDISH IDENTITY." ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT "FACES AN ARMED KURDISH INSURGENCY."

2. (U) THE LEAD PARAGRAPHS NOTED THAT THE GOT WAS SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY THE REPORT'S USE OF THE EXPRESSION, 'TURKISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE SUPPRESSED KURDISH NATIONAL IDENTITY.'" (THE ACTUAL QUOTATION, 1051 OF THE REPORT, IS, "THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS

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ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY ASSERTION OF A KURDISH ETHNIC IDENTITY AND HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO SUPPRESS IT.") THE ARTICLE ALSO QUICKLY CLAIMED THAT THE REPORT WAS "A DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO 'COLDNESS' IN TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS."

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3. (U) HOWEVER, ONCE BEYOND THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS THE STRIDENCY OF THE PRESS REPORT DROPPED OFF. THE ARTICLE NOTED THE USE OF THE TERM "KURD" IN THE 1985

REPORT, AND THAT THE GOT HAD NOT OBJECTED AT THE TIME. ERGIN QUOTED THE USIS INFORMATION OFFICER AS SAYING, "INSTRUCTIONS SENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD REQUESTED A STUDY OF THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES. THE WIDER TREATMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITIES COVERS THE ENTIRE WORLD, NOT JUST TURKEY." AFTER NOTING A "HIGH LEVEL MFA OFFICIAL'S" STATEMENT THAT "WE HAVE FORWARDED OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE REPORT TO THE U.S. THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS" (REFTEL A), THE REPORT CONCLUDED WITH EXTENSIVE QUOTATIONS FROM SECTION 5 OF THE REPORT (PP. 1050-1052). THE WELL-TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS, COMPRISING THE ENTIRE CORPUS OF MATERIAL ON THE KURDS IN SECTION 5, EMPHASIZE THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST KURDS, THE POVERTY OF THE SOUTHEAST, THE SUPPRESSION OF SEPARATE ETHNIC IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE, AND THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE SEPARATIST INSURGENCY.

4. (C) COMMENT: "CUMHURIYET" APPEARS TO HAVE TWO AIMS IN MIND IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE STORY. ONE IS TO PUT THE KURDISH ISSUE BACK IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. AN ARTICLE IN "CUMHURIYET'S" APRIL 4 ISSUE COVERED A

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BRITISH REPORT OF A MEETING BETWEEN IRAQI AND TURKISH KURDS, OSTENTATIOUSLY USING THE WORD "KURD" ABOUT TURKISH CITIZENS. BY PUTTING THE WORD "KURD" IN AMERICAN MOUTHS AS WELL, THE PAPER WAS ABLE TO PUBLISH MORE ON THE KURDS WITHOUT INCURRING THE GOT'S WRATH. AT THE SAME TIME, "CUMHURIYET" IS ENGAGED IN AN ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) CRITICIZING THE DECA (REF B), AND IS DELIGHTED TO PUBLISH ANYTHING WHICH CAN GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF "COLDNESS" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE OZAL GOVERNMENT. THREE OTHER FRONT PAGE STORIES IN THE SAME ISSUE FOCUSSED ON NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR TURKEY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL VERSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON TURKEY FOR 1986 WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO CONGRESS ON JAN. 30. THE REPORT IS STILL CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND EMBARGOED UNTIL ITS SCHEDULED RELEASE FEBRUARY 19. WE THANK POSTS FOR THEIR FINE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FINAL PRODUCT.

2. TURKEY IS A REPUBLIC BASED ON A MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND A STRONG PRESIDENCY. ELECTIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE ARE BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. TWELVE PARTIES COMPETED FREELY IN BYELECTIONS HELD ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1986, IN WHICH THE RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY WON 6 OF THE 11 SEATS CONTESTED. GENERAL ELECTIONS WITH FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PARTIES ARE SCHEDULED FOR NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 1988.

THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR

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MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER IN THE COUNTRY, EXCEPT IN MARTIAL LAW AREAS. IN THOSE AREAS, MILITARY AUTHORITIES OVERSEE SECURITY THROUGH THE GENDARMERIE, WHICH ALSO

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FUNCTIONS AS THE POLICE IN RURAL AREAS. AT THE END OF 1986, 5 OF 67 PROVINCES, ALL IN THE SOUTHEAST WHERE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE FACED AN ARMED INSURGENCY BY KURDISH SEPARATIST SINCE AUGUST 1984, REMAINED UNDER MARTIAL LAW. IN ADDITION, EIGHT PROVINCES (ISTANBUL PLUS

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SEVEN PROVINCES IN THE SOUTHEAST) REMAIN UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH EMPOWERS THEIR GOVERNORS TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE POWERS OF MARTIAL LAW COMMANDERS.

THE END OF MARTIAL LAW IN NOVEMBER 1985 IN ISTANBUL AND ANKARA REMOVED A MAJOR RESTRAINT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, WHICH IS NOW FREE TO PUBLISH ALMOST ANYTHING.

TURKEY IS MOVING FROM A CLOSED ECONOMY DOMINATED BY THE STATE SECTOR TO A FREE MARKET, EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH THE RATES OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT ARE STILL HIGH, THE ECONOMY UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCES.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1982 AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF ASSOCIATIONS AND UNIONS, AND ON ORGANIC LINKS BETWEEN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF TURKISH CITIZENS TO OWN PROPERTY. THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL CITIZENS AS TURKS. EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIAL STATUS GRANTED TO NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES BY THE LAUSANNE TREATY (1923), TURKEY DOES NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZE THE SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITIES.

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IN GENERAL, THE POSITIVE TREND IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUED IN 1986. THE GOVERNMENT MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN REDUCING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS ARE STILL EVIDENT.

THE JUDICIARY HAS CONTINUED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INDEPENDENCE. WITH TWO MAJOR EXCEPTIONS, THE MASS TRIALS OF RECENT YEARS WERE CONCLUDED, MOSTLY WITH ACQUITTALS. SEVERAL TRIALS INITIATED IN 1986 AGAINST CRITICS OF THE STATE WERE EITHER DISMISSED OR ENDED IN ACQUITTALS.

HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THAT TORTURE IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN TURKEY. WITH THE RETURN OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AND THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESS, ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE BRUTALITY HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY PUBLICIZED, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SWIFT ACTION TO PROSECUTE THE PERPETRATORS. IN ADDITION, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND THE PRESS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING REPRESSIVE ACTIVITIES BY SECURITY FORCES

COMBATING THE ARMED KURDISH SEPARATIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY. A NUMBER OF REPORTS, SOME OF THEM MEDICALLY DOCUMENTED, NOTED THE POLICE USE OF TORTURE, USUALLY DURING INITIAL PERIODS OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION. A DRAFT LAW AIMED AT ELIMINATING THESE ABUSES

BY REQUIRING THE PRESENCE OF A LAWYER DURING INTERROGATION WAS DEFEATED IN PARLIAMENT IN 1986.

IN OCTOBER THE RECENTLY-APPOINTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE CONDEMNED TORTURE AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY. PENALTIES FOR PRACTICING TORTURE REMAIN LOW, WITH DEATH BY TORTURE CONSIDERED INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER (TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLE 243). A BILL TO RAISE THE PENALTIES FOR TORTURE WAS DEFEATED IN PARLIAMENT IN 1986. HOWEVER, A REVISION OF THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE, WHICH DATES FROM

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THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC, IS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL KILLING

THERE WERE NO ACCUSATIONS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES IN 1986. IN SEPTEMBER 21 PERSONS DIED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE NEVE SHALOM SYNAGOGUE IN ISTANBUL. ARAB TERRORISTS ARE BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK.

NUMEROUS CLASHES BETWEEN SEPARATIST KURDISH GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF ABOUT 17 TURKISH MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS AND CIVILIANS IN 1986.

THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) DESCRIBES THE INSURGENTS AS PROPONENTS OF AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE, WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE PARTS OF PRESENT-DAY TURKEY, IRAN, AND IRAQ. DRUG SMUGGLERS, ARMENIAN TERRORISTS, AND KURDISH GUERRILLAS OPERATING FROM BASES IN IRAQ, IRAN, AND SYRIA ARE ALL INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENTS, ACCORDING TO THE TGS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE NO KNOWN DISAPPEARANCES CAUSED BY EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION GROUPS.

C. TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR

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PUNISHMENT

THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT "NO ONE SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR ILL-TREATMENT INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY." HOWEVER, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE INITIAL PRETRIAL PERIOD, REMAINED AN UNRESOLVED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. POLITICIANS, THE PRESS, AND OUTSIDE MONITORING GROUPS ALLEGED THAT PRISONERS WERE SUBJECT TO TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT IN PRISONS AND DETENTION HOUSES. ALTHOUGH MANY ALLEGATIONS CONCERN TREATMENT THAT COULD BE DEFINED AS POLICE BRUTALITY, I.E., THEY INVOLVED BEATINGS BY POLICE OFFICIALS AIMED AT INTIMIDATING A SUSPECT OR PRISONER OR RESULTED FROM PERSONAL ANIMOSITY, IN OTHER CASES THE TREATMENT CLEARLY APPEARS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO HAVE RISEN TO THE LEVEL OF TORTURE. MANY ALLEGATIONS WERE DOCUMENTED BY MEDICAL EVIDENCE. IN A FEBRUARY 1986 INTERIM REPORT AND IN ITS OCTOBER 1986 WORLD REPORT, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REITERATED ITS CHARGES THAT TORTURE IS "WIDESPREAD AND SYSTEMATIC" IN TURKEY.

WITH THE RETURN OF FULL POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND A FREE PRESS TO TURKEY, ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE RECEIVED WIDE PUBLICITY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED WITH PROMPT ACTION TO SUSPEND THE ALLEGED OFFENDERS AND INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE. IN AN INTERVIEW, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE SAID 1,459 PERSONS ACCUSED OF TORTURE WERE PROSECUTED IN 1986. OF THESE, 100 WERE CONVICTED, AND MANY CASES ARE CONTINUING. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOVERNMENT FREQUENTLY STATED THAT ALLEGING TORTURE HAD BECOME A STANDARD DEFENSE IN ALL TYPES OF CRIMINAL CASES.

HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE CRITICIZED THOSE WHO ALLEGE TORTURE, CHARGING THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS ARE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO DESTROY TURKEY'S

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INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY AGREEING WITH THESE JUDGMENTS, THE NEWLY APPOINTED JUSTICE MINISTER, IN HIS FIRST STATEMENT AFTER ASSUMING OFFICE, POINTED OUT THAT TORTURE CERTAINLY EXISTS IN TURKEY, INASMUCH AS OVER 500 OFFICIALS HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF IT. HE WENT ON TO CONDEMN TORTURE AND TO EXPRESS THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO ERADICATE IT BY PROMPT AND SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS.

PUNISHMENT FOR TORTURE MAY CHANGE WITH THE ADOPTION OF A NEW CRIMINAL CODE NOW BEING DRAFTED. CURRENTLY, THE CRIMINAL CODE, WHICH DATES FROM THE 1920'S, CATEGORIZES MURDER BY TORTURE AS UNINTENTIONAL MANSLAUGHTER, WHICH IS

NORMALLY PENALIZED BY 8 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. PENALTIES FOR TORTURE WHICH DOES NOT RESULT IN DEATH ARE LESS

SEVERE, RANGING FROM 3 TO 5 YEARS. IN 1986 THE PARLIAMENT DEFEATED A BILL, WHICH WAS OPPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT, PROPOSING THE INCREASE OF THIS PENALTY TO A RANGE FROM 5 TO 10 YEARS.

MANY TURKS LINK THE MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOTION THAT THE POLICE SHOULD ENFORCE PUBLIC ORDER BY WHATEVER MEANS ARE NECESSARY. OTHER CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS INCLUDE THE GENERALLY LOW EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF POLICE PERSONNEL AND THE LACK OF ADEQUATE TRAINING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED THE LATTER PROBLEM BY TAKING STEPS TO UPGRADE THE POLICE FORCE, REQUIRING SECONDARY LEVEL EDUCATION FOR NEW RECRUITS, AND ORGANIZING SPECIAL COURSES TO INSTRUCT POLICEMEN AS TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE LIMITS ON THEIR POWERS UNDER THE LAW.

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PRISON CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO BE AN ISSUE OF CONCERN IN PARLIAMENT AND AMONG NONGOVERNMENTAL BODIES SUCH AS THE BAR ASSOCIATION, MEMBERS OF WHICH SENT A PETITION TO THE GOVERNMENT IN APRIL REQUESTING IMPROVEMENTS. IN FEBRUARY ADANA PRISON EXPERIENCED A 23-DAY HUNGER STRIKE FOR BETTER CONDITIONS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CHARGE THAT THIS STRIKE WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND DIRECTED FROM OUTSIDE. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT, THOUGH, THAT CONDITIONS IN PRISONS HAVE IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF THE ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE BY THE PARLIAMENTARY PRISON COMMISSION, THE PRESS, AND OTHER NONGOVERNMENTAL GROUPS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES A WARRANT FROM THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR ANY DETENTION, EXCEPT IN CERTAIN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G., WHEN A PERSON IS CAUGHT REDHANDED. THE ARREST WARRANT ITSELF IS ISSUED BY A JUDGE AFTER A HEARING. PERSONS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY MAY BE HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT CHARGE BY THE POLICE OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR UP TO 24 HOURS, ACCORDING TO THE POLICE POWERS ACT OF 1985, WHICH REDUCED THE PERIOD FROM 48 HOURS. IF THE POLICE OBTAIN A COURT ORDER, HOWEVER, THE PERIOD MAY BE EXTENDED TO 15 DAYS. DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE IS 15 DAYS IN CASES OF "OFFENSES COMMITTED COLLECTIVELY."

IN THE 5 PROVINCES UNDER MARTIAL LAW AND THE 8 UNDER STATE-OF-EMERGENCY RULE, AN INDIVIDUAL MAY BE DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGE FOR UP TO 30 DAYS. MARTIAL LAW

AUTHORITIES DO NOT NEED WARRANTS TO DETAIN SUSPECTS. MARTIAL LAW COMMANDERS, SUBJECT TO PRESCRIBED JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, MAY IMPOSE INTERNAL EXILE FOR UP TO 5 YEARS

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ON PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE ACTING AGAINST "GENERAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER.: NO SUCH SENTENCES WERE IMPOSED IN 1986.

ONCE TAKEN FORMALLY INTO CUSTODY TO FACE CHARGES, A DETAINEE APPEARS FIRST BEFORE A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, WHO INFORMS HIM OF THE SUSPICIONS OR CHARGES WHICH LED TO HIS DETENTION. IF THE PROSECUTOR DECIDES TO PURSUE THE CASE, THE DETAINEE IS ARRAIGNED BEFORE A JUDGE AND ALLOWED TO RETAIN A LAWYER. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHETHER TO HAVE THE ACCUSED HELD IN DETENTION OR TO PERMIT PROVISIONAL RELEASE DURING THE PRETRIAL INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD.

IN ALL CASES THE AUTHORITIES MAY HOLD A DETAINEE INCOMMUNICADO WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME LIMITS UNTIL HE IS CHARGED OR RELEASED. ACCORDING TO THE POLICE POWERS ACT, A DETAINEE'S NEXT OF KIN MUST BE NOTIFIED "IN THE SHORTEST TIME," EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE SECRECY IS DEEMED NECESSARY, SUCH AS WHEN OTHERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN A GIVEN CRIME. A DETAINEE MAY NOT HAVE ACCESS TO A LAWYER UNTIL HE IS BROUGHT BEFORE A JUDGE. PARLIAMENT IN 1986 DEFEATED A BILL REQUIRING THAT ALL ARRESTED PERSONS BE GIVEN IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO A LAWYER. SIMILAR PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE REVIEWING THE CRIMINAL CODE.

THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE INCLUDES A BAIL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE ARRAIGNING JUDGE MAY RELEASE THE ACCUSED ON PRESENTATION OF AN APPROPRIATE GUARANTEE, OR ORDER HIM HELD IN PREVENTIVE DETENTION IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT HE MAY FLEE OR DESTROY EVIDENCE. THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES THE

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RIGHT OF DETAINEES TO REQUEST SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL, AND RELEASE "IF THE RESTRICTION PLACED UPON THEM IS NOT LAWFUL."

TURKISH JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, UNDER BOTH CIVIL AND MARTIAL LAW, HAVE THE POWER TO IMPOSE SENTENCES OF INTERNAL EXILE. INTERNAL EXILE IS PROVIDED FOR IN THE EXECUTION OF SENTENCES ACT OF 1986, BUT THE NUMBER OF CONVICTS, IF ANY, ON WHOM THIS WAS ACTUALLY IMPOSED AFTER

SENTENCING IS UNKNOWN. AN ARMENIAN PRIEST SENTENCED TO INTERNAL EXILE UPON HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON IN MAY 1986

IS STILL RESIDING IN ISTANBUL, PENDING A HIGH COURT DECISION ON HIS APPEAL OF THE SENTENCE.

THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS FORCED LABOR, AND IT DOES NOT OCCUR IN PRACTICE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

IN MOST CASES, DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN TRIAL, WHICH MAY BE ATTENDED BY FAMILY MEMBERS AND LAWYERS. MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRESS ARE ALSO USUALLY FREE TO ATTEND. IN SOME TRIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE HELD IN MILITARY PRISONS OR ON MILITARY COMPOUNDS, MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MUST SEEK PERMISSION TO ATTEND. THE AUTHORITIES USUALLY GRANT SUCH PERMISSION. IN OCTOBER THE DEFENSE IN A TORTURE TRIAL SUCCEEDED IN HAVING THE JUDGE CHANGED AFTER AN ARGUMENT ARISING FROM HIS BAN ON PUBLIC ATTENDANCE AT THE TRIAL.

THE CONSTITUTION ACCORDS A DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THE LAWYER OF HIS CHOICE. HOWEVER, IN CERTAIN TRIALS STEMMING FROM THE KURDISH INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTHEAST, DEFENDANTS WHO CANNOT SPEAK TURKISH REPORTEDLY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING WITH THEIR LAWYERS, AS THEY

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ARE FORBIDDEN FROM USING ANY LANGUAGE EXCEPT TURKISH WITH VISITORS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT LAWYERS IN THESE TRIALS HAVE EXPERIENCED SOME HARASSMENT.

ALTHOUGH TURKEY IS PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM, ITS COURT SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES ARE MODELED ON THE ITALIAN (CRIMINAL) AND SWISS (CIVIL) LAW CODES. THERE ARE NO SHARI'A (ISLAMIC) OR OTHER RELIGIOUS COURTS.

THE CONSTITUTION DECLARES THAT "JUDGES SHALL BE INDEPENDENT IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES" AND PROVIDES FOR THEIR SECURE TENURE. IT ALSO STATES THAT NO AUTHORITY MAY GIVE ORDERS OR RECOMMENDATIONS TO JUDGES CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. PUBLIC PROSECUTORS ARE ALSO INDEPENDENT, AND, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE ORDERED TO BEGIN PROSECUTIONS, THEY DECIDE THEREAFTER WHETHER TO PURSUE THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1986, THE PROSECUTOR IN FORMER PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT'S TRIAL ON CHARGES OF VIOLATING A BAN ON HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITY REQUESTED A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL, WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE JUDGE. THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTORS, APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, SELECTS JUDGES AND

PROSECUTORS FOR THE HIGHER COURTS AND OVERSEES THOSE OF THE LOWER COURTS.

IN PROVINCES UNDER MARTIAL LAW, ALL DEFENDANTS ACCUSED OF TERRORISM OR OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST THE SECURITY OF THE STATE ARE TRIED IN MILITARY COURTS. MARTIAL LAW JUDGES NORMALLY HAVE LAW DEGREES AND OBSERVE THE SAME STANDARDS AS CRIMINAL JUDGES. THEY MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED AT THE DISCRETION OF MILITARY COMMANDERS. IN PROVINCES UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, CIVILIAN COURTS TRY CASES.

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CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COURTS GENERALLY CONDUCT TRIALS UNDER THE SAME RULES OF PROCEDURE, BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION OR MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS, RESPECTIVELY. A CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL IN EITHER SYSTEM MAY BE APPEALED TO THE APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN OR MILITARY APPEALS COURT. IF AN APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS A LOWER COURT'S GUILTY VERDICT, THE CASE IS SENT BACK TO THE LOWER COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION. IF THE LOWER COURT INSISTS ON ITS ORIGINAL VERDICT, THE CASE IS RETURNED TO THE JOINT COUNCIL OF THE APPEALS COURT FOR A BINDING VERDICT. IN SOME CASES, PARTICULARLY CAPITAL CASES, APPEALS ARE AUTOMATIC TO THE SUPREME COURT OR TO THE HIGH COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS. IF A DEATH SENTENCE IS CONFIRMED BY THE APPEALS COURT, IT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THEN BY PARLIAMENT, AND FINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BY OCTOBER 1986, NEARLY 1,000 DEATH SENTENCES WERE AWAITING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' REVIEW, AND 105 REVIEW BY PARLIAMENT. PARLIAMENT HAS NOT APPROVED ANY DEATH SENTENCES SINCE 1984.

A LIMITED NUMBER OF SPECIAL TRIALS, SUCH AS THE TRIAL OF OVER 1,400 LEADERS OF THE CONFEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNIONS (DISK) AND THOSE IN THE FIRST PEACE ASSOCIATION CASE, HAVE CONTINUED FOR UP TO 5 YEARS. IN DECEMBER THE COURT REACHED A VERDICT IN THE DISK TRIAL, WHICH BOTH THE DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTION PLAN TO APPEAL. THE COURT FOUND 264 DEFENDANTS GUILTY AND SENTENCED THEM FROM 1 TO 10 YEARS IN PRISON. ANOTHER 1,169 DEFENDANTS WERE FOUND INNOCENT, 29 CASES WERE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER COURTS, AND 15 CASES WERE DROPPED. THE COURT ALSO ORDERED DISK AND ALL BUT TWO OF ITS AFFILIATED UNIONS CLOSED PERMANENTLY. THE DISK DEFENDANTS (EXCEPT FOR A FEW SERVING SENTENCES AS A RESULT OF CONVICTION ON OTHER CHARGES) AND ALL OF THE PEACE ASSOCIATION DEFENDANTS REMAIN FREE ON BAIL. UNDER

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THE "EXECUTION OF SENTENCES ACT" OF 1986, WHICH REDUCES SENTENCES TO BE SERVED TO ONE-HALF THE IMPOSED TIME, MOST OR ALL OF THESE DEFENDANTS, EVEN IF FOUND GUILTY, WILL HAVE ALREADY SERVED OUT THEIR SENTENCES.

ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD IN TURKEY'S JAILS VARY GREATLY DEPENDING ON THE SOURCE AND THE SOURCE'S DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PRISONER. THE TURKISH PRESS IN 1985, THE MOST RECENT YEAR FOR WHICH FIGURES WERE AVAILABLE, LISTED ABOUT 3,600 PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES AGAINST THE SECURITY OF THE STATE, CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY FORCES, OR FOR BELONGING TO ARMED ORGANIZATIONS. OF THIS NUMBER, 1,700 WERE CONVICTED OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE. SEVERAL THOUSAND OTHER PEOPLE WERE INCARCERATED WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION OR UNDERGOING TRIAL FOR SIMILAR OFFENSES. AN OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT IN TURKEY THERE WERE 10,000 PRISONERS CONVICTED OF "THOUGHT CRIMES." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SEVERAL HUNDRED PRISONERS WHOM IT TERMED "PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE" CONVICTED OF SUCH OFFENSES AS "MEMBERSHIP IN ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS" OR "MAKING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA."

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE INVIOLABILITY OF A PERSON'S DOMICILE AND THE PRIVACY OF CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATION. ENTRY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND INTERCEPTION OR MONITORING OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE ARE PERMITTED ONLY UPON ISSUANCE OF A JUDICIAL WARRANT.

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IN THE FIVE PROVINCES STILL UNDER MARTIAL LAW, THE AUTHORITIES HAVE THE LEGAL POWER "WITHOUT NEED OF A WARRANT, APPLICATION OR REQUEST...TO SEARCH RESIDENCES, OR BUILDINGS OF ALL SOCIETIES, ASSOCIATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, UNIONS, CLUBS, BUSINESS LOCATIONS, OR OFFICES BELONGING TO OR OCCUPIED BY JURIDICAL AS WELL AS PRIVATE BODIES." THEY MAY ALSO SEARCH, HOLD, OR SEIZE WITHOUT WARRANT PERSONS, LETTERS, TELEGRAMS, AND DOCUMENTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS POWER IS WIDELY USED OR ABUSED.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

THE END OF MARTIAL LAW IN NOVEMBER 1985 IN ISTANBUL AND ANKARA REMOVED A MAJOR RESTRAINT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, WHICH IS NOW FREE TO PUBLISH ALMOST ANYTHING. THE

CRIMINAL CODE, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO PROHIBIT THE ADVOCACY OF CLASS OR RACIAL DOMINATION (COMMUNISM) OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A THEOCRATIC STATE (ISLAMIC

FUNDAMENTALISM) OR OF A SEPARATE STATE ON ETHNIC LINES (KURDISH SEPARATISM). TRIALS OF PERSONS EXPRESSING SUCH VIEWS TAKE PLACE IN ONE OF EIGHT STATE SECURITY COURTS WHICH DEAL ONLY WITH SUCH CASES.

IN ADDITION, IN RESPONSE TO THE INCREASING PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF NAKED WOMEN IN THE SENSATIONALIST POPULAR PRESS, PARLIAMENT IN MARCH 1986 ADOPTED THE "PROTECTION OF MINORS FROM HARMFUL PUBLICATIONS ACT." THIS ACT ESTABLISHED A BOARD WHICH REVIEWS PUBLICATIONS AGAINST WHICH A COMPLAINT IS BROUGHT. THE BOARD CANNOT PREVENT PUBLICATION BUT CAN DEMAND THAT A PUBLICATION BE SOLD ONLY IN AN OPAQUE PLASTIC BAG. IT CAN ALSO CENSOR MOVIES AND VIDEOTAPES. THIS LAW, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN CHALLENGED,

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AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAS AGREED TO REVIEW ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH RULED UNTIL THE RESUMPTION OF CIVILIAN RULE IN 1983, PROMULGATED A LAW SHORTLY BEFORE ITS DISSOLUTION BANNING ALL CRITICISM OF THE DECREES, COMMUNIQUES, AND ACTIONS OF THAT BODY AND ITS MEMBERS. THE SAME LAW ALSO PROSCRIBED ALL STATEMENTS PRAISING OR CONDEMNING LEADERS OF BANNED (PRE-1980) POLITICAL PARTIES. HOWEVER, ALL PROSECUTIONS UNDER THIS LAW HAVE THUS FAR RESULTED IN ACQUITTALS. IN 1986 ILHAN SELCUK AND OKAY GONENSIN, THE EDITORS OF THE LEFTIST DAILY CUMHURIYET, WERE PROSECUTED AND ACQUITTED FOR CRITICIZING THE PRESIDENT AND THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 1980 IN A COLUMN. THE EDITORS OF THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TURKISH DAILY NEWS FACED A SIMILAR CHARGE AND WERE ALSO ACQUITTED. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER MUZAFFAR SARAC WAS ACQUITTED IN OCTOBER 1986 OF CHARGES STEMMING FROM A SPEECH HE GAVE IN IRELAND ALMOST A YEAR BEFORE. AS "BANNED" POLITICAL LEADERS PLAY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN ROLE IN TODAY'S POLITICS, THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST PRAISING OR CONDEMNING THEM HAS COME TO BE TOTALLY IGNORED.

WRITERS ARE STILL BEING PROSECUTED FOR WRITING ALLEGEDLY PRO-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OR VIOLATING SECULARIST PRINCIPLES. PROFESSOR YALCIN KUCUK IS FACING HIS FOURTH RETRIAL ON CHARGES THAT HIS BOOK, "TOWARD A NEW REPUBLIC," IS COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, AND ALI RIZA DEMIRCAN WAS PROSECUTED FOR HIS BOOK "SEXUAL LIFE ACCORDING TO ISLAM;" NEITHER WAS IMPRISONED. TRIALS OF SEVERAL OTHERS CONTINUE, AND NEW CASES ARE OPENED REGULARLY.

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THE NEWSPAPER HURRIYET REPORTED THAT A PUBLISHER, RECEP MARASLI, WAS SENTENCED TO 27 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT ON CHARGES OF SEPARATIST AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AND BELONGING TO AN ILLEGAL KURDISH SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL WROTE TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT THIS CASE. THE UNDERSECRETARY OF THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, RESPONDING THAT AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL COULD NOT INTERFERE IN TURKEY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOTED A "DIFFERENCE IN OPINION" IN THE MATTER, IN WHICH "WHAT WE DEFINE AS A CRIME IN ACTION IS INTERPRETED BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS A THOUGHT CRIME."

THE PRESS IN TURKEY IS PRIVATELY OWNED AND REFLECTS A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL VIEWS. TURKISH RADIO AND TELEVISION (TRT) IS A GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY. A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ITS PROGRAMING CAME ABOUT IN 1986. IN PREVIOUS YEARS, TRT DEVOTED THE LARGEST PORTION OF ITS NEWS COVERAGE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IN 1986 TRT COVERED THE ACTIVITIES OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT IN ITS NEWS PROGRAMS AND SOMETIMES MADE THEM THE LEAD STORY. PRIOR TO THE SEPTEMBER 28, 1986, BYELECTIONS, ALL 12 POLITICAL PARTIES RECEIVED FULL COVERAGE. EVEN "BANNED" POLITICAL LEADERS SUCH AS FORMER PRIME MINISTERS SULEYMAN DEMIREL AND BULENT ECEVIT WERE SHOWN ON TELEVISION, THOUGH NOT IN POLITICAL CAPACITIES. THERE ARE WIDESPREAD ALLEGATIONS--WHICH TRT'S DIRECTOR DENIED IN A PRESS INTERVIEW--THAT CERTAIN ARTISTS AND WORKS ARE BANNED FROM RADIO AND TELEVISION DUE TO EITHER POLITICAL OR CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES ARE PERMITTED WITH PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORITIES. SUCH REQUESTS ARE GENERALLY

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GRANTED. ACCORDING TO CURRENT REGULATIONS, MARCHING ROUTES, RALLY AREAS, CROWD DISPERSION ROUTES, AND POSTER HANGING LOCATIONS ARE TO BE FIXED FOR EACH CITY EVERY JANUARY.

THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, WHICH REFLECTED GOVERNMENT CONCERN OVER THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOME ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRECEDING THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF

1980, PROHIBITS ASSOCIATIONS FROM HAVING ANY TIES TO POLITICAL PARTIES OR ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. FOR EXAMPLE, SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION WHO CIRCULATED A PETITION AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY WERE TRIED ON CHARGES THAT THEIR PETITION VIOLATED THE BAN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY ASSOCIATIONS.

ASSOCIATION ACTIVITY IS CLOSELY MONITORED BY THE

GOVERNMENT. ALL ASSOCIATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE AN ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, WHICH IS ATTENDED BY OFFICIALS OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S SECURITY STAFF. THEY MUST CERTIFY THAT ALL REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH, OR THE ASSOCIATION CAN BE CLOSED. ASSOCIATIONS MUST SUBMIT THEIR CHARTERS FOR THE APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES BEFORE THEY ARE ALLOWED TO FORM. TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, FORMED IN JULY, IS STILL AWAITING PERMISSION TO OPERATE AS A LEGAL ASSOCIATION.

THE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICAL PARTIES LAW PROHIBIT STUDENTS AND FACULTY MEMBERS FROM BECOMING MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES OR INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THUS FACULTY OR STUDENT POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ANY TYPE ARE BANNED, AND POLITICAL PARTIES ARE FORBIDDEN TO FORM YOUTH BRANCHES. PERMISSION OF A UNIVERSITY'S RECTOR

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IS REQUIRED FOR ANY STUDENT TO JOIN ANY ASSOCIATION.

SOME FACULTY MEMBERS WHO WERE DISMISSED WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS IN EFFECT HAVE PETITIONED FOR REINSTATEMENT. SOME OF THOSE FIRED BY THE HIGHER EDUCATION COUNCIL, WHICH CONTROLS THE UNIVERSITIES, WON THEIR SUITS, THOUGH NONE HAS YET BEEN REINSTATED. THOSE FIRED BY MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES ARE BANNED FROM ANY PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, AND MANY ARE CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MARTIAL LAW NO. 1402, WHICH GAVE MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES THE POWER TO FIRE THEM.

THOSE UNIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS SET UP UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1983 LABOR LAW HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ORGANIZE WORKPLACES FREELY AND TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. ALTHOUGH ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S TOTAL WORK FORCE OF SOME 16 MILLION IS ORGANIZED, OVER 60 PERCENT OF INDUSTRIALIZED WORKERS ARE UNION MEMBERS COVERED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. AS A RESULT, UNIONS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY ON ITS WORK RULES AND WAGE STRUCTURE. THE 1983 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, STRIKE, AND LOCK-OUT LAW STRICTLY REGULATES THE BARGAINING PROCESS AND MAKES STRIKES OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS (GENERAL STRIKES, POLITICAL STRIKES, AND SOLIDARITY

STRIKES) ILLEGAL. UNIONS ARE ABLE TO REPRESENT THEIR MEMBERS, ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND ARE RESPONSIVE TO THEIR MEMBERS' INTERESTS.

A RECENT COURT DECISION ORDERED THE PERMANENT CLOSING OF DISK (CONFEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNIONS), WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE SUSPENDED UNDER MARTIAL LAW FOLLOWING THE 1980 MILITARY TAKEOVER AND WHOSE LEADERS HAVE BEEN ON

TRIAL SINCE DECEMBER 24, 1981. THE VERDICT IN THE TRIAL IS BEING APPEALED. THE DISK LEADERS WERE CHARGED WITH

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"TRYING TO CHANGE THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT" AND WITH "INTERFERING WITH THE WORK OF THE PARLIAMENT." SOME DEFENDANTS ARE CHARGED WITH CULPABILITY IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE. ALL DEFENDANTS (EXCEPT TWO CONVICTED OF OTHER CRIMES) REMAIN FREE ON THEIR OWN RECOGNIZANCE, BUT THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS FUNDS REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF COURT-APPOINTED TRUSTEES. AT LEAST TWO UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH TURK-IS HAVE CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW DISK UNIONS TO RESUME THEIR ACTIVITIES.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY TRADE UNIONS IS BANNED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE TRADE UNION LAW. THUS UNIONS CAN NEITHER ENDORSE CANDIDATES AND PARTIES NOR MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR CAMPAIGNS. TRADE UNION ACTIVITY IN DEFENSE OF WORKERS' SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, HOWEVER, IS NOT REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE UNIONS HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THAT DISTINCTION TO MOUNT STRENUOUS PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST VARIOUS GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND TO LOBBY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS IN SUPPORT OF LABOR POSITIONS. THESE CAMPAIGNS INCLUDED AN EFFORT IN JANUARY TO PERSUADE THE PARLIAMENT TO BRING THE LAWS RESTRICTING UNION ACTIVITY INTO HARMONY WITH THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTIONS. BYELECTION ACTIVITIES IN SEPTEMBER PEAKED IN AN ELECTION EVE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE TURK-IS PRESIDENT CALLED WORKERS TO VOTE AGAINST THE GOVERNING PARTY. IN OCTOBER HE SHARPLY CRITICIZED RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE ACTIVITIES OF A MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT, UNION, AND EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ILO. THE MAIN CONFEDERATION, TURK-IS, IS AN AFFILIATE OF THE

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INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU),

AND MOST TURK-IS MEMBER UNIONS ARE AFFILIATED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS.

BOTH THE ILO AND THE ICFTU HAVE CLOSELY MONITORED THE SITUATION OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN TURKEY SINCE THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1980. ILO REPORTS HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED COOPERATION THE ORGANIZATION HAS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS IMPROVEMENT ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES. HOWEVER, THE ONGOING DISK TRIAL REMAINS A MAJOR CONCERN, AS DO SOME RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE UNIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES). THE ICFTU HAS FOLLOWED THE DISK TRIAL CLOSELY, ALTHOUGH DISK IS NOT AN ICFTU AFFILIATE, AND HAS URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO AMEND

ITS LABOR LAWS AND CONSTITUTION ALONG THE LINES URGED BY TURKEY'S LARGEST UNION CONFEDERATION, THE ICFTU-AFFILIATED TURK-IS.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE MAJORITY OF TURKS ARE SUNNI MUSLIMS. THERE ARE ALSO AN ECLECTIC MINORITY "ALEVI" GROUP MADE UP OF ADHERENTS TO DIFFERENT VARIETIES OF SHI'ISM, VARIOUS SMALL CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS GROUPS, AND A SMALL JEWISH COMMUNITY.

TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC HAVE REGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULAR GOVERNMENT AS AN ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE OF A MODERN, WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, AND THE CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMS SECULARISM TO BE A BASIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE STATE. MANY OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED VISIBILITY OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE AND PIETY IN RECENT YEARS. BUT STRINGENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RESTRICTIONS HINDER THE EFFORTS OF A SMALL MINORITY OF MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS WHO ADVOCATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATE WITH A SHARI'A

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LEGAL SYSTEM.

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THAT "EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND CONVICTION." CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AIMED AT PROTECTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM AND SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE LIMIT THAT RIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY. AS A RESULT OF THE KURDISH REBELLION OF 1925, LED BY A SHEIKH OF THE NAKSHIBENDI MYSTICAL SECT, ALL SUCH RELIGIOUS ORDERS WERE BANNED. THEY CONTINUE TO EXIST, HOWEVER, AND THE PRESS FREQUENTLY COMMENTS ON THEIR ACTIVITIES. NUMEROUS ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS TEACHERS CONNECTED EITHER OPENLY OR BY REPUTE WITH THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER IN ISTANBUL HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED FOR ADVOCATING A THEOCRATIC STATE. IN LATE 1986, ONE OF THEM, ADNAN HOCA, WAS UNDER

PSYCHIATRIC OBSERVATION BY COURT ORDER. HE, TOO, WAS CHARGED WITH ADVOCATING A THEOCRATIC STATE.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW PROHIBITS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY ADVOCATING THEOCRACY OR THE FOUNDATION OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT, EVEN PARTIALLY, ON RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER, AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 1985 ACQUITTAL ON APPEAL OF SEVERAL LEADERS OF THE FORMER NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (NSP), WHICH WAS CONSIDERED A "RELIGIOUS" PARTY, THE PARTY SUED AND WON, IN OCTOBER 1986, THE LIFTING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 10-YEAR BAN ON ITS LEADERS' ACTIVITIES. THE SUCCESSOR TO THE NSP, THE REFAH (AFFLUENCE) PARTY, IS LEGAL AND CAMPAIGNED IN THE

SEPTEMBER BYELECTIONS WITH THE OPEN PARTICIPATION OF FORMER NSP LEADERS BUT WON ONLY 5.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTE.

THE CRIMINAL CODE FORBIDS PROSELYTIZING BY ANY PERSON OR

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GROUP. TWENTY-THREE TURKISH JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WERE ACQUITTED ON APPEAL IN JUNE 1986. IN ITS DECISION, THE COURT DEFENDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION, STATING THAT "EVERY TURKISH CITIZEN HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, AND IS FREE TO CHOOSE HIS FAITH AND PERFORM ITS ACTS OF WORSHIP."

IN DECEMBER 1985, ISTANBUL POLICE SEQUESTERED BIBLES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN TURKISH OF THE TURKISH BIBLE SOCIETY. IN MARCH 1986, AFTER THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER, THE CABINET CANCELED ITS RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTING AND DISTRIBUTING BIBLICAL TEXTS, AND CIRCULATION OF BIBLES NOW PROCEEDS UNHINDERED.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, "INSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND MORAL EDUCATION," IN ACCORD WITH A STATE-PREPARED CURRICULUM, IS COMPULSORY FOR ALL STUDENTS. DURING THE 1985-86 SCHOOL YEAR, ASSYRIAN CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTHEAST COMPLAINED THAT THEIR CHILDREN WERE BEING FORCED TO ATTEND ISLAMIC INSTRUCTION. IN 1986 CHRISTIANS IN ISKENDERUN MADE THE SAME COMPLAINT, AND IN OCTOBER THE EDUCATION MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT CONFIRMING THAT NON-MUSLIMS WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION CLASSES BUT WOULD BE EXCUSED FROM THE "PRACTICAL" SECTIONS, WHICH INCLUDE MEMORIZATION OF KORANIC VERSES AND INSTRUCTIONS IN PRAYER. THE COURSES--ABOUT 2 HOURS PER WEEK--ARE TAUGHT BY LAY TEACHERS. EXTRACURRICULAR KORAN COURSES USING GOVERNMENT-APPROVED TEXTS ARE PERMITTED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED KORAN COURSES RUN BY FUNDAMENTALIST SECTS TEACHING A MORE RADICAL BRAND OF ISLAM.

AMONG OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SMALL NUMBERS OF ARMENIAN ORTHODOX AND ARMENIAN CATHOLIC, GREEK ORTHODOX AND GREEK CATHOLIC, BULGARIAN ORTHODOX, ROMAN CATHOLIC, SYRIAN AND ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN, PROTESTANTS, AND JEWISH BELIEVERS ARE

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FOUND IN TURKEY, PRIMARILY IN ISTANBUL. THESE GROUPS OPERATE CHURCHES, MONASTERIES, SYNAGOGUES, SCHOOLS, AND CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS SUCH AS HOSPITALS AND ORPHANAGES. GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS, BEYOND THOSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, ARE INCLUDED IN THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE, WHICH PROVIDES THAT NON-MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITIES MAY HAVE THEIR CHILDREN TAUGHT IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE.

IN 1986 THE GOVERNMENT TOOK SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO RESOLVE SEVERAL ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO NON-MUSLIM GROUPS. THERE ARE MANY REPORTS THAT THE GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE WILL SOON OBTAIN PERMISSION TO REBUILD ITS ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, DESTROYED BY FIRE IN 1941; THE PATRIARCHATE HAS BEEN SEEKING PERMISSION TO REBUILD FOR OVER 40 YEARS. THE RESOLUTION OF THE BIBLE SOCIETY CASE AND THE RELEASE IN 1986 OF AN ARMENIAN PRIEST CONVICTED OF SEDITION IN 1983 WERE OTHER POSITIVE STEPS IN GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES.

LITURGICAL USE BY NON-MUSLIMS OF LANGUAGES OTHER THAN TURKISH, SUCH AS GREEK, ARMENIAN, HEBREW, AND ARABIC IS ALLOWED BUT CONTINUES TO DECLINE.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

THERE IS GENERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN TURKEY, EXCEPT IN THE FIVE PROVINCES UNDER MARTIAL LAW WHERE AUTHORITIES HAVE THE SELDOM-USED POWER TO RESTRICT MOVEMENT. MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES MAY EXPEL "PERSONS WHOSE PRESENCE IN THE MARTIAL LAW AREA IS DETERMINED TO BE PREJUDICIAL," OR RESTRICT AND PROHIBIT THEIR RESIDENCE

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IN, OR ENTRY INTO, CERTAIN AREAS UNDER MARTIAL LAW. SOME BORDER AREAS ARE OFF-LIMITS TO FOREIGNERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC PERMISSION TO VISIT THEM.

TURKS GENERALLY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND INCREASING NUMBERS HAVE DONE SO SINCE THE RELAXATION OF CURRENCY CONTROLS. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, A CITIZEN'S FREEDOM TO LEAVE MAY BE RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT

OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, CIVIC OBLIGATIONS (GENERALLY MILITARY SERVICE), OR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION. MANY TURKS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN MASS TRIALS ARE DENIED PASSPORTS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT OTHER CITIZENS NOT UNDER INDICTMENT ARE DENIED PASSPORTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. TURKISH LAW PROVIDES THAT THOSE DENIED PASSPORTS WHILE UNDER INDICTMENT MAY RECEIVE PASSPORTS IF THE JUSTICE MINISTRY AND PRIME MINISTRY APPROVE THEIR PETITIONS CITING EMERGENCY REASONS FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL. RECENTLY, TURKEY'S LEADING HUMORIST, AZIZ NESIN, WHO IS A DEFENDANT IN THE PEACE ASSOCIATION CASE, WAS GRANTED A LIMITED-USE PASSPORT TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONFERENCE.

TURKISH LAW GUARANTEES CITIZENS PROTECTION AGAINST DEPORTATION, EXTRADITION, OR DENIAL OF REENTRY. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE RIGHTS OF TURKS AND THEIR FAMILIES LIVING ABROAD TO RETURN HOME. UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE TURKISH CITIZENSHIP LAW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT MAY DEPRIVE OF CITIZENSHIP THOSE TURKS WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN TO TURKEY TO FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES OR WHO IT DETERMINES HAVE EXPATRIATED THEMSELVES.

TURKEY HAS PERMANENTLY RESETTLED ABOUT 4,500 AFGHAN REFUGEES OF TURKIC ETHNICITY IN RECENT YEARS, AND PROVIDES A TEMPORARY HAVEN FOR EAST EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN TWO TEMPORARY SETTLEMENT FACILITIES. WHILE THE

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GOVERNMENT DOES NOT GRANT REFUGEE STATUS TO IRANIANS, IT ASSERTS THAT IT DOES NOT DEPORT TO IRAN THOSE WHO HAVE ENTERED TURKEY ILLEGALLY OR HAVE OVERSTAYED THEIR PERMITTED TIME. IN CONSEQUENCE, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIANS ARE NOW LIVING IN TURKEY, MANY OF THEM IN ISTANBUL AND OTHER LARGE CITIES.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

TURKEY HAS A MULTIPARTY, PRESIDENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. THE PRESIDENT IS ELECTED BY PARLIAMENT FOR A SINGLE 7-YEAR TERM. THE CURRENT PRESIDENT, WHOSE ELECTION WAS AUTOMATIC WITH THE APPROVAL OF TURKEY'S NEW CONSTITUTION IN THE 1982 REFERENDUM, IS RETIRED GENERAL KENAN EVREN, FORMER CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF AND HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH GOVERNED TURKEY DURING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1980-83).

THE UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENT HAS 400 SEATS ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THE ELECTION LAW REQUIRES THAT A PARTY WIN AT LEAST 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL VOTE

IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. THE 10 PERCENT THRESHOLD IS INTENDED TO PREVENT POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE RECURRENCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARALYSIS OF THE LATE 1970'S.

PARTIES ADVOCATING CERTAIN BELIEFS ARE RESTRICTED FROM OPERATING IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. THESE INCLUDE PARTIES ADVOCATING A THEOCRATIC STATE, THE SUPERIORITY OR DICTATORSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL CLASS OR GROUP, OR "EXCLUSIVE" OR "ELITIST" POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES. NO PARTY MAY BE FORMED AROUND A PARTICULAR ETHNIC OR

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CULTURAL GROUP. AMONG THE PROHIBITED POLITICAL GROUPINGS ARE COMMUNIST OR OTHER MARXIST PARTIES, WHICH ARE BASED ON CLASS, AND FASCIST "ELITIST" PARTIES. ALL OF THESE ARE REGARDED AS INIMICAL TO A WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THREATENING TO TURKEY'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEGRITY. PEOPLE CONSIDERED FASCISTS OR COMMUNISTS BY

THE AUTHORITIES ARE BANNED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN ANY PARTY. OTHER GROUPS PERMANENTLY BANNED FROM JOINING OR ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN POLITICAL PARTIES INCLUDE ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS--A PROHIBITION BASED ON THE PRE-1980 POLITICIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY STRUCTURES.

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN. TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO GRANT WOMEN FULL AND EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS. THERE ARE 12 WOMEN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND SEVERAL WOMEN HOLD IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN THE PARTY HIERARCHIES, ALTHOUGH THE 23-MEMBER CABINET HAS NO WOMEN MEMBERS AT PRESENT.

MEMBERS OF MINORITIES, MUSLIM AND NON-MUSLIM, FACE NO LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS LONG AS THEY ACCEPT A TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY. KURDS WHO ACCEPT SUCH AN IDENTITY PLAY A SIZABLE ROLE IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE, AND SOME OF THEM ARE MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED VISITS BY FOREIGNERS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY DURING 1986, AND, IN MOST CASES, FACILITATED CONTACTS WITH BOTH OFFICIAL AND NONOFFICIAL VISITORS. VISITORS IN 1986 INCLUDED A DELEGATION FROM

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THE EUROPEAN HELSINKI WATCH COMMISSION, THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, A BRITISH-LED QUAKER GROUP, AND THE U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SENT NO OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR A VISIT TO TURKEY IN 1986.

THE ILO DID NOT PLACE THE SITUATION IN TURKEY ON ITS AGENDA IN 1986, GIVEN TURKISH GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS TO EXPAND LABOR RIGHTS. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE REMOVED TURKEY FROM ITS HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA AFTER A FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT IN DECEMBER 1985 OF THE FIVE-NATION COMPLAINT AGAINST TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. AS PART OF THAT SETTLEMENT, TURKEY UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE REGULAR CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS AND PERMIT SITE VISITS, WHICH IT HAS DONE.

IN JULY 1986, A NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION WAS PROVISIONALLY FORMED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, IT SUBMITTED ITS CHARTER TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR APPROVAL. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT APPROVE IT ON THE

GROUNDS THAT THE AREAS OF THE ASSOCIATION'S INTEREST WERE MORE PROPERLY THE CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE GROUP OPERATES LEGALLY PENDING RESUBMISSION OF ITS CHARTER AND HAS HELD PUBLIC MEETINGS WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY ALSO HAS A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY PREPARING A REPORT ON THE RIGHTS SITUATION IN TURKEY.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

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THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL TURKISH CITIZENS AS TURKS AND PROHIBITS ANY DISCRIMINATION ON ETHNIC GROUNDS. IN THE LAUSANNE TREATY, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK "TO ASSURE FULL AND COMPLETE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND LIBERTY TO ALL INHABITANTS OF TURKEY WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF BIRTH, NATIONALITY, LANGUAGE, RACE, OR RELIGION." AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN THE POLICY OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS FOR MANY YEARS TO SEEK ASSIMILATION OF INDIVIDUALS OF NON-TURKISH ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF TURKISH SOCIETY AND CULTURE, OFTEN TO THE POINT OF FORCEFULLY DISCOURAGING MANIFESTATIONS OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCE. THE SIZE OF THESE COMMUNITIES HAS DECLINED STEADILY OVER THE YEARS.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITY GROUPS CONTINUE TO COMPLAIN ABOUT

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGULATING THE OPERATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF COMMUNITY REAL ESTATE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHURCH PROPERTIES, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF PARISH COUNCILS. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ON PROPERTY ENDOWED TO CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS ALSO CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR CONCERN.

THE POSITION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SMALL ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, CENTERED ON THE SOUTHEASTERN CITY OF MARDIN, HAS BECOME RATHER ISOLATED, AND MANY HAVE CHOSEN TO MOVE TO ISTANBUL OR ABROAD.

TURKEY'S KURDS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED SOUTHEAST. THERE ARE ALSO SIGNIFICANT CONCENTRATIONS OF KURDS ELSEWHERE, THE RESULT OF OTTOMAN SETTLEMENT POLICY AND MORE RECENT MIGRATION TO METROPOLITAN CENTERS.

THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO QUELL AN ARMED KURDISH INSURGENCY OF GUERRILLAS BASED IN THE SOUTHEAST AND IN

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NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THE FIVE PROVINCES REMAINING

UNDER MARTIAL LAW ARE INHABITED PRIMARILY BY KURDS AND ARE ALSO THE CENTER OF THE INSURGENCY. MOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MANY OPPOSITION FIGURES BLAME THE KURDISH INSURGENCY ON OUTSIDE INFLUENCES AND THE DEPRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING TO REMEDY THROUGH LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

KURDS MAY BE FOUND IN EVERY AREA OF TURKISH LIFE AND AT ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY. BUT THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY ASSERTION OF A KURDISH ETHNIC IDENTITY AND HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO SUPPRESS IT. PUBLICATION OF BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS IN KURDISH IS FORBIDDEN, AS ARE BOOKS OR ANY OTHER MATERIALS IN TURKISH DEALING WITH KURDISH HISTORY, CULTURE, OR ETHNIC IDENTITY. USE OF THE KURDISH LANGUAGE IS NOT PERMITTED FOR ANY OFFICIAL PURPOSES, E.G., IN THE COURTS, NOR IS IT ALLOWED IN CERTAIN PRIVATE SITUATIONS SUCH AS RECEIVING VISITORS IN PRISON.

TURKEY HAS LONG BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF NATIONS IN THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS. WOMEN HAVE FULL SUFFRAGE AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS, HAVE ATTAINED HIGH OFFICE, AND ARE REPRESENTED, THOUGH NOT ALWAYS IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS, IN ALL PROFESSIONS AND INSTITUTIONS. WOMEN HAVE SERVED OR ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AT THE RANK OF UNIVERSITY RECTOR AND DEAN,

AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL PARTY VICE PRESIDENT, AND ARMY COLONEL. TURKISH BUSINESSWOMEN PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLES IN MANY INDUSTRIES, AND A FEW SIT ON THE BOARDS OF SOME OF TURKEY'S LARGEST PRIVATE FIRMS. FEMALE LAWYERS AND

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JUDGES ARE NO RARITY, AND FEMALE DOCTORS ARE DOMINANT IN SOME SPECIALTIES.

NONETHELESS, THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SMALLER COMMUNITIES AND RURAL AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN THE EAST--AND INCREASINGLY IN THE URBAN COMMUNITIES INHABITED BY MIGRANTS FROM THE VILLAGES--IS STILL DEFINED BY CENTURIES OF TRADITIONAL PRACTICE WHICH IS PATRIARCHAL AND DICTATES THE SUBORDINATION OF FEMALES TO MALES WITHIN THE FAMILY UNIT. MANY WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE EAST ARE PARTIALLY OR FULLY VEILED, AND CERTAIN RELIGIOUS SECTS, NOW COMMON IN CITIES, ALSO PRACTICE THE VEILING OF WOMEN. PREVAILING SOCIAL OR CULTURAL VALUES MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR SOME WOMEN TO RECEIVE PRIMARY OR SECONDARY EDUCATION OR TO PURSUE CAREERS OUTSIDE THE HOME.

THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUPS TO USE THEIR OWN LANGUAGES IS LIMITED. ALTHOUGH THE LAUSANNE TREATY

STATES THAT "NO RESTRICTIONS SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE FREE USE BY ANY TURKISH NATIONAL OF ANY LANGUAGE IN PRIVATE INTERCOURSE, IN COMMERCE, RELIGION, IN THE PRESS, OR IN PUBLICATIONS OF ANY KIND OR AT PUBLIC MEETINGS," THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY IS TURKISH. ONE ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION BANS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF LANGUAGE, WHILE OTHERS PROHIBIT THE PUBLIC USE OF "LANGUAGES PROHIBITED BY LAW." LEGISLATION PROHIBITING SPECIFIC LANGUAGES HAS NEVER BEEN ADOPTED, BUT TURKISH CITIZENS HAVE BEEN TRIED ON A VARIETY OF CHARGES RELATING TO THE USE OF KURDISH. IN 1986 PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS OF THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY WERE TRIED ON CHARGES THAT THEIR USE OF KURDISH AT PARTY HEADQUARTERS CONSTITUTED "PROPAGANDA DENIGRATING NATIONAL SENTIMENT." THEY WERE ACQUITTED. ALSO ACQUITTED WERE OFFICIALS OF THE STATE STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, WHO PREPARED A HANDBOOK FOR CENSUS OFFICIALS, DIRECTING THEM

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TO ASK WHAT LANGUAGES ASIDE FROM TURKISH THE INTERVIEWEES SPOKE. THE CHARGES STATED THAT BY LISTING KURDISH ALONGSIDE SUCH "INTERNATIONAL" LANGUAGES AS ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND ARABIC, THE HANDBOOK CONSTITUTED PROPAGANDA DENIGRATING NATIONALIST SENTIMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THE INTENT OF ITS BANS ON PUBLISHING IN KURDISH (AND ITS DISCOURAGEMENT OF LANGUAGES SUCH AS GEORGIAN AND LAZ) IS TO FOSTER TURKISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF ALL CITIZENS FOR ALL USES. THIS IS PART OF AN EFFORT TO INCULCATE IN ALL TURKISH CITIZENS A SENSE OF IDENTITY WITH THE TURKISH STATE AND NATION AS OPPOSED TO IDENTIFICATION WITH ANY PARTICULAR GROUPS WITHIN THE NATION. IN PRACTICE, THE SEVERITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF A MINORITY LANGUAGE APPEARS TO DEPEND ON THE PERCEIVED THREAT THE GROUP IN QUESTION PRESENTS TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT FACES AN ARMED KURDISH INSURGENCY AND THEREFORE BELIEVES THE USE OF KURDISH FOSTERS SEPARATIST TENDENCIES, THE USE OF ARABIC, ABOUT WHICH THERE ARE NO SUCH CONCERNS, IS NOT SIMILARLY RESTRICTED.

CONDITIONS OF LABOR

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO REASONABLE CONDITIONS OF LABOR SUITED TO THE WORKER'S AGE, SEX, AND CAPACITY; AND GRANTS THE RIGHT TO REST AND LEISURE AND A FAIR WAGE. THE LABOR LAW FORBIDS THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 13 YEARS OF AGE AND RESTRICTS CHILDREN UNDER 15 TO "LIGHT WORK WHICH WILL NOT HARM THEIR HEALTH AND PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT, PREVENT THEIR ATTENDANCE AT OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMS, OR THEIR

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ABILITY TO BENEFIT FROM EDUCATION." CHILDREN BETWEEN 15 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, NOR MAY THEY BE EMPLOYED AT NIGHT. GIRLS AND WOMEN MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, BUT, IF OVER THE AGE OF 18, MAY WORK NIGHT SHIFTS UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED JOINTLY BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. A BOARD COMPOSED OF GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND LABOR REPRESENTATIVES ESTABLISHES NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS. THE LABOR LAW PROVIDES FOR A 7 1/2-HOUR DAY AND A 45-HOUR WORKWEEK.

IN SPITE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, SPECIFIC LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AND LABOR UNION EFFORTS, A CONSIDERABLE GAP REMAINS BETWEEN SOCIAL GOALS AND THE REALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY LEVELS. TRADE UNIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY COMPLAINED THAT EXISTING REGULATIONS GOVERNING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WORKING CONDITIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ENFORCED. OUTSIDE THE INDUSTRIALIZED SECTOR, WHERE UNIONS EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ARE GENERALLY IGNORED, BOTH ON OCCUPATIONAL

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, KPRP, TU
SUBJECT: PKK AMBUSHES GOT FORCES IN MOUNTAINS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS A SPOT REPORT SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MISSION REPORTING PLAN.

3. SUMMARY: PKK MILITANTS AMBUSHED A TURKISH PATROL IN RUGGED MOUNTAIN TERRITORY ON DECEMBER 6. EIGHT GOT PERSONNEL AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TERRORISTS DIED IN THE CLASH. SUCH ACTIVITY IS UNUSUAL IN THIS REGION DURING DECEMBER AND THE GOT PATROL IN THE AREA WAS REPORTEDLY IN RESPONSE TO INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM DEFECTORS REGARDING PKK HIDEOUTS IN THE HILLS. END SUMMARY

4. IN THE BLOODIEST ACTION AGAINST GOT SECURITY FORCES THUS FAR IN 1988, AN ESTIMATED 25 PKK MILITANTS AMBUSHED A COLUMN OF 28 TURKISH JANDARMA OUT ON RECONNAISSANCE PATROL IN THE CUDI MOUNTAINS SOUTH OF SIRNAK (SIIRT PROVINCE) ON DECEMBER 6. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, 10 TO 15 SOLDIERS AND 10 PKK WERE KILLED IN THE CLASH, BUT THESE REPORTS MAY BE INACCURATE. REGIONAL GOVERNOR HAYRI KOZAKCIOGLU AND SPECIAL BRIGADE COMMANDER LTGEN HULUSI SAYIN, WHO VISITED THE SCENE, CLAIMED THERE WERE ONLY 8 GOT CASUALTIES: A LIEUTENANT, 2 SERGEANTS, AND 5 JANDARMA. THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE IN DIYARBAKIR TOLD US THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT 10 TERRORISTS HAD BEEN KILLED BUT ADDED THAT A BODY SEARCH IS CONTINUING [ ] REPORTED THAT NO BODIES OF PKK TERRORISTS HAD AS YET BEEN DISCOVERED BUT THAT COMMANDO TROOPS WERE BEING BROUGHT IN FROM ... TO CONTINUE SEARCHING THE AREA. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT OF THE TWO HELICOPTERS INVOLVED IN FERRYING REINFORCEMENTS TO THE CLASH, ONE WAS DAMAGED BY PKK GROUND FIRE BUT LANDED SAFELY AT SIRNAK WITHOUT CASUALTIES.

5. "CUMHURIYET" OF DECEMBER 7 CLAIMED THAT THE SURVIVING PKK FLED ACROSS THE BORDER, PRESUMABLY INTO IRAQ, IN THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 6 AFTER MASSIVE GOT REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. THE CUDI MOUNTAINS ARE CLOSE TO THE POINT WHERE SYRIA, TURKEY, AND IRAQ MEET AND THE REPORTED SCENE OF THE CLASH WAS NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER.

6. COMMENT: WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE PKK HAVE LEFT THE AREA. SNOWS IN THESE RUGGED MOUNTAINS ARE CURRENTLY OVER 3 FEET DEEP AND THE PKK COULD WELL HAVE RETREATED INTO ANOTHER HIDEOUT. [ ] NOTED THAT THESE MOUNTAINS HAVE BEEN UNDER PKK CONTROL FOR YEARS.

7. IT IS UNUSUAL TO SEE THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY IN THE REGION

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DURING DECEMBER. REPORTEDLY, THE TURKISH PATROL WAS IN THE AREA IN RESPONSE TO INFORMATION FROM A PKK DEFECTOR WHO REVEALED THE LOCATION OF VARIOUS PKK HIDEOUTS. THE FACT, HOWEVER, THAT A TURKISH PATROL WOULD OPERATE IN THIS ROUGH REGION OVER 6000 FEET IN ALTITUDE AND IN DEEP SNOWS POINTS OUT THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE MILITARY IS UNDERTAKING ITS COUNTER-TERRORIST ROLE. STILL, THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON THE GOT FORCES SHOW THAT THE PKK HAS SOME STING LEFT DESPITE HAVING GONE THROUGH A PERIOD OF REDUCED ACTIVITY IN RECENT MONTHS.
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PTER, PREL, EPET, KPRP, TU, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: KURDS ATTACK TURKISH TANKER TRUCKS IN IRAQ

REF: FBIS TA041543

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS A SPOT REPORT SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MISSION REPORTING PLAN.

3. SUMMARY: ON MARCH 3 KURDISH SEPARATISTS ATTACKED SEVEN TURKISH TANKER TRUCKS, BURNING TWO AND KILLING ONE DRIVER, NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER IN NORTHERN IRAQ. TRUCK DRIVERS COMPLAINED TO THE PRESS OF HAZARDOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS IN IRAQ WHILE INDUSTRY SOURCES REPORT THAT MATTERS ARE UNDER CONTROL AND TRUCK LOSSES ARE RARE. A SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTION OF THE HEAVY TRANSIT TRUCK TRAFFIC, MOST OF IT PETROLEUM-RELATED, WOULD BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR BOTH TURKEY AND IRAQ. FUTURE ATTACKS ON TURKISH TRUCKING COULD FORCE THE GOT TO UNDERTAKE CROSS-BORDER RETALIATORY AIR STRIKES AGAINST KURDISH STRONGHOLDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. END SUMMARY.

4. ACCORDING TO THE MARCH 5 TURKISH PRESS AND FBIS REPORTS, SEVEN TURKISH TANKER TRUCKS CARRYING CRUDE OIL WERE ATTACKED BY KURDISH SEPARATIST MILITANTS BETWEEN ZAKHO AND DOHUK JUST INSIDE THE IRAQI BORDER ON MARCH 3. THE ATTACKERS REPORTEDLY BURNED TWO OF THE TANKERS AND KILLED ONE OF THE DRIVERS WHO ATTEMPTED RESISTANCE. PRESS SOURCES DESCRIBED THE ATTACKERS

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AS "PESHMERGES" BUT DID NOT IDENTIFY THE KURDISH GROUP WITH WHICH THE ATTACKERS WERE AFFILIATED. SILOPI SUBGOVERNOR HUSEYIN SEZGIN REPORTEDLY TRAVELLED TO THE HABUR BORDER CROSSING TO MEET WITH HIS IRAQI COUNTERPARTS CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT.

5. TURKISH DRIVERS, ACCORDING TO "MILLIYET" OF MARCH 5, CLAIM THAT THE ZAKHO-MOSUL ROAD IS LARGELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF KURDISH MILITANTS AND THAT ATTACKS ARE FREQUENT. THE ROAD IS CLOSED AT NIGHT, AND SOMETIMES TRAFFIC IS HALTED FOR HOURS AT GOVERNMENT ROADBLOCKS. THE DRIVERS CALLED ON OFFICIALS TO TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO SECURE THE AREA.

6. HE TRANSPORT BUSINESS ARE NOT OVERLY CONCERNED BY THIS INCIDENT, HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMIT THAT PREVIOUS ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED. NOTED THAT IN SIX YEARS HE HAD NEVER LOST A TRUCK AND CORRECTLY OBSERVED THAT MANY DRIVERS ON THIS ROUTE ARE KURDISH. [redacted]

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CONSIDERED THIS ATTACK TO BE AN ISOLATED EVENT AND UNLIKELY TO BE REPEATED. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST

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MAJOR INCIDENT HE WAS AWARE OF IN ALMOST TWO YEARS.

7. AGREED THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN ABOUT A YEAR THAT SUCH AN INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED AND ATTRIBUTED IT IN PART TO SEVERE WINTER WEATHER DRIVING MILITANTS OUT OF THE HILLS. STILL, HE ADDED THAT IT COULD BE PART OF A NEW KURDISH SEPARATIST STRATEGY OF FOCUSSING ON TRADE ROUTES AND ECONOMIC TARGETS AND SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN AT IRAN'S BEHEST IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT FLARE-UP OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

FYI: MANY BELIEVE THAT IRAN HAD PREVIOUSLY ORDERED THE PESHMERGES NOT TO DISRUPT THIS TRAFFIC FOR FEAR OF COMPLICATING IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. END FYI.

8. COMMENT: TRANSIT TRUCK TRAFFIC IS IMPORTANT TO TURKEY AND VITAL TO IRAQ. OVER 5,000 VEHICLES CROSS THE BORDER DAILY AT HABUR AND THE MAJORITY OF THESE ARE TANKER TRUCKS WHICH CARRY IRAQI EXPORTS OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND CRUDE OIL. THE GOT IN UNLIKELY TO TOLERATE ANY SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTION OF THIS

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TRAFFIC. FAILURE TO REACT COULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THE KURDISH SEPARATISTS TO ATTACK AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT REGIONAL ECONOMIC TARGET, THE TURKISH-IRAQI OIL PIPELINE, WHICH TRANSPORTS 70 MILLION TONS/YEAR OF IRAQI CRUDE TO THE TURKISH PORT OF YUMURTALIK NEAR ADANA. IF INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ARE REPEATED, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE THE GOT UNDERTAKE CROSS-BORDER AIR STRIKES INSIDE IRAQ. THE GOT LAST ATTACKED KURDISH STRONGHOLDS IN IRAQ ON MARCH 4, 1987, IN RETALIATION FOR A KURDISH RAID ON A VILLAGE IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY WHERE 14 WERE KILLED AND FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF A TURKISH ENGINEER IN IRAQ. END COMMENT.

9. BAGHDAD: MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, NATO, PHUM, EEC, US, EG, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 3, 1988

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1. NATO

OZAL URGES ATTENTION TO NATO FLANK COUNTRIES: ALL DAILIES REPORT THAT PM TURGUT OZAL REMINDED ALLIES IN BRUSSELS OF THE NATO PRINCIPLE THAT AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE MEMBER SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ATTACK ON THE ENTIRE NATO COMMUNITY. "TURKISH DAILY NEWS" QUOTES OZAL AS ASKING MEMBER STATES NOT TO IGNORE THE SOUTHERN FLANK COUNTRIES WHEN STRENGTHENING THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF NATO. ACCORDING TO "TERCUMAN," OZAL URGED ALLIES THAT STEPS TAKEN IN ARMS CONTROL SHOULD MEET THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF ALL ALLIES, AND NATO SHOULD BE DECISIVE WHEN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS REGARDING ARMS-CONTROL ISSUES. "CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT OZAL DIPLOMATICALLY EXPLAINED THAT TURKEY WAS OPPOSED TO ASSUMING NEW NUCLEAR MISSIONS AND THAT IT WANTED AN EVALUATION OF MODERNIZING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME.

REAGAN NOT TO PRESS ON DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SHORT-RANGE MISSILES: "MILLIYET" REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DECIDED NOT TO APPLY PRESSURE ON ALLIED COUNTRIES TO DEPLOY NEW SHORT-RANGE MISSILES.

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2. EC

EC LEADERS URGE TURKEY TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN GULF: "TERCUMAN" REPORTS THAT EC LEADERS TOLD PM OZAL THAT A MORE ACTIVE TURKISH ROLE IN GULF PEACE INITIATIVES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED TURKISH-EC RELATIONS.

KOHL ASKS OZAL NOT TO RUSH FULL EC MEMBERSHIP: "MILLIYET" REPORTS THAT DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH PM OZAL IN BRUSSELS FRG CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL, FONMIN HANS DIETRICH GENSCHER, AND HEAD OF THE EC COMMISSION IN CHARGE OF MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS CLAUDE CHEYSSON ADVISED TURKEY NOT TO RUSH FOR EC FULL MEMBERSHIP.

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3. U.S.

TURKISH FINANCE DELEGATION DISCUSSES FMS PAYMENTS IN WASHINGTON: "CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS ON REPAYMENT OF TURKEY'S FMS DEBTS ENDED IN WASHINGTON. THE TURKISH DELEGATION REPORTEDLY ASKED THE U.S. TO CLARIFY THE PROCESS FOR REPAYING TURKEY'S FMS DEBTS.

JUDICIARY DELEGATION DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WITH SCHIFTER: "HURRIYET" REPORTS THAT SENIOR TURKISH JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES VISITING THE U.S. DISCUSSED THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND TURKEY'S HANDLING OF THE KURDISH ISSUE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS RICHARD SCHIFTER. THE DAILY WRITES THE DELEGATION OBJECTED TO THE REPORT "BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON DISINFORMATION." "HURRIYET" ALSO MENTIONED THAT SCHIFTER SAID INSTANCES OF TORTURE DESCRIBED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WERE BASED ON TURKISH PRESS ACCOUNTS. SCHIFTER ALSO MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO TURKEY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

SHP MOTION ON DECA SIDE LETTER: "CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) SUBMITTED A MOTION TO THE PARLIAMENT ASKING FOR A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE DECA SIDE LETTER. MEANWHILE, FORMER FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTER HASAN ESAT ISIK TELLS "CUMHURIYET" THAT THE GOVERNMENT RATIFIED THE SIDE LETTER DESPITE THE "UNFAVORABLE BEHAVIOR" OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. ISIK OPINES THAT FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES FORCED OZAL TO ENDORSE THE AGREEMENT.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR AFFAIRS: ACCORDING TO "GUNAYDIN," AMBASSADOR ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE DEMANDED A BRIEFING FROM MINISTER OF LABOR IMREN AYKUT ON CURRENT STUDIES OF LABOR LEGISLATION. THE AMBASSADOR IS SAID TO HAVE WARNED AYKUT THAT TURKISH TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE U.S. WOULD BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED IF U.S. VIEWS WERE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN PREPARING NEW LEGISLATION. IN REPLY, AYKUT IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE U.S. DID NOT IMPORT ENOUGH TEXTILE PRODUCTS FROM TURKEY, AND THEREFORE IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE IF THE U.S. APPLIED AN EMBARGO.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: TURKISH VILLAGES IN BULGARIA UNDER SIEGE: "CUMHURIYET" QUOTES THE SEMI-OFFICIAL ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY AS SAYING THAT A CORRESPONDENT FOR THE "CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR" COULD NOT REACH VILLAGES IN BULGARIA POPULATED BY THE TURKISH MINORITY. THE DAILY NOTES THAT, CONTRARY TO OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS, TURKISH POPULATED VILLAGES WERE STILL UNDER SIEGE.

U.S. DRUG REPORT DESCRIBES TURKEY AS TRANSIT COUNTRY: "CUMHURIYET" WRITES THAT A DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY REPORT PRESENTED TO CONGRESS DESCRIBED TURKEY AS A "DRUG TRANSIT COUNTRY." THE REPORT ALSO PRAISED TURKISH MEASURES TAKEN TO PREVENT ILLEGAL DRUG PRODUCTION.

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4. EGYPT

TURKISH-EGYPT JOINT EXERCISES: "CUMHURIYET" QUOTES MFA SPOKESMAN INAL BATU AS SAYING THAT TURKISH-EGYPT JOINT NAVAL EXERCISES WILL NOT TARGET ANY COUNTRY.

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5. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

SHP, DYP CRITICIZE PRICE HIKES: ALL DAILIES REPORT THAT OPPOSITION LEADERS CRITICIZED RECENT PRICE HIKES. SHP LEADER ERDAL INONU REPORTEDLY SAID "THE TURKISH PEOPLE DON'T HAVE THE STRENGTH TO SURVIVE," WHILE DYP LEADER SULEYMAN DEMIREL SAID PRICES WERE SPIRALING "LIKE AN UNSTOPPABLE CHAIN OF FIRE."

RIOTS AT BUCA PRISON: "HURRIYET" AND "GUNES" REPORT THAT INMATES AT THE BUCA PRISON IN IZMIR RIOTED MARCH 2 TO PROTEST THE DECISION TO TRANSFER PRISONERS ON A SIX-DAY HUNGER STRIKE TO OTHER PRISONS. THE RIOT WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL LATER THAT SAME DAY. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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FOLLOWING STATE 54396 DTD 23 FEB SENT ACTION BERN BEING REPEATED FOR UR INFO:

QUOTE: UNCLAS STATE 054396

FOR SHERMAN HINSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, TU
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR TURKEY

REF: HINSON/BARR TELCON 2/22/88

1. PER REF FOLLOWING IS HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON TURKEY FOR 1987.

2. TURKEY IS A REPUBLIC WITH A MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND A STRONG PRESIDENCY. IN 1987 TURKEY COMPLETED A RETURN TO A FULL FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY. A REFERENDUM, PASSED ON SEPTEMBER 6, RESTORED ALL POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THOSE FORMER POLITICIANS WHO HAD BEEN BANNED FROM POLITICS BY A PROVISIONAL ARTICLE OF THE 1982 CONSTITUTION. ALL CHARGES AGAINST THE FORMERLY BANNED POLITICIANS FOR ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO THE REFERENDUM WERE DROPPED. PRIME MINISTER TURGUT OZAL CALLED FOR EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON NOVEMBER 29. THESE WERE THE FIRST NATIONAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1980 TO INCLUDE ALL PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADERS. PRIME MINISTER OZAL'S MOTHERLAND PARTY WON THE ELECTIONS FROM A FIELD OF SEVEN LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES. THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE IN THE CITIES AND THE JANDARMA IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER. ON JULY 19, THE GOVERNMENT LIFTED MARTIAL LAW IN THE LAST FIVE PROVINCES WHERE IT HAD BEEN IN EFFECT. AT PRESENT NINE PROVINCES (ISTANBUL, PLUS EIGHT PROVINCES IN THE SOUTHEAST WHERE THE GOVERNMENT FACES ARMED KURDISH GUERRILLAS) REMAIN UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH EMPOWERS THEIR CIVILIAN GOVERNORS TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE POWERS OF MARTIAL LAW COMMANDERS. IN ADDITION, A SPECIALLY EMPOWERED "SUPERGOVERNOR" OVERSEES AND COORDINATES THE ACTIONS OF 12 GOVERNORS IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY (INCLUDING THE 8 SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY).

SINCE 1980 TURKEY HAS BEEN MOVING FROM A CLOSED ECONOMY, DOMINATED BY THE STATE SECTOR, TO A FREE MARKET, EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH THE RATES OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT ARE STILL HIGH, THE ECONOMY UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCES. IN APRIL TURKEY APPLIED FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

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PROGRESS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUED IN 1987. THE END OF MARTIAL LAW IN JULY 1987, THE LIFTING OF POLITICAL BANS IN THE SEPTEMBER REFERENDUM, AND RECENT COURT RULINGS REMOVED MANY RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. IN JANUARY THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED, IN PRINCIPLE, THE RIGHT OF TURKISH CITIZENS TO APPEAL TO THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ALTHOUGH IT HAS YET TO APPROVE APPEALS TO THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT, WHOSE DECISIONS ARE BINDING. IN JANUARY 1988, TURKEY SIGNED THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SIGN A SIMILAR U.N. AGREEMENT. BY SIGNING, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ACCEPTED OFFICIAL OUTSIDE MONITORING OF PLACES OF DETENTION, A STEP HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS HAD LONG BEEN ADVOCATING. APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS PROVIDED AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS FOR BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES INTO CONFORMITY WITH GENERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN NORMS.

THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTED MANY PERSONS ACCUSED OF TORTURING DETAINEES. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR TORTURE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO IMPROVING PRISON CONDITIONS BY BUILDING NEW FACILITIES AND RESPONDING TO PRISONER DEMANDS. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DATE, SERIOUS AND REPEATED INCIDENCES OF TORTURE CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED.

SOME MINORITY PROBLEMS PERSIST. THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL CITIZENS AS TURKS BUT, EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIAL STATUS GRANTED TO NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES BY THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE (1923), TURKEY DOES NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ETHNIC MINORITIES.

TRADE UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS ARE PROHIBITED BY THE 1982 CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OR HAVING ORGANIC LINKS OR TIES WITH POLITICAL PARTIES.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

-- A. POLITICAL KILLING

THERE WERE NO ACCUSATIONS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES IN 1987. A TERRORIST BOMBING IN ISTANBUL DURING OCTOBER KILLED ONE PERSON. ALSO, AN ATTACK ON A POLICE STATION IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE POLICEMAN.

-- B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE NO KNOWN DISAPPEARANCES CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.

-- C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

IN JANUARY 1988, TURKEY SIGNED THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SIGN A SIMILAR U.N. AGREEMENT. ACCESSION TO THE COE CONVENTION ALLOWS AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COE MEMBER STATES TO VISIT ALL PLACES OF DETENTION (POLICE STATIONS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONS, AND MENTAL HOSPITALS) AT ANY TIME, FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION OF

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THE VISIT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY. IN ANNOUNCING ITS INTENTION TO SIGN THE COE CONVENTION, THE GOVERNMENT STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF TURKEY'S DESIRE TO ERADICATE TORTURE.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT "NO ONE SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR ILL-TREATMENT INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY," TURKISH POLITICIANS, THE TURKISH PRESS, AND OUTSIDE MONITORING GROUPS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT PRISONERS ARE SUBJECT TO MISTREATMENT AND TORTURE DURING INITIAL INTERROGATION OR IMPRISONMENT. IN ITS SEPTEMBER 1987 FILE ON TORTURE, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CHARGED THAT TORTURE WAS "WIDESPREAD" AND "SYSTEMATIC," CLAIMING THAT "ALMOST 4 YEARS AFTER A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN NOVEMBER 1983, NO EFFECTIVE MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT TORTURE." THE AMNESTY FILE INCLUDED ACCOUNTS OF TORTURE METHODS, CENTERS OF TORTURE, SEXUAL ABUSE, AND DEATH IN CUSTODY. HELSINKI WATCH IN ITS LATEST REPORT CONCLUDED THAT "TORTURE IS STILL PRACTICED IN TURKEY ON A LARGE SCALE." IT ALSO STATED, HOWEVER, THAT ABUSE OR TORTURE IN PRISONS, APART FROM THE INTITIAL DETENTION PERIOD, HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DECREASED.

SOME ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE CONCERN TREATMENT THAT COULD BE DEFINED AS POLICE BRUTALITY, SUCH AS ROUGH HANDLING BY POLICE OFFICIALS AIMED AT INTIMIDATING A SUSPECT OR PRISONER OR RESULTING FROM PERSONAL ANIMOSITY. IN OTHER CASES THE MISTREATMENT APPEARS TO INVOLVE SYSTEMATIC TORTURE. NEARLY ALL OF THE NUMEROUS ASSERTIONS HAVE DERIVED FROM TREATMENT DURING INITIAL PERIODS OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION, BEFORE CHARGES WERE FILED AND BEFORE THE ACCUSED WAS ABLE TO CONTACT AN ATTORNEY. MANY CASES WERE DOCUMENTED BY MEDICAL EVIDENCE. GREATER FREEDOM OF THE PRESS HAS YIELDED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN TURKEY OF SUCH INSTANCES OF TORTURE, INCLUDING PHOTOS OF VICTIMS, DESCRIPTIONS OF METHODS, AND SKETCHES OF PREMISES WHERE TORTURE IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

EVEN BEFORE SIGNING THE COE CONVENTION, THE GOVERNMENT HAD CONDEMNED TORTURE AND EXPRESSED ITS DETERMINATION TO ERADICATE IT BY PROMPT AND SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS. FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, THE NEWLY APPOINTED DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SECURITY, WHO SERVES AS HEAD OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE, FLATLY CONDEMNED THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE AND PLEDGED TO ERADICATE IT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE AND TO PROSECUTE THE OFFENDERS. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE FIGURES FOR THE NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, THE PRESS CONTINUES TO REPORT SENTENCES OF THOSE CONVICTED OF TORTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN OCTOBER, FOLLOWING A JUDICIAL MEDICAL BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT A PRISONER IN BINGOL DIED AS THE RESULT OF TORTURE, THE GOVERNMENT OPENED A CASE AGAINST A NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING ONE OFFICER. THIS SAME OFFICER WAS LATER CONVICTED OF TORTURE IN A SEPARATE CASE. NONETHELESS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT MANY ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE ARE NOT FULLY INVESTIGATED AND THAT SOME CONVICTED OFFENDERS CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES EVEN WHILE THEIR CASES ARE BEING APPEALED.

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, INCLUDING THE TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION, HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PREVENT TORTURE OR ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE IS TO ALLOW LAWYERS ACCESS TO PRISONERS DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF DETENTION. SUCH ACCESS IS BEING CONSIDERED AMONG PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE. THE REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, IF ADOPTED, WOULD ALSO INCREASE THE PUNISHMENT FOR TORTURE. THE CURRENT CRIMINAL CODE CATEGORIZES MURDER BY TORTURE AS MANSLAUGHTER AND PUNISHES IT WITH AN 8-YEAR SENTENCE. PENALTIES FOR TORTURE WHICH DOES NOT RESULT IN DEATH RANGE FROM 3 TO 5 YEARS. IN 1986 THE PARLIAMENT DEFEATED A BILL WHICH WOULD HAVE INCREASED THIS PENALTY TO A RANGE OF 5 TO 10 YEARS. THE NEW CRIMINAL CODE WOULD INCREASE THE PENALTY FOR MURDER BY TORTURE TO UP TO 16 YEARS.

IN AUGUST, FOLLOWING WIDESPREAD HUNGER STRIKES BY PRISONERS AND PARALLEL DEMONSTRATIONS BY THEIR FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OUTSIDE THE PRISONS, TURKISH REPORTERS WERE PERMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO VISIT PRISONS AND TO REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON PRISON CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS PRESS ATTENTION, CONDITIONS IN MANY PRISONS APPEAR TO HAVE IMPROVED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED TO MANY PRISONER DEMANDS AND HAS BEEN BUILDING NEW PRISONS TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE CLAIMED IN SEPTEMBER THAT PRISON CONDITIONS HAD IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN THE LAST 3 YEARS WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 93 NEW PLACES OF DETENTION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT, MOST PUBLIC FACILITIES IN TURKEY, INCLUDING PRISONS, ARE STILL SUBSTANDARD WHEN JUDGED AGAINST THOSE OF MANY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

-- D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, EXILE, OR FORCED LABOR

EXCEPT IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS WHEN A PERSON IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME, A JUDGE MUST ISSUE A DETENTION WARRANT TO THE PROSECUTOR IF A PRISONER IS TO BE INCARCERATED. THE POLICE OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HOWEVER, CAN HOLD PERSONS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY INCOMMUNICADO AND WITHOUT CHARGE FOR UP TO 24 HOURS. BY COURT ORDER, THE PERIOD OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION MAY BE EXTENDED TO 15 DAYS. IN CASES OF "OFFENSES COMMITTED COLLECTIVELY" BY THREE OR MORE PERSONS, DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE FOR UP TO 15 DAYS IS PERMITTED WITHOUT COURT ORDER.

IN THE NINE PROVINCES UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE GOVERNOR (OR SUPERGOVERNOR) MAY AUTHORIZE DETENTION OF A PERSON FOR UP TO 30 DAYS WITHOUT CHARGE. UNDER EMERGENCY RULE, AUTHORITIES DO NOT NEED WARRANTS TO DETAIN SUSPECTS. ONCE IN FORMAL CUSTODY, A DETAINEE IS TAKEN BEFORE A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO BE INFORMED OF PENDING CHARGES. IF THE PROSECUTOR DECIDES TO PURSUE THE CASE, THE DETAINEE IS ARRAIGNED BEFORE A JUDGE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOWED TO RETAIN A LAWYER.

PARLIAMENT IN 1986 DEFEATED A BILL REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO A LAWYER. A PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE UNDER WHICH A PERSON, UPON BEING DETAINED, WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN A LAWYER IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. A DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF BAIL; THE ARRAIGNING JUDGE, HOWEVER, MAY RELEASE THE ACCUSED ON PROVISIONAL LIBERTY ON PRESENTATION OF AN APPROPRIATE GUARANTEE, OR ORDER HIM HELD IN PREVENTIVE DETENTION IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT HE MAY FLEE OR DESTROY EVIDENCE. THE CONSTITUTION SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF DETAINEES TO REQUEST SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL. IN ALL CASES, THE AUTHORITIES MAY HOLD A DETAINEE INCOMMUNICADO WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME LIMITS UNTIL HE IS CHARGED OR RELEASED. ACCORDING TO THE

POLICE POWERS ACT OF 1975, A DETAINEE'S NEXT OF KIN MUST NORMALLY BE NOTIFIED "IN THE SHORTEST TIME."

ON APRIL 15, THE PARLIAMENT PASSED A LAW RESCINDING A PROVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF SENTENCES ACT OF 1986 THAT PERMITTED TURKISH JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE SENTENCES OF "SECURITY OBSERVATION," KNOWN COMMONLY AS INTERNAL EXILE.

THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS FORCED LABOR, AND THERE IS NONE IN PRACTICE.

-- E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

DEFENDANTS NORMALLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN TRIAL. IN SOME TRIALS, SUCH AS THOSE HELD IN MILITARY PRISONS OR ON MILITARY COMPOUNDS, MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MUST SEEK PERMISSION TO ATTEND, BUT SUCH PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY

GRANTED. ALTHOUGH TURKEY IS PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM, ITS COURT SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES ARE MODELED ON THE ITALIAN (CRIMINAL) AND SWISS (CIVIL) LAW CODES. AS IN MANY OTHER CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES, TRIALS IN WHICH LAYMAN JURIES RENDER VERDICTS DO NOT FORM PART OF THE TURKISH JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

THE CONSTITUTION DECLARES THAT JUDGES SHALL BE INDEPENDENT IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES AND PROVIDES FOR THEIR SECURE TENURE. IT ALSO PROHIBITS AUTHORITIES FROM GIVING ORDERS OR RECOMMENDATIONS TO JUDGES CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY WAS DEMONSTRATED WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL TWO PROVISIONS OF THE 1985 POLICE POWERS ACT WHICH WERE WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE OPPRESSIVE. COURTS HAVE ALSO ACQUITTED MANY DEFENDANTS IN CASES INVOLVING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS ARE ALSO INDEPENDENT; TO PURSUE A CASE IS THEIR DECISION ALONE. IT IS THEY WHO DETERMINE WHETHER TO PURSUE INVESTIGATIONS OF ASSERTIONS OF TORTURE. THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTORS, APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, SELECTS JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS FOR THE HIGHER COURTS AND OVERSEES THOSE OF THE LOWER COURTS.

ALL DEFENDANTS ACCUSED OF TERRORISM OR OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST THE SECURITY OF THE STATE, INCLUDING DRUG SMUGGLING, ARE TRIED IN ONE OF EIGHT STATE SECURITY COURTS. THE JUDGES IN THESE COURTS OBSERVE THE SAME STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE AS JUDGES PRESIDING OVER REGULAR CIVILIAN COURTS. THREE JUDGES PRESIDE OVER STATE SECURITY COURTS: A CIVILIAN JUDGE AS CHAIRMAN, ONE ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN JUDGE, AND ONE MILITARY JUDGE. CIVILIAN AND SECURITY COURTS GENERALLY CONDUCT TRIALS UNDER THE SAME RULES OF PROCEDURE, BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION AND EMERGENCY LAW REGULATIONS.

A CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL IN EITHER SYSTEM MAY BE APPEALED. IF AN APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS A LOWER COURT'S GUILTY VERDICT, THE CASE IS SENT BACK TO THE LOWER COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION. IF THE LOWER COURT INSISTS ON ITS ORIGINAL VERDICT, THE CASE IS RETURNED TO THE APPEALS COURT FOR A BINDING OPINION. IN SOME CASES, PARTICULARLY CAPITAL CASES, APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OR TO THE HIGH COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS ARE MANDATORY AND AUTOMATIC. IF A DEATH SENTENCE IS CONFIRMED BY

AN APPEALS COURT, IT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF

MINISTERS, THEN BY PARLIAMENT, AND FINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT.

AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT KURDISH-SPEAKING DEFENDANTS STANDING TRIAL IN THE SOUTHEAST OFTEN SUFFER FROM HAVING ONLY A PARTIAL, OR IN SOME CASES TOTAL, LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH TURKISH, THE OFFICIAL AND ONLY LANGUAGE PERMITTED IN COMMUNICATION WITH ATTORNEYS OR JUDICIAL OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH TRANSLATORS ARE PERMITTED, THE QUALITY OF THE TRANSLATIONS FROM KURDISH INTO TURKISH IS REPORTEDLY POOR.

ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD IN TURKISH JAILS VARY GREATLY, DEPENDING ON THE SOURCE AND THE SOURCE'S DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PRISONER. THE GOVERNMENT DENIES THAT IT HOLDS ANY POLITICAL PRISONERS BUT POINTS OUT THAT MANY PERSONS HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR TERRORIST ACTS OR FOR OTHER CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF PURSUING OSTENSIBLY POLITICAL GOALS DURING THE 1970'S. HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVE THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED UNDER STATUTES PROSCRIBING "MEMBERSHIP IN ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS," PROHIBITING PROPAGANDA AIMED AT PROMOTING THE HEGEMONY OF ONE CLASS OR ETHNIC GROUP, AND ADVOCATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. THEY ESTIMATE THAT PERSONS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED FOR NONVIOLENT ACTIVITY UNDER THESE STATUTES NUMBER SEVERAL HUNDRED.

-- F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE INVIOLABILITY OF A PERSON'S DOMICILE AND THE PRIVACY OF CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATION. ENTRY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND INTERCEPTION OR MONITORING OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE ARE PERMITTED ONLY UPON ISSUANCE OF A JUDICIAL WARRANT.

IN THE NINE PROVINCES STILL UNDER STATE-OF-EMERGENCY LAW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNOR (OR SUPERGOVERNOR) MAY EMPOWER AUTHORITIES TO SEARCH RESIDENCES OR THE PREMISES OF POLITICAL PARTIES, BUSINESSES, ASSOCIATIONS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT OBTAINING A WARRANT. THEY MAY ALSO SEARCH, HOLD, OR SEIZE WITHOUT WARRANT PERSONS, LETTERS, TELEGRAMS, AND DOCUMENTS.

-- G. VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

SINCE AUGUST 1984, THE GOVERNMENT HAS FACED IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY AN INCREASINGLY BLOODY CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY KURDISH GUERRILLA GROUPS RESIDENT BOTH IN TURKEY AND SEVERAL NEARBY COUNTRIES, WHOSE PROFESSED AIM IS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE--INCORPORATING PARTS OF PRESENT-DAY TURKEY, IRAQ, AND IRAN--BY DESTABILIZING THE CENTRAL TURKISH GOVERNMENT. ARMED KURDISH REBELS IN TURKEY RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND MATERIEL.

GUERRILLA ATTACKS APPEAR TO HAVE INCREASED IN BOTH NUMBER AND GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT IN 1987. RECENT CHANGES IN GUERRILLA TACTICS INCLUDE THE FORMATION OF LARGER BANDS FOR ARMED ATTACKS, STRIKES AT THE ECONOMIC AND TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE REGION, AND BRUTAL, TERRORIST-STYLE MASSACRES OF VILLAGERS, MANY OF THE VICTIMS BEING WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

THE ATTACKS BY SUPPORTERS OF THE MARXIST-ORIENTED KURDISH WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), THE MAIN INSURGENT GROUP,

ON GOVERNMENT AND CIVILIAN TARGETS HAS RESULTED IN AT LEAST 500 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DEATHS. A TURKISH PAPER IN JULY REPORTED THE 3-YEAR DEATH TOLL AT 715, OF WHICH 289 WERE CIVILIANS, MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, 159 MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND 267 GUERRILLAS. THERE HAVE BEEN ADDITIONAL KILLINGS, PARTICULARLY OF CIVILIANS, SINCE THEN. DESPITE MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PKK, GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES CONTINUE IN MANY REMOTE AND RELATIVELY INACCESSIBLE PARTS OF THE SOUTHEAST.

TURKISH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, AND THE TURKISH PRESS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACTIVITIES BY SECURITY FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. REPORTEDLY, FAMILY MEMBERS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN ABUSED OR TORTURED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE TERRORISTS' WHEREABOUTS. IN SOME CASES, THE POPULATIONS OF ENTIRE VILLAGES HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED OR EVEN DETAINED. IN OTHER CASES, VILLAGERS SUSPECTED OF PROVIDING FOOD TO TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH AIDING THE SEPARATISTS.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

-- A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND COURT RULINGS HAVE REMOVED MOST RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. THE CRIMINAL CODE, HOWEVER, PROHIBITS SPEECH OR WRITINGS CONSIDERED THREATENING TO STATE SECURITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. THE PROSCRIPTION APPLIES TO ADVOCACY OF CLASS OR RACIAL DOMINATION (E.G., COMMUNISM OR FASCISM), THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A THEOCRATIC STATE (E.G., ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM), OR THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE STATE ON ETHNIC LINES (E.G., KURDISH SEPARATISM). THESE PROVISIONS ARE LONGSTANDING, DATING FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC.

THE TURKISH PRESS IS ROBUST AND VIGOROUS. IT IS PRIVATELY OWNED AND REFLECTS A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL VIEWS. THERE IS NO "GOVERNMENT" PAPER; TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, ALL NEWSPAPERS PRESENT OPPOSITION VIEWS. FURTHERMORE, THE RECENT TREND IN JUDICIAL RULINGS AFFECTING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY IN FAVOR OF MORE FREEDOM DESPITE STILL EXISTING STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTION PROBABLY INDUCES SOME CAUTION BY THE PRESS IN ITS SELECTION OF SUBJECT MATTER FOR REPORTING.

TURKISH RADIO AND TELEVISION (TRT) IS A GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY. OPPOSITION LEADERS COMPLAIN THAT IT IS BIASED TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS COVERAGE, ALTHOUGH ALL PARTIES WERE PERMITTED TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS DURING THE NOVEMBER ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WORKS OF CERTAIN LEFTIST AND KURDISH PERFORMERS AND WRITERS ARE RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE BANNED FROM BROADCAST ON TRT FOR POLITICAL OR CULTURAL REASONS.

-- B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES ARE PERMITTED WITH PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORITIES. SUCH REQUESTS ARE GENERALLY GRANTED. ACCORDING TO CURRENT REGULATIONS, MARCHING ROUTES, RALLY AREAS, CROWD DISPERSION ROUTES, AND POSTER HANGING LOCATIONS ARE TO BE FIXED FOR EACH CITY EVERY JANUARY. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED POLITICAL RALLIES DURING THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN AND DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING FOR THE NOVEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, WHICH REFLECTED GOVERNMENT CONCERN OVER THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOME ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRECEDING THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF 1980, PROHIBITS ASSOCIATIONS FROM HAVING TIES TO POLITICAL PARTIES OR ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

ASSOCIATION ACTIVITY IS CLOSELY MONITORED BY THE GOVERNMENT. ASSOCIATIONS MUST SUBMIT THEIR CHARTERS FOR THE APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES BEFORE THEY ARE ALLOWED TO FORM. TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, FORMED IN JULY 1986, DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION TO OPERATE AS A LEGAL ASSOCIATION UNTIL 1 YEAR LATER, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ABLE TO HOLD MEETINGS AND SEMINARS IN THE INTERIM.

AS A REACTION TO THE UNIVERSITIES' INVOLVEMENT IN PRE-1980 VIOLENCE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW PROSCRIBE STUDENT AND FACULTY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. POLITICAL PARTIES ARE FORBIDDEN TO FORM YOUTH BRANCHES. STUDENTS MUST OBTAIN THEIR UNIVERSITY RECTOR'S PERMISSION BEFORE JOINING AN ASSOCIATION. AFTER STUDENT PROTESTS, THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW IN APRIL A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT WHICH WOULD HAVE LIMITED STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS TO ONE PER UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. NEVERTHELESS, 143 STUDENTS WHO PROTESTED THE DRAFT LAW WENT ON TRIAL FOR UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY. THIS TRIAL IS STILL GOING ON. OF APPROXIMATELY 100 FACULTY MEMBERS DISMISSED UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS--AS MANY AS 1,000 RESIGNED OF THEIR OWN WILL EITHER OUT OF DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OR FOR OTHER, MAINLY ECONOMIC, REASONS--A NUMBER HAVE PETITIONED FOR REINSTATEMENT, AND AT LEAST ONE PROFESSOR HAS BEEN REINSTATED FOLLOWING A COURT DECISION IN HIS FAVOR.

MEMBERSHIP IN, OR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO, AN ORGANIZATION ADVOCATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BASED ON CLASS (E.G., COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION) ARE ILLEGAL UNDER TURKISH LAW. AUTHORITIES DETAINED FOUR PERSONS IN OCTOBER AND ARRAIGNED THEM ON CHARGES OF BEING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S UNION, WHICH IS CLAIMED TO BE SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

TRADE UNIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS WHICH CONTINUED TO OPERATE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1983 LABOR LAW HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ORGANIZE WORKPLACES FREELY AND TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. ALTHOUGH ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S TOTAL WORK FORCE OF SOME 16 MILLION IS ORGANIZED, OVER 60 PERCENT OF INDUSTRIALIZED WORKERS ARE UNION MEMBERS COVERED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. AS A RESULT, UNIONS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY ON ITS WORK RULES AND WAGE STRUCTURE. THE 1983 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, STRIKE, AND LOCK-OUT LAW STRICTLY

REGULATES THE BARGAINING PROCESS AND MAKES STRIKES OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS (GENERAL STRIKES, POLITICAL STRIKES, AND SOLIDARITY STRIKES) ILLEGAL. UNIONS ARE ABLE TO REPRESENT THEIR MEMBERS, ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND RESPOND TO THEIR MEMBERS' INTERESTS.

UNDER MARTIAL LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF TRADE UNIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS WERE SEVERELY RESTRICTED. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW, POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY TRADE UNIONS IS BANNED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE TRADE UNION LAW. UNIONS CAN THEORETICALLY NEITHER ENDORSE CANDIDATES AND PARTIES NOR MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR CAMPAIGNS. NEVERTHELESS, THE TURKISH CONFEDERATION OF LABOR,

TURK-IS, OPENLY CAMPAIGNED AGAINST THE RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY BOTH IN THE 1986 BYELECTIONS AND THE 1987 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. TRADE UNION ACTIVITY IN DEFENSE OF WORKERS' SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IS NOT REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE UNIONS HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THAT DISTINCTION TO MOUNT STRENUOUS PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST VARIOUS GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND TO LOBBY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS IN SUPPORT OF LABOR POSITIONS.

THESE CAMPAIGNS INCLUDED CONTINUING EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE PARLIAMENT TO BRING THE LAWS RESTRICTING UNION ACTIVITY INTO HARMONY WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTIONS. A MARCH 24 "MARCH ON PARLIAMENT" WAS PREVENTED BY THE POLICE, WHO CHARGED THAT TURK-IS HAD NOT APPLIED FOR A PARADE PERMIT.

A DECEMBER 1986 COURT DECISION ORDERED THE PERMANENT CLOSING OF DISK (CONFEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNIONS), WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE SUSPENDED UNDER MARTIAL LAW FOLLOWING THE 1980 MILITARY TAKEOVER. THE TRIAL IS IN THE APPEALS STAGE. THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS FUNDS REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF COURT-APPOINTED TRUSTEES. THREE FORMER LEADERS OF DISK WERE ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER. THE PEACE ASSOCIATION TRIALS ARE ALSO AT THE APPEALS STAGE, AND ALL DEFENDANTS ARE FREE ON BAIL.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT, UNION, AND EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ILO. THE LARGEST CONFEDERATION, TURK-IS, IS AN AFFILIATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU); MOST TURK-IS MEMBER UNIONS ARE AFFILIATED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WAS ELECTED A DEPUTY MEMBER OF THE ILO GOVERNING BODY IN 1987.

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) HAS ALLEGED THAT THE TURKISH WORKERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ORGANIZE IS HAMPERED BY THE LABOR CODE AND BY GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYER POLICIES AND PRACTICES, THAT THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS HEAVILY ENCUMBERED, AND THAT OBSERVANCE OF MINIMAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS IS LAX. THE MINISTER OF LABOR HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING LEGISLATION WHICH WILL ADDRESS SOME OF THE WORKER RIGHTS ISSUES RAISED BY THE AFL-CIO AND OTHERS. THE NEW LEGISLATION REPORTEDLY WILL MODIFY OR ELIMINATE SOME RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON TRADE UNIONS, EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT OF UNIONS, AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING THEIR FREE CHOICE OF OFFICERS. NEW LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE RIGHT OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND TEACHERS TO ORGANIZE, AS WELL AS THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS A UNION CURRENTLY MUST SATISFY IN ORDER TO BECOME A BARGAINING AGENT.

-- C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF TURKS ARE SUNNI MUSLIMS. "ALEVIS," ADHERENTS OF DIFFERENT HETERODOX VARIETIES OF SHI'ISM, CONSTITUTE FROM 10 TO 15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THERE ARE ALSO VARIOUS SMALL CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS GROUPS, AND A SMALL JEWISH COMMUNITY.

TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC HAVE REGARDED SECULARISM AS AN ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE OF A MODERN, WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, AND THE CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMS IT TO BE A BASIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE STATE. ACCORDINGLY IT DISTINGUISHES CAREFULLY BETWEEN A PERSON'S PRIVATE RIGHT TO "FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND CONVICTION" AND PUBLIC PROSELYTIZING OF ANY KIND. SINCE OTTOMAN TIMES, PERSONAL IDENTITY IN TURKISH SOCIETY HAS CORRELATED WITH RELIGION. THE 1923 TREATY OF LAUSANNE DEFINES MINORITIES ACCORDING TO RELIGION, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY IS STILL LARGELY SYNONYMOUS WITH RELIGIOUS IDENTITY EVEN IN THE MODERN SECULAR TURKISH STATE. PROSELYTIZATION IS THEREFORE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, "INSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND MORAL EDUCATION" IN ACCORDANCE WITH A STATE-PREPARED CURRICULUM IS COMPULSORY FOR ALL STUDENTS. THE EDUCATION MINISTRY CONFIRMED IN 1986 THAT

NON-MUSLIMS WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND CLASSES IN GENERAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION BUT WOULD BE EXCUSED FROM THE "PRACTICAL" SECTIONS, WHICH INCLUDE MEMORIZATION OF KORANIC VERSES AND INSTRUCTIONS IN PRAYER. THE COURSES--2 HOURS PER WEEK--ARE TAUGHT BY LAY TEACHERS. EXTRACURRICULAR KORAN COURSES USING GOVERNMENT-APPROVED TEXTS ARE PERMITTED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED KORAN COURSES RUN BY FUNDAMENTALIST SECTS TEACHING A MORE RADICAL BRAND OF ISLAM.

AMONG OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SMALL NUMBERS OF ARMENIAN ORTHODOX AND ARMENIAN CATHOLIC, GREEK ORTHODOX AND GREEK CATHOLIC, BULGARIAN ORTHODOX, ROMAN CATHOLIC, SYRIAN AND ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN, CHALDEAN UNIATES, PROTESTANTS, AND JEWISH BELIEVERS ARE FOUND IN TURKEY, PRIMARILY IN ISTANBUL. IN ADDITION TO THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION, THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE GUARANTEES THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES. THESE GROUPS OPERATE CHURCHES, MONASTERIES, SYNAGOGUES, SCHOOLS (WHERE STUDENTS MAY BE TAUGHT IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE), AND CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS SUCH AS HOSPITALS AND ORPHANAGES.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITY GROUPS HAVE REPEATEDLY COMPLAINED ABOUT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, THE FORMATION OF PARISH COUNCILS, AND THE REGISTRATION AND REPAIR OF CHURCH PROPERTY. GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY TO RELIGIOUS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS IS ALSO A MATTER OF CONTENTION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO RESOLVE SEVERAL ISSUES OF CONCERN TO NON-MUSLIM GROUPS. IT GRANTED PERMISSION TO THE GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE IN APRIL 1987 TO REBUILD ITS ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, DESTROYED BY FIRE IN 1941. IT INCREASED THE VALUE OF REPAIRS WHICH CAN BE MADE WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION TO HISTORICAL BUILDINGS, THEREBY REMOVING ANOTHER ISSUE OF CONTENTION. IT PERMITTED THE FREE CIRCULATION OF BIBLES. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT YET GRANTED PERMISSION TO BUILD CHURCHES TO SUCH COMMUNITIES AS THE CHALDEAN UNIATES WHO HAVE EMIGRATED TO ISTANBUL FROM THE SOUTHEAST, OR TO THE ARMENIAN COMMUNITY OF ANKARA.

-- D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

THERE IS GENERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN TURKEY. TURKS GENERALLY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND INCREASING NUMBERS HAVE DONE SO SINCE THE RELAXATION OF CURRENCY CONTROLS. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, A CITIZEN'S FREEDOM TO LEAVE MAY BE RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, CIVIC OBLIGATIONS (GENERALLY MILITARY SERVICE), OR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION. SOME TURKS INVOLVED IN LENGTHY MASS

TRIALS DATING FROM THE EARLY 1980'S HAVE BEEN DENIED PASSPORTS, ALTHOUGH OTHERS HAVE BEEN GRANTED PASSPORTS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME CITIZENS NOT UNDER INDICTMENT WERE DENIED PASSPORTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. TURKISH LAW PROVIDES THAT THOSE DENIED PASSPORTS WHILE UNDER INDICTMENT MAY NEVERTHELESS BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL IF THE JUSTICE MINISTRY AND OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER APPROVE. RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN EASED AS A MATTER OF PRACTICE, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN ORDER TO BRING TURKISH PASSPORT POLICIES MORE INTO CONFORMITY WITH EUROPEAN NORMS.

TURKISH LAW GRANTS CITIZENS PROTECTION AGAINST DEPORTATION, EXTRADITION, OR DENIAL OF REENTRY. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT OF TURKS LIVING ABROAD TO RETURN HOME. UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE TURKISH CITIZENSHIP LAW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT MAY STRIP CITIZENSHIP FROM THOSE WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN HOME TO FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES, OR WHO HAVE COMMITTED ACTS EXPATRIATING THEMSELVES, INCLUDING FAILING TO RETURN TO PERFORM MILITARY SERVICE. ACCORDING TO A TURKISH PRESS REPORT IN APRIL, 13,788 TURKS LIVING ABROAD HAVE BEEN STRIPPED OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP SINCE 1980.

TURKEY HAS PERMANENTLY RESETTLED APPROXIMATELY 4,500 AFGHAN REFUGEES OF TURKIC ETHNICITY IN RECENT YEARS AND PROVIDES A TEMPORARY HAVEN FOR EAST EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN TWO TEMPORARY SETTLEMENT FACILITIES. SINCE TURKEY LIMITS THE DEFINITION OF REFUGEES TO EAST EUROPEANS, THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT GRANT REFUGEE STATUS TO IRANIANS. NEVERTHELESS, AS A COUNTRY OF FIRST ASYLUM, TURKEY SERVES AS A SAFE HAVEN FOR MANY IRANIAN REFUGEES BEING PROCESSED FOR RESETTLEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR). IT DOES NOT GENERALLY DEPORT TO IRAN THOSE WHO ENTERED TURKEY ILLEGALLY OR WHO OVERSTAYED THEIR PERMITTED TIME AS "TOURISTS." IN CONSEQUENCE, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIANS ARE NOW LIVING IN TURKEY, MANY OF THEM IN ISTANBUL AND OTHER LARGE CITIES.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT EXISTS BOTH IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE. TURKEY HAS A MULTIPARTY, PRESIDENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. THE PRESIDENT IS ELECTED BY PARLIAMENT FOR A SINGLE 7-YEAR TERM. THE CURRENT PRESIDENT, WHOSE ELECTION WAS AUTOMATIC WITH THE APPROVAL OF TURKEY'S NEW CONSTITUTION IN THE 1982 REFERENDUM, IS RETIRED GENERAL KENAN EVREN, FORMER CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF AND HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH GOVERNED TURKEY DURING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1980-83).

ELECTIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE ARE ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. THE UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENT HAS 450 SEATS ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THE ELECTION LAW REQUIRES THAT A PARTY WIN AT LEAST 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL VOTE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. THE 10 PERCENT THRESHOLD IS INTENDED TO PREVENT POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND RECURRENCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARALYSIS OF THE LATE 1970'S. OF THE SEVEN LEGAL PARTIES WHICH FIELDED SLATES OF CANDIDATES FOR THE NOVEMBER NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THREE RECEIVED MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE.

PARTIES ADVOCATING A THEOCRATIC STATE, THE SUPERIORITY OR DICTATORSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL CLASS OR GROUP, OR "EXCLUSIVE" OR "ELITIST" POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES ARE PROHIBITED.

NO PARTY MAY BE FORMED AROUND A PARTICULAR ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP. AMONG THE PROHIBITED POLITICAL GROUPINGS ARE COMMUNIST AND OTHER MARXIST PARTIES, WHICH ARE BASED ON CLASS, AND FASCIST "ELITIST" PARTIES. THESE ARE REGARDED AS INIMICAL TO A WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THREATENING TO TURKEY'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEGRITY. FASCISTS AND COMMUNISTS SIMILARLY ARE BANNED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN OTHER PARTIES. MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS MAY NOT JOIN ANY POLITICAL PARTY.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN. TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO GRANT WOMEN FULL AND EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 11 FEMALE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, ONE OF WHOM IS A CABINET MINISTER, AND SEVERAL WOMEN HOLD IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN THE PARTY HIERARCHIES. MEMBERS OF MINORITIES, MUSLIM AND NON-MUSLIM, FACE NO LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS LONG AS THEY ACCEPT TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY. DESPITE OTHER LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON KURDS AS AN ETHNIC

GROUP, MANY TURKS OF KURDISH DESCENT SERVE OR HAVE SERVED IN THE PARLIAMENT, THE CABINET, AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSTS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED VISITS TO TURKEY BY FOREIGNERS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS DURING 1987 AND, IN MOST CASES, FACILITATED CONTACTS FOR BOTH OFFICIAL AND NONOFFICIAL VISITORS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS LESS HELPFUL TO VISITORS INVESTIGATING THE KURDISH ISSUE. SINCE THE 1983 SETTLEMENT OF A FIVE-NATION COMPLAINT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TURKEY HAS UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE REGULAR CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND TO PERMIT SITE VISITS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PERMITTED PRISON VISITS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE COE TORTURE CONVENTION WILL MEAN FUTURE VISITS BY THE COE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE.

A NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION WAS PROVISIONALLY FORMED IN JULY 1986 AND HAD ITS CHARTER OFFICIALLY APPROVED IN 1987. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY, THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY, ALSO HAS A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND HAS ACTIVELY PURSUED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN PARLIAMENT.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION REGARDS ALL TURKISH CITIZENS AS EQUAL AND PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON ETHNIC GROUNDS. IN THE LAUSANNE TREATY, THE GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK "TO ASSURE FULL AND COMPLETE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND LIBERTY TO ALL INHABITANTS OF TURKEY WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO BIRTH, NATIONALITY, LANGUAGE, RACE, OR RELIGION." AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN THE LONGSTANDING POLICY OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK ASSIMILATION OF PERSONS OF NON-TURKISH ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF SOCIETY. THE SIZE OF THE NON-MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITIES HAS DECLINED STEADILY OVER THE YEARS.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITY GROUPS CONTINUE TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGULATING THE OPERATION OF COMMUNITY

SCHOOLS, THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF COMMUNITY REAL ESTATE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHURCH PROPERTIES, AND THE

ACTIVITIES OF PARISH COUNCILS. THE PROHIBITION ON MOST CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST ACCEPTING BEQUESTS ALSO CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR CONCERN.

KURDS CAN BE FOUND THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BOTH AS A RESULT OF OTTOMAN SETTLEMENT POLICY AND MORE RECENT MIGRATION TO METROPOLITAN CENTERS. THOSE LIVING OUTSIDE OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN ASSIMILATED MORE COMPLETELY INTO NATIONAL LIFE. MOST KURDISH SPEAKERS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED SOUTHEAST, AND MANY LIVE A TRIBAL EXISTENCE. THROUGH LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO INTEGRATE FULLY BOTH THE REGION AND ITS PEOPLE INTO MODERN TURKEY.

THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY ASSERTION OF A KURDISH ETHNIC IDENTITY WHICH COULD BRING INTO QUESTION THE UNITY OF THE TURKISH STATE. PUBLICATION OF BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS IN KURDISH IS FORBIDDEN, AS ARE BOOKS OR ANY OTHER MATERIALS DEALING WITH KURDISH HISTORY, CULTURE, OR ETHNIC IDENTITY. THE KURDISH LANGUAGE IS NOT PERMITTED FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES, E.G., IN THE COURTS, NOR IS IT ALLOWED IN CERTAIN PRIVATE SITUATIONS SUCH AS RECEIVING VISITORS IN PRISON, EVEN WHEN THE PRISONER OR VISITOR DOES NOT SPEAK TURKISH. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON THE USE OF KURDISH IN NONOFFICIAL SETTINGS.

AS NOTED ABOVE, THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUPS TO USE THEIR OWN LANGUAGES IS LIMITED. ALTHOUGH THE LAUSANNE TREATY STATES THAT "NO RESTRICTIONS SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE FREE USE BY ANY TURKISH NATIONAL OF ANY LANGUAGE IN PRIVATE INTERCOURSE, IN COMMERCE, RELIGION, IN THE PRESS, OR IN PUBLICATIONS OF ANY KIND OR AT PUBLIC MEETINGS," THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY IS TURKISH. ONE ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION BANS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF LANGUAGE, WHILE OTHERS PROHIBIT THE PUBLIC USE OF "LANGUAGES PROHIBITED BY LAW." WHILE THERE IS NO LEGISLATION DEFINING PROHIBITED LANGUAGES, THE BROADCASTING AND PUBLISHING LAWS DO DEFINE "LEGAL LANGUAGES." PERSONS HAVE BEEN TRIED ON A VARIETY OF CHARGES RELATING TO THE USE OF KURDISH. ALL RECENT SUCH TRIALS HAVE RESULTED IN ACQUITTALS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THE INTENT OF ITS BANS ON PUBLISHING IN KURDISH (AND ITS DISCOURAGING OF LANGUAGES SUCH AS GEORGIAN AND LAZ) IS TO FOSTER TURKISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF ALL CITIZENS FOR ALL USES. THIS IS PART OF AN EFFORT TO INCULCATE IN ALL TURKISH CITIZENS A SENSE OF IDENTITY

WITH THE TURKISH STATE AND NATION AS OPPOSED TO IDENTIFICATION WITH ANY PARTICULAR GROUP WITHIN THE NATION. IN PRACTICE, THE SEVERITY OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF A MINORITY LANGUAGE APPEARS TO DEPEND ON THE PERCEIVED THREAT THE GROUP IN QUESTION PRESENTS TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT FACES ARMED KURDISH SEPARATISTS AND BELIEVES THE USE OF KURDISH FOSTERS SEPARATISM. THE USE OF ARABIC, ABOUT WHICH THERE ARE NO SUCH CONCERNS, IS NOT SIMILARLY RESTRICTED.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN A LEADER IN PROMOTING AND PROTECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS. WOMEN HAVE FULL SUFFRAGE AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS, HAVE ATTAINED HIGH OFFICE, AND ARE REPRESENTED IN ALL PROFESSIONS AND INSTITUTIONS. WOMEN HAVE SERVED OR ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN SENIOR POSITIONS AS UNIVERSITY RECTOR AND DEAN, AMBASSADOR,

POLITICAL PARTY PRESIDENT, AND ARMY COLONEL. TURKISH BUSINESSWOMEN PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLES IN MANY INDUSTRIES AND SIT ON THE BOARDS OF SOME OF TURKEY'S LARGEST PRIVATE FIRMS. FEMALE LAWYERS AND JUDGES ARE RELATIVELY MORE COMMON THAN IN THE UNITED STATES, AND FEMALE DOCTORS DOMINATE IN SOME SPECIALTIES.

NONETHELESS, THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SMALLER COMMUNITIES AND RURAL AREAS--ESPECIALLY IN THE EAST--IS STILL CIRCUMSCRIBED BY CENTURIES OF PATRIARCHAL TRADITION. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS IN THESE AREAS LIMIT WOMEN'S EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, THE CONSTITUTION AND BODY OF LAW NOTWITHSTANDING.

CONDITIONS OF LABOR

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT TO REASONABLE CONDITIONS OF LABOR SUITED TO THE WORKER'S AGE, SEX, AND CAPACITY, AND GRANTS THE RIGHT TO REST AND LEISURE AND A FAIR WAGE. THE LABOR LAW FORBIDS THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 13 YEARS OF AGE AND RESTRICTS CHILDREN UNDER 15 TO "LIGHT WORK WHICH WILL NOT HARM THEIR HEALTH AND PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT, PREVENT THEIR ATTENDANCE AT OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMS, OR THEIR ABILITY TO BENEFIT FROM EDUCATION." CHILDREN BETWEEN 15 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, NOR MAY THEY BE EMPLOYED AT NIGHT. GIRLS AND WOMEN MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED IN UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER WORK, BUT, IF OVER THE AGE OF 18, MAY WORK NIGHT SHIFTS UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED JOINTLY BY

THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE.

A BOARD COMPOSED OF GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND LABOR REPRESENTATIVES ESTABLISHES NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS. THE LABOR LAW PROVIDES FOR A 7 1/2-HOUR DAY AND A 45-HOUR WORKWEEK.

IN SPITE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, SPECIFIC LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AND LABOR UNION EFFORTS, A CONSIDERABLE GAP REMAINS BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITIES OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY LEVELS. TRADE UNIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY COMPLAINED THAT EXISTING REGULATIONS GOVERNING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WORKING CONDITIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ENFORCED. OUTSIDE THE INDUSTRIALIZED SECTOR WHERE UNIONS EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ARE GENERALLY IGNORED BOTH ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY AND ON CHILD AND FEMALE EMPLOYMENT. IN GENERAL, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CHILD LABOR AND ITS PRACTICE IS NARROWING. BUT IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO A LARGE DEGREE, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN FAMILY-OPERATED COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, YOUNG CHILDREN STILL WORK AT THEIR PARENTS' SIDE. DURING 1987 AN ILLEGAL MARKET IN THE SERVICES OF CHILDREN IN A PROVINCIAL TOWN, IN WHICH CHILDREN FROM VILLAGES WERE LEASED TO WORK FOR NONRELATIVES DURING THE SCHOOL VACATION MONTHS, RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE AND WAS CLOSED IMMEDIATELY BY THE GOVERNMENT. WHITEHEAD
UNQUOTE SHULTZ

Department of State

INFO: CLP(01) STA(01) ICD(02)

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ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 CTME-00 C-01 OASY-00
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R 050940Z AUG 93
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TO CIMS NTDB WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SHENYANG
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
SECSTATE WASHDC 6547
AMCONSUL CHENGDU

UNCLAS BEIJING 027897

USDOC FOR 3132/010/EAP/CKIM/ASTERLING
USDOC FOR 4420/IEP/EAP/OPH/DFOREST

STATE FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KTDB, BEXP, CH, BTIO
SUBJECT: IMI -- TECHNICAL RENOVATION OF XUANHUA IRON AND STEEL COMPANY

1. INTRODUCTION: LOCATED IN ZHANGJIAKOU CITY, HEBEI PROVINCE, FIRM IS ONE OF THE LARGEST ENTERPRISES IN CHINA. IT IS 170 KM WEST OF BEIJING AND CLOSE TO THE BEIJING-BAOTOU RAILWAY AND THE BEIJING-ZHANGJIAKOU MOTORWAY. WITH 15 PLANTS AND 32,000 WORKERS, FIRM'S FIXED ASSETS WERE USD 150 MILLION IN 1991, PLACING THE COMPANY AT NUMBER 77 OF 500 LARGEST ENTERPRISES IN CHINA. ANNUAL SALES IN 1991 WERE USD 174 MILLION, RANKING IT 149TH. THE YEARLY PRODUCTION CAPACITY IS 1.5 MILLION TONS OF PIGIRON, 200,000 TONS OF STEEL AND 180,000 TONS OF STEEL PRODUCTS.

THE FIRM IS EQUIPPED WITH:

A) 1,260 CUBIC METER BLAST FURNACE	1
B) 300 CUBIC METER BLAST FURNACES	4
C) COKE OVENS (TYPE JN6-82)	2
D) 50 SQUARE METER SINTERING FURNACE	1
E) 64 SQUARE METER SINTERING FURNACE	2
F) 6 TON LD CONVERTER	2
G) 3,200 CUBIC TON/YEAR OXYGEN GENERATOR	1
H) 5 TON E.A.F.	1
I) ROUGH MILL WITH 500MM ROLLERS	1
J) ROD MILL (2 X 44MM ROLERS AND 5 X 250MM ROLLERS)	1
K) STRIP CONTINUOUS MILL	1
L) IRON ORE MINE CAPACITY 1 MILLION TONS/Y	
M) LIMESTONE MINE CAPACITY 690,000 TONS/Y	

THE COMPANY HAVE JUST BEGUN TO BUILD THREE 10.5 T LD CONVERTERS, TWO 3,200T/H OXYGEN GENERATOR, THREE SQUARE BILLET CONTINUOUS CASTING MACHINES AND ONE SHAPED BAR MILL.

2. TECHNICAL RENOVATION
THE ACTUAL PRODUCTION OUTPUT IN 1992 WAS 1.3 MILLION TONS OF IRON AND 245,000 TONS OF STEEL. IT HAS TO RAISE STEEL PRODUCTION. FIRM PLANS THE FOLLOWING:

1) FOR STEEL MAKING

TO BUILD TWO 50 TON LD CONVERTERS, ONE SQUARE AND ONE PLATE CONTINUOUS CASTING MACHINE AND ONE 1,000 TON METAL MIXER TO PRODUCE 1 MILLION TONS OF ROUGH STEEL, 370,000 TONS OF SQUARE BILLETS AND 630,000 TONS OF PLATE BILLETS YEARLY.

2) FOR ROLLING
TO SET UP TWO HIGH SPEED WIRE MILLS (INCLUDING DOUBLE LINES) SO AS TO HAVE 35,000 TONS OF WIRE COIL ANNUALLY. TO CONSTRUCT ONE SET OF MIDDLE PLATE MILL SO AS TO REACH THE PRODUCTION OF 550,000 TONS OF PLATES PER YEAR.

3) OTHERS
TO CONSTRUCT ONE 10,000 TONS/H CUBIC METER OXYGEN GENERATOR, TWO 75 TON BOILERS, ONE 6 MILLION AND ONE 12 MILLION WATT ELECTRICITY GENERATORS AND SOME OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES.

THE TOTAL INVESTMENT WILL BE USD 461 MILLION.

3. CONSTRUCTION PLAN

PLAN ONE: TO INVEST USD 461 MILLION AT ONE TIME TO REACH THE REQUIREMENTS.

PLAN TWO: TO CONSTRUCT A HIGH SPEED WIRE MILL, A SQUARE CONTINUOUS CASTING MACHINE AND A 50 TON LD CONVERTER; THEN A PLATE CONTINUOUS CASTING MACHINE AND THE NEXT CONVERTER.

4. FIRM ALSO INTENDS TO BUY SECOND HAND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING: ROUGH MILL, ROD MILL, LD CONVERTER, PLATE CONTINUOUS CASTING MACHINE, HIGH SPEED STRIP MILL AND HIGH SPEED WIRE MILL. THE EQUIPMENT SHOULD OF 1980'S TECHNOLOGY AND IDLE FOR NO MORE THAN 3 YEARS.

5. FINANCING

FOREIGN INVESTMENT WILL BE MOST DESIRABLE (PRIVATE INVESTMENT, SYNDICATED LOAN OR GOVERNMENT LOAN). FIRM WILL PAY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:
A) THROUGH EXPORT INCOME FROM PIGIRON, STEEL PRODUCTS, COKE BY-PRODUCTS.
B) THROUGH FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET.
C) THROUGH COMPENSATION.

6. INTERESTED COMPANIES MAY CONTACT:
MS. YINGMIN LUO/FOREIGN ECONOMIC & TECHNICAL COOPERATION OFFICE
ZHANGJIAKOU 075103, HEBEI, CHINA
TEL: (86-3453)312176 EXT.3603 OR 2967
TLX: 275072 XHSC CN
FAX: (86-3453)31450
(FCS: BLIU) ROY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR [initials] Date 7/5/96
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CONCEPTS= FOREIGN, MINISTER, VISIT, DISCUSSION, NUCLEAR ENERGY, COOPERATION

TAGS= PREL, ENRG, TNUC, ECIN, TRGY, EAID, PK, FR, (CHEYSSON, CLAUDE)

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ACTION NEA-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2771
INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 05793

VIENNA FOR USIAEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ENRG TNUC ECIN PK FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN

REF: PARIS 11859

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: THE HIGHLIGHTS OO FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON'S MARCH 28-30 VISIT TO PAKISTAN WERE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN ON POSSIBLE FRENCH-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THE [redacted]

AID TO PAKISTAN CONSORTIUM AND PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN. CHEYSSON'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION (PARAS 3-5) ARE VERBATIM FROM THE TAPE RECORDING AT HIS MARCH 29 PRESS CONFERENCE. PRESS REPORTS DO NOT ACCURATELY REPRESENT HIS STATEMENTS. WE NOTE EMBASSY PARIS' CONCERN AT AFP REPORT (REFTEL) BUT IT IS OUR IMPRESSION FROM THE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT THAT THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN CHEYSSON'S POSITION OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE REMARKS NECESSARILY MEAN A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO PROCEED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE ON CHASMA. WE WILL SEEK TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH FRENCH EMBASSY AND GOP OFFICIALS IN COMING DAYS. ON AFGHANISTAN, ACCORDING TO AN EC-10 AMBASSADOR, CHEYSSON WAS SURPRISED BY OPTIMISM OF ZIA AND YAQUB REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. WE VIEW UPBEAT PAKISTANI STATEMENTS AS CONSISTENT WITH ITS LINE THAT PAKISTAN EXPECTS THE SOVIET UNION TO HONOR ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLINGNESS TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

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3. NUCLEAR COOPERATION: DURING HIS PRELIMINARY REMARKS TO REPORTERS CHEYSSON NOTED THAT EVERY COUNTRY HAS A RIGHT TO OBTAIN MODERN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND THAT THE GOF IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE FORM OF SUCH COOPERATION IN PAKISTAN'S CASE WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, PARTICULARLY POSSIBLE FRENCH ASSISTANCE FOR THE CHASMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE "OTHER" NUCLEAR ISSUE HAD ALSO COME UP BUT EXPLAINED THAT AS THIS MATTER WAS STILL A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION HE DID NOT WANT TO GO INTO IT FURTHER.

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4. IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, CHEYSSON,

[redacted]

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ASKED WHETHER FRANCE WOULD SUPPLY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO A NON-NPT SIGNATORY, RESPONDED, "WE HAVE NEVER AND WILL NEVER SUPPLY NUCLEAR PLANTS TO COUNTRIES NOT SUBJECT TO CONTROLS BY THE VIENNA AGENCY." HE ADDED THAT SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED UNDER THE NPT WERE MOST NEEDED IN THE CASE OF NON-NPT SIGNATORIES. ASKED IF HE REALLY MEANT EVERY COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY, HE REPLIED, "YES, BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA AND PAKISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES" --ADDING THIS TIME, "THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES MUST ENSURE SUCH TECH-

NOLOGY IS DEVOTED TO PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT."

5. A QUESTIONER THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH PAKISTAN ON THE CHASMA PROJECT ABSENT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS ON ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND CHEYSSON REPLIED, "ON FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS WE DO NOT HAVE THE SAME APPROACH AS THE UNITED STATES, LET IT BE NOTED." FOLLOWING UP, THE REPORTER ASKED IF THIS MEANT FRANCE WOULD SUPPLY A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO A COUNTRY THAT DOES NOT APPLY FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS TO ALL FACILITIES, AND CHEYSSON RESPONDED, "YES" IN A MOST POSITIVE TONE.

6. AID TO PAKISTAN CONSORTIUM: CHEYSSON NOTED FRANCE HAD BEEN AND WILL BE "VERY ACTIVE" IN THE CONSORTIUM. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT PAKISTAN'S REQUEST AT THE LAST CONSORTIUM MEETING FOR A SECOND RESCHEDULING OF OFFICIAL DEBT HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED. SPECIFICALLY, CHEYSSON SAID, "I AM SURPRISED TO HEAR SOME SAY THAT AS THERE HAS BEEN NO PAKISTANI DEFAULT, THERE CAN BE NO RESCHEDULING: AS IF SIN MUST PRECEDE RESCHEDULING." ASKED IF FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT PAKISTAN IN A REQUEST FOR DEBT RESCHEDULING AT THE UPCOMING APRIL MEETING IN PARIS, HE REPLIED, "WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT PAKISTAN MUST BE FORCED TO DEFAULT BEFORE WE WILL AGREE TO RELIEF,"

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ACTION NEA-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2772
INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 05793

VIENNA FOR USIAEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ENRG TNUC ECIN PK FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO

ADDING, "WE HOPE PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS EITHER."
ASKED IF FRANCE WOULD INCREASE ITS AID TO PAKISTAN, CHEYSSON SAID THAT IT IS UP TO PAKISTAN TO COME UP WITH GOOD PROJECTS AS FRANCE WILL NOT MAKE COMMITMENTS "IN GENERAL TERMS."

7. AFGHANISTAN: WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, CHEYSSON, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SAID THAT FRANCE "DENOUNCED AND CONDEMNED " THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 05793 02 OF 02 010609Z

TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THIS WAS IN LINE WITH FRENCH POLICY OF CONDEMNING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA AND NAMIBIA. HE ALSO SAID FRANCE FAVORS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT "APPRECIATED" THE EFFORTS OF DE CUELLAR AND CORDOVEZ. CHEYSSON ADDED THAT FRANCE WOULD RECOMMEND TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE UN AND ALL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE WORLD TO EXTEND "ALL POSSIBLE MATERIAL HELP TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES."

8. ACCORDING TO AFP CORRESPONDENT, CHEYSSON SAID THAT FONMIN YAQUB EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT AND SAID THE SOVIETS IN FACT WANT TO WITHDRAW ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON APPARENTLY DID NOT LEARN ON WHAT THIS OPTIMISM WAS BASED. ONE EUROPEAN AMBASSADOR ALSO TOLD US THAT CHEYSSON'S DEBRIEFING FOR EC-10 HAD HIGHLIGHTED

YAQUB'S UPBEAT EVALUATION. CHEYSSON HAD MADE CLEAR TO EC REPS THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE SOVIET POLICY HAS CHANGED, AND IS PUZZLED BY PAKISTANI POSITION. OUR OWN SENSE IS THAT THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH TONE ADOPTED BY ZIA AFTER HIS MEETING WITH ANDROPOV.

9. FINALLY, CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE VIEWS OF FRANCE AND PAKISTAN ARE "VERY CLOSE" ON THE ISSUES OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS TO A HOMELAND. SPIERS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D870863-0858

DATE= 19 OCT 87

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

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OFFICE= ACTION PA

TO= STATE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT= PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, OCTOBE
1987, JERUSALEM

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS CONFERENCE, PEACE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICY

TAGS= OVIP, IS, US, (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)

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ACTION PA-02

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, P/G,
VOA/BBN, VOA/CA, NEA/BULLOCK
WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF
STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, OCTOBER 18, 1987,
JERUSALEM

BEGIN TEXT:

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I HAVE RECEIVED A VERY WARM AND PERSONAL WELCOME HERE IN ISRAEL. I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION AND THE RETURN OF THAT WARMTH THAT GOES FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND WORTHWHILE MEETINGS I HAVE HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PERES, DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN AND THEIR ASSOCIATES, THE MEETINGS AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, AND THE CEREMONY AT THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE AND THE LUNCHEON FOLLOWING. THE MOVING EXPERIENCE OF MEETING WITH IDA NUDEL AND ILANA FRIEDMAN, WHO I HAD MET WITH BEFORE--BOTH OF THEM UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES--WAS A GENUINE JOY, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY AND OTHERS WHOM I MET WITH ARE CONTINUAL REMINDERS OF THE WORK YET TO BE DONE. I HOPE THAT MY PRESENCE HERE BEFORE I GO TO MOSCOW MAKES CLEAR BY THAT FACT THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND I THINK ALL AMERICANS ATTACH TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVIET JEWRY. OF COURSE WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONTINUING AND VERY RICH DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR WILL BE IN WASHINGTON, I THINK ON THE 20TH, TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AND

WILL COME NEXT YEAR FOR A MORE FORMAL VISIT. AND WE WILL BE WELCOMING PRESIDENT HERZOG EARLIER. SO THERE ARE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS GOING ON ALL THE TIME. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. I'LL BE GLAD TO TAKE THEM.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, BARRY SCHWEID OF AP. ASSUMING YOU STILL APPLY THE LOFTUS RULE, CAN YOU TELL US IF...

A: YOU MEAN IF YOU DON'T HAVE ANY NEWS, DON'T HOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE?

Q: WELL, THE COROLLARY (LAUGHTER).

A: SEE YOU LATER, FELLOWS (LAUGHTER).

Q: I WAS THINKING OF THE COROLLARY, SINCE

YOU CALLED THIS NEWS CONFERENCE SURELY YOU MUST HAVE NEWS.

A: NO, I DON'T HAVE ANY NEWS.

Q: I MIGHT COAX YOU INTO BY ASKING IF YOU THINK THE SITUATION, THE PEACE PROCESS, REALLY REQUIRES WHAT A LOCAL PAPER HERE CALLS NEW IDEAS OR IF IT REQUIRES THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS TO FIND THEIR OWN WAY TO NEGOTIATION.

A: OBVIOUSLY, THE OBJECTIVE OF ALL OUR EFFORTS IS PEACE. WE BELIEVE IT'S PRETTY CLEAR--I DO, AND I THINK ALL MY FRIENDS HERE DO--THAT THE WAY TO GET THERE IS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND HOW DO YOU BRING THAT

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

ABOUT? SO WE CONTINUE TO SCRATCH OUR HEADS ABOUT THAT. THERE IS A SENSE IN WHICH YOU HAVE TO SAY SO MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE VERY WELL INFORMED AND VERY BRIGHT HAVE WORKED ON THESE ISSUES FOR SO LONG THAT IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THERE ARE ANY GENUINELY NEW IDEAS. BUT THE SITUATION EVOLVES AND YOU TRY TO ARRANGE THESE, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND PROCEDURALLY, TO SEE IF YOU CAN'T FIND A WAY FOR SOME PROGRESS. BECAUSE THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE IS SO IMPORTANT AND THE BENEFITS POTENTIALLY ARE SO GREAT. AND I HAVE BEEN DOING THAT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHOSE DRIVE FOR PEACE IS QUITE APPARENT, AS WELL AS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO ALSO HAS A GREAT CONCERN AND IS CONSUMED BY THAT OBJECTIVE. SO THAT IS WHAT I HAVE BEEN DOING. I WILL DO THAT WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WITH KING HUSSEIN, AGAIN WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON, AND SO ON. WE HOPE THAT WE GRADUALLY GET SOMEWHERE AND IN A WAY, IF YOU LOOK BACK A WAYS, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS.

Q: JIM ANDERSON FROM UPI. FOLLOWING ON, MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU CONTINUE, DO YOU THINK, YOUR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS HAVE MOVED THINGS FORWARD AT ALL? DO YOU SEE ANY REARRANGEMENTS THAT GIVE ANY POSSIBILITY OF
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ANY FUTURE MOVEMENTS?

A: I CAN'T POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR THING AND SAY "LOOK, WE HAVE GONE FROM HERE TO THERE." BUT I DO FEEL THAT WE HAVE HAD SOME...THE DISCUSSIONS ARE ALWAYS INTENSE AND GOOD ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN VERY THOROUGH, AND I BELIEVE, AT LEAST FROM MY STANDPOINT, IT HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. BUT I CAN'T POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR THING AT THIS POINT THAT IS A BIG SIGN OF PROGRESS.

Q: DAVID SHIPLER FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES. WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR RELAX HIS OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE? DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD HELP MAKE PROGRESS?

A: HE IS CONCERNED AS WE ALL ARE, BY WANTING TO FIND A ROAD TO PEACE. AND HE IS CONCERNED AS WE ALL ARE, THAT WE FIND A ROAD THAT TURNS OUT TO BE FRUITFUL AND THAT DOESN'T GET OVERWHELMED BY RISKS. SO I THINK HE HAS AN ASSESSMENT OF RISKS THAT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE; AND WE HAVE TO KEEP WORKING AT THIS BALANCE OF THE RISKS OF DOING SOMETHING, THE RISKS OF NOT DOING SOMETHING; HOW TO MINIMIZE THE RISK CONNECTED WITH ANY ACTION THAT WE CONTEMPLATE AND KEEP STRUGGLING AT IT. AND THAT'S WHAT WE ARE DOING. SO I AM NOT TRYING TO TALK ANYBODY INTO OR OUT OF ANY PARTICULAR THING, BUT JUST FIND SOME AVENUE THAT WE CAN ALL FEEL MORE

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

COMFORTABLE WITH AND HE FEELS, OBVIOUSLY,
WITH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS DESCRIBED
BY MANY.

Q: JAY BUSHINSKY OF THE CHICAGO SUN TIMES. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. SHAMIR, THAT THE MAIN OBJECTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ONLY BE A DESTRUCTIVE ELEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS?

A: OF COURSE THERE ARE THE FACTS THAT IN THE PAST THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE TOWARD THIS. AND WHEN SOMEBODY HAS MADE CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES LIKE KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORT TO FIND SOME REASONABLE GROUND WITH THE PLO, AND HE SEEMED TO BE FINDING THAT, THEY WAITED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEDGER. THEY DON'T HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, MOST PARTICULARLY ISRAEL. WE HAVE THESE CONTINUING, VERY DEEP ISSUES OF SOVIET JEWRY THAT THEY NEED TO FACE UP TO. SO THERE ARE PROBLEMS THERE. SO THAT IS SOMETHING OF AN OBSTACLE. THERE ARE OTHER OBSTACLES, BUT THERE ARE ALWAYS OBSTACLES. THE QUESTION IS HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THEM AND SOLVE THE PROBLEMS, SO YOU GET SOMEWHERE. I HOPE AT

SOME POINT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND.

Q: ANDREW MEISELS OF THE WASHINGTON TIMES. MR. SECRETARY, WHEN YOU WILL BE SPEAKING TO KING HUSSEIN IN LONDON, WILL YOU BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR WILL YOU BE ABLE TO BRING HIM SOME KIND OF AN ALTERNATIVE FOR HIM TO WEIGH BASED ON YOUR TALKS?

A: I WILL HAVE SOME THINGS TO TALK TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT, AND I WILL RESERVE THEM FOR HIM.

Q: (INAUDIBLE) NEWS SERVICE. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY THE RISKS OF DOING NOTHING...?

A: ...IN THE SPEECH THAT I GAVE--WHAT I MEAN BY THE RISK OF DOING NOTHING IS THAT IF THE

SITUATION JUST DRIFTS AND PEOPLE GET THE
FEELING THAT THERE IS NO HOPE, THEN THERE
TENDS TO BE A DEBILITATING PROCESS TAKE
PLACE. I THINK THEREFORE, HAVING A PROCESS
THAT IS ALIVE--AND TO BE SEEN TO BE ALIVE, IT
HAS GENUINELY TO BE ALIVE AND MOVING--ALLOWS
PEOPLE TO BELIEVE, AT LEAST WITH SOME GENUINE
BASIS THAT THINGS CAN BE BETTER. I THINK
THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT. THE RISK OF PEOPLE
BEING RESIGNED TO FEELING THAT NOTHING CAN
CHANGE FOR THE BETTER ARE GREAT RISKS BECAUSE
IT TENDS TO LEAD THEM TO TURN MORE TO
VIOLENCE.

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

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WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

Q: MR. SECRETARY, HOW DO YOU PERCEIVE OR CONSIDER THE IDEA RAISED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, ITZHAK SHAMIR THAT A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND KING HUSSEIN WITHOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE BETTER THAN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

A: KING HUSSEIN HAS TO JUDGE THE MANNER IN WHICH HE CAN PRODUCTIVELY MOVE FORWARD, AND I THINK WE ALL HAVE TO RESPECT THE CONCERNS OF EACH PARTY. IN THE END, OF COURSE, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE KEY PEOPLE IN THE AREA BE ABLE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK TO EACH OTHER AND TALK THROUGH THESE PROBLEMS. THAT'S THE WAY IN WHICH THEY ARE GOING TO BE DEALT WITH. OUTSIDERS REALLY CAN'T DO IT. BUT KING HUSSEIN HAS I THINK QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS FOR PROCEEDING WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CAUTION, AS WE HAVE SEEN.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, GLEN FRANKEL FROM THE WASHINGTON POST. ONE EXAMPLE OF THE FRUSTRATION YOU MAY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WAS THE REFUSAL TODAY OF ANY OF THE

PALESTINIAN LEADERS YOU HAD INVITED HERE TO ATTEND. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT, AND WHAT DO YOU THINK THEIR REASONING WAS?

A: YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK THEM ABOUT THEIR REASONING. BUT I THINK IT IS TOO BAD FOR THEM BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS KEEP SAYING THEY WANT REPRESENTATION, THEY WANT TO BE HEARD, THEY WANT THEIR POINT OF VIEW TO BE LISTENED TO, THAT THEY HAVE IDEAS, THAT THEY HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE, AND OF COURSE I AGREE WITH ALL OF THAT. AND SO DOES EVERYBODY. IT'S RIGHT IN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, THAT THERE ARE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, AND SO ON. SO I CAME HERE AND I HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO VARIOUS PEOPLE AS YOU KNOW, AND I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO LISTEN TO THEM SO THAT THEY COULD TELL ME WHAT THEIR VIEWS ARE, AND WHAT THEIR CONCERNS ARE, AND WHAT THEIR IDEAS ARE. SO I THINK THEY HAVE MISSED SOMETHING IN NOT TAKING PART IN AN IVITATION TO A DIALOGUE. IT'S SORT OF CONTRADICTORY FOR THEM TO SAY THAT THEY NEED TO BE HEARD, BUT THEN WHEN THEY ARE OFFERED THE CHANCE NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. UNDOUBTEDLY AS FAR AS INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS ARE CONCERNED, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, A NUMBER WERE THREATENED. THAT ONLY REMINDS US THAT PEACE HAS ENEMIES, AND IT REMINDS US OF RISKS THAT PEOPLE NEED TO TAKE. BUT WE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT THE ENEMIES OF PEACE ARE NOT BEING CONSTRUCTIVE HERE, AND THE ENEMIES OF PEACE AND THE PURVEYORS OF VIOLENCE, WHAT HAVE THEY ACHIEVED FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE? NOTHING. YOU CAN ACHIEVE MORE BY DIALOGUE AND BY CONSTRUCTIVE WORK, AND THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT HAVE

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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

BEEN PUT IN PLACE IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS THAT ARE PROVING CONSTRUCTIVE. I JUST HOPE THE ENEMIES OF PEACE WILL HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS AND THAT THEY WILL FIND THEMSELVES INCREASINGLY IN THE MINORITY. THEY ARE PART OF THE PROBLEM THAT PREVENTS THE PEOPLE THAT THEY ALLEGEDLY, TO THEM, REPRESENT. THEY ARE PART OF PREVENTING THOSE PEOPLE FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS AND MAKING THEIR ARGUMENTS; TRYING TO HELP ME GAIN MORE INSIGHT INTO THEIR POINT OF VIEW.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, TOM FRIEDMAN FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES. BEFORE YOU CAN BRING THE ISRAELIS AND ARABS TOGETHER, IT'S CLEAR YOU HAVE TO BRING THE ISRAELIS TOGETHER. DO YOU LEAVE HERE FEELING IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH MR. SHAMIR AND MR. PERES, THAT THEY ARE ANY CLOSER TOGETHER, OR JUST AS FAR APART AS YOU KNEW THEM TO BE BEFORE YOU CAME?

A: I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON THEIR DIFFERENCES, ALTHOUGH I WOULD SAY FROM MY CONVERSATIONS THAT MANY OF THE THINGS THEY SAY ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES ARE PARALLEL. AND I THINK THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF A JUDGEMENT IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTIVENESS OF SOME COURSE OF ACTION, OR THE RISKS OF SOME COURSE ACTION. BUT AS FAR AS THE DESIRE TO FIND A

WAY TO PEACE, AS FAR AS THE RECOGNITION THAT SOMEHOW WE HAVE TO FIND OUR WAY TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCERNED AND MANY OTHER THINGS, THERE'S PERHAPS MORE UNITY IN THE UNITY GOVERNMENT THAN PEOPLE GIVE IT CREDIT FOR.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOU'RE BEING ASKED HERE TO CONSIDER REQUESTS TO DELIVER TO THE SOVIETS REQUESTS FROM ISRAEL FOR DIRECT FLIGHTS FOR SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL, AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT

FOR A BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF SOVIET JEWS. WHAT'S THE AMERICAN VIEW ON THOSE REQUESTS AND OTHER REQUESTS THAT MIGHT TEND TO HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THOSE SOVIET JEWS WHO ARE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE?

A: WELL OF COURSE IF IT TURNS OUT TO BE POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT, AND THROUGH THAT AGREEMENT TO BRING ABOUT THE EMIGRATION AND RPATRIATION OF MORE JEWS WHO WISH TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION, I THINK THAT WOULD BE WONDERFUL. NOW, I DO THINK IT'S IMPORTANT, I SAY THIS AS A KIND OF LIBERTARIAN, THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE. SO I WILL ALWAYS STAND FOR THAT PRINCIPAL. BUT IF SOMEBODY SAYS THAT THAT PERSON WANTS TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL, THEN THAT'S FINE, THAT'S A CHOICE, LET THEM MAKE IT. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A GREAT MESSAGE ALSO--I FELT, FROM IDA NUDEL--A PERSON WHO HAD NEVER BEFORE BEEN IN

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

ISRAEL. AND WHEN SHE WAS GENEROUS ENOUGH TO CALL ME UP WHEN SHE GOT HERE THE OTHER DAY. I WAS IN WASHINGTON, AS I REPORTED, AND WHAT SHE SAID WAS "I'M HOME" SO I THINK THERE IS A DEEP MESSAGE IN THOSE TWO PROFOUND WORDS FROM THIS MOST IMPRESSIVE LADY.

Q: MARY CURTIS, BOSTON GLOBE. I JUST WANTED TO FOLLOW UP ON MR. MELMAN'S QUESTION. DO YOU THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AT THIS POINT IN TIME FOR PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND KING HUSSEIN TO MEET? AND WOULD YOU WANT TO PUT THAT FORWARD AS A PROPOSAL WHEN YOU MEET WITH THE KING?

A: IF YOU SAY THAT YOU BELIEVE AS I DO, THAT IN THE END THE WAY TO SETTLE THESE QUESTIONS IS THROUGH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, THEN THAT'S WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE--IS A WAY TO MEET AND TO COME TO GRIPS DIRECTLY WITH THESE PROBLEMS. AND IN A SENSE, THAT IS THE QUESTION, HOW DO YOU ARRANGE THE SCENERY SO THAT SUCH A NEGOTIATION IS POSSIBLE? AND WE ALL REALIZE THAT THERE ARE IMPEDIMENTS. SO YOU TRY TO DEAL WITH THOSE IMPEDIMENTS, AND IN A WAY, AS YOU DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS, OR AS I DO, YOU KIND OF RATCHET BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, AND DISCUSSIONS OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES

AND TRY TO FIND SOME COMBINATION THAT WILL WORK. WE HAVEN'T FOUND IT, BUT WE KEEP INCHING ALONG AT IT. AND THAT'S WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DAOUD KOUTAB FROM EAST JERUSALEM. YOU'VE TALKED ABOUT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT SINCE YOU'VE MADE THIS PHRASE, THE DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN HAS IMPOSED DEPORTATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTIONS, AND TOWN ARRESTS. WE ALSO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN FAMILY REUNIFICATION. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THESE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS?

A: OF COURSE THERE ARE PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS ADVANCES, AND WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS. WE HAVE A VERY GOOD, STRONG DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL ABOUT THEM, AND I THINK THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN A SATISFACTORY WAY. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN POSITIVE THINGS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE, THAT SEEM TO BE WORKING, SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARAB BANK. IT'S NOW ACCUMULATING MORE BRANCHES, DEPOSITS ARE COMING IN AND FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE POPULATION, IT'S THEIR BANK SO TO SPEAK, AND IT'S WORKING, AND THERE ARE OTHER EXAMPLES. SO, THERE ARE PROBLEMS AND THERE ARE ADVANCES AND SO YOU HAVE TO WORK TO TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS AND THINK OF NEW THINGS TO DO THAT WILL MOVE MATTERS ALONG.

AND THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DOING. AND WE HAVE A VERY GOOD DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ON THIS MATTER, AMBASSADOR PICKERING

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UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

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E.O. 12356: N/A

DOES, AND I MIGHT SAY IT'S SOURCE OF SOME SATISFACTION. AND I THINK WE SHOULD TAKE SOME PRIDE IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE QUALITY OF OUR AMBASSADOR HERE AND I SAY THAT BECAUSE WHEREVER I GO, PEOPLE SORT OF CASUALLY SEEM TO QUIETLY LET ME KNOW, "GEE YOU SURE GOT A CAPABLE AMBASSADOR HERE." AND I MIGHT SAY WE'LL WELCOME THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON. WE'RE WELL REPRESENTED IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

QUESTION: BUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, YOU DIDN'T ADDRESS, SIR.

A: WELL, I THOUGHT I DID. I SAID THAT WE HAVE A STRONG DIALOGUE, WE DISCUSS ALL THESE PROBLEMS AND SO, ON THE ONE HAND, YOU DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS, WHERE THERE ARE GENUINE PROBLEMS AND YOU TRY TO WORK IN A POSITIVE WAY. THAT'S WHAT WE ARE DOING.

Q: MR. SECRETARY: IT IS NOW THREE MONTHS SINCE...

A: I'M TOLD THAT THE ONLY WAY TO TAKE CONTROL OF PRESS CONFERENCES, IS TO POINT TO PEOPLE. I GOT THAT INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DON OBERDORFER OF THE

WASHINGTON POST. BEFORE YOU CAME YOUR AIDS IN WASHINGTON AND PRACTICALLY ALL THE ISRAELI PAPERS SINCE YOU'VE BEEN HERE HAVE TALKED NEW IDEAS BEING DISCUSSED AND GENERATED. IN YOUR SPEECH TODAY AT THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE, YOU SAID, "THOSE WHO ARE RELUCTANT TO EXPLORE NEW IDEAS OR EVEN REVISIT OLD ONES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO OFFER SOMETHING DIFFERENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO." IS THIS A DESCRIPTION OF THE KIND OF REACTION THAT THERE'S BEEN TO SOME IDEAS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN PROPOSING, OR COULD YOU EXPLAIN A LITTLE BIT MORE OF WHAT YOU HAD IN MIND WHEN YOU SAID THAT?

A: NO, IT'S NOT A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT I'VE RUN INTO HERE AT ALL. QUITE TO THE CONTRARY. I FIND AN EAGERNESS TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS ON ALL SIDES. IT'S REALLY VERY MUCH AKIN TO SOMETHING I SAID EARLIER IN WASHINGTON, IN ONE OF MY TALKS, I FORGET WHICH ONE, ADDRESSING THIS SUBJECT. AND IT'S JUST BY WAY OF SAYING THAT I THINK ALL OF US WHO HAVE SOME RESPONSIBILITIES HERE NEED TO KEEP THINKING AND WORKING AND EXAMINING NEW IDEAS, AND BEING WILLING TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE OLD ONES AGAIN. AND TO THE EXTENT THAT WE COME UP WITH A CONCLUSION THAT MAYBE WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT DOESN'T WORK, TO DIG IN AND TRY TO THINK OF SOME OTHER WAYS. BECAUSE I THINK THAT JUST DRIFTING IS NOT GOOD - THAT IS ALSO A COURSE OF ACTION, AND IT ALSO HAS ITS RISKS, AND ITS PROBLEMS. SO DOING NOTHING IS NOT AN EMPTY COURSE OF ACTION; IT

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, P/G,
VOA/BBN, VOA/CA, NEA/BULLOCK
WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

HAS CONSEQUENCES TOO. SO I WAS JUST SORT OF EXHORTING, MYSELF AND EVERYBODY ELSE, TO KEEP WORKING AT IT. WHICH IS WHAT WE'VE BEEN DOING. AND I HAVE FOUND GREAT RECEPTIVITY TO THAT EFFORT.

Q: JOHN BRODER FROM THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE. I'D LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT THE GULF, IF I MAY.

A: I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING NEW TO SAY FROM YESTERDAY. I JUST CHECKED IN BRIEFLY. I'VE BEEN BUSY ALL DAY, AND I FOUND THAT THERE'S NOTHING IN PARTICULAR TO ADD.

Q: WELL, IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR IRANIAN BREAKTHROUGH AGAINST THE IRAQIS ON THE LAND WAR AGAINST IRAQ, WOULD THE UNITED STATES

CONSIDER THAT ENOUGH OF A THREAT OR A POTENTIAL THREAT TO ITS INTERESTS IN THE GULF, TO MAKE A CLAR COMMITMENT TO THE ARAB GULF STATES THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW IRAN TO WIN THE WAR, AND THAT IT WILL DEFEND ARAB GULF STATES AGAINST AGGRESSION?

A: I DON'T SEE THAT THERE'S ANY PROSPECT OF THAT, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THAT FACT AND ALL THE DANGERS INVOLVED IN IFFY QUESTIONS, I'LL PASS.
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Q: PALESTINE PRESS SERVICE: I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR AN EXPLANATION FROM YOU SIR, ABOUT THIS SORT OF CONTRADICTION IN STATEMENTS WHEN A JEW IN THE SOVIET UNION IS DENIED DEPARTURE

A: SPEAK A LITTLE SLOWLY BECAUSE I AM NOT UNDERSTANDING YOU.

Q: OKAY, I AM ASKING IF POSSIBLE FOR AN EXPLANATION ON THIS SORT OF CONTRADICTION IN STATEMENTS WHEN A JEW IN THE SOVIET UNION IS DENIED DEPARTURE, YOU CALL IT A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION. WHEN A WHOLE NATION IS SUPPRESSED UNDER OCCUPATION, YOU CALL IT JUST PROBLEMS, BUT YOU ARE HAVING DIALOGUE WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

A: WELL, I DON'T KNOW OF ANY LIMITATIONS ON EMIGRATION. THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE KNOW THAT. AND AS ISSUES ARISE, SOME THAT FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OTHER ISSUES AS WELL, WE DISCUSS THEM WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM VERY GLAD TO BE ABLE TO SAY, THAT THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN DONE--AND I HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THEM RECENTLY--THAT ARE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE GENERAL QUALITY OF LIFE, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO TAKE PART IN GOVERNING YOURSELF TO A GREATER EXTENT, AND THINGS OF THAT KIND. SO THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THAT WE DO SPEAK ABOUT PROBLEMS WHEREVER THEY OCCUR. THAT IS THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND MY GENERAL POLICY. BUT IF YOU

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UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 09 JERUSALEM 03412

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (HEADING)

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, P/G,
VOA/BBN, VOA/CA, NEA/BULLOCK
WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF

ARE INFERRING THAT WHAT'S THE CASE IN THE WEST BANK AND WHAT'S THE CASE IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE SIMILAR, I CERTAINLY DON'T AGREE WITH THAT AT ALL.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DAVID BEDEIN, ISRAEL RESOURCE NETWORK IN EFRAT, A NEW JEWISH SUBURB OF BETHLEHEM. IT IS NOW THREE MONTHS SINCE MEIR KAHANE HAS BEEN $WORN IN THE ISRAELI KNESSET. IS THE U.S. HESITANCY TO STRIP KAHANE OF HIS CITIZENSHIP IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO KAHANE'S PAST HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE?

A: NO.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, RAFI MANN, MAARIV. COULD YOU TELL US PLEASE, IN WHAT WAYS CAN THE U.S. ASSIST MINIMIZING THE RISKS INVOLVED IN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE AT LEAST AS IT IS SEEN BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR? FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD YOU CONSIDER SOME KIND OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO SUCH A CONFERENCE?

A: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AS SUCH, FOR ITS OWN SAKE, DOESN'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE DON'T THINK THAT THAT AS AN OBJECTIVE IS THE WAY TO

ACHIEVE SOMETHING. WE THINK THE WAY TO

ACHIEVE SOMETHING IS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL UMBRELLA, AUSPICES, CONFERENCE OR CALL IT WHAT YOU WILL, CAN BE CONSTRUCTED THAT WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO BRING ABOUT THOSE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU TRY TO DO THAT, YOU SEE THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER--THERE'S NO DOUBT ABOUT IT--CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH A GATHERING. SO YOU SCRATCH YOUR HEAD, AND ASK YOURSELF HOW CAN YOU DEAL WITH THESE VARIOUS PROBLEMS, AND TRY TO EXPLORE JUST WHAT THEY ARE. WE HAVE DONE THAT IN THE PAST, AND WE CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR OTHER POSSIBLE WAYS OF BRINGING ABOUT THE

RESULT WE SEEK. I MIGHT SAY THE RESULT IS NOT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ANY MORE THAN IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE RESULT WE SEEK IS PEACE. THAT'S THE OBJECT. SO WE KEEP STRUGGLING AWAY AT IT.

MR. REDMAN: THANK YOU.

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SHULTZ

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<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

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FILM= D870863-0739

DATE= 20 OCT 87

TYPE= TE

FROM= HELSINKI

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OFFICE= ACTION PA

TO= STATE
LONDON

CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT= TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD REMARKS ENROUTE FROM LONI
HELSINKI, OCTOBER 20, 1987 Q: MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU WRAP UP THE MID-EAST

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS CONFERENCE, TEXT

TAGS= OPRC, OVIP, (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SECRETARY IN HELSINKI 06631

FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

USIA FOR P, P/PFO, P/G, VOA

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: N/A
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TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD REMARKS ENROUTE FROM LONDON TO HELSINKI, OCTOBER 20, 1987

Q: MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU WRAP UP THE MID-EAST FOR

US NOW HAVING SEEN HUSSEIN? DID YOU BRING THEM BAD NEWS...OR ABOUT THE PEACE CONFERENCE REALLY NOT BEING, HAVING MUCH OF CHANCE RIGHT NOW OR WHAT?

A: WITH KING HUSSEIN, WE HAD BASICALLY THE SAME KIND OF DISCUSSION THAT I HAD WITH OTHERS. WE TALKED ABOUT THINGS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, OUR EFFORTS ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND, OF COURSE WE DISCUSSED THE PEACE PROCESS.

I GUESS I WOULD MORE OR LESS USE THE SAME WORDS I'VE USED BEFORE IN TRYING TO MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN PROCEDURES OR MODALITIES AS HE CALLS THEM, AND SUBSTANCE. I THINK THE NET OF IT ALL IS I FEEL THAT WE'RE A LITTLE WAYS AHEAD, BUT I CAN'T REALLY POINT TO MUCH ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT AT ANY RATE, I HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHERE THE EMPHASES ARE. THEY TEND TO CHANGE AS YOU GO ALONG. HE IS...HAS VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND, THE AMMAN CONFERENCE AND HE WAS KIND ENOUGH TO TELL US HIS VIEWS ABOUT THAT AND ASPIRATIONS FOR THAT. SO THAT WAS ALL TOGETHER WORTHWHILE, BUT NOTHING WORLD SHATTERING ABOUT IT.

Q: WHEN YOU SPOKE TO SHAMIR DID YOU DETECT ANY WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE SOVIETS INTO A PEACE CONFERENCE, IF THE SOVIETS OBSERVE CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITIONS OR BEHAVIOR?

A: THE SOVIETS PRESENT HIM A PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY DON'T RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THEY VOTED JUST A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO I GUESS IT WAS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXPEL ISRAEL AGAIN. THE TREATMENT OF JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION IS TOUGH AND WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SOME VERY WELCOMED PERMISSIONS TO EMIGRATE AND AN INCREASE IN EMIGRATION, IT'S STILL FAR BELOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS EXPECT OR THINK AS A REASONABLE LEVEL. AND WE AGREE WITH THAT. SO THAT MEANS THAT HE IS UNEASY ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE BUT (INAUDIBLE).

Q: DID HE SAY THAT IF THE SOVIETS CHANGED THEIR POSITIONS HE MIGHT RECONSIDER THAT OR DIDN'T GO THAT FAR?

A: I DON'T KNOW IF YOU SAY IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, TO MAKE A

DECLARATION THAT ANY JEWISH PERSON IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT WANTS TO LEAVE MAY DO SO, THAT THEY ARE CHANGING THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD JEWISH LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND A BUNCH OF OTHER THINGS. NATURALLY HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM WOULD CHANGE, I DONT DOUBT THAT THERE'S (INAUDIBLE). THOSE ARE ALL DO-ABLE AND IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES, BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY A LONG WAYS FROM BEING FULFILLED. IT DEPRESSES HIM THAT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST HIM AGAIN AT THE UN. SEEMS LIKE A ROUTINE THING THEY ALWAYS DO, BUT NEVERTHELESS IT MAKES IT CLEAR.

Q: YOU SAID THAT MR. SHAMIR WOULD COME TO WASHINGTON SOMETIME NEXT YEAR. HAVE YOU ALSO INVITED KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO COME AND DID THEY INDICATE

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SECRETARY IN HELSINKI 06631

FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

USIA FOR P, P/PFO, P/G, VOA

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: N/A
UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD REMARKS

WHETHER THEY WOULD NOW BE INTERESTED IN COMING TO SEE THE PRESIDENT?

Q: PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS GOING TO BE IN MIAMI FOR A MAJOR EVENT THAT'S PART OF HIS SCHEDULE. AND SO WE ARRANGED TOGETHER FOR HIM IN A SENSE TO COME THROUGH WASHINGTON AND TO DROP IN TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AND, OF COURSE, I'LL SEE HIM, PLAN TO HAVE A LUNCH FOR HIM AND THEN HE GOES ON ABOUT HIS WAY. SO THAT WILL BE A CHANCE TO TOUCH BASE WITH HIM. BUT THEN AT SOME POINT DURING THE YEAR, I DON'T THINK THERE HAS BEEN ANY TIME FOCUSED IN ON, WE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING HIM IN WASHINGTON ON A MORE FORMAL VISIT.

WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WE'VE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF COMING TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME IN THE EARLY PART OF NEXT YEAR, IF WE CAN BE WORK THAT OUT. BUT CERTAINLY HE IS MORE THAT WELCOME AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT HE'D LIKE TO COME. WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY DISCUSSION OF A TRIP WITH KING HUSSEIN, ALTHOUGH OUR DIALOGUE IS VERY WARM AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT WE CAN DO, WE'RE DOING IT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, BEFORE YOU LEFT AND IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THIS TRIP, AT LEAST IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WHAT YOU WERE INVOLVED IN WAS A KIND OF EXPLORATION TO SEE IF YOU COULD GET SOME CREATIVE THOUGHTS, I THINK YOU CALLED THEM AT ONE STAGE, GOING TO RESTART THIS PROCESS, PEACE PROCESS.

IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH YOU REALLY HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANYTHING THAT'S ABLE TO RESTART IT. IN FACT I INTERPRETED WHAT YOU SAID YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO US ON THE WAY TO LONDON AS SAYING THAT IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS THE WAY TO GO, YOU HAVE TO LOOK FOR SOME KIND OF SUBSTITUTE FOR IT. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THIS PROCESS NOW CAN BE RESTARTED AND AFTER HEARING THESE IDEAS HOW POSSIBLY TO COULD GO ABOUT IT?

A: IT'S IMPORTANT TO KEEP WORKING AT IT, AND WE WILL KEEP WORKING AT IT. BUT AS I SAID, REALISTICALLY I CAN'T POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR THING THAT MOVES MATTERS FORWARD. BUT THERE CONTINUES TO BE A GREAT INTEREST IN IT, AND I DID SENSE ALL AROUND A HEIGHTENED, IF ANYTHING, INTEREST IN WORKING FOR PEACE. IT'S VERY MUCH ON PEOPLE'S MINDS.

I THINK THERE IS A SENSE OF SOME INCREASE IN TENSIONS AND PROBLEMS, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, OTHER PROBLEMS, SO THERE IS A GREATER APPRECIATION OF WHAT A SUCCESSFUL PEACE PROCESS COULD DO FOR THE REGION. BUT IT IS VERY HARD TO TRANSLATE THAT FEELING INTO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL THINGS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK YOU TALKED ABOUT VORONTSOV'S VISIT TO THE REGION. DID MUBARAK INDICATE THAT VORONTSOV PROPOSED ANYTHING HIMSELF OR GIVEN ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO ACT ON SOME OF THESE ISSUES THAT DISTURB THE ISRAELIS SO?

A: HE JUST TOLD ME ABOUT THE VISIT AND VORONTSOV IS A

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SECRETARY IN HELSINKI 06631

FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

USIA FOR P, P/PFO, P/G, VOA

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: N/A
UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD REMARKS

GOOD DIPLOMAT AND ENGAGES IN A CONVERSATIONAL MANNER WITH PEOPLE, AS DISTINCT FROM COMING IN GRUFFLY TELLING THEM WHAT THEY THINK AND THAT SHIFT OF STYLE DOES HAVE AN IMPACT ON PEOPLE, JUST AS GORBACHEV'S CHANGE OF STYLE IS INTERESTING TO PEOPLE, SO THAT THEY REMARK ON THAT.

THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE PUSHING VERY HARD ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE KIND OF CONFERENCE THAT THE SOVIETS DESCRIBE IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF CONFERENCE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE SHY OF, AND I AGREE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THAT. IT'S A CONFERENCE IN THEIR MINDS THAT HAS A CONTINUING ROLE AND WILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER MUCH THERE MAY BE SOME BILATERAL GROUPS. THAT'S EXACTLY THE PROBLEM. SO THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW, AND IT ALL JUST SUGGESTS THAT WHAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE -- THAT'S TWO WORDS THAT CAN MEAN A TREMENDOUS VARIETY OF THINGS WHEN YOU DIG INTO IT CAREFULLY. AND THAT'S IN A SENSE WHAT WE'VE BEEN DOING, DIGGING INTO IT, BEHIND THE WORDS WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS.

Q: DOES KING HUSSEIN BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A SUBSTITUTE CONFERENCE AS WELL?

A: THE SHADES OF MEANING IN THE WAY SUBTLETIES OF EXPRESSION ARE VERY GREAT AS PEOPLE DISCUSS THIS AND AS YOU PROBE INTO IT AND IT'S A SORT OF YES AND NO. THAT'S THE BEST I CAN GIVE YOU.

Q: CAN I GO BACK TO THE QUESTION I ASKED -- DID YOU MEAN TO SUGGEST YESTERDAY WAS I CORRECT IN INTERPRETING WHAT YOU TOLD US THAT REALLY WHAT YOU ARE THINKING OF NOW IS LOOKING FOR SOME SUBSTITUTE FOR A CONFERENCE OR IS IT MORE A QUESTION OF WHAT YOU MEAN BY A CONFERENCE?

A: NO DOUBT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ON WHAT KING HUSSEIN CALLS MODALITIES. BUT AT THE SAME TIME,

UNDERNEATH THE DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING MODALITIES, WE ALL KNOW ARE CONCERNS ABOUT WHERE WOULD WE GO, SUBSTANTIVELY? WHAT IS THE SHAPE OF FINAL STATUS? AND TO WHAT DEGREE CAN WE KNOW BEFORE WE START WHAT THAT OUTCOME MIGHT BE, AND IS THAT OUTCOME ANYWHERE NEAR ACCEPTABLE? SO IF WE START POLES APART THEN THE CHANCES OF COMING TO AGREEMENT ARE IN A SENSE LESS THAN IF WE CAN SEE THAT THERE'S A BALLPARK HERE WE'RE PLAYING IN. SO I SUPPOSE IF I GET ANY MESSAGE FROM ALL THIS IT IS THAT EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION ON MODALITIES PROBABLY IS NOT THE WAY TO PURSUE THINGS, AND WE OUGHT TO BE SCRATCHING OUR HEADS IN ADDITION PERHAPS MORE ON WHAT THE SUBSTANCE MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE. BUT OF COURSE THAT'S A VERY ROCKY ROAD TOO, AS WE KNOW.

Q: DID MURPHY GO TO SYRIA?

A: DICK IS GOING TO, AS WE ROUTINELY DO ON THINGS LIKE THIS, GO BACK AND GIVE A READ-OUT TO THE ISRAELIS AND HE MAY OR MAY NOT GO TO SYRIA, DEPENDING UPON WHO IS THERE TO SEE.

THANK YOU.
MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SCHNABEL

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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FROM= SECRETARY

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

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EO= N/A

SUBJECT= SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MINISTERIAL VISIT, SPEECH, JEWS, SECTO

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TAGS= PREL, OVIP, US, IS, (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)

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PAGE 01 SECTO 03411 01 OF 05 190555Z
ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SECRETARY IN JE 03411

SECTO

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, P/G,
VOA/BBN, VOA/CA, NEA/BULLOCK
WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN
INSTITUTE

1. FOLLOWING IS SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ' ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE.

REHOVOT, UPON RECEIPT OF AN HONORARY DOCTORAL DEGREE, ON OCTOBER 18, 1987

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THANK YOU. I AM DEEPLY HONORED TO RECEIVE THIS DEGREE. IT IS A VERY MOVING EVENT FOR ME.

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, AND EXCELLENCIES, MY FRIENDS: I AM TRULY HONORED BY THIS DEGREE, AND IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO COME HERE AND IN A SENSE TO FEEL MYSELF TO BE A PART OF THIS GREAT INSTITUTION. A FEW DAYS AGO, I READ AN ARTICLE ABOUT WORK BEING DONE HERE AT THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE ON ONE OF THE MOST COMPELLING MEDICAL CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME.

THE ARTICLE WAS SHORT AND EASY TO UNDERSTAND. IT WAS WRITTEN FOR THE ORDINARY CURIOUS READER. BUT TO SOMEONE WHO COMES OUT OF THE UNIVERSITY WORLD, IT CONVEYED THE BEAUTY OF A CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION TO LIFE.

-- IT HAD THE SPARK OF A POWERFUL IDEA;

-- IT HAD THE CLEAN AND CLEAR SIMPLICITY THAT SPRINGS ONLY FROM GENIUS;
-- AND IT HAD A READY, PRACTICAL, AND IMMEDIATE USEFULNESS.

THIS, IN A GLORIOUSLY MYSTERIOUS WAY, REPRESENTS AN IDEAL OF OUR PURPOSE IN THIS WORLD AND IN THIS UNIVERSE.

JUST AS OUR FOREBEARS THROUGH THE CENTURIES, WE CONFRONT TODAY A GAP BETWEEN VISION AND REALITY: WE ENGAGE IN THE STRUGGLE TO GRASP KNOWLEDGE -- AND THE EVEN GREATER STRUGGLE TO BRING IT TO BEAR WITH GOOD EFFECT ON THE EVERYDAY WORLD BEFORE US.

SO HERE WE ARE TODAY, AT THIS WEIZMANN INSTITUTE -- ONE OF THE WORLD'S PRECIOUS PLACES WHERE THE TRUTH IS SOUGHT WITH

RIGOROUS INTENSITY, AND WHERE THE BEST THAT HUMANITY CAN ACHIEVE IS PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF A POSITIVE FUTURE.

I AM PROUD TO BE HERE. AND I KNOW THAT ALL ISRAELIS ARE PROUD OF THIS WORLD-CLASS CENTER OF STUDY AND OF SERVICE.

THE AGE-LONG HISTORY OF ISRAEL IS BESET WITH TRAGEDY AND WITH HORROR. BUT TODAY, FOR THIS MOMENT, LET US STOP TO THINK AND BE THANKFUL BECAUSE ISRAEL IS A LUCKY NATION -- BLESSED BY CHARACTER, BY THE SOLIDARITY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE, BY THEIR HUMANITY, AND BY THEIR UNPARALLELED DETERMINATION NOT JUST TO

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 SECRETARY IN JE 03411

SECTO

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,

NEA/P
DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN

SURVIVE, BUT TO LEAD AND TO CONTRIBUTE.

THESE ARE SALIENT QUALITIES FOR THIS AGE. MORE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE HISTORY OF HUMANKIND, WE ARE STANDING ON THE FORWARD EDGE OF AN ERA IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ARE TRANSFORMING REALITY.

INDEED, THE RELATIONSHIP -- OF TENSION YET COMPLEMENTARITY -- BETWEEN THE REALM OF INTELLECT AND THE WORLD OF ACTION -- IS PERHAPS THE FIRST AND MOST FAR-REACHING OF THE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME.

IF WE WISH TO KNOW WHERE ISRAEL RANKS IN THIS REGARD, WE NEED ONLY LOOK AROUND US AT THIS CENTER OF INTELLECT AND EFFECTIVE RESEARCH. SOCIETIES WHICH KNOW HOW TO GENERATE KNOWLEDGE AND TRANSLATE IT INTO ACTION ARE POISED IN THE STARTING BLOCKS FOR THE RACE AHEAD.

THE CAPACITY TO COPE AND TO CONTRIBUTE IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION IS, HOWEVER, ONLY A STARTING POINT. FOR A SECOND CHALLENGE CONFRONTING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IS HOW TO RECONCILE AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY'S STRONG SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY WITH THE NECESSITY OF RELATING TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.
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IN MY COUNTRY, THERE LONG HAVE BEEN THOSE ADVOCATING ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD AS -- I BELIEVE -- AN ILL-CONCEIVED MEANS OF PROTECTING AMERICA'S INTERESTS. BUT EVEN IF WE WANTED TO, AMERICA CANNOT TURN ITS BACK ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT OR THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE. THE WORLD OF TODAY HAS GROWN TOO SMALL, THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH, AND THE "OPPORTUNITY COST" OF FAILING TO ENGAGE IS TOO GREAT. IN TODAY'S WORLD, NO NATION CAN PROSPER IN ISOLATION. EACH NATION BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGING THE PROBLEM OF ENGAGEMENT. EVER GREATER GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, RESPONSIBILITY AND RESTRAINT ARE REQUIRED OF ALL COUNTRIES.

FOR ITS PART, ISRAEL HAS MUCH TO CONTRIBUTE AND MUCH TO GAIN FROM REGIONAL INTERACTION -- BUT A POSITIVE REALITY FROM THAT INTERACTION HAS YET TO COME. SOMETIMES PEOPLE FEEL THERE IS NO REGIONAL INTERACTION. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS -- IT'S MOSTLY NEGATIVE, BUT IT CAN BE VERY POSITIVE.

THE REASON FOR THIS UNFULFILLED PROMISE CAN BE FOUND WITHIN THE THIRD GREAT THEME OF CHALLENGE IN THIS ERA: MANAGING THE DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF TENSION CREATED WHEN THE NEEDS OF HUMAN DIVERSITY AND SELF-EXPRESSION ARE NOT IN FAIR ALIGNMENT WITH THE DEMANDS OF ORDERED GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. AND IN THIS ERA, FOR AS FAR AHEAD AS WE CAN SEE, TENSION WILL BREED INCREASING

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ACTION PA-02 DECLASSIFIED

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 SECRETARY IN JE 03411

SECTO

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
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DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR. CARLUCCI
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WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN

INSTABILITY AND VIOLENCE. TODAY, WEAPONS ONCE THOUGHT SOPHISTICATED ARE EASIER TO MAKE, CHEAPER TO BUY AND HARDER TO TRACE IN AN EXPANDING GLOBAL ARMS MARKET. SO LOCAL CONFLICTS NOW THREATEN NOT ONLY REGIONAL, BUT

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GLOBAL SECURITY. IRAN'S USE OF CHINESE "SILKWORM" AND SOVIET "SCUD" MISSILES AND THE HIDEOUSLY GROWING USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT ARE GRIM EXAMPLES.

THESE THEN ARE THE PROBLEMS. THEY ARE PROBLEMS THAT CALL URGENTLY FOR SOLUTION LEST THEY BECOME IMPERATIVES. WHILE THE CHALLENGE IS NOT OF ISRAEL'S MAKING, ISRAEL ALL THE SAME MUST TAKE A LEADING PART IN THE PATH-BREAKING.

THIS ENVIRONMENT -- TOGETHER WITH THE INCREDIBLE BENEFITS WHICH A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND PEACE WOULD BRING TO THIS REGION --REQUIRE US ALL TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

SURELY, THERE ARE RISKS IN SUCH A PROCESS; BUT EQUALLY SURELY THERE ARE RISKS TO -- AND IMMENSE OPPORTUNITIES FORGONE BY -- ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN NOT ACCEPTING THOSE RISKS. NO ONE HELPS THE CHANCES FOR PEACE BY
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DOING NOTHING. EACH DAY MUST BRING AN EXPLORATION OF IDEAS AND A SEARCH OF THE IMAGINATION TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. EACH DAY MUST BRING RENEWED ACTIVITY IN THOSE POSITIVE ELEMENTS WHICH ALREADY EXIST -- THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE EFFORT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA -- IN ORDER TO PROVE BY EXAMPLE THAT PRACTICAL STEPS GET PEOPLE CLOSER TO THE GOAL OF PEACE.

AND EACH DAY MUST BRING A COMMITMENT TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH PRESENT THEMSELVES. WE KNOW THAT NO ONE-- NOT THE U.S., NOT ISRAEL, NOT THE ARABS -- IMPROVES THE CHANCES FOR PEACE BY DOING NOTHING AT ALL, BY JUST SITTING AROUND. THOSE WHO ARE RELUCTANT TO EXPLORE NEW IDEAS, OR EVEN RESIST OLD ONES, HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO OFFER SOMETHING DIFFERENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO.

THERE IS AN ALMOST UNIVERSAL DESIRE FOR PEACE. THERE IS A RECOGNITION THAT CHANGE IS

GOING TO COME. AND OUR DIPLOMATIC TASK IS TO HELP HARNESS THAT DESIRE INTO A PROCESS THAT HAS A CHANCE OF WORKING.

ISRAEL IS A GREAT NATION AND A PRECIOUS PART OF THE FREE AND FLOURISHING WORLD THAT WILL GAIN EVEN GREATER STRENGTH IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SOMETIMES THE LUCKY AND THE INSIGHTFUL HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD -- EVEN WHEN THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM SHOULD RIGHTLY BE PLACED ON THE SHOULDERS OF OTHERS.

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 SECRETARY IN JE 03411

SECTO

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
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VOA/BBN, VOA/CA, NEA/BULLOCK
WHITEHOUSE FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. HOWARD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN

AS MEN AND WOMEN OF SCIENCE, YOU SEEK TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WORLD. YOURS IS A VISION AND A PLAN OF ACTION TO AFFECT THE NATURAL ORDER OF THINGS IN WAYS WHICH BENEFIT MANKIND. STATESMEN AND POLITICIANS, DRAWING FROM YOUR EXAMPLE, ARE CHARGED WITH CREATING FROM THE ELEMENTS OF OUR UNDERSTANDING A JUST AND DECENT SOCIAL ORDER. HUMAN SOCIETY HAS NO INHERENT SOCIAL PATTERN OF LIFE; OUR GOD-GIVEN GOAL IS TO FULFILL OURSELVES THROUGH THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS THAT WE OURSELVES CREATE IN OUR ENGAGEMENT WITH HISTORY -- AND TO LEAVE THIS WORLD A BETTER PLACE THAN WHEN WE ENTERED.

SO ISRAEL MUST BE STRONG.

ISRAEL MUST HAVE A STRONG ECONOMY. WE'VE ALL WORKED HARD. I'VE WORKED HARD WITH YOU TO HELP BRING THAT ABOUT. I MIGHT SAY TO ANYBODY HERE WHO CAN HELP WITH "OPERATION INDEPENDENCE," THAT IS A CAUSE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

AND ISRAEL MUST BE STRONG MILITARILY.

AMERICA WILL CONTINUE TO HELP ISRAEL LOOK TO ITS SECURITY.

ISRAEL WILL STAY SO STRONG THAT A MILITARY OPTION AGAINST IT CANNOT RATIONALLY EVEN BE CONTEMPLATED. THAT IS HOW IT HAS BEEN AND THAT IS HOW IT WILL BE. AND THAT IS WHY THE ARAB NATIONS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE THAT ISRAEL IS A PERMANENT ACT OF LIFE AND WHY THEY INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE THAT PEACE WITH ISRAEL MUST BE MADE.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL MUST SEE THAT INCREASINGLY IT HAS A TREMENDOUS STAKE IN ATTAINING A MORE FORMALIZED PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

IT IS MORE THAN EVER TRUE THAT ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE EVEN ONE SERIOUS MISTAKE IN THE CALCULUS OF STRENGTH AND DIPLOMACY. BUT IT IS ALSO MORE THAN EVER TRUE THAT SERIOUS OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE MUST BE EXPLORED WITH ENERGY, UNITY AND RESOLVE. FOR FAILURE TO DO SO MAY TURN OUT TO BE THAT ONE SERIOUS MISTAKE.

WE ALL KNOW THAT THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A CONSTANT STRUGGLE REQUIRING STEADFAST RESOLVE. WE CANNOT WAIT FOR IDEAL CONDITIONS TO ARISE. AS IS TRUE OF ANY DIPLOMATIC UNDERTAKING, WE MUST WORK STEADILY, IN THE HERE AND NOW, AND WITHIN THE REALM OF THE POSSIBLE.

OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE ESTABLISHED A FIRM PARTNERSHIP BASED ON SHARED VALUES, COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND A JOINT COMMITMENT TO

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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 SECRETARY IN JE 03411

SECTO

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS, NEA, NEA/IAI,
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)
SUBJECT: SHULTZ ADDRESS AT THE WEIZMANN

THE PERSUIT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WORKING TOGETHER, WE HAVE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED MUCH. LET US CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN AND BUILD UPON OUR UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP. LET US REMAIN OUTWARD-LOOKING, UNDAUNTED, AND MOST OF ALL -- ENGAGED.

I PLEDGE TO YOU TODAY THAT AS ISRAEL DOES

THIS, AMERICA WILL BE WITH HER EVERY STEP OF THE WAY AS FAITHFUL ALLY AND PERPETUAL FRIEND.

THANK YOU.

3. END TEXT.

BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SHULTZ

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PAGE 02 STATE 321924

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PASS PAOS, INFORM CONSUL, MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S PRESS BRIEFING OCTOBER 15, 1987

FOR ADDRESSEE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ'S PRESS BRIEFING OF OCTOBER 15 (IN LIEU OF REGULAR DAILY BRIEFING).

SECRETARY SHULTZ: QUESTIONS?

MR. ANDERSON (UPI): MR. SECRETARY, STARTING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, IN THE PERSIAN GULF THIS MORNING A MISSILE, APPARENTLY FIRED BY THE IRANIANS, HIT A U.S.MANAGED OIL TANKER AT ANCHORAGE OFF KUWAIT. DOES THIS CHANGE ANYTHING? DOES THIS LEAD THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER ANY SORT OF RETALIATION OR COUNTERMEASURES?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE DON'T ANNOUNCE WHAT COUNTERMEASURES OR RETALIATION WE MAY TAKE, BUT I THINK IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO ACT

AS FAR AS THE IRANIAN ACTION IS CONCERNED, IT'S REALLY AIMED AT KUWAIT. THE SHIP WAS NOT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS; IT WASN'T BEING ESCORTED OR ANYTHING OF THE

KIND. IN FACT, IT WASN'T A U.S.-FLAG VESSEL. SO IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE A VERY HOSTILE ACTION TOWARD KUWAIT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE LONG TAKEN THE VIEW, I BELIEVE, IF I'M REPRESENTING IT CORRECTLY, THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULDN'T BE MORE EAGER FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. IN FACT, LAST YEAR YOU SENT MR. MURPHY OUT AND FOUND THE TEMPERATURE OR THE CLIMATE WASN'T RIGHT AND DIDN'T GO. WHY ARE YOU GOING THIS TIME?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I WANT TO TOUCH BASE WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. THE PEACE PROCESS, OBVIOUSLY, IS ONE OF THEM. IN SAUDI ARABIA I EXPECT TO TALK QUITE A BIT ABOUT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, OUR

ACTIONS IN THE U.N.; THE VERY STRONG COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES WE HAVE WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN THE GULF. IN EGYPT, PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS JUST BEEN RE-ELECTED. HE'S A VERY STRONG FRIEND.

IN ISRAEL - IN ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES, OF COURSE, THE PEACE PROCESS BUT IN ISRAEL, IN ADDITION, I WANT TO TALK ABOUT SOVIET JEWRY. I'LL HAVE THE PLEASURE OF MEETING IDA NUDEL IN JERUSALEM, HAVING MET HER IN MOSCOW; THAT WILL BE A THRILL. AS A PERSON OF THE UNIVERSITY, I'M HONORED TO RECEIVE A DEGREE FROM THE WEITZMAN INSTITUTE AND HAVE A CHANCE TO AWARD THE FIRST GEORGE SHULTZ FELLOWSHIP AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY.

AND IN LONDON, I'LL HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE QUALITYOFLIFE PROGRAMS ON THE WEST BANK WITH KING HUSSEIN.

SO ALL IN ALL, I THINK IT'S TIME TO GO AND REVIEW THE BIDDING WITH OUR FRIENDS ON THE PEACE PROCESS, ON THE PERSIAN GULF, ON SOVIET JEWRY, ON GENERAL INTERNAL
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DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS IN EGYPT WHERE PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS JUST WON THIS VERY FINE POLITICAL VICTORY.

QUESTION: SINCE SYRIA IS SUCH A MAJOR PLAN IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WHY IS IT NOT INCLUDED IN YOUR TRAVEL?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WHY IS WHAT NOT INCLUDED?

QUESTION: SYRIA.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I HAVE ONLY A VERY LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME, AND SO I AM GOING TO THE COUNTRIES THAT I SPECIFIED. I DID HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK AT SOME LENGTH

WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK, SO I HAVE HAD THAT CONTACT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MORNING HAS GIVEN NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR RELATIVE TO HIS MEDIATION OF THE IRANIRAQ WAR. CAN YOU ELABORATE FOR US ON WHAT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE AND GIVE US THE U.S. REACTION TO THOSE?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I DON'T WANT TO DISCLOSE IN DETAIL HIS INSTRUCTIONS; BUT BASICALLY THE SOLE BASIS

FOR PROCEEDING, AS WAS SAID IN THE PRESS STATEMENT AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WHENEVER THAT WAS - TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO " THE SOLE BASIS IS RESOLUTION 598. SO THE SECRETARYGENERAL'S INSTRUCTIONS ESSENTIALLY INVOLVE ANOTHER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAN AND IRAQ, AND THEY HAVE TO DO WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION, NOT IN ANY WAY BARGAINING ABOUT THE RESOLUTION AS SUCH. I
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UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS INVITED THE PARTIES TO COME TO NEW YORK, AND THE UNDERSTANDING THAT I HAVE IS THAT THEY WILL PROBABLY DO THAT.

AT ANY RATE, WE CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR A RAPID EFFORT TO, IF POSSIBLE, BRING THE WAR TO AN END THROUGH THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'RE PUSHING.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS, CAN YOU TELL US ANY NEW IDEA YOU ARE CARRYING THERE LIKE WHAT THEY CALL AN "INTERIM ARRANGEMENT?" AND HOW CAN YOU CONVINCE PREMIER SHAMIR TO DROP HIS OPPOSITION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I'M NOT GOING THERE TO TAKE PART IN INTERNAL ISRAELI POLITICS IN ANY WAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO THINK THAT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS IS A VERY IMPORTANT THING FOR ALL OF US FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT MOSTLY, OF COURSE, FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION AND I INTEND TO EMPHASIZE MY VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT.

IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, AND

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United States Department

Washington, D. C. 20520

October 14, 1987 8730881

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM S/S

SECRET

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Foreign Minister Peres: Bilateral Issues

I. **SOVIET JEWRY: DIRECT FLIGHTS:**

- April-August emigration of about 800 per month; slight drop in September to 700; 80% of those leaving are pre-1987 refuseniks. Compares with 914 total for 1986.

- Soviets told Morris Abram last spring that they do not object to direct flights; only obstacle is U.S. opposition.

- Recent indications Soviets may issue exit visas for the country from which the applicant has submitted an invitation.

- Recently Shamir wrote you, asking that you tell Shevardnadze that we have no objection to direct flights. We have sent you a proposed reply saying our position is based on freedom to emigrate and freedom of choice, and this is unchanged.

- Peres proposed direct flights to Shevardnadze at UNGA.

II. **POST LAVI SECURITY ASSISTANCE ISSUES:**

- JSAP and JPMG talks scheduled for October 5-7, cancelled due to death of MOD Director General Ivry's son. Will be rescheduled later this year.

- GOI will press for:

  -- Reduction of F-16 price by eliminating non-recurring costs;

  -- Greater U.S. funding for joint R&D on SDI/ATBM and the Arrow;

  -- Improved Israeli access to U.S. armed forces European workload contracts; and

  -- Increased DOD procurement in Israel.

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- o Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation may cut Israel's FMS program.

- o Concern that Israel will ask for supplemental assistance.

III. WATER ISSUES: MAQARIN DAM:

- o Jordan and Syria have agreed to build Maqarin Dam on Yarmouk river; Jordan has formally requested U.S. aid to help finance feasibility studies and construction; cost would be several hundred million dollars.

- o Dam would significantly benefit Jordan but will also affect Israeli access to Yarmouk waters; GOI officials have expressed concern about dam; Jordan-Israel agreement on water sharing is critical if dam is to be built; GOI desire for water allocation for West Bank, which Jordan resists, is one of many tough issues.

- o Previous efforts to build dam foundered because Syria and Jordan could not agree on water sharing.

- o We have told Israel and Jordan that we are willing to act as intermediary in negotiating water sharing.

- o Despite periodic flare-ups, Israel and Jordan continue to cooperate in managing Yarmouk near entrance to Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal.

IV. QUALITY OF LIFE:

- o Economic development in the occupied territories constrained by Israeli and Arab(primarily Jordanian) barriers to Palestinian trade.

  -- Efforts, supported by EC, to obtain GOI approval for direct Palestinian agricultural exports to Europe via Israeli ports unsuccessful to date.

  -- Recent EC study found that potential Palestinian exports did not pose a serious threat to Israeli farmers.

- o Harsh Israeli security measures which deny due process and severe limits on family reunification undermine impact of quality of life initiative.

V. ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA:

- o Peres and Shamir have publicly criticized plan to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.

- o You asked Peres at the UNGA to refrain from public criticisms; he has continued to voice opposition when questioned by the press.

VI. LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIAITION:

- o Peres will be interested in your views on Lebanon. He will also want to hear what we are accomplishing there:

  -- With Ambassador Eagleton back in Damascus, we are again acting as conduit between Gemayel and Asad.

VII. UNIFIL FUNDING

- o The Senate appropriations committee has zeroed out our request for $19.3 million in FY88 contributions to UNIFIL, although the House approved $18.7 million.

- o UNIFIL is crucial to us. It stabilizes south Lebanon and helps block attacks on Israel inspired by Iran and radical Palestinians.

- o Congress believes Israel is against UNIFIL or indifferent to its continuation.

- o Privately, Rabin tells us he favors UNIFIL continuation. He has declined, however, to issue a public statement of support.

- o We need a GOI statement to convince Congress that UNIFIL merits continued support.

VIII. U.S.-Syrian Talks

- o Peres will be interested in your views on U.S.-Syrian relations since Ambassador Eagleton returned in September.

SETTING

You met with Peres in New York on September 30 and this meeting will be a continuation of your discussion with him there on the peace process and bilateral issues. Peres will

want to learn how your discussion with Shamir went, and to hear your thoughts on possible next steps. His bilateral agenda will continue to focus on post-Lavi support to cushion the cancellation decision. Peres, like Shamir, is not only genuinely concerned but sensitive to the impact of this issue on the elections next year. He probably will raise Israel's interest in direct flights of Soviet Jews from the USSR to Israel and the GOI's continuing objections to arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Pickering
Assistant Secretary Murphy
Dennis Ross, NSC
Ambassador Cluverius
William Kirby, NEA
Molly Williamson, Embassy Tel Aviv (notetaker)

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister Peres
Ambassador Arad
Yossi Beilin, Director General
Nimrod Novik, Political Advisor

Attachments:

Talking Points.

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DEPARTURE STATEMENT

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YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I WANT TO THANK MY HOSTS, AND ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT MUBARAK, FOR THE WONDERFUL HOSPITALITY DURING MY TOO BRIEF VISIT TO EGYPT. I CAME HERE WITH THE GOAL OF REVIEWING WITH THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP THE STATUS OF OUR SHARED SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EGYPT IS A KEY PARTNER IN THAT SEARCH AND I WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES AND DEVELOP SOME IDEAS ON NEXT CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS. AS ALWAYS, I FOUND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO BE A WISE AND THOUGHTFUL INTERLOCUTOR. I WILL TAKE WITH ME A NUMBER OF IDEAS WHICH I WILL BE SEEKING TO DEVELOP FURTHER AS I PROCEED ON MY JOURNEY.

BEYOND OUR COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE, EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES SHARE A COMMON APPROACH TO A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES AND WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE AS WELL DURING OUR TALKS. PRESIDENT HABRE'S EFFORTS TO FREE HIS COUNTRY FROM LIBYAN AGGRESSION AND THE CONTINUED STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO END THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF THEIR COUNTRY ARE, OF COURSE, ISSUES WHICH ACTIVELY CONCERN US BOTH. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR'S SENSELESS AND CRUEL WASTE OF LIFE REMAINS A SOURCE OF SORROW FOR BOTH EGYPT AND THE U.S. WE HAVE RE-DEDICATED OURSELVES TO

SEEKING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THAT CONFLICT. TOGETHER, WE SEEK TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF REGION AND ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF.

IT HAS BEEN A PRODUCTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL VISIT AND I LOOK FORWARD TO RETURNING.

THANK YOU.

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SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS FOR USE IN CAIRO

Drafted: NEA/EGY: GMReigle:ceinial
10/02/87 : X72802 : W2539F

Cleared: NEA: PWilcox
NEA/EGY: TCSchaffer
AF/C: ADaisimer
NEA/PAB: JBruno
PA:
S/P:

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MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

IT HAS BEEN A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO RETURN TO EGYPT ALTHOUGH, REGRETTABLY, MY STAY HERE HAS BEEN BRIEF. BUT MY MEETINGS, PARTICULARLY MY SESSION WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL. THE TIMING OF MY VISIT TO CAIRO COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER, AS I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE PRESIDENT MUBARAK PERSONALLY ON HIS REELECTION TO A SECOND TERM AS PRESIDENT OF EGYPT. MY GOVERNMENT SHARES THE CONFIDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE IN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S STRENGTH AND LEADERSHIP.

I CAME TO CAIRO TO SEEK THE THOUGHTS AND COUNSEL OF OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN SO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS. AS ALWAYS, PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS PROVED TO BE A WISE AND THOUGHTFUL INTERLOCUTOR. WE ARE IN A SITUATION NOW WHICH FAVORS PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ISSUE BEFORE US IS HOW BEST TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT SITUATION AND ACHIEVE TANGIBLE RESULTS. I LEAVE HERE WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE EGYPTIAN PERCEPTION AND SOME USEFUL IDEAS WHICH WILL PLAY A PART IN OUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

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YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO RETURN TO EGYPT AFTER SUCH A LONG TIME AWAY. THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP THAT LINK OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE STRONG AND RESILIENT AND I LOOK FORWARD TO MY DISCUSSIONS HERE. INDEED, EGYPT AND THE U.S. ARE TRULY PARTNERS, BOTH IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND REGIONAL STABILITY AND IN OUR EFFORTS TO ASSIST EGYPT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS GREAT POTENTIAL.

PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKED ME TO UNDERTAKE THIS JOURNEY IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. I WILL BE REVIEWING THE SITUATION TODAY WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THE EGYPTIAN ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS REMAINS A CRUCIAL ONE. SO I WILL BE LOOKING FORWARD TO COMPARING NOTES AND SHARING IDEAS ON HOW TO PROCEED.

THIS VISIT WILL ALSO PROVIDE ME WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW WITH THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP OTHER ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES BOTH WITHIN THE REGION AND BEYOND IT.

THANK YOU.

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MY VISIT AT THE OUTSET OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SECOND TERM, HAS ALSO PROVIDED ME WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW FURTHER WITH OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS THE STATUS OF OUR EXCELLENT BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE FACE GREAT CHALLENGES AS YOU SEEK TO IMPROVE YOUR LIVES AND THE LIVES OF YOUR CHILDREN. THE COURAGE YOU HAVE SHOWN AND THE PROGRESS YOU ARE MAKING IN ACHIEVING THOSE GOALS ARE EQUALLY GREAT. WE ARE PROUD THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A MORE DYNAMIC ECONOMY. AND, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN ITS DRIVE FOR MODERNIZATION AND EFFICIENCY.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND I HAVE ALSO REVIEWED ISSUES OF REGIONAL INTEREST. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CONTINUES TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION AND TO INFLICT TERRIBLE AND UNNECESSARY SUFFERING ON THE PEOPLES OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THERE ARE ALSO SOME HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENTS. PRESIDENT HABRE AND THE PEOPLE OF CHAD HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN DEFEATING LIBYAN AGGRESSION IN THEIR COUNTRY. AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO END THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF THEIR COUNTRY CONTINUES AND IS GROWING IN STRENGTH.

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MY TRAVELS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE IN QUEST OF A WAY TO MOVE TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE -- A GOAL TO WHICH WE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED. IT IS BOTH FITTING AND ESSENTIAL THAT CAIRO IS INCLUDED AMONG MY STOPS. IN A SENSE I AND ALL WHO JOIN ME IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE ARE FOLLOWING IN EGYPT'S PATH.

IT IS NOW TIME FOR ME TO CONTINUE ON MY JOURNEY. I LOOK FORWARD TO RETURNING TO CAIRO -- FOR A LONGER PERIOD NEXT TIME I HOPE -- AND TO CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

THANK YOU.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1987

SUMMARY:
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-- JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. EREZ TO REPLACE SNEH AS WEST BANK CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR.

2. AUTHORITIES DEPORT ONE PALESTINIAN TO JORDAN.

3. WOMAN STABS BORDER POLICEMAN OUTSIDE DAMASCUS GATE; OTHER INCIDENTS.

4. ISRAELI OFFCIALS URGE PALESTINIAN FARMERS TO EXPORT THROUGH JORDAN.

5. AUTHORITIES FORBID HESIDENTS OF BEIT SAHOUR FROM TRAVELLING ACCROSS THE BRIDGE TO JORDAN.

6. 260 PALESTINIAN YOUTHS ARE IN FARA'A PRISON.

7. JERUSALEM MAYOR KOLLEK BOYCOTTS SPANISH NATIONAL DAY FESTIVITIES.

8. DEPSTATE OFFICIAL VISITS UNRWA INSTALLATIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

-- EDITORIALS:

PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONTACTS SHOULD BEAR; ARABS SHOULD CONDEMN SYRIA AS WELL AS IRAN; ATTEMPTS TO

BYPASS THE PLO WILL FAIL; WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS SHOULD REFRAIN FOM SELF-DESTRUCTION; PM SHAMIR DISPLEASED WITH NEW SOVIET POLICY.

-- END SUMMARY.

JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:
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1. ALL PAPERS EXCEPT AL-FAJR REPORTED THAT BHIGADIEH GENERAL YEHOSHUA "SHAIKE" EREZ, HEAD OF THE GAZA DISTRICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, HAS BEEN CHOSEN TO REPLACE BRIGADIER GENERAL EPHRAIM SNEH AS HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN THE WEST BANK. HE IS SLATED TO TAKE OFFICE WITHIN THE COMING WEEK. SNEH RESIGNED RECENTLY AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS AT HIS POST, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE OF POLICY DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE COORDINATOR OF ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SHMUEL

GOREN. EREZ, 48, HAS BEEN HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN THE GAZA STRIP SINCE MARCH 1985. HE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE IDF LIAISON UNIT IN LEBANON AND MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE SINAI AREA. A REPLACEMENT FOR HIM IN GAZA HAS YET TO BE NAMED.

2. AL-FAJR ALONE REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES DEPORTED SECUITY PRISONE ZAKARIYA HAMED AN-NAHHAS, 38, OF RAMALLAH, AFTER A DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE DEPORTATION ORDER ISSUED AGAINST HIM ON JUNE 21. AN-NAHHAS WAS DEPORTED TO JORDAN ACHOSS THE DESET SOUTH OF THE DEAD SEA AFTER HE WAS ACCUSED OF MEMBEHSHIP IN THE PFLP AND INFILTRATION INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

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3. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE JERUSALEM POLICE OBTAINED A COURT ORDER BANNING THE PUBLICATION OF FURTHER DETAILS ON AN ARAB WOMAN WHO TRIED TO STAB A BORDER POLICEMAN NEAR JERUSALEM'S OLD CITY ON OCTOBER 2. THE WOMAN HAS BEEN REMANDED IN CUSTODY FOR TWO WEEKS. POLICE SOURCES SAID SHE WAS ARRESTED A YEAR AGO FOR ATTEMPTING A SIMILAR ACT AND LATER RELEASED ON GROUNDS THAT SHE WAS MENTALLY UNBALANCED. HOWEVER, HER INVOLVEMENT IN A SECOND ATTEMPT HAS RAISED NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT HER MOTIVES. SEVERAL OTHER INICDENTS WERE ALSO REPORTED:

-- ALL ARABIC PAPERS REPORTED THAT A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS TRAVELLING NEAR MIGDALIM SETTLEMENT, NABLUS DISTRICT. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. POLICE SEARCHED THE AREA.

-- THE POST REPORTED THAT TWO OF THE THREE GAZA RESIDENT KILLED BY ISRAELI SOLDIERS ON OCTOBER 1, WHEN THEIR CAR BURST THROUGH A ROADBLOCK AT BUREIJ REFUGEE CAMP IN GAZA STRIP WERE BURIED AT NIGHT ON OCTOBER 4, UNDER TIGHT SECURITY. ONLY A HANDFUL OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS WERE PERMITTED TO ATTEND THE BURIAL. THE THIRD MAN KILLED IN THE INCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT CARRYING IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. SECURITY FORCES ARE CHECKING WHETHER THE MAN LACKED A PERMIT TO STAY IN THE GAZA STRIP AND WHETHER HIS COLLEAGUES RAN THE ROADBLOCK OUT OF FEAR THAT HE WOULD BE FOUND OUT.

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4. THE POST REPORTED THAT, DESPITE AN OFFICIAL

DECISION TO ESTABLISH A MARKETING SOCIETY TO COORDINATE DIRECT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO EUROPE THROUGH ISRAELI POHTS, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ARE NOW URGING PALESTINIAN FARMERS TO EXPORT TO EUROPE THROUGH JODAN. THIS WAS REVEALED DURING A MEETING BETWEEN PROMINENT PRO-JORDANIAN PUBLIC FIGURES IN THE WEST BANK WITH THE COORDINATOR OF ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SHMUEL GOREN. DURING A MEETING FOLLOWING PM SHAMIR'S AUDIENCE WITH THE GROUP, GOREN PROMISED GENEROUS SUBSIDIES FROM THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR GOODS SHIPPED TO EUROPE THROUGH JORDAN AND ALL NECCESSARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING REFRIGERATION FACILITIES. THE ENCOURAGEMENT STEMS FROM THE CONTINUED RESISTANCE OF ISRAELI FARMERS TO THE DIRECT EXPORTS THROUGH ISRAELI PORTS, WHICH THEY SEE AS DANGEROUS COMPETITION.

5. AL-QUDS AND ASHAAB REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES BANNED THE TRAVEL OF RESIDENTS OF BEIT SAHOUR ACROSS THE BRIDGES TO JORDAN UNTIL FUTHER NOTICE.

6. ASHAAB QUOTED RELIABLE SOURCES THAT THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN YOUTHS AGED BETWEEN 12-24 DETAINED AT FARA'A PRISON CAMP IN NABLUS IS ABOUT 260.

7. THE POST REPORTED THAT JERUSALEM MAYOR TEDDY KOLLEK AND OTHER SENIOR CITY OFFICIALS WILL BOYCOTT THE SPANISH NATIONAL DAY FESTIVITIES ON OCTOBER 12 TO PROTEST THE SPANISH CONSULATE'S DECISION TO HOLD TWO SEPARATE PARTIES IN EAST AND WEST JERUSALEM.

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8. AN-NAHAR HEPORTED THAT MS. CHAVCHAVADZE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF REFUGEE AFFAIRS IN THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ARRIVED IN JERICHO VIA THE ALLENBY BRIDGE FROM AMMAN FOR A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO UNRWA INSTALLATIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE U.S. OFFICIAL, ACCOMPANIED BY DIRECTOR OF UNRWA OPERATIONS IN THE WEST BANK, THE AMERICAN CONSUL AND SENIOR UNRWA OFFICIALS VISITED LOCAL UNHWA OFFICES, CLINICS AND SCHOOLS IN THE AREA.

EDITORIALS:
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AN-NAHAR ARGUED THAT IF THE FREQUENT VISITS EXCHANGED BETWEEN ISRAELI "HIGH OFFICIALS" AND PALESTINIAN FIGUES FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CONTINUE WITHOUT ANY CHANGES IN THE HEALTH, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF ARAB RESIDENTS, THIS CONDUCT WILL SHOW THAT ISRAELIS ARE NOT SERIOUS ABOUT FINDING A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

AL-FAJR SAID THAT WHILE ARABS ARE WAITING TO HOLD THEIR SUMMIT MEETING, MORE BLOOD IS BEING SHED IN THE GULF. ARABS SHOULD CONFRONT THE SYRIAN STAND AS WELL AS THE IRANIAN POLICY.

ASHAAB CHITICIZED ATTEMPTS BY SEVERAL PARTIES TO ORGANIZE "PUPPET" GROUPS WHICH TRY TO "FORGE THE PALESTINIAN WILL." WHILE SHAMIR INTENDS TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND SHULTZ IS COMING TO THE REGION, ONE CAN READ THE SCENARIO OF THE EXPECTED

AMERICAN-ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT EIGHT MONTHS, WHICH PERES SAID WOULD BE DECISIVE.

AL-QUDS ADVISED RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO PRACTICE SELF-CRITICISM IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. "AT THESE DIFFICULT TIMES," ONE SHOULD ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF UNITY AND NOT "SELF-DESTRUCTION."

THE POST REMARKED THAT PM SHAMIR IS VERY HARD TO PLEASE. DESPITE RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL, EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMPROVEMENT OF TIES WITH THE U.S., MR. SHAMIR CONTINUES TO MAKE LIGHT OF ANY CONCESSION THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE TO OFFER: "THEY ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS."

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DATE= 19 SEP 87

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FROM= JERUSALEM

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03166

USIA FOR P/R, P/G, P/P, P/FW, P/FN, BXN/VOA,
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SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR
FRIDAY, SEPTEMEBR 18, 1987

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SUMMARY:

-- JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. AUTHORITIES ORDER ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST OF HUSSEINI'S DEPUTY AND OTHERS; HUSSEINI TESTIFIES.

2. DEMONSTRATIONS AND STIKES IN THE WEST BANK MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF SABRA AND SHATILA.

3. VILLAGE LEAGUES "WEST BANK PEACE" RADIO STATION PROMOTED.

4. ISLAMIC FACTION REJECTS AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY'S RESOLUTIONS.

5. FAYEZ ABU RAHMEH AND HANNA SINIORA TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE IN SAN DIEGO.

6. SARI NUSSEIBEH DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PLO.

-- EDITORIALS:

ISRAELI LEADERS AGREE IN PRINCIPLE ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES POLICY; CRISIS AT AN-NAJH RESOLVED; CLOSURE OF PLO OFFICES "AMERICAN TERRORISM;" WILL THE UNSC IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAN? ALGERIA ANOTHER MOSLEM COUNTRY AFTER ALL.

-- END SUMMARY.

JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT AUTHORITIES ORDERED THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST OF ISHAQ BUDEIRI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ARAB STUDIES SOCIETY IN EAST JERUSALEM, LESS THAN A WEEK AFTER FEISAL HUSSEINI, THE RESEARCH CENTER'S DIRECTOR, WAS PLACED IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. BUDEIRI WAS CHARGED WITH ORGANIZING DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE. HIS ARREST WAS MADE DURING A BROAD ROUNDUP OF ACTIVISTS BY SECURITY FORCES. FEISAL HUSSEINI TESTIFIED SEPTEMBER 17 BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE JERUSALEM DISTRICT COURT, WHICH WAS CONSIDERING A REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF HIS SIX MONTH ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST ORDER. A DECISION WILL BE GIVEN IN NINE DAYS.

RAED ISMAIL IDRIS ABU SABGHA OF NABLUS WAS ORDERED HELD FOR THREE DAYS ON SUSPICION OF PLANNING TO ORGANIZE DISTURBANCES. MIDHAT ABDEL MAJID SHAKHSHIR, ALSO OF NABLUS, WAS ORDERED HELD FOR SIX MONTHS' ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION ON SUSPICION OF BEING A FATAH ACTIVIST. AUTHORITIES ISSUED A SIX-MONTH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER AGAINST A MAN FROM AZZOUN VILLAGE, ABDALLAH ABDEL AZIZ ABDALLAH JOUDEH, ON SUSPICION OF ORGANIZING DISTURBANCES. AL-QUDS ADDED THAT AUTHORITIES RENEWED THE SIX-MONTH ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST ORDER ISSUED AGAINST SALAH ZUHEIKA, OF JERUSALEM, FOR THE SECOND TIME IN A ROW. TWELVE PALESTINIANS WERE ARRESTED EARLIER THIS WEEK.

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03166

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TAGS: ASEC, PROG, PREL, SCUL, SHUM, IS, JO, KPAL
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR

2. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
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OF THE MASSACRE AT BEIRUT'S SABRA AND SHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS PASSED "RELATIVELY QUIETLY" IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ARABIC PAPERS SAID THAT THERE WAS AN ATMOSPHERE OF TENTION ALL OVER THE WEST BANK. ALL PAPERS CARRIED REPORTS OF SCATTERED INCIDENTS AND STRIKES IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS. THE MOST SERIOUS CLASH OCCURRED AT THE HEBRON UNIVERSITY WHEN TROOPS FIRED IN THE AIR AND USED TEAR GAS TO BREAK UP A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH YOUTHS THREW ROCKS AT ARMY VEHICLES AND RAISED PALESTINIAN FLAGS. IDF TROOPS SET UP ROAD-BLOCKS NEAR THE CAMPUS. AT BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY, STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED INSIDE THE CAMPUS WITHOUT INCIDENTS. A NEAR-TOTAL COMMERCIAL STRIKE WAS IN FORCE IN RAMALLAH AND EL-BIREH AND IN THE CASBAH IN NABLUS. THREE YOUTHS WERE ARRESTED IN DOWNTOWN NABLUS AFTER THEY ENTERED A GIRL'S SCHOOL AND URGED PUPILS TO DEMONSTRATE. THE CURFEW WHICH WAS IMPOSED ON THE BALATA REFUGEE CAMP IN NABLUS ON SEPTEMBER 16 REMAINED IN FORCE. IT WAS LIFTED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. PROTESTERS ERECTED BARRICADES ON

ROADS AND BURNED TIRES IN RAMALLAH. AT BEIT ULA, NORTH OF HEBRON, AT JALAZONE AND KALANDIA REFUGEE CAMPS AND AT ANATA, NORTH OF JERUSALEM, SECURITY FORCES USED TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATORS. IN WEST JERUSALEM, PLACARD-CARRYING PROTESTERS, ORGANIZED BY THE COMMITTEE TO MARK THE 20 YEARS OF OCCUPATION SHOUTED SLOGANS IN PROTEST AGAINST "MASSACRES AND OCCUPATION."

AUTHORITIES CARRIED OUT SEVERAL PREEMPTIVE DETENTIONS OF "ACTIVISTS" AND DELAYED THE DISTRIBUTION OF ARABIC NEWSPAPERS, ON THE GROUNDS

THAT THEY HAD TO BE CHECKED FOR CENSORSHIP VIOLATIONS. ALL PAPERS CARRIED ILLUSTRATED FEATURE ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS ON THE MASSACRE. POLICE BARRED A PLANNED MARCH BY THE COMMITTEE CONFRONTING THE IRON FIST, A JEWISH-ARAB GROUP OPPOSED TO ISRAELI POLICIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

3. THE POST REPORTED THAT THE HEAD OF THE WEST BANK VILLAGE LEAGUES, JAMIL AL-AMLEH, HAS RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO THE U.S. WHICH HE SAYS WAS DESIGNED TO RAISE MONEY FOR A RADIO STATION, TO BE CALLED "THE VOICE OF PEACE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP." AL-AMLEH SAID HE TRAVELLED ACROSS THE COUNTRY MEETING WITH BUSINESS LEADERS AND CONGRESSMEN, INCLUDING REPUBLICAN SENATOR ROBERT DOLE, TO "PROMOTE THE IDEAS OF PEACE AND OF A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN CONFEDERATION." AL-AMLEH SAID HE NEEDED TO COMBAT WHAT HE SAID WAS A MONOPOLY OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESS EXERCISED BY PLO SUPPORTERS. PALESTINIAN MEDIA IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES DO NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY, HE ADDED. AL-AMLEH ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION OF OPENING THE STATION TWO MONTHS AGO BUT HAS YET TO SUBMIT A FORMAL REQUEST TO THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. THE VILLAGE LEAGUES, WHOSE STRONGHOLD IS IN THE RURAL AREA AROUND HEBRON, WERE ENCOURAGED BY ISRAEL IN THE EARLY 80'S, BUT AUTHORITIES HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR SUPPORT IN RECENT YEARS.

4. AL-FAJR REPORTED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03166

USIA FOR P/R, P/G, P/P, P/FW, P/FN, BXN/VOA,
NEA,USCENTCOM/USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PROG, PREL, SCUL, SHUM, IS, JO, KPAL
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR

NATIONALIST STUDENT FACTIONS AT NABLUS'S AN-NAJAH
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UNIVERSITY, AGREED TO ABIDE BY THE DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, WHILE THE MOSLEM FACTION REJECTED THE RESOLUTIONS AND REFUSED TO HAND OVER THE KEYS OF THE CAMPUS MOSQUE TO THE ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THAT STUDIES WILL RESUME SEPTEMBER 20, AS SCHEDULED.

5. AL-FAJR AND ASHAAB REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES PERMITTED GAZA LAWYER FAYEZ ABU RAHMEH TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WILL BE HELD IN SAN DIEGO LATER THIS MONTH. AL-FAJR EDITOR HANNA SINIORA AND SEVERAL ISRAELI LEADERS AND JOURNALISTS ARE SCHEDULED TO ATTEND. A SIMILAR CONFERENCE HAD TO BE CANCELLED LAST YEAR BECAUSE ABU RAHMEH AND OTHER PALESTINIANS FRON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE NOT PERMITTED TO ATTEND.

6. AN-NAHAR REPORTED THAT MOSHE AMIRAV, A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ISRAELI HERUT PARTY "CLAIMED" THAT HE MET WITH DR. SARI NUSSEIBEH AND FEISAL HUSSENI "IN SECRET" WHERE THEY DISCUSSED THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN THE REGION AND PEACE INITIATIVES. AMIRAV, "CLAIMED" THAT SARI NUSSEIBEH DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PLO AND MAINTAINS NO RELATIONS WITH THE ORGANIZATION.

EDITORIALS:

AL-QUDS SAID THAT THE ISRAELI POLICY IMPLEMENTED BY THE MINISTERS, CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND COORDINATOR OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFFAIRS
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CONTRADICTS INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND CONVENTIONS. "PERSONAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM ARE SUPERFICIAL AND TRANSIENT ONLY."

AL-FAJR PRAISED AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY ADMINISTATIVE STAFF AND THEIR "LOGICAL" PROPOSAL WHICH LED TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC AND NATIONALIST STUDENT FACTIONS.

AL-FAJR CALLED THE CLOSURE OF THE PLO OFFICES IN WASHINGTON "AMERICAN TERRORISM" AND A BREACH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. IT DEMONSTRATES THE AMERICAN POSITION, WHICH TOTALLY CONFORMS WITH ISRAELI POLICY.

ASHAAB SAID THAT AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION, IRAN'S INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN REVEALED. "WILL THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TAKE ANY STEPS AGAINST IRAN?"

AN-NAHAR IS DISAPPOINTED WITH ALGERIA, WHICH SUPPORTS IRAN RATHER THAN IRAQ "A SISTER ARAB AND MOSLEM" COUNTRY. ALGERIA SHOULD HAVE "CLEANED THE WOUNDS OF WAR FROM THE FOREHEADS OF BOTH MOSLEM BRETHEREN, THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS."

THE POST HOPES THAT THREATS TO THE NORTHERN BORDERS OF ISRAEL WILL NOT INCREASE, BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME, "IT WILL FALL TO THE BRAVE YOUNG DRAFTEES AND REGULARS OF THE IDF TO BODILY FEND FOR THEIR COUNTRY UP THERE."

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SUBJECT= JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, HUMAN RIGHTS, PRESS SUMMARY, PROPOSAL, CRIME, CONTROL, BOUNDARY, ARREST, POLICY

TAGS= KPAL, ASEC, PREL, SCUL, OPRC, PHUM, IS, JO

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 02595 01 OF 03 271428Z

THURSDAY, AUGUST 27, 1987

SUMMARY:

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-- JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. GOI INNER CABINET AUTHORIZES WATER DRILLING NEAR BETHLEHEM.

2. EXPORT COMPANY FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PRODUCE APPROVED.

3. AUTHORITIES ARREST FEISAL HUSSEINI IN JERUSALEM.

4. AUTHORITIES SEAL TWO HOUSES IN HEBRON FOR SECURITY OFFENSES; DEMOLISH THREE HOUSES BUILT WITHOUT LICENSES IN JENIN DISTRICT.

5. ARSON IN AN ARAB HOUSE IN JERUSALEM AND A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL ON AN ISRAELI BUS.

7. CINEMA WARS RAGE ON.

-- EDITORIALS:

BRIDGE CROSSINGS SHOULD BE FACILITATED; WEST BANK WATER SHOULDN'T GO TO ISRAEL; COALITION GOVERNMENT TRYING TO KILL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; ISRAEL SHOULD REASSESS ITS POLICY; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CRIME MUST CEASE; GORBACHEV PROPOSALS SERVE ALL.

-- END SUMMARY.

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JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. ALL PAPERS EXCEPT AN-NAHAR REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELI INNER CABINET DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE THE WEST BANK CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING A CONTRACT FOR A MAJOR WATER DRILLING PROJECT AT HERODION, NEAR BETHLEHEM, OVERRULING OBJECTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS. A SENIOR GOVERNMENT SOURCE PREDICTED THAT THE PROJECT WOULD "NEVER GET OFF THE GROUND," GIVEN THE TYPE OF COMPANY INVOLVED AND THE CONDITIONS THAT WILL BE APPENDED TO THE DRILLING CONTRACT, IF IT IS EVER SIGNED. THE PROJECT, WHICH WOULD SUPPLY WATER MOSTLY TO JERUSALEM, IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY INDUSTRY MINISTER ARIEL SHARON.

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR. THE MORIAH TECHNOLOGY AND ENERGY COMPANY SET UP AND RUN BY NORTH AMERICAN CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS, HAS ALREADY REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ISRAELI WATER COMPANY, MEKOROT, TO CARRY OUT THE PROJECT. PROTESTS AGAINST THE PROJECT HAVE ALREADY REACHED ISRAEL FROM WEST BANK NOTABLES, EGYPT, THE EC AND THE UN AND, LESS FORMALLY, FROM THE U.S. BETHLEHEM MAYOR FREIJ SAID THAT HE WAS "DISAPPOINTED" BY THE INNER CABINET DECISION.

2. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT, ACCORDING TO AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN SEVERAL ISRAELI MINISTERS, A NEW COMPANY WILL BE SET UP TO COORDINATE DIRECT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO EUROPE. AGRICULTURAL

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GOODS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA CURRENTLY HAVE TO BE EXPORTED THROUGH THE ISRAELI AGREXCO COMPANY AND CITRUS MARKETING BOARD. PALESTINIANS SAID THE ARRANGEMENT IMPOSES QUOTAS ON THEM TO PREVENT COMPETITION WITH ISRAELI GOODS. UNDER THE NEW ARRANGEMENT, THE COMPANY HANDLING EXPORTS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ISRAELI QUALITY CONTROL.

3. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT SECURITY FORCES ARRESTED "PALESTINIAN ACTIVIST" FEISAL HUSSEINI AND DETAINED HIM FOR 48 HOURS. POLICE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE REASON FOR HIS ARREST AND HUSSEINI'S WIFE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN DENIED A VISIT BY HIS LAWYER. THE POST ADDED THAT SECURITY FORCES CONSIDER HUSSEINI TO BE A LEADING PLO ORGANIZER, WHO HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AND JOINED A DEMONSTRATION CONDEMNING ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARDS PALESTINIANS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE IN JULY FROM THREE MONTHS ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION.

4. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SEALED THE HOMES OF TWO PALESTINIANS FROM HEBRON WHO HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH STABBING AN ELDERLY JEW NEAR JERUSALEM'S OLD CITY IN DECEMBER 1986. THE VICTIM, WHO WAS WEARING A HEAVY COAT, ESCAPED SERIOUS INJURY. THE TWO ACCUSED, NAFEZ QASEM ABEIDO, AND IHAB OTHMAN ATA ABEIDO, BOTH 18 YEARS OLD, HAD LODGED UNSUCCESSFUL APPEALS TO THE HIGH COURT AGAINST THE SEALINGS. AL-QUDS AND AL-FAJR REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES DEMOLISHED THE HOUSE OF MAHMOUD KHALIL KHDEIR IN ARRANA VILLAGE,

JENIN DISTRICT, AND TWO HOUSES BELONGING TO ABDALLAH ABDUS-SALAM AND IZZAT ABDUS-SALAM IN AL YAMOUN VILLAGE, ALSO IN JENIN DISTRICT, ON CLAIMS THAT THE HOUSES WERE BUILT WITHOUT LICENSES.

5. ALL ARABIC PAPERS REPORTED THAT UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS SPRAYED A "HIGHLY INFLAMABLE" LIQUID AND SET FIRE TO THE HOME OF SALEH MOHAMMED AL-YAMANI'S WIDOW, ON AQABAT KHALDIEH STREET IN THE MOSLEM QUARTER OF JERUSALEM'S OLD CITY. ONE OF THE ROOMS, SITUATED ADJACENT TO THE SHUVU BANIM YESHIVA, WAS COMPLETELY BURNED. POLICE ARE INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. ANOTHER INCIDENT WAS REPORTED BY ALL PAPERS: A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS TRAVELLING ON THE MAIN ROAD SOUTH OF BETHLEHEM, NEAR SOLOMON'S POOLS. THE BOTTLE BROKE ON THE SIDE OF THE BUS BUT DID NOT IGNINTE. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND NO DAMAGE WAS DONE.

7. THE POST AND AL-FAJR REPORTED THAT MK YOSSI SARID CALLED ON THE ISRAELI RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS MINISTER AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PREVENT FORMER CHIEF RABBI OVADIA YOSEF FROM ADVISING THE SHAS PARTY ON WHETHER IT SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY COALITION BECAUSE OF MAYOR KOLLEK'S SUPPORT FOR SABBATH FILM SHOWINGS IN JERUSALEM. YOSEF, WHO HEADS THE SHAS COUNCIL OF TORA SAGES, IS A DAYAN, OR RELIGIOUS-COURT JUDGE, AND AS SUCH IS BARRED FROM POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, SARID SAID. JERUSALEM MAYOR KOLLEK IS IN FAVOR OF SABBATH MOVIES AT PRIVATE CLUBS, WHERE NO TICKETS ARE SOLD, IS OPPOSED TO COMMERCIAL CINEMAS BEING

OPEN ON THE SABBATH. LIKUD MINISTERS ANNOUNCED.

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USIA FOR P/R, P/G, P/P, P/FW, P/FN, BXN/VOA
NEA,USCENTCOM/USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PROG, PREL, SCUL, SHUM, IS, JO, KPAL
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR
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THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE STATUS QUO AND CALLED FOR STEPS TO TONE DOWN TENSIONS BETWEEN SECULAR AND ULTRA-ORTHODOX RESIDENTS.

EDITORIALS:

AL-QUDS DECRIED THE PERENNIAL SUFFERING OF SUMMER VISITORS WHO CROSS THE BIDGES TO AND FROM JORDAN EVERY YEAR. AUTHORITIES SHOULD REEVALUATE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN THE PAST AND FACILITATE BRIDGE CROSSINGS.
ASHAAB REJECTS THE ISRAELI PLAN TO PUMP WEST BANK WATER TO ISRAEL BECAUSE IT COULD CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIIES AND WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE WATER NEEDS OF PALESTINIANS. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD EXERT ALL EFFORTS TO STOP THE PROJECT."

AN-NAHAR SAID THAT ISRAELI CALLS TO GRANT RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES A ROLE IN ADMINISTERING THEIR OWN AFFAIRS ARE IRONIC SINCE ISRELI AUTHORITIES RULE WITHOUT CONSULTING THE RESIDENTS AND THE MEASURES THEY ADOPT ARE USUALLY CONTRARY TO THE DESIRES OF THE CITIZENS.

THE POST REMARKED THAT ISRAELIS CONSIDER BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN MORTAL ENEMIES. THE LONGER THEY BLEED ONE ANOTHER ALONG THEIR COMMON BORDER AND IN THE GULF, THE BETTER. ISRAELIS WOULD TEND TO EXPRESS A PREFERENCE FOR IRAN, BUT "IRAQ'S ENMITY CAN NO LONGER BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED AS NO LESSER THAN SYRIA'S AND AS FAR WORSE THAN IRAN'S. THE TIME
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HAS COME FOR A REASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI POLICY.

AL-FAJR REMARKED THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THE RECENT STREET FIGHT IN NABLUS, WHERE ONE PALESTINIAN WAS KILLED AND SEVERAL OTHERS SERIOUSLY INJURED, ARE SPREADING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND CAUSE DEEP SORROW TO ALL THE CITIZENS. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND UNIVERSITIES SHOULD TRY TO ERADICATE THIS PHENOMENON.

ATTALIA WEEKLY SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY GORBACHEV AT THE DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE PROVIDES A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, TO REMOVE ALL TRACES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT WHICH THEY INHERITED FROM COLONIALIST DAYS.

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SUMMARY:

-- JERUSALEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. PETROL BOMB THROWN AT POLICEMAN IN JENIN:

2. SIX VILLAGE LEAGUERS HELD IN WEST BANK SHOOTING.

3. CURFEW IMPOSED ON VILLAGE NEAR TULKAREM.

4. JEWISH VIGILANTES ASK RABIN TO FACILITATE THEIR ACTIVITIES.

5. KACH MOVES GIRLS TRAINING CAMP TO KIRYAT ARBA.

6. FOUR AN-NAJAH STUDENTS CHARGED IN ZAFER AL-MASRI MURDER CASE.

-- EDITORIALS:

FREIJ NO PLO/SHAMIR MIDDLEMAN; SHAMIR BLOCKS ALL ROADS TO PEACE; NEW JORDANIAN MEASURES WILL POSE HARDSHIPS FOR STUDENTS; DON'T BE OVER-OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SOVIET TIES; GAZA CURFEW COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT; GULF WAR MUST END.

-- END SUMMARY.

JERUSLEM/WEST BANK NEWS:

1. ALL ARABIC PAPERS QUOTED A RADIO ISRAEL REPORT THAT A FIREBOMB WAS THROWN AT A LOCAL POLICEMAN IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK TOWN OF JENIN. THE BOMB

IGNITED BUT CAUSED NO INJURIES OR DAMAGE.

2. THE POST AND AL-QUDS REPORTED THAT SIX AIDES OF JAMIL AL-AMLEH, HEAD OF THE HEBRON AREA VILLAGE LEAGUES AND HEAD OF THE BEIT ULLAH VILLAGE COUNCIL, HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED BY POLICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHOOTING THIS WEEK OF TWO MEN IN THE VILLAGE OF BEIT ULLAH, NEAR HEBRON. THE INCIDENT, WHICH OCCURED AUGUST 18, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SPARKED BY A DISPUTE BETWEEN AL-AMLEH'S SUPPORTERS AND A LARGE GROUP OF VILLAGERS. THE VILLAGERS SAY AL-AMLEH'S MEN APPROPRIATED TRACTS OF THEIR LAND AND SOLD THEM AGAINST THEIR WILL.

3. ASHAAB REPORTED THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IMPOSED A CURFEW YESTERDAY ON THE VILLAGE OF RAS ATTIYEH, NEAR TULKAREM, AND ARRESTED A LARGE NUMBER OF MEN ON SUSPICION OF FIRE-BOMB THROWING.

4. AL-QUDS AND ASHAAB REPORTED THAT THE "COMMITEE FOR KEEPING WEST BANK ROADS SAFE", WHICH "KAHANE PEOPLE" RUN, HAS REQUESTED THAT DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN REMOVE THE WIRE-FENCE FROM AROUND THE DEHEISHEH REFUGEE CAMP TO ENABLE THEM TO CHASE STONE-THROWERS INSIDE THE CAMP. COMMITTEE MEMBERS ADDED THAT IF THE IDF TROOPS ARE UNABLE TO RESORE ORDER IN DEHEISHEH, THEY WOULD TAKE EVERY MEASURE NEEDED TO SECURE THE ROADS IN THE WEST BANK.

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02532

USIA FOR P/R, P/G, P/P, P/FW, P/FN, BXN/VOA,
NEA,USCENTCOM/USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PROG, PREL, SCUL, SHUM, IS, JO, KPAL
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK PRESS SUMMARY FOR

5. ASHAAB QUOTED A REPORT IN THE DAVAR HEBREW
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DAILY THAT THE KACH MOVEMENT'S WOMEN'S TRAINING CAMP, WHICH UP TILL NOW HAD BEEN HELD IN THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENT OF OFRA, NEAR RAMALLAH, HAS BEEN MOVED TO THE SETTLEMENT OF KIRYAT ARBA, OUTSIDE HEBRON.

6. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT FOUR PALESTINIANS WERE CHARGED YESTERDAY WITH MEMBERSHIP IN THE TERRORIST CELL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF NABLUS MAYOR ZAFER AL-MASRI. TWO WOMEN FROM NABLUS AND TWO MALE AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FROM GAZA WERE CHARGED AITH POSSESSING ARMS AND BELONGING TO THE PFLP. IN ADDITION TO THE AL-MASRI KILLING, THE GROUP IS ALSO HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JANUARY 1986 SLAYING OF BORDER POLICEMAN JAMIL FARES, AND THE MURDER OF ISRAELI CIVILIAN ALBERT BUKHRIS IN JUNE 1985. TWO PALESTINIANS WERE EARLIER CHARGED WITH CARRYING OUT AL-MASRI'S ASSASSINATION.

EDITORIALS:

ATTALIAH SAID THAT SHAMIR'S REJECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOILED THE ILLUSIONS IN SOME ARAB CIRCLES WHICH SOUGHT TO LINK ARAB VISITS TO THE ROMANIA WITH SHAMIR'S VISIT. "THEY ARE MISTAKEN, ALL THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT BETHLEHEM

MAYOR FREIJ CAN BE A MIDDLEMAN BETWEEN THE PLO AND SHAMIR."

ASHAAB BELIEVES THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF SHAMIR'S VISIT TO ROMANIA SHOWS ARAB UNITY IS IDISPENSABLE. SHAMIR'S STATEMENT SHOWS HE WANTS TO CLOSE ALL DOORS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
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AL-FAJR CRITICIZES THE NEW REGULATIONS BY THE JORDANIAN COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, ACCORDING TO WHICH HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES WILL HAVE TO RECEIVE CERTIFICATION OF THEIR TAWJIHI TRANSCRIPTS FROM JORDANIAN UNIVERSITIES PRIOR TO APPLYING TO OTHER UNIVERSITIES. "A STUDENT RETURNING FROM ABROAD WITH A UNIVERSITY DEGREE MAY FIND THAT HIS DEGREE IS NOT RECOGNIZED IN JORDAN." THE PAPER DOUBTS THIS MEASURE WILL BENEFIT STUDENTS.

AN-NAHAR DECRIED THE CURFEW ON THE JABALYA REFUGEE CAMP IN GAZA. "MORE THAT 50,000 PERSONS ARE LIVING WITHOUT FOOD OR MEDICAL AID; THE COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE GOES BEYOND IMAGINATION."

THE POST WARNS AGAINST EXAGGERATED OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH RELATIONS MAY BE HINDERED BY ISRAEL'S CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN ANY CONFERENCE ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

AL- QUDS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WILL COME TO AN END SOON.
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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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EXCISE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

[redacted] S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Richard Burt RB

SUBJECT: Your Geneva Meeting with Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert: Sunday, January 6, 1985, 4:30 - 5:00 P.M.

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Express your gratitude for Swiss facilitation of your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko and encourage Switzerland's continued opening to international involvement.

2. Brief Aubert on current thinking on East-West relations and your approach to your talks with Gromyko.

3. Explain to Aubert the U.S. position on conflicts of jurisdiction.

4. Stress continued U.S. concern about control of strategic technology exports to the Warsaw Pact.

5. Reassure Aubert that we are giving expeditious consideration to Switzerland's plutonium re-transfer application.

II. SETTING

While your meeting with Aubert is partly a courtesy call to express U.S. appreciation to Switzerland for providing a venue for your talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the importance of our relationship with Switzerland gives it substantive content as well. Such meetings are traditional; Secretary Haig met with Aubert on the occasion of his 1982 talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Vice President Bush met with him during an INF-related trip to Europe in early 1983. The meeting will be a status builder for Switzerland and Aubert and an inducement to the Swiss to use their neutral credentials to advance Western causes. Aubert will use it to propose Geneva as a site for arms control "umbrella" talks.

While our relationship with the Swiss is basically excellent, there are several areas of friction that result from our different legal and political traditions. During the first

DEPARTMENT OF STATE [redacted] IS/FPC/CDR Date.

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OADR Cases Only: EO Citations 9303744

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six months of 1985, we will have consultations with the GOS on civil aviation, extradition, and legal assistance. We have basic differences on all of these issues and there is the strong possibility that we will be unable to reach agreement on any of them. While it is unlikely that Aubert will raise any of these questions, Swiss umbrage at what they feel is the heavy-handed way we have dealt with these topics in the past will color his approach to other bilateral issues.

Over the past few years, Switzerland has begun to venture forth from its neutral cocoon and participate actively in world affairs. Although the Swiss remain observers at the United Nations, a national referendum (which will probably result in a decision to remain outside the UN) is slated for 1986. The Swiss played a helpful role at the CSCE in Madrid and are again demonstrating their interest in keeping the NNA group consistent with Western positions in the CDE. They have supported our efforts to limit budget growth and politicization in the UN specialized agencies, but will remain members of UNESCO and attempt to reform the organization from within.

Switzerland has proven most helpful to the U.S. in representing us in Cuba and Iran, most recently during the Kuwaiti Airline hijacking. Your meeting with Aubert will be a good opportunity to thank the GOS for its excellent work during this unfortunate incident.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Switzerland
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt	MFA State Secretary Edouard Brunner
Ambassador John Davis Lodge	Anton Hegner, Swiss Ambassador in Geneva
Frank Tumminia, Embassy Bern (notetaker) (interpreter)	Philippe Jacquard, interpreter

Attachment:

Biographic information

Drafted:EUR/CE:DTJohnson
12/13/84;632-2005;0110B

Cleared:EUR:TMTNiles
EUR/CE:ARThompson
L/LEI:ASurena
OES/NEP:JDeThomas
EUR/SOV:JTefft
EB/EWT:MDrucker
S/NP:SThompson

DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

1. Express your gratitude for Swiss facilitation of your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko and encourage Switzerland's continued opening to international involvement.

One of the primary purposes of your meeting with Aubert is to express U.S. appreciation for Switzerland's traditional hospitality for U.S.-Soviet meetings in Geneva, Swiss support for Western positions in international fora, and Swiss assistance as our protecting power in Iran and Cuba. Swiss officials appreciate the enhanced international stature that Geneva provides. It is in our interest to use their desire to play the role of facilitator to encourage the Swiss to play a more active role on the world's stage. Their positions on international political questions are almost invariably supportive of ours. Occasionally they are more conservative: one concern Aubert may raise is that the U.S. and NATO have been too flexible on procedural questions at the Stockholm CDE session and are running the risk of breaking the link between security and human rights issues in CSCE. If he raises this point, you should reassure Aubert that our positions are essentially identical and that Ambassador Goodby is interested in visiting Bern. Although their neutrality prevents them from ever becoming an ally in the formal sense, our interests and positions will coincide on most North-South and East-West issues.

--I appreciate your government's traditional willingness to host talks between the United States and the Soviets. You can be proud of your country's role as a facilitator of international understanding.

--I also want to thank you for your invaluable assistance during the recent tragic events in Tehran. Ambassador Salvi and his staff spared no effort to protect U.S. interests.

--Your government's constructive role in Madrid and our close consultations in Stockholm demonstrate that our different international roles do not hinder us from working together to advance our common interests.

--I would like to encourage your continued active involvement and support in forthcoming CSCE meetings. We value the working relationships we have built up in these meetings and wish to enhance them.

--We are working well together on CDE. I hope Ambassador Goodby can visit Bern before the next session.

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3. <u>Stress continued U.S. concern about control of strategic technology exports to the Warsaw Pact.</u>

An inter-agency delegation met June 25 and 26 in Bern to discuss mutual concerns about the control and diversion of strategic technology. Our primary motivation for holding these talks was to press the Swiss to exercise stricter controls over transit shipments and indigenous technology. secret gentlemen's agreement with Switzerland

B-1

The inter-agency trade control group met again with the Swiss on December 12 to discuss Swiss willingness to meet our concerns on technology transfer. The results of those discussions were mixed. The Swiss have agreed to introduce legislation to control their transit zones; however, it will not become effective until at least August. Their response to our requests for controls on indigenous technology was ambiguous. They agreed to pursue an informal control mechanism which would have no penalties for violation, if -- and only if -- Swiss machine tool manufacturers are not affected by our pending Section 232 machine tool import restriction case.

--Our inter-agency team was somewhat disappointed with the outcome of our December talks in Bern. Control of high technology exports to the Soviet Union is something which we believe is in Swiss as well as U.S. security interests.

--We believe it is in all of our interests not to offset the considerable expense we devote to weapons by providing the Warsaw Pact with equipment and technology applicable to military uses. I fail to see how Switzerland benefits from sales of high technology equipment to the Soviet Union.

--We look forward to a continued dialogue on this question. We hope that we can work together and solve our outstanding problems so our industries can continue to trade without undue restriction.

[redacted]

4. Reassure Aubert that we are giving expeditious consideration to Switzerland's plutonium re-transfer application.

The GOS has become increasingly impatient with delays in obtaining permission for the retransfer from France to Switzerland of 200 Kg of plutonium, which is subject to U.S. consent rights, for use by Swiss utilities. These delays will soon result in relatively large extra costs for the Swiss utilities involved. B-1

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--We understand your position on the urgency of obtaining U.S. approval for the retransfer of the plutonium from France. We are addressing the issue on an expedited basis at the highest levels of the Executive Branch. We will provide you with more information on the USG's approach to the retransfer within the next two weeks.

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MX, XF, UN
SUBJECT: ECHEVERRIA PROPOSALS RE MIDDLE EAST

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM AMBASSADOR

1. ECHEVERRIA ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM LAST NIGHT TO HEAR HIS VERSION OF HIS RECENT THIRD WORLD TRIP, DETAILS OF WHICH ARE BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. DURING CONVERSATION HE ASKED ME SPECIFICALLY TO RAISE WITH YOU FOLLOWING PROPOSAL REGARDING PALESTINE SITUATION, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE MAIN SUBJECT OF RABASA'S PROPOSED VISIT WITH YOU.

(A) ECHEVERRIA IS FOLLOWING CLOSELY YOUR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WISHES YOU ALL POSSIBLE SUCCESS.

(B) HE HIMSELF WAS ANGUISHED BY SITUATION AND TENSIONS THAT HE ENCOUNTERED IN AREA. HE DID EVERYTHING WHILE IN ARAB COUNTRIES TO PREACH AGAINST EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM UN AND WHILE IN ISRAEL TO ADVOCATE A NATIONAL HOME FOR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(C) EXCEPT FOR BOUMEDIENNE, WHOM HE FOUND VERY CLOSE-MINDED, HE FOUND OTHER LEADERS RELATIVELY RESPONSIVE. ARAFAT WAS AN EMOTIONAL MYSTIC BUT IN HIS OPINION BASICALLY A GOOD BUT SOMEWHAT SHALLOW MAN, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT [redacted]E VERY MUCH UNDER INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIETS.

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SHOULD YOUR PRESENT MISSION SUCCEED, AS HE SINCERELY HOPES, WE MUST STILL WORRY LEST SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB STATES TURN AGAINST EGYPT AND THIS MIGHT REQUIRE SOME OTHER TYPE OF CONTINUING ATTENTION. SIMILARLY, SHOULD YOUR MISSION NOT PROSPER FULLY, HE HOPES THAT YOU COULD CONTINUE TO WORK WITH DISCRETION UNDER SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL SCREEN WHICH HE PROPOSED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ECHEVERRIA ON HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO UNGA (AND PRESUMABLY AFTER CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES) WOULD PROPOSE THAT UN INVITE THREE CHIEFS OF STATE TO FORM A CONCILIATION COMMITTEE TO WORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, BOTH ON THE SPOT IN EGYPT, ISRAEL AND FROM UN HEADQUARTERS. HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT SUCH A COMMITTEE BE COMPOSED OF THE SHAH OF IRAN ("A MOSLEM WHO HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND AT THE SAME TIME IS A GOOD FRIEND OF ISRAEL'S, HAVING CONTINUED TO SELL THEM OIL"), THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO HIMSELF ("UNIQUELY QUALIFIED BY VIRTUE OF HIS UNPRECEDENTED TRIP THROUGH THE AREA"), AND A EUROPEAN LEADER SUCH AS THE PRIME

MINISTER OF SWEDEN, THE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND OR THE PRESIDENZ OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION.

(2) SUCH A CONCILIATION COMMITTEE WOULD BE MORE THAN MERELY A SCREENAS IT WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE IN ITSELF. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A COVER FOR YOUR OWN CONTINUED ACTIVITIES, SHOULD YOUR PRESENT MISSION REGRETTABLY NOT REACH A FINAL SOLUTION. EVEN IF YOU SHOULD SUCCEED, THE PROPOSED CHIEFS OF STATE COMMITTEE WOULD SERVE TO KEEP OTHER ARAB STATES FROM NIBBLING AWAY AT THE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, BY PLACING THIS MATTER IN A UN CONTEXT (WHILE AT THE SAME TIME LINKING IT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP IT OUT OF THE BROUHAHA OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY POLITICS) IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE UN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE AND HELP TO RESTORE ITS LUSTRE.

2. I THANKED PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA FOR THE EXPOSITION OF HIS PLAN AND PROMISED TO REPORT IT TO YOU AT ONCE, OBSERVING THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE WOULD MAKE YOUR CONVERSATION WITH RABASA MORE MEANINGFUL. I ASKED ECHEVERRIA WHETHER HIS PLAN ENVISAGED A WILLINGNESS TO STATION ON-THE-SPOT OBSERVERS REPRESENTING THE PROPOSED THREE CHIEFS OF STATE. ECHEVERRIA APPARENTLY HAD

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NOT THOUGHT OF THIS BUT ON REFLECTION SAID THAT HIS PLAN SHOULD IN INDEED INCLUDE ON-THE-SPOT OBSERVERS AND THAT THEY COULD EITHER WORK ALONG SIDE THE PROPOSED AMERICAN OBSERVERS, THUS

DILUTING THEIR PRESENCE, OR COULD EVEN CARRY OUT THEIR OBSERVER FUNCTION WITHOUT THE AMERICANS, SHOULD YOUR OWN PLAN NOT SUCCEED.

3. IN CLOSING EHCEVERRIA REITERATED AGAIN HIS VERY STRONG HOPES FOR YOUR OWN SUCCESS, REPEATING THAT HIS PLAN WOULD BE PROPOSED ONLY AS A SUPPLEMENT TO YOUR EFFORTS AND INSURANCE IN CASE YOU DID NOT SUCCEED FULLY, AS WELL AS A MEANS OF RESTORING LUSTRE TO THE UN SYSTEM. JOVA

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 MEXICO 06669 290040Z

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 AF-06 EA-06 EUR-12 NEA-10 L-03

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01

SP-02 /071 W
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R 290001Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9126
INFO AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

[redacted]EXICO 6669

E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PORG PFOR UN GY MX
SUBJECT: GUYANA OFFICIAL CALLS FOR THIRD WORLD SECRETARY GENERAL FOR UN

1. THE MEXICO CITY PRESS JULY 27 QUOTES GUYANA'S MINISTER OF TRADE, GEORGE KING AS SAYING: "THE NATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD MUST BEGIN WORKING NOW IN ORDER THAT THE NEXT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN IS ONE OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES AND TO PREVENT THE FIVE(PERMANENT MEMBERS OF) THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM VETOING THIS." KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS HIGH TIME THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS STOP DOMINATING THE UN.

2. WITH RESPECT TO ECHEVERRIA'S CANDIDACY, KING ASSERTED MEXICO HAS WON THE RESPECT OF THE ENTIRE THIRD WORLD AND THAT FOR GUYANA IT WILL BE A PLEASURE TO SUPPORT ECHEVERRIA'S CANDIDACY FOR SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN.

3. KING MADE HIS REMARKS ON ARRIVAL IN MEXICT JULY 26 WITH A NINE-MAN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MISSION CALLED FOR IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM AND PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA SIGNED ON JULY 10 AT THE END OF THE LATTER'S STATE VISIT TO GUYANA. INCLUDED IN THE GUYANA MISSION IS MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE GAVIN KENNARD.

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PAGE 02 MEXICO 06669 290040Z

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4. COMMENT: KING'S STATEMENTS, COMING FAST ON THE HEELS OF ECHEVERRIA'S VISIT TO GUYANA, ARE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF THE MEXICAN LEADER'S CURRENT TOUR OF 14 NATIONS IS TO PROMOTE HIS CANDIDACY.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 MEXICO 06617 261431Z

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73
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-15 FEA-01 INT-05 EB-07 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01

AID-05 IO-10 /105 W

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R 252325Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9092
INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

UNCLAS MEXICO 6617

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, MX
SUBJECT: ECHEVERRIA PRESS CONFERENCES FEATURE OLD AND NEW REFERINS

1. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS REACHING US HERE,PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA REPEATED SOME WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS AND ADVANCED A FEW NOVEL ONES IN PRESS CONFERENCES JULY 23 AND 24 IN NEW DELHI AND COLOMBO. AMONG THE FAMILIAR REFRAINS:

-- OPEC: MEXICO WILL CONTINUE TO KEY EXPORT PRICES FOR ITS PETROLEUM TO OPEC PRICES. IF LATTER GO UP, MEXICO'S WILL FOLLOW.

-- OAS AND CUBA: RECENT ACTION TO AMEND RIO TREATY AND PAVE WAY FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA WAS A "POSTIVE" STEP BUT TOO LATE IN COMING. THERE IS NO CONTINENT ON EARTH WHERE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES DO NOT EXIST AMONG NATIONS; HARMONIC COEXISTENCE IS ESSENTIAL.
ARMS -- GREAT POWERS ARE STILL SPENDING ENORMOUS SUMS ON ARMS WHICH SHOULD BE CHANNELED INSTEAD INTO THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT.

-- UNITED NATIONS: NO NATION SHOULD WITHDRAW,
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PAGE 02 MEXICO 06617 261431Z

Date: 6/25/97
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SINCE U.S, REPRESENTS HOPE FOR DIALOGUE, FOR EXCHANGE OF IDEAS,AND FOR DISCUSSIONS WHICH PROMOTE PEACE.

2. ECHEVERRIA REVISED OR ELABORATED HIS VIEWS ON A FEW TOPICS:
-- U.N. SECGENSHIP: ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY OF SUCCESS, LDCS SHOULD UNITE TO ENSURE THAT NEXT SECGEN IS A MAN FROM THE THIRD WORLD, SINCE PERIOD OF CRISIS AHEAD REQUIRES SOMEONE WHO CAN UNDERSTAND THEM.(HE MADE NO CLAIM THAT THAT MAN OUGHT TO BE HE, OF COURSE.)
-- DETENTE: GREAT POWER EFFORTS HAVE BEEN SUPERFICIAL, SHALLOW, PEDESTRIAN, AND THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS UNDERMINED BY TENSION-PRODUCING ACTIONS ELSEWHERE. THEY TALK IN ONE WAY AND ACT IN ANOTHER.
-- NON-ALIGNED GROUP: MEXICO IS WATCHING WITH MUCH INTEREST AND CONSIDERS ALL OF THEM ITS FRIENDS.IN MANY WAYS, THEIR EFFORTS DUPLICATE THOSE OF G-77; A UNITED FRONT IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY. MEXICO WILL JOIN THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP WHEN THERE IS SUFFICIENT COOPERATION AMONG THESE COUNTRIES TO GUARANTEE THEIR GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT.
-- AID AND NIEO: INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES' ASSISTANCE TO LDCS MUST NOT BE AN ACT OF CHARITY WHICH DISGUSTS GIVER AND HUMILIATES RECEIVER. IT MUST BE AN INSTITUTIONALIZED ACT OF COOPERATION WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, BASED ON JUSTICE AND RECOGNITION OF ESSENTIAL EQUALITY AMONG NATIONS.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 07091 221521Z

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ACTION NEA-10

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H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-03

USIA-06 SAM-01 OES-03 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00

FRB-03 PRS-01 PA-01 EUR-12 ACDA-05 IO-10 NRC-05

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R 221232Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2638
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
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AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[redacted] EHRAN 07091

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, ETRD, EINV, IR, MX
SUBJ: ECHEVERRIA VISIT TO IRAN - OIL PRICES AND POSSIBLE ECONOMIC COOPERATION

REF: MEXICO 6095

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1. SUMMARY. MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S IRANIAN VISIT BROUGHT FORTH STATEMENTS BY BOTH HEADS OF STATE SUPPORTING HIGHER OIL PRICES. SHAH REPEATED HIS DETERMINATION TO USE OIL WEALTH TO BUILD UP IRAN'S MILITARY STRENGTH. IRANIAN PRESS SAID EACH SIDE AGREED TO MAKE A $400 MILLION CREDIT AVAILABLE FOR JOINT VENTURES IN BOTH COUNTRIES, BUT FONMIN'S SOURCE INDICATED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT LIMITED TO IRAN'S INVESTING $400 MILLION IN MEXICO, IF MONEY AVAILABLE LATER. END SUMMARY

2. AT THE CLOSE OF THE JULY 17-21 VISIT TO IRAN OF PRESIDENT LUIS ECHEVERRIA, A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE CARRIED OVER NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TV WAS HELD IN WHICH THE SHAH REITERATED AT SOME LENGTH THE JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF OIL TO COVER THE ALLEGED 30-35 PERCENT DECLINE IN OIL REVENUES' PURCHASING POWER BECAUSE OF WORLD INFLATION. HE SAID IRAN WOULD NOT INSIST ON AN INCREASE IN OIL PRICES COMMENSURATE WITH THE OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES' ERODED BUYING POWER, BUT HE STATED THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF OIL WOULD BE DETERMINED BY "MANY FACTORS" IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF OPEC. HE CLAIMED HIGHER OIL PRICES WOULD NOT UNDLY HURT THE WORLD ECONOMY AND REITERATED THE IRANIAN VIEW THAT PAST OIL PRICE INCREASES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ONLY A SMALL PART OF WORLD INFLATION. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA STATED THAT MEXICO WOULD UPHOLD A PRICE INCREASE AND NOT UNDERCUT OPEC BY SELLING OIL AT A LOWER PRICE. THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE RELEASED AT THE CLOSE OF THE VISIT STATED THAT THE TWO HEADS OF STATE "REAFFIRMED THAT THE PRICES OF OIL AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS SHOULD BE CLOSELY RELATED TO THAT OF OTHER COMMODITIES."

3. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT STORIES APPERING IN WESTERN PRESS THAT OUL-PRODUCING STATES WERE SQUANDERING THEIR WEALTH ON WEAPONS, SHAH RECALLED THAT IRAN HAD BEEN INVADED BY FOREIGN POWERS IN BOTH WORLD WARS, ALTHOUGH IT HAD DECLARED ITS NEUTRALITY AND THAT "OUR COUNTRY WILL NOT BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AGAIN. WE HAVE DECIDED TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY OURSELVES BEFORE ALLOWING IT TO BE OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY, BUT BEFORE THAT WE WILL FIGHT AND TO FIGHT WE NEED WEAPONS."

4. SHAH REAFFIRMED IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND ITS DESIRE THAT THE MEDEAST BE DECLARED A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE, BUT NOTED IRAN IS ATTAINING THE CAPACITY TO BECOME A NON-MILITARY NUCLEAR POWER.

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5. VISIT WAS ROUTINE BUT SUCCESSFUL IMAGE-BUILDING EXERCISE BY 184-MAN MEXICAN DELEGATION. IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, ECHEVERRIA

STRESSED SIMILARITY MEXICAN AND IRANIAN REVOLUTIONS AND DESIRE FOR ECON, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THIRD WORLD PARTNERS. TWITTING OF SUPERPOWERS WAS HELD TO MINIMUM, APPARENTLY WELL BELOW OTHER ECHEVERRIA VISITS SUCH AS ALGIERS. LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE ACCOMPLISHED, THOUGH THREE ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS SIGNED: (1) PAYMENTS AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES' CENTRAL BANKS; (2) FINANCIAL PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE GOI MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE AND THE MEXICAN FINANCE MINISTRY, AND (3) LETTER OF ASSOCIATEION BY THE PRESIDENTS OF EACH COUNTRY'S CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SETTING UP A JOINT IRANIAN/MEXICAN BUSINESS COMMITTEE WHICH WILL MEET ANNUALLY. IRANIAN PRESS REPORTED EACH COUNTRY AGREED TO MAKE AVAILABLE $400 MILLION CREDIT FOR FINANCING JOINT VENTURES IN BOTH COUNTRIES, BUT DIRECTOR AMERICAN DIVISION AT FONMINISTRY HATEF SAID AGREEMENT WAS ONLY FOR IRANIAN INVESTMENT IN MEXICO, AND MEXICANS WERE TOLD IRAN WOULD HAVE NO MONEY FOR THIS BEFORE LATE SEPTEMBER AT EARLIEST. COMMUNIQUE INDICATED JOINT VENTURE PAPER MILLS, CEMENT PLANTS, MAN-MADE FIBERS, SUGAR MILLS, HEAVY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING (MAINLY FOR CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND OIL DRILLING PLATFORMS), COOPERATION IN PETROLEUM AND PETRO-CHEMICALS AND IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WERE DISCUSSED. THESE COVER SIMILAR TERRITORY TO PROJECTS REVIEWED AT THE JOINT MEXICAN-IRANIAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION MEETING (SUBCABINET AND TECHNICAL LEVEL) DURING THE EARLY JUNE VISIT OF A MEXICAN DELEGATION LED BY THE FINANCE UNDER SECRETARY.NOTHING YET ACCOMPLISHED ON ANY JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER CONCURRENCE OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS. CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENTS ALSO WERE SIGNED, BUT THESE COVER ROUTINE EXCHANGES OF TEACHERS, STUDENTS, AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

6. HATEF ALSO THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO REPEAT NO DISCUSSION OF FUTURE ECHEVERRIA ROLE IN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (PARA FOUR REFTEL).
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a [redacted]
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 MEXICO 06095 092027Z

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 NEA-10 ISO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07

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SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 /077 W
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R 091934Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8802
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY NEW DEHLI
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[redacted]IEXICO 6095

E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR,MX,AG,EG,CE,SG,TZ,GY,SA,KX,IN,TD,IR, IS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA'S TRIP

REF: MEXICO 6020

1. MEXICAN PRESIDENT LUIS ECHEVERRIA ANNOUNCED JULY 7 HIS ITINERARY FOR HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP AS FOLLOWS: GUYANA, JULY 8-10; SENEGAL, JULY 10-14; ALGERIA, JULY 14-17; IRAN, JULY 17-21; INDIA, JULY 21-23; SRI LANKA, JULY 24; TANZANIA, JULY 25-28; KUWAIT, JULY 28-AUG 1; SAUDI ARABIA AUG 1-4; EGYPT, AUG 4-7; 8 4AEL, AUG 7-10; TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, AUG 10-13; AND CUBA, AUG 14-18.

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PAGE 02 MEXICO 06095 092027Z

2. FOLLOWING BACKGROUND MAY BE USEFUL TO POSTS ALONG ROUTE OF ECHEVERRIA'S TRIP. DURING HIS FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AS MEXICO'S PRESIDENT, ECHEVERRIA HAS BROUGHT UNACCUSTOMED ACTIVISM TO GOM FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ATTEMPTED TO INSCRIBE MEXICO FIRMLY AMONG LEADING NATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD. IN THIS QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP, MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN GEARED INCREASINGLY TOWARD PRO-MOTING THIRD WORLD UNITY IN SUPPORT OF A "NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER." ECHEVERRIA IS ENORMOUSLY PROUD OF HIS INIT-IATIVE IN PROPOSING THE CHAPTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (CERDS) AT THE UNCTAD CONFERENCE IN CHILE IN APRIL 1972, AND OF THE LEADING PART TAKEN BY THE GOM IN ITS ADOPTION AT THE UNGA IN DECEMBER 1974. SINCE ITS AP-PROVAL, HE HAS TIRELESSLY SOUGHT TO PROMOTE THE CHARTER AS THE IDEAL"FRAMEWORK" FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

3. ECHEVERRIA'S THIRD WORLD STANCES AND RHETORIC ARE DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO PUT HIM IN WHAT WE BELIEVES IS THE VANGUARD OF THE MOVEMENT BUT ALSO TO WIN SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONALISTIC AND LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN MEXICO AND DEMON-STRATE GOM INDEPENDENCE OF US INFLUENCE. IN PURSUIT OF THE LATTER, THE GOM IS ACTIVELY SEEKING NEW SOURCES OF TRADE, INVESTMENT AND TEHCNOLOGY TO OFFSET THE CURRENT US PRE-PONDERANCE IN THESE AREAS(THE US ACCOUNTS FOR TWO-THIRDS OF MEXICO'S TRADE AND 80 PERCENT OF ITS FOREIGN INVESTMENT).

4. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN NUMEROUS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL HINTS FROM THE GOM THAT ECHEVERRIA, WHO CANNOT SEEK ANOTHER TERM AS PRESIDENT OF MEXICO WHEN HIS CURRENT TERM EXPIRES IN DECEMBER OF 1976, IS INTERESTED IN HEADING AN INTER-NATIONAL ORGANIZATION. BOTH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN AND HEAD OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION HAVE BEEN MENTIONED. IN PUBLIC, ECHEVERRIA IS CURRENTLY DOWNPLAYING THIS AS "PREMATURE". NEVERTHELESS, HE HAS INTENSIFIED HIS ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES IN THE FOREIGN RE-LATIONS SPHERE: SINCE TAKING OFFICE IN 1970, ECHEVERRIA HAS TRAVELLED ABORAD 7 TIMES TO A TOTAL OF 23 NATIONS. HIS CURRENT (8TH) TRIP WILL BE HIS LONGEST IN TERMS OF BOTH DURATION (42 DAYS) AND NUMBER OF NATIONS VISITED (13).

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PAGE 03 MEXICO 06095 092027Z

DURING THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, ECHEVERRIA HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE TEMPO OF FOREIGN VISITS TO MEXICO AND OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES HELD HERE.

5. ECHEVERRIA'S TRIPS ABROAD ARE GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED BY AN ARDUOUS SCHEDULE OF HIGHLY VISIBLE ACTIVITY. THE MEXICAN CHIEF OF STATE SEEKS TO CULTIVATE AN IMAGE AS A TIRELESS AND DYNAMIC LEADER. HE LOVES TO HAVE CROWDS TURNED OUT FOR HIM AND TO MEET PEOPLE. IN PARTICULAR, ECHEVERRIA LIKES TO MEET WITH INTELLECTUALS FOR INFORMAL AND GENERALLY ONE-SIDED "DISCUSSIONS" WHICH OCCASIONALLY ARE EMBARRASSING TO HIS HOSTS AND DRAG ON FOR HOURS, DISRUPTING HIS SCHEDULE. ECHEVERRIA'S DISLIKE OF FORMALITY IS LEGEND. NEVERTHELESS, MEXICANS ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO JOINT COM-MUNIQUES AND NEGOTITATE TENACIOUSLY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON SUCH PET TOPICS AS CERDS AND NIEO.

6. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH TRIP TAKES PLACE IS EVE(FOUR MONTHS HENCE) OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. SELECTION(NOT ELECTION) IS ESSENTIALLY CLOSED PROCESS IN WHICH CURRENT RULING ELITE, HEADED BY PRESIDENT, MAKES THE CHOICE. ECHEVERRIA'S ABSENTING HIMSELF FOR 42 DAYS AT THIS TIME REFLECTS CONFIDENCE IN HIS CONTROL OF DOMESTIC SITUATION.

7. AS USUAL PRESIDENT IS TRAVELING WITH HUGE ENTOURAGE, WHICH REPRESENTS MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL, PRIVATE, AND POLITICAL INTERESTS(HOWEVER, NONE OF THREE OPPOSITION PARTIES IS REPRESENTED).

8. REPORTS ON SUBSTANCE AND ATMOSPHERICS OF ECHEVERRIA'S VISITS, AND IN PARTICULAR ANY IMPRESSIONS FROM PRESS OR HOST GOVERNMENT SOURCES OF DYNAMICS AMONG SUPPORTING ACTORS, WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 MEXICO 06020 080158Z

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 NEA-10 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15

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AID-05 (ISO) W
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R 080039Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8749
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

UNCLAS MEXICO 6020

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR, MX, AG, EG, CE, SG, TZ, GY, SA, KU,
IN, TD, IR, IS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA'S TRIP

REF MEXICO 5894

THIS CABLE CONSOLIDATES REPORTING OF EARLIER CABLES (REFTEL AND PREVIOUS) ON NATIONS MEXICAN PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA WILL VISIT BETWEEN JULY 8 AND AUGUST 16: GUYANA, SENEGAL, ALGERIA, EGYPT, IRAN, INDIA, ISRAEL, KUWAIT, SRI LANKA, SAUDI ARABIA, TANZANIA, TRINIDAD, AND TOBAGO, AND CUBA. THE GOM HAS NOT ANNOUNCED EITHER THE DATES OR SEQUENCE OF VISITS. JOVA
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PAGE 01 OTTAWA 07761 01 OF 03 221946Z
ACTION EUR-00

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O 221934Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5529
THE WHITE HOUSE
AMCONSUL HALIFAX
AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMCONSUL MONTREAL
AMCONSUL TORONTO
AMCONSUL CALGARY
AMCONSUL VANCOUVER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR Date: 2/12/97
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P/PFE; EU
STATE FOR EUR/CAN; EUR/PA
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN '88.

1. THERE WAS ONE ITEM ON ISRAEL IN CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS SEPT. 22, AND THREE ON THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN. EXCERPTS FOLLOW.

2. TORONTO SUN COLUMNIST ERIC MARGOLIS WROTE A PIECE ENTITLED, "ISRAEL'S EYE IN THE SKY." "THE ARAB NATIONS
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OF THE MIDEAST WILL NOW HAVE TO GET USED TO THE

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UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING THAT SOMEONE IS LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS. THE SOMEONE IS, OF COURSE, ISRAEL WHICH JUST LAUNCHED ITS FIRST SATELLITE ON MONDAY....

3. "WHAT PRECISELY WAS LAUNCHED INTO LOW ORBIT REMAINS SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. THE BEST GUESS IS THAT IT WAS EITHER A TEST PACKAGE DESIGNED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A FORTHCOMING LAUNCH OF A SPY SATELLITE OR AN ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING SYSTEM TO MONITOR ARAB COMMUNICATIONS....

4. "ISRAEL HAS LONG PUT INTENSE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI-CONTROLLED CHANNEL ON U.S. SPY SATELLITES. THE U.S. MILITARY RESISTED THIS BUT WAS FORCED BY CONGRESS TO GRUDGINGLY SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH EDITED SATELLITE IMAGERY AND ELECTRONIC DATA AMERICA'S ARAB ALLIES WERE OUTRAGED THAT SUCH DATA WERE PASSED ON TO THEIR ENEMY.

5. "THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCH IMAGERY WAS SEEN IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR... SATELLITE PHOTOS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. ALLOWED IRAQ TO SEE WHERE IRANIAN ATTACKS WOULD BE MOUNTED AND TO PREPARE COUNTERMEASURES. EVERYTHING IRAN DID WAS OBSERVED BY U.S. SATELL
TES AND QUICKLY RELAYED
TO BAGHDAD. DEPRIVED OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, IRAN LOST ITS ONLY CHANCE TO WIN THE WAR.

6. "AN ISRAELI SATELLITE WILL PERFORM A SIMILAR USEFUL ROLE. IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO SECRETLY MASS TROOPS FOR A SURPR
SE ATTACK ON
ISRAEL....MONDAY'S LAUNCH ALSO DELIVERED ANOTHER MESSAGE TO THE ARAB STATES. THE MISSILE THAT LOFTED THE

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PAGE 03 OTTAWA 07761 01 OF 03 221946Z

SATELLITE WAS LIKELY AN ISRAELI-BUILT JERICHO II....LAST AUGUST, THE SOVIET UNION PROTESTED TO ISRAEL AFTER THE JERICHO WAS TEST-FIRED INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE MISSILE'S RANGE PUTS THE SOUTHERN USSR UNDER RISK OF ISRAELI NUCLEAR STRIKES....

7. "HOW ISRAEL, WITH A CHRONICALLY AILING ECONOMY, AND UNDER A TIGHT AUSTERITY PROGRAM, MANAGED TO FIND THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS NEEDED TO BUILD A SPY SATELLITE SYSTEM REMAINS A MOST INTRIGUING MYSTERY. ONE MUST

WONDER IF THIS HUGELY EXPENSIVE PROJECT WAS NOT FUNDED BY THE U.S. THROUGH TOP-SECRET 'BLACK PROGRAMS.'... ISRAEL HAS CONFIRMED IT IS A MINI-SUPERPOWER, AND PERHAPS THE WORLD'S FOURTH OR FIFTH-RANKING MILITARY POWER....

8. "ISRAEL IS A WHOLE MILITARY GENERATION AHEAD OF THE ARABS AND WILL LIKELY REMAIN SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE GREATEST DANGER IS NO LONGER ARAB ARMORED DIVISIONS BUT THE SEETHING REVOLT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE MORAL ROT IT IS CAUSING INSIDE ISRAEL. THE TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN TURNED BY ISRAEL INTO A MAMMOTH PENAL COLONY FOR PALESTINIANS...."

9. THE TORONTO STAR'S WASHINGTON COLUMNIST BOB HEPBURN WROTE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER THE HEADLINE, "TO BUSH, MEDICARE FIRST STEP TO COMMUNISM." "GEORGE BUSH, THE AMERICAN SUPER-PATRIOT LAST SEEN WRAPPING HIMSELF IN THE STARS AND STRIPES AT A NEW JERSEY FLAG FACTORY, IS RAISING CANADA-BASHING TO NEW HEIGHTS OF LUNACY.

10. "IT STARTED LAST MONTH WITH HIS STRIDENT DEFENCE OF

ACTION EUR-00

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THE WHITE HOUSE
AMCONSUL HALIFAX
AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMCONSUL MONTREAL
AMCONSUL TORONTO
AMCONSUL CALGARY
AMCONSUL VANCOUVER

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 OTTAWA 07761

USIA

AGENCY FOR P/M (INFO P/R); P/GF; P/FW; P/FN; VOA/BXN;
P/PFE; EU
STATE FOR EUR/CAN; EUR/PA
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN

DAN QUAYLE, HIS RICH RUNNING MATE WHO SERVED HIS COUNTRY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR BY WRITING PRESS RELEASES FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.... BUSH HAILED QUAYLE AS A TRUE AMERICAN, INSINUATING THAT AMERICANS WHO MOVED TO CANADA WERE A BUNCH OF SNIVELLING TRAITORS. TODAY, MANY OF THOSE AMERICANS ARE HARDWORKING CANADIAN CITIZENS.

11. "NOW BUSH AND HIS SLEAZEBALL HANDLERS ARE INDIRECTLY LASHING OUT AT CANADA'S UNIVERSAL HEALTH

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INSURANCE SCHEME, SUGGESTING IT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF A COMMUNIST PLOT TO RUIN THE ECONOMY....THE BUSH GOAL IS TO SCARE THE LIVING DAYLIGHTS OUT OF AMERICANS. WHY? BECAUSE BUSH FEARS MANY AMERICANS MIGHT VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE MICHAEL DUKAKIS BECAUSE OF HIS PROMISE TO PUSH FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE....

12. "DUKAKIS PROPOSED TUESDAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRE EMPLOYERS TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THEIR WORKERS....HIS PLAN IS BASED ON A SIMILAR SCHEME APPROVED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN HIS HOME STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. THE ROOTS OF THAT PLAN EMERGED FROM DUKAKIS' CLOSE INVESTIGATION OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM....

13. "BUSH HATES THE CANADIAN SYSTEM. HE HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED MANDATED INSURANCE BENEFITS.... AMERICAN HEALTH CARE FOR THE WORKING POOR IS A NATIONAL DISGRACE. BESIDES SOUTH AFRICA IT IS THE ONLY MAJOR COUNTRY THAT FAILS TO PROVIDE BASIC HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS....

14. "DUKAKIS SEEMS EAGER TO EMBRACE FOREIGN SOLUTIONS -- MANY OF THEM CANADIAN -- TO DEEP-SEATED PROBLEMS. HE FAVORS CANADA'S APPROACH ON ACID RAIN, NOTICE OF PLANT CLOSINGS, AND NOW ON MEDICAL INSURANCE. HOWEVER, BUSH IS TYING HIMSELF EVER CLOSER TO AMERICAN IMAGES: THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE, THE FLAG, THE RIGHT FOR EMPLOYERS TO LET THEIR LOW-PAID WORKERS FEND FOR THEMSELVES ON HEALTH CARE, THE THINLY VEILED FOREIGN BASHING...."

15. THE NEXT CAMPAIGN ITEM APPEARED IN THE OTTAWA

CITIZEN AND WAS WRITTEN BY SOUTHAM NEWS' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT PETER CALAMAI UNDER THE HEADLINE, "DIRTY TRICKS SURFACE IN U.S. ELECTION, AS IN PAST." "FOR U.S. POLITICS, IT WAS A TYPICAL WEEK IN THE DIRTY TRICKS DEPARTMENT. THE DEMOCRATS STARTED A RUMOR THAT A TOP CAMPAIGN AIDE TO GEORGE BUSH WAS ONCE ARRESTED IN NEW YORK'S CENTRAL PARK ON A FIREARMS CHARGE. THE REPUBLICANS TRIED TO REVIVE A STORY THAT MICHAEL DUKAKIS IS HOMOSEXUAL....

16. "VETERAN CAMPAIGN-WATCHERS CITE THREE DEVELOPMENTS

WHICH ARE PUSHING THE POLITICKING TOWARDS THE NASTIER END OF THE SPECTRUM: THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPELLING NATIONAL ISSUES, THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF DIRECT MAIL AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND THE CONTINUED RISE OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL CONSULTANTS...."

17. "JESSE IS DUKE'S ALBATROSS" WAS THE TITLE OF A TORONTO SUN PIECE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON COLUMNIST ALLAN FOTHERINGHAM. "THERE IS ONE PARTICULAR IMAGE THAT REMAINS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN STEAMY ATLANTA IN JULY. IT IS THE SIGHT OF JESSE JACKSON ON STAGE, AND ALL THE JACKSON CHILDREN ON STAGE... - ALL OF IT TAKING UP AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME IN A CONVENTION THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO MICHAEL DUKAKIS....

18. "JACKSON, WITH HIS ENORMOUS EGO, EXTRACTED SO MUCH FROM DUKAKIS IN RETURN FOR BEING A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE TEAM THAT IT LEFT THE QUESTION OF WHO ACTUALLY IS IN CHARGE OF THE PARTY. IT ESPECIALLY LEFT THE QUESTION WITH THE VOTERS DUKAKIS NEEDS MOST IN NOVEMBER: THE

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TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5531
THE WHITE HOUSE
AMCONSUL HALIFAX
AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMCONSUL MONTREAL
AMCONSUL TORONTO
AMCONSUL CALGARY
AMCONSUL VANCOUVER

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 OTTAWA 07761

USIA

AGENCY FOR P/M (INFO P/P); P/GF; P/FW; P/FN; VOA/BXN;
P/PFE; EU
STATE FOR EUR/CAN; EUR/PA
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN

SO-CALLED 'REAGAN DEMOCRATS.' RONALD REAGAN RAN AWAY
WITH THE 1980 ELECT
ON AND SCORED A LANDSLIDE IN 1984 BY
STEALING AWAY THE WHITE, BLUE-COLLAR VOTE IN THE
SOUTH....

19. "POOR DUKAKIS, WITH ALL HIS OTHER PROBLEMS, CAN'T

REALLY WIN WITH GUY WHO HOGGED ALL THAT TIME IN
ATLANTA. HE KNOWS THAT THOSE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS DON'T

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FANCY JACKSON IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND HE DOESN'T WANT TO REINFORCE THOSE VIEWS BY EMBRACING JESSE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MUST FIND SOMETHING USEFUL FOR JACKSON TO DO --- OR RISK THE TICKING GRENADE CALLED JESSE BLOWING UP A MAJOR DISPUTE, TO THE DELIGHT OF THE BUSHITES...."

THURBER

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	AF-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4706
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USUN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 02399

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AL, KPAL, TS
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE PEACE COMMITTEE: PROPOSED
- DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON MARCH 11 OR
- MARCH 28

REF: (A) TUNIS 02107; (B) STATE 062308

1. [redacted]

2. ACTION REQUEST PARAGRAPH 10.

3. ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL CHEDLI KLIBI CALLED IN AMBASSADOR MARCH 4 TO DISCUSS FOLLOW UP TO MEETING OF ARAB LEAGUE PEACE COMMITTEE (REF A). AMBASSADOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND POLCOUNS. KLIBI WAS JOINED BY HIS AIDE AHMED HERGUEM.

4. RECALLING HISTORY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE EFFORT, KLIBI DESCRIBED THE NEXT STEP AS DISPATCH OF

[redacted]

PAGE 02 TUNIS 02399 01 OF 02 041508Z

DELEGATIONS TO CAPITALS OF UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS FOR "AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS". THE INTENT, KLIBI CONTINUED, WAS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE, NOT TO DEMAND ANY PARTICULAR POSITIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED. THE PROPOSED DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON WOULD INCLUDE SAUDI ARABIA, ALGERIA, SYRIA AND ARAB LEAGUE. SCHEDULING IS COMPLICATED BY THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS, BUT THE ARAB LEAGUE HOPED ITS DELEGATION MIGHT BE RECEIVED EITHER

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MARCH 11 OR MARCH 28. THE FORMER DATE, HE NOTED, LEFT LITTLE TIME FOR PREPARATION. KLIBI ALSO ASKED FOR A REACTION TO THE INCLUSION OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE, PERHAPS AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR.

5. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE ARAB LEAGUE REQUEST TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION. HE THEN ADDED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN THE 1982 ARAB DELEGATION HAD REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAT INITIATIVE. HE BELIEVED THAT ANY DELEGATE ADVERTISED AS A "MEMBER OF THE PLO" WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE PRESENT ONE. AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE SEEMED TO HAVE RESTRAINED ITS INITIATIVE DURING SECRETARY SHULTZ' CURRENT MISSION. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO ASSURE THAT THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE EFFORT DOES NOT PUT US AT CROSS PURPOSES.

6. KLIBI AGREED. THE ARAB LEAGUE EFFORT SHOULD BE REALISTIC AND ABOVE ALL ELSE AIM AT CONCRETE RESULTS. IN THIS REGARD, HE WELCOMED ANY INSIGHTS ABOUT THE SHULTZ MISSION. AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL REPORT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT

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NO ONE HAD REJECTED THE INITIATIVE AND EVERYONE, INCLUDING SYRIA, WAS ENCOURAGING CONTINUED AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT. THE SECRETARY'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SUBSEQUENT RETURN TO THE REGION INDICATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR EFFORT. KLIBI SAID THE SYRIANS HAD ALSO CONFIRMED THEIR INTEREST TO HIM. TO SUCCEED, HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE REQUIRED A NEW ELEMENT WHICH HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT SHOULD BE U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT THE SECRETARY HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIANS AND PROVIDED TEXT OF THE FEBRUARY 26 STATEMENT AND MARCH 3 CBS INTERVIEW. KLIBI SAID HE HAD STUDIED THE FEBRUARY 26 STATEMENT AND FOUND IT MOST ADEPT.

7. AMBASSADOR THEN TURNED CONVERSATION TO IRAN/IRAQ WAR AND REVIEWED SITUATION IN THE UNSC PER REF B. HE MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR CONTINUED ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS BOTH THE SOVIETS AND ALGERIANS. WHILE THE ALGERIANS MAY ULTIMATELY SUPPORT A RESOLUTION, HE EMPHASIZED, WE HAVE NOT BEEN AWARE OF THEM EITHER EXPRESSING THAT SUPPORT OR LOBBYING OTHERS. KLIBI NOTED THIS POINT AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HAVING IT BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION. THERE WAS ROOM

FOR DOUBT VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS, HE ACKNOWLEDGED.
STILL HE BELIEVED THEY WOULD GO ALONG BASED ON
ASSURANCES PREVIOUSLY GIVEN TO BAGHDAD AND RIYADH.

8. AMBASSADOR NOTED, BEFORE DEPARTING, THAT TUNISIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER MESTIRI IS PLANNING TO VISIT
WASHINGTON MARCH 28 (COINCIDENT WITH ONE ARAB LEAGUE

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ACTION NEA-11

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FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4707
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USUN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 TUNIS 02399

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AL, KPAL, TS
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE PEACE COMMITTEE: PROPOSED

DATE) AND ALSO NOTED THAT ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER
SHAMIR IS EXPECTED IN WASHINGTON MARCH 16.

9. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BRITISH EMBASSY THAT ARAB
LEAGUE DELEGATION IS PROPOSED FOR LONDON FOR PERIOD
MARCH 14-16. IT WILL INCLUDE JORDANIANS, IRAQIS AND

KLIBI HIMSELF. UK AMBASSADOR DECLINED ARAB LEAGUE INVITATION TO PROPOSE OTHER MEMBERS, I.E. PLO REPRESENTATIVE. (IN AN ASIDE, KLIBI NOTED LATTER MIGHT BE "AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR.") DELEGATION'S MISSION WAS DESCRIBED IN IDENTICAL TERMS (PARA 4 ABOVE). IN RESPONSE, UK AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD PROCEED IN A WAY WHICH WILL KEEP U.S. INITIATIVE GOING AND AVOID SLAMMING ANY DOORS. SUBSEQUENTLY, BRITISH INFORM US THAT ARAB LEAGUE ALSO PROPOSED MARCH 14-16 FOR VISIT TO PARIS FOR WHICH

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DELEGATION WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PLO'S QADDUMI AND SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE ACCEPTABILITY OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION AS WELL AS ANY PARTICULAR VIEWS ON MEMBERSHIP AND TIMING.

11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

PELLETREAU

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PAGE 01 CARACA 10037 112102Z

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ACTION ARA-16

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E.O 12065: GDS 11/7/86(LUERS, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: PINS ASEC CU VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA/CUBA: ORLANDO BOSCH

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A CALL NOVEMBER 7 TO REVIEW A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PAEZ PUMAR, I ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ORLANDO BOSCH CASE.

3. PAEZ PUMAR, ON BOSCH, HAS STEADFASTLY TAKEN THE LINE THAT IT AL IS IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY COURT, THAT HE IS NOT FOLLOWING IT CLOSELY, HE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY HIGH COURT IS TAKING ITS TIME IN REVIEWING THE CONSIDERABLE BODY OF MATERIAL INVOLVED. ("PAGE BY PAGE", HE SAID.) PAEZ PUMAR SAID HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO PREDICT WHEN THE DECISION TO RELEASE BOSCH WILL COME OUT BUT HE THINKS IT WILL NOT BE UNTIL THE YEAR'S END. (I ASKED HIM TO TRY TO LET US KNOW IN ADVANCE, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE). PAEZ PUMAR ALSO SAID THAT HE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY OFFERS FROM OTHER STATES TO ACCEPT BOSCH. THEY HAVE RAISED THE MATTER QUIETLY

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WITH SOME IN THE SOUTHERN CONE AND GOTTEN NEGATIVE

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RESPONSES.

4. WHEN I ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN-VENEZUELAN RELATIONSHIP, HE SAID NO. RELATIONS ARE MUCH THE SAME. AS HE HAD EXPECTED, THE CUBANS BEHAVED QUITE PROPERLY AND CORRECTLY IN THE CASE THURSDAY (NOVEMBER 6) OF THE HIJACKED AVENSA AIRLINER (CARACAS 9966). NOTHING MORE THAN THAT, HOWEVER.
LUERS

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Department of State INCOMING TELEGRAM

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NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC

Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr

Date: 7/86 19

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/17/86 (LUERS, WILLIAM H.) OR-M

TAGS: VE

SUBJECT: CUBA: TALK WITH DISIP CHIEF UZCATAGUI

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. DURING MY FRIDAY LUNCH (NOV 14) WITH REMBERTO UZCATAGUI, HEAD OF DISIP, HE SAID, AS OTHERS HAVE RECENTLY, THAT ORLANDO BOSCH PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED FOR A MONTH OR SO MORE. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR A DELAY IN THE RELEASE SO THAT THEY CAN DETERMINE HOW TO DEAL WITH THEIR EMBASSY IN HAVANA AND WITH THE 19 ASYLEES IN THAT EMBASSY. HE SAID THE GOV IS CONCERNED THE MOMENT BOSCH IS RELEASED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE SOME ACTION, POSSIBLY INCLUDING PERMITTING PEOPLE TO ENTER THE EMBASSY AND EVEN INJURING THE VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATS, NOT TO MENTION THE ASYLEES. HE SAID THERE ARE STILL DIFFICULTIES AS TO WHICH COUNTRY MIGHT PROTECT VENEZUELAN INTERESTS.

3. UZCATAGUI REVEALED, HOWEVER, A MORE IMPORTANT REASON, FROM HIS STANDPOINT, FOR THE DELAY. HE SAID THAT AMONG THE 19 ASYLEES IS ONE CUBAN CITIZEN WHO WAS BORN IN VENEZUELA. HE ALSO BELIEVES ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE REASONS THE ASYLEES HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN SAFE CONDUCT BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS BECAUSE OF THIS ONE INDIVIDUAL.

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ACTION IO-15

INFO OCT-01 ARA-12 ADS-00 HA-06 OCT-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1679
INFO USINT HAVANA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNCLASSIFIED USUN NEW YORK 04251

E.O.12065: GDS 10/14/86 (MOOSE, G.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, PEPR, UNGA, CU, VE
SUBJECT: CUBAN-VENEZUELAN DISPUTE

1. (U) CUBAN BITTERNESS HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN RECENT DAYS IN THE UNGA OVER THE SEPT. 26 ACQUITTAL BY THE VENEZUELAN PERMANENT COUNCIL OF WAR OF ORLANDO BOSCH AND THREE OTHERS INDICTED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA AIRLINES PLANE IN 1976.

2. (U) A CUBAN MISSION NOTE (IN SPANISH) DATED OCT. 1, SIGNED BY PERMREP ROA CONTAINS THE TEXT OF FIDEL CASTRO'S SEPT. 27 PUBLIC STATEMENT HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISION AND THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. VENEZUELAN PERMREP NAVA-CARILLO RESPONDED TO THE CUBAN DOCUMENT IN A NOTE (SPANISH AND ENGLISH) DATED OCTOBER 8, WHICH CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE GOV ON SEPT. 28 IN SHARP RESPONSE TO THE CASTRO STATEMENT. BOTH DOCS WERE INFORMALLY CIRCULATED BY THE SYG AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMREPS.

3. (U) IN ADDITION, CUBAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER VIERA BLASTED VENEZUELA OVER THE ISSUE IN HIS GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH TO THE UNGA ON OCTOBER 10. REFERRING TO THOSE IN
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PAGE 02 USUN N 04251 150032Z

LATIN AMERICA WHO "CLAIM TO BE DEFENDERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WHILE TRAMPLING UNDER FOOT THE MEMORY OF BOLIVAR...." VIERA SAID "THE INCONCEIVABLE ACTIONS OF THE VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE IN THE FUTURE THE CARRYING OUT OF NEW AND COWARDLY TERRORIST ACTS." NAVA-CARILLO CALMLY RESPONDED TO THESE REMARKS IN A RIGHT OF REPLY AT THE END OF THE MEETING, NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIARY, BE IT CIVIL OR MILITARY.

4. (C) CUBAN PIQUE OVER THE VENEZUELAN ACTION WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN A RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN MISOFF AND FELIX PITA, THIRD-RANKING OFFICER OF THE CUBAN MISSION, IN WHICH PITA RAISED THE ISSUE OF BOSCH'S ACQUITTAL. PITA FOUND THE DECISION INCONCEIVABLE AND NOTED (AS DID CASTRO) THAT THE VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES HAS THE POWER TO DICTATE TO THE MILITARY COURT. PITA SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HA" OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT BOSCH AND COMPANY WOULD BE SECRETLY SENT OFF TO CHILE FOLLOWING THE FINAL ACTION OF THE COURT. HE ADDED THAT PANAMANIAN LEADER OMAR TORRIJOS HAD BEEN TOLD BY HAVANA RECENTLY NOT TO BE SURPRISED IF CUBA TAKES ACTION "TO PROTECT ITS WOMEN AND CHILDREN" FROM THE LIKES OF BOSCH.
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PAGE 01 CARACA 08979 082106Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3631
INFO USINT HAVANA

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ UNCLASSIFIED CARACAS 8979

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/8/86 (LUERS, WILLIAM H.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, ASEC, VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA/CUBA: ORLANDO BOSCH

REF: STATE 262748

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. DESIROUS OF KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ON THE BOSCH CASE, I CALLED ON ACTING INTERIOR MINISTER ARISTIGUIETA ON OCTOBER 7. HE SAID THAT HE STILL ANTICIPATED THAT BOSCH WOULD PROBABLY BE RELEASED IN LESS THAN A MONTH. THEY ARE LOOKING INTO WHERE HE WILL GO AND EXPECT TO HAVE HIM DEPART CARACAS IMMEDIATELY ON BEING RELEASED. THEY INTEND TO CONSULT WITH HIM SOON TO FIND OUT IF HE HAS ANY OPTIONS OR PREFERENCES. ARISTIGUIETA SAID THAT HE HAS NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION BUT WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT FIDEL WOULD ATTEMPT SOME ACTION AGAINST BOSCH. VENEZUELA, THEREFORE, WANTS BOSCH OUT OF THE COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RELEASE.

3. ARISTIGUIETA ALSO SPECULATED ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES THE GOV MIGHT EXPECT FROM CUBA IN THE WAKE OF DRAMATIC DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS. HE SAID THEY ARE DOUBLING THEIR SECURITY ON VIASA AND OTHER AIRLINES

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PAGE 02 CARACA 08979 082106Z

AND ARE OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THREATS AGAINST

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GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN VENEZUELA. THEY, FRANKLY, EXPECT THE MOST LIKELY TARGET WOULD BE BOSCH HIMSELF.

4. ARISTIGUIETA ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD INFORM ME OFFICIALLY OR SEMI-OFFICIALLY IN ADVANCE OF BOSCH'S DEPARTURE AND WOULD TRY TO GIVE ME AS MUCH INFORMATION AS HE COULD ON BOSCH'S TRAVEL PLANS.
LUERS

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AN: D800469-0839

PAGE 01 STATE 262748
ORIGIN SS-30

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INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ UNCLASSIFIED STATE 262748

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/86 (EATON, S. D.)

TAGS:PINS, ASEC, VE, CI

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH CASE

REF: SANTIAGO 5965

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE AGREE THAT HIS PRESENCE IN CHILE MIGHT RAISE PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE DESTINATION IN MIND AND WE DO NOT WANT HIM HERE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO LET THE "CARD" FALL WHERE HE MAY. CHRISTOPH

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PAGE 01 CARACA 08691 011534Z
ACTION ARA-16

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SS-15 ICA-15 DCT-02 SY-05 SYE-00 /106 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3530
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
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AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PINS ASEC CU VE
SUBJ: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BOSCH CASE

REF: (A) CARACAS 8511 (B) CARACAS 8616

1. IN A NEW WRINKLE TO AN ALREADY COMPLICATED AFFAIR VENEZUELAN JOURNALIST ALICIA HERRERA, WHO DISAPPEARED FROM VENEZUELA IN AP[illegible] WITH HER CUBAN HUSBAND RAIMUNDO URRECHAGA, RESURFACED IN MEXICO SUNDAY MAKING CHARGES OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IN THE PARDONING OF ORLANDO BOSCH AND FRIENDS FOR THE 1976 CUBANA AIRLINES BOMBING INCIDENT. HERRERA WAS DIRECTOR OF TWO WOMEN'S MAGAZINES IN VENEZUELA, "PAGINAS" AND "KENA". AFTER LEAVING VENEZUELA, SHE ALLEGEDLY MADE HER WAY TO MEXICO
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VIA COLOMBIA AND MIAMI, MAKING CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN EMBASSY

IN MEXICO CITY AND VISITING CUBA SEVERAL TIMES.

2. HERRERA HAS CHARGED THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMNET ALTERED EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED TO FACILITATE THEIR PARDON, WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR GUILT. IN ADDITION, HERRERA CLAIMS THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AND LUIS POSADA CARRILES ADMITTED TO HER THAT THEY AUTHORED THE 1976 BOMBING. SHE CHARGED THAT ALL FOUR WERE RECEIVING MONTHLY SALARIES FROM $500 TO $2,000 FROM THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

3. VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS QUICKLY DENIED THE CHARGES. DISIP DIRECTOR REMBERTO UZCATEGUI, AFTER CONSULTING WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR RAFAEL MONTES DE OCA, SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS KNOWN FOR "A LONG TIME" THAT HERRERA IS A CUBAN SPY, ALTHOUGH SHE NEVER COMMITTED A CRIME AGAINST VENEZUELA. UZCATEGUI SAID HERRERA WAS REPEATING WHAT HER CUBAN BOSSES WANT HE TO SAY AND ADDED THAT VENEZUELA WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRYING HERRERA FOR TREASON. MONTES DE OCA CATEGORICALLY DENIED THE CHARGES OF MUNIPULATION OF EVIDENCE IN THE BOSCH CASE.

4. MEANTIME DIARIO DE CARACAS REPORTS, SEPTEMBER 30, THAT THE GOV IS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING ITS PERSONNEL FROM THE MISSION IN HAVANA. A STICKING POINT, BASED ON COMMENTS BY LEOPOLDO CASTILLO, SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, IS FINDING A THIRD COUNTRY IN CUBA TO REPRESENT VENEZUELAN INTERESTS AND PSO TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY -- WITH CUBAN APPROVAL-- FOR THE NINETEEN ASYLEES PRESENTLY IN THE VENEZUELAN MISSION.
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PAGE 01 SANTIA 05965 292005Z
ACTION SS-30

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INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNCLASSIFIED SANTIAGO 5965

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-1 9/29/95 (LANDAU, GEORGE W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS ASEC VE CI
SUBJ: ORLANDO BOSCH CASE

REF: (A) STATE 247049; (B) CARACAS 8511 AND PREVIOUS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NOW THAT THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HAS MADE PUBLIC ITS DECISION TO DROP THE CHARGES AGAINST BOSCH, THE REST OF THE SCENARIO FORECAST BY REF. B WILL EVIDENTLY LEAD TO BOSCH'S RELEASE FAIRLY SOON. SEEN FROM HERE, THE NEXT MAJOR QUESTION IS WHERE HE GOES FROM CARACAS. WE ARE AWARE FROM REF. A THAT ONE POSSIBLE DESTINATION IS CHILE, A PROSPECT WHICH HAS OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY AS WELL AS POLITICAL INTERESTS.

3. BEFORE THERE IS PUBLIC SPECULATION HERE ABOUT WHERE BOSCH GOES, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO POINT OUT PRIVATELY TO A FEW APPROPRIATE CHILEAN OFFICIALS THAT HIS PRESENCE HERE WOULD RAISE PROBLEMS THEY MIGHT WISH TO AVOID. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL NOTT DECIDE TO LET HIM IN ANYWAY, BUT IT SEEMS WORTH TRYING, UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE DESTINATION

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PAGE 02 SANTIA 05965 292005Z

IN MIND.

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4. PLEASE LET ME KNOW QUICKLY, BEFORE THE GOC IS FACED WITH THE ISSUE PUBLICLY.
LANDAU

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PAGE 01 KUALA 03597 250900Z
ACTION NEA-11

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[redacted] KUALA LUMPUR 03597

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MY
SUBJECT: MAHATHIR COMMENTS ON ABU JIHAD ASSASSINATION

REF: KL 3558

1. [redacted]

2. MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR WAS QUOTED IN THE APRIL 23 EDITIONS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEW STRAITS TIMES AND STAR NEWSPAPERS AS CONDEMNING THE ASSASSINATION OF PLO LEADER ABU JIHAD (KHALID AL-WAZIR) AS A "CRUEL" ACT OF TERRORISM. A SIMILAR STORY APPEARED IN THE APRIL 24 VERSION OF THE MALAY LANGUAGE MINGGUAN MALAYSIA. ACCORDING TO THESE ACCOUNTS, MAHATHIR ADDED THAT WHILE ISRAEL HAD BEEN THE "MASTERMIND," ISRAEL'S "ALLIES" HAD PROBABLY ASSISTED IN PLANNING OR CARRYING OUT THE ATTACK. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT, "THESE ALLIES OFTEN CONDEMNED TERRORISM BUT THEY NOW SIDED WITH A POWER THAT RESORTED TO THIS PRACTICE WHEN THEY HELPED KILL ABU JIHAD."

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PAGE 02 KUALA 03597 250900Z

3. THE STORIES ALSO NOTE THAT MAHATHIR CITED THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE RECENT KUWAITI HIJACKING, AND OTHER VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD AS EVIDENCE THAT MANY MUSLIMS DID NOT FOLLOW THE TEACHINGS OF ISLAM CLOSELY. HE CALLED UPON MUSLIMS IN MALAYSIA TO UNITE SO THAT WHATEVER MISUNDERSTANDINGS OCCURRED WITHIN THE COUNTRY COULD BE RESOLVED AMICABLY.

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4. COMMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE DURING A BREAKING OF FAST RECEPTION HELD AT A MOSQUE IN HIS HOME STATE OF KEDAH. FOLLOWING THE APPEARANCE IN LOCAL NEWSPAPERS OF A WIRE SERVICE REPORT LINKING THE U.S. TO THE ABU JIHAD ASSASSINATION, THE AMBASSADOR ON APRIL 20 PASSED DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT DENYING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLING TO MFA ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL RAZALI ISMAIL (REFTEL); RAZALI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CLARIFICATION.
MONJO

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PAGE 01 STATE 125800 TOSEC 090100
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SOPN
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF EVENING TV NEWSCASTS, WEDNESDAY 4/20

A. ABC'S WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

1. HIJACKING AFTERMATH - HOSTAGES FROM THE KUWAITI AIRCRAFT HAVE IDENTIFIED ONE OF THEIR HIJACKERS AS HASSAN IZZ-AL-DIN, A LEBANESE MEMBER OF HEZBOLLAH. IZZ-AL-DIN MAY HAVE PULLED THE TRIGGER ON THE GUN THAT KILLED U.S. NAVY DIVER ROBERT STEDHAM DURING THE HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847. THE U.S. HAS HAD A WARRANT OUT FOR HIS ARREST SINCE 1985. (SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ: "THESE PEOPLE WERE NOT ONLY HIJACKERS, THEY ARE ALSO MURDERERS. LET'S NOT FORGET THAT.") THE U.S. IS FURIOUS THAT IZZ-AL-DIN AND HIS ACCOMPLICES APPEAR TO HAVE GOTTEN AWAY. AND, ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE U.S. CITIZEN WAS ON BOARD THE KUWAITI JET, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID IT WILL TRY TO PUNISH THE HIJACKERS. (PHYLLIS OAKLEY: "WE WILL NOT REST IN OUR EFFORTS TO BRING THEM TO JUSTICE WHEREVER THEY ARE.") IF THE HIJACKERS HAVE INDEED FLED TO IRAN,
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PAGE 02 STATE 125800 TOSEC 090100

LEBANON, OR LIBYA, THE CHANCES OF THE U.S. GETTING ITS HANDS ON THEM ARE SLIM. THE HIJACKERS' FAILURE TO WIN THE RELEASE OF THE KUWAITI PRISONERS AND THE FACT THAT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE GOTTEN OFF SCOT-FREE HAS AMERICAN OFFICIALS WORRIED THAT IT'S JUST A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THEY HIJACK AGAIN. (JEANNE MESERVE - STATE DEPARTMENT)

2. PERSIAN GULF - AS TO WHETHER IRAN USED CHINESE SILKWORM MISSILES AGAINST AMERICAN FORCES IN THE PERSIAN

GULF, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TELL ABC THAT AERIAL PHOTOS TAKEN OF THE SILKWORM LOCATIONS ALONG THE GULF OFFER NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY SILKWORM WAS FIRED. (PETER JENNINGS)

3. ABU JIHAD - IN DAMASCUS TODAY, ABU JIHAD WAS GIVEN A VERY POLITICAL FUNERAL. (PETER JENNINGS)

IF ANYONE THOUGHT THE DEATH OF ABU JIHAD WOULD WEAKEN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT, THEY WERE WRONG -- ON THIS DAY, AT LEAST. PALESTINIANS OF ALL FACTIONS CAME TOGETHER IN A RARE SHOW OF SOLIDARITY. BUT THERE WAS ONE GLARING EXCEPTION -- PLO CHAIRMAN YASIR ARAFAT. HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH ABU JIHAD WAS OVERSHADOWED BY HIS FIVE-YEAR FEUD WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD. (DON KLADSTRUP - DAMASCUS)

FOR THE ISRAELIS, THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD HAD A DOUBLE OBJECTIVE. FIRST, TO ELIMINATE THE MAN WHO WAS INVOLVED IN COORDINATING AND FUNDING THE UPRISINGS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SECOND, TO REAFFIRM THE REPUTATION OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES, TARNISHED BY ACTION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD MAY HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL, AS WELL. HE IS NOW A MARTYR, AND HIS DEATH ALREADY HAS FUELED UPRISINGS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AND EVEN
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PAGE 03 STATE 125800 TOSEC 090100

IF ISRAEL SAW ABU JIHAD AS A TERRORIST, OTHERS SAW HIM AS A MODERATE WHO WAS WILLING AND CAPABLE OF NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAEL. AS ABU JIHAD'S BODY LEFT TUNISIA YESTERDAY, PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT PROMISED THAT HIS DEATH WOULD BE AVENGED. INFORMATION FROM TOP PLO OFFICIALS INDICATES THAT REVENGE IS ALREADY BEING PLANNED. (PIERRE SALINGER - LONDON)

B. CBS EVENING NEWS

1. HIJACKING AFTERMATH - U.S. OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY WERE UPSET THAT THE HIJACKERS APPARENTLY WILL GO SCOT-FREE. (DAN RATHER)

EVEN AS A SENSE OF RELIEF FLOWED THROUGH KUWAIT, QUESTIONS WERE BEING ASKED ABOUT JUST WHAT DEAL HAD BEEN MADE. AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SAID THE 17 TERRORIST PRISONERS HELD HERE WOULD NOT BE RELEASED, AS THE HIJACKERS WANTED, THOUGH NOT EVERYONE AGREED THE HIJACKERS SHOULD BE LET GO. THERE WAS ADMIRATION FOR THE KUWAITIS' STANCE AROUND THE WORLD. BUT THERE WERE RESERVATIONS, TOO. (SECRETARY SHULTZ: "THESE PEOPLE WERE NOT ONLY HIJACKERS, THEY ARE ALSO MURDERERS. LET'S NOT FORGET THAT.") THE MEMBERS OF KUWAIT'S RULING FAMILY WERE DECLARING VICTORY AS THEY CELEBRATED TONIGHT. STILL

CELEBRATING TONIGHT, KUWAIT BELIEVES IT HAS TAUGHT THE WORLD A LESSON ON HOW TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS. BUT THIS IS A LIMITED VICTORY WITH THE HIJACKERS GOING FREE. THIS SMALL, V

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR COLIN POWELL

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, TU, KPLO
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: STATUS OF ACTION ON TUNISIAN COMPLAINT

1. (U) SCHEDULE: THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET APRIL 21 AT 11:00 A.M. AND AGAIN THE MORNING OF APRIL 22 IN RESPONSE TO TUNISIAN REQUEST. LIST OF SPEAKERS AS OF COB APRIL 20 IS AS FOLLOWS: TUNISIA, PLO, SYRIA, JORDAN, ARRAB LEAGUE, MOROCCO, AND KUWAIT.

2. [redacted] DRAFT RESOLUTION: AS OF COB APRIL 20 TUNISIAN DELEGATION HAS NOT CIRCULATED ANY TEXT. DURING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS APRIL 20, FRG PERMREP SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION POINTING THE FINGER AT ISRAEL FOR ABU JIHAD'S ASSASSINATION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ALREADY AVAILABLE.

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01131 202306Z

THE UK HAS ALREADY GIVEN SIMILAR ADVICE TO THE TUNISIAN MISSION. FRENCH MISSION HAS CAREFULLY KEPT ITS OWN COUNSEL CONCERNING THE POSITION IT WOULD TAKE IF THE DRAFT TO BE PRESENTED BY TUNISIA POINTS THE FINGER AT ISRAEL. HOWEVER, FRENCH HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE ANNOYED BY THE REFERENCE TO ISRAEL IN THE STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (PARA 4).

3. [redacted] OTHER POSITIONS: SOVIET MISSION POLCOUNS TOLD

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USUN MISSOFF THAT SOVIET UNION WAS ADEQUATELY SATISFIED WITH THE EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MISSOFF, HE SAID THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE PRESENTING ANY EVIDENCE OF ITS OWN TO THE COUNCIL. ISRAELI MISSION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO PARTICIPATE AT ALL IN MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. (U) AT NOON BRIEFING APRIL 20 THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE SYG'S BEHALF:

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS BEEN INFORMED IN EUROPE OF THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND CONVEYING THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT BY THE TUNISIAN AUTHORITIES INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE ASSASSINATION OF MR. KHALID AL-WAZIR (ABU JIHAD). THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS VERY CONCERNED AT WHAT APPEARS TO BE EVIDENCE OF A FURTHER INFRINGEMENT BY ISRAEL OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF TUNISIA. HE RECALLS THAT, IN RESOLUTION 573 (1985), THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INTER ALIA, VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED AN EARLIER ACT

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OF ARMED AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL AGAINST TUNISIAN TERRITORY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED HIS CONDEMNATION OF ACTS OF ASSASSINATION."
END TEXT.
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PAGE 01 STATE 125665 TOSEC 090088
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INFO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE

[redacted] STATE 125665 TOSEC 090088

FOLLOWING USUN NEW YORK 01131 DTG APR 20 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TUNIS UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLL ARAB/ISRAELI COLL BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

QUOTE

[redacted] USUN NEW YORK 01131

BUENOS AIRES PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR WALTERS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR COLIN POWELL

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, TU, KPLO
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: STATUS OF ACTION ON TUNISIAN COMPLAINT

1. (U) SCHEDULE: THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET APRIL 21 AT 11:00 A.M. AND AGAIN THE MORNING OF APRIL 22 IN RESPONSE TO TUNISIAN REQUEST. LIST OF SPEAKERS AS OF COB APRIL 20 IS AS FOLLOWS: TUNISIA, PLO, SYRIA, JORDAN, ARRAB LEAGUE, MOROCCO, AND KUWAIT.

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 125665 TOSEC 090088

2. [redacted] DRAFT RESOLUTION: AS OF COB APRIL 20 TUNISIAN DELEGATION HAS NOT CIRCULATED ANY TEXT. DURING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS APRIL 20, FRG PERMREP SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION POINTING THE FINGER AT ISRAEL FOR ABU JIHAD'S ASSASSINATION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ALREADY AVAILABLE. THE UK HAS ALREADY GIVEN SIMILAR ADVICE TO THE TUNISIAN MISSION. FRENCH MISSION HAS CAREFULLY KEPT ITS OWN COUNSEL CONCERNING THE POSITION IT WOULD TAKE IF THE

DRAFT TO BE PRESENTED BY TUNISIA POINTS THE FINGER AT ISRAEL. HOWEVER, FRENCH HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE ANNOYED BY THE REFERENCE TO ISRAEL IN THE STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (PARA 4).

3. [redacted] OTHER POSITIONS: SOVIET MISSION POLCOUNS TOLD USUN MISSOFF THAT SOVIET UNION WAS ADEQUATELY SATISFIED WITH THE EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MISSOFF, HE SAID THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE PRESENTING ANY EVIDENCE OF ITS OWN TO THE COUNCIL. ISRAELI MISSION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO PARTICIPATE AT ALL IN MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. (U) AT NOON BRIEFING APRIL 20 THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE SYG'S BEHALF:

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS BEEN INFORMED IN EUROPE OF THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND CONVEYING THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT BY THE TUNISIAN AUTHORITIES INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 03 STATE 125665 TOSEC 090088

THE ASSASSINATION OF MR. KHALID AL-WAZIR (ABU JIHAD). THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS VERY CONCERNED AT WHAT APPEARS TO BE EVIDENCE OF A FURTHER INFRINGEMENT BY ISRAEL OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF TUNISIA. HE RECALLS THAT, IN RESOLUTION 573 (1985), THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INTER ALIA, VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED AN EARLIER ACT OF ARMED AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL AGAINST TUNISIAN TERRITORY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED HIS CONDEMNATION OF ACTS OF ASSASSINATION."
END TEXT.
OKUN
UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

[redacted]

R

PAGE 01 STATE 124234
ORIGIN NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /011 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:NEA/AFN:MACASEY
APPROVED BY:NEA/AFN:MACASEY
NEA/IAI:JHIRSCH
------------------104040 200827Z /38

R 200635Z APR 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS

[redacted] STATE 124234

FOLLOWING TEL AVIV 5732 DTD 18 APR SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ARAB ISARELI COLLECTIVE BEING REPEATED FOR UR INFO:

QUOTE: [redacted] TEL AVIV 05732

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PBTS, KPAL, PREL, IS
SUBJECT: THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD: WHODUNIT?

1. [redacted]

2. (SUMMARY) DESPITE OFFICIAL DISCLAIMERS OF RESPONSIBILITY, HARDLY ANYONE IN ISRAEL TODAY DOUBTS THAT THE ISRAELIS KILLED ABU JIHAD ON APRIL 16 IN TUNIS. THOSE WHO WOULD KNOW JUST AREN'T SAYING MUCH, IF ANYTHING. THOSE WHO DON'T KNOW SPECULATE THAT THE LONG REACH OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ELIMINATED ABU JIHAD AND THEY APPLAUDE. WITH AN INCREASINGLY HAWKISH DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY THAT SUPPORTS THE USE OF WHATEVER FORCE IS NECESSARY AGAINST PALESTINIANS, THE HIT AGAINST ONE OF ISRAEL'S MOST PROMINENT ENEMIES PLAYS VERY WELL. (END SUMMARY)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 124234

3. THE LATEST POLITICAL GUESSING GAME IN ISRAEL DID NOT LAST VERY LONG. ALTIOUGH THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN EQUIVOCAL, BY NOW, NOBODY DOUBTS THAT ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH ARMY RADIO, FOREIGN MINISTER PERES SEEMED TO SKIRT THE ISSUE OF ABU JIHAD. WHEN ASKED, "ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE KILLING OF ABU JIHAD WAS A SIGNAL TO THOSE WHO ESPOUSE VIOLENCE?" HE REPLIED,

"I WOULD NOT LIKE TO REFER TO THE ABU JIHAD ISSUE IN ANY WAY. I AM REFERRING TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FACT THAT THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN US AND THE PALESTINIANS IS NO SECRET. THE REAL PROBLEM IS HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS CONFLICT, WITH SWORDS OR IN TALKS." DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN, ASKED TO COMMENT ON NBC AND "TIME" MAGAZINE REPORTS THAT ISRAEL CARRIED OUT THE KILLING, SAID, "ASK TIME AND NBC." PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR CALLED THE CHARGE "NONSENSE", BUT HIS PROTESTATION WAS NOT PERSUASIVE.

4. IN THE FIRST FEW HOURS AFTER THE KILLING, MANY ISRAELIS WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT A FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF PARTIES--ISRAELIS, RIVAL PALESTINIANS, AND OTHER ARABS--HAD SCORES TO SETTLE WITH ABU JIHAD AND ANY ONE OF THOSE HAD A MOTIVE TO KILL HIM. BUT AS NO PARTY STEPPED FORWARD TO TAKE CREDIT AND AS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECLINED TO ABSOLVE ITSELF OF BLAME, DOMESTIC SPECULATION INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON ISRAEL AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ACT.

5. LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND ANALYSTS POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL COULD HAVE BEEN SEEKING SIMPLY TO AVENGE THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE DIMONA BUS LAST MONTH (AN

[redacted]

PAGE 03 STATE 124234

ATTACK FOR WHICH ABU JIHAD CLAIMED RESPONSIELITY). BUT THEY SPECULATED THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE ASSESSED THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE PLO'S MILITARY CHIEF WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO PALESTINIAN MORALE AND IN TE LONG RUN COULD LEAD TO THE SUBSIDING OF THE UPRISING IN THE TERRITORIES (EVEN THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE AN INITIAL VIOLENT UPSURGE). SOME ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S MOTIVES FOR THE MOVE WERE DETERRENT, TO DEMONSTRATE THE LONG REACH OF THE ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE PLO THINK TWICE BEFORE ATTACKING ISRAEL AGAIN. WHATEVER THE GOI'S MOTIVES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ISRAELI ARABS AND A FEW FAR LEFT POLITICIANS, ISRAELIS UNIVERSALLY PRAISED THE RESULTS.

6. THE KILLING HAS BEEN GREETED WITH REJOICING IN ISRAEL AND WE SUSPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT STANDS TO GAIN MORE WITH ITS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY THAN IT STANDS TO LOSE IN WORLD OPINION IF SOME PROOF IS FOUND OF AN ISRAELI HAND IN THE DEATH OF ABU JIHAD. AT THE MOMENT, THE ISRAELIS CAN ENJOY THE PRESTIGE OF HAVING DONE IT, WITHOUT THE ONUS OF HAVING TO ADMIT IT. PICKERING UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 11/14/1996 DOC_NUMBER: 88DOHA01101 CHANNEL: n/a

E125

[redacted]

PAGE 01 DOHA 01101 201343Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO							
INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
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	SSO-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	EAP-00	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01
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O 201338Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5998
INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3410
CJTFME PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

[redacted] DOHA 01101

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, KPAL, PINR, US, QA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE TO CONTINUED MEDIA IMPLICATION OF U.S. IN ABU JIHAD ASSASSINATION

REF: DOHA 1080

1. (U) THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE "DAILY GULF TIMES" FOR WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1988, IN FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL ENTITLED "WEIGHING PROSPECTS" SUGGESTS THAT THE U.S. COOPERATED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PALESTINIAN LEADER ABU JIHAD. QUOTE:

[redacted]

PAGE 02 DOHA 01101 201343Z

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, EVEN NOW, SHOWS ITS BIAS ON THE
-- ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, REFRAINING FROM ANY CONDEMNATION
-- OF MOSSAD'S ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. AND IF SOME
-- REPORTS ARE TRUE, THAT THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET DID
-- INDEED GIVE HELP TO THE ASSASSINS ON THEIR
-- DASTARDLY MISSION, THEN A WHOLE NEW FIELD OF COOPERATION
-- BETWEEN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE TEL AVIV TERRORISTS
-- WILL HAVE BEEN EXPOSED. IT WOULD BE HARD IN SUCH
-- CIRCUMSTANCES TO EXPECT ANY ENLIGHTENED US APPROACH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR Date: 3/13/97
(X) RELEASE ( ) EXCISE ( ) DENY ( ) (X) DECLASSIFY ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART
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-- IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. UNQUOTE

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2. [redacted] AT 7:30 THIS MORNING, AMBASSADOR PHONED THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND AMIR'S OFFICE DIRECTOR, ISSA GHANIM AL-KAWARI) TO PROTEST AGAINST SUCH RECKLESS EDITORIALIZING WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF SPREADING MANIFEST UNTRUTHS AND INCITING PUBLIC EMOTIONS. AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT TO AL-KAWARI THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS CONDEMNED THIS POLITICAL ASSASSINATION AND OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

-

3. [redacted] AMBASSADOR DRAFTED LETTER TO AL-KAWARI EXPRESSING THIS PROTEST IN SPECIFIC TERMS. THE LETTER WAS DELIVERED BY THE PAO DIRECTLY TO AL-KAWARI'S OFFICE AT 10:00 A.M.

4. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
GHOUGASSIAN

[redacted]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02154 200958Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00
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	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02
	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/076 W	

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R 200957Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6904
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTI 0024

[redacted] BAGHDAD 02154

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, PINR, IS, IZ, ASEC
SUBJECT: IRAQIS BLAME ISRAEL, NOT U.S.
FOR ABU JIHAD KILLING

1 [redacted]

2. SUMMARY: IRAQ HAS NOT REPEATED PLO CHARGES THAT THE U.S. CONNIVED WITH ISRAEL TO ASSASSINATE PLO CHIEFTAN KHALIL AL-WAZIR (ABU JIHAD). SADDAM HUSSEIN BLAMED "AGENTS OF ZIONISM" FOR THE ASSASSINATION IN TELEGRAPHED CONDOLENCES TO ARAFAT. END SUMMARY.

3. IRAQ HAS NOT ECHOED CHARGES MADE BY PLO OFFICIALS THAT THE UNITED STATES GAVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO ISRAEL TO ASSASSINATE PLO LEADER ABU JIHAD. SADDAM HUSSEIN, IN A TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCE TO YASIR ARAFAT, BLAMED "AGENTS OF ZIONISM" FOR THE KILLING.

4. IRAQI PRESS HAS GIVEN PROMINENT COVERAGE TO THE ASSASSINATION AND TO CHARGES THAT ISRAEL WAS BEHIND IT. LOCAL MEDIA QUOTED NBC TELEVISION REPORTS THAT SAID ABU JIHAD WAS KILLED BY THE MOSSAD,

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02154 200958Z

NAVAL COMMANDOS, AND MEMBERS OF AN ELITE ARMY UNIT IN A COMBINED OPERATION APPROVED BY SHAMIR, PERES, AND RABIN. IRAQ'S VICTORY AT FAO PUSHED ARAFAT'S APRIL 18 REPETITION OF THESE CHARGES OFF THE FRONT PAGES. NOTHING IN THE IRAQI PRESS HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE U.S. OR HINTED AT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION.

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH HIGHLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE PLO

AND ALWAYS EAGER TO CASTIGATE "THE ZIONIST ENTITY" (ESPECIALLY ISRAEL'S RELATION WITH IRAN), IRAQ DOES NOT WISH TO PROMOTE ITS ARAB CREDENTIALS THROUGH ANTAGONIZING THE U.S., ESPECIALLY AT THIS JUNCTURE OF PARALLELISM OF IRAQI-AMERICAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS AND ACTIONS.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 PORT L 00979 201115Z
ACTION DSE-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	AF-00	CIAE-00
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	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-01	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
	M-01	NRC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01	SCT-02	ZOVD-00	P-02
	T-01	/030 W					

------------------113657 201116Z /38

O 201114Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0352

[redacted] PORT LOUIS 00979

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR [signature] Date: 3/13/97
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TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, MP
SUBJECT: TFGULF02: SECURITY MEASURES

REF: STATE 121680

1. [redacted]

2. POST CONVENED A MEETING OF THE EAC ON APRIL 19 TO DISCUSS SECURITY SITUATION, IN LIGHT OF NOT ONLY THE GULF NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS BUT ALSO THE KUWAITI HIJACKING AND ABU JIHAD ASSASSINATION.

3. POST MADE CONTACT APRIL 19 WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICE AUTHORITIES. IN ADDITION, THE MARINE SECURITY GUARDS, RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARDS CONTRACTOR, AND CHANCERY BUILDING SECURITY GUARDS HAVE BEEN PUT ON ALERT.

4. DUE TO THE LOW THREAT LEVEL IN MAURITIUS, POST FEELS

[redacted]

PAGE 02 PORT L 00979 201115Z

THAT SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS IN REFTEL (REDUCING PUBLIC ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES, AND REDUCING CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS), ARE NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIME.
PALMER

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PAGE 01 STATE 122162
ORIGIN EAP-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /002 R

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APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RLWILSON
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NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE EAP/IMBS TWO COPIES ONLY
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O 190010Z APR 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE

[redacted] STATE 122162

FOR DCM FROM EAP/IMBS RICH WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, MY
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL IMBS TO KUALA LUMPUR NO. 18

1. (U) ASSASSINATION OF PLO OFFICIAL: THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PLO OFFICIAL ABU JIHAD WAS READ AT THE NOON BRIEFING APRIL 18:

Q: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE ASSASSINATION THIS WEEKEND OF KHALIL WAZIR (AKA ABU JIHAD) WHO WAS THE CHIEF MILITARY PLANNER AND NUMBER TWO MAN TO YASSER ARAFAT?

A: THE U.S. CONDEMNS THIS ACT OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATION. VIOLENCE IS NOT THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF NOR WAS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN THE ASSASSINATION. ANY SUGGESTION OF THAT SORT IS TOTALLY BASELESS. U.S. LAW

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 122162

PROHIBITS ASSASSINATIONS - ASSASSINATIONS ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. THE U.S. DOES NOT PRACTICE SUCH, NOR DO WE BELIEVE ANYONE ELSE SHOULD.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON WHO IS RESPONSIBLE.

Q: WHAT IMPACT WILL THIS HAVE ON THE PEACE PROCESS?

A: WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ON MOVING THE PEACE

PROCESS FORWARD.

NOW MORE THAN EVER, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYONE REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

2[redacted] WE ARE REPEATING STATE 121581 TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. F.Y.I. NEA ADVISES TUNISIA IS EXPECTED TO REQUEST A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE INCIDENT AND THE MEETING MAY TAKE PLACE TOMORROW.

3. (U) KLSE INVITATION TO SEC COMMISSIONER: SEC ADVISED APRIL 18 THAT CHAIRMAN RUDER WAS FORCED TO DECLINE KLSE INVITATION; HOWEVER, COMMISSIONER CHARLES COX ACCEPTS IN HIS STEAD. SEC ASKED FOR A POINT OF CONTACT IN KL WITH WHOM COX CAN DISCUSS PROGRAM AND TRAVEL DETAILS. PLEASE ADVISE.

4. [redacted] BELLER TDY: JOHN DUNCAN ASSURED US A CABLE PROVIDING INFORMATION REQUESTED IN YOUR O.I. 28 WOULD GO OUT APRIL 19. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE IT PROMPTLY.

5. [redacted] MALAYSIAN NATIONAL R & D WORKSHOP: DR. KRUYTBOSCH TOLD US APRIL 18 THAT HE IS DEFINITELY

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 03 STATE 122162

INTERESTED IN ATTENDING R & D WORKSHOP IN KL. HE SAID HE NEEDS TO HAVE THE LETTER OF INVITATION IN HAND IN ORDER TO TRY TO ARRANGE HIS MALAYSIA TRIP IN CONJUNCTION WITH OFFICIAL TRAVEL TO INDIA.

6. [redacted] WE SHARE YOUR FRUSTRATION WITH LACK OF SUPPORT FROM OES/SCT. IT TOOK NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS TO PRODUCE EVEN A BELATED RESPONSE TO YOUR INITIAL MESSAGE ON THE WORKSHOP. (THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE WAS SECURED DIRECTLY FROM DR. KRUYTBOSCH.) I WILL FOLLOW-UP WITH BILL MOODY IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE SUPPORT. SHULTZ

[redacted]

PAGE 01 RIYADH 03981 191247Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00	H-01
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	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01	DSE-00	SCT-02
	P-02	T-01	/091 W				

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P 191248Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9458
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR Date: 3/13/97
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TS authority to:
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C
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[redacted] RIYADH 03981

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PLO, I, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI REACTION TO ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD

REF: RIYADH 03945

1. [redacted]

2. IN A STATEMENT MADE AFTER THE APRIL 18 MEETING OF THE SAUDI CABINET CHAIRED BY KING FAHD, INFORMATION MINISTER ALI AL-SHAER SAID THAT THE CABINET EXPRESSED DEEP SORROW OVER THE DEATH OF ABU JIHAD AND STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE "COWARDLY METHOD ADOPTED BY THE CRIMINAL KILLERS IN PERPETRATING THIS HIDEOUS CRIME." HE ADDED THAT THE CABINET REITERATED SAUDI ARABIA'S SOLIDARITY WITH THE STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 RIYADH 03981 191247Z

3. PLO CHAIRMAN YASSIR ARAFAT WAS IN BAHRAIN WHEN HE RECEIVED NEWS OF ABU JIHAD'S ASSASSINATION ON APRIL 16. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS HE ARRIVED IN RIYADH, WHERE HE AND HIS DELEGATION WERE RECEIVED BY KING FAHD. ALSO PRESENT AT THE AUDIENCE WERE GOVERNOR OF RIYADH PRINCE SALMAN, ALI AL-SHAER, AND PLO REPRESENTATIVE TO SAUDI ARABIA RAFIQ SHAKIR AL-NATSHA. ON APRIL 17, KING FAHD, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH, AND SECOND DEPUTY PREMIER AND DEFENSE AND AVIATION MINISTER PRINCE SULTAN SENT CONDOLENCE MESSAGES

TO ARAFAT, WHO HAD RETURNED TO TUNIS, AND TO JIHAD KHALIL AL-WAZIR, SON OF THE SLAIN ABU JIHAD.

4. THE SAUDI PRESS GAVE FRONT-PAGE TREATMENT TO THE ASSASSINATION, ASSERTING THAT IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY ISRAELI MOSSAD AND ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL. IT ALSO REPORTED ACCUSATIONS OF U.S. COMPLICITY IN THE MATTER. SAUDIS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN, HOWEVER, STRONGLY CONDEMNED WHAT THEY WERE SURE WAS AN ISRAELI ASSASSINATION, BUT GENERALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THE U.S. WAS TO BLAME FOR THIS ACT. HORAN.

[redacted]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

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[redacted]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01313 01 OF 02 191517Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
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	STR-17	SIL-01	INRE-00	OPM-01	RP-10	ACDA-12	SP-02
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R 191515Z APR 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2098
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USIA WASHDC 6714

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TS authority to:
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( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01313

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PBTS, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: STRIKES, LOWER PROFILES CHARACTERIZE INTERIM WEST BANK REACTION TO ABU JIHAD'S DEATH

REF: JERUSALEM 1282

1[redacted]

2. FOLLOWING THE VERY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE IDF AND PALESTINIANS EXPRESSING SHOCK AND OUTRAGE AT THE MURDER OF ABU JIHAD, ON SATURDAY, APRIL 16, THE BROAD REACTION IN THE WEST BANK TO HIS DEATH HAS SETTLED INTO A PATTERN OF OBSERVATION OF THE GENERAL COMMERCIAL AND TRANSPORTATION STRIKE WHICH BEGAN ON SUNDAY, APRIL 17. THE TRADITIONAL SHOPPING SPREES MADE ON THE FIRST DAY OF

[redacted]

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RAMADAN, WHICH THIS YEAR FELL ON APRIL 17, DID NOT TAKE PLACE AS MOST WEST BANK RESIDENTS STAYED IN THEIR HOMES FOLLOWING THE VIOLENT CLASHES OF SATURDAY. NEARLY EVERY REFUGEE CAMP IN EAST JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK WAS PUT UNDER CURFEW, AS WERE THE TOWNS OF NABLUS AND JENIN, BOTH OF WHICH REMAIN UNDER CURFEW..

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3. IN RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT AND THE WEST BANK REACTION TO IT, THE CONSULATE GENERAL DECIDED TO POSTPONE BRIEFINGS TO BE GIVEN TO PALESTINIANS BY WAT CLUVERIUS, AS WELL AS SOME INTRODUCTORY CALLS ON WEST BANK MAYORS AND A DINNER IN HONOR OF NEWLY ARRIVED CONSUL GENERAL WILCOX. OUR PALESTINIAN CONTACTS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THESE POSTPONEMENTS,STATING THAT THEY WOULD FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE UNDERTAKING SUCH ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF OFFICIAL MOURNING, THAT CURFEWS ROADBLOCKS AND DEMONSTRATIONS MADE TRAVELLING COMPLICATED AND THAT IN THE INFLAMED ATMOSPHERE AT PRESENT, IT MIGHT BE DANGEROUS FOR THEM TO BE SEEN WELCOMING USG OFFICIALS. ALL OUR CONTACTS, HOWEVER, SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE THAN PLEASED TO ATTEND THESE FUNCTIONS NEXT WEEK WHEN THE SITUATION PRESUMABLY WILL HAVE SOMEWHAT CALMED.

4. DUE TO THE STRIKES AND TO THE TRAVEL DIFFICULTIES, MOST OF OUR CONTACTS HAVE BEEN LYING LOW. FROM THE FEW WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN, HOWEVER, WE GATHER THAT MODERATE PRO-JORDANIAN AND PRO-PLO WEST BANKERS WILL

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BE REFRAINING FROM MAKING STATEMENTS OF RECONCILIATION OR WILLINGNESS TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL FOR THE TIME BEING AND WILL AVOID HIGH-PROFILE CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. AL-FAJR EDITOR HANNA SINIORA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE CANCELLING SOME OF HIS SCHEDULED APPEARANCES WITH ISRAELI GROUPS, AND BETHLEHEM MAYOR FREIJ SAID HE DECIDED NOT TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES LATER THIS WEEK TO ATTEND A WASHINGTON INSTITUTE SEMINAR AND HAD TOLD THE ORGANIZERS AT THE FRED HANSEN INSTITUTE THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THEIR SYNPOSIUM IN SAN DIEGO MAY 2.

5. IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO SORT OUT ALL THE FEELINGS ON THE WEST BANK AND SEE HOW THE LOCAL POPULATION REACTS TO THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. THE MESSAGE THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN CONVEYING INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THAT IT WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO QUELL THE UPRISING, HAS NOW BEEN STRONGLY REIN-FORCED BY THE PERCEPTION THAT ISRAEL IS WILLING TO ACT OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS WELL. THE COMMON PALESTINIAN SENTIMENT IS

OUTRAGE AND BITTERNESS TOWARDS ISRAEL,
WHOM ALL ASSUME CARRIED OUT THE DEED. SO FAR
THIS HAS NOT SEEMED TO TRANSLATE INTO BITTER-
NESS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND WE HAVE
NEITHER SEEN NOR HEARD CHARGES OF U.S. COM-

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	MSC-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00
	HA-09	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01
	STR-17	SIL-01	INRE-00	OPM-01	RP-10	ACDA-12	SP-02
	SR-06	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01	DSE-00	SCT-02
	P-02	T-01	/128 W				

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R 191515Z APR 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2099
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USIA WASHDC 6715

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01313

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PBTS, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: STRIKES, LOWER PROFILES CHARACTERIZE

PLICITY. THE STATEMENT MADE AT THE NOON
BRIEFING ON APRIL 18 CONDEMNING THE ASSASSI-
NATION OF ABU JIHAD WAS RUN ON THE FRONT PAGE
OF THE LARGEST CIRCULATION ARABIC DAILY PAPER

IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AL-QUDS.
WILCOX

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00	MSC-01
	IO-19	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09	PM-10
	EAP-00	PA-02	INRE-00	ACDA-12	SP-02	C-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	SCT-02	P-02	T-01	/078 W		

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O 191226Z APR 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2081
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 01296

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S-S PASS NEA STAFF ASSISTANT

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, PTER, IS
SUBJECT: TWO GAZANS KILLED; WEST BANK SEALED OFF

1. (U) SUMMARY: TWO GAZANS WERE KILLED AND AT LEAST TWO WOUNDED (TEL AVIV WILL REPORT SEPTEL) AS A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE IDF SEALED OFF MOST OF THE WEST BANK TO JOURNALISTS AND NON-RESIDENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PLO MILITARY COMMANDER ABU JIHAD (KHALIL AL-WAZIR). ISRAELI CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A PROMISED RESIGNATION BY NABLUS MAYOR HAFEZ TOUQAN WOULD PLACE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON OTHER WEST BANK MAYORS TO RESIGN (DETAILS SEPTEL). SIX PALESTINIANS FROM THE VILLAGE OF BEITA NEAR NABLUS WHO WERE ISSUED DEPORTATION ORDERS LAST WEEK HAVE WITHDRWN THEIR APPEALS TO THE MILITARY APPEALS COMMITTEE, CLEARING THE WAY FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE
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DEPORTATION. END SUMMARY.

TWO GAZANS KILLED; WEST BANK CLOSED OFF
///

2. (U) TWO GAZANS WERE KILLED AND AT LEAST TWO WOUNDED ON MONDAY, APRIL 18, AS A COMPREHENSIVE STRIKE ENTERED ITS SECOND SCHEDULED DAY THROUGHOUT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. CURFEWS WERE IN PLACE

IN ALL WEST BANK REFUGEE CAMPS EXCEPT THE AQABAT JABR AND THE EIN SULTAN REFUGEE CAMPS NEAR JERICHO. CHECKPOINTS BEGINNING AT A-RAM, JUST OUTSIDE THE NORTHERN BORDER OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF JERUSALEM, PREVENTED ALL BUT WEST BANK RESIDENTS FROM ENTERING THE NORTHERN AREA OF THE WEST BANK. IN THE CITY OF NABLUS ALL STREETS WERE EMPTY AND THE IDF REPORTED NO ENCOUNTERS WITH PALESTINIANS AS THE CITY BEGAN YET ANOTHER CURFEW IN THE COURSE OF THE UPRISING. SHOPS WERE CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK ON THE SECOND DAY OF MOURNING AND STRIKE CALLED FOR IN PROTEST OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PLO MILITARY COMMANDER AND FATAH SECOND-IN-COMMAND ABU JIHAD (KHALIL AL-WAZIR).

NABLUS MAYOR'S RESIGNATION COULD SPILL THE DOMINOES
//

3. (U) A PROMISED RESIGNATION BY APPOINTED NABLUS MAYOR HAFEZ TOUQAN DUE TO CALLS FROM THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL UPRISING RAISED CONCERNS AMONG CIVAD OFFICIALS THAT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE MAY NOW BY PLACED UPON OTHER WEST BANK MAYORS TO RESIGN. TOUQAN HAS OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED
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THE CIVAD OF HIS INTENTION TO RESIGN, BUT HAS NOT DELIVERED AN OFFICIAL RESIGNATION LETTER. MAYOR FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM TOLD CONGEN HE DEEPLY REGRETTED TOUQAN'S INTENTION TO RESIGN.

SIX DEPORTEES WITHDRAW APPEAL
/////////////////////////////

4. (U) SIX PALESTINIANS FROM THE VILLAGE OF BEITA, NEAR NABLUS, WHO WERE SERVED WITH DEPORTATION ORDERS LAST WEEK, WITHDREW THEIR APPEALS TO THE MILITARY APPEALS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY, APRIL 18. ATTORNEYS FOR THE PALESTINIANS, WHO WERE CHARGED WITH ATTACKING A GROUP OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND TWO ARMED ESCORTS FROM THE ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT, SAID THEIR CLIENTS DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THE DEPORTATION ORDERS WOULD BE OVERTURNED AND DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF LEGITIMIZING THE ORDERS VIA AN UNSUCCESSFUL APPEAL. THE WITHDRAWALS CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE DEPORTEES TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AT ANY TIME. ALL ARABIC PAPERS RAN FRONT-PAGE STORIES ON THE U.S. VETO OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE DEPORTATIONS, AND PRO-JORDANIAN AN-NAHAR

EDITORIALIZED THAT THE VETO SHOWED THE U.S. WAS
NOT SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING PEACE.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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	EB-00	DODE-00	IO-19	NSAE-00	AMAD-01	PM-10	PA-02
	INRE-00	SP-02	PRS-01	/051 W			

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O 191452Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2890
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 8261
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 09300

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON

USCINCCENT FOR POLAD

ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EAID, ECON, EG, US, SA
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-
THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS (GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION) AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF

THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- US FORCES ATTACK TWO IRANIAN OIL RIGS AND THREE FRIGATES IN THE GULF.

-- MORE COMMENTS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD.

-- CRITICISM OF US BIAS TOWARDS ISRAEL.

-- A SOVIET DELEGATION ARRIVES IN CAIRO.

-- EGYPTIAN EXPATRIATES IN THE US FINANCE TOURIST PROJECTS.

-- OPPOSITION AL-SHAAB REPORTS AMBASSADOR WISNER TRIES TO REACTIVATE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

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-- OPPOSITION WRITERS BLAME TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE SECURE BASES FOR THE PLO.

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ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

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1. US ATTACK ON IRANIAN OIL RIGS. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL PAPERS REPORTS US FORCES ATTACKED TWO IRANIAN OIL RIGS IN THE GULF, USED AS RADAR STATIONS BY THE IRANIAN MILITARY, IN REPRISAL FOR IRAN'S RECENT RESUMPTION OF MINING INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND FOR THE MINE ATTACK LAST WEEK ON A US FRIGATE. THE US FORCES ALSO ATTACKED THREE IRANIAN WARSHIPS IN RETALIATION FOR IRAN'S ATTACK ON AN OIL FIELD IN UAE RUN BY AMERICANS. REPORTEDLY, US ARMY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING DEALING ANOTHER BLOW AT IRANIAN TARGETS IN THE GULF. IN THE SAME ITEM, ALL PAPERS REPORT IRAQ HAS LIBERATED AND REGAINED THE FAW PENINSULA. FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID EXPRESSED EGYPT'S REGRET AT IRAN'S RECENT ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE, ADDING THAT "WE UNDERSTAND THE US REACTION AND ATTACK ON THE IRANIAN OIL PLATFORMS AND WE URGE IRAN TO STOP THE POLICY OF PROVOCATION." ON IRAQI LIBERATION OF FAW, ABDEL MEGUID SAID THE PENINSULA

IS PART OF IRAQI TERRITORIES AND IRAQ'S DUTY IS TO LIBERATE ITS TERRITORIES EVEN BY FORCE. MUBARAK TELEPHONED PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO CONGRATULATE HIM ON LIBERATING FAW.

2. ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. ALL PAPERS REPORT ABDEL MEGUID ANNOUNCED EGYPT'S CONDEMNATION OF THE

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INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
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FBIS RESTON VA
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USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON

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ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EAID, ECON, EG, US, SA
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ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD AND ADDED THAT NOTHING WOULD STOP THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE. ABDEL MEGUID POINTED OUT THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION WOULD ONLY LEAD TO NEGATIVE RESULTS, NOTING THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND TERRORISM. MFA FIRST UNDERSECRETARY OSAMA AL-BAZ STATED UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE US THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NOT STOP THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING AS ISRAEL MAY HAVE IMAGINED. UNDER A HEADLINE THAT READS "THE JEWS ARE CHASTISING THE WORLD", AKHBAR ASSERTS THAT AFTER THE JEWS BECAME GATHERED IN ISRAEL THEY BEGAN TAKING REVENGE ON THE WORLD. THE SHORT ARTICLE REFERS TO ISRAELI KILLING OF MORE THAN 20 PALESTINIANS THIS WEEK, ASSASSINATING ABU JIHAD, AND CONVICTING "THE GERMAN" DEMANJUK FOR TORTURING JEWS IN THE DAYS OF THE NAZIS. AN UNSIGNED EDITORIAL IN AHRAM WRITES THAT THE

ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD BY THE MOSSAD DOES NOT AND WILL NOT ACHIEVE ANY AIMS, AND ON THE CONTRARY WILL LEAD TO WORSE CONSEQUENCES. AKHBAR'S DAILY COLUMNIST ABDEL SALAM DAWOUD CONDEMNS ISRAELI HOOLIGANISM BUT AT THE SAME TIME CRITICIZES THE DIVISION OF THE ARABS WHO HAD NO REACTION TO THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. GUMHOURIYYA'S EDITOR IN CHIEF MOHSEN MOHAMMAD WRITES THAT IT IS STRANGE THAT THE US, WHICH ALWAYS ANNOUNCES REJECTION OF TERRORISM, DID NOT DECLARE INTERNATIONALLY ITS CONDEMNATION OR EVEN REJECTION OF THE CRIMINAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. ISRAEL WANTS TO PROVE THAT IT IS THE SOLE PROTECTOR AND SUPPORTER OF US INTERESTS AND "PURPOSES" IN THE REGION, THEREBY CONVINCING THE US CANDIDATES RUNNING FOR PRESIDENCY THAT THEY SHOULD SUPPORT THE STRONGER PARTY, ISRAEL, AND NOT THE WEAKER PARTY, THE ARABS WHO CAN BE KILLED IN THEIR HOMES NO MATTER HOW FAR THEY ARE FROM
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ISRAEL. THE WRITER CONCLUDES BY CALLING UPON THE PLO TO EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT AND BE PATIENT.

WEEKLY PERIODICAL SABAH EL-KHEIR WRITES THAT THE HIJACKING OF THE IRANIAN PLANE AND THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD ARE PART OF A WIDE-SCALE CONSPIRACY BY ISRAEL AND IRAN TO SQUEEZE THE ARAB NATION WITH THE AIM OF ABORTING THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING; DEALING A BLOW AT NATIONALISM AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES; SEPARATING THE ARAB COUNTRIES FROM EACH OTHER IN ORDER TO DESTROY THE SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS TIES AMONG THEM AND PUSH THEM TO A CIVIL WARS; AND REPRESENTING THE ARABS BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS BACKWARD PEOPLES AND TERRORISTS.

3. EGYPT/US. AN UNSIGNED EDITORIAL IN AKHBAR REFERS TO ISRAEL'S RECENT THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ATTACKS US BLIND BIAS TOWARDS ISRAEL, AND THE STAND ADOPTED BY THE "AGENTS OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM IN THE CONGRESS", WHICH IS CONSIDERED A PROVOCATION DIRECTED AT THE WHOLE ARAB NATION. THE EDITORIAL CRITICIZES THE CONGRESS WHICH ALWAYS APPROVES OF ISRAELI POLICY AND WHICH HAS NOT SAID A SINGLE WORD ABOUT ISRAELI POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND REFUSAL OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.

4. AID FROM THE US. AKHBAR REPORTS THREE ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WILL BE SIGNED WITH THE US, WHEREBY EGYPT WILL GET 70 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT AND HOUSING PROJECTS, AND TO DEVELOP TAXATION MACHINERY.

5. SOVIET DELEGATION IN CAIRO. AHRAM REPORTS A SOVIET DELEGATION HEADED BY THE DIRECTOR OF EGYPT DEPARTMENT AT

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2892
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
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AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EAID, ECON, EG, US, SA
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THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT ARRIVED IN CAIRO FOR A TWO-DAY VISIT. THE DELEGATION WILL HOLD TALKS WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO.

6. DEBT RESCHEDULING TALKS FINISHED. AHRAM REPORTS THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS FINISHED TALKS WITH ALL CREDITOR STATES, EXCEPT JAPAN, ON RESCHEDULING ITS DEBTS. NEGOTIATIONS ON EGYPT'S DEBT
S TO JAPAN WILL BE HELD IN
MAY. AHRAM ADDS THAT A NEW ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF WILL START IN MAY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GRANTING EGYPT THE SECOND PART, I.E. 135 MILLION DOLLARS, OF THE

150 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN PROVIDED LAST MAY.

7. ON THE TABA ISSUE. ALL PAPERS QUOTE ABDEL MEGUID AS AFFIRMING THAT THE VERDICT IN THE TABA CASE WILL BE IN EGYPT'S FAVOR BECAUSE OF THE UNTENABLE DOCUMENTS THAT ISRAEL HAD SUBMITTED.

8. EGYPT/TUNISIA. ALL PAPERS REPORT A STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED ON THE RESULTS OF THE EGYPTIAN-TUNISIAN TALKS. VISITING TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER AL-BACCOUSH STATED THAT EGYPT'S MILITARY PRODUCTION COULD ENABLE EGYPT TO DEFEND THE ARABS' RIGHTS, PROTECT THEIR TERRITORIES, AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR INDUSTRIES.

9. WHEAT FROM SPAIN. AHRAM REPORTS AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED WHEREBY EGYPT WILL GET 5000 TONS OF WHEAT FROM SPAIN.

10. SHIPPING. AHRAM REPORTS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS, AND MARITIME TRANSPORT SOLIMAN METWALLI
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ANNOUNCED THAT THE ARAB BRIDGE NAVIGATION COMPANY, A JOINT EGYPTIAN-JORDANIAN-IRAQI ENTERPRISE WHICH NOW RUNS THE NUWEIBA-AQABA FERRY, WILL ALSO ENGAGE IN CARGO SHIPPING OPERATIONS.

11. EGYPT/SAUDI ARABIA. AKHBAR REPORTS THAT DURING TALKS IN CAIRO, THE VISITING SAUDI FINANCE MINISTER HAS BROACHED A SAUDI PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SAUDI-EGYPTIAN COMPANY FOR JOINT INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS. ALSO DISCUSSED WERE PLANS TO REACTIVATE PREVIOUS LOAN AGREEMENTS.

DOMESTIC NEWS
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12. TOURIST PROJECTS. AHRAM REPORTS TOURISM MINISTER FOAD SULTAN STATED UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE US THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH EGYPTIANS LIVING THERE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 5 TOURIST PROJECTS IN THE RED SEA, SINAI, AND NORTHERN COAST AREAS.

13. NEW PETROLEUM STRATEGY. AHRAM REPORTS THE PETROLEUM SECTOR WILL DRAW UP A NEW STRATEGY AIMED AT INCREASING QUANTITIES OF NATURAL GAS AND DOUBLING THE CRUDE OIL RESERVE, MAINTAINING THE DAILY OUTPUT OF PETROLEUM AT 870,000 BARRELS PER DAY. AHRAM NOTES THAT EGYPT CONSUMES ABOUT HALF OF ITS OIL OUTPUT AT A RATE OF 400,000 BARRELS PER DAY.

14. EGYPT EXPORTS COKE TO US. GUMHOURIYYA REPORTS THAT THE BOARD CHAIRMAN OF AL-NASR COMPANY FOR COKE AND BASIC CHEMICALS SAID THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HIS COMPANY WOULD

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	EB-00	DODE-00	IO-19	NSAE-00	AMAD-01	PM-10	PA-02
	INRE-00	SP-02	PRS-01	/051 W			

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O 191452Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2893
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
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USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON

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E.O. 12356: N/A
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SHIP 17000 TONS OF COKE TO THE US AT A VALUE OF DOLLARS 1.6 MILLION.

15. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR APRIL 19 IS PT 225.0 FOR BUYING AND PT 225.6 FOR SELLING.

OPPOSITION NEWS
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16. AMBASSADOR WISNER REACTIVATES NORMALIZATION. AL-SHAAB REPORTS AMBASSADOR WISNER HELD SEVERAL CONTACTS WITH SENIOR EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS WITH THE AIM OF REACTIVATING NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FOR HOLDING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS IN -
THE FIELDS OF TOURISM AND AGRICULTURE, AS A MEANS OF EASING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

17. RESERVATION TOWARDS A SOVIET OFFER. AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPTIAN EXPERTS SHOWED RESERVATIONS TOWARDS A SOVIET OFFER TO FINANCE A POWER PLANT IN EIYOUN MUSA IN SINAI. THE EXPERTS CALLED FOR RECONSIDERING THE FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE OFFER.

18. TAXATION AGREEMENT. AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPT AND THE US ARE SCHEDULED APRIL 21 TO SIGN A BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO PREVENT DOUBLE TAXATION.

19. ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD. AL-SHAAB'S EDITOR IN CHIEF OF ADEL HUSSEIN WRITES THAT HE VISITED ABU JIHAD TWO WEEKS AGO AND NOTICED THAT SECURITY AROUND HIS
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PAGE 03 CAIRO 09300 04 OF 05 191527Z

HOUSE IN SIDI BOU SAID WAS VERY MINIMAL AND THAT WHEN HE (ADEL HUSSEIN) TOLD ABU JIHAD ABOUT THAT THE LATTER SAID TO HIM THAT THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAD PREVENTED HIM FROM HAVING ENOUGH GUARDS TO PROTECT HIM ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT

IS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY THAT IS CAPABLE OF PROTECTING ITS GUESTS. HUSSEIN GOES ON TO ACCUSE TUNISIA FOR NOT PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR ABU JIHAD AND HELPING HIM HAVE A STABLE FOUNDATION FROM WHICH HE CAN RUN HIS CONTACTS AND OPERATIONS.

ADEL HUSSEIN NOTES THAT NONE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAS ACCEPTED TO PUT UP ABU JIHAD AND THAT IS WHY THEY ARE ALL RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ASSASSINATION. THE EDITOR FURTHER ACCUSES EGYPT, A COUNTRY THAT HAS WEIGHT ON THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC SCENE, OF FAILING TO PROTECT THE ARABS AND CONFINING ITS ROLE TO HOPING THAT SHULTZ WOULD COME BACK TO THE REGION, THAT THE DEBTS WOULD BE RESCHEDULED, AND THAT WHEAT SUPPLIES WOULD CONTINUE. "WHERE WERE YOU, OH MEN OF THE REGIME? YOU KILLED ABU JIHAD WHEN YOU FAILED TO OFFER HIM ASSISTANCE AND REFUGE. YOU WILL KILL ALL THE ARABS IF YOU CONTINUE TO BE SO WEAK BEFORE THE ZIONISTS AND THEIR ALLIES, THE AMERICANS."

AL-WAFD'S WRITER IBRAHIM YOUNIS COMMENTS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD, NOTING THAT TUNISIA IS JUST LIKE ANY OTHER ARAB COUNTRY, INCLUDING EGYPT, THAT IS NO
-
LONGER SAFE OR SECURE. BECAUSE OF SADAT AND HIS AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, THE CIA AND THE MOSSAD HAVE LEARNED EVERYTHING ABOUT EGYPT, AND THE EGYPTIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE BECOME CONCERNED MORE WITH CHASING PATRIOTIC EGYPTIANS AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES THAN WITH

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 09300 05 OF 05 191527Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	EUR-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	IO-19	NSAE-00	AMAD-01	PM-10	PA-02
	INRE-00	SP-02	PRS-01	/051 W			

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O 191452Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2894
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 8265
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 CAIRO 09300

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON

USCINCCENT FOR POLAD

ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EAID, ECON, EG, US, SA
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, APRIL 19, 1988
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 09300 05 OF 05 191527Z

HOUNDING FOREIGN AGENTS. ARAB SOCIETY HAS BECOME INSECURE; ARAFAT FEELS SECURE ONLY IN IRAQ WHERE, AS A RESULT OF WAR CIRCUMSTANCES, SECURITY IS VERY STRONG AND PALESTINIAN MEN ARE WELL PROTECTED. EGYPT SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD, AND THE MOSSAD AND CIA MEN SHOULD BE HOUNDED BY THE ARABS THE SAME WAY THE ARABS ARE HOUNDED BY ISRAEL AND THE CIA UNDER ANY FLIMSY PRETEXTS.
WISNER

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E101

[redacted]

PAGE 01 NOUAKC 01587 181527Z
ACTION DSE-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	AF-00	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	NEA-05	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	L-02	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00
	INRE-00	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02
	DOEE-00	M-01	NRC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01	SCT-02	ZOVD-00
	P-02	T-01	/034 W				

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O 181520Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2807

[redacted] NOUAKCHOTT 01587

TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, MOPS, PREL, MR, ZP
SUBJECT: TFGULF02: MISSION RESPONSE TO THREAT
- ADVISORY

REF: STATE 121680

1. [redacted]

2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION RESPONSES TO ACTIONS REQUESTED PARA 6, REFTEL:

(A) AMBASSADOR CONVENED THE POST'S EAC ON MORNING APRIL 17 (SUNDAY IS A REGULAR POST WORKDAY BECAUSE THIS IS AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC) IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE POSSIBLE LOCAL IMPACT OF THE ABU JIHAD ASSASSINATION IN TUNISIA ON THE SAFETY OF POST PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE AMCITS. AT THAT MEETING WE DECIDED TO ALERT ALL AMCIT PERSONNEL TO TAKE EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AND MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE UNTIL WE COULD ASCERTAIN LOCAL REACTIONS.

[redacted]

PAGE 02 NOUAKC 01587 181527Z

THUS, WE WERE ALREADY IN A CAUTIONARY STANCE WHEN POST RECEIVED REFTEL.

(B) USG EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS HAVE BEEN ALERTED.

(C) POST WARDEN PLAN WAS REVISED AND DISTRIBUTED TO ALL PARTICIPANTS ON APRIL 7, ONLY ELEVEN DAYS AGO. WE ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP WHERE IT MAY BE USEFUL, MAINLY WITH PRIVATE AMCITS.

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(D) WE REVIEWED OUR GENERAL DEFENSIVE STATUS AT THE EAC MEETING, AND THE PSO AND MSG ARE ON ALERT STATUS.

(E) WE ARE CONTACTING AN APPROPRIATE GIRM SECURITY OFFICIAL ABOUT OUR NEW GULF-RELATED CONCERNS.

(F) OUR LOCAL GUARDS ARE ON ALERT.

(G) WE HAVE ADOPTED LOWER PROFILE. ONE SOCIAL EVENT PLANNED FOR TODAY HAS BEEN CANCELLED. THE AMERICAN CLUB IS CLOSED TODAY AND TOMORROW AS USUAL, AND WE WILL EVALUATE WHETHER IT SHOULD OPEN THEREAFTER ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

(H) POST HAS NO USIS MISSION AND WE ARE REVIEWING POSSIBLE SHORT-TERM MODIFICATIONS OF OUR CONSULAR OPERATION.

(I) WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS AND DO NOT BELIEVE ANY REDUCTIONS ARE NEEDED AS MATTERS NOW STAND.

(J) CONSOFF IS ALERTING PRIVATE AMCITS ABOUT THE

[redacted]

PAGE 03 NOUAKC 01587 181527Z

THREAT.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, THE AMBASSADOR HAS MADE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST AND GULF AFFAIRS TO BRIEF HIM ON OUR RECENT ACTIONS AGAINST IRAN, TO DENY ANY USG ENCOURAGEMENT OR APPROVAL OF THE ALLEGED ISRAELI ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD, AND TO SEEK HIS READOUT OF THE GIRM REACTION TO THESE EVENTS. ON APRIL 18 THE DCM TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED MEETING WITH A SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL BRIEFLY TO STATE THE USG POSITION ON THESE TWO EVENTS, AND GOT A FAVORABLE RESPONSE. THAT WAS THAT WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THE GIRM WELCOMES THE USG ACTION IN THE GULF AGAINST IRAN, AND HOPES THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ NEXT WEEK CAN CONVINCE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO ENFORCE UNSC RESOLUTION 598. OUR INTERLOCUTOR ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE OF ALL AMERICA'S ARAB FRIENDS, WHICH HE SAID INCLUDES MAURITANIA, THAT THE USG CAN CONVINCE ISRAEL TO MODERATE ITS CONDUCT. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, CRITICIZE THE USG FOR POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS WITH ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD.
PUGH

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 01 STATE 061743 TOSEC 050150
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00)/001 R

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APPROVED BY:S/S-O:JJNORRIS
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE

[redacted] STATE 061743 TOSEC 050150

EXDIS - DECAPTIONED

FOLLOWING AMMAN 02369 DTD FEB 28, SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE [redacted] AMMAN 02369

EXDIS
DEPT FOR S/S ONLY PENDING CLEARANCE
PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY ASAP FOR CLEARANCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JORDANIAN
- CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, FEBRUARY 27--THE
- GULF WAR

THE FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT MEMCON OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETING IN JORDAN FEBRUARY 27 FOR THE PORTION CONCERNING THE GULF WAR. WE SUGGEST GULF WAR COLLECTIVE DISTRIBUTION (NOTE BAGHDAD ON MINIMIZE).

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 061743 TOSEC 050150

1. [redacted]

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE; SEE PARA 6.

3. TOWARDS THE END OF HIS MEETING FEBRUARY 27 WITH THE SECRETARY, JORDANIAN CROWN PRINCE HASSAN RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. HASSAN NOTED THE GULF WAR'S IMPORTANCE AS A REGIONAL PROBLEM AND

REAFFIRMED KING HUSSEIN'S INTEREST IN RECEIVING A FULL BRIEFING ON U.S. DIPLOMACY IN MOSCOW AND AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN HE MEETS THE SECRETARY IN LONDON MARCH 1.

4. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A SPECIAL EFFORT BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL (UNSYG) WITH IRAN, WHEREAS THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN TRIED. HOWEVER, RECOGNIZING THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL AGREEMENT ON A SECOND RESOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL, THE U.S. PROPOSED THAT WE MOVE TO A VOTE SOON, POSSIBLY BY FEBRUARY 29, TO SET UP A SECOND RESOLUTION ON AN ARMS EMBARGO WHICH WOULD HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DATE 30 OR 60 DAYS LATER. IN THE INTERIM, THE UNSYG WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO APPOINT A SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR WHO WOULD USE THIS TIME PERIOD IN ANOTHER EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT UNSCR 598. IF THE NEGOTIATOR DOES NOT REPORT SUCCESS, THE SANCTIONS WOULD THEN GO INTO EFFECT. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUND THIS APPROACH INTERESTING AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH IRAQ AND OTHERS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I'S QUESTION,

[redacted]

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE CURRENT BRITISH DRAFT UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE UNSC WOULD NEED TO BE AMPLIFIED TO REFLECT THIS PROCEDURE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY ADDED THAT A VOTE MAY COME AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 29 OR MARCH 1.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: HASSAN MENTIONED THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE ASKING THE SECRETARY FOR AN UPDATE ON THE GULF WAR. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT PREPARE APPROPRIATE TALKING POINTS IN TIME FOR THE MEETING TUESDAY, MARCH 1, IN LONDON.

7. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SUDDARTH
UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02369 281323Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
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O 281320Z FEB 88
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7377

[redacted] AMMAN 02369

EXDIS
DEPT FOR S/S ONLY PENDING CLEARANCE
PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY ASAP FOR CLEARANCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JORDANIAN
- CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, FEBRUARY 27--THE
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1. [redacted]

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE; SEE PARA 6.

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[redacted]

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02369 281323Z

4. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A SPECIAL EFFORT BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL (UNSYG) WITH IRAN, WHEREAS THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN TRIED. HOWEVER, RECOGNIZING THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL AGREEMENT ON A SECOND RESOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL, THE U.S. PROPOSED THAT WE MOVE TO A VOTE SOON, POSSIBLY BY FEBRUARY 29, TO SET UP A SECOND RESOLUTION ON AN

ARMS EMBARGO WHICH WOULD HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DATE 30 OR 60 DAYS LATER. IN THE INTERIM, THE UNSYG WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO APPOINT A SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR WHO WOULD USE THIS TIME PERIOD IN ANOTHER EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT UNSCR 598. IF THE NEGOTIATOR DOES NOT REPORT SUCCESS, THE SANCTIONS WOULD THEN GO INTO EFFECT. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUND THIS APPROACH INTERESTING AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH IRAQ AND OTHERS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I'S QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE CURRENT BRITISH DRAFT UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE UNSC WOULD NEED TO BE AMPLIFIED TO REFLECT THIS PROCEDURE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY ADDED THAT A VOTE MAY COME AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 29 OR MARCH 1.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: HASSAN MENTIONED THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE ASKING THE SECRETARY FOR AN UPDATE ON THE GULF WAR. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT PREPARE APPROPRIATE TALKING POINTS IN TIME FOR THE MEETING TUESDAY, MARCH 1, IN LONDON.

7. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SUDDARTH

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 03 AMMAN 02369 281323Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9023668 S/FPC/CDR TRB Date. 9/13/93

(X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 018075

ADP215

[redacted]

PAGE 01 SEOUL 18075 280954Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O 280950Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2646

[redacted]SEOUL 18075

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Reviewed by: EK
Date: 4-22-93 19

E.O. 12065:RDS-1 11/28/99 (GLEYSTEEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR,PGOV,KS,US
SUBJECT: ROK PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION

REF: A. STATE 305997 B. SEOUL 17961

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I TOLD FONMIN PARK TONG JIN NOVEMBER 28 THAT MY COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT AND I FELT THE ROKG WOULD MAKE A MISTAKE IF IT SOUGHT HIGH LEVEL U.S. AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATION AT THE DECEMBER INAUGURATION. BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS, IRAN, AND THE QUESTIONABLE SYMBOLISM, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET A SENIOR U.S. DELEGATION TO SEOUL. MORE IMPORTANT, PROMINENT DELEGATIONS MIGHT CONVEY THE WRONG SIGNAL TO KOREANS ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO FULFILL A LIMITED MANDATE. THE FONMIN INITIALLY DISAGREED WITH ME, STATING THAT HE FELT THE KOREAN PEOPLE WOULD WELCOME A HIGH LEVEL U.S. DELEGATION AS EVIDENCE THAT WE SUPPORTED A POLITICALLY NEUTRAL PRESIDENT FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SUGGESTED WE COULD INDICATE OUR SUPPORT IN OTHER WAYS AND, AS WE TALKED, PARK SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF ROUTINE REPRESENTATION AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

[redacted]

PAGE 02 SEOUL 18075 280954Z

3. AT A MINIMUM THE ROKG IS NOW ON NOTICE THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO SEND A HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION, AND HOPEFULLY THEY WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE OF LETTING US KNOW THAT THEY HAVE CHANGED THEIR MINDS.

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4. ACTION REQUESTED: I WOULD LIKE TO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE FONMIN THAT WHILE WE CONSIDER AMBASSADORIAL REPRESENTATION THE MOST APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOR THE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 018075

INAUGURATION WE INTEND TO SEND A CONGRATULATORY LETTER TO THE ACTING PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER WHICH WOULD COMMEND THE NEW PRESIDENT'S ROLE OF PRESIDING OVER THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A BROADER POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN KOREAN SOCIETY. SUCH A LETTER WOULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS AND PROBABLY GO A LONG WAY TO SATISFY CHOI. FONMIN PARK SEEMED VERY INTERESTED IN THIS IDEA. PLEASE ADVISE. GLEYSTEEN

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date. 7/13/95

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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority to.
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 017966

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ADP580
[redacted]

PAGE 01 SEOUL 17966 260950Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12 IO-14 OMB-01 SPH-01
TRSE-00 SY-05 SYE-00 OC-06 CCO-00 /090 W
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O 260931Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2590
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SA CINCUNC KS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//SJS

[redacted] SEOUL 17966

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/26/85 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: SHUN PINS KS
SUBJECT: (U) ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION AT YWCA HALL
- AND LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED AT SEOUL NATIONAL
- UNIVERSITY

1. [redacted] SUMMARY. ANTI-ROKG DISSIDENTS MOUNTED A DEMONSTRATION TO PROTEST THE UPCOMING NATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR UNIFICATION (NCU) ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT. ANTI-ROKG LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED AT SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY (SNU) BUT STUDENTS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE. THE MARTIAL LAW COMMAND (MLC) ALLOWED ROK MEDIA TO REPORT THE YWCA DEMONSTRATION WITH A RESTATEMENT OF THE MLC'S DETERMINATION TO PREVENT SOCIAL DISORDER. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) THE MLC ANNOUNCED NOVEMBER 26 THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GATHERING AT THE YWCA HALL IN SEOUL NOVEMBER 24 TO PROTEST THE UPCOMING NCU PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THE REPORT WAS CARRIED AS THE TOP STORY IN THE NOVEMBER 26 AFTERNOON PAPERS. ACCORDING TO THE MLC, THE ORGANIZERS ARRANGED THE

[redacted]

PAGE 02 SEOUL 17966 260950Z

MEETING IN THE GUISE OF A WEDDING CEREMONY, INCLUDING THE SENDING OF 500 INVITATION CARDS AND TWO PEOPLE DRESSED AS BRIDE AND GROOM. PAK CHANG-TAE, FORMER DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN ASSEMBLYMAN WHO BROKE WITH THE ROKG OVER THE ISSUE OF A THIRD PRESIDENTIAL TERM IN 1969, READ "A NATIONAL DECLARATION FOR STOPPING THE NCU ELECTION" WHICH URGED THE PEOPLE "TO RISE UP" AND DEMONSTRATE IN ALL MAJOR CITIES, INCLUDING THE KWANGHWAMUN INTERSECTION IN SEOUL. THE MLC ARRESTED 96 PERSONS FOR VIOLATING MARTIAL LAW DECREE #1'S BAN ON

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ASSEMBLY. THOSE DETAINED INCLUDED PAK, YANG SUN-SHIK, HAM SOK-HON (CO-CHAIRMAN WITH KIM TAE-CHUNG AND YUN PO-SON OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY AND UNIFICATION), AND FORMER TONGA ILBO REPORTER KIM PYONG-GOL. THE MLC REPEATED THAT IT "WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY ACTS WHICH CREATE SOCIAL DISORDER" AND THAT THE INCIDENT WILL BE CLOSELY INVESTIGATED.

3. [redacted] ALTHOUGH THE MLC ANNOUNCEMENT DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC GROUPS AS BEING BEHIND THE YWCA DEMONSTRATION, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE SAME FIVE GROUPS WHICH ISSUED A STATEMENT NOVEMBER 13 CRITICIZING CURRENT ROKG POLICY: DISMISSED PROFESSORS' ASSOCIATION, TONGA STRUGGLE COMMITTEE, FAMILIES OF THE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE ASSOCIATION, YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRACY, AND LITERARY FIGURES FOR THE REALIZATION OF FREEDOM. AN ESTIMATED 500 PEOPLE PARTICIPATED. A SOURCE IN THE MLC SAYS THE LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED AT THE DEMONSTRATION LISTED A NUMBER OF POLITICAL FIGURES AND SOME ROK BUSINESSMEN AS ENEMIES OF DEMOCRACY; THE MLC REPORTEDLY SENT EACH PERSON SO NAMED A COPY OF THE LEAFLET.

4. [redacted] A HANDFUL OF STUDENTS AT SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 22 DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS CALLING FOR THE

[redacted]

PAGE 03 SEOUL 17966 260950Z

REINSTATEMENT OF EXPELLED STUDENTS AND FIRED PROFESSORS, CAMPUS FREEDOM, AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE STUDENT DEFENSE CORPS AND THE RESTORATION OF "DEMOCRATIC STUDENT GOVERNMENT." POLICE PICKED UP TWO STUDENTS.

5. [redacted] COMMENT: THESE TWO INCIDENTS DEMONSTRATE THAT SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS AMONG THE DISSIDENTS AND THE STUDENT ACTIVISTS ARE NOT WILLING TO FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF OTHERS WHO URGE RESTRAINT IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-ROKG MOVEMENT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT IS THE TIME TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THEIR DEMANDS AND IGNORE PLEAS FOR MODERATION. THE INGENUITY OF MOUNTING A MOCK WEDDING CEREMONY SHOWS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY THE MINOR DETAILS OF MARTIAL LAW. THEIR AGRESSIVENESS, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT THESE ANTI-ROKG HARDLINERS MAY BE DISTANCING THEMSELVES (AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT) FROM THE MASS SUPPORT WHICH THEY NEED FOR SUCCESS. THE MLC'S WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW NEWS OF SUCH ACTIVITIES TO APPEAR IN THE MEDIA SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT SUCH IS THE MLC'S PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION. IF THE GOVERNMENT MOVES TOO SLOWLY, THE HARDLINERS MAY FIND A LARGER AND MORE SYMPATHETIC UDIENCE. AS AN ASIDE, SOME OF THOSE MOST INTERESTED IN SEEING THE U.S. TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PRODUCING DEMOCRACY STATE THAT A PUBLIC PERCEPTION BY THE KOREAN POPULATION THAT THE U.S. IS TOO CLOSELY TIED TO THE PRESENT ROKG (ESPECIALLY IF IT

LIBERALIZES IN AN EXCESSIVELY LEISURELY FASHION) COULD
PRODUCE ANTI-U.S. OUTBURSTS SUCH AS THOSE IN IRAN AND
PAKISTAN. OTHERS HAVE USED THE IRAN EXAMPLE
TO WARN US AGAINST PRESSING TOO HARD ON THE CURRENT ROKG.
GLEYSTEEN

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EXCISE

E1374

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT - PARA 4)

E.O. 12065:RDS-3 3/12/00 (GLEYSTEEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, MILI, KS
SUBJECT: YET ANOTHER ASSESSMENT OF ROK STABILITY AND
- POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
Date: 4-28-93 19

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND DEMOCRATIC-MINDEDNESS IN THE ROK DURING 1980 ARE FAIR, ALTHOUGH THE GOING WILL GET ROUGHER RATHER THAN EASIER AS THE YEAR CHURNS ON. THE STUDENTS COULD PROVE SPOILERS, BUT CIVIL UNREST WILL PROBABLY BE HELD IN CHECK. DISSIDENTS HAVE NOT FOUND THEIR BALANCE IN THE FACE OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS RELAXING RESTRICTIONS, WHILE POLITICIANS ARE BEHAVING CIRCUMSPECTLY FOR FEAR OF PROVOKING THE MILITARY AND DESTROYING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS. FOR THE SHORT TERM WORKERS MAY TAKE A TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN REAL INCOME RATHER THAN RESORT TO STRIDENT DEMANDS AS A RESPONSE TO DEPRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT IS OPERATING WITH ENOUGH COMPETENCE TO COPE WITH THE NATION'S PROBLEMS -- AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF NOT PROVIDING A CONVENIENT EXCUSE FOR THOSE WHO MIGHT WISH TO TERMINATE ITS PROGRAM OF "ORDERLY DEMOCRATIZATION".

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3. THE ODDS OF AN EARLY MILITARY COUP SEEM TO HAVE RECEDED -- IN PART BECAUSE MILITARY OFFICERS ARE COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITY OF KOREA'S ECONOMY, THE DELICACY OF KOREA'S FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE QUITE APPARENT CONSENSUS OF MOST KOREANS OPPOSING A DIRECT MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS. THE THREAT OF EARLY INTERNECINE STRIFE WITHIN THE ROK ARMY DOES NOT SEEM AS GREAT AS A FEW WEEKS AGO-- LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT OF KEY TROOP COMMANDERS AND AWARENESS THAT THE USG WOULD NOT SUPPORT AN EFFORT TO UPSET THE CURRENT EQUILIBRIUM.

4. WITHIN THE CONTROL STRUCTURE A PARTICULARLY WORRISOME PHENOMENON IS THE GREAT POWER OF CHUN DOO HWAN, WHO HAS SPREAD HIS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY NET THROUGHOUT THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND, DESPITE FLAT ASSURANCES AGAINST INVOLVING HIMSELF IN POLITICS (AS HE DEFINES POLITICS), GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN BIDING HIS TIME TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT EITHER DIRECTLY OR BEHIND SOME FACADE. SHOULD HE TRY TO EXTEND HIS FORMAL POWER TO INCLUDE THE KCIA OR MANIPULATE THE STRUCTURING OF THE NEXT ELECTIONS, HE COULD PRECIPITATE DANGEROUS PUBLIC UNREST AND REACTIVATE STRESSES WITHIN THE ROK ARMY -- EVEN HIS DECEMBER 12 COLLABORATORS MIGHT TURN ON HIM.

5. ANOTHER SOURCE OF SERIOUS CONCERN IS THE DEPTH OF DISTRUST OF THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP TOWARD KIM YONG SAM AND KIM TAE CHUNG. SINCE THIS CANNOT BE ERASED IN THE SHORT TIME BEFORE ELECTIONS, THE MILITARY WILL BE TEMPTED TO JOIN A BUREAUCRATIC/BUSINESS COALITION TO PREJUDICE THE CONTEST AND POSSIBLY TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS IF THE NDP SHOULD WIN. FORTUNATELY, SOME SENIOR OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARMY WOULD JEOPARDIZE ITS

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POPULAR SUPPORT IF IT WERE TO ENGAGE IN CRUDE MANIPULATION BEFORE AN ELECTION OR ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE A POPULARLY ELECTED NDP-LED GOVERNMENT -- AT LEAST BEFORE IT HAD BLOTTED ITS COPYBOOK.

6. HOPEFULLY PRESIDENT CHOI AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND DIRECT ELECTIONS MORE OR LESS AS PLANNED WITH A RESULTING GOVERNMENT THAT IS SOMEWHAT MORE LIBERAL THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE. CONCEIVABLY THE CONTEST WILL BE A STRAIGHTFORWARD ONE BETWEEN THE NDP AND DRP KIMS, BUT GIVEN THE NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATS, BUSINESSMEN, AND SOLDIERS WITH AN INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME, THEY MAY TRY TO INJECT OTHER PLAYERS IN THE RACE AND GIVE THEM SPECIAL ADVANTAGES. ALTHOUG SUCH A MOVE MIGHT DISTURB ROUSSEAU DEMOCRATS, WE SHOULD NOT JUMP TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD SIGNAL THE RETURN OF YUSHIN OR BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE KOREAN PUBLIC. END SUMMARY.

7. THE JUXTAPOSITION IN LOCAL MEDIA OF NEWS ABOUT KIM TAE CHUNG'S RECENT RETURN TO POLITICS AND CHUN DOO HWAN'S PROMOTION TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL CONJURES UP CONTRASTING PICTURES OF KOREA. THE FIRST IS OF A COUNTRY PROCEEDING MORE OR LESS ON SCHEDULE WITH PROMISES OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND HEADED - RATHER UNBELIEVABLY - FOR TRANSFORMATION FROM THE AUTHORITARIAN ONE-MAN RULE OF THE YUSHIN ERA TO A FULLY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN NOT MUCH OVER ONE YEAR. THE SECOND MORE SINISTER PICTURE FOCUSSES ON CHUN DOO HWAN'S GRADUAL AGGRANDIZEMENT OF POWER TO THE POINT WHERE MANY FEEL HE ALREADY CONTROLS BASIC GOVERNMENT POLICY., HE HAS WON THE BATTLE OVER HIS THIRD STAR, EXTENDED HIS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY NET THROUGHOUT THE ARMED SERVICES BY MEANS OF A COMMISSAR SYSTEM, AND SET ABOUT DEALING WITH ALL

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KINDS OF PEOPLE IN A MANNER SUGGESTIVE OF A NATIONAL LEADER RATHER THAN SECURITY OFFICER. GENERALLY, HE GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN BIDING HIS TIME TO TAKE OVER POWER -- EITHER DIRECTLY OR BEHIND A CIVILIAN FACADE. BOTH PICTURES PORTRAY IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SOUTH KOREA'S CONTEMPORARY REALITY. ULTIMATELY THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED; YET NO ONE KNOWS EXACTLY HOW AND WHEN THIS WILL OCCUR, AND MOST PEOPLE'S JUDGMENT IS COMPLICATED BY UNCERTAINTY, IGNORANCE, AND RUMOR-MONGERING.

8. HOW STABLE IS SOUTH KOREA?

GRANTING THAT THE TOUGHER TESTS LIE AHEAD, THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND DEMOCRATIC-MINDEDNESS THROUGH 1984 ARE NOT BAD. THE ODDS OF A DANGEROUS DISRUPTION, SUCH AS A MILITARY COUP OR MASSIVE STUDENT/WORKER UPRISING DO NOT SEEM HIGH. AMONG THE MILITARY, THE PROSPECT OF COUNTERACTIONS WITHIN THE ROK ARMY AGAINST THE DECEMBER 12 GROUP HAS RECEDED WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEW (AND FOR THE MOST PART COMPETENT) OFFICERS INTO KEY TROOP COMMANDS. IN RETROSPECT, MOREOVER, THOSE OFFICERS WHO PROBED OUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE COUNTERACTION APPARENTLY HAD FEW TROOPS AT THEIR READY DISPOSAL. DISGRUNTLED FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO COALESCE DANGEROUSLY UNLESS SERIOUS SOCIAL UNREST

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DEVELOPS. DESPITE HIS FLAT ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, CHUN DOO HWAN MAY TRY TO EXTEND HIS STRING-PULLING ROLE FROM THE MILITARY TO THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, BUT HOPEFULLY WILL STOP SHORT OF CAUSING FEAR AND ANTAGONISMS OF DANGEROUS PROPORTIONS.

9. ON THE CIVIL SIDE, KOREAN SOCIETY WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM STUDENTS WHO ARE SO SELF-CONSCIOUS ABOUT THEIR "HISTORICAL ROLE" AND OFTEN INSENSITIVE TO THE DANGERS OF EXCESS. OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES OF UNREST SEEM EITHER OFF BALANCE OR CHASTENED BY FEAR OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. DISSIDENTS ARE GROPING RATHER UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR TARGETS TO ATTACK. POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS -- IN FACT ALL POLITICAL LEADERS -- ARE CONSTRAINED BY LATENT THREATS AND PRE-OCCUPIED BY INTERNECINE WARFARE, WHILE WORKERS AND OTHERS WHO CREATED TROUBLE AT THE TIME OF THE PUSAN/MASAN RIOTS SEEM PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE TO KOREA'S VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES BY TAKING SOME REDUCTION IN REAL INCOME RATHER THAN TAKING TO THE STREETS.

10. WHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE?

POWER IN KOREA TODAY IS DIFFUSED. THE MILITARY CONTROL THE RAW POWER WITHOUT THE BUFFER OF A POWERFUL LEADER TO KEEP THEM IN THE TRENCHES; AND WITHIN THE MILITARY CHUN DOO HWAN IS CLEARLY THE MAN TO WATCH. YET THE MILITARY ARE NOT "RUNNING THE COUNTRY". EVEN THOUGH THEY CAN OBTAIN BLUE HOUSE RATIFICATION FOR DECISIONS IN THE MILITARY AND SECURITY AREAS, A CIVILIAN COMPLEX OF BUREAUCRATS, BUSINESSMEN, AND POLITICIANS ARE MAKING AND EXECUTING MOST OTHER DECISIONS. MOREOVER, THE LONGER THESE CIVILIANS REMAIN IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, THE MORE INFLUEN-

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TIAL AND AUTHORITATIVE THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE. THE POWER OF THE POLITICIANS IS STILL MARGINAL, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY INCREASE AS THE COUNTRY HEADS TOWARDS MORE DECISIVE STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ELECTIONS. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IS HUNKERED DOWN, WORRYING ABOUT "PURIFICATION" (ANTI-CORRUPTION) CAMPAIGNS AND TEMPTED TO BUY ITS WAY INTO POLITICAL OPERATIONS IN THE STYLE OF EARLIER ERAS.

11. HOW WELL IS THE SYSTEM FUNCTIONING?

THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM HAS LOST EFFICIENCY, DISCIPLINE, AND MOMENTUM, BUT IT IS STILL RUNNING PRETTY WELL -- PARTICULARLY IF COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES OR MEASURED AGAINST THE MAGNITUDE OF CHALLENGE. PRESIDENT CHOI UNFORTUNATELY ALLOWS HIMSELF TO BE SEEN AS A FLABBY, HYPERCAUTIOUS LEADER CONTENT WITH FORMAL ROLE PLAYING. EXCEPT FOR PRO FORMA APPEARANCES, HE TENDS TO KEEP THE MILITARY AT ARM'S LENGTH, AVOIDING ARGUMENT AND CONFRONTATION. HIS GOVERNMENT HAS NOT APPEARED DECISIVE, AND RUMORS OF BUSINESS CORRUPTION AND GENERAL LOOSENING OF STANDARDS ARE PREVALENT. HOWEVER, THESE IMPRESSIONS OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE CHOI GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED THE FIRST STAGE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL AND HAS BEEN FAR MORE DECISIVE THAN MANY ASSUMED -- POLITICALLY, LIFTING EM-9 AND ALLOWING KIM TAE CHUNG BACK ON THE SCENE; ECONOMICALLY, IN CARRYING THROUGH DEVALUATION AND ENERGY PRICE INCREASES; AND SOCIALLY, IN MAKING CHANGES IN CAMPUS ADMINISTRATION WHICH WERE OPPOSED BY THE GUARDIANS OF LAW

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AND ORDER.

12. WHAT ARE THE STRATEGIES OF KEY PLAYERS?

ALTHOUGH THE CHOI GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A PROGRAM OF "ORDERLY DEMOCRATIZATION" WITH POPULAR ELECTIONS WITHIN THE FIRST HALF OF 1981, MANY PEOPLE -- MYSELF INCLUDED -- ARE WORRIED THAT THE PROCESS WILL BE JEOPARDIZED OR SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED. TO PUT THE PROBLEM SIMPLY: PREVAILING OPINION IS THAT THE NDP WOULD SWEEP ANY ELECTION CONDUCTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE OF A NATURAL REACTION TO THE YUSHIN PERIOD; THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP VIEW THE PROSPECT OF A NDP-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT WITH SOMETHING BETWEEN DEEP APPREHENSION AND A DETERMINATION TO PREVENT IT; WHILE ALMOST EVERYBODY AGREES THAT THE KOREAN PEOPLE WOULD BE DEEPLY ANTAGONIZED BY EITHER A MILITARY TAKEOVER IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR CRASS MANIPULATION OF POPULAR ELECTIONS, NO KOREAN KNOWS HOW THIS DILEMMA IS GOING TO BE MANAGED. THE BEST THEY CAN DO IS TO SORT OUT POSSIBLE SCENARIOS AND CALCULATE THEIR OWN POTENTIAL ROLES -- WHICH ULTIMATELY WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE EMERGING PATTERN OF OTHERS' ACTIONS.

(A) THE MILITARY:

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THERE ARE TWO GREAT PROBLEMS AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS GENERALLY. FIRST, THE UNDISGUISED DISTRUST OF ALL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS -- PRE- AND POST-DECEMBER 12 HIERARCHIES AS WELL AS RETIRED OFFICERS -- TOWARD KIM TAE CHUNG (BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED SOFTNESS AND LEFTISM) AND KIM YONG SAM (BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED GENERAL INADEQUACY). A DISTURBING NUMBER STATE FLATLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT PERMIT EITHER KIM TO COME TO POWER AND WOULD MOVE TO PREVENT IT IN ADVANCE OF AN ELECTION OR BY COUP AFTER THE ELECTION. FORTUNATELY, OTHERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARMY COULD DESTROY ITS CRUCIAL RAPPORT WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IF IT WERE TO ARBITRARILY ANNUL THE RESULTS OF A MAJORITY DECISION. SECOND, KOREAN MILITARY OFFICERS VIEW THE PROCESS OF "DEMOCRATIZATION" THROUGH A YUSHIN FILTER, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO TOLERATE THE DEGREE OF FREE CHOICE AND CRITICISM ASSOCIATED WITH A MODICUM OF DEMOCRACY. DESPITE THESE POWERFUL PREJUDICES, I CONCLUDE HESITANTLY THAT THE MILITARY HIERARCHY: RECOGNIZES WITH SUFFICIENT REALISM THAT A PRE-ELECTION COUP WOULD PIT THE ARMY AGAINST THE PEOPLE IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY; WILL THUS BE STRONGLY ATTRACTED TOWARD ANY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT REDUCE THE PROSPECT OF AN NDP VICTORY; AND, IF THE NDP WERE NEVERTHELESS TO COME INTO POWER, MORE OR LESS UNDERSTANDS THAT THE NDP -- POSSIBLY EVEN KIM TAE CHUNG -- WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TIME TO PROVE ITSELF CAPABLE OR INCAPABLE OF GUIDING THE ROK. IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION WILL REMAIN A DAMOCLES SWORD OVER KOREA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FOR SOME TIME.

(B) CHUN DOO HWAN:

WE -- AND I SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE MYSELF -- SHOULD RESIST

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OVERSIMPLIFYING KOREAN POLITICS BY MAKING CHUN DOO HWAN THE SINISTER SOURCE OF ALL EVIL. HE HAPPENS TO BE ONE OF A NUMBER OF KOREANS WHOSE PERSONAL DECISIONS COULD PROVE FATEFUL FOR THEIR COUNTRY. FOR THE SHORT RUN, HE IS STRONGLY CONSTRAINED FROM OPENLY VIOLATING HIS ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT INTERVENING IN POLITICS, AND SO FAR HE HAS WORKED TO CONTROL RATHER THAN STIMULATE THE KIND OF UNREST THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY EXTENSION OF HIS POWER. YET EVEN IF HE CONTINUES TO BIDE HIS TIME, HE WILL WIELD POWER THAT MAKES ALMOST EVERYONE UNCOMFORTABLE. IN STRUCTURING THE NEXT ELECTION, HE MIGHT PLAY A VERY CRUDE ROLE BUT HE MIGHT CONTENT HIMSELF WITH PLAYING THE ROLE OF A BACKSTAGE MENTOR IF HE COULD FIND A COMBINATION OF POLITICIANS BOTH WILLING TO FRONT FOR HIM AND ABLE TO WIN AN ELECTION. MARKING TIME WILL NOT BE WITHOUT PROBLEMS FOR CHUN BECAUSE HIS OPPONENTS MAY SEEK TO EMBARRASS OR DESTROY HIM, ESPECIALLY IF HE MISPLAYS HIS CARDS. HE IS ALREADY WIDELY FEARED AND WITHIN THE ARMY EVEN HIS COLLABORATORS OF DECEMBER 12 MIGHT FEEL BETRAYED IF HE WERE TO REACH OUT FOR OVERT POLITICAL POWER. CLEARLY HE IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF OUR MAIN PROBLEMS.

(C) THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS TOLD ME QUITE CANDIDLY THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT MUCH CONFUSION WILL DEVELOP LATER THIS YEAR WHEN THE NDP AND DRP WILL DISCOVER THAT NONE OF THE KIMS IS A SHOO-IN FOR THE ROK'S NEXT PRESIDENT. THUS THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY IS TO GOVERN AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE AND TO ALLOW A POLITICAL STALEMATE TO DEVELOP

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BEFORE SUGGESTING A SOLUTION. ONE SOLUTION APPARENTLY APPEALING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, IF NOT THE PRESIDENT, WOULD BE TO ENTER THE RANKS AS A SUPRA-PARTISAN CANDIDATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD BE EASIER IF THE NDP AND DRP WERE BOTH FRAGMENTED BY THIRD PARTY ACTIVITIES, AND THE GOVERNMENT MAY HOPE THAT KIM TAE CHUNG WILL OBLIGE FROM ONE SIDE WHILE SOME BUREAUCRAT/BUSINESS/MILITARY GROUP OBLIGES FROM THE OTHER. I SENSE THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD READILY ENTER THE FRAY IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT I CREDIT HIM FOR BEING UNWILLING TO SERVE AS A FRONT FOR A MILITARY CABAL AND RECOGNIZING THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO WIN IN A FAIR ELECTION. MOST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT WOULD BE RE-ASSURED WITH SUCH A PATERNALISTIC ARRANGEMENT IF ONLY THEY COULD FIGURE OUT HOW TO CONVINCE THE VOTERS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER SEEM RELATIVELY CONFIDENT THAT THEIR SCHEDULE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZA-TION AND ELECTIONS CAN BE MAINTAINED. LIKE THE MILITARY, THEY HAVE IN MIND A MORE CONSERVATIVE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY THAN MUCH OF THE URBAN PUBLIC AND THEY MAY ADOPT A MORE INTERVENTIONIST ROLE THAN MANY PEOPLE THINK FAIR FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

(D) THE DRP AND KIM JONG PIL:

KIM JONG PIL RECOGNIZES THAT HIS CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR AN

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ELECTION VICTORY ARE POOR BUT HE OBVIOUSLY HOPES THAT WITH TIME HE WILL HAVE A FIGHTING CHANCE TO WIN. HE WILL WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO ENCOURAGE FRACTURES IN THE OPPOSITION AND TRY TO REPAIR THE DRP'S IMAGE THROUGH POLICIES DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO FARMERS AND THE URBAN POOR. ABOVE ALL HE WILL EXPLOIT HIS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE AND HIS RELATIVELY GREATER ACCEPTABILITY TO THE MILITARY THAN EITHER OF THE NDP KIMS. NEVERTHELESS, KIM JONG PIL WILL BE A LONG SHOT UNLESS THE ESTABLISHMENT RALLIES AROUND HIM, WHICH THEY HAVE NOT SO FAR. HE HAS THE LIABILITIES OF PAST CORRUPTION, CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH YUSHIN, AND POWERFUL ENEMIES WITHIN THE DRP. MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SEE HIM SIMPLY AS PREFERABLE TO THE NDP KIMS AND NOTHING MORE.

E. NDP KIM YUNG SAM AND KIM TAE CHUNG:

THE NDP'S RATHER UNQUESTIONED ADVANTAGE IS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY WIN DECISIVELY IF A POPULARITY CONTEST WERE CONDUCTED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ITS GREAT LIABILITY IS THE UNDISGUISED DISTRUST OF THE MILITARY LEADERS (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THE TROOPS). ALTHOUGH NEITHER KIM YONG SAM NOR KIM TAE CHUNG HAS LET WORRY OVERRIDE HIS AMBITION, NDP LEADERS KNOW VERY WELL THAT A PARTY SPLIT WOULD KEEP POWER OUT OF THEIR GRASP. TO A LESSER EXTENT THERE ARE GLIMMERINGS OF AWARENESS THAT OVER TIME THE NDP MAY BE FORCED TO DEMONSTRATE MORE CONVINCINGLY THAN IN THE PAST THAT IT IS CAPABLE OF INTELLIGENT POLICIES AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION, NOT JUST OPPOSITION FIREWORKS.

THE STRATEGIES OF THE TWO KIMS REFLECT THESE CONSIDERATIONS. THEY ARE PLAYING RATHER ROUGHLY WITH EACH OTHER

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BUT ARE AT LEAST TRYING NOT TO SPLIT THE PARTY WHILE THEY BOTH BLAME ALL ILLS ON THE CHOI GOVERNMENT AND ARGUE THAT KIM JONG PIL CAN NEVER ESCAPE HIS YUSHIN ASSOCIATION. NEITHER KIM HAS YET DARED TO PURSUE THE CORRUPTION ISSUE WHICH REACHES WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS, AND, IN A STRIKING BREAK FROM THE PAST, BOTH HAVE COMMENDABLY REFRAINED FROM INFLAMING PUBLIC PASSIONS OR SNIPING AT SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH/SOUTH KOREAN DIALOGUE. THE IMAGEMAKERS OF BOTH KIMS ARE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM OF "POLICY-MINDEDNESS" AND KIM YONG SAM HAS AT LEAST TRIED TO IMPROVE HIS MILITARY TIES. THIS EFFORTS SO FAR HAVE NOT MADE MUCH OF A DENT. KIM TAE CHUNG HAS TAKEN THE PROUD STAND THAT HE IS READY TO CONSULT WITH THE MILITARY IF THEY TAKE THE INITIATIVE, PRESUMABLY AN INDICATION THAT HE EITHER FAILS TO UNDERSTAND HIS PROBLEM OR IS TOYING WITH A DANGEROUS KIND OF CONTEST. THE NDP WILL PROBABLY AVOID A "OVERHEATED" APPROACH FOR A FEW MORE MONTHS TO BUILD UP THE IMAGE OF SOBRIETY, TO AVOID BEING CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING CIVILIAN RULE, AND TO SORT OUT THE LEADERSHIP CONTEST WITHIN THE PARTY. AT SOME POINT, HOWEVER, IT WILL ALMOST SURELY TAKE OFF THE GLOVES EVEN AT THE RISK OF A CRACKDOWN BY THE AUTHORITIES.

13. UNLESS THE STUDENTS OR OTHERS GET OUT OF HAND, KOREA IS LIKELY TO REMAIN FAIRLY STABLE FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BECAUSE: THE SOLDIERS KNOW THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MILITARY TAKEOVER; GENERAL CHUN HAS PAINTED HIMSELF INTO A CORNER IN TERMS OF EXTENDING HIS FORMAL POWER; THE POLITICIANS KNOW THAT THEIR GRADUALLY EXPAND-

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ING CONTEST IS AT THE SUFFERANCE OF MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES; THE CHOI GOVERNMENT KNOWS IT HAS THE CENTRAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING CHAOTIC DEVELOPMENT; AND THE GENERAL POPULACE SEEMS MORE OR LESS SATISFIED OR AT LEAST UNWILLING TO MANIFEST ITS UNHAPPINESS BY DRAMATIC ACTION. THE DISPOSITION OF THE KIM JAE KYU CASE AND THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW WILL BE TRICKY, BUT THE CRUNCH POINTS WILL BE THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEXT ELECTIONS. THE CHANCE OF VERY SERIOUS CONTROVERSY OVER THESE ISSUES IS GREAT, MAGNIFIED BY A STAGGERING DEGREE OF REGIONAL ANIMOSITY. HOPEFULLY GENERAL CHUN AND LIKE-MINDED MILITARY OFFICERS WILL RESTRAIN THEMSELVES WHILE POLITICIANS WORK OUT COMPROMISES THAT WILL ALLOW AT LEAST SOME PROGRESS IN THE CURRENT ROK EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS MAINTAINED ITS BASIC COHESION AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO.

14. GENERAL WICKHAM CONCURS IN THIS ASSESSMENT. [redacted] RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY FOLLOW SEPTEL.

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6866
INFO COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

[redacted] SEOUL 07260

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/86 (GLEYSTEEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, PINS, KS
SUBJECT: WIVES OF PRISONERS CALL ON AMBASSADOR

1. [redacted]

2. ON JUNE 6, A DELEGATION OF WIVES OF DISSIDENTS ARRESTED ON OR AFTER MAY 17 CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR.

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3. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT USG CONSIDERED POLITICAL ACTIONS OF ROKG SINCE MAY 17 AS A SETBACK TO PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HAD SAID SO PUBLICLY. USG HAD NOT QUESTIONED ROKG'S NEED AND RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER, HOWEVER. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT USG CONTINUED TO ENCOURAGE ESTABLISHMENT OF BROADLY BASED GOVT

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 07260 060614Z

IN KOREA. HE POINTED OUT THAT U.S. OPTIONS TO MOVE ROKG IN THIS DIRECTION WERE LIMITED AND COUNSELED MODERATION ON PART OF ALL ACTORS ON KOREAN SCENE AS THE NATION WORKED OUT ITS FUTURE.

4. WOMEN SAID THEY HAD CALLED ON THE DEFENSE SECURITY COMMAND A WEEK AGO TO ASK ABOUT THEIR HUSBANDS, BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHERE THEIR HUSBANDS WERE BEING HELD, HOW THEY WERE, OR WHETHER THEY

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COULD GIVE THEM CLOTHES AND MEDICINE. THERE WERE MANY RUMORS ABOUT TORTURE OR KILLINGS OF PRISONERS AND, WITHOUT INFORMATION FROM DSC, THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION OF THEIR HUSBANDS.

5. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THEIR HUSBANDS AND OTHER PRISONERS NOW DETAINED. HE HAD ALREADY MADE INQUIRIES OF ROKG ABOUT STATUS AND WELFARE OF PRISONERS. HE HAD SPOKEN TO HIGH-LEVEL ROK MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS AND MADE KNOWN TO THEM U.S. CONCERN THAT PRISONERS BE TREATED HUMANELY AND THAT, IF THERE ARE CHARGES AGAINST THEM, THEY BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL PROMPTLY. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED THE LADIES TO KEEP HIM INFORMED ON ANY INFORMATION THEY MAY DEVELOP ON THEIR HUSBANDS SINCE EMBASSY INQUIRIES RECEIVED GREATER ATTENTION FROM ROKG WHEN THEY WERE DETAILED RATHER THAN GENERAL.

6. WOMEN ASKED AMBASSADOR TO ENCOURAGE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND OTHER AGENCIES TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN KOREA. AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THESE ORGANIZATIONS WOULD LIKELY DO SO ON THEIR OWN WITHOUT OUTSIDE PROMPTING.

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7. WOMEN TURNED TO POLITICAL ISSUES. THEY SAID THEY HAD SEEN NO COMPROMISE EXTENDED BY GOVT OF PRESIDENT CHOI (M-R: CH'OE), THAT ROKG HAD NEVER ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH ORGANIZATIONS THE WOMEN BELONGED TO, AND THAT THE STUDENTS HAD SHOWN GREAT RESTRAINT IN PERIOD BEFORE MAY 17. THEY SAID THEIR HUSBANDS HAD NO POLITICAL AMBITIONS, BUT THAT GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) WAS TRAMPLING ON THEM. THEY ASKED AMBASSADOR IF THERE WERE REALLY NO HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN KOREA.

8. AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO DRAW SUCH A CONCLUSION. THE PATH TOWARD POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, BUT AMBASSADOR DID NOT FEEL AS PESSIMISTIC AS VIEW EXPRESSED BY WOMEN. HE THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE WOMEN AND OTHERS TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS, BUT ENCOURAGED THEM TO DO SO IN A MODERATE TONE AND TO BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE WHEN THEY COULD.

9. UPON LEAVING, WOMEN TOLD OFFICER ESCORTING THEM TO THE DOOR THAT THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH USG STANCE AND FEARED ANOTHER "IRAN" WAS IN THE MAKING. GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80SEOUL 004357

ADP414
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PAGE 01 SEOUL 04357 080722Z
ACTION SS-15

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
------------------056262 080727Z /10

O 080714Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5452

[redacted]SEOUL 04357

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/8/86 (MONJO, JOHN C.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP, EINT, KS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FONMIN PARK

1. [redacted]-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FONMIN TONG JIN P A R K (M-R: P A K TONG-CHIN) APRIL 14. THERE ARE NO SURPRISES. THE POINTS MADE IN PARAS 3 AND 4 BELOW ARE IMPORTANT NOT BECAUSE PARK NEEDS TO BE CONVINCED BUT BECAUSE HE NEEDS TO REPORT THAT USG SHARES THE VIEWS OF ITS LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES.

3. KOREAN POLITICAL SCENE. SECRETARY COULD COMMENT FAVORABLY ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS (LIFTING OF EM-9, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION PROCESS, ETC.), BUT NOTE OUR CONTINUED CONCERN THAT PRESIDENT CHOI'S POLITICAL PROGRAM BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM MILITARY OR ANY OTHER QUARTER. SECRETARY SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR BELIEF THAT OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF KOREANS WANT A DEGREE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, INCLUDING A REAL CHOICE IN POPULAR ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR. HE COULD THEN ASK PARK'S ESTIMATE OF HOW THINGS ARE LIKELY TO EVOLVE.

4. U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS. AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WICKHAM CONTINUE TO URGE ALL IMPORTANT KOREAN ELEMENTS TO WORK FOR AN ORDERLY POLITICAL EVOLUTION LEADING TO ADOPTION OF A

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NEW CONSTITUTION AND ELECTION OF A POPULARLY CHOSEN PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE CAREFUL NOT TO INDICATE ANY PREFERENCE AMONG THE LEADING CONTENDERS. AMBASSADOR AND WICKHAM HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR MILITARY TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE WORKING RELATIONS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS. WE TRUST ROK MILITARY ARE RECEIVING THE SAME GUIDANCE, SO THAT ANY TEMPORARY RIFTS MAY BE FULLY REPAIRED.

5. NORTH-SOUTH TALKS. WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY WAY ROK POPULATION HAS STOOD BEHIND GOVERNMENT AS IT NEGOTIATES WITH NORTH. WE BELIEVE ROKG HAS BEEN WISE TO CONSULT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY IN EFFORT TO KEEP ISSUE OUT OF PARTISAN POLITICS. WE CELT ROKG HANDLED INFILTRATION INCIDENTS WISELY, NEITHER IGNORING THEM NOR LETTING THEM CAUSE THE TALKS TO ABORT. IMPORTANT THAT ROK PRESERVE THE WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT THAT IT HAS ACHIEVED BY ITS BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH. HOW DOES PARK THINK THE TALKS WILL COME OUT?

6. SCM AND PPT. WE ARE PLEASED MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY DATES AND LOCI HAVE BEEN FOUND FOR THESE TWO ANNUAL MEETINGS. OUR TWO SIDES ARE NOW WORKING ON THE AGENDAS (ARMACOST AND PLATT VISITS TO KOREA IN THIS CONNECTION).

7. CHINA AND KOREA. SECRETARY MAY WISH TO BRIEF PARK ON VICE MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN'S VISIT TO U.S. (PARK LEFT KOREA PRIOR TO OUR RECEIVING MANY OF THE REPORTING TELS). ALSO SECRETARY MIGHT WISH TO MENTION OUR RAISING INFILTRATION QUESTION WITH CHINESE. IN ALL CONTACTS WITH CHINESE WE BELIEVE ROK'S WOULD BE WISE TO KEEP PUSHING FOR CONTACTS, BEGINNING WITH RELATIVELY EASY ISSUES SUCH AS TRADE AND TRYING HARD TO AVOID PUBLICITY.

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8. OLYMPICS. SECRETARY MIGHT WISH TO BRING PARK UP TO DATE ON STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS.

9. IRAN. SECRETARY WILL WISH TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THAT KOREA, ALONG WITH ALL OTHERS, DO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH OUR REQUESTS AND AVOID IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN UNTIL THE HOSTAGES ARE FREED.

10. ECONOMIC MATTERS. SECRETARY MIGHT NOTE THE FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEATHER AND THE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY CEILING AS EVIDENCE OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. IF THE RICE PROBLEM HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WITH JAPAN, THIS TOO WOULD BE WORTH MENTIONING.

11. PARK'S TRIP. WHAT DID PARK GLEAN FROM HIS TALKS IN INDIA, SRI LANKA, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN, AND THE UK? (KOREAN PRESS INDICATED HE DEVOTED SOME TIME IN TALKING TO KOREAN AMBASSADORS POSTED IN EUROPE ABOUT DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS WITH EAST EUROPE.) GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80SEOUL 004247

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 04247 01 OF 02 042121Z
ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ADS-00 SS-15 NSC-06 /031 W
------------------032481 042126Z /64

P 040938Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5413
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

[redacted]ECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 04247

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BEIJING AND TOKYO - PASS CODEL BINGHAM

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/3/86 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, SHUM, KS, US
SUBJECT: CODEL CALL ON KIM DAE JUNG

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT. THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH CODEL.

2. CONGRESSMEN BONKER, BURTON, JONES, FITHIAN, BEILENSON, AND MRS. BINGHAM CALLED ON FORMER NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP)PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE KIM DAE JUNG AT HIS HOME APRIL 1. CONGRESSMAN BONKER SAID HE HAD READ THAT KIM WILL NOT FORM A NEW PARTY AND WORK WITH THE NDP. KIM SAID THAT HE WANTED TO WORK WITH THE NDP (HE HAD BEEN A PARTY MEMBER UNTIL 1978) AND ITS PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM. THE NDP MUST OPEN ITS DOORS TO THE DISSIDENTS. KIM DAE JUNG HOPED THAT THIS ISSUE HAD NOT "PLANTED THE SEED OF DIVISION" IN THE PARTY. WHILE THERE ARE FEW REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSITION KIMS, KIM DAE JUNG SAID THAT HE IS MORE INTERESTED IN DEMOCRATIZATION THAN IN WHETHER HE OR THE NDP PRESIDENT BECOMES THE NDP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE ON POLICY TOWARD THE U.S., ALTHOUGH IF HE IS ELECTED, SAID KIM DAE JUNG, THE TIES WOULD BECOME EVEN CLOSER THAN

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THEY ARE NOW.

3. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NDP AND DRP ARE MUCH GREATER THAN THOSE BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSITION KIMS, SAID KIM DAE JUNG. THE NDP STANDS FOR A FREE ECONOMY AND A FAIRER DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. THE NDP IS SKEPTICAL OF THE DRP'S SINCERITY IN SEEKING DEMOCRATIZATION, AND IN FACT THERE ARE "HUGE DIFFERENCES" BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. THE DRP WANTS A SEMI-OPPRESSIVE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IF

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A TRULY FREE SOCIETY IS ACHIEVED IN KOREA, THIS WILL ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE NORTH. DURING PRESIDENT PARK'S REGIME MANY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING KIM JONG PIL, WERE SUSPECTED OF CORRUPTION. THIS MUST BE ROOTED OUT.

4. CONGRESSMAN BURTON THEN QUESTIONED KIM ABOUT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. FIRST, WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OR POWERFUL ELEMENTS TRY TO STOP THE ELECTION? KIM SAID THAT, WHILE HE COULD NOT TOTALLY DENY THIS POSSIBILITY, THE CHANCES FOR THIS ARE SMALL. THE PEOPLE WILL NOT GIVE AN EXCUSE TO ANYONE SEEKING TO BLOCK ELECTIONS.

5. BURTON ASKED IF ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED. KIM SAID THIS WAS MORE WORRISOME. THE GOVERNMENT COULD STALL ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION OR ELECTION PREPARATIONS. BURTON ASKED IF THAT MEANT THAT THERE IS NO FIRM TIMETABLE, AND KIM REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOT. BONKER SAID THAT PRESIDENT CHOI HAD IMPLIED THAT MORNING THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD NEXT SPRING AND ASKED KIM IF THERE WERE NO ANNOUNCED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO ELECTIONS EARLY NEXT YEAR. BOTH KIM AND CHO SE HYONG, A NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN INTERPRETING FOR KIM, SAID THAT NO FIRM DATE HAD BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED. THE POLITICAL

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COUNSELOR INTERJECTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD IMPLIED ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD NEXT SPRING, BUT KIM REPEATED THAT A CONCRETE SCHEDULE HAD NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED.

6. COMMENT: IN A SPEECH ON NOVEMBER 10, 1979, PRESIDENT CHOI SAID THAT "THE NEW PRESIDENT TO BE ELECTED OUGHT NOT EXHAUST THE REMAINING TENURE OF OFFICE STIPULATED IN THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION BUT, AS SOON AS REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE, SOUND OUT A WIDE SPECTRUM OF ALL SECTORS AND LAYERS OF SOCIETY, AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION". THE PRESIDENT AFFIRMED THIS STATEMENT IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF DECEMBER 21, 1979, AND SAID "I THINK THAT A CONSTITUTION THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WILL APPROVE CAN BE PREPARED IN ABOUT A YEAR'S TIME, UNLESS ANY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OCCUR. IT IS MY HOPE THAT SUBSEQUENT NECESSARY STEPS WILL THEN BE TAKEN STEADILY AND FAIR ELECTIONS HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE." WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE STEPS LEADING UP TO ELECTIONS HAS NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED, VIRTUALLY EVERYONE ASSUMES THAT THEY WILL BE HELD NEXT SPRING. IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE CODEL EARLIER THAT DAY, FOR EXAMPLE, NDP PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM SPOKE OF MARCH 1981 ELECTIONS (HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER TWICE WITH THE PRESIDENT). WHILE SAYING THERE IS NO REASON THE ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT BE HELD EARLIER, KIM ACCEPTED THE EARLY 1981 TIME FRAME FOR

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ELECTIONS. KIM DAE JUNG ALSO TOLD THE DELEGATION THAT HE COULD ACCEPT THIS SCHEDULE. END COMMENT.

7. CONGRESSMAN BURTON ASKED KIM IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS MIGHT NOT ABIDE BY ELECTION RESULTS. KIM SAID THAT THIS IS "UNIMAGINABLE". KOREANS ARE

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ACTION H-03

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

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BEIJING AND TOKYO - PASS CODEL BINGHAM

POLITICALLY MATURE, AND IF ANYONE TRIES SUCH A MOVE THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT ALLOW IT.

8. CONGRESSMAN BURTON ASKED IF KIM SAW ANY EVIDENCE THAT ANY ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE HELPING ONE PARTY OR ANOTHER. KIM SAID THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY RECENTLY. THE U.S. ROLE IS "IMPRESSIVE" AND KOREANS APPRECIATE IT. BEFORE PRESIDENT PARK'S ASSASSINATION, SOME PEOPLE HAD ENTERTAINED DOUBTS ABOUT OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT NOW ALL THESE DOUBTS ARE GONE. KIM SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE 1980'S. THE PEOPLE HAVE MATURED AND WILL GIVE NO EXCUSE TO NORTH KOREA OR ENEMIES OF DEMOCRACY TO STOP THE PROCESS. KOREA TODAY IS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN IRAN AFTER THE SHAH'S EXPULSION. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON WHAT IS NEEDED EXISTS. THE PRINCIPLE OF THIS NATIONAL CONSENSUS IS (A) ANTI-COMMUNISM, (B) LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, (C) FREE ECONOMIC SYSTEM, (D) SOCIAL JUSTICE, (E) CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. AND JAPAN, AND (F) A DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH.

9. KIM SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN A MODERATE, PRESIDENT PARK HAD FORCED PEOPLE TO BECOME EXTREMISTS.

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PARK HAD EVEN TRIED TO KILL HIM, SAID KIM, "BUT NOW I'M A MODERATE AGAIN. I WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE CHOI GOVERNMENT, AND CONVINCE STUDENTS TO DO THE SAME. IF CHOI IS FAITHFUL TO DEMOCRACY, WE WILL SEE A SMOOTH TRNSITION. THE U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT ONLY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, NOT ANY ONE PERSON, INCLUDING ME." UNFORTUNATELY, CHOI IS RELUCTANT TO SHORTEN THE PERIOD OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, "BUT DON'T WORRY, WE CAN HANDLE IT". PRESIDENT CHOI CLAIMS THAT HE NEEDS AN ENTIRE YEAR TO AMEND

THE CONSTITUTION. THERE IS NO REASON FOR THIS, BUT "I CAN BE PATIENT".

10. CONGRESSMAN FITHIAN ASKED KIM WHAT INFLUENCE OPPOSITION ISSUES LIKE INFLATION WERE LIKELY TO HAVE ON THE VOTERS. KIM SAID THAT PRESIDENT PARK EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC GROWTH TOO MUCH, WHICH RESULTED IN A POOR DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. BECAUSE OF PARK, THE DRP IS IN A VERY UNFAVORABLE POSITION IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS. STILL, THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE PEOPLE IS WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS FAITHFUL TO DEMOCRATIZATION. GLEYSTEEN

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PAGE 01 STATE 100417
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /030 R

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S:ARAPHEL
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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

S/S REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by EK
4-28-93

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E.O. 12065: RDS-2, 4, 4/14/2000 (HOLBROOKE, RICHARD C.)

TAGS: PEPR, OVIP (PARK, TONG JIN), KN, KS, US

SUBJECT: ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY -- GENERAL ISSUES AND IRAN

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER P A R K TONG JIN (M-R: PAK TONG-CHIN) MET WITH THE SECRETARY FOR MORE THAN ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS APRIL 14 IN HIS ONLY MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS DURING HIS ONE-DAY STOP IN WASHINGTON. ACCOMPANYING PARK WERE ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER P A R K SANG YOUNG (M-R: PAK SSANG-YONG), AMBASSADOR YOUNG SHIK K I M (M-R: KIM YONG-SIK), AND AMERICAN BUREAU DIRECTOR-GENERAL CHONG HAH Y U (M-R: YU CHONG-HA).

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ALSO PRESENT WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE, NSC

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STAFF MEMBER GREGG, AND KOREA COUNTRY DIRECTOR RICH. THIS MESSAGE COVERS THE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS. OTHER TOPICS ARE COVERED IN SEPTELS.

3. FOLLOWING BRIEF COMMENTS ABOUT HIS VISITS IN ASIA AND EUROPE BEFORE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON, PARK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR USG ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ROK SINCE THE CRITICAL OCCURRENCES OF LATE OCTOBER. PRESIDENT CHOI HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY ASSURANCES THAT HE IS FAITHFULLY CARRYING OUT HIS COMMITMENTS TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE TO OVERSEE RATIFICATION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAS FOLLOWED EVENTS IN KOREA WITH GREAT INTEREST, AND WITH GREAT SATISFACTION OVER THE MANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE HIS VISIT IN EARLY NOVEMBER. HE ASKED THAT HIS RESPECT BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT CHOI FOR HIS SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF EMERGENCY MEASURE NO. 9, THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THE BEGINNING OF CONCRETE WORK ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION. NOTING THAT GENERAL WICKHAM (CINCUNC) AND AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR PEOPLE IN KOREA TO MAINTAIN VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS, INCLUDING THE ROK MILITARY, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SIMILAR GUIDANCE IS IN EFFECT ON THE KOREAN SIDE AND THAT THERE WILL BE THE FULLEST CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL COOPERATION.

5. IRAN--THE SECRETARY NOTED THE WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISLOCATION DUE TO OIL PRICE

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PROBLEMS. AT PRESENT THERE IS SOMETHING OF AN OIL GLUT, BUT SOME PRODUCERS MAY REDUCE THEIR PRODUCTION TO FIRM THE MARKET. IRAN IS NOW CHARGING A PREMIUM OF TWO DOLLARS OR MORE FOR ITS OIL, BUT HOPEFULLY THE REALITIES OF THE MARKETPLACE WILL DICTATE A REDUCTION. WE ESTIMATE IRAN'S PRODUCTION IS DOWN TO ONE MILLION BPD, OR ONLY ABOUT 300,000 BPD FOR EXPORT AFTER DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE MET. THEY ARE RUNNING OUT OF EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS FOR THEIR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE

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OF CHAOS IN THE OIL FIELDS, AND PRODUCTION PROSPECTS ARE GENERALLY UNCERTAIN.

6. THE SECRETARY THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE ROK'S CONTINUING SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY OVER THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WE WERE B/A5
HOPEFUL WE HAD WORKED OUT CONCRETE STEPS WITH IRAN REGARDING THE HOSTAGES, BUT EACH TIME WHEN THE CRUNCH CAME THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CARRY THROUGH. THERE IS SIMPLY NO ONE IN TEHRAN WITH WHOM WE CAN DEAL WHO IS A COMPETENT INTERLOCUTOR. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THIS IS THEREFORE THE MOST FRUSTRATING PROBLEM HE HAS EVER FACED.

7. THE USG HAS USED GREAT RESTRAINT. WE HAVE UTILIZED ALL AVAILABLE INTERNATIONAL ORGANS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED TIME AFTER TIME. THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO PUT INTO PLACE IN SOLIDARITY WITH OUR ALLIES SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WHICH HAVE A BITE. THE EC NINE WILL BE DISCUSSING ON APRIL 22 WHETHER TO TAKE COLLECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN. IF THERE IS NO COMMUNITY AGREEMENT, THEN INDIVIDUAL EC MEMBERS WILL BE FREE TO TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF OUR FRIENDS TO REALIZE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATING AND DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THAT

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THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE REACHING THE END OF THEIR ROPE.

8. FOREIGN MINISTER PARK SAID HE SHARED THE FRUSTRATION AND PROFOUND DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE FAILURE OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE FORTHRIGHT ACTION IN SPITE OF U.S. PATIENCE FOR SO MANY MONTHS. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR AN ESTIMATE OF THE CHANCE FOR SUCCESS OF DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID WE BELIEVE THOSE IN IRAN OUTSIDE THE CONSERVATIVE CLERICAL ELEMENT OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE WANT THE HOSTAGE ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED SOON SO THE GOVERNMENT CAN TURN TO URGENT ISSUES SUCH AS THE ECONOMY AND INCIPIENT SEPARATISM. CONTINUATION OF PRESENT TRENDS COULD LEAD TO FRAGMENTATION OF THE COUNTRY AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION. HOWEVER, THE

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RIGHT-WING CLERICAL GROUPS DO NOT AGREE WITH THE NEED TO TURN TO THESE OTHER PRIORITIES. WE FORESEE A HEIGHTENED STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CLERICAL AND SECULAR GROUPS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. MEANWHILE, WE MUST KEEP UP ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE. WE BELIEVE IT IS HAVING AN EFFECT.

10.

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THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT IF THERE IS NOT STRONG COLLECTIVE ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON IRAN, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE TO

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UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH WE WOULD RATHER NOT TAKE.

11. PARK SAID THAT THE ROK IS CURRENTLY DEPENDENT UPON IRAN FOR 75,000 BPD OF OIL, ABOUT 12 PERCENT OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION.

B/A3

THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ASKED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO RECALL THEIR AMBASSADORS AND THEY HAVE DONE SO. IF THE SITUATION DOES NOT IMPROVE BY MID-MAY, WE ARE ASKING THAT THEY

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PROCEED TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS   VANCE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80STATE 207196

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MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority to.
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
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ADP910 [redacted]

PAGE 01 STATE 207196
ORIGIN EA-12

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INFO OCT-00 H-01 ADS-00 SS-15 HA-05 (ADS) R

DRAFTED BY EA/K:W T BREER:JCM
APPROVED BY EA/K:W T BREER, ACTING
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
H:W ITOH (INFO) , EA/RA:J CUNNINGHAM (INFO)
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R 050954Z AUG 80
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

[redacted] STATE 207196

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS:PINT, PINS, KS

SUBJECT: LETTER TO AMBASSADOR FROM CONGRESSMAN WOLFF

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN AUGUST 1 LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR. WE ARE HOLDING THE ORIGINAL FOR HIS RETURN. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO MAKE INTERIM RESPONSE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

WHEN WE MET RECENTLY IN MY OFFICE IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE PRESENT CRISIS IN SOUTH KOREA, I INDICATED THAT I HELD INCREASINGLY GRAVE RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE ABILITY OF THE FRIENDS OF SOUTH KOREA TO CONTINUE TO MUSTER THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IF THE PRESENT TRENDS IN SOUTH KOREA CONTINUED.

[redacted]

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I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR YOU IF I SPECIFIED SOME OF MY CONCERNS IN WRITING, SO THAT, SHOULD YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE, YOU COULD CITE THESE VIEWS TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN SOUTH KOREA.

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SPECIFICALLY, I THINK WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE TRAGEDY IN IRAN, AND THE SOCIAL UPHEAVALS ON TAIWAN, IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND OTHER NATIONS, THAT NO AMOUNT OF AMERICAN

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MORAL SUPPORT OR MATERIAL AID CAN INSULATE A GOVERNMENT FROM ITS OWN PEOPLE.

THUS, THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES, IN MY VIEW, WOULD NEVER ABANDON ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH KOREA, DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT, SHOULD NOT, OR WILL NOT HAVE DEEP RESERVATIONS ABOUT DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA, PARTICULARLY AS THEY IMPACT ON INTERNAL STABILITY.

AS IN IRAN, WE ARE LEARNING THAT ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST ENFORCE ITS LEGITIMACY THROUGH THE USE OF TROOPS, WIDE-SPREAD ARRESTS OF POPULAR POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND IN-TELLECTUAL LEADERS, AND SEVERE PRESS CENSORSHIP, WILL BE AN INHERENTLY UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.

WE CANNOT EXPECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, OR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CONGRESS, TO FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA, OR IN ANY FOREIGN NATION. SIMILARLY, NO DOUBT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH KOREA VIEW WITH CONCERN MANY ACTIONS OR OCCURENCES IN THE UNITED STATES.

NONETHELESS, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, A PERCEIVED PATTERN OF

[redacted]

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ACTIONS OF OCCURENCES IN SOUTH KOREA WILL BECOME VERY DIFFICULT TO PUT INTO A PERSPECTIVE OF UNDERSTANDING, MUCH LESS CONTINUED SUPPORT ACROSS-THE-BOARD IN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY AREAS.

THUS, THE ARREST OF VIRTUALLY EVERY POPULAR POLITICAL LEADER, AND THE APPARENT DETERMINATION TO TRY FOR HIS LIFE A MAN NEARLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF SOUTH KOREA, AND IN WHOM THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED ITS HUMANI-TARIAN INTEREST, ARE AMONG THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE CAUSED MOUNTING CONCERN IN THE CONGRESS.

I WOULD BE REMISS IN MY DUTY AS A FRIEND OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE IF I DID NOT MAKE CLEAR MY CONCERN THAT IF THE PRESENT TRENDS IN SOUTH KOREA CONTINUE, AND IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE APPARENT INTENTION TO TRY KIM DAE JUNG FOR HIS LIFE REACHES A NEGATIVE RESULT, THE NEXT VOTES CON-CERNING SOUTH KOREA -- INCLUDING POSSIBLE SECURITY ASSISTANCE -- WILL BE IN JEOPARDY. I WOULD CITE THE JULY 25 VOTE ON THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION ACT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS, WHERE THE CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY RESTRICTED ANY MONEY GOING TO ENFORCE MARTIAL LAW IN SOUTH KOREA.

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IN VERY FRANK AND CANDID PUBLIC TESTIMONY BEFORE THE

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FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THIS WEEK, SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE SPECIFIED OTHER CONCERNS WHICH WOULD WELL AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT: THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW SO THAT THE SCHEDULE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD HELP REDUCE THE SOCIAL TENSIONS IN SOUTH KOREA, AND WHICH WOULD HELP RESTORE THE DREAM OF DEMOCRACY TO THE YOUTH OF KOREA, WHO WILL INHERIT THEIR COUNTRY REGARDLESS OF THE ACTIONS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

[redacted]

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U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE CONGRESS, FOR THAT MATTER, CAN FREQUENTLY BE CRITICIZED FOR RAPID SWINGS OF SUPPORT FOR ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER IN WORLD AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, THIS IS A PHENOMENON WHICH HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. I RAISE THIS POINT BECAUSE OF THE RECENT PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE BY THE AUTHORITIES IN PYONGYANG.

A LOSS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC GOOD WILL AND SUPPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA, IF PRESENT TRENDS CONTINUE, COULD THUS BECOME IRREVERSIBLE, WITNESS CURRENT U.S. ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS NOT GOING TO DIMINISH FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

WHILE I COULD MAKE OTHER POINTS, I THINK MY ESSENTIAL MESSAGE IS CLEAR, THAT IS, THE FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH KOREA ARE GOING TO FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO SECURE THE TRADITIONAL SUPPORT WHICH HAS CHRACTERIZED OUR RELATIONS OVER THE YEARS, UNLESS THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH KOREA EXERCISES RESTRAINT.

TRUSTING THAT THESE THOUGHTS MAY SERVE OF SOME USE TO YOU, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I SUPPORT AND APPRECIATE YOUR OUTSTANDING EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE DIALOG BETWEEN SEOUL AND WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY YOURS,

LESTER L. WOLFF, CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

END TEXT. MUSKIE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80SEOUL 001186 **UNCLASSIFIED** 173

ADP727
[redacted]

PAGE 01 SEOUL 01186 01 OF 03 290105Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08 ICA-11
DODE-00 AID-07 MMO-01 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 MED-05
HA-05 L-03 DLOS-09 TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-01 PC-01
PER-01 COME-00 OMB-01 INM-05 CA-01 SIG-03 COMP-01
FBO-05 AGR-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 A-02 JUS-01 DEA-01
SP-02 OC-06 PPT-01 VO-05 OCS-06 IO-14 /181 W
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P 290051Z JAN 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3928
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

[redacted] ECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 01186

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/28/86 (GLEYSTEEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: AMGT, OGEN, PEPR, KS
SUBJECT: KOREA - AMBASSADOR'S POLICY ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) 73 STATE 310299 (PARA 5), (B) STATE 003581

900 36068

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date 9/13/93
(X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY MR Cases Only
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1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BASIC U.S. INTERESTS IN KOREA REMAIN UNCHANGED BUT THE FOCUS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS HAS ALTERED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE PAST YEAR. MAJOR BILATERAL PROBLEMS --SUCH AS THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE, KOREAGATE AND THE TRADE BALANCE--WERE ESSENTIALLY RESOLVED IN 1979. NOW, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT PARK'S DEATH AND THE MILITARY UPHEAVAL OF DECEMBER 12, WE FIND OURSELVES IN AN UNPRECEDENTEDLY ACTIVIST ROLE AS WE SEEK TO HELP STABILIZE EVENTS DURING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL TRANSITION, COMPOUNDED BY THE SEVEREST ECONOMIC SITUATION MANY KOREANS CAN REMEMBER. SWIFT REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT TO THE ROK HAS PROVIDED AN ESSENTIAL UNDERPINNING FOR STABILITY IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD. OUR KEY POSITIONS AT THIS POINT

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ARE TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, THE MILITARY TO REMAIN UNIFIED AND REFRAIN FROM CRUDE INTERVENTION IN POLITICS, AND THE OPPOSITION TO BE PATIENT. BUT OUR ACTIVIST ROLE IS NOT AN EASY ONE AND EVENTUALLY WE WILL BE "DAMNED IF WE DO AND DAMNED IF WE DON'T" BY VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY SEEKING OUR SUPPORT. THE COSTS OF MISCALCULATION ARE HIGH. IF WE DON'T DO ENOUGH, DANGEROUS EVENTS COULD OCCUR; IF WE TRY TO DO TOO MUCH, WE MAY PROVOKE STRONG, CHAUVINIST REACTIONS. USG

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POLICY OF DEALING WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS RISKS INCREASING THE PRESSURES ON THE PRESENT CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN AN AREA THAT MAY BE CRUCIAL TO ITS SURVIVAL AND TO PEACEFUL TRANSITION. ALTHOUGH THEY USUALLY MUTE THEIR OPINION, MOST KOREANS SENSE A REDUCTION IN THE REAL POWER OF THE U.S. AND ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO FACE UP TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE, AND THEY ARE ALSO SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL OF OUR ABILITY TO HANDLE BEIJING. THEY SUSPECT WE MAY BE TOO PREOCCUPIED ELSEWHERE TO RESPOND RESOLUTELY TO DIFFICULTIES ON THE PENINSULA. FEW KOREANS BELIEVE THAT PYONGYANG HAS CHANGED ITS SPOTS, AND SEE THE RECENT PEACE OFFENSIVE AS A TACTICAL PLOY. STILL, THEY APPRECIATE KOREA'S SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND SUPPORT THE ROKG'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL. FOR SOME IT IS ONLY TO PUT THE ONUS ON PYONGYANG FOR AN EVENTUAL FAILURE OF THE RENEWED NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE; FOR OTHERS IT IS THE HOPE THAT TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA CAN ACTUALLY BE REDUCED WITHIN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. BASIC U.S. INTERESTS IN KOREA REMAIN THE SAME AS THOSE OUTLINED IN LAST YEAR'S "GOALS AND OBJECTIVES," BUT THE SETTING AGAINST WHICH WE PURSUE THESE OBJECTIVES HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY. BY MID-1979 WE SAW RESOLUTION OF

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MOST SERIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH DOMINATED THE RELATIONSHIP FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS WOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AT LEAST 1981 CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO KOREAN CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ROK SECURITY--THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY OF VIRUTALLY ALL KOREANS. WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO SEOUL IN LATE JUNE, THE STRAINS IN THE RELATIONSHIP CAUSED BY "KOREA-GATE" WERE LARGELY PUT BEHIND US. AND, THANKS IN PART TO A CONSCIOUS ROKG POLICY AND IN PART TO VIGOROUS EMBASSY-BUSINESS COOPERATIVE EFFORTS, THE BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONSHIP IMPROVED TO GIVE THE U.S. A SMALL SURPLUS. ONGOING LARGE PROJECTS ARE LIKELY TO PRODUCE SIMILAR RESULTS IN YEARS TO COME.

4. HOWEVER, WITH THE SOURING OF THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE FALL, PRESIDENT PARK'S ASSASSINATION, AND THE POWER GRAB ON DECEMBER 12, WE WERE FACED WITH A NEW BALLGAME, ONE REQUIRING A DEGREE OF DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC KOREAN AFFAIRS UNPARALLELED IN MANY YEARS.

5. THE MAJOR BILATERAL ISSUE NOW IS A CONTINUING U.S. EFFORT TO PROMOTE STABILITY WITHIN THE ROKG BODY POLITIC. PARK'S DEATH HAS OPENED OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING A MODERN POLITICAL CONSENSUS, BUT IT HAS ALSO DEPRIVED KOREA OF ITS FATHER FIGURE. THE DIFFUSE POWER STRUCTURE NOW IN

PLACE IS HARD PUT TO FACE THE CHALLENGES OF OVERSEEING AND GUIDING THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, COPING WITH A SEVERE ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND DEALING WITH THE NORTH'S NEW PEACE OFFENSIVE. OUR SWIFT ACTIONS TO ENSURE SECURITY FOLLOWING PARK'S DEATH AND THE DECEMBER 12 INCIDENT PROVIDED AN ESSENTIAL UNDERPINNING FOR INTERNAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND INCREASED OUR INFLUENCE--AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

6. OUR EFFORTS HAVE FOCUSSED ON: (A) ADVISING THE ROK

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ADP731
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DODE-00 AID-07 MMO-01 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 MED-05
HA-05 L-03 DLOS-09 TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-01 PC-01
PER-01 COME-00 OMB-01 INM-05 CA-01 SIG-03 COMP-01
FBO-05 AGR-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 A-02 JUS-01 DEA-01
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P 290051Z JAN 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3929
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 03 SEOUL 01186

MILITARY, ON THE ONE HAND, TO HOLD TOGETHER AND, ON THE OTHER, TO REFRAIN FROM MUCKING UP THE POLITICAL PROCESS WHICH THEY PERCEIVE IN EXCESSIVELY SIMPLISTIC TERMS; (B) URGING THE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ON BROADLY DESIRED POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, WHICH INCLUDES REVISING THE UNPOPULAR YUSHIN CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING FOR THE DEMOCRATIC ELECTION OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT, LIFTING MARTIAL LAW, AND ELIMINATING PARK-ERA HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES; AND (C) IMPRESSING UPON STUBBORN OPPOSITION PARTIES AND OTHER ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT GROUPS THE NEED FOR PATIENCE AND SOME DEGREE OF COOPERATION WITH THE AUTHORITIES TO REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF A MILITARY COUNTER LASH.

7. WE SHOULD APPROACH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WITH A CLEAN SLATE, CRITICIZING IT ONLY FOR ERRORS OF ITS OWN MAKING RATHER THAN CONDEMNING IT FOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS INHERITED FROM THE PAST. AMONG THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPINGS THERE SEEMS SOME REALIZATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, AND THERE ARE SOME ATTEMPTS AT ACCOMMODATION. HOWEVER, THE HARD TESTS--SUCH AS ENDING MARTIAL LAW, AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION, AND DECIDING WHO

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MAY RUN FOR PRESIDENT--LIE AHEAD. THE ODDS ARE THAT KOREAN SOCIETY WILL SURVIVE IN REASONABLY GOOD SHAPE, BUT IT MAY GO THROUGH A FAIRLY ROUGH BASHING FROM FORCES THAT DO NOT KNOW THE ART OF COMPROMISE.

8. THE ACTIVIST ROLE THRUST ON US BY EVENTS IS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE AT BEST. ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ELEMENTS SEEK THE IMAGE OF U.S. SUPPORT AND MANY SEEK RATHER CRUDE U.S. INTERVENTION TO SHORE UP THEIR WEAKNESSES; ULTIMATELY

WE WILL THEREFORE BE CRITICIZED FOR UNDUE INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY THOSE WHO SEE OUR SUPPORT FOR THEM AS LESS HELPFUL THAN DESIRED. FEW OF THEM REALIZE THAT OUR INFLUENCE IS LIMITED IN LARGE PART BY THE FACT THAT WE COULD NOT PULL OUR POWERFUL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC LEVERS WITHOUT RISK OF DESTROYING THE ROK'S STABILITY.

9. IN ONE AREA OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WE COULD BE MORE HELPFUL. SEVERAL YEARS AGO MOST KOREANS WOULD HAVE PAINTED AN OPTIMISTIC PICTURE OF THEIR ECONOMIC FUTURE; THIS IS NO LONGER TRUE, AND SHOULD THE PRESENT CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT BE PERCEIVED AS INCAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, THE RISK OF A MILITARY COUP OR A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED. HOWEVER, WE INVARIABLY DEAL WITH THE KOREANS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM AS RICE, COLOR TELEVISION, TEXTILES, SHOES, SHIPPING, ETC. ONLY ON THE MERITS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE, WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OUR NEGATIVE ACTIONS HAVE ON THE ROKG. THROUGH STRENUOUS EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES OUR OVERALL TRADE ACCOUNTS HAVE NOW BECOME FAVORABLE TO US; AND WE MUST SHOW A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN MEETING SOME OF KOREA'S PRESSING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF OUR OVERALL POLICY INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY.

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10. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING OUR HELPFUL SECURITY ROLE IN THE POST-PARK ERA, MOST POLITICALLY AWARE KOREANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS OUR LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND MILITARY RESOLVE IN THE WORLD ARENA. COMPOUNDING THEIR LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT OUR RESOLUTION AGAINST THE NORTH KOREANS, THEY FEAR WE LACK THE WILL TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE AND THEY SUSPECT WE OVERESTIMATE THE PRC'S UTILITY AND RELIABILITY. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT WE WILL DRAW DOWN OUR FORCES IN ASIA TO PARRY SOVIET MOVES ELSEWHERE, THUS ENCOURAGING NORTH KOREAN ADVENTURISM AT A TIME WHEN THE U.S. IS NOT IN A POSITION TO RESPOND. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISCIPLINED TO DEAL WITH THE DOMESTIC U.S. IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH GLOBAL ISSUES AS THE ENERGY CRISIS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ROKG DOUBTS OUR ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY (BY EFFECTING GREATER CONSERVATION AT HOME) THE OIL WHICH IRAN WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CUT OFF IF THE ROKG JOINS US IN SANCTIONS AS WE HAVE REQUESTED.

11. KOREANS ARE AMBIVALENT ABOUT CHINA'S INCREASED INTERNATIONAL ROLE, AND IMPROVING U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS. ON THE ONE HAND THEY ACTIVELY HOPE CHINA WILL HELP COUNTERBALANCE RUSSIA AND PYONGYANG. ON THE OTHER HAND THEY CONTINUE TO DISTRUST THE PRC AND FEAR WE MAY ONE DAY BE TAKEN IN BY BEIJING, TO THE ROK'S DETRIMENT.

12. KOREA'S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN ARE ABOUT AS GOOD AS ONE MIGHT HOPE, GIVEN THEIR LONG PAINFUL HISTORY. IN PART AS A RESULT OF CLOSER PARALLELISM OF THEIR APPRECIATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CHINA, THERE IS AN INCREASING DEGREE OF TACIT COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ROK ON SECURITY MATTERS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT ON NORTH KOREA, WITH THE JAPANESE TENDING TOWARDS AN UNRECIPROCAL TWO KOREAS POLICY WHICH IS ANATHEMA TO THE ROK.

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13. AS REGARDS NORTH KOREA, FEW PEOPLE IN THE ROK BELIEVE

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ACTION EA-12

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HA-05 L-03 DLOS-09 TRSE-00 PM-05 PA-01 PC-01
PER-01 COME-00 OMB-01 INM-05 CA-01 SIG-03 COMP-01
FBO-05 AGR-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 A-02 JUS-01 DEA-01
SP-02 OC-06 PPT-01 VO-05 OCS-06 IO-14 /181 W
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P 290051Z JAN 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3930
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

[redacted]ECTION 03 OF 03 SEOUL 01186

THAT AFTER THIRTY YEARS THE LEOPARD HAS CHANGED HIS SPOTS. DESPITE PYONGYANG'S USE OF THE PROPER TERMINOLOGY IN ADDRESSING ROK OFFICIALS, MOST CONSIDER THE RECENT DPRK PEACE OFFENSIVE AS A PLOY AIMED AT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT TRANSITIONAL PERIOD HERE, RATHER THAN A SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT EASING TENSIONS. HOWEVER, THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING POSTURE, WITH THE GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT THE NORTH'S "TRUE COLORS" WILL ULTIMATELY EMERGE DURING NORTH-SOUTH TALKS, LEAVING THE ONUS FOR FAILURE ON PYONGYANG. DESPITE THIS CYNICISM, MANY KOREANS APPRECIATE THE EXTENT OF CHANGE IN THEIR GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND FAVOR CAUTIOUS EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THE CHANGES TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. SELF CONFIDENCE INDUCED BY RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PLAYED A CRUCIAL PART IN THIS NEW REALISM.

14. ADMINISTRATIVELY, OUR ACTIVIST ROLE OF MONITORING EVENTS AND EXERCISING "FRIENDLY PERSUASION" WITH THE PRINCIPAL PLAYERS ON THE SCENE IS STRAINING THE PERSONNEL RESOURCES OF THE MISSION. NO RESPITE IS IN SIGHT AND OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WE WILL NEED A FULL STAFF OF TOP

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QUALITY PEOPLE IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN HELPING KOREA THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PERIOD OF TRANSITION.
GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80SEOUL 000813

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 00813 210836Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-15 HA-05 /089 W
------------------122847 210846Z /61

P 210733Z JAN 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3737
INFO COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//SJS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB
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FOIA Exemptions
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UNCLAS SEOUL 00813

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: SOPN, KS, PEPR, US
SUBJECT: ROK PRESS COVERAGE OF HOLBROOKE VISIT

1. THE ROK PRESS GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HOLBROOKE'S KOREA VISIT, INCLUDING HIS MEETINGS WITH ROKG OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS. PARTICULAR ATTENTION WAS PAID TO HOLBROOKE'S COMMENTS ON THE ROK'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ON DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN'S CHINA VISIT. OTHER POINTS WERE: HOLBROOKE'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE U.S. RESOLVE TO CARRY OUT ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO THE ROK IN THE WAKE OF THE IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN CRISES AND HOLBROOKE'S VIEW THAT THE TIMING OF THE RECENT NORTH KOREAN CALL FOR NORTH-SOUTH TALKS SUGGESTS IT IS "A PLOT TO SPLIT THE SOUTHERN SIDE". THERE WERE CONFLICTING REPORTS ON WHAT IF ANYTHING CONCERNING KOREA WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN SECRETARY BROWN AND THE CHINESE, ALTHOUGH HOLBROOKE WAS QUOTED AS DENYING RECENT ROK PRESS STORIES THAT THE PRC PROPOSED A U.S. APPROACH TO THE DPRK WITHOUT DRAWING A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM BROWN.

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 00813 210836Z

2. EDITORIALS EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR "CLOSE COOPERATION" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE ROK IN THE WAKE OF PRESIDENT PARK'S ASSASSINATION AND THE DECEMBER 12TH SHOOT-OUT AT THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE KUKCHE SINMUN JANUARY 18 DESCRIBED HOLBROOKE'S COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT, AS WELL AS THOSE ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AS "VERY ENCOURAGING, AND BELIEVE THAT THEY INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE IN OUR ALLY". THE HANKUK ILBO JANUARY 17 DESCRIBED HOLBROOKE'S SUPPORTIVE COMMENTS

ON THE ROKG'S PLAN FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS "THE FIRST OFFICIAL POSITION EVER EXPRESSED BY A U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL". THE EDITORIALISTS CONCLUDED THAT THE PRC "SEEMS TO WANT TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA" (SEOUL SINMUN) AND THAT THE VISIT WAS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE "IT PROVIDED A CHANCE FOR SOUNDING OUT, ALTHOUGH INDIRECTLY, THE PRC'S POSTURE TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA" (HANKUK ILBO). GLEYSTEEN

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 CIAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5962
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 05419

FOR EA/K RICH FROM GLEYSTEEN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINT, KS
SUBJECT: GIST OF CHUN DOO HWAN PRESS CONFERENCE
1. FOLLOWING IS GIST OF APRIL 29 PRESS CONFERENCE BY LT. GEN. CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN), ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (KCIA) AND COMMANDER OF THE DEFENSE SECURITY COMMAND:

BEGIN TEXT:

Q: AFTER YOUR INAUGURATION AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE
- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), RUMORS HAVE IT
- THAT THE MILITARY MAY MEDDLE IN POLITICS AND AFFECT
- THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. WHAT DO YOU
- THINK ABOUT THIS?

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A: IF PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT MY CONCURRENT POST AS ACTING
- CIA DIRECTOR MAY CAUSE A SETBACK IN POLITICAL DEVEL-
- OPMENT, IT IS TOTALLY A GROUNDLESS FEAR. THERE CAN
- BE NO HITCHES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS THE GOVERN-
- MENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE PUSHING AHEAD WITH
- THEIR PLANS FOR THE REALIZATION OF POLITICAL PROGRESS
- AND REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Q: UNTIL WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO HOLD THE POSTS OF

- COMMANDER OF THE DEFENSE SECURITY COMMAND AND CENTRAL
- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) DIRECTOR CONCURRENTLY?

A: YOU KNOW WELL THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC OFFI-
- CIALS IS LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT.

Q: WERE THERE ANYSPECIAL REQUESTS FROM PRESIDENT CHOI
- KYU-HAH WHEN HE GAVE YOU A LETTER OF APPOINTMENT?

A: I WAS ASKED TO NORMALIZE THE FUNCTION OF THE CIA AND
- DEVELOP IT AS AN ORGAN THAT CAN DRAW TRUST FROM THE
- PEOPLE.

Q: THE CIA HAS COME UNDER FIERCE ATTACKS FROM CITIZENS
- IN THE PAST FOR ITS ABUSE OF POWER, ALTHOUGH IT HAS
- MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAUSE OF
- NATIONAL SECURITY. HOW WILL YOU OPERATE THE CIA IN
- COMING DAYS?

A: FIRST OF ALL, THE BUSINESS OF THE AGENCY WILL BE TO
- ENGAGE IN THE WORK OF COLLECTING INFORMATION WITH
- REGARD TO ANTI-COMMUNIST AFFAIRS AND NO INTERFERENCE
- IN ANY AGENCY OR ADMINISTRATION BY THE AGENCY PER-
- SONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED.

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Q: ARE YOU WILLING TO WITHDRAW CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS
- AT AN EARLY DATE?

A: THE PROBLEM IS SUBJECT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE PRESS
- SECTION OF THE MARTIAL LAW COMMAND AND I AM NOT AFFI-
- LIATED WITH IT. AT SUCH A DIFFICULT JUNCTURE AS
- TODAY, I HOPE THAT THE PRESS WILL LEAD THE VAN IN
- CORRECTLY GUIDING THE PEOPLE.

Q: NOT ONLY CIA AGENTS BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE DEFENSE
- SECURITY COMMAND FREQUENT THE PRESS ORGANS. DO YOU
- INTEND TO STOP THEIR VISITS OR TO CORRECT THIS PRAC-
- TICE?

A: I'VE LEARNED THAT THEY ARE CONTACTING PRESS ORGANIZA-
- TIONS IN CONNECTION WITH "COOPERATION FOR SPECIFIC
- MATERIALS" WHICH THE LATTER REQUEST AND REQUIRE.
- THE DSC MEMBERS VISIT PRESS COMPANIES ONLY IN CONNEC-
- TION WITH THE MARTIAL LAW COMMAND'S OFFICIAL WORK.
- THEIR VISITS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FREEDOM OF
- THE REPORTORIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE PRESS OR INFRINGE-
- MENT ON THE JOURNALISTS' RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.

Q: WOULD YOU MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THE CIA WILL CONTROL
- PRESS REPORTS AS BEFORE THE OCTOBER 26 INCIDENT EVEN
- AFTER THE CENSORSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS IS DISCONTINUED

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- WITH THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW?

A: THERE WILL BE NO SUCH CONTROL OF THE PRESS. FREEDOM
- OF THE PRESS AND JOURNALISTS' RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
- WILL BE FULLY GUARANTEED. BUT THE CIA WILL REQUEST
- COOPERATION FROM PRESS ORGANS ONLY ON MATTERS WHICH

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 PM-05
INRE-00 /047 W
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O 300820Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5963
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 SEOUL 05419

- MAY BECOME DECISIVE FACTORS HAMPERING NATIONAL SE-
- CURITY.

Q: WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE PERSISTENT RUMOR ABOUT A
- NEW POLITICAL PARTY WILL BE FOUNDED?

A: I'VE LEARNED FROM NEWSPAPERS THAT SUCH A RUMOR IS
- SPREADING. BUT THE RUMOR IS TOTALLY GROUNDLESS
- ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE ORGANS
- UNDER MY JURISDICTION.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE TIMETABLE FOR POLITICAL
- DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?
A: I HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HERE THAT WHAT I AM DOING
- HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE
- SCHEDULE FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
- AMENDMENT.

- I HOPE YOU WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT THE BASIC DUTY OF
- THE ORGAN I MANAGE IS TO PROTECT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
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- BY GETTING RID OF FACTORS HARMFUL TO IT WHILE SAFE-
- GUARDING THE COUNTRY AND MAINTAINING SOCIAL STABILITY.

Q: CAN YOU EXPRESS YOUR VIEW ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
- THE NATIONAL SITUATION, ESPECIALLY THE CAMPUS PROBLEMS
- AND THE BEHAVIOR AND REMARKS OF POLITICIANS?

A: I FEEL THAT ALL OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD CHERISH THE STU-
- DENTS AND SUPPORT THEM TO ENABLE THEM TO INDULGE IN

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- STUDYING. I ALSO THINK THAT WE SHOULD LOOK AFTER THEM
- LEST THEY BE POLLUTED BY SOME INDISCREET POLITICAL
- FORCES. I HOPE THAT CAMPUS PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED
- BY THE CAMPUSES THEMSELVES.

- IT IS UNDESIRABLE FOR POLITICIANS TO MAKE REMARKS OR
- COMMIT BEHAVIOR STIRRING UP THE PEOPLE OR CONFUSING
- SOCIETY.

Q: WOULD YOU EXPLAIN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPREME
- COURT'S TRIAL OF KIM JAE-KYU?

A: I'VE LEARNED THAT THE SUPREME COURT IS TRYING THE
- CASE. I EXPECT THE APPEAL TRIAL TO END AROUND THE
- MIDDLE OF MAY ACCORDING TO THE COURT PROCEDURES.

Q: SIX DEFENDANTS INCLUDING KIM JAE-KYU WERE SENTENCED
- TO DEATH BY THE APPEAL COURT. IS THERE ANY PROSPECT
- FOR CHANGE IN THEIR PENALTY BY THE SUPREME COURT?

A: WE CAN SEE THIS ONLY AFTER THE HIGHEST COURT MAKES
- ITS FINAL JUDGMENT.

Q: A MOVEMENT TO SAVE THE LIFE OF KIM JAE-KYU IS BEING

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- LAUNCHED IN SOME CIRCLES OF SOCIETY. WHAT DO YOU
- THINK ABOUT THIS?

A: IT IS VERY REGRETTABLE. I SUFFER HEARTACHE ABOUT THE
- INVOLVEMENT OF A FEW RELIGIOUS MEN IN THE MOVEMENT.
- IF THEY ATTEMPT TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE MOVEMENT AS A
- MEANS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR POLITICAL PURPOSES,
- CALLING HIM A DEMOCRATIC FIGHTER, SUCH AN ATTEMPT
- WOULD BE EXTREMELY WORRISOME. WHAT DID KIM JAE-KYU
- COMMIT?

- KIM IS AN IMMORAL PERSON, WHO CALLED FOR THE IMPOSI-
- TION OF EMERGENCY MEASURE NO. 10. HE DISGRACED DEMO-
- CRATIZATION ITSELF BY GLOSSING OVER HIS CRIME AS A
- DEED FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE NATION.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS TO CARRY OUT
- IN MEMORY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG-HEE AND
- MEASURES FOR HIS BEREAVED FAMILY?

A: I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT ABOUT 30,000 CITIZENS HAVE VISITED
- THE LATE PRESIDENT'S GRAVE EACH DAY. I BELIEVE THAT
- THEY WILL PROMOTE PROJECTS TO CHERISH THE MEMORY OF
- THE LATE PRESIDENT SOME DAY.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF GROWING LABOR DISPUTES IN CONNEC-

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- TION WITH THE RIOTS OF THE MINERS IN SABUK?

A: I CAN UNDERSTAND THE SUFFERING OF THE MINERS. BUT THE
- PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED THROUGH REGULAR PROCEDURES.
- THE HIGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1970S, WHAT-
- EVER OTHERS MAY SAY, WAS OWING TO THE LABORERS WHO

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 PM-05
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O 300820Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5964
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

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- SWEATED AT RELATIVELY LOW WAGES ON THE INTERNATIONAL
- LEVEL.

- BUT THE DISPUTES SHOULD BE SETTLED IN THE LEGAL FRAME-
- WORK. WAGES SHOULD BE RESTUDIED FROM THE VIEWPOINT
- OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THE GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS
- AND UNION LEADERS SHOULD FEEL RESPONSIBILITY.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR EVALUATION OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION?

A: IT IS TRUE THAT THE ARMED FORCES ARE ON ALERT DUE TO
- THE SITUATIONS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN.

- THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SECURITY-FIRST GOVERNMENT
- POLICY. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT NORTH KOREA VIGOROUSLY
- PURSUES THE UNIFICATION OF THE NATION UNDER COMMUNISM.
- WE ARE NOW DISPOSED AT THE WEAKEST POINT DOMESTICALLY,
- WHICH SHOULD BE WEIGHED.
- SINCE AFTER THE OCTOBER 26 INCIDENT, THE SECURITY
- ISSUE HAS BECOME MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER BEFORE.
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- NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE IS A TENDENCY AMONG THE PEOPLE
- TO MAKE LIGHT OF IT.

- NATIONAL SECURITY CAN BE THOUGHT TO BE NOT AS IMPOR-
- TANT NOW AS A RESULT OF IMMUNITY FORMED DUE TO TOO
- MUCH EMPHASIS ON IT. SOME MAY CLAIM THAT NATIONAL
- SECURITY WAS ONLY AN EXCUSE FOR PERPETUATING A REGIME.

- BUT IT IS A HARD FACT THAT NATIONAL SECURITY CONTINUES

- TO BE THE TOP PRIORITY OF NATIONAL CONCERN UNTIL NORTH
- KOREA ABANDONS ITS ADVENTURISM.

- NATIONAL SECURITY SHOULD BE NEITHER A TOOL FOR KEEP-
- ING POWER NOR AN EXCUSE FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVI-
- TIES.

Q: SOME RETIRED GENERALS ARE TAKING PART IN POLITICAL
- ACTIVITIES, JOINING POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE WAKE OF
- THE OCTOBER 26 INCIDENT. WILL THIS HAVE EFFECT ON
- NATIONAL SECURITY?

A: I THINK IT IS UP TO EACH PERSON WHETHER TO JOIN A
- PARTY. THERE ARE ABOUT 800 RETIRED GENERALS AND ONLY
- ABOUT 20 TO 30 HAVE JOINED POLITICAL PARTIES. I EX-
- PECT JOINING POLITICAL PARTIES, RULING OR OPPOSITION,
- TO BE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

Q: WILL YOU TELL US ABOUT THE GENERALS OUSTED IN THE
- DECEMBER 12 INCIDENT AND GEN. YUN PIL-YONG?

A: ONLY FIVE GENERALS TOOK OFF THEIR UNIFORMS IN THE
- DECEMBER 12 INCIDENT. THEY ARE RESIGNED TO THEIR
- FAMILY LIVES, BEHAVING THEMSELVES PRUDENTLY. GEN.

- YUN WAS REHABILITATED ON FEBRUARY 29. I KNOW THAT
- HE CONCERNS HIMSELF WITH HIS FAMILY NOW.

Q: WOULD YOU PLEASE SAY SOMETHING ABOUT NORTH KOREA?

A: NORTH KOREA IS NOW CONSOLIDATING ITS PEOPLE IN BOTH
- ORGANIZATION AND SPIRIT IN PREPARATION FOR THE SIXTH
- GENERAL MEETING OF THE WORKERS' PARTY. IN ORDER TO
- ACHIEVE THIS YEAR'S ECONOMIC GOALS BY OCTOBER, THE
- NORTH KOREAN REGIME IS MOBILIZING THE PEOPLE IN
- VARIOUS LABOR SERVICES. IT IS ALSO EXPECTED THAT
- KIM IL-SUNG'S SON KIM CHONG-IL WILL SURFACE AS HEIR-
- APPARENT IN THE SIXTH MEETING.

- IN THE MILITARY FIELD, AN EXTENDED MEETING OF MILITARY
- AND PARTY LEADERS WAS HELD IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR, IN
- WHICH THEY VOWED TO COPE WITH DEVELOPMENTS AT HOME
- AND ABROAD MILITARILY, STRESSING COMBAT PREPAREDNESS.
- SINCE THE START OF THE NEW YEAR, UNPRECEDENTED OFFEN-
- SIVE TRAINING HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY HELD.

- THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME BELIEVES THAT CURRENT DEVELOP-
- MENTS HERE ARE AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR REVOLUTION 18
- YEARS AFTER THE MAY 16 REVOLUTION. IT IS BEEFING UP
- OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTH KOREA MAINLY TO EXPLOIT THE
- POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DECISIVE TIME FOR REVOLU-

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- TION.

- IT IS ALSO HOLDING VARIOUS RALLIES IN NORTH KOREA
- SUPPORTING THE "STRUGGLE" OF STUDENTS IN SOUTH KOREA.
- IT ALSO OPENED A BRANCH OFFICE OF TONGHYOKDANG
- (REVOLUTIONARY UNIFICATION PARTY), A DISGUISED UNDER-

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 PM-05
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5965
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

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- GROUND PARTY IN SOUTH KOREA, IN JAPAN ON APRIL 18 AND
- IS INCREASING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOUTH
- KOREA BY VARIOUS MEANS.

Q: IT IS REPORTED THAT THE DISPUTE IN KOREAN-AMERICAN
- RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 12 INCIDENT LAST
- YEAR HAS BEEN SOLVED COMPLETELY. ARE THESE REPORTS
- TRUE?

A: IT IS TRUE THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING
- ABOUT THE QUESTION WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHT OF COMMAND
- IN THE WAKE OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT.

- HOWEVER, THROUGH EFFORTS EXERTED MUTUALLY BY BOTH
- SIDES, IT HAS BEEN SOLVED COMPLETELY AND THE TWO
- ALLIES ARE NOW SOLIDIFYING THEIR JOINT DEFENSE POS-
- TURE STEADFASTLY. THE JOINT EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT '80
- CONDUCTED BETWEEN MARCH AND EARLY THIS MONTH HAS
- ACCOUNTED FOR THIS.

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Q: THE UNITED STATES IS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED DISCONTENT
- WITH YOUR CONCURRENT SEAT AS ACTING CIA DIRECTOR.
- WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THIS?
A: FROM THE COMMON-SENSE POINT OF VIEW, THERE IS NO REA-
- SON FOR OUR STAUNCH ALLY, AMERICA, TO INTERFERE IN
- KOREA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND DESTROY TRUSTWORTHY RELA-
- TIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES BY EXPRESSING DISSATIS-
- FACTION OVER OUR PRESIDENTIAL RIGHT TO GIVE A NEW
- ASSIGNMENT TO ANY PERSON CONCERNED.

- I BELIEVE IT IS NOTHING BUT THE TACTICS OF SOME PER-
- SONS, WHO HAVE IMPURE MOTIVATIONS, TO ALIENATE KOREA
- FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Q: WHEN DO YOU THINK MARTIAL LAW CAN BE LIFTED?

A: I PERSONALLY HOPE THAT IT WILL BE LIFTED AT THE
- EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE CREATED
- FOR THAT END.

- TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE DATE FOR THE LIFTING OF
- MARTIAL LAW IS BEYOND MY AUTHORITY.

END TEXT. GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 014313 102

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 14313 190958Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 HA-05 /058 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1028
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SA CINCUNC KS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//SJS

UNCLAS SEOUL 14313

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: SOPN KS US PEPR
SUBJECT: ROK MEDIA COVERAGE OF KIM YONG-SAM'S NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW

REF: SEOUL 14243

1. THE ROK PRESS IS GIVING CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE TO THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING OPPOSITION NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY HEAD KIM YONG-SAM'S INTERVIEW WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES. MOST PAPERS 9/19 RAN SUMMARIES OF THE INTERVIEW'S MAIN POINTS: KIM'S OPPOSITION TO CARTER'S ROK VISIT, HIS DEMAND THAT THE U.S. END SUPPORT FOR THE PARK REGIME, THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SEOUL TO ENLARGE THE SCOPE OF ITS CONTACTS, THE NECESSITY FOR THE U.S. TO INTERFERE IN ROK POLITICS. THE TONGA ILBO PRINTED THE INTERVIEW IN FULL ON ITS FRONT PAGE.

2. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTED NDP ACTING SPOKESMAN CHONG CHAE-WON'S STATEMENT 9/19 THAT KIM'S INTERVIEW WAS INTENDED TO SUPPORT SENATOR KENNEDY'S CANDIDACY FOR THE
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PRESIDENCY "AND THAT IS WHY HE ATTACKED PRESIDENT CARTER AND CARTER'S KOREA POLICY." ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, KIM IS CONCERNED THAT, SINCE THE PARK-CARTER SUMMIT 6/30, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS OPPRESSION IN THE ROK, AND THE U.S. HAS IMPOSED "ARBITRARY" AND "EXCESSIVE" RESTRICTIONS ON KOREAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S. KIM REPORTEDLY FEARS THAT PRESENT U.S. POLICY WILL LEAD TO ANOTHER DEBACLE IN KOREA SIMILAR TO THOSE IN IRAN, CUBA, AND VIETNAM. (IN A TONGA ILBO GOSSIP COLUMN,

KIM WAS QUOTED AS SAYING HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SEOUL REFLECTED HIS BELIEF THAT INACCURATE REPORTS FILED BY THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN SAIGON AND TEHRAN LED TO "UNFORTUNATE RESULTS" IN THOSE COUNTRIES.) SPOKESMAN CHONG'S STATEMENT ALSO CALLED FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE INTERVIEW'S COMPLETE TEXT. HIS COMMENT WAS JUXTAPOSED WITH FULL TEXT ON TONGA ILBO FRONT PAGE.

3. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTED THE RULING DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE KIM INTERVIEW AS "FLUNKEYISM" AND THE DRP'S INTENTION TO MAKE A POLITICAL ISSUE OUT OF IT IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION WHICH BEGINS SEPTEMBER 20. GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81MOSCOW017654

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	SY-05	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/142 W	

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0423
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0488
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302486 FPC/CDR Date: SEP 19 1996
(X) RELEASE ( ) EXCISE ( ) DENY ( )
(X) DECLASSIFY ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
EO Citations
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or
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TS authority to

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 17654

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/87 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
[redacted]

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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON POLAND, DECEMBER 31, 1981:
- REPORT NO. 58

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: THIS EVENING THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHINE ROSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE U.S. DECISION ON SOVIET SANCTIONS. IT UNLEASHED A BARRAGE OF CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION, AND IT SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SANCTIONS. A USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL CHARGES

THE U.S. WITH SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TO DISCIPLINE DISOBEDIENT ALLIES. TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK AS CHARGING THAT POLAND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIAL ZAMYATIN, LIKE BREZHNEV IN THE RECENT INTERVIEW WITH NBC, EMPHASIZES THAT THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES LIE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE. TASS, REPLAYING A POLISH PRESS ITEM, ASSERTS THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS OFTEN VISITED SOLIDARITY LEADERS AND THAT AFTERWARD THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, TASS ASSESSES THE SANCTIONS AND FINDS THEY ARE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE OR WILL HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE USSR. END SUMMARY.

2. [redacted] TASS HAS TAKEN ANOTHER SWIPE AT THE U.S. SANCTIONS PUT ON THE USSR ON ACCOUNT OF POLAND. A COMMENTARY BY RADOMIR BOGDANOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, BUT IDENTIFIED HERE AS A "TASS NEWS ANALYST," CHARGES THAT THE "IMPERIAL WARRIORS" IN THE WHITE HOUSE

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ARE TRYING TO "WHIP UP PASSIONS AROUND POLAND" AND TO "USE RUDENESS, BLACKMAIL AND VIOLENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY." THE ARTICLE, ENTITLED "TERRORISM," CONTAINS A LONG LISTING OF AMERICAN MISDEEDS AND "ACTS OF TERRORISM" STARTING WITH HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, THROUGH IRAN, VIETNAM, CHILE, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. IT CHARGES THAT POLAND IS "ONLY A PRETEXT FOR FURTHER WHIPPING UP INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS" IN ORDER TO 1) DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: AND 2) DISCIPLINE "DISOBEDIENT ALLIES." THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR, ACCORDING TO BOGDANOV, REFLECT THE "MORAL EROSION" OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY RATHER THAN "STRENGTH OR CONFIDENCE." WHEREAS PRESIDENT CARTER WAS THE MAN WHO "PUT INTO HIGH GEAR THE MACHINE FOR DESTROYING AND UNDERMINING DETENTE," NOW IT IS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS "ACCELERATING THE REVOLUTIONS OF THIS MACHINE," IN ACTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE "THE LIMIT OF HYPOCRISY AND ADVENTURISM."

3. ([redacted] COMMENT: BOGDANOV'S CLEAR THEMES ARE THAT THE U.S. IS USING POLAND AS A PRETEXT FOR ACTIONS IT WOULD LIKE TO UNDERTAKE IN ANY CASE, AND THAT THE STRATEGY BEHIND THESE ACTIONS HAS TO DO WITH FEARS OF SLIPPING INFLUENCE WITH THE WESTERN ALLIES. IT HARDLY NEEDS TO BE STATED THAT BOTH

THESE ARGUMENTS ARE CALCULATED 1) TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUE OF POLAND; AND 2) TO SOW DISCORD AMONG THE NATO ALLIES. THE ACCUSATIONS OF PAST AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE INTENDED TO APPEAL TO THE WIDER WORLD AUDIENCE AND THE EUROPEAN LEFT, AND AGAIN, TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND. END COMMENT.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81MOSCOW017654

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	SY-05	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/142 W	

------------------055575 311940Z /50

O 311917Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0424
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0489
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

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4. [redacted] IN A DECEMBER 31 DISPATCH FROM WARSAW,

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TASS ATTACKS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES" AGAINST POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAVE "AROUSED STRONG PROTESTS AND INDIGNATION IN POLAND." TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER JOZEF CZYREK AS SAYING, "SETTING THINGS IN ORDER IN OUR OWN HOME IS OUR INTERNAL MATTER. POLAND WISHES TO MAINTAIN EQUAL RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES AND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

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5. [redacted] BASING ITS OBSERVATIONS ON A STATEMENT BY THE POLISH PRESS AGENCY(PAP), TASS REPORTS THAT THE POLISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE EFFECTS OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND HAS CONCLUDED THAT "THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY NOW TO END THE DEEP CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY DUE TO THE LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE." THE RECENT INTRODUCTION OF UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY UNDER MARTIAL LAW IS CITED AS ONE OF THE RECENT CHANGES WHICH HAS CREATED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR "ENSURING A GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY." THE RECENT GROWTH IN COAL OUTPUT--"ALMOST 600,000 TONS OF COAL WERE MINED ON DECEMBER 29, THE HIGHEST DAILY PERFORMANCE IN COAL MINING IN RECENT WEEKS"--IS PORTRAYED AS A RESULT OF THE CLAMP-DOWN ON THE "PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF SOLIDARITY RADICALS."

6. [redacted] IN AN INTERVIEW PRINTED IN THE NEW YEAR'S ISSUE OF THE SOVIET WEEKLY 'MOSCOW NEWS,' THE CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, LEONID ZAMYATIN, PINPOINTS THE THREE KEY QUESTIONS FOR THE NEW YEAR: 1)

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MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE; 2) CARRYING ON THE SALT PROCESS; AND 3) BREAKING THE DEADLOCK AT THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. ZAMYATIN STRESSES THAT THE SOVIET UNION "HAS ALWAYS FAVORED DIALOGUE WITH THE USA AT ANY LEVEL," AND THAT IT DESIRES "HONEST AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS..." HE WARNS, HOWEVER, THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS MUST BE BASED ON "OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT." ON POLAND, ZAMYATIN REPEATS THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CHRISTMAS SPEECH VIOLATED "INTERNATIONAL NORMS" AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

7. ([redacted] COMMENT: AS BREZHNEV DID IN THE NBC INTERVIEW, ZAMYATIN DWELLS ON ARMS CONTROL THEMES AND SOVIET INTEREST IN CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., ON SOVIET TERMS OF COURSE. ZAMYATIN'S (AND BREZHNEV'S) PURPOSES ARE: 1) TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE; 2) TO HIGHLIGHT TO EUROPEANS THAT, DESPITE POLAND, EUROPE HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN REACHING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE USSR ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE AND ITS SECURITY; AND 3) TO INDICATE THAT IF THE U.S. IS WILLING TO OVERLOOK

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POLAND, THE USSR IS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. END COMMENT.

8. [redacted] TASS PICKED UP AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY THE POLISH NEWSPAPER 'WIRDOMOSCI SZCZEDINSKIE' IN WHICH REAGAN'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE WAS CHARACTERIZED AS A "CLASSICAL EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. POLICY WITH REGARD TO OTHER COUNTRIES." ACCUSING REAGAN OF HAVING

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	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	SY-05	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/142 W	

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O 311917Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0425
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0490
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

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REVEALED HIS TRUE INTENTIONS, THE POLISH ARTICLE REPORTS THE POLISH ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN'S ACTION

[redacted]

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AS NEW PROOF OF AN "OLD TRUTH," NAMELY THAT "IMPERIALISTS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE A CENT TO ANYONE IF THEY DO NOT REPEAT NOT SEE ANY ADVANTAGE FOR THEMSELVES." (REAGAN IS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID THAT HE "HAS NO REPEAT NO INTEREST IN POLAND.") THE U.S. IS CHARGED WITH AIMING IN RECENT MONTHS TO "ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER POLAND'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" AND WITH SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY BECAUSE "IT SUITED THE AIMS AND TASKS OF WESTERN

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SUBVERSIVE IDEOLOGICAL CENTERS." IT IS POINTED OUT THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS "OFTEN MADE VISITS TO LEADERS OF SOLIDARITY" AND THAT "AFTER EVERY SUCH MEETING THE BEHAVIOR OF TRADE UNION LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN AND THEY WERE PUSHING THE COUNTRY FURTHER TOWARD AN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT." POLES ARE EXHORTED TO "RELY ON THEIR OWN RESOURCES AND ON THE ASSISTANCE OF TRUE FRIENDS WHO HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT LEFT THE POLES IN NEED."

9. [redacted] COMMENT: THE POLISH JOURNALIST PLAYS TO POLES' HISTORICAL ANGER AT BEING ABANDONED BY THE WEST DURING WWII BY PORTRAYING THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY THE U.S., AS INTERESTED IN POLAND ONLY AS LONG AS THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS ECONOMICALLY EXPLOITABLE. THE IMPLIED ACCUSATION THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS EXHORTED SOLIDARITY TO MORE BRAZEN ACTIONS REPRESENTS AN ESCALATION IN THE SOVIET MEDIA OF ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE USG TO SOLIDARITY.

10. [redacted] TASS OBSERVER IVAN ABLAMOV REPLAYS THEMES REMINISCENT OF THE SOVIET STANCE TAKEN DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S GRAIN EMBARGO: 1) PAST EMBARGOS HAVE NOT PREVENTED THE SOVIET UNION FROM

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BECOMING A MILITARY SUPERPOWER OR FROM DEVELOPING ITS ECONOMY; AND 2) EMBARGOS HURT U.S. BUSINESSMEN AND FARMERS MORE THAN THEY HURT THE SOVIET UNION. HE ESTIMATES THAT LOSSES TO U.S. CORPORATIONS AS A RESULT OF REAGAN'S SANCTIONS WILL BE "AT LEAST 3.7 BILLION DOLLARS" AND THAT LOSSES TO U.S. FARMERS WILL BE ANOTHER "1.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR." HE ASSERTS THAT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN "REAGAN HIMSELF HAD TO ADMIT THE POINTLESSNESS OF UNILATERAL CURTAILING OF TRADE WITH THE USSR."

11. A COMMENTATOR ON THE NIGHTLY TV NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA" STATED THAT THE WEST HAS "PROOF" THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE IT. HE ALSO REJECTED THE NOTION THAT PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE SOVIET "FRATERNAL" BEHAVIOR TOWARD ITS ALLY. "VREMYA" ANNOUNCER ALSO REPEATED TASS ITEM IN PARA 5 ABOUT UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY AND INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY RESULTING FROM THE "LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY." HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN ITS ALLIES 24 HOURS' WARNING BEFORE IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND HAD MISTAKENLY TAKEN THEIR SILENCE FOR SUPPORT. HE REPEATED THE WARNING (PARA 10) THAT AN EMBARGO WOULD HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION. HARTMAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 015513

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 PA-02 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 /025 W
------------------087736 141140Z /11

R 130048Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO USICA WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1464

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 15513

USICA

USICA WASHDC FOR EA FITZGERALD
STATE FOR EA/K AND EA/PA CANNON

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: HANKUK ILBO ARTICLE ON TREATMENT OF ROK
- REPORTERS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ARTICLE BY HANKUK ILBO CORRESPONDENT CHO SOON HWAN WHICH APPEARED ON THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS PAGE OF THE 10/12 HANKUK ILBO UNDER THE HEADLINE "AMERICAN OFFICIALS BECOME 'STIFF' ON KOREA":
THREE TO FOUR DAYS HAVE ALREADY PASSED SINCE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO KOREA WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN WAS CALLED BACK BY HIS HOME GOVERNMENT. INFORMATION OFFICIALS AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN CHARGE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS HAVE INVARIABLY GIVEN "STIFF RESPONSES" TO THIS REPORTER'S QUESTIONS ON AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN'S ACTIVITIES.

ASKED ABOUT GLEYSTEEN'S ITINERARY, THEY FLATLY REFUSED TO ANSWER SAYING ONLY "I DON'T KNOW," OR WOULD AVOID GIVING ANY REPLY AT ALL BY BLUNTLY TELLING THE REPORTER TO GO ASK NORTHEAST ASIAN BUREAU SPOKESMAN CANNON.
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AFTER TWO DAYS OF "HIDE AND SEEK GAMES," THIS REPORTER FINALLY GOT HOLD OF CANNON OVER THE PHONE, AROUND SIX P.M. OCT. 10.

HE SAID NICELY THAT HE HAD TRIED TO REACH THIS REPORTER, BUT EACH TIME WHEN HE TELEPHONED THE OFFICE WAS CLOSED. BUT ON MATTERS FOR WHICH HE SHOULD CERTAINLY BE NICE AND GIVE HIS NICE ANSWERS, HE WAS STIFF -- TO AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE.

HE BEGAN THE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW BY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE REPORTER'S MESSAGE AND SO HE KNEW WHAT THE REPORTER WAS UP TO.

"I DO NOT HAVE THE LIBERTY OF TALKING ABOUT AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN'S SCHEDULE."

-- DON'T YOU UNDERSTAND HOW MUCH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN'S MOVEMENTS? PLEASE UNDERSTAND THIS CORRESPONDENT'S DUTY TO MAKE THEM KNOWN TO KOREA.

"FOR MY PART AS A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, I APPRECIATE THAT YOU HAVE SO MUCH CONCERN AND INTEREST."

-- HOW MANY CONGRESSMEN HAS HE SEEN SO FAR, AND IS HE GOING TO SEE ANY MORE OF THEM? ARE SENATORS INCLUDED IN THE CONGRESSMEN HE IS EXPECTED TO SEE?

"HE HAS MET WITH A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN BY NOW. HE WILL SEE MORE CONGRESSMEN, INCLUDING SENATORS."

-- IS HE GOING TO MEET WITH SECRETARY VANCE?

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"NO COMMENT."

-- WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE?

"NO COMMENT."

-- WHEN WILL HE GO BACK TO HIS POST?

"NO COMMENT."

-- IN RETURNING TO HIS POST, WILL AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN COME BACK QUIETLY, OR ISSUE A STATEMENT?

"NO COMMENT."

MEANWHILE, AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS HERE BEGAN CARRYING THEIR EDITORIALS ON KOREA. IN ITS RELATIVELY LENGTHY EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN THE OCT. 9TH ISSUE, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR BEGAN AS FOLLOWS:

"THE U.S. FACES A GROWING DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA IN SOUTH KOREA. ON THE ONE HAND, IT SEEKS TO ENHANCE THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF A NATION CRUCIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD IN EAST ASIA. ON THE OTHER, IT SEEKS TO SPUR THE ADVANCEMENT OF POLITICAL AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRY..."

IN THE END, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR MADE AN

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1465

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IRRESPONSIBLE COMMENT, LINKING THE STATIONING OF AMERICAN FORCES IN KOREA WITH TODAY'S POLITICAL SITUATION IN KOREA.

THE BALTIMORE SUN IN ITS OCT. 10TH EDITORIAL ALSO MADE SOME IRRESPONSIBLE COMMENTS. IT SAID THAT UNLIKE IRAN, SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IS MORE NARROWLY MILITARY... AND SOUTH KOREA NEEDS U.S. SUPPORT MUCH MORE THAN THE U.S. DOES.

SOME REPORTERS COVERING THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANALYZED THE CALLING OF AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN BACK TO WASHINGTON, ON THE BASIS OF REALITY. ONE REPORTER WHO BELONGS TO ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR AMERICAN NEWS AGENCIES SAID, "AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN'S RECALL IS NOTHING BUT A SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION OF THE U.S. DISPLEASURE. WHAT OTHER ACTION DO YOU EXPECT THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO TAKE? MAYBE AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN IS INTRIGUED BY THE WORLD SERIES BASEBALL GAMES?"

A NEWSPAPER REPORTER WHO CYNICALLY ANALYZED EVEN THE STATE VISIT TO KOREA BY PRESIDENT CARTER SAID, "THE RANGE OF SOME ACTION THAT MAY BE TAKEN BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS VERY NARROW. AT PRESENT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEEMS TO BE DIVIDED INTO THE HARDLINE AND MODERATE THEORIES AS IT WAS WHEN IT PREPARED ITS OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE
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KOREAN COURT INJUNCTION WHICH SUSPENDED NDP LEADER KIM YONG-SAM FROM PERFORMING HIS DUTY."

WHEN THE KOREAN POLITICAL SITUATION IS DISCUSSED AT THE DEPARTMENT'S BRIEFING ROOM, SEVERAL AMERICAN REPORTERS GIGGLE. THIS REPORTER IS AROUSED TO FEEL EVEN NATIONALISTIC FURY AT THE SIGHT, BUT YOU CANNOT HELP IT. IT IS VEXING TO THIS REPORTER THAT HE, AS A REPORTER OF A SOVEREIGN NATION, HAS TO ASK AMERICAN COMMENTS ON THE

KOREAN POLITICAL SITUATION AND TURN IN HIS PIECES BASED
ON THOSE COMMENTS. DICKSON

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00
CIAE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
------------------109607 220420Z /62

O 190559Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2434

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - (PARA 2.)

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/19/85 (GLEYSTEEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, KS, US
SUBJECT: CHARGES OF U.S. COMPLICITY IN PRESIDENT PARK'S DEATH

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: SUSPICION OF U.S. COMPLICITY IN THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK PERSISTS IN KOREA, ESPECIALLY ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND MAY COMPLICATE OUR LIVES FOR SOME TIME. APART FROM SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS BY COMMUNIST FABRICATORS, JAPANESE AND SOME U.S. MEDIA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SENSE OF CONSPIRACY BY IMPLYING THAT U.S. CRITICISM OF THE PARK GOVERNMENT WAS INTENDED AS A SIGNAL TO WOULD-BE COUP MAKERS AND SAIVORS OF THE NATION. CONCEIVABLY KIM CHAE KYUMAY CLAIM HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY ME AND MY PREDECESSOR TO STRIKE AGAINST PARK. HE WAS NOT, AS THE MESSAGE BELOW EXPLAINS. END SUMMARY.

3. SUSPICION OF U.S. COMPLICITY IN THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK PERSISTS IN KOREA, ESPECIALLY ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT

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FLANKS OF THE POLITICAL SCENE AND MAY COMPLICATE OUR LIVES FOR SOME TIME. SOME DISSIDENT AND CHURCH GROUPS BELIEVE - IN SOME CASES APPROVINGLY - THAT WE WERE PART OF KIM CHAE KYU'S CONSPIRACY, AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF HAVING GIVEN A SIGNAL. STUDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS SHARING THIS VIEW, AND SOME OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S CRONIES (E.G., GENERAL MUN HYONG TAE, DRP CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE) WORRY THAT WE WERE SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN HIS KILLING. JAPANESE MEDIA CONTRI-

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BUTED HEAVI THIS SPECULATION AT EARLY STAGES, AND A FEW JOURNALISTS FOR PRESTIGIOUS AMERICAN PAPERS DID THEIR BIT. THE MOST MALICIOUS WERE PYONGYANG, MOSCOW, AND BEIJING PROPAGANDISTS.

4. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE I HAVE BEEN VAGUELY ACCUSED OF HAVING TOLD INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS THAT I DOUBTED THE PARK GOVERNMENT WOULD LAST FOR MORE THAN ONE MORE YEAR. OBVIOUSLY, I NEVER ENGAGED IN SUCH SUBVERSION, BUT OUR PUBLIC CRITICISM OF CERTAIN ACTIONS BY PRESIDENT PARK MAY WELL HAVE LED SOME KOREANS TO MISCONSTRUE OUR WORDS AND ACTIONS TO MEAN THAT WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS NEARING THE END OF HIS RULE AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY TO SEE HIM DEPART THE SCENE. AND FONDNESS FOR CONSPIRCY IS SUFFICIENTLY GREAT IN SOME KOREAN CIRCLES THAT PEOPLE MIGHT INFER THIS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED OUR CONTINUING COOPERATION WITH THE PARK GOVERNMENT AND EXPLAINED OUR POLICY OF KEEPING SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES SEPARATE FROM OUR POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE ROKG.

5. I DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT AT HIS TRIAL KIM CHAE KYU MAY MAKE SOME REFERE NCE TO WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE EVIDENCE OF U.S. DISSATISFACTION WITH PARK, PERHAPS

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REFERRING TO U.S. AMBASSADORIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM.

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6. I HAVE CHECKED WITH DICK SNEIDER AND CAN STATE FLATLY THAT NEITHER OF US EVER SIGNALLED TO KIM CHAE KYU OR ANY OTHER KOREAN THAT WE THOUGHT THE PARK GOVERNMENT'S DAYS WERE NUMBERED OR THAT WE WOULD CONDONE PARK'S REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH KIM CHAE KYU WERE RECORDED ON BOTH SIDES. I WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN SO RECKLESS AS TO TOUCH ON THE TRICKY SUBJECT OF PRESIDENT PARK'S PROSPECTIVE TENURE. TAREST I CAME TO IT WAS IN THE FOLLOWING ANSWER TO A QUESTION KIM PUT TO ME DURING OUR LAST CONVERSATION ON SEPTEMBER 26.

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QUOTE NEARING THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE DIRECTOR ASKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND HIS VIEWS ON FUTURE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. ON THE FORMER POINT, THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT WHILE HE WAS NOT AN ECONOMIST HE DID BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE SLOWING IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY OVER THE NEXT SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS. DURING THIS TIME THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING PRESS ON WAGES AND POLITICAL PRESSURES BECAUSE OF GRADUAL INFLATION. NEVERTHELESS, HE FELT THE

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KOREAN ECONOMY WAS BASICLLY SOUND AND WOULD CONTINUE TO GROW, BUT PROBABLY NOT AT THE SAME PACE AS IN THE PAST. ADDRESSING THE POLITICAL QUESTION, THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT IN LOOKING AT THE SOUTH KOREAN SCENE THERE WERE TWO ISSUES WHICH CONCERNED HIM. THE FIRST WAS THE PROSPECT OF GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY DIVIDE THE NATION AND CREATE POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79SEOUL 017592 [redacted]

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
------------------086190 190932Z /10

O 190559Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2435

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EXDIS

CURRENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY GYRATIONS INVOLVING THE NDP ILLUSTRATED THIS TENDENCY. THE SECOND ISSUE WHICH SHOULD CONCERN KOREANS WAS THAT OF THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF POWER. ON THIS POINT THE AMBASSWDOR WAS STILL NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION OR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WERE YET ABLE TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND HE BELIEVED THAT IT IS A SUBJECT WHICH SHOULD CONCERN ALL KOREANS. FINALLY, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THOSE WHO TRIED TO COMPARE THE KOREAN SITUATION WITH IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS. KOREA IS MUCH STRONGER DOMESTICALLY AND KOREANS HAVE COMMON VALUE INTERESTS. THIS WAS NOT TRUE IN IRAN. THEREFORE, HE FELT OPTIMISTIC REGARDING KOREA'S FUTURE. DIRECTOR KIM REPLIED THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S JUDGMENTS WERE VERY ACCURATE. HE ADDED THAT DURING ANY TRANSITION PERIOD OR OTHER PERIODS OF DOMESTIC CRISIS, LIKE WAR, THE KOREAN PEOPLES' VALUES WILL REMAIN CONSTANT. THE MOST IMPORTANT FOUNDATION FOR KOREAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IS POLITICAL STABILITY AND THIS MUST BE PROTECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.UNQUOTE

EK
4-22-93

7. I OFFERED MY NOT-PARTICULARLY-PRESCIENT COMMENT ON THIS EXCHANGE IN THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM MY CABLED REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION:

QUOTE: KIM, WHO SEEMED UNUSUALLY INTERESTED IN MY VIEWS

[redacted]

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ON THE STATE OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND EVOLUTION OF KOREAN POLITICS, LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOT ALARMED ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN BASIC CONTROL BUT IS MORE CONCERNED THAN IN THE PAST ABOUT THE ACCUMULATION OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE PARK GOVERNMENT AND THE RELATIVELY DEPRESSED ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN WHICH SUCH GRIEVANCES CAN GROW. CLEARLY HE EXPECTS THE NDP TO SPLIT AND ASSUMES THAT VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE THEIR TACTICS OF CONFRONTATION.

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ALTHOUGH KIM SAID HE AGREED WITH ME, I AM NOT REALLY SURE THAT HE FAVORS GREATER RESTRAINT BY ROKG SECURITY AUTHORITIES. I SUSPECT HE THINKS THE OPPOSITION SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT WHILE THE GOVERNMENT TAKES ROUGH DETERRENT ACTION AGAINST SELECTIVE TARGETS. UNQUOTE

8. COMMENT: AS I HAVE STATED IN OTHER CHANNELS, I FEAR CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON RECENT KOREAN EVENTS, AND OUR PROSPECTIVE POLICIES, MIGHT FOCUS ON THESE ISSUES. SHOULD THEY DO SO THEY WOULD ASSIST OUR ENEMIES AT A TIME AND IN A WAY THAT WOULD DEEPLY DISTRESS KOREANS AND DAMAGE BASIC U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS.

9. I WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE DEPARTMENT'S SHOWING THIS MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFFS.

GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80STATE 272469 **EXCISE**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR RB Date. 9/13/93 857

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AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY POUCH
XMT AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
AMEMBASSY SUVA

[redacted] STATE 272469

E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 10/9/00 (HOLBROOKE, RICHARD) S

TAGS: .GA, OBEP, EAGR, KS, OVIP, EAIR, US, ETRD, SHUM, K

SUBJECT: EEKLY STATUS REPORT - KOREA
WEEKLY STATUS REPORT - KOREA

O: EA - MR. HOLBROOKE

FROM: EA/K - ROBERT G. RICH

1. KOREA IN THE UNGA: [

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(RICH)

2. THE FIRST CODEL (CONF)

THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO GO TO THE ROK SINCE CHUN BECAME PRESIDENT AND KIM DAE JUNG WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH WILL BE CONGRESSMAN BREAUX (DEM - LOUISIANA), WHOSE PRIMARY INTERESTS WILL BE RICE AND FISHERIES. THE RICE ISSUE ALONE WILL BE TANGLED ENOUGH, BUT AS THE FIRST CON-

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GRESSMAN TO ARRIVE WE ANTICIPATE A FULL COURT PRESS ROKG EFFORT TO PRESENT THE BREAUX VISIT AS A RETURN TO NORMALITY IN US-ROK RELATIONS AND AS EVIDENCE THAT THE KIM DAE JUNG TRIAL IS NOT THAT IMPORTANT. BREAUX WILL ARRIVE IN SEOUL OCTOBER 27. THE ONLY OTHER CONGRESSMAN TO GO SINCE THE TURMOIL OF MID-MAY WAS SOLARZ ON HIS TRIP TO BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IN JULY. (RICH)

3. A LOT OF RICE CHAFF (CONF)

TOO MUCH RAIN IN JULY AND AUGUST LED TO FUNGUS AND OTHER BLIGHTS IN KOREA'S RICE PADDIES. TWO RECENT WEEKS OF WARM WEATHER HELPED SOMEWHAT, BUT THE HARVEST WILL BE VERY POOR. THE ROKG ESTIMATES THAT 1.5-1.6 MILLION TONS OF IMPORTED RICE WILL BE NEEDED. IT SIGNED AGREEMENTS TO PURCHASE APPROXIMATELY 644,000 TONS OF U.S. RICE LAST WEEK AND IS SEEKING SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION TONS MORE. THIS HAS WHETTED THE APPETITES OF U.S. RICE EXPORTERS WHO GENERATED AN ILL-TIMED AND INACCURATE CONGRESSIONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN URGING KOREA TO BUY U.S. RICE IMMEDIATELY. THE REAL ISSUES ARE THAT KOREA WILL BUY ALL OF THE LONG GRAIN WEST COAST RICE (MAINLY CALROSE) AVAILABLE BUT SUPPLIES PROBABLY WILL BE WELL SHORT OF A MILLION TONS. KOREANS CLAIM THAT THEY DON'T LIKE AND CAN'T SELL IN THEIR MARKETS THE MEDIUM GRAIN RICE TYPICALLY AVAILABLE IN LARGER QUANTITIES FROM GULF

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COAST PRODUCERS. THEIR TASTE MAY BE SOMEWHAT INFLUENCED BY THE AVAILABILITY OF HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED RICE FROM JAPAN. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU WILL HEAR, AGAIN THIS YEAR, MORE THAN YOU REALLY WANT TO KNOW ABOUT JAPANESE RICE SUBSIDIES AND KOREAN "OBLIGATIONS" TO BUY U.S. RICE. (RICHMOND)

4. FORMER PRESIDENT CHOI IN USA (LOU)

FORMER KOREAN PRESIDENT CHOI KYU HAH ARRIVES IN NEW YORK

[redacted]

PAGE 04 STATE 272469

CITY OCTOBER 12 AND PROCEEDS TO BOSTON FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY DETAILS. APPROPRIATE PROTOCOL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE. WE KNOW OF NO PLANS AT THIS TIME BY THE PRESIDENT TO COME TO WASHINGTON. (RICH)

5. NORTH KOREAN SUPPLIES TO IRAN [redacted]

WHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS REFUSING COMMENT ON REPORTS OF NORTH KOREAN SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN, TREASURY SECRETARY MILLER WAS CONFIRMING AND ELABORATING ON THE REPORTS AT A LUNCHEON HE WAS HOLDING FOR A GROUP OF REPORTERS. WE WERE SOON BESIEGED BY PHONE CALLS WANTING TO KNOW WHY TREASURY COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE STATE DEPT REFUSED TO COMMENT ON. WE SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE BEEN CONFIRMING WHAT MILLER SAID WITHOUT PROVIDING ADDITIONAL DETAILS. MOST QUESTIONS HAVE CENTERED ON POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES FOR SUPPLYING IRAN. ONE OF THE MORE POPULAR PRESS THEORIES IS THAT NORTH KOREA IS ACTING AS A SURROGATE FOR THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE TRYING TO PLAY BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE IN THE CONFLICT. (RASMUSSEN)

6. NRC APPROVES EXPORT OF NUCLEAR REACTORS (UNCL)

THE NRC BY A VOTE OF 3-1 REJECTED THE PETITION TO REVIEW THE WESTINGHOUSE EXPORT OF REACTORS FOR KOREAN NUCLEAR POWER UNITS 7 AND 8. THE FINAL APPROVAL TO PERMIT EXPORT IS WELCOME NEWS THAT SHOULD HELP REASSURE THE KOREANS OF OUR RELIABILITY AS A NUCLEAR EXPORTER AND REDUCE THE THREAT THAT FUTURE NUCLEAR-RELATED CONTRACTS WORTH TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS MIGHT BE LOST TO FOREIGN COMPETITION. WE ARE SENDING THE EMBASSY COPIES OF THE NRC'S DECISION (RASMUSSEN)

7. F-16 SWAP OUT ANNOUNCED (UNCL)

[redacted]

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THE AIR FORCE PROCEEDED OCTOBER 8 WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE

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PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF USAF F-16 AIRCRAFT TO KOREA NEXT SUMMER AS A SWAP OUT FOR F-4 SQUADRONS. THIS WILL PERMIT THE PREPOSITIONING OF SPARE PARTS, MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO BEGIN. (RICH)

8. ROK OIL VULNERABILITY (LOU)

THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR WILL HAVE LITTLE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON KOREA. KOREAN REFINERIES REDUCED THEIR IRANIAN CRUDE PURCHASES IN MID-SUMMER TO ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF THEIR DAILY NEEDS. HOWEVER, ALMOST ALL OF KOREA'S CRUDE COMES FROM MIDDLE-EASTERN SOURCES AND REFINERS WOULD BE VULNERABLE WERE THE WAR TO SPREAD. KOREAN REFINERS CLAIM THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN RESERVES FOR 120 DAYS OF NORMAL CONSUMPTION. (RICHMOND)

9. BIRDS OF PREY (CONF)

RECENTLY THE KOREANS DENIED PAN AMERICAN'S APPLICATION TO MATCH NEW LOW FARES TO AND FROM THE U.S. AND KOREA ON THE GROUNDS THAT PAN AM HAS NO OPERATIONS IN KOREA AND HAS NOT FILED AN INTERLINE AGREEMENT. OUR OFFICE OF AVIATION CON-

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(RICHMOND)

10. VANNING IS BECOMING POPULAR (CONF)

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11. TRAVELERS AND ABSENTEES (UNCL)

WE REMAIN CRITICALLY SHORT OF PLAYERS IN EA/K. BOB RICHMOND ARRIVED BACK WEDNESDAY FROM TWO WEEKS IN KOREA, BUT FRED ASHLEY IS AWAY AND WE SEND OUR CONDOLENCES OVER THE SAD DEATH OF HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW. BILL BREER SHOULD BE BACK FROM ASIA ON OCTOBER 15. (RICH)

12. REPORTING KUDOS (CONF)

[redacted]

PAGE 07 STATE 272469

OUR KUDOS THIS WEEK GO TO AN EXCELLENT UPDATE FROM THE EMBASSY (SEOUL 12787) ON THE POLITICAL MOOD IN KWANGJU AND THE CHOLLA PROVINCES FOUR AND ONE-HALF MONTHS AFTER THE "KWANGJU UPRISING." (RICH) MUSKIE

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 02670 220732Z
ACTION EA-12

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EO 12065: GDS 2/22/85 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, SHUM, KS, US
SUBJECT: (U) KIM YONG-SAM'S SPEECH AT YALE AND HIS POLL

REF: SEOUL 2338

1. (U) NDP ASSEMBLYMAN KIM YONG-SAM HAS BEEN IN GOSSIP COLUMNS OF PAPERS OVER PAST FEW DAYS ON TWO COUNTS -- CONTENT OF HIS SPEECH AT YALE FEBRUARY 15 AND POLL WHICH HIS OFFICE RECENTLY MAILED OUT. (SEE REFTEL)

2. (U) KIM'S SPEECH AT YALE HAS DRAWN FIRE FROM NDP RIVALS, NOTABLY KO HUNG-MUN, WHO SAY THAT KOREANS SHOULD NOT MAKE CRITICISMS OF ROK ABROAD THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE AT HOME. ALTHOUGH ONLY EXCERPTS OF KIM'S YALE SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN PRINTED, KIM IS QUOTED AS SAYING KOREANS WOULD FIGHT TO PRESERVE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE "ONLY UNDER SYSTEM IN WHICH THEY FULLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT". CHUNGANG ILPO ALSO QUOTES HIM AS SAYING "IF U.S. HAD MADE SHAH STEP DOWN TEN YEARS AGO AND HAD ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH OPPOSITION, THERE WOULDN'T EXIST A SITUATION IN WHICH THE EMBASSY IS BEING STORMED".

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3. [redacted] ALTHOUGH KIM'S OFFICE MAILED OUT POLL CONCERNING

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ROKG POLICIES, ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND "PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER" TO 3500 PEOPLE FEBRUARY 7, NONE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. THREE ASSEMBLYMEN IN KIM'S FACTION QUERIED MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT NON-DELIVERY FEBRUARY 17. ONE OF THREE, HWANG NAK-CHU, TOLD EMBOFF FEBRUARY 21 THAT MINISTER HAD BEEN EVASIVE, BUT HAD PROMISED TO TELL THEM LATER IN WEEK WHETHER QUESTIONAIRES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE DELIVERED. HOWEVER, HWANG SAID HE HAS IMPRESSION THERE IS NO CHANCE THEY WILL IN FACT BE DELIVERED OR THAT PREPAID ENVELOPES CONTAINING ANSWERS WOULD BE MAILED BACK TO KIM'S OFFICE IF THEY WERE.

4. [redacted] COMMENT: KIM MAY HAVE GUESSED THAT HIS POLL WOULD NOT BE DELIVERED AND PROBABLY FEELS THAT HIS MAIN GOAL -- THAT OF KEEPING HIS NAME BEFORE THE PUBLIC AND NPD AS "TRUE" OPPOSITION LEADER (AS OPPOSED TO WHAT HE CALLS "SAKURA" YI CHOL-SUNG) -- HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO GIVEN HIM STICK WITH WHICH HE CAN BEAT THEM ON HIS RETURN, WHEN HE WILL DOUBTLESS CLAIM, AS HWANG DOES ALREADY, THAT GOVERNMENT REFUSAL TO DELIVER POLL IS NOTHER BLOW TO LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES OF ASSEMBLYMEN. ON THE OTHER HAND, IMPLICATIONS IN YALE SPEECH THAT KOREANS WOULD NOT FIGHT FOR COUNTRY UNDER PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THAT KOREAN SITUATION IS ANALOGOUS TO THAT IN IRAN MAY PROVOKE GREATER ROKG REACTION THAN HE EXPECTS. GLEYSTEEN

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 02486

EO 12065: GDS 2/16/85 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, PINS, KS
SUBJECT: [redacted] GOVERNMENT AND DISSIDENTS GIRD FOR SPRING
1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: EACH SPRING FRICTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND DISSIDENTS RISES. THIS YEAR DISSIDENTS' DETERMINATION SEEMS STRONGER THAN USUAL DUE LARGELY TO THEIR REINFORCEMENT WITH THE RELEASE OF KIM TAE-CHUNG AND THEIR BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK EVEN, FOR FIRST TIME, ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS (INFLATION). GOVERNMENT EQUALLY DETERMINED TO MEET ANY CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC ORDER OR ATTEMPT TO FLOUT EXISTING LAW. END SUMMARY.

3. EACH SPRING FRICTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND DISSIDENTS RISES. THIS YEAR IS FOLLOWING THE USUAL PATTERN, AND, SINCE IT IS THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARCH 1 INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, THE DISSIDENTS'

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DETERMINATION TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT SEEMS HIGHER

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THAN USUAL.

4. THE ROKG'S SPRING TIGHTENING IS CLEARLY UNDERWAY. THE INDICTMENT OF ASSEMBLYMAN O SE-UNG, THE QUESTIONING OF NDP FLOOR LEADER SONG WON-YONG, THE TEMPORARY DETENTION OF KIM TAE-CHUNG, ALL HAVE CONVEYED THE MESSAGE THAT THE ROKG IS STILL READY TO ENFORCE EM-9 AND THAT NO VIOLATOR IS TOO BIG OR TOO WELL CONNECTED TO ESCAPE THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, DISSIDENTS REPORT A SURGE IN GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE IN THE LAST WEEK OR TWO.

5. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION HAS NOT OCCURRED IN A VACUUM. DISSIDENTS IN THEIR TALKS AMONG THEMSELVES, TO OTHER KOREANS AND TO FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING CORRESPONDENTS, HAVE OUTLINED A VERY AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES THIS YEAR. THEY HAVE TALKED OF BROAD FRONTS, COORDINATED NATIONWIDE STUDENT STRIKES, WIDE-SCALE LABOR UNREST. FORMER PRESIDENT YUN TOLD EMBOFF (AND OTHERS) THAT PAK REGIME WAS ON THE DEFENSIVE AND PROMISED THAT DISSIDENTS INTENDED TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF IT.

6. GIVEN THEIR FRUSTRATIONS IN 1978, THE DISSIDENTS' TOUGH TALK MAY STRIKE SOME AS WISHFUL. HOWEVER, SEVERAL FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR OPTIMISM. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT IN IRAN GAVE THEM HEART SINCE MANY CHOSE TO DRAW THE LESSON THAT IT SHOWED THAT EVEN THE TOUGHEST DICTATORSHIP COULD CRUMBLE OVERNIGHT. SOME HOPE IT WILL CONVINCE THE U.S. TO ASSIST DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS AS AN INSURANCE AGAINST THE UNCERTAINTIES OF TODAY'S WORLD. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HINTS THAT IT TOO DREW LESSON FROM IRAN.

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THE GOVERNMENT SAYS IT HAS LEARNED THAT IT IS COSTLY FOR THE STATE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO DISSIDENTS.

7. DISSIDENTS FEEL THAT INFLATION GIVES THEM AN ECONOMIC ISSUE WHICH WILL BE EXPLOITABLE WITH THE MASSES. DIFFERENT DISSIDENTS EMPHASIZED DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF INFLATION AS A THEME. THOSE AROUND YUN PO-SUN FEEL INFLATION HAS MADE PEOPLE QUESTION THE EFFICIENCY OF THE REGIME FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS AND HOPE IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO LABOR UNREST DURING WAGE NEGOTIATIONS THIS YEAR. THOSE

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CLOSE TO THE SMALL CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THINK TANKS FEEL THE GOVERNMENT WILL FAIL IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL INFLATION AND, IN ITS VERY ATTEMPTS TO COOL OFF THE SURGE IN PRICES, ABORT THE ECONOMY'S FORWARD THRUST. COMMENT: THE ELECTIONS SHOWED THAT INFLATION WAS IMPORTANT TO THE ELECTORATE, BUT ITS POLITICAL EFFECTS STILL APPEAR MANAGEABLE. PUBLIC SEEMS TO WANT GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT INFLATION AND DOES NOT SEEM TO BE CALLING FOR REGIME TO STEP ASIDE AND LET OTHERS HANDLE PROBLEM.

8. THE RETURN OF KIM TAE-CHUNG TO THE RANKS ALSO GIVES DISSIDENTS THE FEELING THAT THEIR EFFORTS THIS YEAR MIGHT BEAR MORE FRUIT THAN THEY HAD LAST YEAR. KIM'S PARTICIPATION WILL MAKE THE DISSIDENTS' STATEMENTS, RALLIES, AND PRAYER MEETINGS NEWSWORTHY ONCE MORE. KIM'S LEADERSHIP MAKES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD FRONT POSSIBLE. THE DISSIDENTS TRIED THIS LAST YEAR BUT WERE ABLE TO DO NO MORE THAN SET UP SEVERAL PAPER ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH RHE SAME SET OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS TOOK ACTION UNDER DIFFERENT NAMES. COMMENT: KIM HAS THE POLITICAL ACUMEN, THE CONTACTS, AND THE ORGANIZING SKILLS TO GIVE SOME MEASURE OF LIFE TO A FRONT. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO KEEP KIM ISOLATED FROM GROUPS OUTSIDE OF DISSIDENT COMMUNITY BY HEAVY SURVEILLANCE AND BY LEANING ON PEOPLE

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
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WHO ACT AS HIS EMISSARIES.

9. THEN, TOO, DISSIDENTS FEEL THAT KIM'S RELEASE IS PROOF THAT THE ROKG IS RESTRAINING ITSELF UNDER FOREIGN PRESSURE. DISSIDENTS BELIEVE THE PAK REGIME SORELY WANTS A SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND WILL THEREFORE HANDLE THIS SPRING'S CHALLENGE WITH KID GLOVES. THEY SEEM TO FEEL THAT MR. KIM WILL BE ESPECIALLY SAFE. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT HESITATE TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO CONTAIN DISSIDENT ACTIVITY. WE EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL TEND TO RELY ON PREVENTIVE TACTICS AS IT DID LAST YEAR, BUT THAT IT WILL GO TO FORMAL PROSECUTION MORE OFTEN IF THE DISSIDENTS SHOW ANY SIGNS OF MAKING HEADWAY.

10. DISSIDENTS SEEM TO THINK THEY CAN USE THE SUMMIT AS A THEME TO FOCUS THEIR PROTEST ACTIVITIES. THEY COULD

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PUSH FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE MEETING AND BENEFIT IF IT FELL THROUGH FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER. ON THE OTHER

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HAND, IF IT PROCEEDED, THEIR DEMANDS WILL AT LEAST HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM IN KOREA. IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SUMMIT, THE DISSIDENTS COULD MAKE GOOD USE OF CHURCH AND OTHER GROUPS IN JAPAN AND THE U.S. WHICH ARE AMONG THE DISSIDENTS' MOST VALUABLE ASSETS.

11. STUDENTS SEEM TO CONSTITUTE THE MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT *TO THE SPRING'S TRANQUILITY. THE DISSIDENTS STRIVE TO* GET THEM TO DEMONSTRATE, AND STUDENTS HAVE, IN THE PAST, BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THE DISSIDENTS' CALL. THE GOVERNMENT EXPENDS CONSIDERABLE ENERGY IN HEADING OFF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND IN CONTAINING THOSE THAT OCCUR. DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS, DEMONSTRATIONS OCCUR EVERY YEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EVEN ONE OF SIZE SUCH AS OCCURRED IN TAEGU LAST YEAR, HAVE NOT CAUSED THE REGIME NOTICEABLE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. STILL, WHILE THE POLICE SEEM SKILLED AT RIOT CONTROL, THERE IS ALWAYS THE CHANCE OF A SERIOUS INCIDENT, GIVING THE STUDENT MOVEMENT A FOCAL POINT AROUND WHICH TO RALLY.

12. COMMENT: THE SPRING BATTLE LINES ARE DRAWN AGAIN. WE EXPECT THE DISSIDENTS TO CHALLENGE THE REGIME WITH MORE ELAN AND THE GOVERNMENT TO REACT WITH DETERMINATION. WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY REAL THREAT TO THE PAK GOVERNMENT -- THERE WILL BE SPARKS OF FRICTION BUT THE GOVERNMENT RETAINS MANY RESOURCES TO DRAW ON IN MAINTAINING STABILITY. BUT WE THINK THE ROKG MAY BE HEADED FOR ANOTHER PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT -- THE DISSIDENTS WILL USE THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN CONNECTIONS TO MAGNIFY WHATEVER DEGREE OF CONFRONTATION AND TENSION

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THAT ACTUALLY DEVELOPS. GLEYSTEEN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79STATE 039446

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AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY POUCH
XMT AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
AMEMBASSY SUVA

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E.O. 12065 GDS, 2/15/85 (RICH, ROBERT G, JR.)

TAGS: PINT, PINS, SHUM, MARR, MASS, KS, KN, TU

SUBJECT: WEEKLY STATUS REPORT - KOREA

TO: EA - MR. HOLBROOKE

FROM: EA/K - ROBERT R. RICH, JR.

1. THE LIMITS OF DISSENT (C, GDS)

SEVERAL RECENT ROKG ACTIONS SEEM DESIGNED TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN KOREA APPLY TO EVERYONE. FIRST, OUTSPOKEN ASSEMBLYMAN O SE-UNG WAS INDICTED ON FEBRUARY 5 UNDER EM-9 FOR CAMPAIGN REMARKS VIEWED AS SLIGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT. THEN NDP ASSEMBLY

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FLOOR LEADER SON WON-YONG WAS HELD A DAY FOR QUESTIONING, ALLEGEDLY ABOUT REMARKS HE MADE AT A RECENT WASHINGTON PRAYER BREAKFAST. FINALLY, ON FEBRUARY 10, KIM TAE-CHUNG WAS QUESTIONED FOR FOUR HOURS ABOUT HIS REMARKS AT A PRAYER-MEETING-CUM-POLITICAL-RALLY TWO DAYS EARLIER. MEANWHILE, THE PROSECUTION HAS ASKED FOR 3- TO 7 YEAR SENTENCES FOR ELEVEN STUDENTS WHO PLANNED (UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST THE YUSIN CONSTITUTION LAST OCTOBER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date 9/13/93
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FOIA Exemptions B1 4.5
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 79STATE 039446

PERHAPS IN REACTION TO EVENTS IN IRAN, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE TAKING STEPS AGAIN TO DEFINE THE LIMITS ON POLITICAL EXPRESSION IN KOREA. (DBM)

2. TEAM SPIRIT ANNOUNCEMENT DELAYED (C, GDS)

THE UNC HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY BUT IN A LOW-KEY MANNER TEAM SPIRIT 79, AN EXERCISE INVOLVING US AND ROK FORCES NUMBERING 46,000 SCHEDULED TO BEGIN MARCH 1. CINCUNC, EMBASSY SEOUL AND THE ROKG ARE CONSIDERING THE BEST TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT HOWEVER, TO MINIMIZE RISK OF TEAM SPIRIT BECOMING AN ISSUE IN THE BUDDING NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. (DB)

3. HUMAN RIGHTS FAMILIARIZATION TOUR (C, GDS)

HA'S STEVE COHEN IS PLANNING A 7-10 DAY FAMILIARIZATION TRIP TO KOREA THIS SPRING, PROBABLY IN APRIL. WE ARE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING THE TRIP, THOUGH SUGGESTING THAT 7-10 DAYS IS TOO LONG, AND CONSIDERING ASKING PAUL CLEVELAND TO ACCOMPANY COHEN. SUCH A VISIT, ASSUMING A BALANCED SCHEDULE CAN BE ARRANGED, COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR ABILITY TO WORK SMOOTHLY WITH HA

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PAGE 03 STATE 039446

ON DIFFICULT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. (DB)

4. TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN UNC LAPSES WITHOUT A FIGHT (C, GDS)

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5. ROK SUBMARINE PURCHASE PROPOSAL SURFACES (S, GDS)

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 02464 170308Z
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
IO-14 HA-05 /085 W
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R 160826Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6412
INFO USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//SJS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
SA CINCUNC KS

[redacted] SEOUL 02464

EO 12065: N/A
TAGS: MILI, KS, KN
SUBJECT: (U) KOREAN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S
- *TROOP WITHDRAWAL MORATORIUM*
1. (U) PRESIDENT CARTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT IN HIS FEBRUARY 9 MEETING WITH VISITING JOURNALISTS THAT FURTHER TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE ROK WOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING ASSESSMENT OF A NUMBER OF NORTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENTS DREW MODEST COVERAGE IN THE SOUTH KOREAN MEDIA. PAPERS QUOTED CARTER AS SAYING THAT THE U.S. IS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDING FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, BUT NOTING THE PRESIDENT HAS "MADE A BASIC DECISION THAT U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN".

2. (U) THE HANKOOK ILBO OF FEBRUARY 14 QUOTED A "MEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL" OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS SAYING CARTER'S STATEMENT WAS AN INDICATION OF HIS INTENTION TO READJUST THE TIMING AND RATE OF THE PULLOUT PLAN.

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3. (U) THE EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARY ON THE WITHDRAWAL

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MORATORIUM WERE FEW IN NUMBER. ON FEBRUARY 12, DONGA ILBO PUBLISHED AN EDITORIAL PRAISING PRESIDENT CARTER FOR STOPPING THE WITHDRAWAL AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE DELAY IN FURTHER WITHDRAWALS WILL BE INDEFINITE, SAYING THAT "THE U.S. MUST KEEP ITS GROUND TROOPS AT THE PRESENT LEVEL IN KOREA AS A SYMBOL OF ITS DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO KOREA, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID FOR PEACE...." STATING THE MORATORIUM CAME "JUST IN TIME", DONGA ILBO CAUTIONED AGAINST PUTTING ANY FAITH IN THE IDEA THAT U.S./PRC NORMALIZATION OFFERS ANY ASSISTANCE TO PEACE IN KOREA AS YET, AND SAID IT APPEARED THAT CARTER'S INTENTION WAS TO HALT THE WITHDRAWAL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE SHOWN A REAL DESIRE FOR PEACE.

4. (U) ON THE OTHER HAND, A SEOUL SINMUN FEATURE, DATELINED WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 13, QUOTED DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN AS SAYING "THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL PLAN REMAINS A FIRM POLICY" (WITHOUT NOTING WHEN HE MADE THE STATEMENT). THIS ARTICLE WAS CRITICAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAN AND IN ASIA AND SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S STATEMENTS THAT SECURITY MUST BE MAINTAINED IN ASIA, JUXTAPOSED WITH REMARKS SUCH AS THOSE MADE BY THE SECDEF, LEAD "TO A SUSPICION THAT WASHINGTON'S PLEDGES MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A 'RHETORICAL ORNAMENT'".

5. [redacted] WE HAVE HEARD LITTLE REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION. GENERAL IMPRESSION SEEMS TO BE THAT BASIC DECISION REMAINS UNCHANGES, WHILE PAST ADJUSTMENTS AND COMPENSATORY MEASURES APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN EDGE OFFIMMEDIATE ANXIETIES. GLEYSTEEN

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P 211551Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3945
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04817

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/21/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, AF, PL
SUBJECT: CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER DEMICHEV ON POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, AND START

REF: MOSCOW 4671

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: DURING AN APRIL 19 MEETING WITH SOVIET MINISTER OF CULTURE AND CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER PETR DEMICHEV, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIONS ON POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN IN CREATING THE NEGATIVE CLIMATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. DEMICHEV RESPONDED BY SAYING WE SHOULD NOT "WASTE TIME AND POLEMICS ON THIRD-RATE PROBLEMS" SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND TO THE DETRIMENT OF ARMS CONTROL. HE REPEATED THE SOVIET LINE THAT MARTIAL LAW HAD SAVED POLAND FROM A CIVIL WAR AND THAT STATEMENTS OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN THAT COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS WERE ABSURD. HE DEFINED THE

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SOVIET INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN AS "SOVIET SECURITY," DESCRIBED THE EFFORT THERE AS "COSTLY," AND SAID THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS THERE WERE GUARANTEES OF BORDER SECURITY FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN THAT HALTED CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS AGAINST THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. DURING THE CONVERSATION, DEMICHEV SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE A SPRIGHTLY CONVERSATIONALIST WHO SEEMED TO ENJOY THE EXCHANGE, BUT HIS STANDARD RESPONSES DID NOT SUGGEST HE CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT IN THE POLICY PROCESS.

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END SUMMARY.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE BRIEF REMARKS NOTED REFTEL ON A REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT AND A DISCUSSION ON CULTURAL ISSUES (SEPTEL), DEMICHEV USED THE AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED TO DEMICHEV THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FORMATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE FEELING OF ANGER AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN THE U.S. ABOUT SOVIET ACTIONS IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT CREATED THESE PROBLEMS, THE SOVIETS HAD, AND WE NEEDED TO TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES TO SEE IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE POLES AND THE AFGHANS TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

4. DEMICHEV RESPONDED THAT THE WEST SHOULD LOOK DEEPLY INTO THE SITUATION IN POLAND. IF IT DID SO, IT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WHICH SAVED THE COUNTRY FROM A CIVIL WAR THAT COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A EUROPEAN AND WORLDWIDE CONFRONTATION. HE ARGUED THAT LABELLING SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON

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THE POLISH SITUATION AS "INTERFERENCE" WAS ABSURD. THE SOVIETS, HE AVERRED, DID NOT ENDANGER THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OVER DIFFERENCES ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, NOR DID IT CHARGE PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH INTERFERENCE IN MEXICAN AFFAIRS WHEN HE MET WITH LOPEZ PORTILLO OR ATTACK SECRETARY HAIG FOR HIS CURRENT ROUND OF VISITS TO LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. HE SAID THAT THE WEST WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS CONTRARY TO ITS INTERESTS TO CUT OFF ECONOMIC AID TO POLAND SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY EMBITTER THE POLES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN SCANDINAVIA SHORTLY BEFORE DECEMBER 13 AND THE ONLY CONCERN THAT HE HAD HEARD WAS THAT SOVIET TROOPS SHOULD NOT ENTER POLAND, WHICH OF COURSE, THEY HAD NOT.

5. ON AFGHANISTAN, DEMICHEV SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AS SOON AS GUARANTEES OF BORDER SECURITY WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN WERE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FROM THESE COUNTRIES WAS STOPPED. THE ISSUE AT STAKE, HE CONTINUED, IS SOVIET SECURITY AND THAT IS THE ONLY ISSUE. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ANY OTHER SOVIET INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN, A SMALL AND POOR COUNTRY WITHOUT RESOURCES. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET EFFORT THERE IS COSTLY AND THE USSR DERIVES NO

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ECONOMIC BENEFIT FROM IT.

6. NEITHER POLAND NOR AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID, SHOULD STAND IN THE WAY OF RESOLVING LARGER PROBLEMS SUCH AS THAT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. IT WAS FOOLISH TO WASTE TIME AND POLEMICS ON THIRD-RATE PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE MOST

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P 211551Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3946
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL

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IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL. DOING SO WOULD RESULT IN OUR NOT SOLVING THE MAIN PROBLEM AND ALSO FAILING TO DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE WHOLE RANGE OF SMALLER PROBLEMS DIVIDING OUR TWO COUNTRIES. DEMICHEV CONTINUED THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT PEOPLE IN THE U.S. WERE NOW REEXAMINING THE SALT-II AGREEMENT, WHICH HAD AMONG OTHER THINGS CALLED FOR LOWER ARMS LEVELS. THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE SALT-II TREATY THAT WAS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE U.S. IT WAS THE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SALT TALKS, HE CLAIMED, THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE INCREMENTAL. THE QUESTIONS OF LOWER LEVELS WOULD BE EXAMINED IN THE SALT-III NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER SALT-II HAD BEEN CONCLUDED AND RATIFIED. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY MADE KNOWN ITS WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ANY ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL, AS THE U.S. WAS WELL AWARE.

7. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN REPLIED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE U.S. WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON START AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE IN JUNE,

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WHEN HE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR ALL OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY, NOT JUST FOR ONE ELEMENT OF IT LIKE ARMS CONTROL. THUS, ISSUES SUCH AS POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED PARALLEL TO AND IN RELATION WITH ARMS CONTROL.

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8. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL

ISSUES, DISCUSSION TURNED TO A GENERAL, PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON WORLD EVENTS. DEMICHEV SHOWED A BRISK INTEREST, AND AT LEAST SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE, ON SUCH VARIED SUBJECTS AS ROBOTICS, AUTOMATION, THE WORK OF AMERICAN FUTUROLOGISTS, THE PROBLEMS OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE SPOKE WITH PLEASURE ABOUT HIS LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. AND IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AT A DINNER HOSTED BY DOBRYNIN. SEVERAL TIMES HE USED BRZEZINSKI'S NEOLOGISM "TECHNETRONIC." AND HE SAID HE HAD ANSWERED A QUESTION BY BRZEZINSKI ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS BY SAYING THAT ULTIMATELY THE BORDER BETWEEN THEM WOULD DISAPPEAR AND THERE WOULD THEN BE NO PROBLEM.

9. COMMENT: DEMICHEV APPEARED HEALTHY, ANIMATED, AND IN GOOD FORM. HIS REMARKS WERE STANDARD, BUT HE SHOWED A SPRIGHTLINESS OF INTELLECT RARE WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE SPOKE THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, BUT HE DEMONSTRATED AT LEAST SOME KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH, AT ONE POINT USING THE WORD "NONSENSE." DEMICHEV SEEMED TO ENJOY THE CONVERSATION, AND PROLONGED IT LONG AFTER IT HAD GOTTEN BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF HIS MINISTRY'S

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RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THIS BROAD RANGE OF INTERESTS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE POLITBURO OR WHETHER IT MEANS HE SIMPLY DOESN'T HAVE ENOUGH TO DO. WE WOULD GUESS THAT THE LATTER INTERPRETATION IS CLOSER TO THE TRUTH.
HARTMAN

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
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R 141621Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0750
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/14/88 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET JOURNALIST PESSIMISTIC ON U.S.-USSR PROSPECTS

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WELL-CONNECTED IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN SHOWED HIS BEST PROPAGANDISTIC STYLE IN TAKING AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CODEL GEJDENSON. HE ARGUED THAT THE U.S. STUBBORNLY REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE THAT PARITY WITH THE USSR EXISTS, AND THAT POLAND WAS BUT ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD USED IN JUDGING SOVIET ACTIONS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON JEWISH EMIGRATION, DISCLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. HIS SUBSEQUENT IZVESTIYA COLUMN CONTAINED SEVERAL OF THE POINTS HE MADE DURING THE PRIVATE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH MEMBERS OF CODEL GEJDENSON AND EMBOFF, IZVESTIYA POLITICAL

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OBSERVER AND TELEVISION COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN SOUGHT TO CONVEY A SENSE OF DEEP PESSIMISM OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE U.S. REACTION -- "ALMOST HYSTERICAL" -- TO MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND WAS ONLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF STEPS BY THIS AND PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS TO DISMANTLE THE GAINS OF DETENTE. IN HIS VIEW, IT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS NOW THAT THE "EXTREME RIGHT" CONTROLS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, EVEN

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DOWN TO THE "SECONDARY ECHELON" OF GOVERNMENT. WHEN THE CODEL POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY SEEMS TO ENJOY BIPARTISAN SUPPORT, BOVIN ACCEPTED THE POINT, BUT REPLIED THAT WILL MAKE IT ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE THE PRESENT TREND IN RELATIONS.

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4. BRUSHING ASIDE REJOINDERS THAT SOVIET ACTIONS (MASSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES, POLAND, AFGHANISTAN) HAD ONLY NATURALLY PRECIPITATED A RESPONSE, HE SAID THE REASONS FOR CURRENT U.S. BEHAVIOR ARE DEEPER. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION CAME TO POWER AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A PSYCHOLOGY THAT YEARNED FOR A HAPPIER TIME WHEN THE U.S. WENT UNCHALLENGED IN THE WORLD. NOW THAT THE USSR HAS CAUGHT UP AND APPROXIMATE PARITY EXISTS, THE U.S. REFUSES TO ACCEPT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. PARITY IS SEEN AS INFERIORITY. BEFORE RELATIONS CAN BE IMPROVED, AMERICANS MUST LEARN TO TAKE THE USSR'S INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. ALSO, THE U.S. MUST STOP LOOKING FOR MOSCOW'S HAND BEHIND ALL EVENTS IN THE WORLD (POLAND, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA). THE U.S. SETS TWO DIFFERENT STANDARDS BY WHICH TO JUDGE AMERICAN AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THIS IS INTOLERABLE. SOVIETS ARE UNHAPPY WITH U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, BUT

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DO NOT RESORT TO EXTREME MEASURES SUCH AS SANCTIONS. CURRENT U.S. POLICY IS TOO IDEOLOGICAL AND INFLEXIBLE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH A POWER LIKE THE SOVIET UNION. MOSCOW, HE SAID, WILL NEVER GIVE IN TO PRESSURE, AND IN FACT, ATTEMPTS TO USE PRESSURE ONLY STIFFEN SOVIET RESOLVE.

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ON POLAND, HE PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND U.S. MOTIVES. IF THE U.S. WERE TO BE CONSISTENT IN INVOKING SANCTIONS BECAUSE OF MARTIAL LAW, THEN WHY DOES IT SUPPORT THE CHILEAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN REGIMES. HE SAID HE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE THAN CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK IN SHAPING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

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5. HE FLATLY REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION ON THE ISSUE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION. IT WAS NOT HIS AREA AND HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE MATTER, HE CLAIMED. "I MYSELF SAY THAT WHOEVER WANTS TO GO SHOULD GO. BUT WE HAVE A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM HERE AND I AM IN THE MINORITY." WHEN SHCHARANSKI WAS BROUGHT UP, HE ASKED WHERE HE WAS ("IN THE WEST?") AND DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE. EMIGRATION POLICY, HE MAINTAINED, WAS AN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTER, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT SOME IN THE WEST SAW A LINK. HOWEVER, HE SAID, INCREASED EMIGRATION DOES NOT LEAD TO IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET

RELATIONS. IT IS THE OTHER WAY AROUND, CITING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MID '70'S.

6. MANY OF THESE SAME THEMES CAME THROUGH IN BOVIN'S SUBSEQUENT JANUARY 9 IZVESTIYA ARTICLE, "FARCE INSTEAD OF POLICY," WHICH HE HAD TOLD THE CODEL WAS

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0751
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

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"UNCHARACTERISTICALLY NASTY," BUT WHICH REFLECTED HIS PESSIMISM. (A THIRD SOURCE TOLD US BOVIN SAID HE WAS "FORCED" TO WRITE THE ARTICLE.) MUCH OF THE ARTICLE WAS DEVOTED TO A POINTED, IF STANDARD, REBUKE OF THE U.S. FOR INTERFERING IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BUT IT ALSO WAS ROUNDLY CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICY IN GENERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARTICULAR.

MAIN POINTS OF THE ARTICLE FOLLOW:

-- THE U.S. IS BEHAVING AS THOUGH POLAND WERE THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE.

-- ONE COULD PERHAPS UNDERSTAND, IF NOT AGREE WITH, U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN OR SALVADOR, WHERE THE U.S. WAS ACCUSTOMED TO ITS DOMINANCE, BUT THE U.S. HAS NO COMMON BORDER WITH POLAND AND "THERE ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN ANY KIND OF AMERICAN INTERESTS" IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, "UNFORTUNATELY," IS "A CYNICAL AND DISHONEST FARCE." IF THE U.S. WERE TRULY CONCERNED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, WHY ARE SANCTIONS NOT PROPOSED AGAINST CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE LIKE. IN FACT, "IF THE AMERICANS WERE HONEST," THEY WOULD REVEAL THAT THEY SIMPLY WERE OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIST

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POLAND. INSTEAD, THE U.S. IS USING "DEMAGOGIC ANNOUNCEMENTS" ABOUT POLAND'S AFFAIRS THAT ARE INTENDED TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE U.S.'S OWN INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN ITS "WAR FOR RESOURCES."

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-- THE U.S. HAS BEEN ONLY PARTLY SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING EUROPEAN BACKING ON POLAND. WESTERN EUROPE REALIZES THAT SANCTIONS AND THREATS ARE NOT A POLICY AND THEY

WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON POLAND OR THE USSR.

7. THE ARTICLE CLOSES WITH LENGTHY QUOTES FROM TWO RECENT ARTICLES BY GEORGE KENNAN WHICH TAKE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR TO TASK AS BEING SUBJECTIVE, INCORRECT, AND EVEN DANGEROUS IN "PERVERTING THE CHARACTER AND POSITION OF ANOTHER GREAT PEOPLE."
HARTMAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82MOSCOW000139

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P 061539Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0508
INFO USICA WASHDC 0516
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00139

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, PEPR, PROP, UR, US, PL

SUBJECT: SOVIET WEEKLY BLASTS US FOOD AID POLICY
- AND "INTERFERENCE" IN POLAND'S AFFAIRS -
- REPORT NO. 65

1. SUMMARY: "FOOD AND BLACKMAIL" ALLEGES SYSTEMATIC

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U.S. USE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE AS A WEAPON IN THE INTERFERENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY POLAND. THIS REVIEW IN EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA JANUARY 6 ARGUES THAT "WHEN COUNTERREVOLUTION TOOK CHARGE IN AUGUST 1980," THE U.S. RUSHED TO ASSERT ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE, EXTEND CREDITS, SELL GRAIN AND OTHER COMMODITIES AND CALL FOR NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT COUNTRY. BUT WHEN "THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND TOOK THE DECISION

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TO CHECK COUNTERREVOLUTION," THE U.S. CUT FOOD SALES AND SUSPENDED PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS. IN ADDITION TO GROSSLY DISTORTING THE CHARACTER OF U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND, THIS ARTICLE FALSIFIES THE ENTIRE POST-WAR HISTORY OF U.S. FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. ALSO MISSING, IS ANY STATEMENT CONCERNING SOVIET POSTWAR FOOD AID TO POLAND OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

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2. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA JANUARY 6 (NO. 2) CARRIES A LONG REVIEW OF U.S. FOOD POLICY ENTITLED "FOOD AND BLACKMAIL" BY V. POLYAKOV. AFTER DISCUSSING VARIOUS FORMS OF U.S. "INTERFERENCE", THE ARTICLE OBSERVES THAT "THE IMPERIALISTS OF THE USA USE ALL FORMS OF PRESSURE ON SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, SANCTIONS AND EMBARGOES. ATTEMPTING TO ASSERT ITS SUPREMACY OVER ONE OR ANOTHER COUNTRY, THE U.S. HAS USED FOOD AS A WEAPON OF BLACKMAIL AND PRESSURE." TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS CLAIM, POLYAKOV GROSSLY DISTORTS U.S. FOOD POLICY SINCE WWII, REFERRING IN DETAIL TO ALLEGED BLOCKADES, SANCTIONS AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERFERENCE IN GUATEMALA (1951), CUBA (1959), CHILE (1970),

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IRAN (1978-79), AND NICARAGUA (1979). (NOTE: HE OMITS THE 1980 GRAIN EMBARGO AND OLYMPIC BOYCOTT FROM HIS REVIEW.)

3. POLYAKOV ATTACKS U.S. FOOD POLICY TOWARD POLAND, WHICH HE CALLS "UNPARALLELED DUPLICITY AND HYPROCISY." "IN AUGUST 1980 WHEN COUNTERREVOLUTION TOOK CHARGE IN POLAND, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SUDDENLY BECAME ENAMORED OF THE POLISH PEOPLE, CALLED ON ITS ALLIES TO EXTEND CREDITS TO POLAND, TO SELL GRAIN AND NEEDED COMMODITIES, AND CALLED FOR NON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND." BUT THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND (I.E., THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW) "DID NOT FIT INTO THE PLANS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION." SANCTIONS RESULTED WHICH THE POLISH PRESS HAS LABELED PROVOCATORY ACTS AND GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. IN SO DOING,CONTINUES POLYAKOV, "THE PRESIDENT FORGOT THAT OTHER SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS EXIST IN THE WORLD BESIDES THE USA, THAT THESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE, (AND ALSO) THAT RESPECT OF THIS SOVEREIGNTY IS AN ELEMENTARY OBLIGATION OF EVERY POLICY, ESPECIALLY OF THE LEADER OF A GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAKES STATEMENTS ABOUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS TOWARD POLAND."

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4. COMMENT: PREDICTABLY, THE AUTHOR GROSSLY DISTORTS THE CHARACTER OF U.S. FOOD AID AND SALES POLICY SINCE WWII AND OMITS ANY CONTRAST WITH SOVIET POLICY, EVEN WITH RESPECT TO POLAND, THE ONE CASE EN WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN "GENEROUS." THE FAILURE TO BRAG ABOUT AID TO POLAND PROB'BLY REFLECTS THE UNPOPULARITY OF THAT AID; REFERENCES

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TO IT HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN EXCISED BY SOVIET CENSORS FROM POLISH STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT. END COMMENT.

5. DEPT. PASS WARSAW AS DESIRED. HARTMAN

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E.O. 12065: GDS 01/02/88 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON POLAND, JANUARY 2, 1982:
- REPORT NO. 60

REF: MOSCOW 00001

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: SOVIET COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN POLAND JANUARY 2 IS LIMITED TO A REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE POLISH ARMY, WHERE POLISH SOLDIERS ARE JOINING THE PARTY AND FULFILLING THEIR DUTIES. SOVIET

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COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. SANCTIONS CONTINUES TO PORTRAY THEM AS A FAILURE OF AMERICAN POLICY, HIGHLIGHTING THE ALLEGED HARM THEY WILL BRING TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND THE NATO ALLIANCE. ALEKSANDR BOVIN, IN AN IZVESTIYA COMMENTARY, WONDERS WHEN THE U.S. WILL LEARN THAT ITS POLICIES ARE AS DANGEROUS TO ITSELF AS TO OTHERS, AND RECOMMITS THE USSR TO A "CONSTRUCTIVE" POLICY IN 1982. IRONICALLY, BY STRESSING THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE THE SANCTIONS WILL SUPPOSEDLY CAUSE IN AMERICA, SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS MAY HEIGHTEN THEIR OWN CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE HARSHNESS OF THESE SANCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

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2. [redacted] PRAVDA JANUARY 2 CONTAINS A REPORT FROM OLEG LOSOTO IN WARSAW ON A VISIT TO POLISH TROOPS DURING THE HOLIDAYS. BESIDES RECEIVING HOLIDAY GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FROM POLISH CIVILIANS, THE TROOPS ARE FULL OF CONFIDENCE AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED INTO THE PZPR HAS INCREASED. ONE OFFICER, ASKED WHY HE JOINED THE PARTY, SAYS HE WANTED TO BELONG TO "THOSE WHO HAVE FOUGHT AND ARE FIGHTING, FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE POLISH

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PEOPLE." IN SHORT, THE POLISH ARMY IS IN GOOD CONDITION, IT "FIRMLY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE AND SOCIALISM, AND "CARRIES OUT ITS DUTY TO THE END."

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3. [redacted] IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN TAKES A NEW YEAR'S LOOK FORWARD AND BACK ON THE PAGES OF IZVESTIYA JANUARY 1, SAYING 1981 WAS A DISTURBING YEAR, LARGELY BECAUSE OF U.S. POLICY, AND THAT 1982 IS NOT LIKELY TO BE LESS SO, UNLESS WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDS THAT ITS BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER. IN AN ARTICLE MORE REFLECTIVE AND LESS "ANALYTICAL" THAN ARBATOV'S PRAVDA PIECE (REF A), BOVIN PUTS ALL THE BLAME ON THE U.S. FOR CURRENT TENSIONS OVER POLAND, AND PLEDGES THAT THE USSR WILL OPPOSE THE "OPPONENTS OF DETENTE" WITH "CLEAR AND CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS" ON THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF WORLD ISSUES.

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4. [redacted] BOVIN MAKES THE NOW STANDARD POINT THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BEGAN TO CHANGE DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF A TRUMPED-UP SOVIET THREAT, BUT REALLY, ACCORDING TO BOVIN, ON ACCOUNT OF "POLITICAL FAILURES AND SOCIAL CHANGES" WHICH CAUSED THE "MOST RIGHT WING, CONSERVATIVE" SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS

TO REACT. ALTHOUGH, BOVIN SAYS, THE "LOGICAL" COURSE WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR THE U.S. TO ACCEPT THAT "THE WORLD WAS NOT DEVELOPING ACCORDING TO AMERICAN PLANS," A "CHAUVINISTIC WAVE" DROWNED OUT THE "SOBER VOICES," AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS BLAMED FOR ALL THE AMERICAN REVERSES FROM VIETNAM TO IRAN. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A "PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY," WASHINGTON SET A COURSE OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY

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OVER THE USSR, FRIGHTEN IT, AND AT THE SAME TIME
PACIFY THE THIRD WORLD.

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5. [redacted] TURNING TO SOVIET INTENTIONS, BOVIN SAYS
THAT:
- 1) THE USSR WILL NOT ALLOW THE MILITARY-
- STRATEGIC BALANCE TO BE UPSET;
- 2) IT IS "SENSELESS" TO TRY TO FRIGHTEN THE
- SOVIET UNION;
- 3) THE PROCESS OF "SOCIAL RENEWAL" OF THE WORLD
- WILL CONTINUE--NOT BECAUSE MOSCOW WANTS IT,

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- BUT BECAUSE "PEOPLE WANT TO LIVE BETTER";
- 4) THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO AID NATIONS AND
- POLITICAL MOVEMENTS THAT ARE STRUGGLING
- AGAINST "HATEFUL REGIMES."

6. [redacted] AS FOR THE QUESTION OF THE U.S. SANCTIONS, BOVIN ACCUSES THE UNITED STATES OF PURSUING ITS POLICY OF "INTERFERENCE, SANCTIONS AND BLACKMAIL" WITH "ALMOST MANIACAL PERSISTENCE." PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SANCTIONS AGAINST BOTH POLAND AND THE USSR, BOVIN ASSERTS, ARE "UNNEEDED EVIDENCE" OF WASHINGTON'S LACK OF INTEREST IN "FACING THE REALITIES OF WHAT AMERICAN CAN ACCOMPLISH," AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS. HE WRITES THAT THE THREAT POSED BY WASHINGTON'S POLICY IS A "REAL" ONE, NOT ONLY TO OTHERS, BUT "TO THE U.S. ITSELF," AND THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE THE U.S. TO UNDERSTAND THIS. THE USSR, FOR ITS PART, WILL "MULTIPLY ITS EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE," TRYING TO "TURN WORLD POLITICS INTO THE CHANNEL OF DETENTE."

7. [redacted] TWO SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE SEIZED ON THE

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ARGUMENT THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR WILL BACKFIRE AND DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF U.S. COMPANIES AND WORKING PEOPLE. NIKOLAI KURDYUMOV, WRITING IN PRAVDA JANUARY 1, QUOTES THE FOLLOWING SAMPLES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION:

-- PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ED MEESE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
- "UNFORTUNATE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR THE
- PRESIDENT'S DECISION" IN TERMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT;
- (THIS IS SOURCED TO AN UNIDENTIFIED TV INTERVIEW)
-- A SPOKESMAN FOR DRESSER INDUSTRIES STATES THAT
- IT WAS "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE" FOR AMERICAN
- BUSINESSMEN TO EXPORT MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
- TO THE USSR EVEN BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF
- SANCTIONS;
-- RICHARD BELL, PRESIDENT OF RICELAND FOODS,
- DESCRIBED THE SANCTIONS AS A "SAD DAY" FOR
- AMERICAN FARMERS, AND ADDED THAT THE DECISION
- TO FREEZE TALKS ON A NEW GRAIN AGREEMENT IS
- "TANTAMOUNT TO AN EMBARGO";
-- A REPRESENTATIVE OF CATERPILLAR TRACTOR SAID
- SOVIET ORDERS WOULD NOW BE DIRECTED TO OTHER
- COUNTRIES.

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8. [redacted] A. TOLKUNOV, WRITING IN PRAVDA JANUARY 2, QUOTES A WASHINGTON POST STORY WHICH SAYS THAT

SECRETARY HAIG WAS ADVISED THAT U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR WOULD "DRAG THE U.S. INTO UNILATERAL ACTIONS THAT WILL PUT US IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION AND CAUSE QUARRELING WITH THE ALLIES." THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THIS ADVICE HAS BEEN BORNE OUT:

-- U.S. PEACE COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEYERSON

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- SAYS THE ANTI-SOVIET SANCTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO
- DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE "DEEPENING ECONOMIC

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- CRISIS" IN THE U.S.;
-- THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION
- "MAY HOLD UP STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS" ON
- ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN POLAND;
-- OTHER "OBSERVERS" SPEAK OF "DIRECT BLACKMAIL"
- OF OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES: EITHER SUPPORT
- US ON THESE SANCTIONS OR ELSE WE WILL CUT OFF
- THE INF TALKS, THE U.S. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE
- SAID;

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-- WASHINGTON IS SEIZED BY AN "ANTI-SOVIET,
- ANTI-POLISH PSYCHOSIS," DESPITE THE "OBVIOUS
- FAILURE" OF "COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS";
-- "ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-SOVIET HYSTERIA" HAVE
- REACHED AN UNPRECENDENTED LEVEL.

9. [redacted] ECHOING THE THEME OF EUROPEAN OPPOSITION TO [redacted]CTIONS, PRAVDA JANUARY 2 CARRIES A TASS ROUND-UP OF EUROPEAN OPINION TO "PROVE" THE POINT. MOST DAMAGING ARE QUOTES FROM THE LONDON TIMES ("FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES OF WORLD VIEW BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE"), FRG ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF ("EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL NOT JOIN THE BOYCOTT"), AND SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN HANS-JUERGEN WISCHNEWSKI (I DO NOT CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION OF SANCTIONS A GOOD ONE. A FURTHER WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE FRG). PRAVDA ALSO QUOTES CRITICISM OF THE U.S. MOVE BY PAPERS IN SYRIA AND INDIA.

10. WARSAW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HARTMAN

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E.O. 12065: 1/01/88 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, UR, PL
SUBJECT: ARBATOV PUMMELS U.S. ON POLAND--REPORT NO. 59
[redacted]

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-- JANUARY 1, 1982
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1. [redacted] SUMMARY: IN A LONG PRAVDA ARTICLE TODAY CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AND USA INSTITUTE CHIEF ARBATOV SHARPLY CRITICIZES U.S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND AND SEEKS "ANALYTICALLY" TO EXPOSE WASHINGTON'S REAL MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES IN ITS "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN." ARBATOV CALLS THIS CAMPAIGN AND U.S. ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST POLAND IMMORAL AND HYPOCRITICAL BEYOND ALL

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LIMITS. HE REPEATS THE THEME THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE POLAND. ARBATOV DRAWS A PARALLEL BETWEEN MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND USG ACTION "NINE TIMES SINCE WW II" TO EMPLOY SPECIAL POWERS TO DEAL WITH RACIAL CRISES OR STRIKES. TO EXPLAIN THE REAL MOTIVES OF U.S. POLICY ON POLAND, ARBATOV CLAIMS ONE MUST LOOK TO THE RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS WHO DOMINATE THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY, AND TO THE PRESIDENT WHO SHARES THEIR VIEWS. ARBATOV SEES THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN: TO BRING THE NATO ALLIES CLOSER TOGETHER, TO PRESERVE THE ARMS RACE, AND TO MAKE AMERICANS FORGET ABOUT THEIR OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. IT IS CURIOUS THAT ARBATOV BELIEVES THE U.S. HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO "USE" POLAND TO PROMOTE ALLIANCE UNITY. OTHER PROPAGANDISTS HAVE PUSHED THE LINE THAT U.S. POLICY, PARTICULARLY SANCTIONS, IS LIKELY TO EXACERBATE ALLIANCE DIFFERENCES.

2. [redacted] SINCE THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS HAVE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS IN POLAND LEADING TO THIS STEP, AND THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION THERE. SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SANCTIONS ON POLAND AND ON THE USSR, SOVIET

[redacted]

PROPAGANDISTS HAVE INCREASINGLY CHARGED THAT U.S. POLICY ON POLAND HAS AS ITS PURPOSES TO HEIGHTEN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, TO HARM U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND TO FURTHER OTHER U.S. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY GOALS FAVORED BY THE "EXTREME RIGHT." THESE THEMES STRIKINGLY RESEMBLE THE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET ANTI-US PROPAGANDA IN RECENT YEARS, PARTICULARLY ON STRATEGIC AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. AN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ARBATOV ARTICLE, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT INTEGRATES SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND WITH THE OVERALL SOVIET PROPAGANDA STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. (LOU) IN A LONG ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, GEORGI ARBATOV, THE DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USA AND CANADA, CALLS U.S. POLICY ON POLAND AN ATTEMPT TO COMPLICATE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION THERE, TO "INTERNATIONALIZE" THE CRISIS, AND TO USE EVENTS THERE TO SHARPEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR, RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. ARBATOV ALLEGES THAT THE U.S. "CAMPAIGN" IS IMMORAL, AND ITS HYPOCRISY GOES BEYOND ALL LIMITS. DESPITE ITS "LOFTY MORAL CONSIDERATIONS," THE U.S. HAS DECLARED "ECONOMIC WARFARE ON POLAND." "IN FACT, ALL U.S. INFLUENCE IS BEING TO PUSH THE COUNTRY TOWARD CONFRONTATION, ANARCHY, CHAOS, AND BLOODSHEAD."

4. [redacted] ARBATOV ADMITS THAT MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	ARA-16	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
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	RP-10	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/153 W

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O 011312Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0428
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0493
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
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USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY

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IS AN "UNPLEASANT AND PAINFUL MEASURE." NEVERTHELESS, HE CONTINUES, IT IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF EVERY COUNTRY. BY ITSELF, IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

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"COMMONLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.N. CHARTER OR EXISTING TREATIES" (READ: THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT), EVEN THOUGH WASHINGTON IS TRYING TO PROVE THE REVERSE.

5. [redacted] ARBATOV THEN DRAWS A PARALLEL BETWEEN MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND THE "EXAMPLE OF THE U.S." ARBATOV NOTES PROVISIONS IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS FOR COMBATTING SOCIAL UNREST. THE USG,HE CONTINUES,

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HAS USED THESE POWERS "NINE TIMES SINCE WORLD WAR II ALONE, MOSTLY IN CASES OF RACIAL RIOTS, EXCEPT THE INCIDENTS OF THE USE OF TROOPS TO SUPRESS STRIKES." ARBATOV ASKS RHETORICALLY: CAN POLISH AUTHORITIES NOT USE SIMILAR MEASURES TO AVERT THE THREAT OF NATIONAL CATASTROPHE? HE ASSERTS THAT IN MANY OTHER CASES--CHILE, IRAN, SOUTH KOREA, LATIN AMERICA--THE U.S. HAS WELCOMED COUPS ACCOMPANIED BY APPALLING ATROCITIES AND BLOODSHEAD.

6. [redacted] THIS APPARENT DISCREPANCY, CONTINUES ARBATOV, NATURALLY LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF WASHINGTON'S REAL MOTIVES IN TAKING THESE MEASURES TOWARD POLAND. ARBATOV SUGGESTS THAT THE ANSWER MAY BE FOUND BY EXAMINING THE OUTLOOK OF WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS. HE ARGUES THAT NOT JUST SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS BUT THE ENTIRE "SECOND-ECHELON" OF THE U.S. FOREIGN-POLICY BUREAUCRACY CONSISTS OF "EXTREMISTS REPRESENTING THE EXTREME RIGHT, THE EXTREME MILITARY FLANK OF THE U.S. RULING CLASS." THE PRESIDENT, HE ADDS, SHARES THIER VIEWS. ARBATOV CONTINUES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BEGAN WITH A SERIES OF ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA, NICARAGUA, AND MANY ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS EVIDENT "RETURN TO THE COLD WAR" FRIGHTENED U.S. ALLIES AND MANY AMERICANS AS WELL. IN RECENT MONTHS, THEY HAVE

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FORCED THE ADMINISTRATION TO CHANGE ITS TONE, TO TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, ABOUT ARMS LIMITATIONS, NOT ABOUT WAR BUT ABOUT PEACE.

7. [redacted] ARBATOV ATTRIBUTES TO THE U.S. THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES IN THE "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN.":

--TO BRING THE (NATO) ALLIES CLOSER TOGETHER AND TO PATCH UP WITH THE BALLYHOO OVER POLAND THE SERIOUS FRICTIONS WHICH HAVE FLARED UP OVER THE MAJOR QUESTIONS OF SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ECONOMICS;

--TO PRESERVE THE ARMS RACE, DESPITE THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ONGOING TALKS;

--TO MAKE AMERICANS FORGET ABOUT THE GROWING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THEIR COUNTRY, AN OBJECTIVE THAT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE IN 1982.

8. [redacted] FINALLY, CONCLUDES ARBATOV, THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE U.S. WILL INTERVENE IN POLAND IN THE EVENT OF A DRAMATIC UPRISING THERE. IN THIS "NUCLEAR CENTURY," EMPHASIZES ARBATOV, LOCAL CONFLICTS ALWAYS POTENTIALLY THREATEN TO EVOLVE INTO A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT

POWERS. WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED, ARBATOV ASKS, IF DURING THE COURSE OF POST-WAR EVENTS LEADERS HAD FOLLOWED THEIR INSTINCTS, SYMPATHIES, AND ANTIPATHIES? NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, OF COURSE. "THE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS TRUTH" STRENGTHENS THE INVINCIBLE, VITAL FORCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF STATES BELONGING TO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS. IN ONE OR ANOTHER FORM, THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES,

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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0494
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INCLUDING THE U.S. BUT, IN RECENT TIMES, OFFICIAL AMERICA AGAIN AND AGAIN HAS FORGOTTEN THE REALITIES OF OUR EPOCH, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT

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SITUATION IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH WITHOUT ARTICIALLY FORMENTING CRISES."

9. WARSAW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CI'E-00	EB-08	EA-10
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	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0488
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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/87 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON POLAND, DECEMBER 31, 1981:
- REPORT NO. 58

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: THIS EVENING THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHINE ROSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE U.S. DECISION ON SOVIET SANCTIONS. IT UNLEASHED A BARRAGE OF CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION, AND IT SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SANCTIONS. A USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL CHARGES

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THE U.S. WITH SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TO DISCIPLINE DISOBEDIENT ALLIES. TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK AS CHARGING THAT POLAND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIAL ZAMYATIN, LIKE BREZHNEV IN THE RECENT INTERVIEW WITH NBC, EMPHASIZES THAT THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES LIE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE. TASS, REPLAYING A POLISH PRESS ITEM, ASSERTS THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS OFTEN VISITED SOLIDARITY LEADERS AND THAT AFTERWARD THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, TASS ASSESSES THE SANCTIONS AND FINDS THEY ARE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE OR WILL HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE USSR. END SUMMARY.

2. [redacted] TASS HAS TAKEN ANOTHER SWIPE AT THE U.S. SANCTIONS PUT ON THE USSR ON ACCOUNT OF POLAND. A COMMENTARY BY RADOMIR BOGDANOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, BUT IDENTIFIED HERE AS A "TASS NEWS ANALYST," CHARGES THAT THE "IMPERIAL WARRIORS" IN THE WHITE HOUSE

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ARE TRYING TO "WHIP UP PASSIONS AROUND POLAND" AND TO "USE RUDENESS, BLACKMAIL AND VIOLENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY." THE ARTICLE, ENTITLED "TERRORISM," CONTAINS A LONG LISTING OF AMERICAN MISDEEDS AND "ACTS OF TERRORISM" STARTING WITH HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, THROUGH IRAN, VIETNAM, CHILE, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. IT CHARGES THAT POLAND IS "ONLY A PRETEXT FOR FURTHER WHIPPING UP INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS" IN ORDER TO 1) DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: AND 2) DISCIPLINE "DISOBEDIENT ALLIES." THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR, ACCORDING TO BOGDANOV, REFLECT THE "MORAL EROSION" OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY RATHER THAN "STRENGTH OR CONFIDENCE." WHEREAS PRESIDENT CARTER WAS THE MAN WHO "PUT INTO HIGH GEAR THE MACHINE FOR DESTROYING AND UNDERMINING DETENTE," NOW IT IS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS "ACCELERATING THE REVOLUTIONS OF THIS MACHINE," IN ACTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE "THE LIMIT OF HYPOCRISY AND ADVENTURISM."

3. [redacted] COMMENT: BOGDANOV'S CLEAR THEMES ARE THAT THE U.S. IS USING POLAND AS A PRETEXT FOR ACTIONS IT WOULD LIKE TO UNDERTAKE IN ANY CASE, AND THAT THE STRATEGY BEHIND THESE ACTIONS HAS TO DO WITH FEARS OF SLIPPING INFLUENCE WITH THE WESTERN ALLIES. IT HARDLY NEEDS TO BE STATED THAT BOTH

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THESE ARGUMENTS ARE CALCULATED 1) TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUE OF POLAND; AND 2) TO SOW DISCORD AMONG THE NATO ALLIES. THE ACCUSATIONS OF PAST AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE INTENDED TO APPEAL TO THE WIDER WORLD AUDIENCE AND THE EUROPEAN LEFT, AND AGAIN, TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND. END COMMENT.

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	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0489
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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4. (LOU) IN A DECEMBER 31 DISPATCH FROM WARSAW,

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TASS ATTACKS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES" AGAINST POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAVE "AROUSED STRONG PROTESTS AND INDIGNATION IN POLAND." TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER JOZEF CZYREK AS SAYING, "SETTING THINGS IN ORDER IN OUR OWN HOME IS OUR INTERNAL MATTER. POLAND WISHES TO MAINTAIN EQUAL RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES AND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

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5. [redacted] BASING ITS OBSERVATIONS ON A STATEMENT BY THE POLISH PRESS AGENCY(PAP), TASS REPORTS THAT THE POLISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE EFFECTS OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND HAS CONCLUDED THAT "THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY NOW TO END THE DEEP CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY DUE TO THE LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE." THE RECENT INTRODUCTION OF UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY UNDER MARTIAL LAW IS CITED AS ONE OF THE RECENT CHANGES WHICH HAS CREATED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR "ENSURING A GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY." THE RECENT GROWTH IN COAL OUTPUT--"ALMOST 600,000 TONS OF COAL WERE MINED ON DECEMBER 29, THE HIGHEST DAILY PERFORMANCE IN COAL MINING IN RECENT WEEKS"--IS PORTRAYED AS A RESULT OF THE CLAMP-DOWN ON THE "PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF SOLIDARITY RADICALS."

6. (LOU) IN AN INTERVIEW PRINTED IN THE NEW YEAR'S ISSUE OF THE SOVIET WEEKLY 'MOSCOW NEWS,' THE CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, LEONID ZAMYATIN, PINPOINTS THE THREE KEY QUESTIONS FOR THE NEW YEAR: 1)

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MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE; 2) CARRYING ON THE SALT PROCESS; AND 3) BREAKING THE DEADLOCK AT THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. ZAMYATIN STRESSES THAT THE SOVIET UNION "HAS ALWAYS FAVORED DIALOGUE WITH THE USA AT ANY LEVEL," AND THAT IT DESIRES "HONEST AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS..." HE WARNS, HOWEVER, THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS MUST BE BASED ON "OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT." ON POLAND, ZAMYATIN REPEATS THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CHRISTMAS SPEECH VIOLATED "INTERNATIONAL NORMS" AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

7. [redacted] COMMENT: AS BREZHNEV DID IN THE NBC INTERVIEW, ZAMYATIN DWELLS ON ARMS CONTROL THEMES AND SOVIET INTEREST IN CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., ON SOVIET TERMS OF COURSE. ZAMYATIN'S (AND BREZHNEV'S) PURPOSES ARE: 1) TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE; 2) TO HIGHLIGHT TO EUROPEANS THAT, DESPITE POLAND, EUROPE HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN REACHING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE USSR ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE AND ITS SECURITY; AND 3) TO INDICATE THAT IF THE U.S. IS WILLING TO OVERLOOK

POLAND, THE USSR IS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY.
END COMMENT.

8. (LOU) TASS PICKED UP AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY THE POLISH NEWSPAPER 'WIRDOMOSCI SZCZEDINSKIE' IN WHICH REAGAN'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE WAS CHARACTERIZED AS A "CLASSICAL EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. POLICY WITH REGARD TO OTHER COUNTRIES." ACCUSING REAGAN OF HAVING

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O 311917Z DEC 81
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0490
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REVEALED HIS TRUE INTENTIONS, THE POLISH ARTICLE REPORTS THE POLISH ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN'S ACTION

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AS NEW PROOF OF AN "OLD TRUTH," NAMELY THAT "IMPERIALISTS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE A CENT TO ANYONE IF THEY DO NOT REPEAT NOT SEE ANY ADVANTAGE FOR THEMSELVES." (REAGAN IS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID THAT HE "HAS NO REPEAT NO INTEREST IN POLAND.") THE U.S. IS CHARGED WITH AIMING IN RECENT MONTHS TO "ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER POLAND'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" AND WITH SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY BECAUSE "IT SUITED THE AIMS AND TASKS OF WESTERN

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SUBVERSIVE IDEOLOGICAL CENTERS." IT IS POINTED OUT THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS "OFTEN MADE VISITS TO LEADERS OF SOLIDARITY" AND THAT "AFTER EVERY SUCH MEETING THE BEHAVIOR OF TRADE UNION LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN AND THEY WERE PUSHING THE COUNTRY FURTHER TOWARD AN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT." POLES ARE EXHORTED TO "RELY ON THEIR OWN RESOURCES AND ON THE ASSISTANCE OF TRUE FRIENDS WHO HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT LEFT THE POLES IN NEED."

9. [redacted] COMMENT: THE POLISH JOURNALIST PLAYS TO POLES' HISTORICAL ANGER AT BEING ABANDONED BY THE WEST DURING WWII BY PORTRAYING THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY THE U.S., AS INTERESTED IN POLAND ONLY AS LONG AS THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS ECONOMICALLY EXPLOITABLE. THE IMPLIED ACCUSATION THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS EXHORTED SOLIDARITY TO MORE BRAZEN ACTIONS REPRESENTS AN ESCALATION IN THE SOVIET MEDIA OF ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE USG TO SOLIDARITY.

10. [redacted] TASS OBSERVER IVAN ABLAMOV REPLAYS THEMES REMINISCENT OF THE SOVIET STANCE TAKEN DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S GRAIN EMBARGO: 1) PAST EMBARGOS HAVE NOT PREVENTED THE SOVIET UNION FROM

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BECOMING A MILITARY SUPERPOWER OR FROM DEVELOPING ITS ECONOMY; AND 2) EMBARGOS HURT U.S. BUSINESSMEN AND FARMERS MORE THAN THEY HURT THE SOVIET UNION. HE ESTIMATES THAT LOSSES TO U.S. CORPORATIONS AS A RESULT OF REAGAN'S SANCTIONS WILL BE "AT LEAST 3.7 BILLION DOLLARS" AND THAT LOSSES TO U.S. FARMERS WILL BE ANOTHER "1.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR." HE ASSERTS THAT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN "REAGAN HIMSELF HAD TO ADMIT THE POINTLESSNESS OF UNILATERAL CURTAILING OF TRADE WITH THE USSR."

11. A COMMENTATOR ON THE NIGHTLY TV NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA" STATED THAT THE WEST HAS "PROOF" THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE IT. HE ALSO REJECTED THE NOTION THAT PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE SOVIET "FRATERNAL" BEHAVIOR TOWARD ITS ALLY. "VREMYA" ANNOUNCER ALSO REPEATED TASS ITEM IN PARA 5 ABOUT UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY AND INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY RESULTING FROM THE "LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY." HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN ITS ALLIES 24 HOURS' WARNING BEFORE IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND HAD MISTAKENLY TAKEN THEIR SILENCE FOR SUPPORT. HE REPEATED THE WARNING (PARA 10) THAT AN EMBARGO WOULD HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION. HARTMAN

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	OIC-02	CIAE-00	D⁻⁻E-00
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P 211551Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3945
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04817

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/21/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, AF, PL
SUBJECT: CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER DEMICHEV ON
POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, AND START

REF: MOSCOW 4671

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: DURING AN APRIL 19 MEETING WITH SOVIET MINISTER OF CULTURE AND CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER PETR DEMICHEV, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIONS ON POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN IN CREATING THE NEGATIVE CLIMATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. DEMICHEV RESPONDED BY SAYING WE SHOULD NOT "WASTE TIME AND POLEMICS ON THIRD-RATE PROBLEMS" SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND TO THE DETRIMENT OF ARMS CONTROL. HE REPEATED THE SOVIET LINE THAT MARTIAL LAW HAD SAVED POLAND FROM A CIVIL WAR AND THAT STATEMENTS OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN THAT COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS WERE ABSURD. HE DEFINED THE

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SOVIET INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN AS "SOVIET SECURITY," DESCRIBED THE EFFORT THERE AS "COSTLY," AND SAID THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS THERE WERE GUARANTEES OF BORDER SECURITY FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN THAT HALTED CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS AGAINST THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. DURING THE CONVERSATION, DEMICHEV SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE A SPRIGHTLY CONVERSATIONALIST WHO SEEMED TO ENJOY THE EXCHANGE, BUT HIS STANDARD RESPONSES DID NOT SUGGEST HE CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT IN THE POLICY PROCESS.

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END SUMMARY.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE BRIEF REMARKS NOTED REFTEL ON A REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT AND A DISCUSSION ON CULTURAL ISSUES (SEPTEL), DEMICHEV USED THE AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED TO DEMICHEV THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FORMATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE FEELING OF ANGER AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN THE U.S. ABOUT SOVIET ACTIONS IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT CREATED THESE PROBLEMS, THE SOVIETS HAD, AND WE NEEDED TO TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES TO SEE IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE POLES AND THE AFGHANS TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

4. DEMICHEV RESPONDED THAT THE WEST SHOULD LOOK DEEPLY INTO THE SITUATION IN POLAND. IF IT DID SO, IT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WHICH SAVED THE COUNTRY FROM A CIVIL WAR THAT COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A EUROPEAN AND WORLDWIDE CONFRONTATION. HE ARGUED THAT LABELLING SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON

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THE POLISH SITUATION AS "INTERFERENCE" WAS ABSURD. THE SOVIETS, HE AVERRED, DID NOT ENDANGER THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OVER DIFFERENCES ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, NOR DID IT CHARGE PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH INTERFERENCE IN MEXICAN AFFAIRS WHEN HE MET WITH LOPEZ PORTILLO OR ATTACK SECRETARY HAIG FOR HIS CURRENT ROUND OF VISITS TO LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. HE SAID THAT THE WEST WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS CONTRARY TO ITS INTERESTS TO CUT OFF ECONOMIC AID TO POLAND SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY EMBITTER THE POLES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN SCANDINAVIA SHORTLY BEFORE DECEMBER 13 AND THE ONLY CONCERN THAT HE HAD HEARD WAS THAT SOVIET TROOPS SHOULD NOT ENTER POLAND, WHICH OF COURSE, THEY HAD NOT.

5. ON AFGHANISTAN, DEMICHEV SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AS SOON AS GUARANTEES OF BORDER SECURITY WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN WERE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FROM THESE COUNTRIES WAS STOPPED. THE ISSUE AT STAKE, HE CONTINUED, IS SOVIET SECURITY AND THAT IS THE ONLY ISSUE. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ANY OTHER SOVIET INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN, A SMALL AND POOR COUNTRY WITHOUT RESOURCES. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET EFFORT THERE IS COSTLY AND THE USSR DERIVES NO

ECONOMIC BENEFIT FROM IT.

6. NEITHER POLAND NOR AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID, SHOULD STAND IN THE WAY OF RESOLVING LARGER PROBLEMS SUCH AS THAT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. IT WAS FOOLISH TO WASTE TIME AND POLEMICS ON THIRD-RATE PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE MOST

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	SP-02	SPRS-02	/094 W				

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P 211551Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3946
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL

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IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL. DOING SO WOULD RESULT IN OUR NOT SOLVING THE MAIN PROBLEM AND ALSO FAILING TO DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE WHOLE RANGE OF SMALLER PROBLEMS DIVIDING OUR TWO COUNTRIES. DEMICHEV CONTINUED THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT PEOPLE IN THE U.S. WERE NOW REEXAMINING THE SALT-II AGREEMENT, WHICH HAD AMONG OTHER THINGS CALLED FOR LOWER ARMS LEVELS. THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE SALT-II TREATY THAT WAS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE U.S. IT WAS THE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SALT TALKS, HE CLAIMED, THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE INCREMENTAL. THE QUESTIONS OF LOWER LEVELS WOULD BE EXAMINED IN THE SALT-III NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER SALT-II HAD BEEN CONCLUDED AND RATIFIED. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY MADE KNOWN ITS WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ANY ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL, AS THE U.S. WAS WELL AWARE.

7. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN REPLIED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE U.S. WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON START AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE IN JUNE,

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WHEN HE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR ALL OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY, NOT JUST FOR ONE ELEMENT OF IT LIKE ARMS CONTROL. THUS, ISSUES SUCH AS POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED PARALLEL TO AND IN RELATION WITH ARMS CONTROL.

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8. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL

ISSUES, DISCUSSION TURNED TO A GENERAL, PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON WORLD EVENTS. DEMICHEV SHOWED A BRISK INTEREST, AND AT LEAST SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE, ON SUCH VARIED SUBJECTS AS ROBOTICS, AUTOMATION, THE WORK OF AMERICAN FUTUROLOGISTS, THE PROBLEMS OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE SPOKE WITH PLEASURE ABOUT HIS LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. AND IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AT A DINNER HOSTED BY DOBRYNIN. SEVERAL TIMES HE USED BRZEZINSKI'S NEOLOGISM "TECHNETRONIC." AND HE SAID HE HAD ANSWERED A QUESTION BY BRZEZINSKI ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS BY SAYING THAT ULTIMATELY THE BORDER BETWEEN THEM WOULD DISAPPEAR AND THERE WOULD THEN BE NO PROBLEM.

9. COMMENT: DEMICHEV APPEARED HEALTHY, ANIMATED, AND IN GOOD FORM. HIS REMARKS WERE STANDARD, BUT HE SHOWED A SPRIGHTLINESS OF INTELLECT RARE WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE SPOKE THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, BUT HE DEMONSTRATED AT LEAST SOME KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH, AT ONE POINT USING THE WORD "NONSENSE." DEMICHEV SEEMED TO ENJOY THE CONVERSATION, AND PROLONGED IT LONG AFTER IT HAD GOTTEN BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF HIS MINISTRY'S

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RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THIS BROAD RANGE OF INTERESTS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE POLITBURO OR WHETHER IT MEANS HE SIMPLY DOESN'T HAVE ENOUGH TO DO. WE WOULD GUESS THAT THE LATTER INTERPRETATION IS CLOSER TO THE TRUTH.
HARTMAN

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSC-05	NSAE-00	HA-06	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
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R 141621Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0750
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/14/88 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET JOURNALIST PESSIMISTIC ON U.S.-USSR PROSPECTS

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WELL-CONNECTED IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN SHOWED HIS BEST PROPAGANDISTIC STYLE IN TAKING AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CODEL GEJDENSON. HE ARGUED THAT THE U.S. STUBBORNLY REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE THAT PARITY WITH THE USSR EXISTS, AND THAT POLAND WAS BUT ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD USED IN JUDGING SOVIET ACTIONS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON JEWISH EMIGRATION, DISCLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. HIS SUBSEQUENT IZVESTIYA COLUMN CONTAINED SEVERAL OF THE POINTS HE MADE DURING THE PRIVATE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH MEMBERS OF CODEL GEJDENSON AND EMBOFF, IZVESTIYA POLITICAL

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OBSERVER AND TELEVISION COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN SOUGHT TO CONVEY A SENSE OF DEEP PESSIMISM OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE U.S. REACTION -- "ALMOST HYSTERICAL" -- TO MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND WAS ONLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF STEPS BY THIS AND PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS TO DISMANTLE THE GAINS OF DETENTE. IN HIS VIEW, IT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS NOW THAT THE "EXTREME RIGHT" CONTROLS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, EVEN

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DOWN TO THE "SECONDARY ECHELON" OF GOVERNMENT. WHEN THE CODEL POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY SEEMS TO ENJOY BIPARTISAN SUPPORT, BOVIN ACCEPTED THE POINT, BUT REPLIED THAT WILL MAKE IT ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE THE PRESENT TREND IN RELATIONS.

4. BRUSHING ASIDE REJOINDERS THAT SOVIET ACTIONS (MASSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES, POLAND, AFGHANISTAN) HAD ONLY NATURALLY PRECIPITATED A RESPONSE, HE SAID THE REASONS FOR CURRENT U.S. BEHAVIOR ARE DEEPER. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION CAME TO POWER AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A PSYCHOLOGY THAT YEARNED FOR A HAPPIER TIME WHEN THE U.S. WENT UNCHALLENGED IN THE WORLD. NOW THAT THE USSR HAS CAUGHT UP AND APPROXIMATE PARITY EXISTS, THE U.S. REFUSES TO ACCEPT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. PARITY IS SEEN AS INFERIORITY. BEFORE RELATIONS CAN BE IMPROVED, AMERICANS MUST LEARN TO TAKE THE USSR'S INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. ALSO, THE U.S. MUST STOP LOOKING FOR MOSCOW'S HAND BEHIND ALL EVENTS IN THE WORLD (POLAND, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA). THE U.S. SETS TWO DIFFERENT STANDARDS BY WHICH TO JUDGE AMERICAN AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THIS IS INTOLERABLE. SOVIETS ARE UNHAPPY WITH U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, BUT

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DO NOT RESORT TO EXTREME MEASURES SUCH AS SANCTIONS. CURRENT U.S. POLICY IS TOO IDEOLOGICAL AND INFLEXIBLE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH A POWER LIKE THE SOVIET UNION. MOSCOW, HE SAID, WILL NEVER GIVE IN TO PRESSURE, AND IN FACT, ATTEMPTS TO USE PRESSURE ONLY STIFFEN SOVIET RESOLVE.

ON POLAND, HE PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND U.S. MOTIVES. IF THE U.S. WERE TO BE CONSISTENT IN INVOKING SANCTIONS BECAUSE OF MARTIAL LAW, THEN WHY DOES IT SUPPORT THE CHILEAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN REGIMES. HE SAID HE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE THAN CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK IN SHAPING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

5. HE FLATLY REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION ON THE ISSUE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION. IT WAS NOT HIS AREA AND HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE MATTER, HE CLAIMED. "I MYSELF SAY THAT WHOEVER WANTS TO GO SHOULD GO. BUT WE HAVE A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM HERE AND I AM IN THE MINORITY." WHEN SHCHARANSKI WAS BROUGHT UP, HE ASKED WHERE HE WAS ("IN THE WEST?") AND DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE. EMIGRATION POLICY, HE MAINTAINED, WAS AN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTER, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT SOME IN THE WEST SAW A LINK. HOWEVER, HE SAID, INCREASED EMIGRATION DOES NOT LEAD TO IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET

RELATIONS. IT IS THE OTHER WAY AROUND, CITING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MID '70'S.

6. MANY OF THESE SAME THEMES CAME THROUGH IN BOVIN'S SUBSEQUENT JANUARY 9 IZVESTIYA ARTICLE, "FARCE INSTEAD OF POLICY," WHICH HE HAD TOLD THE CODEL WAS

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0751
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

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"UNCHARACTERISTICALLY NASTY," BUT WHICH REFLECTED HIS PESSIMISM. (A THIRD SOURCE TOLD US BOVIN SAID HE WAS "FORCED" TO WRITE THE ARTICLE.) MUCH OF THE ARTICLE WAS DEVOTED TO A POINTED, IF STANDARD, REBUKE OF THE U.S. FOR INTERFERING IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BUT IT ALSO WAS ROUNDLY CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICY IN GENERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARTICULAR.

MAIN POINTS OF THE ARTICLE FOLLOW:

-- THE U.S. IS BEHAVING AS THOUGH POLAND WERE THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE.

-- ONE COULD PERHAPS UNDERSTAND, IF NOT AGREE WITH, U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN OR SALVADOR, WHERE THE U.S. WAS ACCUSTOMED TO ITS DOMINANCE, BUT THE U.S. HAS NO COMMON BORDER WITH POLAND AND "THERE ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN ANY KIND OF AMERICAN INTERESTS" IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, "UNFORTUNATELY," IS "A CYNICAL AND DISHONEST FARCE." IF THE U.S. WERE TRULY CONCERNED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, WHY ARE SANCTIONS NOT PROPOSED AGAINST CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE LIKE. IN FACT, "IF THE AMERICANS WERE HONEST," THEY WOULD REVEAL THAT THEY SIMPLY WERE OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIST

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POLAND. INSTEAD, THE U.S. IS USING "DEMAGOGIC ANNOUNCEMENTS" ABOUT POLAND'S AFFAIRS THAT ARE INTENDED TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE U.S.'S OWN INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN ITS "WAR FOR RESOURCES."

-- THE U.S. HAS BEEN ONLY PARTLY SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING EUROPEAN BACKING ON POLAND. WESTERN EUROPE REALIZES THAT SANCTIONS AND THREATS ARE NOT A POLICY AND THEY

WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON POLAND OR THE USSR.

7. THE ARTICLE CLOSES WITH LENGTHY QUOTES FROM TWO RECENT ARTICLES BY GEORGE KENNAN WHICH TAKE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR TO TASK AS BEING SUBJECTIVE, INCORRECT, AND EVEN DANGEROUS IN "PERVERTING THE CHARACTER AND POSITION OF ANOTHER GREAT PEOPLE."
HARTMAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82MOSCOW000139

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ACTION EUR-12

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P 061539Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0508
INFO USICA WASHDC 0516
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
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BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, PEPR, PROP, UR, US, PL

SUBJECT: SOVIET WEEKLY BLASTS US FOOD AID POLICY
AND "INTERFERENCE" IN POLAND'S AFFAIRS -
REPORT NO. 65

1. SUMMARY: "FOOD AND BLACKMAIL" ALLEGES SYSTEMATIC

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U.S. USE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE AS A WEAPON IN THE INTERFERENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY POLAND. THIS REVIEW IN EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA JANUARY 6 ARGUES THAT "WHEN COUNTERREVOLUTION TOOK CHARGE IN AUGUST 1980," THE U.S. RUSHED TO ASSERT ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE, EXTEND CREDITS, SELL GRAIN AND OTHER COMMODITIES AND CALL FOR NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT COUNTRY. BUT WHEN "THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND TOOK THE DECISION

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TO CHECK COUNTERREVOLUTION," THE U.S. CUT FOOD SALES AND SUSPENDED PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS. IN ADDITION TO GROSSLY DISTORTING THE CHARACTER OF U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND, THIS ARTICLE FALSIFIES THE ENTIRE POST-WAR HISTORY OF U.S. FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. ALSO MISSING, IS ANY STATEMENT CONCERNING SOVIET POSTWAR FOOD AID TO POLAND OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

2. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA JANUARY 6 (NO. 2) CARRIES A LONG REVIEW OF U.S. FOOD POLICY ENTITLED "FOOD AND BLACKMAIL" BY V. POLYAKOV. AFTER DISCUSSING VARIOUS FORMS OF U.S. "INTERFERENCE", THE ARTICLE OBSERVES THAT "THE IMPERIALISTS OF THE USA USE ALL FORMS OF PRESSURE ON SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, SANCTIONS AND EMBARGOES. ATTEMPTING TO ASSERT ITS SUPREMACY OVER ONE OR ANOTHER COUNTRY, THE U.S. HAS USED FOOD AS A WEAPON OF BLACKMAIL AND PRESSURE." TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS CLAIM, POLYAKOV GROSSLY DISTORTS U.S. FOOD POLICY SINCE WWII, REFERRING IN DETAIL TO ALLEGED BLOCKADES, SANCTIONS AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERFERENCE IN GUATEMALA (1951), CUBA (1959), CHILE (1970),

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IRAN (1978-79), AND NICARAGUA (1979). (NOTE: HE OMITS THE 1980 GRAIN EMBARGO AND OLYMPIC BOYCOTT FROM HIS REVIEW.)

3. POLYAKOV ATTACKS U.S. FOOD POLICY TOWARD POLAND, WHICH HE CALLS "UNPARALLELED DUPLICITY AND HYPROCISY." "IN AUGUST 1980 WHEN COUNTERREVOLUTION TOOK CHARGE IN POLAND, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SUDDENLY BECAME ENAMORED OF THE POLISH PEOPLE, CALLED ON ITS ALLIES TO EXTEND CREDITS TO POLAND, TO SELL GRAIN AND NEEDED COMMODITIES, AND CALLED FOR NON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND." BUT THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND (I.E., THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW) "DID NOT FIT INTO THE PLANS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION." SANCTIONS RESULTED WHICH THE POLISH PRESS HAS LABELED PROVOCATORY ACTS AND GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. IN SO DOING,CONTINUES POLYAKOV, "THE PRESIDENT FORGOT THAT OTHER SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS EXIST IN THE WORLD BESIDES THE USA, THAT THESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE, (AND ALSO) THAT RESPECT OF THIS SOVEREIGNTY IS AN ELEMENTARY OBLIGATION OF EVERY POLICY, ESPECIALLY OF THE LEADER OF A GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAKES STATEMENTS ABOUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS TOWARD POLAND."

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4. COMMENT: PREDICTABLY, THE AUTHOR GROSSLY DISTORTS THE CHARACTER OF U.S. FOOD AID AND SALES POLICY SINCE WWII AND OMITS ANY CONTRAST WITH SOVIET POLICY, EVEN WITH RESPECT TO POLAND, THE ONE CASE EN WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN "GENEROUS." THE FAILURE TO BRAG ABOUT AID TO POLAND PROB^BLY REFLECTS THE UNPOPULARITY OF THAT AID; REFERENCES

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-15	NSC-05	NSAE-00	HA-06	L-03	TRSE-00
	PM-09	PA-01	SMS-01	AGRE-00	ACDA-12	SP-02	SPRS-02
	/097 W						

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P 061539Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0509
INFO USICA WASHDC 0517
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00139

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

TO IT HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN EXCISED BY SOVIET CENSORS FROM POLISH STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT. END COMMENT.

5. DEPT. PASS WARSAW AS DESIRED. HARTMAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82MOSCOW000003

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
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	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01	STR-13
	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	SAL-01	BIB-01	RP-10	ACDA-12
	ICAE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/136 W		

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O 021154Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0431
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0496
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00003

E.O. 12065: GDS 01/02/88 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR

[redacted]

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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON POLAND, JANUARY 2, 1982:
- REPORT NO. 60

REF: MOSCOW 00001

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1. [redacted] SUMMARY: SOVIET COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN POLAND JANUARY 2 IS LIMITED TO A REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE POLISH ARMY, WHERE POLISH SOLDIERS ARE JOINING THE PARTY AND FULFILLING THEIR DUTIES. SOVIET

COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. SANCTIONS CONTINUES TO PORTRAY THEM AS A FAILURE OF AMERICAN POLICY, HIGHLIGHTING THE ALLEGED HARM THEY WILL BRING TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND THE NATO ALLIANCE. ALEKSANDR BOVIN, IN AN IZVESTIYA COMMENTARY, WONDERS WHEN THE U.S. WILL LEARN THAT ITS POLICIES ARE AS DANGEROUS TO ITSELF AS TO OTHERS, AND RECOMMITS THE USSR TO A "CONSTRUCTIVE" POLICY IN 1982. IRONICALLY, BY STRESSING THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE THE SANCTIONS WILL SUPPOSEDLY CAUSE IN AMERICA, SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS MAY HEIGHTEN THEIR OWN CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE HARSHNESS OF THESE SANCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. [redacted] PRAVDA JANUARY 2 CONTAINS A REPORT FROM OLEG LOSOTO IN WARSAW ON A VISIT TO POLISH TROOPS DURING THE HOLIDAYS. BESIDES RECEIVING HOLIDAY GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FROM POLISH CIVILIANS, THE TROOPS ARE FULL OF CONFIDENCE AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED INTO THE PZPR HAS INCREASED. ONE OFFICER, ASKED WHY HE JOINED THE PARTY, SAYS HE WANTED TO BELONG TO "THOSE WHO HAVE FOUGHT AND ARE FIGHTING FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE POLISH

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PEOPLE." IN SHORT, THE POLISH ARMY IS IN GOOD CONDITION, IT "FIRMLY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE AND SOCIALISM, AND "CARRIES OUT ITS DUTY TO THE END."

3. [redacted] IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN TAKES A NEW YEAR'S LOOK FORWARD AND BACK ON THE PAGES OF IZVESTIYA JANUARY 1, SAYING 1981 WAS A DISTURBING YEAR, LARGELY BECAUSE OF U.S. POLICY, AND THAT 1982 IS NOT LIKELY TO BE LESS SO, UNLESS WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDS THAT ITS BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER. IN AN ARTICLE MORE REFLECTIVE AND LESS "ANALYTICAL" THAN ARBATOV'S PRAVDA PIECE (REF A), BOVIN PUTS ALL THE BLAME ON THE U.S. FOR CURRENT TENSIONS OVER POLAND, AND PLEDGES THAT THE USSR WILL OPPOSE THE "OPPONENTS OF DETENTE" WITH "CLEAR AND CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS" ON THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF WORLD ISSUES.

4. [redacted] BOVIN MAKES THE NOW STANDARD POINT THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BEGAN TO CHANGE DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF A TRUMPED-UP SOVIET THREAT, BUT REALLY, ACCORDING TO BOVIN, ON ACCOUNT OF "POLITICAL FAILURES AND SOCIAL CHANGES" WHICH CAUSED THE "MOST RIGHT WING, CONSERVATIVE" SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS

TO REACT. ALTHOUGH, BOVIN SAYS, THE "LOGICAL" COURSE WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR THE U.S. TO ACCEPT THAT "THE WORLD WAS NOT DEVELOPING ACCORDING TO AMERICAN PLANS," A "CHAUVINISTIC WAVE" DROWNED OUT THE "SOBER VOICES," AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS BLAMED FOR ALL THE AMERICAN REVERSES FROM VIETNAM TO IRAN. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A "PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY," WASHINGTON SET A COURSE OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
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	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	SAL-01	BIB-01	RP-10	ACDA-12
	ICAE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/136 W		

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O 021154Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0432
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0497
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

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OVER THE USSR, FRIGHTEN IT, AND AT THE SAME TIME
PACIFY THE THIRD WORLD.
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5. [redacted] TURNING TO SOVIET INTENTIONS, BOVIN SAYS
THAT:
- 1) THE USSR WILL NOT ALLOW THE MILITARY-
- STRATEGIC BALANCE TO BE UPSET;
- 2) IT IS "SENSELESS" TO TRY TO FRIGHTEN THE
- SOVIET UNION;
- 3) THE PROCESS OF "SOCIAL RENEWAL" OF THE WORLD
- WILL CONTINUE--NOT BECAUSE MOSCOW WANTS IT,

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- BUT BECAUSE "PEOPLE WANT TO LIVE BETTER";
- 4) THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO AID NATIONS AND
- POLITICAL MOVEMENTS THAT ARE STRUGGLING
- AGAINST "HATEFUL REGIMES."

6. [redacted] AS FOR THE QUESTION OF THE U.S. SANCTIONS, BOVIN ACCUSES THE UNITED STATES OF PURSUING ITS POLICY OF "INTERFERENCE, SANCTIONS AND BLACKMAIL" WITH "ALMOST MANIACAL PERSISTENCE." PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SANCTIONS AGAINST BOTH POLAND AND THE USSR, BOVIN ASSERTS, ARE "UNNEEDED EVIDENCE" OF WASHINGTON'S LACK OF INTEREST IN "FACING THE REALITIES OF WHAT AMERICAN CAN ACCOMPLISH," AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS. HE WRITES THAT THE THREAT POSED BY WASHINGTON'S POLICY IS A "REAL" ONE, NOT ONLY TO OTHERS, BUT "TO THE U.S. ITSELF," AND THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE THE U.S. TO UNDERSTAND THIS. THE USSR, FOR ITS PART, WILL "MULTIPLY ITS EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE," TRYING TO "TURN WORLD POLITICS INTO THE CHANNEL OF DETENTE."

7. [redacted] TWO SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE SEIZED ON THE [redacted]

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ARGUMENT THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR WILL BACKFIRE AND DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF U.S. COMPANIES AND WORKING PEOPLE. NIKOLAI KURDYUMOV, WRITING IN PRAVDA JANUARY 1, QUOTES THE FOLLOWING SAMPLES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION:

-- PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ED MEESE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
- "UNFORTUNATE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR THE
- PRESIDENT'S DECISION" IN TERMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT;
- (THIS IS SOURCED TO AN UNIDENTIFIED TV INTERVIEW)
-- A SPOKESMAN FOR DRESSER INDUSTRIES STATES THAT
- IT WAS "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE" FOR AMERICAN
- BUSINESSMEN TO EXPORT MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
- TO THE USSR EVEN BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF
- SANCTIONS;
-- RICHARD BELL, PRESIDENT OF RICELAND FOODS,
- DESCRIBED THE SANCTIONS AS A "SAD DAY" FOR
- AMERICAN FARMERS, AND ADDED THAT THE DECISION
- TO FREEZE TALKS ON A NEW GRAIN AGREEMENT IS
- "TANTAMOUNT TO AN EMBARGO";
-- A REPRESENTATIVE OF CATERPILLAR TRACTOR SAID
- SOVIET ORDERS WOULD NOW BE DIRECTED TO OTHER
- COUNTRIES.

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8. [redacted] A. TOLKUNOV, WRITING IN PRAVDA JANUARY 2, QUOTES A WASHINGTON POST STORY WHICH SAYS THAT

SECRETARY HAIG WAS ADVISED THAT U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR WOULD "DRAG THE U.S. INTO UNILATERAL ACTIONS THAT WILL PUT US IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION AND CAUSE QUARRELING WITH THE ALLIES." THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THIS ADVICE HAS BEEN BORNE OUT:

-- U.S. PEACE COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEYERSON

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
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	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	SAL-01	BIB-01	RP-10	ACDA-12
	ICAE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/136 W		

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0498
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00003

\- SAYS THE ANTI-SOVIET SANCTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO
\- DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE "DEEPENING ECONOMIC

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\- CRISIS" IN THE U.S.;
\-- THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION
\- "MAY HOLD UP STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS" ON
\- ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN POLAND;
\-- OTHER "OBSERVERS" SPEAK OF "DIRECT BLACKMAIL"
\- OF OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES: EITHER SUPPORT
\- US ON THESE SANCTIONS OR ELSE WE WILL CUT OFF
\- THE INF TALKS, THE U.S. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE
\- SAID;

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-- WASHINGTON IS SEIZED BY AN "ANTI-SOVIET,
- ANTI-POLISH PSYCHOSIS," DESPITE THE "OBVIOUS
- FAILURE" OF "COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS";
-- "ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-SOVIET HYSTERIA" HAVE
- REACHED AN UNPRECENDENTED LEVEL.

9. [redacted] ECHOING THE THEME OF EUROPEAN OPPOSITION TO THE SANCTIONS, PRAVDA JANUARY 2 CARRIES A TASS ROUND-UP OF EUROPEAN OPINION TO "PROVE" THE POINT. MOST DAMAGING ARE QUOTES FROM THE LONDON TIMES ("FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES OF WORLD VIEW BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE"), FRG ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF ("EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL NOT JOIN THE BOYCOTT"), AND SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN HANS-JUERGEN WISCHNEWSKI (I DO NOT CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION OF SANCTIONS A GOOD ONE. A FURTHER WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE FRG). PRAVDA ALSO QUOTES CRITICISM OF THE U.S. MOVE BY PAPERS IN SYRIA AND INDIA.

10. WARSAW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HARTMAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82MOSCOW000001

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-^`	DODE-00
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	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	OCS-06	SAL-01	BIB-01
	RP-10	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/153 W

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O 011312Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0427
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0492
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
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USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00001

E.O. 12065: 1/01/88 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, UR, PL
SUBJECT: ARBATOV PUMMELS U.S. ON POLAND--REPORT NO. 59

[redacted]

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-- JANUARY 1, 1982

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: IN A LONG PRAVDA ARTICLE TODAY CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AND USA INSTITUTE CHIEF ARBATOV SHARPLY CRITICIZES U.S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND AND SEEKS "ANALYTICALLY" TO EXPOSE WASHINGTON'S REAL MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES IN ITS "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN." ARBATOV CALLS THIS CAMPAIGN AND U.S. ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST POLAND IMMORAL AND HYPOCRITICAL BEYOND ALL

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LIMITS. HE REPEATS THE THEME THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE POLAND. ARBATOV DRAWS A PARALLEL BETWEEN MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND USG ACTION "NINE TIMES SINCE WW II" TO EMPLOY SPECIAL POWERS TO DEAL WITH RACIAL CRISES OR STRIKES. TO EXPLAIN THE REAL MOTIVES OF U.S. POLICY ON POLAND, ARBATOV CLAIMS ONE MUST LOOK TO THE RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS WHO DOMINATE THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY, AND TO THE PRESIDENT WHO SHARES THEIR VIEWS. ARBATOV SEES THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN: TO BRING THE NATO ALLIES CLOSER TOGETHER, TO PRESERVE THE ARMS RACE, AND TO MAKE AMERICANS FORGET ABOUT THEIR OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. IT IS CURIOUS THAT ARBATOV BELIEVES THE U.S. HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO "USE" POLAND TO PROMOTE ALLIANCE UNITY. OTHER PROPAGANDISTS HAVE PUSHED THE LINE THAT U.S. POLICY, PARTICULARLY SANCTIONS, IS LIKELY TO EXACERBATE ALLIANCE DIFFERENCES.

2. [redacted] SINCE THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS HAVE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS IN POLAND LEADING TO THIS STEP, AND THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION THERE. SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SANCTIONS ON POLAND AND ON THE USSR, SOVIET

[redacted]

PROPAGANDISTS HAVE INCREASINGLY CHARGED THAT U.S. POLICY ON POLAND HAS AS ITS PURPOSES TO HEIGHTEN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, TO HARM U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND TO FURTHER OTHER U.S. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY GOALS FAVORED BY THE "EXTREME RIGHT." THESE THEMES STRIKINGLY RESEMBLE THE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET ANTI-US PROPAGANDA IN RECENT YEARS, PARTICULARLY ON STRATEGIC AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. AN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ARBATOV ARTICLE, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT INTEGRATES SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND WITH THE OVERALL SOVIET PROPAGANDA STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. [redacted] IN A LONG ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, GEORGI ARBATOV, THE DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USA AND CANADA, CALLS U.S. POLICY ON POLAND AN ATTEMPT TO COMPLICATE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION THERE, TO "INTERNATIONALIZE" THE CRISIS, AND TO USE EVENTS THERE TO SHARPEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR, RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. ARBATOV ALLEGES THAT THE U.S. "CAMPAIGN" IS IMMORAL, AND ITS HYPOCRISY GOES BEYOND ALL LIMITS. DESPITE ITS "LOFTY MORAL CONSIDERATIONS," THE U.S. HAS DECLARED "ECONOMIC WARFARE ON POLAND." "IN FACT, ALL U.S. INFLUENCE IS BEING TO PUSH THE COUNTRY TOWARD CONFRONTATION, ANARCHY, CHAOS, AND BLOODSHEAD."

4. [redacted] ARBATOV ADMITS THAT MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82MOSCOW000001

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	DODE-00
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O 011312Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0428
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0493
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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY

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IS AN "UNPLEASANT AND PAINFUL MEASURE." NEVERTHELESS, HE CONTINUES, IT IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF EVERY COUNTRY. BY ITSELF, IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

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"COMMONLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.N. CHARTER OR EXISTING TREATIES" (READ: THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT), EVEN THOUGH WASHINGTON IS TRYING TO PROVE THE REVERSE.

5. [redacted] ARBATOV THEN DRAWS A PARALLEL BETWEEN MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND THE "EXAMPLE OF THE U.S." ARBATOV NOTES PROVISIONS IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS FOR COMBATTING SOCIAL UNREST. THE USG,HE CONTINUES,

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HAS USED THESE POWERS "NINE TIMES SINCE WORLD WAR II ALONE, MOSTLY IN CASES OF RACIAL RIOTS, EXCEPT THE INCIDENTS OF THE USE OF TROOPS TO SUPRESS STRIKES." ARBATOV ASKS RHETORICALLY: CAN POLISH AUTHORITIES NOT USE SIMILAR MEASURES TO AVERT THE THREAT OF NATIONAL CATASTROPHE? HE ASSERTS THAT IN MANY OTHER CASES--CHILE, IRAN, SOUTH KOREA, LATIN AMERICA--THE U.S. HAS WELCOMED COUPS ACCOMPANIED BY APPALLING ATROCITIES AND BLOODSHEAD.

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6. [redacted] THIS APPARENT DISCREPANCY, CONTINUES ARBATOV, NATURALLY LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF WASHINGTON'S REAL MOTIVES IN TAKING THESE MEASURES TOWARD POLAND. ARBATOV SUGGESTS THAT THE ANSWER MAY BE FOUND BY EXAMINING THE OUTLOOK OF WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS. HE ARGUES THAT NOT JUST SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS BUT THE ENTIRE "SECOND-ECHELON" OF THE U.S. FOREIGN-POLICY BUREAUCRACY CONSISTS OF "EXTREMISTS REPRESENTING THE EXTREME RIGHT, THE EXTREME MILITARY FLANK OF THE U.S. RULING CLASS." THE PRESIDENT, HE ADDS, SHARES THIER VIEWS. ARBATOV CONTINUES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BEGAN WITH A SERIES OF ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA, NICARAGUA, AND MANY ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS EVIDENT "RETURN TO THE COLD WAR" FRIGHTENED U.S. ALLIES AND MANY AMERICANS AS WELL. IN RECENT MONTHS, THEY HAVE

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FORCED THE ADMINISTRATION TO CHANGE ITS TONE, TO TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, ABOUT ARMS LIMITATIONS, NOT ABOUT WAR BUT ABOUT PEACE.

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7. [redacted] ARBATOV ATTRIBUTES TO THE U.S. THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES IN THE "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN.":

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--TO BRING THE (NATO) ALLIES CLOSER TOGETHER AND TO PATCH UP WITH THE BALLYHOO OVER POLAND THE SERIOUS FRICTIONS WHICH HAVE FLARED UP OVER THE MAJOR QUESTIONS OF SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ECONOMICS;

-

--TO PRESERVE THE ARMS RACE, DESPITE THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ONGOING TALKS;

-

--TO MAKE AMERICANS FORGET ABOUT THE GROWING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THEIR COUNTRY, AN OBJECTIVE THAT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE IN 1982.

-

8. [redacted] FINALLY, CONCLUDES ARBATOV, THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE U.S. WILL INTERVENE IN POLAND IN THE EVENT OF A DRAMATIC UPRISING THERE. IN THIS "NUCLEAR CENTURY," EMPHASIZES ARBATOV, LOCAL CONFLICTS ALWAYS POTENTIALLY THREATEN TO EVOLVE INTO A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT

POWERS. WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED, ARBATOV ASKS, IF DURING THE COURSE OF POST-WAR EVENTS LEADERS HAD FOLLOWED THEIR INSTINCTS, SYMPATHIES, AND ANTIPATHIES? NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, OF COURSE. "THE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS TRUTH" STRENGTHENS THE INVINCIBLE, VITAL FORCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF STATES BELONGING TO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS. IN ONE OR ANOTHER FORM, THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES,

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	ARA-16	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	SY-05	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	OCS-06	SAL-01	BIB-01
	RP-10	ACDA-12	SYE-00	SP-02	SR-04	SPRS-02	/153 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0429
INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0494
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
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USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY

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INCLUDING THE U.S. BUT, IN RECENT TIMES, OFFICIAL AMERICA AGAIN AND AGAIN HAS FORGOTTEN THE REALITIES OF OUR EPOCH, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT

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SITUATION IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH WITHOUT ARTICIALLY FORMENTING CRISES."

9. WARSAW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81MOSCOW017654

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CI?E-00	EB-08	EA-10
	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00
	SY-05	HA-06	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0488
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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/87 (COURTNEY, WILLIAM H) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR

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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON POLAND, DECEMBER 31, 1981:
- REPORT NO. 58

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: THIS EVENING THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHINE ROSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE U.S. DECISION ON SOVIET SANCTIONS. IT UNLEASHED A BARRAGE OF CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION, AND IT SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SANCTIONS. A USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL CHARGES

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THE U.S. WITH SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TO DISCIPLINE DISOBEDIENT ALLIES. TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK AS CHARGING THAT POLAND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIAL ZAMYATIN, LIKE BREZHNEV IN THE RECENT INTERVIEW WITH NBC, EMPHASIZES THAT THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES LIE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE. TASS, REPLAYING A POLISH PRESS ITEM, ASSERTS THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS OFTEN VISITED SOLIDARITY LEADERS AND THAT AFTERWARD THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, TASS ASSESSES THE SANCTIONS AND FINDS THEY ARE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE OR WILL HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE USSR. END SUMMARY.

2. [redacted] TASS HAS TAKEN ANOTHER SWIPE AT THE U.S. SANCTIONS PUT ON THE USSR ON ACCOUNT OF POLAND. A COMMENTARY BY RADOMIR BOGDANOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, BUT IDENTIFIED HERE AS A "TASS NEWS ANALYST," CHARGES THAT THE "IMPERIAL WARRIORS" IN THE WHITE HOUSE

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ARE TRYING TO "WHIP UP PASSIONS AROUND POLAND" AND TO "USE RUDENESS, BLACKMAIL AND VIOLENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY." THE ARTICLE, ENTITLED "TERRORISM," CONTAINS A LONG LISTING OF AMERICAN MISDEEDS AND "ACTS OF TERRORISM" STARTING WITH HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, THROUGH IRAN, VIETNAM, CHILE, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. IT CHARGES THAT POLAND IS "ONLY A PRETEXT FOR FURTHER WHIPPING UP INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS" IN ORDER TO 1) DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: AND 2) DISCIPLINE "DISOBEDIENT ALLIES." THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR, ACCORDING TO BOGDANOV, REFLECT THE "MORAL EROSION" OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY RATHER THAN "STRENGTH OR CONFIDENCE." WHEREAS PRESIDENT CARTER WAS THE MAN WHO "PUT INTO HIGH GEAR THE MACHINE FOR DESTROYING AND UNDERMINING DETENTE," NOW IT IS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS "ACCELERATING THE REVOLUTIONS OF THIS MACHINE," IN ACTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE "THE LIMIT OF HYPOCRISY AND ADVENTURISM."

3. [redacted] COMMENT: BOGDANOV'S CLEAR THEMES ARE THAT THE U.S. IS USING POLAND AS A PRETEXT FOR ACTIONS IT WOULD LIKE TO UNDERTAKE IN ANY CASE, AND THAT THE STRATEGY BEHIND THESE ACTIONS HAS TO DO WITH FEARS OF SLIPPING INFLUENCE WITH THE WESTERN ALLIES. IT HARDLY NEEDS TO BE STATED THAT BOTH

THESE ARGUMENTS ARE CALCULATED 1) TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUE OF POLAND; AND 2) TO SOW DISCORD AMONG THE NATO ALLIES. THE ACCUSATIONS OF PAST AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE INTENDED TO APPEAL TO THE WIDER WORLD AUDIENCE AND THE EUROPEAN LEFT, AND AGAIN, TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND. END COMMENT.

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	EA-10
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	MCT-02	STR-13	SIL-01	INRE-00	SMS-01	BIB-01	RP-10
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0489
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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4. [redacted] IN A DECEMBER 31 DISPATCH FROM WARSAW,
[redacted]

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TASS ATTACKS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES" AGAINST POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAVE "AROUSED STRONG PROTESTS AND INDIGNATION IN POLAND." TASS QUOTES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER JOZEF CZYREK AS SAYING, "SETTING THINGS IN ORDER IN OUR OWN HOME IS OUR INTERNAL MATTER. POLAND WISHES TO MAINTAIN EQUAL RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES AND WILL NEVER AGREE TO INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

5. [redacted] BASING ITS OBSERVATIONS ON A STATEMENT BY THE POLISH PRESS AGENCY(PAP), TASS REPORTS THAT THE POLISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE EFFECTS OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND HAS CONCLUDED THAT "THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY NOW TO END THE DEEP CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY DUE TO THE LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE." THE RECENT INTRODUCTION OF UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY UNDER MARTIAL LAW IS CITED AS ONE OF THE RECENT CHANGES WHICH HAS CREATED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR "ENSURING A GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY." THE RECENT GROWTH IN COAL OUTPUT--"ALMOST 600,000 TONS OF COAL WERE MINED ON DECEMBER 29, THE HIGHEST DAILY PERFORMANCE IN COAL MINING IN RECENT WEEKS"--IS PORTRAYED AS A RESULT OF THE CLAMP-DOWN ON THE "PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF SOLIDARITY RADICALS."

6. [redacted] IN AN INTERVIEW PRINTED IN THE NEW YEAR'S ISSUE OF THE SOVIET WEEKLY 'MOSCOW NEWS,' THE CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, LEONID ZAMYATIN, PINPOINTS THE THREE KEY QUESTIONS FOR THE NEW YEAR: 1)

[redacted]

MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE; 2) CARRYING ON THE SALT PROCESS; AND 3) BREAKING THE DEADLOCK AT THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. ZAMYATIN STRESSES THAT THE SOVIET UNION "HAS ALWAYS FAVORED DIALOGUE WITH THE USA AT ANY LEVEL," AND THAT IT DESIRES "HONEST AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS..." HE WARNS, HOWEVER, THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS MUST BE BASED ON "OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT." ON POLAND, ZAMYATIN REPEATS THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CHRISTMAS SPEECH VIOLATED "INTERNATIONAL NORMS" AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

7. [redacted] COMMENT: AS BREZHNEV DID IN THE NBC INTERVIEW, ZAMYATIN DWELLS ON ARMS CONTROL THEMES AND SOVIET INTEREST IN CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., ON SOVIET TERMS OF COURSE. ZAMYATIN'S (AND BREZHNEV'S) PURPOSES ARE: 1) TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE READERS THAT POLAND IS NOT AN ISSUE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE; 2) TO HIGHLIGHT TO EUROPEANS THAT, DESPITE POLAND, EUROPE HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN REACHING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE USSR ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE AND ITS SECURITY; AND 3) TO INDICATE THAT IF THE U.S. IS WILLING TO OVERLOOK

POLAND, THE USSR IS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY.
END COMMENT.

8. [redacted] TASS PICKED UP AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY THE POLISH NEWSPAPER 'WIRDOMOSCI SZCZEDINSKIE' IN WHICH REAGAN'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE WAS CHARACTERIZED AS A "CLASSICAL EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. POLICY WITH REGARD TO OTHER COUNTRIES." ACCUSING REAGAN OF HAVING

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INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0490
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
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USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY

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REVEALED HIS TRUE INTENTIONS, THE POLISH ARTICLE
REPORTS THE POLISH ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN'S ACTION
[redacted]

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AS NEW PROOF OF AN "OLD TRUTH," NAMELY THAT
"IMPERIALISTS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE A CENT TO
ANYONE IF THEY DO NOT REPEAT NOT SEE ANY ADVANTAGE
FOR THEMSELVES." (REAGAN IS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID
THAT HE "HAS NO REPEAT NO INTEREST IN POLAND.")
THE U.S. IS CHARGED WITH AIMING IN RECENT MONTHS
TO "ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER POLAND'S SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" AND WITH SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY
BECAUSE "IT SUITED THE AIMS AND TASKS OF WESTERN

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SUBVERSIVE IDEOLOGICAL CENTERS." IT IS POINTED OUT THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS "OFTEN MADE VISITS TO LEADERS OF SOLIDARITY" AND THAT "AFTER EVERY SUCH MEETING THE BEHAVIOR OF TRADE UNION LEADERS BECAME MORE BRAZEN AND THEY WERE PUSHING THE COUNTRY FURTHER TOWARD AN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT." POLES ARE EXHORTED TO "RELY ON THEIR OWN RESOURCES AND ON THE ASSISTANCE OF TRUE FRIENDS WHO HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT LEFT THE POLES IN NEED."

9. [redacted] COMMENT: THE POLISH JOURNALIST PLAYS TO POLES' HISTORICAL ANGER AT BEING ABANDONED BY THE WEST DURING WWII BY PORTRAYING THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY THE U.S., AS INTERESTED IN POLAND ONLY AS LONG AS THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS ECONOMICALLY EXPLOITABLE. THE IMPLIED ACCUSATION THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS EXHORTED SOLIDARITY TO MORE BRAZEN ACTIONS REPRESENTS AN ESCALATION IN THE SOVIET MEDIA OF ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE USG TO SOLIDARITY.

10. [redacted] TASS OBSERVER IVAN ABLAMOV REPLAYS THEMES REMINISCENT OF THE SOVIET STANCE TAKEN DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S GRAIN EMBARGO: 1) PAST EMBARGOS HAVE NOT PREVENTED THE SOVIET UNION FROM

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BECOMING A MILITARY SUPERPOWER OR FROM DEVELOPING ITS ECONOMY; AND 2) EMBARGOS HURT U.S. BUSINESSMEN AND FARMERS MORE THAN THEY HURT THE SOVIET UNION. HE ESTIMATES THAT LOSSES TO U.S. CORPORATIONS AS A RESULT OF REAGAN'S SANCTIONS WILL BE "AT LEAST 3.7 BILLION DOLLARS" AND THAT LOSSES TO U.S. FARMERS WILL BE ANOTHER "1.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR." HE ASSERTS THAT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN "REAGAN HIMSELF HAD TO ADMIT THE POINTLESSNESS OF UNILATERAL CURTAILING OF TRADE WITH THE USSR."

11. A COMMENTATOR ON THE NIGHTLY TV NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA" STATED THAT THE WEST HAS "PROOF" THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE IT. HE ALSO REJECTED THE NOTION THAT PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE SOVIET "FRATERNAL" BEHAVIOR TOWARD ITS ALLY. "VREMYA" ANNOUNCER ALSO REPEATED TASS ITEM IN PARA 5 ABOUT UNIVERSAL LABOR DUTY AND INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY RESULTING FROM THE "LIQUIDATION OF ANARCHY." HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN ITS ALLIES 24 HOURS' WARNING BEFORE IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND HAD MISTAKENLY TAKEN THEIR SILENCE FOR SUPPORT. HE REPEATED THE WARNING (PARA 10) THAT AN EMBARGO WOULD HURT THE U.S. MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION. HARTMAN

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 MSC-01
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RP-10 SP-02 M-01 PRS-01 /040 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2470
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0895
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 20333

DEPARTMENT FOR PA -- A/S TUTWILER; ALSO FOR EUR/SOV, RP, AND HA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CVIS, PREL, PROP, UR, PINR, PGOV, US
SUBJECT: JULY 27 MFA PRESS BRIEFING
/

HIGHLIGHTS
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1. THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED JULY 27 MFA PRESS BRIEFING FEATURED:

-- NIKOLAY GRIGORYEVICH BELOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE, WHO PROVIDED STATISTICS CONCERNING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989 IN THE USSR;

-- AMBASSADOR YURIY KASHLEV AND RUDOLF ALEKSEYEVICH KUZNETSOV, HEAD OF UVIR (OFFICE OF VISAS AND
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REGISTRATION), USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHO DISCUSSED ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION SIX MONTHS AFTER THE VIENNA ACCORDS;

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-- BRIEF STATEMENTS BY MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN GENNADIY GERASIMOV AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE. GERASIMOV MENTIONED TALKS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOLTON AND SOVIET DEP. FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKIY, AND THE STOCKHOLM CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN BEGINNING JULY 31 BETWEEN ASST. SECRETARY JOHN KELLY AND SOVIET AMB.-AT-LARGE KOZOREV. (GERASIMOV STRESSED THAT NO OTHER SUBJECT, INCLUDING IRAN, WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THESE MEETINGS).

END HIGHLIGHTS
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2. DEPUTY PRESS SPOKESMAN PERFYL'EV INTRODUCED NIKOLAY GRIGORYEVICH BELOV OF THE STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE, WHO PRESENTED STATISTICS ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, CRIME, INFLATION, HOUSING, THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY, AND THE PURCHASE OF TEN BILLION RUBLES' WORTH OF CONSUMER GOODS FROM WESTERN NATIONS IN HARD CURRENCY. A DETAILED REPORT OF THESE STATISTICS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.

SIX MONTHS AFTER VIENNA
----

3. AMBASSADOR YURIY KASHLEV AND UVIR HEAD RUDOLF KUZNETSOV ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION TO EXAMINE AND CONSIDER ALL OUTSTANDING APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT VISAS WITHIN THE SIX MONTHS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TALKS IN VIENNA. ON JANUARY 19, THERE
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WERE 1855 APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT VISAS PENDING FROM REFUSENIKS (A WORD THEY SAID THEY DID NOT LIKE). AS OF THE END OF JUNE, 1600 OF THESE PERSONS HAD BEEN GRANTED EXIT PERMISSION. DENIALS WERE BASED MAINLY ON THE GROUNDS OF KNOWLEDGE OF STATE SECRETS OR OBJECTIONS FROM FAMILY MEMBERS.

A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME
----

4. AMBASSADOR KASHLEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED THE EUROPEAN PROCESS AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND DYNAMIC, AND THAT THE SPIRIT OF EUROPE WAS CHANGING, AS EVIDENCED BY

RECENT TRIPS OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO THE FRG, UK AND FRANCE. THIS SPIRIT WAS GIVING A NEW DIMENSION TO THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND GORBACHEV'S IDEA OF A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME.

5. AMB. KASHLEV STATED THAT THE VIENNA CFE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE CONCLUDED IN 1990. ADDITIONAL EVENTS ARE BEING PLANNED:

-- PARIS: SOVIET-FRENCH CONFERENCE ON JOINT LEGAL DOCTRINES, THE INCREASING ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS, AND

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ACTION PA-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 AMAD-01 VO-06
INRE-00 RP-10 SP-02 M-01 PRS-01 /040 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2471

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0896
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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DEPARTMENT FOR PA - A/S TUTWILER; ALSO FOR EUR/SOV,
RP, AND HA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CVIS, PREL, PROP, UR, PINR, PGOV, US
SUBJECT: JULY 27 MFA PRESS BRIEFING

HANDLING OF CONSULAR AND VISA PROBLEMS;

-- SOFIA: CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT (TO TAKE PLACE IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER);

-- POLAND: CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION;

-- THE OPENING OF NEW CULTURAL CENTERS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS.

FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION

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6. RUDOLF KUZNETSOV, HEAD OF UVIR, PROVIDED ADDITIONAL STATISTICS ON EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR. HE ANNOUNCED THAT A TOTAL OF 108,000 PERSONS HAD EMIGRATED FROM THE USSR IN 1988, AND AN ADDITIONAL 91,000 HAD EMIGRATED DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, INCLUDING 1600 OF A TOTAL OF 1855 INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN TERMED REFUSENIKS AS OF JANUARY 19, 1989.

7. UVIR IS NOW TELLING ALL SOVIETS WHO WANT TO EMIGRATE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT SELL THEIR POSSESSIONS AND GIVE UP THEIR APARTMENTS UNTIL THEY HAVE AN ENTRY VISA FOR ANOTHER COUNTRY. HE MENTIONED THE LONG LINES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY AS AN EXAMPLE OF DIFFICULTIES PEOPLE ARE HAVING IN OBTAINING PERMISSION TO IMMIGRATE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY. A TOTAL OF 35,000 VISAS FOR EMIGRATION TO

ISRAEL WERE ISSUED IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, AND THERE IS LARGE SCALE EMIGRATION TO THE FRG ALSO.

8. KUZNETSOV MENTIONED THAT AS OF MARCH 1, 1989, PEOPLE LIVING IN THE USSR-HUNGARY BORDER AREA HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO PASS FREELY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITHOUT VISAS, ALTHOUGH THE USSR HAD TO STOP CURRENCY EXCHANGES BECAUSE OF A SHORTAGE OF HUNGARIAN CURRENCY

NEW LEGISLATION
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9. KUZNETSOV SPECULATED THAT NEW LEGISLATION WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR AN INVITATION FROM ABROAD FOR SOVIETS GOING ONLY ON A TEMPORARY VISIT, ALTHOUGH INVITATIONS WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED FOR EMIGRATION. KUZNETSOV REPEATED THE MYTH THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT QUOTE APPROVES ALL INVITATIONS UNQUOTE (HE APPARENTLY IS
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REFERRING TO THE STATE DEPT. VERIFICATION OF SIGNATURES -- A PURELY NOTARIAL FUNCTION -- ON SOME OF THESE DOCUMENTS).

10. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION, KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS TRYING TO ADJUST ITS INTERNAL LEGISLATION TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS, AND THAT EVEN WITHOUT THE VIENNA DOCUMENTS THE SOVIET INTERNAL PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD LEAD TO FREER TRAVEL. KUZNETSOV STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WANTS TO OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE STILL PROBLEMS:

-- THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF AIR TICKETS;

-- THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT ALLOW EMIGRANTS TO EXCHANGE MORE MONEY BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF HARD CURRENCY;

-- THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING ADEQUATE PRODUCTION OF NEW PASSPORTS.

ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GERASIMOV
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11. MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV APPEARED AT THE END

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 20333

DEPARTMENT FOR PA - A/S TUTWILER; ALSO FOR EUR/SOV,
RP, AND HA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CVIS, PREL, PROP, UR, PINR, PGOV, US
SUBJECT: JULY 27 MFA PRESS BRIEFING

OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOR BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENTS. HE NOTED:

-- TALKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN ASST. SEC. OF STATE BOLTON AND DEP. FOREIGN MIN. PETROVSKIY;

-- ASST. SEC. OF STATE JOHN KELLY AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE KOZOREV WILL MEET IN STOCKHOLM ON JULY 31 TO HOLD TALKS ON PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN (GERASIMOV STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OTHER TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN STOCKHOLM, INCLUDING IRAN);

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-- THAT AN ABC CORRESPONDENT HAD UNLEASHED A NEW SPY-MANIA WITH THE STORY OF FELIX BLOCH, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF MR. BLOCH EXCEPT WHAT HAS APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON POST;

-- THE USG'S NEW B-2 STEALTH BOMBER; GERASIMOV FURTHER SPECULATED ABOUT POSSIBLE MOTIVES FOR BUILDING SUCH A FUTURISTIC AIRCRAFT, SINCE WE ALL KNOW THAT A FIRST STRIKE WOULD BE SUICIDAL.

12. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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PAGE 01 STATE 232671
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UNCLAS STATE 232671

FOR PAOS INFORM CONSULS GENEVA PASS NST AND CD DELS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE - JULY 21, 1989

1. FOLLOWING ARE 7/21/89 PRESS GUIDANCES OF EUROPEAN INTEESTUIDANCES OF EUROPEAN INTEREST. DEPUTY SPOKESMAN RICHARD BOUCHER WAS THE BRIEFER.
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2. INQUIRY INTO ACTIVITIES OF STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE (GUIDANCE PREPARED FRIDAY AFTERNOON AND USED AFTER THE

STORY BROKE ON THE ABC EVENING NEWS)

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURIUTY IS COOPERATING WITH AN FBI INQUIRY INTO REPORTS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING A STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE AND AGENTS OF A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE SUBJECT OF THIS INQUIRY IS MR. FELIX BLOCH, A CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS. MR. BLOCH HAS BEEN PLACED ON ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE AND HIS STATE DEPARTMENT BUILDING PASS HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN PENDING RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER. THE FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED ARE PURSUING THE INQUIRY THOROUGHLY IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE EXTENT OF THE COMPROMISE OF SECURITY WHICH HAS OCCURRED AND APPROPRIATE LEGAL STEPS.

3. U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS: PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT (USED)

AS PART OF OUR ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS, U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS WILL MEET IN STOCKHOLM JULY 31-AUGUST 1 TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. WE ALSO EXPECT TO RAISE ISSUES RELATED TO IRAN. U.S. EXPERTS WILL BE HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS JOHN KELLY.

4. AFGHANISTAN: TONY O'BRIEN RELEASED: PRESS STATEMENT (USED)

WE ARE PLEASED TO CONFIRM THAT TONY O'BRIEN, THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST HELD FOR A MONTH BY THE KABUL REGIME, WAS RELEASED EARLIER THIS MORNING. WE EXPECT HIM TO DEPART SOON FOR NEW DELHI IN THE COMPANY OF OUR CONSULAR OFFICER, RENNY SMITH, WHOM WE HAD SENT TO AFGHANISTAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE. THIS OUTCOME IS VERY WELCOME NEWS.

5. SOVIET OFFICIALS VISIT (NOT USED)

Q: WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN IS MEETING TODAY AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT?

A: -- SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANATOLI ADAMISHIN WILL BE MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS HERE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AS PART OF A CONTINUING SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS. MR. ADAMASHIN HAS PLAYED A CONSISTENT ROLE WITH US IN NEGOTIATIONS ON AFRICA AND WILL MEET WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN AS WELL.

6. CYPRUS: JULY 19 WOMEN'S MARCH HOME (USED)

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE JULY 19 DEMONSTRATION BY GREEK CYPRIOT WOMEN IN NICOSIA AND THEIR DETENTION BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS?

A: -- ABOUT 500 GREEK CYPRIOT MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE WOMEN'S WALK HOME ORGANIZATION CROSSED THE CEASE FIRE LINE INTO THE UN-CONTROLLED BUFFER ZONE IN THE OLD WALLED CITY OF NICOSIA JULY 19 IN A DEMONSTRATION MARKING THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TURKISH INTERVENTION ON THE ISLAND. 113 PERSONS, INCLUDING THREE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE ARRESTED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. THE THREE JOURNALIST WERE RELEASED ON JULY 20. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE OTHER DETAINEES WILL BE RELEASED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE HAVE CALLED ON ALL CONCERNED TO ACT WITH
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RESTRAINT AND TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN IN RESTORING THE STATUS QUO IN THE BUFFER ZONE.

Q: WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE UN SPONSORED TALKS?

A: -- THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HOSTED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES' LEADERS AT THE END OF JUNE, 1989 AT WHICH IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE IN NICOSIA BEGINNING THE WEEK OF JULY 24 AND CONTINUING AS NECESSARY INTO SEPTEMBER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVES UNTIL AN OUTLINE FOR A SETTLEMENT TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS REACHED.

7. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BAKER

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APPROVED BY: EUR/PA: CRSTEINER, JR.
PA/PRESS: ASTOCKMAN
EUR/SOV: JTEFFT

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FOR PAOS INFORM CONSULS GENEVA PASS NST AND CD DELS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCES - MAY 16, 1990

1. FOLLOWING ARE TODAY'S PRESS GUIDANCES OF EUROPEAN INTEREST. THEY WERE NOT USED IN TODAY'S DEPARTMENT BRIEFING. DEPUTY SPOKESMAN RICHARD BOUCHER WAS THE BRIEFER.

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2. LATVIA (EXCERPT BY BAKER IN MOSCOW 5/16

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Q: MR. SECRETARY, HAVE YOU HEARD ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS?

SECRETARY BAKER: YES, I HAVE. IT'S NOT ENCOURAGING.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SITUATION THAT YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT IN LATVIA AND ESTONIA?

SECRETARY BAKER: WHEN I SAID IT'S NOT ENCOURAGING, I'M REFERRING TO THE FACT, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A DIALOGUE DEVELOP WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS GENERALLY. THAT DIALOGUE HAS NOT AS YET DEVELOPED.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WILL THAT INTERFERE AT ALL, IN YOUR VIEW, WITH YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS THIS WEEK?

SECRETARY BAKER: WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE BALTICS IN MY TALKS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS.

Q: WILL THAT GET IN THE WAY OF PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT.

SECRETARY BAKER: LET'S WAIT AND I'LL GIVE YOU A COMMENT AFTER I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TALK WITH SOME OF MY INTERLOCUTORS. I HAVEN'T HAD THAT CHANCE YET, RALPH....

Q: IS THERE A CLOUD OVER THESE TALKS BECAUSE OF EVENTS IN LATVIA, ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA?
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SECRETARY BAKER: I SPOKE TO THAT EARLIER WHEN I WAS WITH YOU DURING THE COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. IT'S NOT ENCOURAGING TO US TO SEE THE ABSENCE OF A DIALOGUE. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS RESOLVED, OF COURSE, IN A PEACEFUL MANNER AND THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND LITHUANIANS. THE MINISTER KNOWS THIS BECAUSE WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT BEFORE. AND WE HOPE THAT HAPPENS.

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3. TERRORISM: STATE SPONSHORSHIP

Q: WHAT HAS THE U.S. DONE TO COUNTER STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM?

A: -- THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN PRESSURING STATES THAT SUPPORT TERRORISM. SUCH COUNTRIES ARE DEALT WITH PRIMARILY THROUGH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS, BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES.

-- WE HAVE CONVEYED TO STATE SPONSORS THAT AS LONG AS THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT TERRORISM, THEY CANNOT HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED NATIONS.

-- WE ANNUALLY PUBLISH A LIST OF NATIONS THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM AND APPLY STRONG ECONIMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE STATES. COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE LIST ARE: LIBYA, IRAN, SYRIA, NORTH KOREA, SOUTH YEMEN, AND CUBA.

Q: WHY DON'T WE USE MILITARY FORCE MORE OFTEN, SUCH AS PRE-EMPTIVE AND RETALIATORY STRIKES?

A: -- THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF
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OPTIONS THAT WE CAN USE AGAINST STATE SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM. WE APPLIED THIS OPTION AGAINST LIBYA IN 1986. WE HAVE THE WILL AND THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHEN IT IS WARRANTED.

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4. PAN AM 103: TASK FORCE ON REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Q: ANY UPDATE ON STATE'S VIEW OF THE REPORT ISSUED YESTERDAY BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURTY AND TERRORISM?

A: -- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION AS THE REPORT WAS BEING PREPARED. WE BELIEVE IT IS AN EXCELLENT PIECE OF WORK, AND WE ARE STUDYING THE BEST WAY TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS DEPARTMENT. ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER HAS DIRECTED IVAN SELIN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

MANAGEMENT, TO SET UP A TASK FORCE TO REVIEW AND TO IMPLEMENT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS AS APPROPRIATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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5. NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE ARTICLE ON FELIX BLOCH CASE (NOT USED)

Q: THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE ARTICLE ON THE FELIX BLOCH CASE CONTAINED A STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT ASKED FOR BELGIAN SECURITY SERVICE ASSISTANCE AND MISTRUSTED THE BELGIAN SERVICE. IS THIS TRUE? DID YOU
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ASKED BELGIAN ASSISTANCE?

A: -- BELGIUM IS A VALUED ALLY WITH WHOM WE HAVE CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

Q: WERE U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN BELGIUM WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT?

A: -- I CANNOT DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, SO I CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

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6. GREECE: BASE NEGOTIATIONS

Q: ANY COMMENT ON THE GOG SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS THAT A "POSITIVE OUTCOME" MAY BE POSSIBLE ON THE BASE NEGOTIATION TALKS?

A: THE LATEST ROUND OF RESUMED BASE NEGOTIATION TALKS WHICH ENDED YESTERDAY WERE POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO INITIATION OF THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON MAY 22.

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A NEW DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AND LOOK FORWARD TO CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ACCOMPLISH THAT.

Q: WHEN WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE CONCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGREEMENT?

A. WHILE WE HOPE FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS ONCE NEGOTIATIONS RESUME IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, I CANNOT SPECULATE ON TIMING OF CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT.
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7. GREECE: RASHID

Q: (IF ASKED) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE U.S. REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION OF MOHAMMED RASHID?

A: OUR REQUEST FOR THE EXTRADITION OF RASHID STANDS. WE LOOK TO THE MITSOTAKIS GOVERNMENT TO UPHOLD THE MAY 1989 RULING OF THE GREEK SUPREME COURT THAT RASHID IS EXTRADITABLE.

Q: (IF ASKED) WHEN WOULD YOU EXPECT THE MITSOTAKIS GOVERNMENT TO ACT ON THE U.S. REQUEST?

A: THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH YOU SHOULD PUT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE.

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8. GREECE: PM MITSOTAKIS VISIT TO U.S.

(ONLY IF ASKED)

Q: ANY COMMENT ON GREEK PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON?

A: -- PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS WILL BE IN THE U.S. ON A PRIVATE VISIT IN EARLY JUNE. THE PRESIDENT HAS INVITED HIM TO A MEETING AND LUNCHEON ON JUNE 6.

-- THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAMARAS WILL
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ALSO HAVE A SEPARATE MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER ON JUNE 4.

-- I HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS ON PLANNING FOR THIS VISIT AT PRESENT.

9. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
EAGLEBURGER

Tightening Sanctions - Next Steps on Land, Sea and Air

I. Summary

UNSC Resolution 661 imposes a near-comphrehensive embargo on Iraq, including financial, trade and other dealings. However, questions have arisen in its implementation and subsequent resolutions have served to provide enforcement measures and mechanisms to ensure its strict and uniform application. In general, the sanctions have been successful in preventing proscribed cargo from going to or from Iraq or occupied Kuwait by sea or land. Moreover, thus far, we are not aware of significant violation by air, although this could change over time as the maritime interdiction becomes even tighter.

Certain additional measures could serve to further strengthen the maritime effort, and we could usefully forge consensus on application of the embargo to the air to advance bilateral efforts we have already made. We should also seek to ensure that all states freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets as we have done and, if we can persuade the Soviets, secure agreement on denial of services to Iraq and Kuwait. We should, however, resist current UK efforts to provide for use of force in the air to parallel resolution 665 because of the risks involved, at least in the absence of further military action by Iraq.

II. Draft Resolution 668

The current draft focuses on enforcement of the embargo in the air. It also provides for detention of shipping and freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. It does not provide for denial of services to Iraq and Kuwait or for detention of Iraqi or Kuwaiti aircraft. It also does not provide for detention of third country vessels or aircraft being used to transport cargo in violation of 661.

The Air

Confirming that 661 included air transportation, it decides that states should not permit:

-- landing, overflight or departure of Iraqi cargo aircraft in their territories except for those carrying medical supplies or otherwise authorized by the sanctions committee in accordance with 661 and 666;

[redacted]

-- If a ban on all services is included in the resolution, the ground will have to be laid in the Sanctions Committee for sensible implementation, e.g. to permit safety-related port/air traffic services, and some reference to this in the resolution would be desirable. The departure of the crew would be the detaining state's responsibility, although ultimate responsibility should fall to Iraq.

Detention of Shipping/Aircraft

Iraqi and Kuwaiti vessels/aircraft entering US territory would be seized as part of the U.S. assets freeze imposed by Executive Order. The draft resolution, if adopted, should help ensure that this is done worldwide, but it only explicitly addresses vessels. There are questions regarding possible Iraqi reaction that warrant considering carefully whether to add a reference to aircraft. In this regard, for example, it is possible that if we seek now to have Iraqi aircraft seized Saddam could retaliate by refusing to permit ongoing refugee evacuation flights.

-- The relevant provision in the draft resolution should be expanded to require detention of Iraqi vessels (and perhaps aircraft) that enter a state's territory except for those used for purposes approved by the Sanctions Committee. As drafted, the resolution would only provide for seizure of vessels in violation of 661, thus leaving untouched empty vessels (or aircraft).

-- Provision could be added for vessels/aircraft of third country sanctions breakers, although this might not be easily negotiable at this point and could be difficult, or impractical, to implement (e.g., who determines whether an aircraft had been used to break sanctions?).

-- Modalities of implementation should be left to be worked out in the Sanctions Committee. For example, practical responsibility to seize and detain once a ship is in port would rest with the port state, which would also provide for security of a vessel and its cargo. A decision to offload cargo might depend on its nature (e.g. perishability), alternate facilities and other factors. There should be no requirement for the port state to provide maintenance. It would have to be determined whether there are conditions under which a vessel and/or its cargo might be sold, e.g. to prevent deterioration, and the proceeds put into a blocked account. Again, departure of the crew would be the detaining state's responsibility, with ultimate responsibility to fall to Iraq.

-- If permitted by the resolution as finally adopted, the Sanctions Committee could determine any exceptions to the detentions. Depending on whether we want to consider offloading, sale and other functions, we would want to clarify any further Committee role.

-- It would be useful to add language that makes clear that vessels and aircraft are covered by the general assets freeze.

Freezing of Assets

As noted above, the US and EC have blocked Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in their territories. Ensuring that other countries do likewise will further tighten sanctions. It would be desirable to add language to make clear that this applies to all tangible and intangible assets. For example, there are Iraqi MIGs in Yugoslavia for servicing. A resolution making clear that physical assets are to be frozen would require Yugoslavia to seize the MIGs, just as a denial of services provision would require their ceasing all work on the planes.

-- Reporting to the UN as called for in the draft seems appropriate.

-- The draft resolution does not address vesting of blocked assets. Under international law, when assets of a foreign government or person are blocked, title remains in the owner. Most often, these assets have been held (hostage) pending a settlement of the underlying dispute. The UNSC could presumably authorize the vesting of title in the seizing government (or in the UN) for an agreed purpose consistent with Chapter VII of the Charter. While this would be unprecedented, so are the circumstances, including the scope and degree of support for the Iraq embargo. On the other hand, a general vesting of assets would presumably have to take into account existing third -party interests (e.g., dedicated letters of credit) in those assets. Moreover, we do not currently have domestic legal authority to vest Iraqi assets. The question of vesting assets therefore needs to be deferred for further study.

Land Transportation

So far as we are aware, land transportation of proscribed cargo has not been a major problem. It might be useful to specify trucks or other land vehicles in the resolution to ensure parity. On balance, however, we believe that making this too explicit would pose a major problem for Jordan, which continues to receive oil shipments by truck from Iraq. The one other potential land problem involves possible connection of the Iraqi oil pipeline to Iran's. This would be prohibited under the ban on services (as it is already by 661's prohibition on any activity promoting Iraqi exports). However, absent any evidence that Iran is willing to make such an arrangement, there would seem to be no need to go further in this area.

Air Interdiction

-- Enforcement: The resolution deals with air transport in two basic clusters:

1) Denying Overflight and Diplomatic Pressure on Violators: The current UN draft resolution outlines an extension of the current technique the U.S. is using to get concerned countries to deny overflight clearances. This policy would be significantly strengthened by an explicit UN mandate.

- All flights into Iraq or Kuwait would be denied overflight clearances by all states as presumptive violations of UN sanctions. To overcome this presumption of violation, the flight would have to submit to inspection at some point outside of Iraq to determine that it is not carrying proscribed cargo. It should be recognized that false manifests and the changing of flight plans en route could undercut the effectiveness of such an inspection regime.

- Flights which avoided this procedure would be tracked and noted as sanctions violators as described below. The violation could then immediately be taken up with the offending state by the UN Sanctions Committee.

- If permitted by the resolution as finally adopted, the Sanctions Committee could make exceptions not only for agreed humanitarian flights but also for diplomatic flights such as a Tariq Aziz flight to confer with the Secretary General. We could remain open to language that might include such flights as stated exceptions as long as it is not too broad.

2) Interception: The draft resolution also contains language that contemplates more dramatic measures -- it calls on states to use all measures permissable under international law that do not endanger the lives of the crew and safety of the aircraft that may be necessary to prevent the evasion of the provisions of UNSC 661 by air transport. This provision may imply erroneously that we cannot use force in self-defense where international law would otherwise permit. At the same time, we do not want language that would require or explicitly permit the use of force to enforce the air embargo to parallel 665 for the maritime interdiction effort at this point. It would be greatly preferable to drop this provision.

- We must recognize that, absent a credible threat to use force, orders to land may not be obeyed. Consequently, interceptions of civilian aircraft could entail high political risk, e.g., either we acquiesce in violations or shoot down aircraft.

- Because of the inherent risks and limitations of interception, however, we should not support references to this form of enforcement and should leave the issue of interception of aircraft violating national airspace or flight clearance instructions to the state in question. Syria, for example, has already forced down a Libyan cargo flight returning from Iraq for violation of Syrian airspace.

- At some point, we may decide we want to go so far as to engage in interceptions and attempted force-downs, either in international airspace or over another state, at that state's invitation. Absent Security Council authorization, we could base our action on our inherent right of self-defense under the UN charter if we could demonstrate that this was a necessary and proportional response. That would be a high adverse presumption to overcome in justifying this.

-- <u>Tracking Violators</u>: Civil air traffic control systems, possibly supplemented by U.S. and allied assets in the Gulf, have the capability to detect, track, and communicate with aircraft approaching Iraq or Kuwait.

- In order to give high political visibility to sanctions violations, the Sanctions Committee could establish a central information center to (1) on a near-real time basis flag potential violators at the time they request overflight clearances and alert countries of which the clearance has been requested to deny the clearance and (2) assemble and catalogue information concerning violations of sanctions by air. (Note: ICAO would not be effective if given this or similar tracking or enforcement roles).

- Civil air traffic control systems could conceivably feed information on flights to and from Iraq and Kuwait directly to this central point. (A few are already giving us this information informally through U.S. Embassies.)

- This network would be sufficient to track some but not nearly all potential sanctions busters. Supplementing this network with military assets (U.S. or NATO AWACs, etc.) would produce greater increases in information (i.e. civilian aviation assets can tell us the identity of the aircraft while military assets can tell us its location).

- However, we believe consideration should be given to diverting such assets only if it is found that civilian tracking is inadequate to prevent significant diversion by air. If we find that major gaps in coverage exist and are exploited, or develop over time, we can reassess using military assets to fill them.

-- <u>Airfields and Inspection Teams</u>: The current draft UN resolutions do not establish procedures for determining locations at which such aircraft would be required to land or the composition of inspection teams. While the nation denying overflight clearance should designate the landing facility, it would probably be to our advantage to at least leave open the option of multinational inspection teams to give this procedure some teeth. The groundwork for these issues could be laid in the Sanctions Committee for sensible implementation of any regime adopted.

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Drafted:PM-EVerville;PM/P-AWinner;NEA/AF/N-JMcNamara
9/20/90; #22070

Cleared:NEA/RA:AKeiswetter
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L:AKreczko
EB:RHecklinger
P:MMalinowski
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Department of State **UNCLASSIFIED** **TELEGRAM**

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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7934

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EXDIS DECAPTIONED

FOR DEP ASST SECY BARRY

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 2(A))
E.O. 12065: GDS 1/3/86 (SCHAUFELE, WILLIAM E. JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, PL, US, IR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MEETING WITH GIERK

1. [redacted]NTIRE TEXT)

2. WE NOTE FOLLOWING CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS UNRELATED TO DIRECT BILATERAL MATTERS BUT AFFECTING OUR RELATIONS WITH POLAND.

(A) WITH REGARD TO IRAN POLAND IS ONE OF FEW EE COUNTRIES TO MAKE EVEN AN ADMITTEDLY NOT COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY PUBLIC STATEMENT. POLISH REPORITNG HAS BEEN REASONABLY STRAIGHTFORWARD ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES SINS OF OMISSION. NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO IMPEDE THE DEC . 17 ECUMENICAL SERICE SUPPORTING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.
(B) GOP DUTIFULLY MOUNTED STANDARD CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO TNF DECISION BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE EVENT. HOWEVER, THE MOST EMPHASIZED, EMOTIONAL THEME WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY ELICITS THE GENERAL SUPPORT OF

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VIRTUALLY ALL POLES WAS THE PROSPECT OF DEPLOYING

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INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN THE FRG.
[redacted]OP HAS BEEN ALMOST MUTE ON AFGHANISTAN, WITH VERY BRIEF COVERAGE IN THE MEDIA, EXCEPT TO HIDE BEHIND THE PRAVDA EXPLANATION OF SOVIET ACTIONS. AT THIS WRITING POLAND HAS NOT PUBLICIZED AN OFFICIAL MESSAGE TO THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME IF, INDEED, IT HAS SENT ONE. AND GIEREK FAILED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT IN HIS NEW YEAR'S EVE SPEECH.

3. AS WENOTE AND INTERPRET THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NUANCES WHICH PROJECT SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POLISH ATTITUDES THAN THOSE EMANATING FROM MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE, I AM REMINDED OF A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH GIEREK IN DECEMBER 1977, I.E., THE ROLE THAT POLAND CAN PLAY IN THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW DIALOGUE.

4. MORE IN THE INTEREST OF THE US-POLISH DIALOGUE THAN IN THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES, I WONDER WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE A PROPITIOUS MOMENT TO HAVE A SUITABLE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT ON WHICH TO HANG A MEETING WITH GIEREK. I HAD ANTICIPATED SEEKING ANOTHER SUCH MEETING MLY AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS.

5. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE RESULTS WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED EXCEPT IN AN ABSTRACT WAY. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THERE ARE PERCEPTIBLE-DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND POLISH ATTITUDES, EVEN IF ONLY IN DEGREE, AND AS LONG AS THE POLISH INTERNAL SITUATION REMAINS LIBERAL RELATIVE TO THAT OF MOST OF ITS ALLIES WE SHOULD SEEK SUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO

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EXPLOIT THE DIFFERENCES. I ADDITION, FOLLOWING MY DEC. 21 MEETING WITH KANIA IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO MORE BACK TOWARD A MORE AMICABLE DIALOGUE WITH GIERE WHO, IN ANY CASE, IS CLOSER TO THE POLISH MAINSTREAM THAN HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUE.

6. CERTAINLY I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE DISCUSSION OF SOME OF OUR PERENNIAL BILATERAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING POLISH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, BUT AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OUR CONTINUING HIGH-LEVEL

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CONTACTS IS THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN WHICH POLAND MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE--HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY--SOME INPUT IN MOSCOW. ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN, THE POLES MUST BE APPALLED OVER THIS KIND OF SOVIET ADVENTURE--OR MISADVENTURE--THE EFFECTS OF WHICH NEARLY ALWAYS COST THE POLES SOMETHING--IF NOT IN MATERIAL AT LEAST IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS. WE KNOW FOR INSTANCE THAT THE POLES ARE UNHAPPY OVER HAVING THEIR ARMS TWISTED FOR AID TO VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND CUBA AND OVER CONSTANT SOVIET DEMANDS FOR INCREASES IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

7. THEREFORE, I SEE SOME ADVANTAGE TO DISCUSSING THESE THREE ITEMS, PREFERABLY, IN MEASURED NON-POLEMICAL TERMS APPROPRIATE FOR A GREAT POWER, TO RAISE OTHER QUESTIONS INCLUDING FINANCES AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, TO GAIN SOME IDEA OF HOW FAR GOP WILL GO IN ITS CURRENT MORE REPRESSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND TO ASK FOR A POST-CONGRESS MEETING AS WELL.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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EUR/SOV:WSHIN
EUR:RLBARRY
EUR/RPM:SLEDOGAR
S/MS:MSHULMAN
NEA/PAB:RDLORTON
NSC:SLARRABEE
S/S-O:RSTEVEN

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EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12065: XDS-3, 1/7/2000 (EUR:BARRY, ROBERT L.)

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, PL, UR, AF, IR, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH GIEREK

REF: WARSAW 0054 NOTAL

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GIVEN THE PRESENT PREOCCUPATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, WE HAVE DECIDED TO FOREGO A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GIEREK. THE AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER,

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SHOULD SEEK AN URGENT MEETING WITH GIEREK TO DISCUSS U.S.-

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POLISH RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CREATED BY SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

3. AMBASSADOR SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO GIEREK:

-- THE UNITED STATES IS SHOCKED BY THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AN ACTION WITH CLEAR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S OTHER NEIGHBORS, AND BY SOVIET DUPLICTY BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE ENTRY OF ITS TROOPS INTO THAT FORMERLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

-- THIS SOVIET ACTION IS CONTRARY TO ACCEPTABLE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE UNITED

NATIONS CHARTER. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING UN ACTION TO BRING ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

-- UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES ALSO FEELS COMPELLED TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS--UNILATERALLY AND IN CONCERT WITH ITS ALLIES--TO UNDERLINE TO THE SOVIET UNION THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF ITS PRESENT BEHAVIOR.

-- IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO DECIDED TO DEFER SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT DUE TO THE VERY UNFAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR RATIFICATION CREATED BY THE SOVIETS' BEHAVIOR. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS WILL KEEP SALT II RATIFICATION UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW, RECOGNIZING THAT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BENEFIT THE U.S., THE USSR AND THE ENTIRE WORLD.

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-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTI- ATIONS IN PROGRESS. WE HAVE MADE IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSALS IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS--LRTNF, MBFR, CTB--AND HOPE THAT EVEN IN THE TENSE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THIS AREA.

-- THE UNITED STATES ALSO REMAINS COMMITTED TO A CONTINU- ATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND LOOKS FORWARD TO FURTHER BILATERAL CONSULTATION.

-- THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO STRESS THAT IT DOES NOT

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WISH A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR BUT RATHER A RETURN BY THE SOVIET UNION TO BEHAVIOR COMPATIBLE WITH A RELAXATION IN U.S.-SOVIET TENSIONS.

-- WHILE THERE WILL BE AN INEVITABLE DETERIORATION IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE UNITED STATES ALSO WISHES TO STRESS THAT IT SEEKS A CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN THE US.-POLISH RELATIONS AND WILL CONDUCT THOSE RELATIONS ON THEIR OWN MERIT. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT PERHAPS POLAND CAN HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE.

-- IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD WILL BE THE POLISH POSITION ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES; BILATERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ISSUES THAT IMPACT SO DIRECTLY AND HEAVILY ON INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN CITIZENS; AND THE STATE OF THE POLISH ECONOMY, WHICH BEARS SO HEAVILY ON OUR ABILITY TO ADVANCE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

-- CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, WE ARE AWARE OF POLAND'S SITUATION VIS-A-VIS ITS ALLIES. FOR OUR PART, WE ASK

THAT POLAND: 1) SHOW AN AWARENESS THAT OUR POSITION ON THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IS IN NO WAY CONTRIVED, BEING BASED ON SINCERE CONCERN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL

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SYSTEM AND ON SINCERE SHOCK OVER SOVIET DUPLICITY; AND 2) NOT FORGET THE STARVATION OF NOW MILLIONS OF KAMPUCHEANS, WHOSE DEATHS, LIKE THE HOLOCAUST IN EUROPE, WILL HAUNT CIVILIZED NATIONS AND PEOPLES THAT DO NOTHING. IF POLAND CANNOT HELP ON SUCH ISSUES, WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT HINDER THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS OR, AS IN THE CASE OF IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, AT LEAST DISTANCE ITSELF TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE FROM THE UNHELPFULNESS OF OTHERS. IN THIS REGARD, THE POSITIVE ACTIONS OF POLAND WITH REGARD TO OUR HOSTAGES AND THE PUBLIC RESTRAINT SHOWN BY POLAND WITH REGARD TO AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR AMERICAN PEOPLE.

-- NEITHER HAVE WE IGNORED POLAND'S POSITIVE ACTIONS IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS THAT HAVE RESULTED IN THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO DOZENS OF AMERICANS OF POLISH DESCENT WHO WISH TO VISIT FRIENDS AND RELATIVES. SUCH PROGRESS,

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WHICH WE WILL PUBLICIZE, WILL STRENGTHEN THE CONSTITUENCY FOR IMPROVED U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS. SIMILAR PROGRESS ON DIVIDED FAMILIES, THE NUMBER OF WHICH IS GREATER NOW THAN AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT, AND WITH REGARD TO TEMPORARY TRAVEL ABROAD BY POLISH INTELLECTUALS AT THE INVITATION OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS WOULD ALSO GIVE GREAT IMPETUS TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. THESE ARE MATTERS THAT I WILL SHORTLY SEEK TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WOJTASZEK. I BRING THEM TO YOUR ATTENTION NOW ONLY TO UNDERLINE THE HIGH LEVEL AND BROAD CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ISSUE.

-- TRADE AND BUSINESS COOPERATION HAVE BECOME A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OUR RELATIONS, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THEIR CONTINUED EXPANSION TO OUR MUTUAL

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BENEFIT. I WOULD NOT BE FRANK, HOWEVER, IF I DID NOT EXPRESS OUR GOVERNMENT'S DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE POLISH ECONOMY IS HEADED. UNLESS CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMSARE APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED SOON, WE SEE NOT ONLY MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF OUR BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS BUT

ALSO A LONG-TERM DETERIORATION IN THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. LAST NOVEMBER THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY AUTHORIZED THE EXTENSION OF CCC AGRICULTURAL CREDITS IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF POLAND'S REQUEST, DESPITE A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE GLOBAL BUDGET FOR THIS PROGRAM. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN POLAND'S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUCH SPECIAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST POLAND MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING IN THE FUTURE.

4. AS A FINAL POINT, THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD RAISE THE TNF QUESTION, MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO GIEREK:

-- WE AND OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE BEEN STUDYING THE QUESTION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACHIEVED OVER THE PAST DECADE, AT A TIME WHEN US DEPLOYMENT LEVELS OF LONG-RANGE THEATER

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NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE REMAINED VIRTUALLY STATIC.

THE DESTABILIZING RESULTS OF SUCH SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS ARE CLEAR. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE QUESTION OF LAND-BASED MISSILES DEPLOYED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION BASES THAT CAN SUPPORT ALMOST 700 SS-20 WARHEADS THAT COULD BE LAUNCHED AGAINST TARGETS AROUND THE SOVIET PERIPHERY; ABOUT 2/3 OF THESE COULD BE TARGETTED ON WEST EUROPE. BEYOND THIS, THERE ARE

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ROUGHLY 450 SS-4/5 WARHEADS AND A MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE THAT COULD ALSO BE TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE. INDEED, IN TOTAL WEAPONS WITH RANGES GREATER THAN 1000 KILOMETERS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, NATO IS CURRENTLY OUTNUMBERED BY THE SOVIET UNION MORE THAN 2 TO 1.

-- THESE ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HAVE SHAPED OUR COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, LEADING UP TO THE DECISION WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES ADOPTED THIS DECEMBER. THIS DECISION RESPONDS TO A CLEAR AND VISIBLE DANGER TO THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE.

-- WHILE THE ALLIANCE FELT THE URGENT NEED TO REDRESS THE SECURITY BALANCE BY TAKING DECISIONS DESIGNED TO MODERNIZE ITS OWN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE, AT THE SAME TIME IT RESOLVED TO HOLD TNF ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT REDUCING THE GROWING DISPARITY AND HOPEFULLY LEADING ULTIMATELYTO REDUCTIONS.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL RECONSIDER ITS INITIAL, NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF JANUARY 3 TO OUR OFFER OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS, AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. IF GIEREK RESORTS TO THE SOVIET CANARD THAT IT IS RESPONDING IN AFGHANISTAN TO U.S. ACTIVITIES AIMED AGAINST THAT COUNTRY, THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD FIRMLY REJECT SUCH ALLEGATIONS. VANCE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80WARSAW000670

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ACTION SS-30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8370
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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E.O. 12065: XDS-3 1/21/2000 (SCHAUFELE, WILLIAM E. JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, PL, UR, AF, IR, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH GIEREK

REFS: (A) STATE 4873; (B) STATE 8682; (C) STATE 12406;
(D) STATE 14191

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN ONE AND A HALF HOURS MEETING THIS MORNING, I FOUND GIEREK IN A SOMEWHAT SOMBER MOOD, LESS AGRESSIVE THAN HE HAS BEEN IN SOME OF OUR OTHER MEETINGS, WHICH MAY BE EXPLAINED BY HIS STATEMENT LATE IN THE MEETING, "WE ARE WORRIED." AT HIS REQUEST, I WENT THROUGH ALL THE POINTS IN REFTELS TO SOME OF WHICH HE DID NOT REPLY, AT LEAST DIRECTLY.

3. AFGHANISTAN: GIEREK DID NOT VIGOROUSLY DEFEND THE SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN ALTHOUGH HE SUPPORTED THEM. HE GAVE THE USUAL EXPLANATION OF INCREASING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AGHANISTAN WHICH AS THEY GREW IN INTENSITY, THE SOVIET UNION REGARDED AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO ITS SOUTHERN BORDER AREA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE US RESPONSE AS A BLUNDER,

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PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE SUSPENSION OF GRAIN SHIPMENTS, WHICH IS ALSO CONTRARY TO THE PRESIDENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. HE STATED THAT IT WOULD NOT "BRING THE SOVIET UNION TO ITS KNEES" OR STARVE THE SOVIET PEOPLE." RE THE JAROSZEK STATEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS, GIEREK VERY POINTEDLY STATED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK AT HIS OWN STATEMENT (WARSAW 95 REPORTING GIEREK'S SPEECH TO THE WARSAW MILITARY DISTRICT PZPR PRE-CONGRESS

MEETING) WHICH HE SAID WAS THE DEFINITIVE VIEW OF POLAND REGARDING AFGHANISTAN. GIEREK STATED THAT POLAND ACCEIED US CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT CONDITIONS BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WOULD NOT DIVERT GRAIN SHIPMENTS FROM THE US. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THAT POLAND WOULD HAVE ANY HIGHER TECHNOLOGY THAN THAT WHICH THE USSR HAD DEVELOPED ON ITS OWN OR IMPORTED FROM THE WEST ALREADY.

4. BILATERAL RELATIONS: GIEREK DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO OUR POINTS REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BUT DURING THIS PART OF MY PRESENTATION HE LISTENED WITH UNUSUAL INTENSITY. MY OWN REACTION IS THAT THEY REGISTERED, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE DID PICK UP THE POINT ABOUT JAROSZEK'S SPEECH. IN A MORE GENERAL SENSE, HE STATED THAT, AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS AND THE ELECTIONS, POLISH DIPLOMACY WOULD BECOME MORE ACTIVE THAN IT HAS BEEN OF LATE.

5. DIVIDED FAMILIES: SOMEWHAT TO MY SURPRISE, GIEREK WAS PREPARED FOR THIS AND INFORMED ME THAT IN THE LAST WEEK HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO DRAW NO DISTINCTION IN ISSUING

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EMIGRATION PASSPORTS TO THOSE WHOSE FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE US HAD IMMIGRATED LEGALLY OR ILLEGALLY. I HOPE TO DISCOVER THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS "CONCESSION" WHEN I HAVE A MEETING WITH WOJTASZEK.

6. NATO. IN RESPONDING TO MY PRESENTATION ABOUT NATO FORCE MODERNIZATION, GIEREK PREDICTABLY CITED POLISH PUBLIC OPINION WHICH WAS EXTREMELY UNEASY OVER THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. HE DID NOT ADDRESS THE ARGUMENTATION ABOUT THE SOVIET BUILD-UP WHICH DESTABILIZED THE WEAPONS BALANCE OR THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTION THAT TNF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD PROCEED. HE DID CHARACTERIZE THE POLISH PRESS HANDLING OF THE NATO DECISION AS RESTRAINED. (HE ALSO SAID THAT THE HOLDING US HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN WAS INADMISSIBLE AND THAT THE POLISH MEDIA HAD BEEN "ORDERED" NOT TO INFLAME THE SITUATION.)

7. IN RESPONSE, I SAID THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE DID NOT AGREE ON AFHANISTAN. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES FOUND THE SITUATION CREATED BY SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN EXTREMELY GRAVE AND WHETHER GIERK HIMSELF AGREED WITH US OR NOT, HE COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE BY STRESSING TO HIS ALLIES JUST HOW GRAVELY WE PER-

CEIVE THE PROBLEM. REGARDING THE LIBERALIZATION OF PASSPORT ISSUANCE, I SAID THAT WE WELCOME THE STEP OF WHICH HE HAD INFORMED ME AS WELL AS ANY OTHER LIBERALIZATION MEASURES THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WOULD UNDERTAKE. I EXPLAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES INDEED UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE POLISH REACTION TO THE NATO DECISION. ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THE LESSONS OF HISTORY, WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SITUATIONS ARE NOT STATIC AND THERE

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HAD BEEN GREAT PROGRESS OVER THE YEARS. SINCE WE WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE CURRENT ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IN VARIOUS FORA, IT SEEMED TO ME PERFECTLY LOGICAL TO DO THE SAME THING WITH REGARD TO TNF. IF THE SOVIETS HOPE FOR ANY MODIFICATION IN THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8371
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT DECISION, IT CANNOT COME ABOUT BY REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE WESTERN REACTION TO THE SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN. REGARDING THE STEPS TAKEN AGAINST THE USSR, I STATE THAT I DOUBTED ANYONE EXPECTED THEM "TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO THEIR KNEES" OR "STARVE THE SOVIET PEOPLE" BUT THEY REPRESENTED A PENALTY WHICH THE SOVIETS MUST EXPECT TO PAY FOR THEIR UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR.

8. GIEREK INQUIRED ABOUT THE REPORTS OF CHINESE AND PAKISTANI TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND WARNED THAT, IF THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE, RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES USE ITS INFLUENCE TO FORESTALL OR STOP SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT GIEREK SAID THAT DESPITE AFGHANISTAN, POLAND WISHED THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WITH THE WEST BUT "WE ARE WORRIED."

9. GIEREK SAID HE FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS COULD REFUSE TO SIT DOWN TO RESUME THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS AND

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HE EXPECTED THAT, WITHIN A FEW MONTHS, THIS WOULD HAPPEN. HE MADE A PLEA FOR THE US NOT TO UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD MKE THE PRESENT SITUATION ANY WORSE.

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10. I REPLIED THAT "A FEW MONTHS" SEEMED OPTIMISTIC (TO WHICH GIEREK INTERJECTED "TWO YEARS."). I ADDED THAT THE HIGH DEGREE OF SOVIET INVECTIVE BEING POURED ON THE

PRESIDENT PERSONALLY AND THE CHARGES OF AMERICAN "HYSTERIA" DID NOT HELP MATTERS. IN BOTH IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN THE US HAD REACTED FIRMLY AND CALMLY.

11. REFERRING TO GIEREK'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, I REMINDED HIM OF HOW WE VALUED HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET POLICIES AND

ACTIONS JUST AS WE HOPED HE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MOSCOW'S UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICIES AND ACTION. GIEREK ACKNOWLEDGED THIS TWO-WAY STREET, ADDING THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS LISTENED CLOSELY TO HIS VIEWS ON WASHINGTON'S POLICIES ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT ALWASY HEED THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SAID WE WOULD WELCOME A REVIVIFICATION OF A MORE ACTIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE POLISH FOREIGN POLICY.

12. GIERK CLOSED WITH WARM GREETINGS TO THE PRESIDENT AND AGREED THAT WE WHOULD MEET AGAIN AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS AND THE SEJM ELECTIONS.

13. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION WAS NOTABLE

[redacted]

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FOR GIEREK'S RESTRAINT AND LACK OF CONTENTIOUSNESS. THERE WAS NONE OF THE PUBLIC "DISINFORMATION" CAMPAIGN JUSTIFYING SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND LITTLE DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES. SUBDUED, THOUGHTFUL AND OBVIOUSLY CURIOUS ABOUT OUR ACTIONS AND POLICIES, GIEREK REFLECTED THE TYPICAL POLISH EMPHASIS ON EUROPE--INCLUDING THE RAPACKI PLAN AND THE CONCERN ABOUT THE FRG--AND DESIRE TO AVOID A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF AREAS OUTSIDE POLAND'S IMMEDIATE INTEREST.

14. HE ALSO REFLECTED CURRENT POLISH NERVOUSNESS ABOUT EFFECTS ON POLAND GROWING OUT OF THE CURRENT TENSION. HE PROBABLY WAS BASICALLY REASSURED BUT NEVERTHELESS LISTENED CLOSELY-AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OCCASSIONALLY--TO THE CAVEATS AND IMPLIED WARNINGS IN MY PRESENTATION.

15. GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS ABOUT THE BEST CONVERSATION WE COULD EXPECT BUT IN THE LONGER RANGE, WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW MUCH MORE PRESSURE MOSCOW WILL PUT ON WARSAW TO SUPPORT THE USSR MORE STRIDENTLY.

16. AS BEFORE I NOTICED HOW GIEREK, ALTHOUGH HE ALWAYS REFERS TO THE SOVIET UNION, CALLS THE LEADERSHIP AND PEOPLE "RUSSIAN" BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS TRANSLATED AS THAT.
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USOFFICE KOLONIA
USOFFICE MAJURO
AMCONSUL HONIARA
AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

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PARIS FOR KANEDA, COMNAVFORKOREA FOR REAR ADMIRAL PENDLEY

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JULY 20 EAP PRESS SUMMARY

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-- 1. SHULTZ ASIA TRIP/JAPAN/MARSHALL ISLANDS
-- 2. PHILIPPINES
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1. SHULTZ ASIA TRIP/JAPAN/MARSHALL ISLANDS

-- THE WASHINGTON POST'S OBERDORFER, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR'S SNEIDER, AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES' NEILAN (ALL TOKYO) REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO JAPAN.

OBERDORFER SAYS SHULTZ, "AT THE END OF A SAYONARA VISIT TO THE MOST IMPORTANT US ALLY IN ASIA," SAID TUESDAY THAT

THE US AND JAPAN HAVE "TURNED A CORNER" BY REVERSING THE SEEMINGLY CONSTANT GROWTH OF THE US-JAPAN TRADE IMBALANCE THAT HAS GENERATED SEVERE FRICTIONS FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 2 LARGEST ECONOMIES IN THE WORLD IS ON A GOOD, HEALTHY, POWERFUL TRACK. THE WAY TO KEEP IT THAT WAY IS TO KEEP TALKING," HE QUOTES SHULTZ AS TELLING JAPANESE OFFICIALS. HE SAYS SHULTZ SPOKE AFTER THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESENTED HIM WITH DATA SHOWING JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE US MEASURED IN DOLLAR TERMS HAD DECREATED FROM 25 BILLION DOLLARS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1987 TO 21 BILLION DOLLARS IN THE SAME PERIOD THIS YEAR, A DECLINE OF ABOUT 15 PERCENT.

OBERDORFER REPORTS THAT THE IMBALANCE WITH THE US HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DECLINING IN TERMS OF VOLUME, BUT THE NEW FIGURES WERE DESCRIBED BY A SENIOR SHULTZ AIDE AS

REVEALING "A CHANGE IN THE TREND LINES" IN DOLLAR TERMS.

IN A NEWS CONFERENCE, OBERDORFER ADDS, SHULTZ STATED: "I THINK A CORNER HAS BEEN TURNED. IT'S BEEN TURNED IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT." HE SAYS THE SECRETARY ATTRIBUTED SOME OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE TRADE BALANCE TO THE SOLUTION OF SPECIFIC US-JAPAN ISSUES, BUT HE SAID THE BROAD ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE 2 NATIONS ARE EVEN MORE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHANGE. HE REPORTS SHULTZ SAID JAPAN'S ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS MADE IT LESS DEPENDENT ON EXPORT-LED GROWTH. OBERDORFER SAYS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FIGURES PRESENTED TO SHULTZ INDICATED THAT, AS A RESULT OF DOMESTIC SHIFTS, JAPANESE IMPORTS FROM THE US HAVE GROWN BY 40 PERCENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR, WHICH IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN REDUCING THE TRADE IMBALANCE.

OBERDORFER SAYS SHULTZ ALSO NOTED THAT THE OVERALL US

TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE WORLD IS NOW DECLINING, AND HE PREDICTED IT MAY DECLINE "RATHER DRAMATICALLY" IN THE MONTHS TO COME.

OBERDORFER QUOTES AN AIDE TO SHULTZ AS SAYING THAT BECAUSE MOST OF THE OUTSTANDING TRADE ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, THERE WASN'T MUCH TO TALK ABOUT IN THAT AREA DURING THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS TUESDAY WITH PM TAKESHITA AND OTHER OFFICIALS.

OBERDORFER REPORTS SHULTZ, IN A BANQUET TOAST TUESDAY NIGHT, RECALLED THAT THE TAKESHITA AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS HAD ESTABLISHED AN EXTENSIVE AGENDA OF

OBJECTIVES WHEN THE NEW JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITED WASHINGTON IN JANUARY AND THAT MOST OF THESE HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED OR ARE ON THEIR WAY TO ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE NOTES THE ITEMS SHULTZ MENTIONED WERE RESTRUCTURING OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY, JAPAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A GREATER SHARE OF THE COST OF MAINTAINING 60,000 US TROOPS IN JAPAN, PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS BY US FIRMS TO JAPANESE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS, AGREEMENT TO REMOVE JAPANESE QUOTAS ON BEEF AND CITRUS, A NEW US-JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT, A REVISED BILATERAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT, STRENGTHENING OF JAPAN'S EXPORT CONTROLS ON MILITARILY-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND CO-DEVELOPMENT OF A

NEW FIGHTER PLANE FOR JAPAN.

OBERDORFER REPORTS AN AIDE TO SHULTZ SAID THE US IS NOT ASKING JAPAN TO ACCELERATE FURTHER THE 5-6 PERCENT ANNUAL INCREASES IN MILITARY SPENDING THAT HAVE RESULTED IN A 30-BILLION-DOLLAR DEFENSE BUDGET -- THE 5TH LARGEST IN THE WORLD.

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OBERDORFER POINTS OUT THAT NEARLY ALL THE ISSUES MENTIONED HAD BEEN HOTLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN ONE OR BOTH COUNTRIES FOR A TIME. IN SUMMING UP, HE REPORTS, SHULTZ SAID THAT "SO MANY ISSUES ARE BEHIND US" THAT THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS "AS GOOD AND HEALTHY AS IT HAS EVER BEEN IN MY OBSERVATION OF IT." OBERDORFER POINTS OUT THAT THIS GOES BACK AT LEAST TO THE EARLY 1970'S, WHEN SHULTZ WAS TREASURY SECRETARY IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION.

-- SNEIDER REPORTS SHULTZ AND TOP JAPANESE OFFICIALS JOINED TUESDAY IN WELCOMING IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A UN CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION, AND OFFICIALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES SAID THEY WOULD SUPPORT THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE PLAN. HE NOTES TAKESHITA SAID JAPAN WOULD BE WILLING TO DISPATCH NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL TO HELP ENFORCE A UN CEASEFIRE. SNEIDER OBSERVES THAT JAPAN IS ONE OF THE FEW MAJOR POWERS TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH WARRING PERSIAN GULF NATIONS. PREVIOUSLY, HE RECALLS, THE GOJ HAD STATED ITS READINESS TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO RECONSTRUCT BOTH COUNTRIES FOLLOWING A PEACE AGREEMENT.

SNEIDER SAYS SHULTZ PRAISED JAPAN'S INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, SAYING: "EVERYONE WELCOMES THE FACT THAT JAPAN IS CLEARLY RECOGNIZING THINGS IT CAN DO, GIVEN ITS CAPABILITY."

ACCORDING TO SNEIDER, THE ATMOSPHERE OF COOPERATION ON

THE GULF AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REFLECTED THE ABSENCE OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS ON THE US-JAPAN AGENDA. "IT IS A PLEASURE TO COME AND TALK WHEN SO MANY ISSUES ARE BEHIND US," HE QUOTES SHULTZ AS SAYING. HE ALSO QUOTES THE SECRETARY AS SAYING THAT "THE CORNER HAS BEEN

TURNED" IN REVERSING THE HUGE US-JAPAN TRADE IMBALANCE.

SNEIDER REPORTS SHULTZ OUTLINED A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN SOLVED SINCE TAKESHITA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY. "JAPAN HAS ACCELERATED ITS RELIANCE ON DOMESTIC DEMAND EXPANSION TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH," HE QUOTES SHULTZ AS SAYING, AND HE REPORTS THE SECRETARY POINTED TO RESOLUTION OF TRADE DISPUTES SUCH AS ACCESS TO JAPAN'S CONSTRUCTION MARKET AND THE RECENT AGREEMENT TO REMOVE QUOTAS ON BEEF AND CITRUS IMPORTS.

SNEIDER SAYS THE SECRETARY ALSO EMPHASIZED IMPROVMENTS IN DEFENSE COOPERATION, INCLUDING INCREASED JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO THE COSTS OF SUPPORTING US FORCES IN JAPAN, AND HE NOTED THE ADOPTION OF A NEW SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT WHICH HE SAID WOULD PROVIDE "VASTLY INCREASED INTERCHANGE OF IDEAS."

SNEIDER OBSERVES THAT SHULTZ'S PRAISE CAME IN SHARP CONTRAST TO HIS HARSH CRITICISM OF SOUTH KOREAN RESTRICTIONS ON THE ENTRY OF US PRODUCTS INTO ITS MARKET.

SNEIDER REPORTS SHULTZ WAS TO LEAVE JAPAN WEDNESDAY FOR THE MARSHALL ISLANDS.

-- NEILAN REPORTS SHULTZ TOLD TAKESHITA TUESDAY THAT THE 2 COUNTRIES' RELATIONS WERE THE BEST THEY HAVE BEEN IN HIS EXPERIENCE. HE SAYS, AFTER AN HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH THE JAPANESE PM, THE SECRETARY PRAISED TAKESHITA FOR ACHIEVING ALL THE PROMISES HE MADE TO REAGAN IN WASHINGTON LAST JANUARY, ACCORDING TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES. HE RECALLS THAT TAKESHITA TOLD REAGAN AT THE TIME THAT JAPAN WOULD MAKE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO

MEET US REQUESTS TO IMPROVE FOREIGN ACCESS TO JAPAN'S PUBLIC WORK PROJECTS AND TO SETTLE A BILATERAL AGRICULTURAL DISPUTE.

NEILAN QUOTES SECRETARY SHULTZ AS TELLING A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT HE DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, CAMBODIA, THE PHILIPPINES, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE USSR WITH JAPANESE LEADERS, AND "I ALSO TOLD THEM ABOUT SOME

THOUGHTS WE HAVE ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA." HE ALSO QUOTES SHULTZ AS SAYING THAT "I THINK A CORNER HAS BEEN TURNED IN RESPONSE TO EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES" ON TRADE ISSUES;

"WE HAVE RESOLVED A GREAT MANY PROBLEMS. NOW WE MUST WORK TOGETHER IF WE ARE TO LOWER TRADE BARRIERS..., TO DO ALL WE CAN TO MAKE THE URUGUAY ROUND (OF TRADE TALKS) SUCCESSFUL."

NEILAN REPORTS SHULTZ ALSO PROPOSED TO JAPANESE LEADERS A FORUM OF CLOSER DIALOGUE BETWEEN LEADERS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. HE SAYS THE SECRETARY HAS REPEATED THAT CALL AT
EACH STOP ON HIS ASIAN TOUR BUT THAT IT HAS RECEIVED ONLY A LUKEWARM RESPONSE. HE ADDS THAT THE SECRETARY ALSO CALLED FOR EXTENDING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT, AND TAKESHITA REPLIED THAT JAPAN IS READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE US TO HELP THE PHILIPPINES, ACCORDING TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES.

NEILAN REPORTS SHULTZ RELAYED A MESSAGE FROM ROK PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO TO TAKESHITA EXPRESSING THANKS FOR JAPAN'S HELP TO THE ROK IN HOSTING A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPIC GAMES. HE ALSO SAYS THAT SHULTZ WAS QUOTED AS SAYING TO JAPANESE LEADERS THAT THE US HAS TOLD MOSCOW THAT NO FRIENDSHIP CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR UNLESS ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES IS SETTLED. HE REPORTS SHULTZ MADE THAT COMMENT IN REFERENCE TO FORMER
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PM NAKASONE'S WEEK-LONG VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT IS TO START WEDNESDAY.

NEILAN NOTES THAT NAKASONE WAS ONE OF SEVERAL LDP MEMBERS WITH WHOM SHULTZ HAD LUNCH TUESDAY. IN ADDITION TO HIS MEETING WITH TAKESHITA, HE REPORTS, THE SECRETARY TALKED WITH FINANCE MINISTER MIYAZAWA, FOREIGN MINISTER UNO, AND LDP SECRETARY-GENERAL ABE.

-- REUTER'S GIACOMO (MAJURO) REPORTS SECRETARY SHULTZ WEDNESDAY VISITED THE MARSHALL ISLANDS FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THIS GROUP OF PACIFIC ATOLLS BECAME INDEPENDENT FROM THE US IN 1986. NEARING THE END OF A 3-WEEK TOUR OF ASIA, SHE SAYS, THE SECRETARY STATED ON HIS ARRIVAL IN MAJURO THAT "NO JOURNEY TO ASIA AND THE PACIFIC WOULD BE COMPLETE WITHOUT SPENDING TIME IN A COUNTRY RIGHT IN THE

MIDDLE OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN."

GIACOMO REPORTS A WARM AND FESTIVE WELCOMING CEREMONY DREW SEVERAL HUNDRED MARSHALLESE TO THE AIRPORT, AND SHULTZ AND HIS ENTOURAGE WERE FESTOONED WITH GARLANDS AND FLORAL CROWNS. SHE ADDS THE SECRETARY WAS ENTERTAINED WITH UKELELE AND GUITAR MUSIC AND WAS QUICKLY ENLISTED TO DANCE BY A LOCAL WOMAN.

"I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT OUR PRESENCE HERE TODAY IS INTENDED TO SHOW THE DEEP SENSE OF FRIENDSHIP THAT WE FEEL FOR THE MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE PRIDE WE FEEL AT YOUR PEOPLE'S HAVING CHOSEN FREELY TO ENTER INTO A SPECIAL FREE ASSOCIATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH US," GIACOMO QUOTES SHULTZ AS SAYING IN HIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT. SHE ADDS THAT THE SECRETARY, IN REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY DURING HIS 4-HOUR VISIT,
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ACKNOWLEDGED THE "MAJOR SACRIFICE" MADE BY THE MARSHALLESE "IN SECURING PEACE IN OUR POST-WAR WORLD."

GIACOMO NOTES THAT THE US HAS A MISSILE RANGE ON THE MARSHALL ATOLL OF KWAJALEIN THAT MONITORS THE TRAJECTORIES OF THE MX AND TRIDENT MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM VANDENBERG AFB IN CALIFORNIA, AND BETWEEN 1946 AND 1954, SHE ADDS, THE US DETONATED 66 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE ABOVE THE ISLANDS THAT SUBJECTED THE ISLANDERS TO HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT. SHE POINTS OUT THAT, AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH GAVE THE MARSHALLS INDEPENDENCE IN FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE US, WASHINGTON SET UP A 150-MILLION-DOLLAR TRUST FUND DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR 166 PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL LIVING AND WHO WERE AFFECTED BY THE FALL-OUT.

GIACOMO REPORTS SHULTZ WAS DUE TO MEET WITH MARSHALL ISLANDS PRESIDENT AMATA KABUA AND FOREIGN MINISTER TOM KIJINER BEFORE FLYING TO HAWAII.

2. PHILIPPINES

-- REUTER (MANILA) REPORTS A GOP DOCUMENT MADE PUBLIC WEDNESDAY SAYS AQUINO CAN SIDESTEP THE ANTI-NUCLEAR PROVISION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND ALLOW US BASES TO REMAIN IN THE PHILIPPINES BEYOND 1991. IT SAYS JUSTICE MINISTER SEDFREY ORDONEZ SPELLED OUT THE LEGAL POSITION IN A MEMORANDUM TO FOREIGN SECRETARY MANGLAPUS,

WHO HEADS THE PHILIPPINE SIDE IN THE CURRENT BASES REVIEW TALKS.

REUTER QUOTES WESTERN DIPLOMATS AS SUGGESTING ORDONEZ'S OPINION APPEARS TO OFFER AQUINO A WAY OUT OF AN IMPASSE CAUSED BY THE US REFUSAL TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A SENATE BILL BANNING NUCLEAR ARMS FROM PHILIPPINE TERRITORY.
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"BASED ON...HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS, STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE REALITIES OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, IT IS MY OPINION THAT (AQUINO) MAY NEGOTIATE A MODIFICATION OR EXTENSION OF THE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT

WITH THE US REGARDLESS OF THE PROVISIONS THEREIN (IN THE CONSTITUTION?) PERTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS," REUTER QUOTES ORDONEZ AS SAYING. IT REPORTS HE SAID THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CONFERS ON AQUINO THE POWER TO INITIATE AND CONCLUDE TREATIES AFTER FEELING "THE PULSE OF THE SENATE" AND THAT SUCH TREATIES ONLY REQUIRE SENATE "CONCURRENCE." IT ADDS ORDONEZ, REFERRING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE COMMITTING THE COUNTRY, "CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL INTEREST," TO A POLICY OF FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STATED: "...THESE WORDS MUST BE VIEWED AS THE INSTRUMENT, RATHER THAN THE OBJECTIVE, OF TREATY-MAKING POWER." IT NOTES HE SAID THAT IF A NUCLEAR-FREE POLICY IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL INTEREST "IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS," AQUINO "MAY DEFER FROM IT, ALTHOUGH SUCH DEFERMENT MAY NOT RECEIVE THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE."

REUTER REPORTS MANGLAPUS SAID ORDONEZ'S OPINION "OF COURSE...WILL FORM AN IMPORTANT BASIS FOR DEVELOPING (A STAND) BY THE PHILIPPINE PANEL." HOWEVER, IT SAYS, MANGLAPUS "DID NOT RADIATE OPTIMISM" REGARDING A "PLEDGE" BY AQUINO AND SHULTZ THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY BY THE END OF THE MONTH. "WE'RE LOOKING FORWARD TO HAVING A GOOD TRY AT MEETING THE DEADLINE, BUT THERE IS NO REAL, HARD DEADLINE. THERE IS NO MAGIC ABOUT JULY 31," IT QUOTES HIM AS SAYING.
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REUTER NOTES THAT ORDONEZ'S MEMORANDUM WAS IMMEDIATELY ATTACKED BY SEN WIGBERT TANADA, A CHIEF ARCHITECT OF THE SENATE ANTI-NUCLEAR BILL. "HIS OPINION GIVES THE PRESIDENT THE DECISION TO PUT THE LIVES OF THE FILIPINOS IN IMMEDIATE DANGER. THE SAFETY OF THE FILIPINO NATION DOES NOT RESIDE IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY," IT QUOTES TANADA AS SAYING.

REUTER REPORTS AMB PLATT LAST MONTH WARNED THAT ENACTMENT OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR BILL COULD SPELL THE END OF THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND PHILIPPINES.

-- THE WASHINGTON POST (7/14) REPORTS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH TRYING TO RECOVER BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY AMASSED BY MARCOS, RESIGNED AMID CHARGES OF CORRUPTION. IT NOTES AQUINO ACCEPTED THE RESIGNATION OF RAMON DIAZ BUT OFFERED HIM A MONTH TO RECONSIDER HIS DECISION.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/14) REPORTS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, IN A

PASTORAL LETTER TO BE READ IN ALL CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES LAST SUNDAY, CALLED FOR AN END TO POLITICAL KILLINGS AND ALSO CRITICIZED THE USE BY THE MILITARY OF ARMED RELIGIOUS SECTS AND VIGILANTES IN ITS WAR AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS. "WE BELIEVE THAT INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ARE SIMPLY RELATED TO THE BIGGER PROBLEMS OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES. FOR THIS REASON, WE SAY: LET US STOP THIS WAR," IT QUOTES THE LETTER BY THE CATHOLIC CONFERENCE OF BISHOPS AS SAYING

REUTER ALSO QUOTES THE PASTORAL LETTER AS SAYING THAT THE VIOLENCE SPAWNED BY THE COMMUNIST GUERRILLA WAR SHOULD
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NOT BE "LICENSE FOR ANYONE TO KILL FREELY THOSE WHOSE POLITICS DOES NOT AGREE WITH HIS. IT IS ON THE RECORD THAT GRAVE OFFENSES AGAINST LIFE AND PROPERTY HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE MILITARY'S USE OF ARMED FANATICAL SECTS AND UNDISCIPLINED ARMED VIGILANTES."

-- UPI (ANGELES CITY 7/14) REPORTS COMMUNIST INSURGENTS

ANNOUNCED LAST THURSDAY THE CREATION OF A NEW DEATH SQUAD THAT WOULD OPERATE IN NEIGHBORHOODS SURROUNDING CLARK AIR BASE. IT SAYS THE "RAMOS CURA BRIGADE" IS NAMED AFTER A PROMINENT CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER KILLED JUNE 18 IN ANGELES.

-- THE WASHINGTON POST'S BABCOCK (7/15) REPORTS THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMISSION HAS DROPPED ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE SOURCE OF MORE THAN 100,000 DOLLARS IN ALLGEDLY ILLEGAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE MARCOS GOVERNMENT TO US POLITICAL CANDIDATES IN 1980. IT SAYS THE FEC VOTED 5-1 IN MAY TO CLOSE THE CASE AFTER HEARING DENIALS BY DR LEONILO MALABED OF SAN FRANCISCO THAT A CORPORATION HE HEADED WAS USED AS A COVER TO GET MARCOS MONEY INTO US ELECTIONS. HE ADDS MALABED, ALLEGEDLY A KEY FIGURE IN INVESTIGATIONS OF CORPORATE INVESTMENT OF MARCOS MONEY IN US REAL ESTATE, CITED HIS 5TH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE SAME FUND WAS USED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, INCLUDING PAYING FOR ASSASSINATION OF MARCOS FOES.

BABCOCK REPORTS MICHAEL WITHEY, A SEATTLE ATTORNEY WHO FILED THE COMPLAINT THAT TRIGGERED THE INVESTIGATION, SAID LAST WEEK THAT THE FEC IGNORED EVIDENCE THAT MALABED WROTE CHECKS ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTS -- WHICH WOULD BE ILLEGEL EVEN IF THE MONEY DID NOT COME FROM THE PHILIPPINES. HE NOTES WITHEY IS SUING MARCOS, MALABED,
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AND THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF 2 MARCOS OPPONENTS WHO WERE MURDERED IN 1981. HE REPORTS WITHEY ALLEGES THAT MALABED SET UP THE CORPORATION AS A

SECRET MARCOS INTELLIGENCE SLUSH FUND.

BABCOCK SAYS THE FOCUS OF THE FEC INVESTIGATION WAS A DOCUMENT SEIZED FROM MARCOS AFTER HE ARRIVED IN HAWAII IN 1986 WHICH SUPPOSEDLY SHOWED EXPENSES OF MALABED'S "MABUHAY CORP," INCLUDING 50,000-DOLLAR DONATIONS IN 1980 TO THE CAMPAIGNS OF JIMMY CARTER AND RONALD REAGAN, 50,000 DOLLARS TO A FILIPINO-AMERICAN RUNNING FOR THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE, AND 10,000 DOLLARS TO SEN ALAN CRANSTON (D-CALIF). HE NOTES MALABED'S ATTORNEY SAID HIS CLIENT NEVER MADE SUCH CONTRIBUTION AND HAD BEEN PRESSURED BY OTHER MARCOS ASSOCIATES INTO AUTHENTICATING THE DOCUMENTS.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/16) REPORTS PHILIPPINE

REPRESENTATIVES AT THE BASES REVIEW TALKS SAID THEY EXPECT TO START FINALIZING A NEW AGREEMENT NEXT WEEK. IT QUOTES A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE TEAM AS SAYING SATURDAY THAT "IF BY FRIDAY...WE ARE NOT TALKING OF AN AGREEMENT YET, THINGS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. IF WE CAN'T AGREE BY THE END
OF JULY, I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN AGREE AT ALL."
IT ADDS THE PHILIPPINE OFFICIAL SAID FINAL PROPOSALS FROM BOTH SIDES WERE TO BE PRESENTED MONDAY BEFORE NEGOTIATORS START WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "A MAKE OR BREAK SESSION."

REUTER ALSO REPORTS THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY MANGLAPUS SAID LAST FRIDAY THAT THE MEETING THIS WEEK IS IMPORTANT "BECAUSE WE ARE APPROACHING OUR GOAL." IT SAYS MANGLAPUS STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT IS NEEDED BEFORE THE END OF JULY TO ALLOW THE US CONGRESS TO DISCUSS IN THEIR 1990 BUDGET THE NEW COMPENSATION FOR THE BASES; THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSON OF THE NEW BUDGET WILL BE IN SEPTEMBER, IT SAYS
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HE ADDED.

MEANWHILE, REUTER REPORTS, AQUINO LAST FRIDAY DENIED SHE WOULD VETO THE ANTI-NUCLEAR BILL, IF IT IS PASSED BY CONGRESS, IN EXCHANGE FOR HIGHER COMPENSATION FOR THE BASES.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/16) REPORTS THE USSR HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE FARM EQUIPMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES' LAND REFORM PROGRAM IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR AND COPRA OIL, ACCORDING TO SEN AQUILINO PIMENTEL SATURDAY. IT NOTES PIMENTEL SAID SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE THE OFFER WHEN HE AND 11 OTHER PHILIPPINE CONGRESSMEN VISITED MOSCOW FROM JULY 4-13 AT THE INVITATION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. "THEY ARE IN THE POSITION TO HELP US IN THIS REGARD. THEY ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT PAYMENT IN KIND LIKE COPRA OIL, SUGAR, AND SOME OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES," IT QUOTES PIMENTEL AS SAYING.

-- THE NY TIMES' SHENON (ALSO IN THE BALTIMORE SUN -- BOTH 7/17) SAYS THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS REVIEWING A DRAFT OF A PROPOSED RACKETEERING INDICTMENT OF MARCOS BUT HAS NOT MADE A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO BRING CRIMINAL CHARGES, ACCORDING TO DOJ OFFICIALS. HE QUOTES THE OFFICIALS AS SAYING THE INDICTMENT, PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF US ATTORNEY RUDOLPH GIULIANI, ACCUSES MARCOS OF RACKETEERING AND FRAUD INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS THAT HE ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN

MANHATTAN REAL ESTATE. HOWEVER, HE ADDS, THE OFFICIALS SAID DOJ LAWYERS IN WASHINGTON ARE CONCERNED THE INDICTMENT MAY BE TOO BROAD AND THAT IT MAY BE IMPROPER TO BRING CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST A FOREIGN LEADER FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE HE ACCEPTED ASYLUM (SIC) IN THE US.

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SHENON QUOTES ONE OFFICIAL AS SAYING: "THE DEBATE WITH GIULIANI IS GOING TO GO ON FOR AT LEAST A FEW DAYS. I DON'T KNOW WHAT WE'RE GOING TO PRESENT TO WHITE HOUSE OR WHEN." HE ADDS THE OFFICIAL DENIED A REPORT IN THE "VILLAGE VOICE" LAST WEEK THAT DOJ PLANNED TO ASK REAGAN LAST WEEK TO APPROVE AN INDICTMENT OF MARCOS. HE SAYS DOJ OFFICIALS STATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN DELAYED WHILE THE HEAD OF DOJ'S CRIMINAL DIVISION, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWARD DENNIS, JR, WAS ON AN OFFICIAL TRIP TO THE USSR.

SHENON REPORTS THE OFFICIALS SAID THEY EXPECT CHARGES EVENTUALLY WILL BE FILED AGAINST MARCOS BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE "LESS BROAD" THAN THOSE SOUGHT BY GIULIANI.

SHENON RECALLS THAT LAST WEDNESDAY THE WHITE HOUSE SAID IT HAD NOT RECEIVED A RECOMMENDATION FROM DOJ BUT THAT IT WANTED TO REVIEW ANY PROPOSED INDICTMENT. "THIS IS A MATTER THAT HAS FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS," HE QUOTES WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FITZWATER AS SAYING. HE NOTES FITZWATER DENIED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAS "VETO POWER" OVER AN INDICTMENT, BUT HE SAID "WE CERTAINLY WANT TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT."

ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SHENON REPORTS, THE WHITE HOUSE IS HOPING TO AVOID THE SORT OF EMBARRASSMENT THAT OCCURED THIS YEAR WHEN PANAMA'S NORIEGA WAS INDICTED ON DRUG SMUGGLING CHARGES.

SHENON REPORTS GIULIANI, WHO HAS BEEN INVESTIGATING MARCOS FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, HAS REVIEWED A SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SEVERAL VALUABLE BUILDINGS IN

MANHATTAN. HE RECALLS THAT DOJ SOURCES SAID IN THE PAST THEY WERE LOOKING INTO CHARGES THAT MARCOS AND IMELDA

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PURCHASED THE BUILDINGS WITH MONEY THAT WAS MISAPPROPRIATED IN THE PHILIPPINES AND INVESTED FRAUDULENTLY IN THE US. HE SAYS A MANHATTAN GRAND JURY IS KNOWN TO BE INVESTIGATING MARCOS' ACTIVITIES BOTH WHILE HE WAS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IN THE 2 YEARS SINCE HE WAS FORCED TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE IN HAWAII.

SHENON REPORTS THE WHITE HOUSE HAS SAID IT IS CONCERNED AN INDICTMENT MIGHT VIOLATE PROMISES MADE TO MARCOS WHEN HE AGREED TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES. HE QUOTES FITZWATER AS SAYING: "HE HAS BEEN GIVEN CERTAIN ASSURANCES BY THE US IN REGARD TO THAT DEPARTURE, AND HE STILL HAS INFLUENCE AND CONTACTS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. SO THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED."

IF AN INDICTMENT IS BROUGHT UNDER FEDERAL RACKETEERING LAWS, PROSECUTORS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ESTABLISH THAT MARCOS WAS PART OF A CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVOLVED IN A PATTERN OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT SPANNING A NUMBER OF YEARS, SHENON SAYS.

ACCORDING TO DOJ OFFICIALS, SHENON ADDS, OTHER POTENTIAL TARGETS OF THE MANHATTAN GRAND JURY INCLUDE IMELDA MARCOS AND SAUDI ARABIAN BUSINESSMAN ADNAN KHASHOGGI.

-- THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (7/18) CARRIES AN AP PHOTO OF COMMUNIST INSURGENTS. THE CAPTION SAYS GREGORIO ROSAL, ONE OF THOSE PICTURED IN THE JUNGLES OF QUEZON PROVINCE, SPEAKING TO REPORTERS SUNDAY IN A "RARE" PRESS CONFERENCE, SAID THAT COMMUNIST REBELS ARE WILLING TO OPEN NEW PEACE TALKS WITH AQUINO'S GOVERNMENT.

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-- BUT REUTER (MANILA 7/17) REPORTS ROSAL, WHOM IT DESCRIBES AS A LEADING COMMUNIST COMMANDER, IN A TAPED MESSAGE RELEASED TO REUTER SUNDAY, REJECTED AQUINO'S CONDITION THAT REBELS MUST FORMALLY ASK FOR A RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS TO END THE INSURGENCY. IT SAYS ROSAL ACCUSED AQUINO OF IMPOSING AN "UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION" BY DEMANDING THAT THE REBELS MAKE THE FIRST MOVE AND FORMALLY REQUEST NEGOTIATIONS. "NO TRUE REVOLUTIONARY CAN ACCEPT THE CONDITION IMPOSED BY THE FASCIST AQUINO

GOVERNMENT. WHY SHOULD WE ASK FOR TALKS WHEN SHE HAS EMBARKED ON A POLICY OF TOTAL WAR AND SHE CALLS US TERRORISTS?" IT REPORTS ROSAL SAID. IT ADDS HE DEMANDED THAT THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT "MUST SHOW SINCERITY FIRST."

REUTER SAYS THE STATEMENT WAS THE FIRST OFFICIAL REBEL REACTION TO CALLS BY THE COUNTRY'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS FOR A RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS, BROKEN OFF IN JANUARY 1987.

-- REUTER (MOUNT BANAHAW 7/17) REPORTS COMMUNIST REBELS WHO HAVE HELD 5 PHILIPPINE SOLDIERS IN A MOUNTAIN HIDEOUT FOR 47 DAYS SHOWED THEIR CAPTIVES TO THE PRESS, SAYING THEIR DETENTION PROVES GUERRILLAS CONTROL THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT SAYS JOURNALISTS MET THE SOLDIERS AT A GUERRILLA CAMP ON MOUT BANAHAW, ABOUT 50 MILES SOUTHEAST OF MANILA LAST WEDNESDAY. IT ADDS THAT 4 BATTALIONS OF SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR THE SOLDIERS SINCE THEIR ABDUCTION ON JUNE 1 DURING A GUERRILLA RAID ON A CHICKEN FARM OF THE "SAN MIGUEL CORP," THE COUNTRY'S LARGEST FOOD CONGLOMERATE.

-- THE WASHINGTON TIMES' "INTELLIGENCE REPORT (7/18) REPORTS THE PHILIPPINE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' COMMITTEE ON ENERGY HAS ACCUSED THE SUBIC BAY NAVAL STATION AND CLARK AIR BASE OF DRAINING THE ENERGY OF THE COUNTRY. IT REPORTS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN HERMINIO AQUINO OF TARLAC PUSHED THROUGH HIS COMMITTEE 2 MEASURES TO DUMP

THE US MILITARY FACILITIES FROM THE COUNTRY'S ELECTRIC POWER GRID, FORCING THEM TO OPERATE FROM THEIR EMERGENCY GENERATING FACILITIES. IT NOTES THAT THE MEASURES, APPROVED JUNE 26 BY THE COMMITTEE, WILL BE PRESENTED FOR A VOTE OF THE FULL CONGRESS.

THE TIMES ADDS THAT PRESSURE AGAINST THE BASES IS ALSO BEING APPLIED BY THE "LEFTIST 'GABRIELA WOMEN'S GROUP,'" WHICH ASSEMBLED A PICKET LINE JUNE 27 NEAR THE US EMBASSY IN MANILA. IT SAYS THE DEMONSTRATORS, "MOST OF WHOSE LEADERS OPENLY SUPPORT THE COMMUNIST NPA," SAID THE BASES SHOULD BE CLOSED AS A HEALTH HAZARD, CHARGING THAT MOST OF THE 64 FILIPINOS FOUND TO BE INFECTED WITH THE AIDS VIRUS WERE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNISTY OF 26,000 REGISTERED PROSTITUTES AND BAR GIRLS WHO SERVE THE US BASES.

-- REUTER (WASHINGTON TIMES MANILA) AND THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (BOTH 7/19) REPORT COMMUNIST REBELS

MONDAY FIRMLY REJECTED A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE INSURGENCY, "IN A REBUFF TO THE COUNTRY'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH," REUTER SAYS." MEANWHILE, IT ADDS, SUSPECTED COMMUNIST REBELS SHOT AND KILLED BOTH A COUNCILLOR IN HIS OFFICE IN CENTRAL LUCENA CITY AND A POLICEMAN SENT TO ARREST A VILLAGER IN NEARBY BULACAN PROVINCE, ACCORDING TO PNA.

REUTER NOTES, IN A STATEMENT DELIVERED TO NEWS AGENCIES,

THE NPA ACCUSED AQUINO'S GOVERNMENT OF DUPLICITY AND SAID "CEASEFIRE TALKS CAN NEVER BE POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT...RESPOND POSITIVELY TO A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE THAT WILL MEAN THE ANNIHILATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND ITS MASS BASE." IT SAYS THE STATEMENT WAS
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ISSUED 4 DAYS AFTER THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE CALLED FOR A SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES AND A RESUMPTION OF TALKS TO END THE INSURGENCY. "WE ADVISE THE (BISHOPS) TO EXAMINE CLOSELY WHO ARE THE REAL CULPRITS IN THIS WAR," IT QUOTES THE NPA AS SAYING.

REUTER REPORTS AQUINO HAS WELCOMED THE CHURCH INITIATIVE, BUT SHE SAID THE REBELS MUST MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ANY RESUMPTION OF TALKS. IT ADDS THAT HER SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS REJECTED THE BISHOPS' PROPOSAL.

IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, REUTER SAYS, A SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDER HAS ORDERED THE DISMANTLING OF CHECKPOINTS ON MAJOR HIGHWAYS FOLLOWING COMPLAINTS OF ALLEGED ABUSES BY SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN MANNING THEM, ACCORDING TO THE MILITARY MONDAY. IT REPORTS A MILITARY SPOKESMAN QUOTED MAJ GEN RAMON MONTANO, HEAD OF THE PARAMILITARY PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, AS SAYING THE CHECKPOINTS WOULD BE SET UP ONLY DURING EMERGENCIES AND "FOR TACTICAL REASONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS."

ACCORDING TO REUTER, HEAVILY-ARMED SOLDIERS AND POLICE SEARCHING VEHICLES FOR ILLEGAL GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES HAVE BEEN A COMMON SIGHT ON THE STREETS OF MANILA AND OTHER CITIES SINCE A SERIES OF ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW AQUINO BEGAN IN 1986.
IT NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS HAVE ACCUSED SOLDIERS AND POLICE OF USING THE CHECKPOINTS TO EXTORT MONEY AND HARASS MOTORISTS.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/18) AND THE LA TIMES (7/19) REPORT A FORMER SOLDIER, JOSE FRONDA SANTOS, TESTIFIED MONDAY THAT BRIG GEN LUTHER CUSTODIO, ONE OF 34 SOLDIERS ON TRIAL WITH 3 CIVILIANS IN THE CONNECTION WITH THE KILLING OF BENIGNO AQUINO, ORDERED HIM IN 1982 TO KILL THE OPPOSITION LEADER AND MAKE IT LOOK LIKE AN ACCIDENT -- BUT HE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE THE HEART TO OBEY. "HE
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INSTRUCTED ME TO KILL SEN AQUINO IF I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY," REUTER QUOTES SANTOS AS SAYING. IT ADDS HE SAID THE KILLING OF THE PRESIDENT'S LATE HUSBAND WAS PLANNED WHILE HE WAS IN EXILE IN THE US. IT NOTES THAT AT THE TIME OF AQUINO'S KILLING IN AUGUST 1983, GEN CUSTODIO HEADED THE AVIATION SECURITY COMMAND, WHICH WAS IN CHARGE OF SECURITY AT MANILA AIRPORT, THE SCENE OF THE ASSASSINATION.

REUTER REPORTS CHIEF PROSECUTOR RAUL GONZALES PRESENTED SANTOS AS A WITNESS TO BACK HIS THEORY THAT AQUINO'S MURDER WAS PART OF A WIDE-RANGING MILITARY CONSPIRACY HATCHED LONG BEFORE AQUINO'S RETURN FROM EXILE. IT ALSO REPORTS THAT SANTOS IDENTIFIED A .357-CALIBER REVOLVER WITH WHICH THE MILITARY SAID ROLANDO GALMAN SHOT AQUINO AS A GUN HE SAW IN CUSTODIO'S HEADQUARTERS A WEEK BEFORE THE MURDER. IT ADDS HE SAID HE SAW CUSTODIO'S CHIEF AID, LT JESUS CASTRO, AND 2 OTHER SOLDIERS HOLDING THE GUN AT DIFFERENT TIMES. IT NOTES CASTRO AND THE 2 OTHER SOLDIERS ARE AMONG THOSE ON TRIAL.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/19) REPORTS SANTOS, TESTIFYING FOR A 2ND DAY, SAID A GENERAL CLOSE TO MARCOS PLANNED THE ASSASSINATION. IT NOTES HE SAID GEN CUSTODIO, A FORMER MARCOS INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, ASSIGNED HIM AS TRIGGERMAN, PROMISING HIM SANCTUARY ABROAD. IT ADDS SANTOS SAID HE AVOIDED THE ASSIGNMENT BY NOT SHOWING UP AT A FINAL MEETING CALLED BY CUSTODIO ON MIDNIGHT AUG 20, 1983. IT NOTES CUSTODIO SNICKERED AT SANTOS' TESTIMONY, TELLING REPORTERS: "HE'S DREAMING."

-- UPI (SAN FRANCISCO 7/18) REPORTS MARCOS AND IMELDA HAVE BEEN SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY ABOUT AN ALLEGED REAGAN
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ADMINISTRATION COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE MARCOS OPPONENTS, LAWYERS FOR ANTI-MARCOS ACTIVIST STEVE PSINAKIS CHARGED MONDAY. IT NOTES THAT PSINAKIS CONTENDS THAT A 2-COUNT US DISTRICT COURT INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM FOR ALLEGED CONSPIRACY AND INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES WAS SPARKED BY A PURPORTED MEETING IN NEW YORK IN DECEMBER 1980 AMONG RONALD REAGAN, GEORGE BUSH, AND IMELDA MARCOS. IT SAYS PSINAKIS HAS BEEN FREE ON 200,000 DOLLARS BAIL AFTER THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF CORAZON AQUINO.

UPI REPORTS THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHETHER MARCOS WOULD FIGHT THE SUBPOENA.

UPI NOTES PSINAKIS SAYS HIS PROSECUTION IS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND CONTENDS THAT IN 1981 IMELDA MARCOS TOLD HIM REAGAN HAD PROMISED HER ANTI-MARCOS ACTIVISTS IN THE US WOULD BE PROSECUTED. IT REPORTS US DISTRICT JUDGE ROBERT SCHNACKE STRONGLY SUGGESTED MONDAY HE WAS NOT BOTHERED BY THE SIMPLE FACT OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MEETING TO DISCUSS MUTUAL ANTI-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND SAID HE WAS MORE INTERESTED IN QUESTIONING LOWER-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN PROSECUTIONS "TO ENSURE THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT INFECTED BY THE TOP-LEVEL

ACTIVITIES."

IN A "SETBACK" FOR PSINAKIS, UPI REPORTS, SCHNACKE REVERSED ONE OF HIS EARLIER RULINGS, STATING THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO SEE SECRET FBI AFFIDAVITS USED TO JUSTIFY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WIRETAPS ON THE PSINAKIS HOME IN FEBRUARY 1981. IT SAYS THE WIRETAP APPROVALS CAME 3 MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED REAGAN-BUSH-IMELDA MARCOS MEETING. IT SAYS SCHNACKE ALTERED HIS POSITION AFTER READING A DOCUMENT SEALED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS AND PROVIDED BY THE
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GOVERNMENT. "UNLESS I AM CONVINCED THERE WAS HIGH-LEVEL INTRUSION INTO THE INVESTIGATION...THEN I SEE NO NEED TO LOOK FURTHER. UNDER THE SPECIAL MANDATE OF THE LAW, IF THE PROSECUTORS DID SOMETHING THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE DONE, THEN WE NEED TO LOOK FURTHER."

UPI NOTES ASSISTANT US ATTORNEY CHARLES BURCH SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE ISSUE IMMEDIATELY TO

A FEDERAL APPEALS COURT IF SCHNACKE HAD PERMITTED THE DISCLOSURE OF THE SECRET DOCUMENTS.

ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL INDICTMENT, UPI REPORTS, PSINAKIS ASKED ARTURO TACA TO BUY 700 FEET OF DETONATION CORD AND BLASTING CAPS IN ST LOUIS AND HAD IT TRANSPORTED BY BUS TO SAN FRANCISCO. THIS WAS PART OF A PURPORTED PLOT TO HASTEN THE FALL OF MARCOS IN THE PHILIPPINES, IT SAYS.

UPI NOTES SCHNACKE SET A JULY 22 HEARING TO LOOK INTO THE LEGALITY OF 2 FBI SEARCHES OF TRASH COLLECTED FROM GARBAGE CANS OUTSIDE PSINAKIS' HOUSE. IT REPORTS PSINAKIS CONTENDS THAT, AT A TIME WHEN HE WAS RECEIVING DEATH THREATS, 2 OF HIS DOGS WERE DRUGGED TO ALLOW SEVERAL PEOPLE TO TAKE AWAY THE CONTENTS OF HIS TRASH CANS. IT REPORTS PROSECUTOR BURCH SAID AGENTS FOUND DETONATING CORD IN THE TRASH DURING THE FIRST SEARCH BUT INSISTED THAT FBI AGENTS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY DRUGGING OF PSINAKIS' DOGS.

-- REUTER (MANILA 7/19) REPORTS THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY IS INVESTIGATING CHARGES THAT SOLDIERS TORTURED A MAN INTO CONFESSING THAT CHURCH FUNDS WERE BEING DIVERTED TO COMMUNIST REBELS, ACCORDING TO AN ARMY SPOKESMAN
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TUESDAY. IT NOTES NOEL VILLALBA APPEARED BEFORE REPORTERS TUESDAY, DISOWNED HIS ALLEGED CONFESSION, AND SHOWED HOW SOLDIERS TIED HIS LEGS WITH NYLON CORD BEFORE HE UNDERWENT THE "WATER CURE," IN WHICH HE WAS HELD DOWN WHILE WATER WAS POURED THROUGH HIS NOSE. IT NOTES

VILLALBA WAS FREED ON BAIL LAST WEEK AFTER 2 WEEKS IN DETENTION IN A SUBURBAN MILITARY CAMP.

REUTER REPORTS AN ARMY SPOKESMAN SAID ARMED FORCES CHIEF GEN RENATO DE VILLA ORDERED A FULL INVESTIGATION OF VILLALBA'S ALLGEATIONS. IT QUOTES COL EMILIANO TEMPLO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MILITARY UNIT THAT DETAINED VILLALBA, AS SAYING HE "PROBABLY WANTED TO GET BACK INTO THE GOOD GRACES OF HIS ORGANIZATION, SO HE CLAIMED HE WAS TORTURED TO CALM THE ANGER OF THOSE HE IMPLICATED."

REUTER NOTES THE MILITARY HAS SAID VILLABLA SIGNED A CONFESSION ADMITTING THAT FOREIGN AID INTENDED TO FINANCE PROJECTS BY A GROUP OF PROTESTANT CHURCHES WAS BEING

CHANNELLED TO THE GUERRILLAS. IT ADDS VILLABLA TOLD REPORTERS: "THEY FORCED ME TO WRITE A SUPPOSED CONFESSION. I DISOWN WHAT I WROTE BECAUSE THEY OBTAINED IT WHILE I WAS UNDER TORTURE OR UNDER DIRECT THREAT OF TORTURE." IT ADDS HE ALSO CHARGED THAT WHILE HE WAS REALLY ARRESTED JUNE 27, THE MILITARY FAKED THE DATE TO JULY 2 BECAUSE IT WANTED TO MAKE SURE TORTURE MARKS ON HIS BODY DISAPPEARED BEFORE ANNOUNCING HIS CAPTURE.

-- REUTER (MANILA) REPORTS AQUINO HAS ASKED "AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL," WHICH HAS LISTED HUNDREDS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, TO GIVE THE COUNTRY BALANCED TREATMENT, THE MALACANANG SAID WEDNESDAY. "IT IS (GOVERNMENT) POLICY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS," IT NOTES A GOP SPOKESMAN QUOTED AQUINO AS SAYING AFTER MEETING OFFICIALS OF "AI" TUESDAY. IT ADDS AQUINO
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SAID HER GOVERNMENT WOULD TREAT WITH IMPORTANCE COMPLAINTS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND SHE ASKED THE GROUP "TO GIVE A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES."

-- REUTER (MANILA) NOTES THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, A BODY SET UP TO TRACK DOWN MARCOS' ALLEGED ILLEGAL ASSETS, HAS NOW BECOME THE TARGET OF CORRUPTION CHARGES. IT SAYS AQUINO ACTED ON THE COMPLAINTS TUESDAY, ORDERING AN AUDIT OF THE COMPANIES THE COMMISSION HAS TAKEN OVER WHILE INVESTIGATING THEIR OWNERSHIP. "BASED ON THESE (AUDIT) REPORTS, THEN WE WILL KNOW WHETHER WE HAVE TO REVAMP THE PCGG OR NOT," IT QUOTES AQUINO AS TELLING REPORTERS. IT NOTES THE PCGG ENJOYS SWEEPING POWERS TO SEIZE BANK ACCOUNTS, STOCK, AND OTHER ASSETS IF IT IS SUSPECTED THEY WERE CONTROLLED BY MARCOS OR HIS ASSOCIATES.

IN A SEPARATE CASE, REUTER NOTES, AN ANTI-GRAFT COURT

TUESDAY ORDERED THE ARREST OF THE COMMISSION'S DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, QUINTIN DOROMAL, ON CHARGES HE HAD ILLEGALLY ALLOWED HIS FAMILY-RUN COMPANY TO BE AWARDED A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT. IT SAYS A SIMILAR CASE AGAINST DOROMAL WAS FILED LAST YEAR BUT DISMISSED BY THE SUPREME COURT, AND DOROMAL DENIES ANY WRONGDOING.

REUTER ADDS AQUINO ALSO SAID SHE HAS ACCEPTED COMMISSION CHAIRMAN DIAZ'S RESIGNATION. LAST WEEK, IT RECALLS, SHE

ORDERED BOTH DIAZ AND HIS OPPONENT IN A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED DISPUTE, SOLICITOR-GENERAL FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, TO GO ON INDEFINITE LEAVE. IT REPORTS AQUINO'S LEGAL COUNSEL, ADOLFO AZCUNA, NAMED AS ACTING PCGG CHAIRMAN, TOLD
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REPORTERS THAT ABOUT 100 FISCAL AGENTS OF THE COMMISSION WERE BEING INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPANIES THEY WERE HANDLING.

MEANWHILE, REUTER REPORTS, HOUSE SPEAKER RAMON MITRA SAID A BILL SEEKING TO STRIP THE PCGG OF THE IMMUNITY IT CURRENTLY ENJOYS AGAINST PROSECUTION WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF THE LOWER HOUSE'S AGENDA WHEN CONGRESS REOPENS ON JULY 26.

3. VIETNAM

-- UPI (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER) AND THE THE LA TIMES (BOTH SUBIC BAY NAVAL STATION) NOTE THE RETURN OF 3 NAVY FLIERS RESCUED BY VIETNAM TO THE SUBIC BAY NAVAL STATION IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE LA TIMES (AP), BOSTON GLOBE (AFP), AND USA TODAY CARRY PHOTOS OF THE CREWMEN ON THEIR RETURN.

THE LA TIMES QUOTES LT RICHARD MAURER AS SAYING: "WE'D LIKE TO THANK THE VIETNAMESE NAVY FOR PULLING US OUT OF THE SEA AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR COURTESY AND HOSPITALITY. THEY TREATED US VERY WELL. THEY WERE VERY CONCERNED FOR OUR SAFETY." WHITEHEAD

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	E-01	FRB-03	H-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19
	ITC-01	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SB-00	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
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DEPARTMENT FOR HA:CFINERTY, EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM

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SUBJECT: COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY EXPENDITURES
REPORTING REQUIREMENT: TURKEY

REF: (A) STATE 101930, (B) 92 ANKARA 09928,
(C) 92 ANKARA 15129, (D) 92 ANKARA 17706

1.(U) PER REFTEL A, WE ARE PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON TURKEY'S 1992 MILITARY, HEALTH AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURES, THE MILITARY'S SIZE AND ROLE, FOREIGN MILITARY PURCHASES, AND TURKEY'S WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE DATA ON MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS REDUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, EMBASSY NOTES THAT, SINCE TURKEY IS A MEMBER OF NATO, THE THRUST OF THE QUESTION ABOUT EFFORTS THIS COUNTRY MAY BE MAKING

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TO REDUCE MILITARY EXPENDITURES (REF A, PARAS 2 AND 6) SEEMS MISPLACED. IN FACT, TURKEY HAS INCREASED MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN RECENT YEARS. THIS SERVES IMPORTANT NATO AND U.S. INTERESTS BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING INSTABILITY IN THIS REGION AND BECAUSE IT ENABLES THE TURKS TO ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY BURDEN. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES HAVE PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE TO SUPPLEMENT TURKEY'S OWN, NATIONALLY-FUNDED EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE ITS ARMED FORCES. MOST ASPECTS OF THIS SITUATION WERE ADDRESSED IN THE EMBASSY'S BURDEN-SHARING REPORT FOR TURKEY (REF C) AND WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AND UPDATED IN THE 1993 AIASA REPORT. RESPONSE IS KEYED TO REFTEL A, PARAGRAPH 6.

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A. MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

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2.(U) ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL TURKISH GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 1992 MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS IN USD, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE STATE BUDGET AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S GNP ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- IN MILLIONS OF USD 3,988 (USD-6,979TL)

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP 2.6

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF
-- TOTAL STATE BUDGET 13.4

TURKEY'S DEFENSE SPENDING IS RELATIVELY HIGH BECAUSE OF OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON TURKEY BY ITS GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION AND ITS NEED TO MODERNIZE AND UPGRADE THE QUALITY OF ITS EQUIPMENT. SOME DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE DIFFICULT TO ISOLATE AND ARE CONTAINED IN OTHER BUDGET CATEGORIES.

EFFORTS TO REDUCE MILITARY FORCES AND EXPENDITURES.

3.(U) THE TURKISH MILITARY PLANS TO TRANSITION TO A SMALLER, MORE FLEXIBLY-STRUCTURED PROFESSIONAL ARMY IN THE YEARS AHEAD, A MOVE THE USG SUPPORTS, BUT WHICH WILL BE EXTREMELY COSTLY TO IMPLEMENT.

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4.(C) THE GULF WAR AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

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FORCED THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) TO RETHINK THEIR TRADITIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE. WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE THREAT OF A MASSIVE SOVIET-LED GROUND OFFENSIVE, THE TURKS NO LONGER NEED THE LARGELY STATIC, DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGY DESIGNED TO COUNTER IT, OR THE LARGE CONSCRIPT INFANTRY TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE THREAT FROM THE NORTH AND THE LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR HAVE RESULTED IN SHORTENING OF THE PERIOD OF NATIONAL SERVICE FROM 18 TO 15 MONTHS (WITH A FURTHER CUT TO 12 MONTHS UNDER CONSIDERATION) AND A PLAN TO DOWNSIZE THE ARMY TO 300,000 - 350,000 TROOPS (FROM A PRE-GULF WAR HIGH OF A HALF MILLION). THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THIS REDUCTION IS LIKELY TO PROCEED SLOWLY, HOWEVER, WITH NO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN LAND FORCES YET REALIZED. THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY WILL RETAIN THEIR MANPOWER LEVELS, OF APPROXIMATELY 50,000 EACH. WITH CONTINUED UNREST IN THE

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	AMAD-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00	CISA-00	EB-01	EUR-01	EXIM-06
	E-01	FRB-03	H-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19
	ITC-01	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SB-00	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	RPE-01
	SNIS-00	/110W					

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P 161021Z APR 93

UNCLASSIFIED

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9681
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
DIA WASHDC//DSP-2B//

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 04806

DEPARTMENT FOR HA:CFINERTY, EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, TU, EAID, ECON, MARR, MASS, PREL
[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 ANKARA 04806 02 OF 03 161023Z
SUBJECT: COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY EXPENDITURES REPORTING REQUIREMENT: TURKEY

SOUTHEAST, THE SITUATION IN IRAQ STILL VOLATILE, AND MISTRUST TOWARD HEAVILY-ARMED SYRIA AND REARMING IRAN, COMBINED WITH THE THREAT OF SPILLOVER FROM THE BALKANS AND CAUCASUS CONFLICTS, TURKEY SEES THE SECURITY OF ITS NEIGHBORHOOD AS PERHAPS MORE THREATENED THAN EVER AND WILL PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY.

5. [redacted] WHILE EFFORTS AT RESTRUCTURING WILL MOST LIKELY LEAD TO LONG-TERM SPENDING REDUCTIONS, UPGRADING EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY WILL MEAN MORE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE SHORT-TERM, NOT LESS. THE SAME WILL BE TRUE OF THE PLANNED EXPANSION IN THE ARMY'S CAREER PROFESSIONAL COMPONENT.

6. [redacted] THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DECISION TO CUT FY93 FMF FUNDS BY USDOL 50 MILLION AND THE CHANGE IN TERMS OF THE REMAINING USDOL 450 MILLION FROM GRANT TO CREDITS COMES AS A SERIOUS SETBACK TO THE TURKISH MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. COUPLED WITH U.S. NATO BURDEN-SHARING INITIATIVES THE DECISION HAS ALREADY INCREASED THE ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE AMOUNTS OF TURKISH FUNDS ALLOCATED TO THE MILITARY, E.G. TURKISH NATIONAL FUNDS, TOTALING 75 MILLION USD, HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED IN THE TURKISH DEFENSE FUND ACCOUNT TO COVER THE PROJECTED FY-93 75M GRANT U.S. CONTRIBUTION WHICH WAS NOT FORTHCOMING.

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B. HEALTH AND EDUCATION.

7.(U) ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL TURKISH GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 1992 EDUCATION AND HEALTH APPROPRIATIONS IN USD, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE STATE BUDGET AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S GNP ARE AS FOLLOWS:

HEALTH

-- IN MILLIONS OF USD 1,410 (USD-6,979TL)

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP .92

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF
-- TOTAL STATE BUDGET 4.7

EDUCATION

-- IN MILLIONS OF USD 5,630 (USD-6,979TL)

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP 3.66

-- AS PERCENTAGE OF
-- TOTAL STATE BUDGET 18.9

C. SIZE AND ROLE OF ARMED FORCES.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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8.(U) TURKEY MAINTAINS THE SECOND LARGEST ARMED FORCES IN NATO (AFTER THE UNITED STATES), WITH THE BULK COMMITTED TO NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK INTERESTS. AS STATED ABOVE, REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE ARMY FROM A PRE-GULF WAR HIGH OF 500 THOUSAND TO BETWEEN 300 AND 350 THOUSAND TROOPS IS PROJECTED, WITH THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY RETAINING MANPOWER LEVELS, OF APPROXIMATELY 50,000

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EACH. REFLECTING A STRONG HISTORICAL AND PATRIOTIC TRADITION, NATIONAL DEFENSE ENJOYS SOLID POPULAR SUPPORT. HAVING INTERVENED IN THE POLITICAL ARENA THREE TIMES SINCE 1960, THE TURKISH MILITARY CONTINUES TO REGARD ITSELF AS THE WATCHDOG OF SECULAR DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT, UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, OF A NEW MILITARY INTERVENTION, HOWEVER.

D. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04806 03 OF 03 161
023Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	AMAD-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00	CISA-00	EB-01	EUR-01	EXIM-06
	E-01	FRB-03	H-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19
	ITC-01	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SB-00	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	RPE-01
	SNIS-00	/110W					

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P 161021Z APR 93
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9682
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
DIA WASHDC//DSP-2B//

[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 03 ANKARA 04806

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DEPARTMENT FOR HA:CFINERTY, EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, TU, EAID, ECON, MARR, MASS, PREL

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 04806 03 OF 03 161023Z
SUBJECT: COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY EXPENDITURES REPORTING REQUIREMENT: TURKEY

9.(C) THERE ARE NO FIGURES AVAILABLE ON THE PERCENTAGE OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE BUDGET SPENT ON FOREIGN MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN THE LAST TEN YEARS TURKEY HAS BEGUN TO PRODUCE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DOMESTICALLY (MOSTLY JOINT VENTURES, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS THE PRODUCTION OF F-16 FIGHTERS), BUT IT REMAINS HIGHLY DEPENDANT ON FOREIGN SUPPLIERS. MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY PURCHASES ARE FROM THE U.S.

E. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

10.(U) AS AN ALLY, TURKEY REGULARLY PROVIDES RELEVANT DATA ON ITS MILITARY SPENDING TO NATO. IT IS ALSO A PARTY TO THE CFE TREATY AND PROVIDES INFORMATION ON ITS TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT (TLE) IN THE ATTU ZONE UNDER CFE REPORTING PROCEDURES.

BARKLEY

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E-2

PAGE 01 STATE 283991
ORIGIN EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 IO-19 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 P-02 /044 R

R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SE:C HUGGINS:CH
APPROVED BY: P:R M KIMMITT
EUR/SE:T B FRIEDMAN, P:E EDELMAN, EUR/SE:A K KORKY,
NEA/NGA:L POPE (INFO), PM/SAS:D O'GRADY (INFO),
S/S-O: LGERSON, S/S:JELAKE
------------------010111 051823Z /41

P 051812Z SEP 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL IZMIR PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USNATO
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
JCS WASHDC 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[redacted] STATE 283991

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, US, TU
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT'S MEETING WITH TURKISH AMBASSADOR KANDEMIR

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN AN AUGUST 28 MEETING WITH NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR KANDEMIR, UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT REASSURED THE GOT OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR ALLIANCE WITH

[redacted]

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TURKEY. KANDEMIR MADE A PITCH FOR HIGH LEVELS OF EARMARKED SECURITY ASSISTANCE, EXPRESSED TURKISH CONCERN BOUT INCLUSION OF THE ARMENIAN ISSUE IN THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, SOUGHT U.S. APPROVAL FOR THIRD-COUNTRY SALES OF F-16 AIRCRAFT CO-PRODUCED IN TURKEY, PROPOSED USING CFE-MANDATED REDUCTIONS TO MODERNIZE THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, AND SAID THE GOT WOULD PURSUE SPECIAL CYPRUS

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COORDINATOR NELSON LEDSKY'S SUGGESTION FOR BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN CYPRUS TALKS. KIMMITT STRESSED THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE CONGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND URGED THAT TURKEY DO WHAT IT COULD TO KEEP CONTENTIOUS ISSUES FROM BECOMING MATTERS OF CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN. END SUMMARY.

2. KIMMITT OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING KANDEMIR AND NOTING THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. FOR THAT REASON, KIMMITT BELIEVED HE AND KANDEMIR COULD HAVE A CLOSE, CANDID RELATIONSHIP. KIMMITT SAID HE AND AMBASSADOR ABRAMOWITZ WERE GOOD FRIENDS, AND ABRAMOWITZ WOULD BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA. KANDEMIR AGREED THAT FRANK EXCHANGES WERE NECESSARY AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO WORKING WITH KIMMITT. KIMMITT SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO CONSULTATIONS WITH KANDEMIR'S SUCCESSOR AT THE MFA AND HOPED HE COULD TRAVEL TO ANKARA FOR THOSE CONSULTATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT PROBABLY NOT BEFORE LATE NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER. KANDEMIR SAID KIMMITT WOULD BE WELCOME AT ANY TIME.

3. BEFORE TURNING TO BILATERAL ISSUES, KANDEMIR RAISED THE SITUATION IN IRAN, POINTING OUT THAT RAFSANJANI APPEARED TO BE SELECTING HIS MINISTERS FROM YOUNGER, MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS. IN RESPONSE TO KANDEMIR'S OPINION THAT

[redacted]

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IRAN WOULD NOT MOVE ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION WITHOUT A "QUID" FROM THE U.S. SUCH AS RELEASING FROZEN ASSETS, KIMMITT CLARIFIED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IRANIAN MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE "FROZEN ASSET" ISSUE. SPECIFICALLY, KIMMITT REVIEWED THE ALGIERS ACCORDS AND THE CLAIMS TRIBUNAL PROCESS, EXPLAINING THAT THE CLAIMS WERE ACTIVELY UNDER RESOLUTION RATHER THAN FROZEN.

4. TURNING TO THE BILATERAL AGENDA, KANDEMIR SAID HE HAD RELAYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MFA SPECIAL CYPRUS COORDINATOR LEDSKY'S SUGGESTIONS FOR BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN CYPRUS TALKS CAUSED BY TURKISH CYPRIOT OBJECTIONS TO THE UN'S PAPER ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. HE HAD RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND THE TURKS WOULD BE APPROACHING DENKTASH ABOUT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A REASONABLE PROPOSAL BY LEDSKY. (SEE STATE 274083. LEDSKY PROPOSED LAST WEEK THAT ANKARA ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO SUGGEST AN EARLY MEETING, CHAIRED BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, BETWEEN VASSILIOU AND DENKTASH SO THAT THE TWO LEADERS COULD BEGIN TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENT TO PRODUCE AN OUTLINE OF A SETTLEMENT THIS FALL.)

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5. KIMMITT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR TURKEY'S ASSISTANCE. CONTINUING, HE SAID THAT THE REASON FOR SELECTING A PERSON OF NELSON LEDSKY'S STATURE AND

EXPERIENCE FOR THE POSITION OF SPECIAL CYPRUS COORDINATOR WAS THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE. KIMMITT USED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE CONGRESS PLAYS IN RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. KIMMITT URGED KANDEMIR TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESS. THE FACT THAT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS SOMETIMES SEEMED UNFAIR WAS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR THE TURKS TO SPEND LOTS OF TIME ON THE HILL. CYPRUS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ISSUES IN WHICH THE CONGRESS WAS VERY INTERESTED. ANOTHER WHICH COULD BECOME A PROBLEM IF NOT RESOLVED SOON WAS TURKEY'S

[redacted]

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IMPOSITION OF A VALUE-ADDED TAX ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN THE COMMON DEFENSE.

6. IN REPLY KANDEMIR SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESS. ON VAT, KANDEMIR NOTED THAT A JOINT U.S./TURKISH "EXPERTS GROUP" WAS CONSIDERING THE MATTER AND THE TURKISH SIDE HAD BEEN TOLD TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE. KANDEMIR HOPED THAT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND.

7. TURNING TO ISSUES ON THE TURKISH AGENDA, KANDEMIR HANDED OVER TO KIMMITT FOUR NON-PAPERS COVERING: SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SUBSTITUTING OUTDATED TURKISH EQUIPMENT FOR ITEMS SLATED FOR DESTRUCTION UNDER A CFE AGREEMENT, SALES OF F-16 AIRCRAFT CO-PRODUCED IN TURKEY TO THIRD COUNTRIES, AND INCLUSION OF THE ARMENIAN ISSUE IN THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM.

8. ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE, KANDEMIR SAID TURKEY EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE CUTS, BUT THAT THESE CUTS WOULD AFFECT ONLY THOSE COUNTRIES WITHOUT EARMARKS. TURKEY UNDERSTOOD THE ADMINISTRATION'S OPPOSITION TO EARMARKS, BUT GIVEN THE U.S. BEST EFFORT COMMITMENT AND THE "APPROACHING DECA," KANDEMIR OPINED THAT ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR AN EARMARK WAS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE FULL FUNDING FOR THE TURKISH PROGRAM. WITH RESPECT TO F-16 SALES TO THIRD COUNTRIES, KANDEMIR POINTED OUT THAT THE PROJECT WAS PROCEEDING WELL AND THE TIME HAD COME TO CONSIDER SALES OF THE AIRCRAFT TO THIRD COUNTRIES. ON CFE, KANDEMIR RELAYED TURKEY'S MODERNIZATION NEEDS AND ASKED THAT TURKEY'S ANTIQUATED EQUIPMENT BE SUBSTITUTED FOR EQUIPMENT SLATED FOR DESTRUCTION IN AN EVENTUAL CFE AGREEMENT. FINALLY

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REGARDING THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, KANDEMIR SAID THAT THE

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TURKISH PUBLIC WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW UNFOUNDED ARMENIAN ALLEGATIONS COUND END UP IN THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM.

9. IN RESPONSE TO KANDEMIR'S POINTS, KIMMITT REAFFIRMED ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION TO EARMARKS, STRESSING THAT EARMARKS WERE A FORM OF UNNECESSARY MICROMANAGEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, TURKEY COULD REST ASSURED THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD EXERT ITS BEST EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE LEVELS FOR TURKEY. REGARDING CFE EQUIPMENT SLATED FOR DESTRUCTION, KIMMITT SAID TURKEY'S REQUEST WOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AS WE MOVED DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS AGREEMENT. ON F-16 SALES, KIMMITT NOTED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUE, BUT SAID WE WOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE REQUEST. IN THAT CONNECTION, KIMMITT REMINDED KANDEMIR OF U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT TOURS OF THE FACILITY BY CERTAIN THIRD COUNTRIES. EVEN ACCESS TO NONCLASSIFIED PARTS OF THE FACILITY COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE HILL. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, KIMMITT REPEATED THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW THAT THE ARMENIAN QUESTION WAS BEST LEFT TO HISTORY. TURKEY'S MOVES TO OPEN THE OTTOMAN ARCHIVES WERE HELPFUL.

10. BEFORE CONCLUDING THE MEETING, KIMMITT ASSURED KANDEMIR OF OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR TURKEY WITH RESPECT TO THE TRAGEDY UNFOLDING IN BULGARIA AND THOSE BULGARIAN TURKS WHO HAD FLED TO TURKEY. KIMMITT EXPLAINED THAT OUR NORMAL POLICY WAS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN REFUGEE SITUATIONS THROUGH THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS THE UNHCR. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE ENORMITY OF THIS SITUATION AND OUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH TURKEY, WE WERE ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS ACTIVELY SEEKING FUNDS TO MAKE A BILATERAL CONTRIBUTION TO TURKEY. KANDEMIR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR U.S. EFFORTS. HE CONTRASTED OUR EFFORTS WITH THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF CONCERN SHOWN BY OTHER ALLIES, WHO SEEMED TO FEEL FREE TO CRITICIZE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY, BUT CARED LITTLE ABOUT THE ABUSES IN BULGARIA.

[redacted]

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11. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE TURKISH DCM BATIBAY, EUR/SE DIRECTOR FRIEDMAN, COUNTRY OFFICER HUGGINS, AND P STAFFER EDELMAN.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY

[redacted] STATE 194151

FOR CHARGE FROM NEWTON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AMGT, IZ
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. (U) FRANK MAY HAVE PASSED YOU SOME OF THE FOLLOWING, BUT THERE ARE FURTHER DETAILS YOU MAY NOT HAVE.

2. [redacted] DOD APPROVAL HAS BEEN PASSED TO USDOC FOR THE COMPUTER SALES WITH CONDITIONS OF PERIODIC INSPECTION AND ONE DOWNGRADE REGARDING THE INOC COMPUTER WITH WHICH THE IRAQIS SHOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE. WE CAN EXPECT SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH FUTURE COMPUTER SALES BUT THE INITIAL VICTORY IS AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT.

3. [redacted] WE WERE ABLE TO GET THE DRAFT ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OUT OF COMMERCE TO THE TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE LAST WEEK. I HOPE YOU WILL HAVE IT VERY SOON TO PASS TO MINTRADE. TO MY REGRET WE CANNOT PUT THE MISSION TOGETHER UNTIL SEPTEMBER (KELLY IS UNAVAILABLE IN JULY), MAKING IT MORE URGENT TO GET THE DRAFT INTO IRAQI HANDS.

[redacted]

4. [redacted] I BRIEFED THE FULL EX-IM BOARD LAST TUESDAY INCLUDING CHAIRMAN DRAPER AND FOUND THEY ARE BECOMING A BIT MORE SYMPATHETIC. THE STAFF IS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED THAT IRAQ HAS MADE TEN MILLION AND SIX MILLION DOLLAR PAYMENTS ON TIME RECENTLY. I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AQABA GUARANTEES NOT USED MIGHT BE REPLACED BY GUARANTEES ON OTHER PROJECTS.

5. [redacted] VLAVIANOS IS RELATIVELY UPBEAT ON THE TRADE FAIR AND PROMISED TO HAVE DUSEX VIGNEAULT IN BAGHDAD IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. FAS ADMINISTRATOR SMITH AT MY REQUEST IS WORKING ON AN FAS BOOTH FOR COOPERATORS. SECRETARY BALDRIGE PROMISED TO SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO PROMOTE EX-IM FINANCING. I WILL TALK AT CSIS, MEI AND BCIU AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLUG IRAQ, ESPECIALLY THE FAIR.

6. (U) DICK FAIRBANKS IS RETURNING TO PRIVATE LIFE. HE MENTIONED AN INTEREST IN TRAVELLING TO IRAQ IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY LATER THIS YEAR. UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER HAS BEEN GIVEN THE IRANIAN ARMS PORTFOLIO BY THE SECRETARY. HAMDOON HAS BEEN INFORMED.

7. [redacted] FBO IS ENCOURAGING ABOUT FUNDING FOR US IN EARLY JULY. RON GAIN IS CLEARLY DOING HIS BEST. NEWEX AND

M/MO ARE VERY SYMPATHETIC ON OUR FOUR FCN SLOTS AND A THIRD B AND F POSITION. INCIDENTALLY EVERYONE KNOWS OF OUR PROBLEMS AND OUR RECORD ON REPORTS IS MUCH BETTER THAN SOME LARGE POSTS WITH AMPLE RESOURCES. I WILL MEET WITH GERLACH/MELROSE/IMBRIE NEXT WEEK TO TRY TO TIE DOWN THE PERSONNEL ISSUES.

8. [redacted] RSO HUSH HAS TO TAKE SOME SY TRAINING HERE THAT [redacted]

SY AND NEA/EX AGREE IS NEEDED. WE CANNOT ACCELERATE HIS ARRIVAL ALTHOUGH HE IS HIGHLY MOTIVATED. SINCE WE HAVE PHONE PROBLEMS, WE NEED TO BE SURE TO SEND ALL MESSAGES TO NEA/EX IN ORDER NOT TO SHORTSTOP JOE MELROSE'S EFFORTS. MY FAULT ON DAN GOODSPEED; I SHOULD HAVE TOLD FRANK TO INFORM JOE WHO HAD WORKED OUT A JULY 4 ARRIVAL TO SOLVE OUR GAP PROBLEM. [redacted]

B6

9. [redacted] NO REPLACEMENT FOR HAZZARD IN SIGHT BUT OC IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT TDY REPLACEMENTS. [redacted]

B6

10. (U) THE COMMITTEE TURNED DOWN OUR DANGER PAY DESPITE WILL'S BEST EFFORTS. THERE ARE TOO MANY DANGEROUS POSTS, ESPECIALLY IN LATIN AMERICA, AND THE SCUD'S BY THEMSELVES WERE NOT SUFFICIENT.

11. (U) I WILL CABLE YOU JIM BULLOCK'S REVIEW STATEMENT IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN THE CONSULTATION SCHEDULE EASES.

12. (U) IG HARROP CONFIRMED OUR INSPECTION IN THE LATE FALL, LIKELY NOVEMBER. I APPRECIATE BILL'S WILLINGNESS TO POSTPONE HIS LEAVE; HIS FALL ARRANGEMENTS SOUND FINE.

13. (U) JOE SISCO SAYS STONE AND WEBSTER WILL RETURN TO BAGHADAD SHORTLY. HE ASKED TO CONFIRM THAT MATERIAL SW SENT THROUGH US REACHED THE MINISTRY OF ELECTRICITY.

14. [redacted] I PLAN TO BE OUT OF WASHINGTON THE FIRST HALF [redacted]

OF JULY VISITING RELATIVES AND WILL RETURN JULY 15 FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S COURSE AND A TWO-DAY TRIP TO NEW YORK CITY. [redacted]

B6

[redacted]

B6

15. (U) FRANK HAS NOTIFIED HAMNDOON THAT ROCKY SUDDARTH WILL BE REPLACING JIM PLACKE. HAMDOON AGREED TO ASK MFA TO MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS.

16. (U) AS FRANK MENTIONED [redacted]

B6

17. (U) THE PA & H BUREAUS SAID THEY HAVE NO CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIES, CURRENT POLICY PAPERS, SPEECHES, OR "GISTS" ON THE US POLICY TOWARD THE RED SEA, HORN OF AFRICA, OR INDIAN OCEAN. FRANK'S NOW CHECKING THE LIBRARY AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY DESKS AND SHOULD GET SOMETHING INTO THE NEXT CLASSIFIED POUCH (CLOSING 6/27).

18. [redacted] IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NGA IF YOU COULD POUCH YOUR BEST CITY MAP OF BAGHDAD, NOTING LOCATIONS AND DATES OF EXPLOSIONS APPARENTLY DUE TO SCUDS. NGA HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANYONE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT HAS TRACKED THE EXPLOSIONS SYSTEMATICALLY.

[redacted]

19. [redacted] JIM PLACKE HAS BEEN IN FREQUENT AND INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN BERMAN IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. THE SECRETARY HAS SIGNED A LETTER TO BERMAN ASKING HIM TO CONSENT TO DELETION OF THE IRAQI RELEVANT PORTION OF HIS AMENDMENT, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS WILL DO THE TRICK. WHEN THE SITUATION IS RESOLVED, NEA WILL ADVISE YOU FORMALLY AND IN DETAIL.

20. [redacted] INR ANALYST WAYNE WHITE JOINS NGA AND MYSELF IN COMPLIMENTING YOUR FINE ANALYSIS OF THE GULF WAR SITUATION (BAGHDAD 1857) IN RESPONSE TO EMBASSY ABU DHABI'S VIEWS.

21. (U) NGA PERSONNEL CHANGES: PETER BURLEIGH, FORMER DIVISION CHIEF IN INR/NESA, TOOK OVER AS NGA OFFICE DIRECTOR JUNE 17. FRANK RICCIARDONE WILL BE ATTACHED TO NGA UNTIL AUGUST 9, BUT WILL TAKE A LOT OF LEAVE IN MID-LATE JULY AS GREG BERRY PHASES IN. GREG IS READING-IN RELIGIOUSLY, HAS ACCOMPANIED ME ON SEVERAL CALLS, AND IS BECOMING WELL KNOWN ON THE IRAQ CIRCUIT. PETER LYDON WILL REMAIN AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND DON ROBERTS WILL REMAIN AS IRAN DESK OFFICER FOR ANOTHER YEAR. WHATEVER THE TITLES, EVERYONE'S DUTIES ARE SUBJECT TO MAJOR RE-ASSIGNMENT AND OVERLAP ONCE THE NEW PEOPLE HAVE SETTLED IN.

22. (U) THE NEW AGRICULTURAL OFFICER IS NOW LARRY

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PANASUK [redacted]

23. REGARDS. SHULTZ

[redacted]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** ONLY
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 025939 **UNCLASSIFIED** E97

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08 DODE-00
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DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:JDBINDENAGEL
APPROVED BY P:WJSTOESSEL
EUR/CE:TGWESTON
EUR/CE:WHGUSSMAN
EUR/CE:JCKORNBLUM
EB:RHORMATS
EUR:TMTNILES
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TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMCONSUL STUTTGART
AMCONSUL MUNICH

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E.O. 12065: GDS 01/27/88 (NILES, THOMAS M.T.)

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TAGS: PINS, PINT, PEPR, GE, PL

SUBJECT: VISIT BY OTTO WOLFF VON AMERONGEN, PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, JANUARY 26, 1982

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: OTTO WOLFF VON AMERONGEN, PRESIDENT OF

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GERMAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HORMATS, AND DE PUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NILES JANUARY 26, 982. VON AMERONGEN STRESSED THAT FRG BUSINESSMEN WILL NOT PURSUE BUSINESS AS USUAL DURING THE POLISH CRISIS, WILL BE HELPFUL IN TIGHTENING THE COCOM LIST TO ELIMINATE SOME GREY AREAS, BUT ARE OPPOSED TO GENERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION. VON AMERONGEN FELT THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND WOULD DRIVE THE POLES CLOSER TO THE USSR. USG INTERLOCUTORS STRESSED THAT WE STILL HAVE MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE PIPELINE PROJECT QUITE APART FROM THE IMPACT OF U.S. SANCTIONS IN THE POLISH SITUATION. FRG SUPPORT FOR TIGHTENING

THE COCOM LIST WAS WELCOMED BY THE U.S.; HOWEVER, THE SANCTIONS WE IMPOSEDASARESULT OFTHE REPRESSION IN POLAND WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE THE ALLIES ALSO PURSUE THEIR OWN SANCTIONS AGAINST BOTH POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION. ALSO ATTENDING WERE FRG AMBASSADOR HERMES, FRG MINECON POSCH GERMAN AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPRESENTATIVE GUESSBACH AND J.D. BINDENAGEL EUR/CE'. END SUMMARY.

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3. IN HIS MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL, WOLFF VON AMERONGEN STRESSED THAT HIS MAIN PURPOSE OF VISITING WASHINGTON WAS TO REITERATE FRG SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP DURING THE POLISH CRISIS. VON AMERONGEN TOLD STOESSEL THAT THE FRG BUSINESSMEN WILL NOT PURSUE "BUSINESS AS USUAL" DURING THE POLISH CRISIS. THE SITUATION IS DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS, ESPECIALLY SINCE MAJOR BUSINESS CREDITS AND PAYMENTS ARE IN DOUBT, SINCE POLAND IS LOCATED SO CLOSE TO GERMANY, SINCE BERLIN COULD BE AFFECTED AND THE INNER-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP THREATENED. HE ARGUED THAT THE PROPER APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE MULTI-LATERAL AND STATED THAT THE FRG WILL BE HELPFUL IN TIGHTENING THE COCOM LIST TO ELIMINATE SOME OF THE GREY ZONES. HE SAID IT IS IMPORTANT TO RELATE POTENTIAL HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WITH SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY AND SUGGESTED THAT, SHOULD THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS BE ESTABLISHED, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM WITH EUROPEAN APPROVAL OF A LENGTHENED AND TIGHTENED COCOM LIST.

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4. VON AMERONGEN, HOWEVER, ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINS GENERAL SANCTIONS WHICH HE BELIEVES ARE NOT HELPFUL FOR EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN INTERESTS AND WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE. HE CITED PREVIOUS SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA

AND RHODESIA AND CALLED FOR A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SANCTIONS BEFORE ANY GENERAL SANCTIONS ARE IMPOSED. HE ALSO STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND WILL NOT HELP NORMALIZATION IN POLAND BUT RATHER WILL DRIVE THE POLES CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT POLISH VICE PREMIER RAKOWSKI HAD ALSO TOLD HIM THIS DURING HIS VISIT TO GERMANY.

5. VON AMERONGEN MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND AND SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

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AND IN THIS CONTEXT RAISED THE WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE PROJECT. HE ARGUED THAT THE U.S. CONCERNS AND

ARGUMENTS ON EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE WERE NOT PERSUASIVE, AS THE EUROPEANS HAD DEVELOPED SOME ALTERNATIVES AND INDEED HAD NOT INCREASED DRAMATICALLY THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENERGY RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH THIS DEAL. HE NOTED THAT THE FRG'S COMBINED IMPORTS OF SOVIET CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN THE 70'S EQUALLED APPROXIMATELY THE SAME ENERGY EQUIVALENT TO BE IMPORTED WHEN THE PIPELINE GAS IS COMPLETED. HE DID AGREE THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENEFITS TO THE SOVIETS IS MORE DIFFICULT TO REFUTE. HOWEVER, THE FRG CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE WILL BE GREATLY IMPROVED BY THE PROJECT. A MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FOR THE FRG WAS THAT IF ONE MUST BE DEPENDENT, AS THE FRG MUST IN ENERGY, IT IS BETTER TO DEPEND ON AN ENEMY YOU CAN PREDICT THAN ONE YOU CANNOT. HE CITED THE RECENT IRAN-IRAQ WAR AS AN INDICATION OF THE GERMAN RISK IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY.

6. AS REGARDS U.S. SANCTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE PIPELINE, VON AMERONGEN NOTED AEG WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE GE ROTORS AND THE FRG CANNOT UNDERCUT U.S. SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT SUPPLY THE NECESSARY PARTS. HOWEVER, AEG WILL LOOK FOR A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT SINCE WITHOUT THIS 700 MILLION MARK ORDER THE COMPANY IS LIKELY TO GO BANKRUPT. IN ANY CASE, THE SANCTIONS MAY ONLY DELAY THE PROJECT AND VON AMERONGEN REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEANS, WILL NOT DROP THEIR INTEREST IN THE PROJECT. HE CITED THE POLITICAL DANGER WHICH CONTINUED U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE PIPELINE PROJECT IMPLIES AND

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NOTED THAT A RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL IN THE FRG SHOWED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THOSE POLLED WERE IN FAVOR OF

THE PIPELINE PROJECT. HE ALSO ARGUED AGAINST FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS WHO OPPOSED THE PROJECT AND ADVISED BREAKING THE CONTRACT. VON AMERONGEN RECALLED THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE 1960'S PIPE SALE DEAL TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THE FRG BROKE AT U.S. INSISTENCE. HE CLAIMED THAT IMMEDIATE REACTION HAD BEEN TO POINT TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE GERMANS TO SUPPLY CONTRACTED MATERIALS.

7. UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL THANKED VON AMERONGEN FOR HIS VIEWS WHICH REFLECT ACCURATELY REPORTS OF VIEWS WE HAVE SEEN FROM THE FRG. HE ASSURED VON AMERONGEN THAT THOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS THE U.S. CONSIDERS ITS POLICY OPTIONS. HOWEVER, STOESSEL TOLD VON AMERONGEN THAT THE USG CONTINUES TO HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THIS PROJECT AND FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN THE SITUATION IN POLAND,

CONTINUATION ON THIS PROJECT WILL SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION. STOESSEL WELCOMED THE FRG BUSINESSMEN'S SUPPORT FOR A TIGHTENED AND LENGTHENED COCOM LIST TO ELIMINATE GREY AREAS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO EARLY MOVEMENT ON THAT FRONT. STOESSEL ALSO ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT DESPITE THE ECONOMIC COST TO CERTAIN SECTORS THE USG FELT IT NECESSARY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON DECEMBER 29 TO GIVE WEIGHT TO U.S. POLICY STATEMENTS DURING THE POLISH CRISIS. WE FULLY EXPECT THE ALLIES TO ACT ALSO AND WE HOPE THEY PURSUE THEIR OWN SANCTIONS AGAINST BOTH POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION SHORTLY. AMBASSADOR HERMES REPLIED TO STOESSEL THAT THE FRG IS PREPARING ITS POSITION FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON FEBRUARY 3 TO ADDRESS THOSE U.S. CONCERNS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME PRESENTATION, [redacted]

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY HORMATS MADE CLEAR TO VON AMERONGEN THAT THE U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERCUT BY THE EUROPEANS. HE ASKED WHETHER FRG BUSINESSMEN WOULD FOLLOW THE U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY, AS IN THE CASE WHERE THE U.S. HAS DENIED LICENSES FOR COMPANIES SUPPLYING PARTS TO THE PIPELINE. VON AMERONGEN ARGUED THAT FRG BUSINESSMEN PREFER MULTILATERAL CONTROLS LIKE COCOM RATHER THAN NATIONAL CONTROLS AND, IN FACT, HE HAS CALLED FOR THE ABOLITION OF NATIONAL CONTROLS IN SUCH CASES. VON AMERONGEN DEFINED UNDERCUTTING BY CITING THE ARMCO STEEL PROJECT DURING THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS WHERE THE FRG DID NOT SEEK TO TAKE OVER THIS PROJECT FROM THE U.S. CONTRACTOR. COMMENT: HE DID NOT MENTION THE ALCOA ALUMINUM DEAL, IN WHICH KLOECKNER REPLACED THE U.S. PARTNER, AT LEAST IN OUR VIEW. END COMMENT. HE ALSO REITERATED THE FRG INABILITY TO

SUPPLY ROTORS TO REPLACE GENERAL ELECTRIC IN THE CASE OF THE PIPELINE PROJECT. HOWEVER, IN REPLY TO HORMATS DIRECT QUESTION ON SUBCONTRACTING, VON AMERONGEN BELIEVED THAT MANNESMANN WILL NOT PRESS AEG TO FULFILL ITS CONTRACTS; HOWEVER, AEG, GIVEN ITS FINANCIAL CONDITION, MUST SEEK TO FIND REPLACEMENT SUPPLIES FOR THE GENERAL ELECTRIC ROTORS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE U.S. ACTION WILL HAVE A HEAVY POLITICAL COST AS REGARDS THE ATTITUDES OF GERMAN BUSINESSMEN TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

9. HORMATS CALLED ON THE FRG TO CONSIDER AGAIN DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE AND MORE RELIABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY THAN SOVIET SOURCES. HE WARNED THAT DEPENDENCE IS INDEED A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THAT IT IS MORE DIFFICULT

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TO AFFECT SHORTAGES OF GAS AS OPPOSED TO OIL; DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS OF THE GAS ARE TOO HEAVILY FOCUSED ON RESIDENTIAL AREAS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE PIPELINE PROJECT MAY LEAD THE PUBLIC TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE FRG AND LIMIT FRG FLEXIBILITY IN POLICY MAKING. HORMATS ENVISIONED RESTRAINTS ON FRG POLICY OPTIONS IF SUCH OPTIONS JEOPARDIZED THE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS FROM THE USSR. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET HARD CURRENCY GAINS FROM THIS PROJECT WILL ALLOW THEM TO PURCHASE ABROAD NEEDED HIGH TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE U.S. AND THE FRG MUST SPEND MORE IN THEIR OWN MILITARY PROGRAMS TO COUNTE, THIS ADDITIONAL MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. VON AMERONGEN REPLIED WITH SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ARGUMENTS USED WITH STOESSEL BUT WAS CONCERNED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS OPPOSED TO ANY NEW SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD GAIN. HORMATS REPLIED THAT THE U.S. IS NOT AIMING AT CUTTING OFF ALL EAST-WEST TRADE, BUT THAT THIS PROJECT CREATES A SPECIAL PROBLEM IN ITS MAGNITUDE AND IN ITS ELEMENT OF DEPENDENCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM THROUGH STRENGTHENED COOPERATION COUPLED WITH CLEAR SIGNALS TO THE SOVIET UNION INCLUDING ACTION IN COCOM, INCREASING THE COST OF CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION (AS IS BEING SUGGESTED IN OECD,, HIGHER TARIFFS ON SOVIET EXPORTS, RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITY, AND REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION. VON AMERONGEN RETURNED TO HIS ARGUMENT OF WHETHER THE WEST COULD PUNISH THE SOVIETS AND EXPRESSED HIS SUSPICION THAT EVEN IF THE DEMANDS OF SOLIDARITY HAD OEEN COMPLETELY FULFILLED,THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN POLAND WOULD HAVE BEEN JUST AS GREAT. HORMATS REJOINED THAT OUR READING OF THE ECONOMIC

SITUATION IN POLAND SHORTLY BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS THAT STABILITY WAS BEGINNING TO RETURN, PRODUCTION ESPECIALLY IN THE COAL MINES WAS

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INCREASING AND THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY WERE BETTER THAN THEY HAD BEEN. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WILL NOT WORK TO RESTORE ECONOMIC VIABILITY IN POLAND.

10. EUR/DAS NILES, IN RESPONSE TO VON AMERONGEN'S CLAIM THAT THE POLISH SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, REJECTED HIS ANALYSIS THAT MARTIAL LAW WAS INEVITABLE. NILES RELAYED TO VON AMERONGEN THE KEY ASPECTS OF OUR ANALYSIS INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING: BEFORE DECEMBER 13, 1981THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS NOT INEVITABLY HEADED FOR DISASTER. THERE HAD BEEN

VIRTUALLY NO STRIKES IN INDUSTRY, PRODUCTION WAS INCREASING (COAL MINING WAS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN MONTHS;, THERE WAS NO CHAOS, THE DISCIPLINE AND MORALE OF THE WORKERS WAS AT A HIGH LEVEL; SERIOUS PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED PRIMARILY IN SUPPLY OF KEY COMPONENTS AND PARTS. NILES ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH SOLIDARITY HAD PLANNED A STRIKE FOR DECEMBER 17. THEIR PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED GENERAL STRIKES HAD NOT COME TO PASS. VON AMERONGEN REJOINED BY REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH POLISH VICE PREMIER RAKOWSKI WHO HAD SHOWN HIM A NEWSPAPER LIST OF STRIKES APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS BEFORE DECEMBER 13. THE LIST WAS IMPRESSIVELY LONG, ALTHOUGH IN POLISH WHICH AMERONGEN DOESN'T READ. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THE POLES MUST HAVE INFORMED AND CLEARED IT WITH THE SOVIETS. HE BELIEVED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR THE POLISH LEADERSHIP. NILES

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RESPONDED THAT THE SELF-JUSITIFICATION OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP FOR ITS IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW MUST BE COUNTERED AND THAT WE HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PREPARATIONS FOR THIS MILITARY ACTION HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR MANY MONTHS WITH FULL SOVIET PARTICIPATION. HE NOTED THAT THE SPEED AND EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH THE POLISH ARMY TOOK OVER DECEMBER 13 ALSO SUGGESTS THAT SUCH ACTION WAS PLANNED AND EXECUTED WITH SOVIET KNOWLEDGE AND INFLUENCE.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFO 03 VICE 02)

GENEVA USINF DELEGATION

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/14/88 (BARKLEY, RICHARD C.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, INF, EEWT, ENRG, GE
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S JANUARY 14 BUNDESTAG
-- SPEECH: ALL TOGETHER NOW

1. [redacted] SUMMARY: IN A STORMY BUNDESTAG SESSION HELMUT SCHMIDT REVIEWED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON POLAND SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. HE DESCRIBED BONN, WASHINGTON AND PARIS AS IN ACCORD, BOTH IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND IN HOW EACH SHOULD

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REACT TO IT. THERE WAS ALSO NO SIGN OF WAVERING FROM THE TONE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH SCHMIDT STRUCK IN WASHINGTON. SPEAKING FOR THE OPPOSITION, HELMUT KOHL CASTIGATED SPD AND FDP POLICY AND SCHMIDT IN PARTICULAR AS CONTRIBUTING TO A SERIOUS LACK OF CREDIBILITY AMONG THE FRG'S CLOSEST ALLIES.
END SUMMARY.

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2. (U) HELMUT SCHMIDT, IN HIS JANUARY 14 ADDRESS TO THE BUNDESTAG. STRONGLY DEFENDED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT STANCE ON POLAND, EMPHASIZING THE BROAD AGREEMENT HE HAS REACHED WITH PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND MITTERRAND.

3.(J)DECLARING THAT " WE ARE NO WANDERERS BETWEEN TWO WORLDS," SCHMIDT BITTERLY ACCUSED THE OPPOSITION OF UNWITTINGLY ASSISTING SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS IN ATTEMPTING TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE NATO ALLIES. HE SHARPLY CRITICIZED RECENT CDU STATEMENTS FOR SOWING THE SEEDS OF DISHARMONY, AND LINKED CDU CRITICISM TO NAZI-STYLE ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLES AND RUSSIANS ONCE AGAIN BEING HEARD IN THE FRG. (THIS COMMENT TOUCHED OFF A TWO-MINUTE CHORUS OF BOOING FROM THE CDU/CSU.)

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4.(U)THE CHANCELLOR NOTED THAT THE BUNDESTAG, WITH ITS DECEMBER 18 RESOLUTION ON POLAND, WAS THE FIRST PARLIAMENT IN THE WORLD TO REGISTER ITS GRIEVANCES AGAINST IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. HE APPLAUDED THE GERMAN PEOPLE'S SPONTANEOUS EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE THROUGH

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THE MILLIONS OF PACKAGES THUS FAR SENT TO POLAND AND WHICH CONTINUE AT THE RATE OF OVER 10,000 PER DAY. SCHMIDT STRESSED THE BROAD UNITY OF VIEWS ON THE POLISH SITUATION SHARED WITH PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND MITTERRAND IN THEIR RECENT PRIVATE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND PARIS, AND ATTEMPTED TO DEBUNK MEDIA REPORTS THAT FRG VIEWS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THE OTHER ALLIANCE PARTNERS.

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5.(U)SCHMIDT STRESSED THREE THEMES ON WHICH HE FOUND HIMSELF IN FULL ACCORD WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

-- INF. SCHMIDT WELCOMED U.S. READINESS TO PROCEED WITH INF TALKS, AND QUOTED THE US-FRG DECLARATION THAT ARMS CONTROL IS AN "INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT OF OUR COMMON SECURITY POLICY." HE RECALLED HIS SUPPORT FOR AND IDENTIFICATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOVEMBER 18 PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AS EVIDENCE OF US DEVOTION TO INF ARMS CONTROL, THE CHANCELLOR NOTED THAT THE TALKS ONCE AGAIN GOT UNDER WAY IN GENEVA TWO DAYS AGO.

-- CSCE. SCHMIDT STRESSED THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT "PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT BASIS FOR OUR DEMAND THAT THE PRESENT POLISH REGIME RETURN TO THE COURSE OF REFORM. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NOT A QUESTION

OF MEDDLING IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
RATHER, THE CSCE SIGNATORY STATES -- INCLUDING
THE SOVIET UNION* -- EXPRESSLY ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT
THE CSCE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE IN MADRID SHOULD ASSESS
CSCE-RELATED CONSEQUENCES IN THE SIGNATORY STATES.
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I AGREE COMPLETELY THAT THE
CRISIS IN AND AROUND POLAND MUST BE THE OBJECT OF
THOROUGH DELIBERATIONS IN MADRID AT A MEETING
OF MINISTERS."

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CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
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AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION 02 OF 03 VICE 02 OF 02)

-- DIALOGUE. "JUST AS WE DO, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDER THAT PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF CRISIS IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ONE ANOTHER TO STAY IN CONTACT. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MY EXPERIENCES IN CONVERSING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN BONN, I ARGUED FOR A MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY AT THE RIGHT MOMENT (ZUM RECHTEN ZEITPUNKT). FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN OUR GERMAN-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS IS THE ABILITY OF THE TWO WORLD POWERS TO ASSESS EACH OTHER CORRECTLY IN THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT."

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7.(U) SCHMIDT WAS NONCOMMITTAL ON SANCTIONS, NOTING THAT HIS "AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS EXPLAINED THAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR MEASURES OF DECEMBER 29 AS A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE CONTINUING SUPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND RIGHTS TO FREEDOM IN POLAND HAS FAR-REACHING (SCHWERWIEGENDE) CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. I AGREED WITH THIS INTERPRETATION." SCHMIDT ALSO NOTED, IN LANGUAGE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL

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TO THAT OF THE DECEMBER 18 BUNDESTAG JOINT RESOLUTIOTHAT "THE FRG WILL SUSPEND (OFFE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AID TO POLAND AS LONG AS THE OPPRESSIVE MEASURES CONTINUE." SCHMIDT RECALLED THAT IN THE RECENT PAST -- E.G., IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN -- WHEN THE FRG EVENTUALLY DID DECIDE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS, IT STUCK TO THEM.

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8.(U) SCHMIDT DEFENDED HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HE ALSO POINTED TO THE COMMON HERITAGE AND VALUES OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, AND REFERRED TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS WHICH SHOW THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GERMANS SUPPORT FRG PARTICIPATION IN NATO AND THE DOUBLE DECISION, BUT ALSO THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF DETENTE. HE ALSO ROUNDLY CRITICIZED CERTAIN SEGMENTS OF THE GERMAN "PEACE MOVEMENT" FOR FINDING SS-20'S TARGETED ON THE FRG LESS DANGEROUS THAN US MISSILES WHICH DO NOT YET EXIST, AND FOR FAILING TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND: "PEOPLE WHO PROTEST AT HIGH VOLUME AGAINST THE WEST, BUT HAVEN'T A SINGLE WORD AND DO NOT DEMONSTRATE FOR PEOPLE IN POLAND,MAKE NO CONVINCING IMPRESSION ON ME, EITHER MORAL OR POLITICAL."

[redacted]

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9. (U) IN AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE, CDU CHAIRMAN HELMUT KOHL BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS THANKS TO GERMAN CITIZENS WHO HAD RESPONDED MASSIVELY TO POLISH NEEDS. HE CONTRASTED THIS TO THE "WEAKNESS AND OPPORTUNISM" OF THE CHANCELLOR'S POLICIES IN RECENT MONTHS: "ALL YOU CAN DO IS RESPOND WITH NAKED AGGRESSIVENESS." KOHL CHARACTERIZED SCHMIDT'S POLICY AS A MIXTURE OF "HUBRIS AND WEAKNESS." THE HUBRIS, HE ASSERTED, WAS SEEN IN THE EFFORT TO EQUATE ATTACKS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY WITH ATTACKS ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THE AGGRESSIVITY, KOHL WENT ON, WAS DEMONSTRATED IN SCHMIDT'S IMPLIED CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM AND LETTERS TO THE CHANCELLOR FROM OLD NAZIS. KOHL: "WE'VE HEARD THIS MELODY AND TEXT FOR YEARS -- NO PARTICULARLY DEPUTY HELMUT SCHMIDT, SHOULD SAY SUCH THINGS." STRONG CDU/CSU APPLAUSE FOLLOWED THIS STATEMENT.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
USNMR SHAPE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA

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10. (U) KOHL CONTINUED IN THE SAME VEIN, STANDING UP FOR FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS, WHOM SCHMIDT HAD ATTACKED DIRECTLY: "I DON'T HAVE TO ASK WHERE (STRAUSS) STOOD ON JULY 20, 1944." KOHL RECALLED THAT AT A BUNDESTAG DEBATE LAST FALL HE HAD DEFENDED SCHMIDT AGAINST ATTACKS BY MENACHEM BEGIN. SCHMIDT WAS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE, KOHL DECLARED, FOR HIM TO CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR. "NEVER HAS A CHANCELLOR CONTRIBUTED SO LITTLE TO DOMESTIC PEACE." DESCRIBING THE LAST FOUR WEEKS AS A TRAGEDY FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, FOR WHICH THE SPD IS RESPONSIBLE, KOHL PORTRAYED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AS SITTING BETWEEN TWO CHAIRS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE ANTI-GERMAN FEELINGS WHICH SCHMIDT'S POLICIES

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HAVE ALLEGEDLY AROUSED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND DECLARED THAT GERMANS HAVE LOST MUCH OF THE TRUST PAINFULLY WON OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS.

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11. (U) THE PROBLEM, KOHL ASSERTED, IS NOT HELMUT SCHMIDT, BUT HOW THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC GOES ON FROM HERE. HE RECALLED THREE INSTANCES IN THE PAST THIRTY DAYS WHEN THE CHANCELLOR HAS BEEN CAUGHT

SHORT: FIRST, WHEN SCHMIDT DESCRIBED HIMSELF, AFTER HIS CONVERSATION WITH ERICH HONECKER, AS JUST AS UPSET AS HONECKER HIMSELF THAT THE POLISH CRACK-DOWN HAD BEEN "NECESSARY;" SECOND, WHEN SCHMIDT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN BECKER HAD DECLARED ON DECEMBER 30 THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE THE U.S. ASSESSMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOOD BEHIND POLISH EVENTS; AND THIRD, WHEN SCHMIDT, IN A RECENT NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW, HAD LINKED POLISH EVENTS TO YALTA. KOHL ASKED THE CHANCELLOR HOW, IN VIEW OF THE GERMAN ROLE IN POLAND'S FATE, HE COULD REFER TO YALTA. "I WOULD EXPECT A MINIMUM OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING FROM THE CHANCELLOR." TO CITE YALTA, KOHL WENT ON, COULD ONLY LEAD TO IMMEDIATE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO APPLAUSE FROM MOSCOW. THE MAIN POINT, KOHL SUMMED UP, IS THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS BEING HURT BY CRITICISM FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, PEOPLE AND THE PRESS. "YOU ARE GUILTY BEFORE THE GERMAN PEOPLE."

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12. [redacted] COMMENT: TODAY'S BUNDESTAG DEBATE, WHICH PROMISES TO DRAG ON LATE INTO THE EVENING, WILL GO DOWN AS ONE OF THE STORMIEST, MOST PERSONAL AND MOST VITUPERATIVE

[redacted]

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IN RECENT MEMORY. IN SUM, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT PRESENTED A CAREFUL AND THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, WITH A STRESS ON THE COMMON BONDS LINKING BONN TO ITS WESTERN ALLIANCE PARTNERS AND TO WASHINGTON IN PARTICULAR. THE SUBSTANCE OF SCHMIDT'S SPEECH WAS RIGHT, BUT THE TONE -- PARTI-CULARLY THE DRAGGING UP OF OLD NAZI-RELATED GHOSTS -- WAS AT TIMES UNFORTUNATE. THE EXPLANATION APPEARS TO LIE IN SCHMIDT'S PERCEIVED NEED TO PUT THE OPPOSITION ON THE FOREIGN POLICY DEFENSIVE AND CREATE FOR HIMSELF THE BROADEST POSSIBLE ROOM FOR MANUEVER. END COMMENT. BURNS

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A POSSIBLE STATEMENT OF US POLICY RELATING TO NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

The Proposal

On an appropriate occasion, a high level US official might include in his remarks a statement along the following lines:

"In some regions of the world, the question of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from other questions affecting the military security of the states concerned. The United States does not regard this as a satisfactory situation, and we shall continue the search for arrangements that will better serve the security of all. But while seeking such arrangements, we shall continue, in light of the wishes of our friends and allies, to view the presence or availability of our nuclear and non-nuclear forces as one means of discouraging the misuse of the military power others may possess.

"There are other regions of the world where the emplacement of nuclear weapons could have disruptive rather than stabilizing effects. Therefore, to avoid any misapprehensions or misunderstandings, I wish to make it clear that the United States has no intention of stationing nuclear weapons on the Continent of Africa, in the territory of the Arab States or Israel, or in the territory of our friends and neighbors the Latin American Republics. We do not station nuclear weapons in the countries in these regions today, and we do not plan to station them there in the future.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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"We would commend this policy to other nuclear powers, whose adoption of a different course would clearly have disruptive effects. Similarly, we would encourage non-nuclear states in these regions, as well as others, to refrain from seeking nuclear weapons of their own since such a course could interrupt progress toward a sound basis for preaceful relations among states within and outside these regions.

"The differences among the several regions of the world insofar as the question of nuclear weapons is concerned should not be interpreted as meaning that one part of the world must live constantly under the threat of nuclear war. In the view of the United States, there has occurred in recent years significant progress in relations among the major nuclear powers. And while meaningful and effective ways are sought to diminish both the incentive and capacity for war, there is no reason why the threat of war should not itself diminish if states will act responsibly and with due regard for the rights of others."

Interpretative Comments

1. The statement would be made on a unilateral basis and could be modified or revoked in whole or in part should need arise. Two loopholes are provided. The third paragraph has the effect of making our own policy

contingent at least in part on what others may do with respect to introducing nuclear weapons into the regions involved. The first paragraph could also provide a basis for changing our policy if one of the regions should, for some reason that cannot now be foreseen, become an area where "the question of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from other questions..."

2. The terms "emplacement" and "stationing" are intended to exclude "transport and transit" (whether they would have the desired effect is considered in the "Discussion" section below). The US does not at this time have nuclear weapons stationed in the countries that would be covered under this policy.

3. Reference to the "Continent of Africa" is largely self-explanatory. Nearby islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans except for Madagascar, would not be covered.

4. The "Arab States" comprise more of a political than geographic unit. The term would cover states associated with the Arab League and the Arab "Summit" meetings. Reference to "the Arab States and Israel" would tend to focus geographically on the UAR, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Greece, Turkey, and Iran would not be covered by this terminology.

5. The term "Latin American Republics" would, of course, exclude Puerto Rico. The Panama Canal Zone is more troublesome. If necessary we might construe "territory" in the legal sense of "territory under the jurisdiction and control" of another state, the Canal Zone being under

our own jurisdiction and control. The problem here would not be transit but such possibilities as the stationing of air defense weapons in the Canal Zone itself. If that particular problem should arise, we might need to make an exception (tacit or otherwise) to our general policy.

Discussion

1. There are two questions that always need to be asked about proposals of this character: first, what benefits the US would derive; and second, whether there are disadvantages which might outweigh these benefits. In the present instance, the benefits are probably marginal, and the disadvantages, problematical.

2. In a broad sense, the proposed statement ought to convey to others a sense of responsibility on the part of the US as well as an impression of our desire to be responsive to the concern expressed by a majority of countries in several regions of the Southern Hemisphere respecting the possibility that they might become targets in a nuclear conflict. The statement might assist in undercutting efforts by some countries in these areas to secure the adoption of arrangements which would adversely affect our interests, and it might to an extent strengthen our ability to retain some non-nuclear installations we now have in these areas. The approach would be consistent with our position on non-proliferation and would, in particular, put some pressure on Israel and the UAR. It would not have much direct bearing on US-Soviet relations but could conceivably have some precedental value if Cuba-type operations should tempt the Soviet

Union (or Communist China) at a future time. In this connection, it is worth noting that we would retain our own forward deployment while providing ourselves with an additional basis for arguing against changes in the status quo by others.

3. There is a question, however, whether the US should take the initiative or whether we would not do better to let matters take their course. Although the regions involved have been vocal enough in expressing their concerns, they have not yet shown a capacity for effective action. If we precipitate the matter, we may find the transit issue, in particular, both an embarrassment to us politically and a hazard to the flexibility of our forces. The statement could also have the effect of generating similar proposals for other regions where we could not today accept limitations similar to those outlined—in the statement, for example in the Far East or the Indian Ocean Area.

4. On balance, the view adopted in this paper is that during a period when major steps in arms control do not seem to be in the cards and when the US is seeking to influence the course followed by the developing nations, a gesture of this type, which may mean a great deal to the countries directly involved, would be useful. If we cannot find ways of working out the transit problem against the background of the assurances provided in the proposed statement, we shall probably not work it out at all. In this regard, the statement would give us (and our friends in these regions) a reasonable basis on which to take our stand.

5. As a unilateral expression of policy, the statement could, if necessary, be modified or revised. Although there might be political difficulties in doing so, they could probably be overcome in any really urgent case. Meanwhile, there is no reason for the US to appear insensitive to the concerns that have been expressed. On the contrary, we would serve our over-all interests best by taking the initiative rather than by acquiescing reluctantly in some future arrangement we might not like but could not oppose. Perhaps most importantly, there is much merit in making clear that the East-West struggle as it applies to these regions is not a nuclear struggle and need not become one.

6. It is not unlikely that the proposed statement would lead to some intensification of proposals that similar arrangements be applied to other regions. However, there have already been a number of such proposals, and we shall undoubtedly see more in the future whatever we may do. But a number of countries in other regions do not favor such proposals, and we would have substantial support for limiting our policy to the three regions that would be specified. The last paragraph of the proposed statement is, of course, intended to strengthen our hand in fending off limitations in regions where we and our friends and allies do not want them.

7. Prior consultation with certain of our friends and allies (in particular, the UK, FRG, Australia, and certain of the Latin American countries) would be desirable. The Soviets can always out-bid us on proposals of this character, and negotiations with the Soviet Union would not be useful. However, consideration might be given to notifying the

Soviet Union immediately in advance of the statement or to calling their attention after it has been made.

8. Finally, it may be tactically wiser to make separate declarations, e.g., with respect to the Continent of Africa at the time of UNGA debate on the African denuclearization resolution.

Department of State
December 11, 1964

PRIORITY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, ETRD, CU, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA
INCREASINGLY IN SPOTLIGHT

REF: MOSCOW 5654

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. IN RECENT WEEKS, SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF WHAT INCREASINGLY APPEARS TO BE A VIRTUAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN, WITH THE FIRST EVER PUBLICATION OF DETAILED STATISTICS ON CUBA'S DEBT TO THE U.S.S.R., AND OTHER ARTICLES DESCRIBING THE SOVIET-CUBAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP AND DEMANDING OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE. THESE DEVELOPMENTS, ALONG WITH A REPORTED COMMENT BY ONE MEMBER OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT "CASTRO IS FINISHED," SUGGEST THAT AT LEAST SOME ELEMENTS HERE ARE MAKING A STRONG PUSH FOR MOSCOW TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE CUBAN REGIME. END SUMMARY.

3. IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE, THE MARCH 1 ISSUE OF "IZVESTIYA" PRINTED A DETAILED CHART OF FOREIGN DEBT OWED TO THE SOVIET UNION. UNSUPRISINGLY, LEADING THE LIST OF DEBTOR COUNTRIES WAS CUBA, WHOSE 15 AND A HALF BILLION RUBLE DEBT WAS MORE THAN 50 PER CENT LARGER THAN THAT OF THE NEAREST COMPETITOR, VIETNAM. THE STATISTICS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A COMMENTARY POINTING OUT THAT SUCH DEBTS WERE A NORMAL PART OF WORLD TRADE AND FULLY ACCEPTABLE WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS. HOWEVER, PUBLICATION OF SUCH MATERIAL CAN ONLY FUEL THE GROWING DEBATE HERE OVER SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA.

4. SOVIET AID TO CUBA WAS THE SUBJECT OF A MAJOR ARTICLE IN THE FEBRUARY 7 ISSUE OF THE LIBERAL WEEKLY "OGONYOK" (FEBRUARY 7) (REFTEL), AND, JUST A WEEK LATER, OF ANOTHER ARTICLE IN THE MAGAZINE "NEW TIMES." THE "NEW TIMES" PIECE, AFTER POINTING OUT THAT THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA IS UNBALANCED--WITH THE CUBANS REQUIRING NEARLY A BILLION RUBLES IN CREDITS ANNUALLY TO PAY FOR SOVIET IMPORTS--NOTES THAT THE CUBANS, DESPITE THEIR CONTINUAL EXPRESSIONS OF GRATITUDE FOR SUCH SUPPORT, "CONSIDER OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP NOT SO MUCH AS AID, BUT AS COOPERATION ON A JUST BASIS BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED AND UNDERDEVELOPED WORLDS." IN HIS MOST TELLING POINT, THE AUTHOR ADDS THAT

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THIS IS ALL WELL AND GOOD, BUT FOR THE FACT THAT THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE U.S.S.R. COULD PERHAPS MORE APTLY BE COMPARED TO THAT OF CUBA ITSELF RATHER THAN TO THE "DEVELOPED WORLD." HE NOTES THAT THE AVERAGE LIFESPAN IN CUBA IS TEN YEARS LONGER, AND THE INFANT MORTALITY RATE SEVERAL TIMES LESS, THAN IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA.

5. THE MARCH 3 EDITION OF "KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA" CARRIES A LENGTHY ARTICLE BY ITS NEW HAVANA CORRESPONDENT, ALEKSEY NOVIKOV, CONCERNING CUBA'S EXTREME STATE OF MILITARY READINESS, AND CASTRO'S GROWING PARANOIA ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIALIST CAMP. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT ONE FACTOR BEHIND CASTRO'S "FIGHT TO THE DEATH" RHETORIC IS THAT "IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND EVEN IN THE U.S.S.R., MORE AND MORE OFTEN VOICES ARE HEARD DEMANDING A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF CURRENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA."

6. SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, IN A CONVERSATION SHORTLY AFTER THE NICARAGUAN ELECTION, REPORTEDLY TOLD A WESTERN AMBASSADOR HERE THAT "CASTRO IS FINISHED." THIRD WORLD EXPERT NODARI SIMONIYA OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHO MAINTAINS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS INCREASINGLY COMING AROUND TO "NEW THINKING," I.E., CRITICAL, VIEWS ON CASTRO, PREDICTED TO POLOFF THAT THE NICARAGUAN DEVELOPMENTS WOULD INEVITABLY FORCE CHANGES IN CUBA, BECAUSE "SUCH A SMALL COUNTRY CAN NOT POSSIBLY REMAIN ISOLATED FROM WORLD TRENDS."

7. COMMENT: AS NOTED IN REFTEL, A GRADUAL SOVIET DISENGAGEMENT FROM CUBA SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAN A SUDDEN "ABANDONMENT" OF CASTRO. THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT AT LEAST SOME ELEMENTS HERE ARE MAKING A STRONG PUSH FOR MOSCOW TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE CUBAN REGIME MORE QUICKLY.

MATLOCK

Dan, when are we meeting with Geo. Gedda?

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ARA/NEA REARCS

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APPROVED BY: EUR:CKAMMAN
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S/S: JSROY S/S-O:JMUSSOMELI
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
INFO ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 0000
CIA WASHDC 0000
SECDEF WASHDC 0000

[redacted] STATE 047333

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL

REF: (A) STATE 46079
(B) STATE 46017

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ALL ADDRESSEES -- EXCEPT NATO POSTS, CANBERRA, SEOUL AND TOKYO (WHICH SHOULD USE SEPTEL TALKING POINTS) -- MAY DRAW ON POINTS IN PARA 3 AS APPROPRIATE TO BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON FEBRUARY 7-9 MOSCOW MINISTERIAL. ADDRESSEES MAY ALSO DRAW ON JOINT STATEMENT (REF A) AND JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (REF B).

3. BEGIN TEXT MINISTERIAL TALKING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

O WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV MET IN MALTA, THEY DEFINED CERTAIN GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WITH A PARTICULAR VIEW TOWARD THE JUNE SUMMIT.

-- THE OVERARCHING AIM, IN THIS TIME OF TRANSFORMATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IS TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

O THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL STEP IN LAYING THE GROUND FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE LEADERS IN JUNE.

O THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE REVIEWED THE FULL AGENDA OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

-- WHILE NOTING THAT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON CERTAIN ISSUES, THEY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THEY HAD A GOOD AND WORTHWHILE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND RECORDED CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS.

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

O THE MINISTERIAL FOLLOWED AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE: THE FEBRUARY 5-7 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.

-- THOUGH BESET BY DIFFICULT CHALLENGES -- A STUMBLING ECONOMY, SEPARATISM IN THE BALTICS, SHARP INTERETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE CAUCASUS -- GORBACHEV SEEMS DETERMINED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH PERESTROYKA AND INTRODUCE A NEW DYNAMISM INTO SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE.

O BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT PERESTROYKA HAD REACHED A POINT REQUIRING DECISIVE ACTION, AND THEY INDICATED THAT THE PLENUM WOULD BE THE START OF A NEW PUSH TO RADICALIZE THE REFORM PROCESS.

ARMS CONTROL

O THE MINISTERS, ASSISTED BY EXPERTS, HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE ON THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.

O IN TWO DAYS OF VIRTUALLY ROUND-THE-CLOCK NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE OR CLOSE WITHIN ONE OR TWO ISSUES ON SUCH MAJOR START ISSUES AS ALCMS, SLCMS, AND NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES.

O THE SECRETARY TOOK TO MOSCOW A PACKAGE ON ALCMS THAT INVOLVED A NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

-- FOR COUNTING ALCMS WITHIN THE 6000 LIMIT, OUR PREVIOUS POSITION WOULD HAVE ATTRIBUTED TEN TO EACH BOMBER EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS. IN MOSCOW WE PROPOSED A DIFFERENTIATED COUNTING RULE UNDER WHICH B-52S, B-1S AND FUTURE BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH TEN, WHILE TU-95 BEAR H AND TU-160 BLACKJACK BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH EIGHT.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT NO BOMBER MAY BE CONFIGUED TO CARRY MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY ALCMS AS THE NUMBER ATTRIBUTED TO IT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE B-52 COULD CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THIS WOULD BE VERIFIED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE SOVIETS PROPOSED.

-- AND WE PROPOSED TO MOVE ON THE RANGE THRESHOLD BY LOWERING OUR PROPOSAL FROM 1500 TO 1000 KILOMETERS.

O IN TWO DAYS OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ALL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD.

O AS FOR SLCMS, WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DRAFT OF THE TYPE OF SLCM DECLARATION THAT WE HAVE IN MIND, UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD ANNUALLY DECLARE ITS NUCLEAR SLCM PLANS FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

-- THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN, GAVE US A SLCM DECLARATION OF THEIR OWN. WE WERE THEN ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL ISSUES EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD AND THE QUESTION WHETHER ONLY NUCLEAR OR BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS ARE INCLUDED. THIS DECLARATORY APPROACH IS BASED ON A POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WE FELT WOULD

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BE INEFFECTIVE AND UNWORKABLE.

-- THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN GENEVA.

O ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, WE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NON-DEPLOYLD MISSILES WOULD BE PERMITTED NEAR DEPLOYMENT AREAS ONLY IN AGREED VERY SMALL NUMBERS, WITH ALL OTHERS CONFINED TO DECLARED FACILITIES SOME DISTANCE AWAY.

-- AND WE AGREED THAT ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL LIMITS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES OF TYPES FLIGHT-TESTED FROM MOBILE LAUNCHERS.

O THE SIDES ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING DATA DENIAL UNDER THE START TREATY.

O WE ADVANCED NEW IDEAS ON OTHER START ISSUES AS WELL, INCLUDING ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION, TREATY DURATION AND PHASING OF REDUCTIONS.

O WHILE COMPLEX ISSUES REMAIN, WE ARE MOVING FORWARD TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF HAVING THE SUBSTANTIVE START ISSUES RESOLVED BY THE JUNE SUMMIT.

O THE MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE AND SPACE.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD BE INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING PREDICTABILITY MEASURES SHORTLY IN GENEVA.

-- THE SOVIETS REPEATED THEIR CALL FOR AN AGREED START STATEMENT THAT AN ABM TREATY VIOLATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START. HOWEVER, IN AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT THAT CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DELINKED START FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE, THEY STATED THIS WAS A PREFERENCE -- NOT A PRECONDITION -- FOR A START ACCORD.

O ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SECRETARY PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO MOVE FORWARD ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CW ARMS CONTROL.

O THE SOVIETS AGREED TO A GENERAL FRAMEWORK, WHICH WAS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP IN U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON CW ARMS CONTROL, AND SHOULD GIVE A MAJOR STIMULUS TO BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE MOVING FROM THE REALM OF WORDS TO ACTION.

O WE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS, RESOLVED SEVERAL ISSUES, AND REAFFIRMED THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE TTBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS READY FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT.

O ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT

NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE AMONG THE 23, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR RECENT INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT (THIS WAS THE SAME DAY THAT THEY WERE BEING TABLED IN VIENNA).

-- HE MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. FORCE LEVELS WERE NOT LINKED TO SOVIET LEVELS, THAT 195,000 IN THE CENTRAL ZONE WAS A SUSTAINABLE LEVEL FOR THE U.S., AND THAT SOVIETS COULD WELL CHOOSE TO GO LOWER.

O GORBACHEV PRESENTED THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL, OFFERING A CHOICE OF 225,000 OR 195,000 U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IN EITHER CASE THE LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SHEVARDNADZE HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS NO LONGER INSISTED ON OVERALL NATO-WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LIMITS, AND THAT THEY WOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR LIMITS ON OTHER ALLIES' STATIONED FORCES.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE WOULD CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES ON OUR RESPONSE.

O ON AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO INCLUDE MEDIUM BOMBERS (TU-22, TU-22M, TU-16) BUT NOT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. IN A STEP AWAY FROM OUR NEW PROPOSAL, THEY ALSO PROPOSED:

-- A BASE OF 4700 COMBAT AIRCRAFT;

-- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500 INTERCEPTORS, WITHOUT FREEDOM TO MIX;

-- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500-1600 COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, THIS WOULD TOTAL MORE THAN 2000 MORE AIRCRAFT THAN NATO NOW HAS.

-- WE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

O THE SECRETARY NOTED THE UTILITY OF AN OPEN SKIES REGIME AND URGED SHEVARDNADZE TO WORK TO MAKE THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE A SUCCESS.

-- HE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE RATIONALE FOR THE NATO APPROACH.

-- WE ALSO NOTED THE HUNGARIAN DESIRE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT READY FOR SIGNING THIS SPRING. WE THINK THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT AT THE OUTSIDE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TREATY READY FOR SIGNATURE IN THE FALL.

O THE SIDES DISCUSSED NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTIONS AND AGREED TO PREPARE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE LEADERS A STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES AND CONCRETE STEPS TO CONTROL CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

O ON THE QUESTION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL, THE SOVIETS, IN AN IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENT, INFORMED US OF THEIR READINESS TO ADHERE TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE MTCR, SOMETHING WE HAD LONG SOUGHT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

O REGIONAL ISSUES AGAIN FIGURED PROMINENTLY DURING THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

O THE SECRETARY UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES.

O THE TOP ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS REMAINS AFGHANISTAN.

O THE SECRETARY LAID OUT A DETAILED THREE-PHASE PLAN

INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TOWARD A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AFGHANS AND COMPATIBLE WITH OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTS A DEVELOPMENT OF PREVIOUS U.S. IDEAS, AND AN EFFORT TO TRY TO DEFINE AT LEAST FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES HOW A TRANSITION PROCESS MIGHT UNFOLD.

-- THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN ARE AIMED AT PROMOTING THE PROSPECT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT THAT IS BROAD-BASED, NON-ALIGNED AND AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- AN ESSENTIAL RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE DEPARTURE OF NAJIBULLAH AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES AT SOME POINT IN THE TRANSITION; OTHERWISE, THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT REMAINS REMOTE.

-- ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO REJECT THE NOTION THAT NAJIBULLAH'S PRESENCE REMAINS A REAL OBSTACLE TO PEACE, THEY UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL THROUGH EXPERTS TALKS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

O SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASIZED NAJIBULLAH'S RECENT ELECTION PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO REITERATED A NUMBER OF OLD IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AND PROPOSED A JOINT EFFORT WHEREBY THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS COULD BETTER INFORM THEMSELVES ABOUT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- THE U.S. AGREED TO DISCUSS THE IDEA AT THE NEXT EXPERTS TALKS.

O THE SECRETARY RAISED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS IN THIS REGION. HE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. DESIRE TO SEE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS TAKE ROOT IN THE REGION.

-- IN THIS REGARD, HE HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA AND THEIR RELATION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY AGREED WITH BOTH THESE POINTS.

-- BOTH SIDES PLEDGED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS.

O THE SOVIETS WERE CRITICAL OF THE U.S. ACTION IN PANAMA AND SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE U.S. INVASION. HE REAFFIRMED U.S. INTENTION TO REMOVE ALL REMAINING TROOPS INTRODUCED INTO PANAMA SINCE LAST DECEMBER BY THE END OF THE MONTH. AND HE SUGGESTED THE SOVIETS SEND A FIVE-PERSON SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION TO PANAMA TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES HOW PANAMA HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED.

O ON EL SALVADOR, THE SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FMLN.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS REACHING THE FMLN FROM CUBA AND NICARAGUA.

-- SECRETARY BAKER HIGHLIGHTED, AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AGREED WITH, THE NEED FOR ALL OUTSIDE

SUPPORT TO THE FMLN TO STOP IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO PROMOTE A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

O THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN OVER RECENT MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION, INCLUDING MIG-29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA, WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE ARE CONDUCIVE TO EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION.

-- SHEVARDNADZE SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DELIVERIES AND URGED THE U.S. TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

O SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE ASIA SINCE WE HAD NOT HAD THE TIME TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN MALTA.

O THE DISCUSSION ON ASIA INCLUDED USEFUL EXCHANGES ON THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE REGION; THE U.S. URGED THAT THE GENERAL EASING OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS NOT BYPASS THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION.

O THE SECRETARY POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND URGED MOSCOW TO TAKE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WITH JAPAN -- AN ITEM WHICH REMAINS A STUMBLING BLOCK IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- HE SAID THE U.S. AGREED WITH JAPAN ON THIS ISSUE AND BELIEVED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENED TENSIONS IN THE REGION AT LARGE.

-- ALTHOUGH SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN "NORMALIZING" RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, HE WAS UNWILLING TO ADDRESS DIRECTLY THE ISSUE, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TOKYO AND THAT 98 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE OPPOSED RETURNING THE ISLANDS.

O THE SIDES REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND AGREED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS THERE. BOTH SIDES AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NORTH KOREA SIGN A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT -- EVEN IF MOSCOW REMAINS SENSITIVE ABOUT PUBLIC CALLS TO THIS EFFECT.

-- SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED THE THREAT TO THE ROK FROM THE NORTH AND SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME A REDUCTION OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA. HE DREW

ATTENTION TO NORTH KOREA'S PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH.

-- THE SECRETARY DISAGREED WITH THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT. HE POINTED TO THE MILITARY IMBALANCE GREATLY FAVORING THE NORTH, WHILE EMPHASIZING OUR SUPPORT FOR A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

O ON CAMBODIA, THE U.S. URGED THE USSR TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE HUN SEN REGIME TO HELP CREATE A NEUTRAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A TRANSITION PROCESS WITH AN ENHANCED UN ROLE COULD OCCUR.

-- THE SOVIETS REVEALED THAT THEY MAY SOON MEET WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND URGED THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACTS WITH HUN SEN.

O DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE.

-- THE U.S. SIDE DESCRIBED EFFORTS IT WAS TAKING TO

PROMOTE SUCH A DIALOGUE AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS BY RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND INCREASING OTHER FORMS OF CONTACT WITH ISRAEL.

O THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET EMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

- THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THE LONGSTANDING U.S. VIEW THAT ANY SUCH SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT CONDUCIVE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE U.S. NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT FEW SOVIET EMIGRANTS HAD, IN FACT, SETTLED IN THE TERRITORIES, AND WE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN THIS REGARD.

O THE SIDES ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT AND THE TENSE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

O WITH REGARD TO AFRICA, THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA WAS LAGGING BEHIND THAT IN NAMIBIA AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN SUGGESTED A MUTUAL CUTOFF OF U.S. AND SOVIET ARMS TO THE COMBATTANTS.

O AS TO THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA, BUT CONTINUED TO DISAGREE ON THE ROLE SOVIET MILITARY AID TO MENGISTU PLAYS IN PROLONGING FIGHTING IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- IN VIEW OF THE GROWING THREAT OF FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA, THE SIDES UNDERTOOK TO CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE RENEWED HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY FACING THE REGION.

O THE SOVIETS AGAIN TRIED TO TAKE UP THE CYPRUS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE U.S. SIDE REITERATED ITS VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VENUE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO LEND ITS FULL AND UNDIVIDED SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO HELP RESOLVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

EUROPE

O THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON A CSCE SUMMIT: THAT IT SHOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT; THAT IT SHOULD BE PREPARATORY TO THE ALREADY-AGREED 1992 HELSINKI SUMMIT; AND THAT IT SHOULD HAVE AS ONE OF ITS OBJECTIVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE ELECTIONS AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT WITHIN THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NOT REACT TO THE SECRETARY'S FREE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL.

O THE KEY EUROPEAN QUESTION OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS WAS, OF COURSE, GERMAN UNIFICATION.

-- THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF UNIFICATION FOR YEARS; THAT WE SUPPORTED A UNIFIED GERMANY WITHIN NATO, BUT THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ENSURE THAT NATO'S MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD NOT EXTEND FURTHER EASTWARD; THAT WE BELIEVED THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WERE A MATTER FOR THE TWO GERMANYS TO ADDRESS; AND THAT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION

SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A FRAMEWORK THAT TOOK APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF OTHER STATES.

-- THE SOVIETS LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ARGUMENTS, BUT WERE NON-COMMITTAL IN RESPONSE.

HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATION

O IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OUR TRADITIONAL CONCERNS (SPECIFIC SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AND NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION INVOLVING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIETS REGARDING DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW AS WELL AS DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

O AMONG TRADITIONAL CONCERNS:

-- WE KNOW OF NO REMAINING PURELY POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE DISCUSSED SOME DOUBFUL CASES WITH THE SOVIETS. THERE ARE LESS THAN 30 LEFT IN THIS CATEGORY.

-- WHILE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY AS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PRACTICE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ENDED, WE RAISED THOSE REMAINING CASES OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNING WHOM WE HAVE SOME QUESTIONS.

-- WE URGED PASSAGE OF A NEW LAW ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

-- RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION CONTINUE TO BE RELAXED. WE REVIEWED THE APPROXIMATELY 60 CASES ON OUR LIST OF REFUSENIKS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED ON SECURITY GROUNDS. THERE ARE PROBABLY HUNDREDS OF CASES OF DENIALS BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF PARENTAL CONSENT TO THE EMIGRATION OF ADULTS, BUT OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS REPORTED THAT THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW, EXPECTED TO PASS WITHIN THE NEXT 60 DAYS, SHOULD HELP TO RESOLVE THESE CASES.

O WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A FIRM STAND AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM AND TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH CULTURE IN THE USSR.

O DURING THE MINISTERIAL WE DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR A NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INTENDED TO ASSIST IN BUILDING A CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

-- THERE WILL BE A SEMINAR IN MOSCOW IN MARCH FEATURING U.S. AND SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS.

-- AS PART OF AN ONGOING EXCHANGE STARTED LAST YEAR, A DELEGATION OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN 1990.

-- WE ALSO HOPE TO PLACE SOME 50 SOVIET LAW STUDENTS INTO POST-GRADUATE PROGRAMS AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES.

-- TEN SOVIET JUDGES WILL ATTEND JUDICIAL TRAINING COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES IN MAY.

-- OTHER PROGRAMS IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD, INCLUDING FOR THE HANDICAPPED AND WORKER SAFETY, ARE ALSO UNDER DISCUSSION.

O THE SOVIETS ASSURED US OF A NEW, COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THEY SAID THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE IT IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

TRANSNATIONAL MATTERS

O TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED MAINLY IN THE WORKING-GROUP MEETINGS.

-- WE FOCUSED ON COUNTERTERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND ENVIRONMENT.

O ON COUNTERTERRORISM, WE FAVORABLY NOTED SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF THE FEBRUARY 4 TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAELI TOURISTS.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND LIBYA TO CURTAIL TERRORIST MOVEMENTS.

O IN THE NARCOTICS DISCUSSIONS WE NOTED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE THE JANUARY 1989 MOU.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFGANISTAN, BULGARIA, CUBA AND LAOS.

O ON THE ENVIRONMENT, THE SOVIETS PRIMARILY RESPONDED TO U.S. PROPOSALS MADE IN WYOMING:

-- THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WERE READY TO ESTABLISH A JOINT PARK IN THE BERING LAND BRIDGE AREA.

-- THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN STARTING POLLUTION STUDIES IN AGRICULTURAL RUN-OFF AREAS.

O WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLY PLANNING FOR THE 1992 UN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

BILATERAL ISSUES

O OUR EMPHASIS ON THE BILATERAL SIDE HAS BEEN ON EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, FACILITATION OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS AND EASING OF LIVING/WORKING CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, EXCHANGEES, JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN.

O IN EXPANDING COOPERATION PROGRAMS, WE HAVE FOCUSED ON BASIC SCIENCES, HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. WE CAREFULLY AVOID AREAS THAT INVOLVE DUAL-USE OR RESTRICTED TECHNOLOGIES.

-- THE SIDES AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NEW AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT ON WORLD OCEANS, PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, AND DEMARCATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY.

O WE ALSO HOPE TO CONCLUDE BY JUNE AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIETS CULTURAL CENTERS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

O THE U.S. URGED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE AN EARLY -- AND FAVORABLE -- REPLY TO THE "OPEN LANDS" INITIATIVE ADVANCED BY THE SECRETARY IN WYOMING TO ABOLISH CLOSED AREAS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

O AN EXTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE QUESTIONS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

O THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

O IN THIS REGARD, THEY POINTED OUT THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVES AGREED TO AT THE MALTA MEETING.

-- THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT BY THE JUNE SUMMIT, CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE AT MALTA.

-- THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS, ONCE A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER IS IN PLACE, TO EXPLORE WITH THE CONGRESS REMOVING THE RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT.

-- THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO THE ONSET IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT AND A TAX TREATY.

O THE SIDES ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT, AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, AND A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT.

O THE SIDES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS THAT WERE PROPOSED AT THE MALTA MEETING AND THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR.

O THEY ALSO DISCUSSED SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS IN THE GATT. THE U.S. SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION AT THE END OF 1990.

O THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE OECD.

END TEXT TALKING POINTS. EAGLEBURGER

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PAGE 01 OF 02 HAVANA 05792 00 OF 02 270248Z 005871 209843
ACTION: CU(02)

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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

EXCISE

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USIA FOR AR, P/G, EU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UR, ECON, ECIN, ASEC, CU
SUBJECT: SOVIET JOURNALIST LEAVES CUBA WITH BITTER MEMORIES

REF: HAVANA 5613

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A SOVIET JOURNALIST, KNOWN FOR HIS BITING CRITICISMS OF CUBA, SHARED WITH USINT OFFICERS HIS VIEWS ON SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS AND RECOUNTED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS HE FACED WHILE REPORTING IN CUBA. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN A SERIOUS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AS A RESULT OF AGGRESSIVE INTIMIDATION BY THE CUBAN MINISTRY. END SUMMARY.

3. PAO AND CONOFFS RECENTLY MET WITH SOVIET JOURNALIST WAS ABOUT TO DEPART CUBA TO RETURN TO MOSCOW, SO HE PULLED NO PUNCHES ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH USINT OFFICERS.

4. WHILE IN CUBA, MOSTLY REPORTED ON THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA. HE ALSO WROTE FEATURE ARTICLES DESCRIBING THE EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS OF OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN CUBA. COMPLAINED THAT THE GOC TRIED TO GET HIM TO CHANGE OR KILL HIS ARTICLES WHICH CRITICIZED CUBAN SOCIETY. HE SAID THAT AT LEAST ONCEA HIGH-RANKING PCC CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER SUMMONED SOVIET AMBASSADOR YURI PETROV TO REQUEST HIS ASSISTANCE IN RESTRAINING CRITICISM. THAT ARTICLE, AND OTHERS, HE SAID, WERE SUPPRESSED. ALSO CLAIMED MANY SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS OPPOSED HIS ATTEMPTS TO CRITICALLY EVALUATE CUBAN SOCIETY. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, COMMONLY REFERRED TO HIS ARTICLES IN SCATOLOGICAL TERMS. "clientitis"

5. ON SEPTEMBER 12, THE PCC OFFICIAL DAILY, GRANMA, USED AN ENTIRE PAGE TO ATTACK THE REPORTING OF TWO SOVIET JOURNALISTS GRANMA CALLED ARTICLE, WHICH IT REPRINTED, "OFFENSIVE AND UNACCEPTABLE." ON SEPTEMBER 13, GRANMA TOOK A PARTING SHOT AT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 6/27/97
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FOR HIS "REPEATED SLANDER AND ANTI-CUBAN FABRICATIONS."

6. ALSO DESCRIBED TO USINT OFFICERS A SERIOUS ACCIDENT HE SUFFERED IN HAVANA ON MARCH 23, 1990. CLAIMS THAT A CAR WITH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR LICENSE PLATES SWERVED WILDLY AND SMASHED INTO HIS CAR AS HE DROVE ALONG A MAIN THROUGHFARE. THIS ACCIDENT OCCURRED LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER GOC AGENTS ATTACKED AND BEAT ON JANUARY 26. SAID THAT HE SUFFERED TWO CRACKED VERTEBRAE FROM THE ACCIDENT. HE CLAIMED THAT DURING THE TRIAL WHICH FOLLOWED, THE OTHER DRIVER IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A MAJOR IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. THE MAJOR WAS FOUND NOT TO BE AT FAULT. not unusual MININT practice

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA:

SAID THAT THERE STILL EXISTS A STRONG CORE OF CUBAN SUPPORTERS IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE SAID THAT THEIR SUPPORT WAS DUE PARTLY TO THE SOVIET VERSION OF "CLIENTITIS," SINCE SO MANY SOVIET DIPLOMATS HAVE BUILT CAREERS ON CUBA, AND HAVE TIED THEIR CAREERS TO COLD WAR THINKING. HE SAID THAT ONE OFFICIAL IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN HAVANA RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT CUBA REMAINS MORE STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN THE BALTIC STATES.

8. SAID THAT HE HAD LIVED IN CUBA FOR THREE YEARS IN THE LATE 1960'S, WHILE HIS FATHER SERVED AS A DIPLOMAT IN HAVANA. COMPARING HIS IMPRESSIONS THEN AND NOW, HE NOTED THAT THE CUBAN PEOPLE CLEARLY HAVE TIRED OF REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC BLARING FROM EVERY RADIO, TV, BILLBOARD AND NEWSPAPER. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY, SAID THAT LIFE IN CUBA WAS STILL MUCH EASIER THAN IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHERE, HE NOTED, EVEN CIGARETTES AND BREAD ARE BECOMING HARD TO FIND.

9. SAID HE THOUGHT THE U.S. WAS ACTING "SHREWDLY" BY LINKING SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS TO U.S. SUPPORT FOR WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. NOTED THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING WOULD IMPROVE IF THEIR GOVERNMENT STOPPED PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LONG-TIME ALLIES SUCH AS CUBA. ALSO SAID THAT MANY SOVIET TECHNICIANS IN CUBA HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THEY EXPECT TO BE PAID IN HARD CURRENCY AS OF JANUARY 1991.

10. WILL RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION WHERE HE PLANS TO ASSUME DUTIES AS THE CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF

, IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND HAS OFFERED TO MAKE HIM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF A NEW WEEKLY TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE RSFSR PARLIAMENT. SAID THAT SEVERAL OF HIS RELATIVES HAVE LONG ENJOYED THE PRIVILEGES OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP.

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11. COMMENT: JUDGING FROM THE ATTACKS IN GRANMA, CERTAINLY RAISED THE HACKLES OF THE GOC. FOR HIS PART HE IS ALSO CLEARLY DISILLUSIONED WITH THE OLD SOVIET SYSTEM AND WITH THE ATTENDANT SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH USINT HAS NO EVIDENCE WHICH MIGHT CORROBORATE CHARGES REGARDING HIS CAR ACCIDENT, WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS STORY. THE ASSAULT BY AUTOMOBILE ACCOUNT IS CONSISTENT WITH INTIMIDATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST USINT OFFICERS. WE HAVE HAD NO ACCIDENTS BUT THERE HAVE BEEN CLOSE CALLS. ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPERIENCES IN HAVANA SUPPORTS OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT THE GOC IS HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME DEALING WITH THE NEW POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. OBSERVATION THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY STILL HAS MANY OLD-STYLE DIPLOMATS MAY PARTIALLY EXPLAIN THE CUBAN SLOWNESS TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF CHANGE IN MOSCOW. IF SUCCESSOR IN HAVANA SHARES HIS CRITICAL VIEWS, WE ANTICIPATE THE CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO REACT IN A HEAVY-HANDED MANNER. FLANIGAN

Soviets' Latin policy abandons revolution

By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — After decades of suspicion and covert competition with the United States in Latin America, the Soviet Union is reshaping its policy under the premise that "world revolution" is dead.

Top Soviet diplomats and experts on Latin America said Thursday that the Soviet Union is abandoning an admittedly "confrontational" effort challenging U.S. domination in the region and will use its influence to help reduce tensions there.

In an unusually explicit account of evolving Soviet views toward Latin America, the officials said they are working to remove ideology from their policy concerns, encouraging discussion on a range of once "taboo" subjects, seeking U.S. cooperation to defuse political conflicts and redirecting their attention from Central to South America.

"I would say that, previously, although we practically never acknowledged it publicly, our policy in Latin America, as well as the policy of the United States, had a very clear, confrontational aspect," said Valery Nikolayenko, Latin America director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

"It was actually the essence of the policies of both countries. There was a type of perennial suspicion of the intentions of each other," Nikolayenko said at a conference at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. "Gradually, this approach is changing on both sides."

Despite a mutually declared end to the Cold War, Latin America provides some of the more sensitive and enduring points of regional conflict between Washington and Moscow.

'I would say that, previously . . . our policy in Latin America. . . . had a very clear, confrontational aspect.'

VALERY NIKOLAYENKO,
of Soviet Foreign Ministry

Cuba one of top concerns

Chief among those concerns is Cuba and U.S. anger at the Soviets' continued support for the government of President Fidel Castro. In the midst of a severe economic reordering, the Soviets say their subsidies to Cuba are under review and will doubtless change when their economy adopts hard-currency requirements beginning next year.

The Soviets nonetheless do not want to be perceived as abandoning Castro, an old ideological ally, and have been pressing the United States to lift its economic embargo against the island. In the context of a new era in Soviet-U.S. relations, Nikolayenko argued, the 27-year economic blockade "is one of the last remnants of the Cold War mentality."

The Bush administration holds that its policy of economic and political isolation of Castro is undercutting his support and forcing drastic conservation efforts. The United States has called on the Soviets to withdraw military personnel and aid.

If Cuba remains an emotionally charged issue in Latin America, the tenor of Soviet statements Thursday suggested it may be one of the last. Soviet-inspired leftist insurgences are a thing of the past, said Georgi Mirsky, a Latin expert at Moscow's Institute for World Economy and International Relations.

"In my mind, it is highly unlikely that any country, even driven to total desperation with the capitalist system, will ever raise the banner of Marxism again," Mirsky said.

New thinking exemplified

The Soviet diplomats said their conduct in Nicaragua best reflects their new thinking about the region. Despite the defeat of the Soviet-backed Sandinista government in recent elections, the Soviet Embassy has maintained close ties with the government of Violeta Chamorro and joined in efforts to raise funds for the government.

One indicator that revolutionary ideology is dissolving from policy goals is a straightforward appraisal of human rights violations, drug trafficking and terrorism in Latin America, regardless of the country, the Soviet diplomats said.

Soviet diplomats long felt it was taboo to criticize violations in friendly countries — including Argentina and Cuba — but not in antagonistic nations such as Chile and El Salvador, Nikolayenko said.

"We [were trying] to avoid discussion of the human rights situation in our own country," he said. He said Washington, in picking among the region's violators, was also guilty of a double standard.

The Soviets said they hope to enhance business ties in the region, particularly with South America's economic giants, Brazil and Argentina.

Charles Maechling, a former senior U.S. diplomat, said the collapse of the Soviet model did not mean that revolutionary movements would disappear forever from Latin America. Social inequities and poverty will find new political identities, he said: "You have got to expect this unrest will continue under different names — statism, populism, etc."

From Herald Wire Services

COSTA RICA

Legislators ask U.S. for secret documents

SAN JOSE — A four-member congressional commission Thursday began a probe of a botched assassination attempt on former Nicaraguan rebel leader Eden Pastora, which killed four people, including three journalists.

Costa Rican legislators investigating the 1984 La Penca bombing agreed to request classified documents from U.S. Senate panels that investigated the Iran-contra affair and drug trafficking in Central America.

ETC.

■ **ARGENTINA** — A newspaper reported Thursday that police uncovered a plot to kill President Bush during his visit here next week, but government officials said the report was unfounded.

■ **CARIBBEAN** — Jamaica Prime Minister Michael Manley urged Caribbean nations Thursday to speed the region's economic integration to compete with emerging blocs in E[illegible] and [illegible].

■ **COLOMBIA** — President Cesar Gaviria called Thursday for democratic elections in Cuba after arriving in Bolivia for an Andean summit.

■ **NICARAGUA** — The Sandinista National Liberation Front expressed opposition Thursday to efforts in the national assembly to reduce military spending by 75 percent.

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E.O. 12356: N/A
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OBEY SUBCOMMITTEE ACTION ON PAKISTAN

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Q.: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE OBEY SUBCOMMITTEE'S ACTION IS VOTING A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE (FMS) TO PAKISTAN UNTIL JANUARY 15, L988?

A.: WHILE WE SEEK A MORE SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, WE ALSO WISH TO MAINTAIN THE CONTINUITY OF OUR CRUCIAL COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN. FOR THIS REASON, WE REGRET THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S ACTION IN VOTING A SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)

CREDITS FOR THE FIRST THREE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS OF THE FISCAL YEAR.

WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS VOTED TO FULLY FUND THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST FOR PAKISTAN AID IN FY-88, AND THAT IT HAS WAIVED THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR COVERED BY THE BILL. WE ARE GRATIFIED BY THESE ACTIONS.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND TH CONGRESS SHARE A DEEP CONCERN ABOUT ASPECTS OF THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, CONCERNS WHICH HAVE BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY THE RECENT INDICTMENT OF SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, FOR VIOLATIONS OF U.S. LAW IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED EFFORTS TO EXPORT ITEMS OF NUCLEAR SIGNIFICANCE TO PAKISTAN.

WE ARE PURSUING THIS MATTER URGENTLY WITH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, AND HAVE WELCOMED PAKISTAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT HAS ITSELF INITIATED A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTIGATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A CONTINUING, INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION WHICH WILL BE PURSUED TO ITS CONCLUSION.

THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF A CLOSE AND

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MUTUALLY-SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN. WE SHARE IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INTERESTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY IN REGARD TO AFGHANISTAN.

U.S. AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT

Q.: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION TO KEEP AMBASSADOR QUAINTON IN KUWAIT FOR AN EXTRA TWO WEEKS?

A.: THIS HAS HAPPENED ELSEWHERE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHERE WE WANT TO MAINTAIN AMBASSADORIAL CONTINUITY DURING PERIODS WHEN FREQUENT HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS ON-GOING.

(IF PRESSED) THIS DECISION DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN OUR POLICY OR THAT WE FORESEE ANY ESCALATION IN THE SITUATION IN THE GULF.

IRAN: VERBAL THREATS AGAINST THE U.S. AND GULF STATES

Q.: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE CONTINUING IRANIAN VERBAL THREATS AGAINST THE GULF STATES AND THE U.S.?

A.: THESE IRANIAN STATEMENTS ARE THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF

THEIR HOSTILE RHETORIC APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO ESCALATE TENSION IN THE GULF IN THE HOPE OF INTIMIDATING GULF STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. OUR OBJECTIVE, AND THAT OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY IS TO DEFUSE TENSION AND BRING THE WAR TO A NEGOTIATED END. IN THE MEANTIME, WE PURSUE OUR DETERENT POLICY IN THE REGION.

(IF PRESSED) I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE THREATS.

QUESTION TAKEN AT THE NOON BRIEFING OF JULY 28, 1987.
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IRAQ: COMPENSATION FOR ATTACK ON STARK

Q.: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OUR REQUEST FOR COMPENSATION FROM IRAQ FOR THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. STARK?

A.: WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF COMPILING THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO SUBMIT A CLAIM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. SHULTZ

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 01536

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 12

- BEGIN SUMMARY: NEWS REPORTS JANUARY 20 FOCUSED ON PM GANDHI'S VISIT TO SWEDEN TO ATTEND A SIX-NATION SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. BRIEFING NEWSMEN ABOUT THE SUMMIT, M. DUBEY, ADDITIONAL SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SAID THE LEADERS WOULD TRY TO IMPRESS UPON THE U.S. THAT IT SHOULD NOT GO AHEAD WITH ITS SDI PLANS. REACTION TO U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL. OTHER COMMENT AND COVERAGE ANALYZED DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA, THE GULF, AND THE U.S. "DUMPING" OF TOXIC WASTES IN INDIA AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

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- PM GANDHI

- NEWS REPORTS SAID PM GANDHI IS LEAVING JANUARY 20 FOR A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO SWEDEN WHERE HE WILL HAVE A "WIDE-RANGING" EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH PM CARLSSON AND ALSO ATTEND A SIX-NATION SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

- --UNI WIRE SERVICE REPORTED THAT M. DUBEY,

ADDITIONAL SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, TOLD NEWSMEN THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD IMPRESS UPON THE U.S. THAT IT SHOULD NOT GO AHEAD WITH ITS SDI PLANS. HE REPORTEDLY ADDED ALTHOUGH THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION WILL LAUD THE RECENT INF AGREEMENT, IT WILL EXPRESS ITS DISAPPOINTMENT ON THE SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ASCRIBED THE SLOW PROGRESS TO THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

- --PRO-GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL HERALD" CARRIED COLUMNIST D.R. GOYAL'S VIEW THAT THE PLEA OF THE SIX-NATION SUMMIT ON A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING "HAD GONE UNHEARD IN WASHINGTON, EVEN THOUGH THE USSR HAD OBSERVED A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM FOR A YEAR AND A HALF." THE U.S., HE ADDED, "WAS NOT OPPOSED TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY IN PRINCIPLE BUT THOUGHT IT COULD BE PRACTICABLE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF DEEP REDUCTIONS IN EXISTING ARSENALS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A BALANCE IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS NATO AND WARSAW PACT AS WELL AS THE U.S. AND THE USSR." A SIGNIFICANT INITIAL STEP IN THAT DIRECTION, GOYAL MAINTAINED, HAVING BEEN TAKEN AND FURTHER PROGRESS PROMISED, BANNING THE TESTS "SHOULD NO

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LONGER BE CONSIDERED IMPRACTICABLE EVEN ACCORDING TO WASHINGTON'S LOGIC." ANOTHER HOPEFUL SIGN, HE CONCLUDED, "IS THE AGREEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT ON STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE 1972 ABM TREATY IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM AND MEANING."

- U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

- THE "INDIAN EXPRESS" HAD AN EDITORIAL CARTOON ON ITS FRONT PAGE SHOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PAKISTAN PRESIDENT ZIA HAVING DRINKS TOGETHER. TO ZIA'S QUESTION, "DO YOU REALIZE, BOSS, IF THE RUSSIANS LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AND THE AFGHAN REFUGEES RETURN HOME, WHAT A VACUUM IT WILL CREATE IN MY LIFE?," PRESIDENT REAGAN REPLIES, "THERE'S NO VACUUM THAT CANNOT BE FILLED BY A FRESH SUPPLY OF ARMS."

- --EDITORIALLY, THE PAPER EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT "THE CYNICISM WITH WHICH PAKISTAN HAS INFRINGED (U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION) LAWS HAS BEEN MATCHED WITH THE CYNICISM WITH WHICH REAGAN HAS TURNED A BLIND EYE TO PAKISTAN'S ACTION." IN THIS CONTEXT, THE EDITORIAL MENTIONED THE RECENT CONVICTION OF THE CANADIAN OF PAKISTANI ORIGIN, ARSHAD PERVEZ, "WAS EVIDENTLY OF NO CONSEQUENCE AT ALL TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT."

- "FOR MANY MONTHS," THE "EXPRESS" EDITORIAL CONCLUDED, "CONGRESSMEN AND OFFICIALS WENT ON DISCUSSING WHETHER IT WAS PROPER TO ACQUIESCE QUIETLY IN THE UNCONCEALED PAKISTANI CONTEMPT FOR AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS JUST BECAUSE ISLAMABAD WAS AN AMERICAN ALLY IN THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. REAGAN HAS BEEN

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 01536

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
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LEAST BOTHERED BY SUCH CONSIDERATIONS.... NOR COULD HE CARE LESS IF OTHER COUNTRIES AND IN PARTICULAR THE

INTERNATIONAL MAFIA IN NUCLEAR PIRACY ARE MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER BEFORE THAT THEY NEED NOT TAKE THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION SERIOUSLY."

- --PRO-GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL HERALD" EDITORIALLY COMMENTING ON RECENT NEWS THAT THE NETHERLANDS AND GREAT BRITAIN, IN ADDITION TO WEST GERMANY AND BELGIUM, HAVE HELPED PAKISTAN IN BOOSTING ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, SAID: "PRIVATE SUPPLIERS GAVE TO PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, WHILE GOVERNMENTS GAVE THE RAW STOCK,
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FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. ALL OF THEM KNEW WHAT THE STUFF WAS FOR, AND WHAT IT COULD LEAD TO." IT IS TIME, THE EDITORIAL SUGGESTED, THAT THE SIX-MEMBER LONDON CLUB "GAVE A THOUGHT TO WHAT IS ACTUALLY GOING ON IN THEIR BACKYARDS, AND STOPPED ALL NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN."

- --"THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" ED-PAGE ANALYSIS, "MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN: U.S. CASE UNCONVINCING," BY LT.-GEN. A.M. VOHRA (RETIRED), SAID IN PART: "IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. POLICY OF CONTINUED MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN IS IN FACT RESULTING IN INSTABILITY AND IS AFFECTING RECONCILIATION. HOW CAN TWO COUNTRIES ARMING AGAINST EACH OTHER COOPERATE AND NORMALIZE RELATIONS? AND, THIS COMPETITIVE ARMS BUILD-UP IS EGGED ON BY THE U.S. MILITARY AID.

- "IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO THINK THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. MILITARY AID AND THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IS NOT CLEAR TO THE U.S. POLICY MAKERS. U.S. COMPULSION IN VIEW OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC INTEREST IS ALSO APPARENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE EXPRESSION U.S. ACADEMICS USE AS AN OBJECTIVE IS NEARER THE TRUTH, NAMELY, 'THE NEED TO PRESERVE INDO-PAK MILITARY BALANCE.' THE TALK OF INDIA'S MARKED SUPERIORITY DOES NOT BEAR ANALYSIS. NOR DO THE U.S. DECLARATIONS OF ENCOURAGING OR SUPPORTING INDO-PAK RECONCILIATION. THIS OBJECTIVE TAKES A POOR SECOND PLACE, AND LOSES BADLY TO THE PRIMARY CONCERN FOR U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS. INDIA UNDERSTANDS THIS. THE U.S. SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT ITS MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN PROMOTES INSTABILITY IN THIS REGION."

- KAMPUCHEA

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- NEWS TREATMENT NOTED INDIA'S MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NATWAR SINGH, MET WITH THE FORMER KAMPUCHEAN RULER PRINCE SIHANOUK AND PHNOM PENH PREMIER HUN SEN IN PARIS.

- --OTHER REPORTS, CREDITED TO AFP, SAID IN BANGKOK, ASSISTANT SECSTATE FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, GASTON SIGUR, SAID THERE WERE SIGNS THAT VIETNAM WAS MOVING TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT. BUT, HE STRESSED, THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO OPPOSE RENEWING ECONOMIC TIES WITH VIETNAM UNTIL IT WITHDREW ITS FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA.

- AFGHANISTAN

- "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" CARRIED ON ED-PAGE AN ANALYSIS, "NAJIB'S TOUGH TALKS," BY AMERICAN WRITER ELIZABETH WEYMOUTH, SAYING PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH "APPEARED CONFIDENT-- AND ON SOME ISSUES, INTRANSIGENT--DURING AN INTERVIEW LAST WEEK, DESPITE RECENT HINTS FROM THE SOVIETS THAT HIS DAYS IN POWER MAY BE NUMBERED."

- --MEANWHILE, "THE STATESMAN" PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE, "CIA FUNDS AFGHAN REBELS," BY EDWARD GORMAN, CREDITED TO "THE TIMES" OF LONDON. HE WROTE IN PART: "A COVERT PROGRAM RUN BY THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, USAID, TO SUPPLY NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE INSIDE AFGHANISTAN TOTALLED DOLS. 30 MILLION, AND DOLS. 10 MILLION WAS SUPPLIED UNDER THE SO-CALLED MCCOLLUM AMENDMENT ALLOWING FOR THE DELIVERY OF NON-LETHAL U.S.

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ARMY SURPLUS SUPPLIES.

- "THE DISTRIBUTION POINT FOR MUCH OF THIS MATERIAL IS PESHAWAR, THE SPRAWLING AND CHAOTIC CAPITAL OF PAKISTAN'S NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE WHERE PRESIDENT ZIA HAS ALLOWED THE SEVEN PRINCIPAL RESISTANCE PARTIES TO BASE THEMSELVES.

- "IT HAS BECOME QUITE THE THING IN PESHAWAR THESE DAYS TO FIND LEADING GUERRILLA COMMANDERS LIVING IN THE FASHIONABLE UNIVERSITY TOWN SUBURB IN SUMPTUOUS VILLAS, REPLETE WITH THE LATEST IN TELEVISIONS, VIDEOS AND
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MICROWAVES, OR DRIVING NEW MERCEDES CARS AND EVEN TAKING THEIR HOLIDAYS IN THE U.S. ON A RECENT VISIT TO NANGARHAR PROVINCE IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN, ONE WESTERN JOURNALIST WAS ASTOUNDED TO FIND THAT AN ATTACK ON THE AFGHAN ARMY'S LOCAL GARRISON WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE THE MUJAHIDEEN COMMANDER WAS IN FLORIDA.

- "U.S. POLICY ALSO RUNS THE RISK THAT THE PROGRAM HAS FLOODED PAKISTAN WITH WEAPONS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE GONE TO THE MANY OPPONENTS TO THE ZIA REGIME. THE CIA HAS SPENT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BOLSTERING PAKISTAN AS ITS PRINCIPAL REGIONAL ALLY, BUT HAS ALSO CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR THE REGIME'S DESTRUCTION."

- THE GULF

- FROM WASHINGTON, R. CHAKRAPANI REPORTED IN "THE HINDU" THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION "CONSIDERED, AT ONE STAGE OF THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF, TO INTERCEPT SHIPS CARRYING THE CHINESE-MADE ANTI-SHIP SILKWORM MISSILES TO IRAN BUT THE MOVE WAS DROPPED AS IT WAS FELT IT MIGHT BE ILLEGAL AND DIPLOMATICALLY UNWISE TO DO SO." THE REPORT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO "THE NEW YORK TIMES."

- TOXIC WASTE

- UNDER THE EDITORIAL HEADLINE, "THIRD WORLD AS DUSTBIN," THE "TRIBUNE" OF CHANDIGARH OBSERVED THAT REPORTS THAT HIGHLY TOXIC WASTE, MOSTLY FROM THE UNITS OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, IS BEING DUMPED IN INDIA AND CERTAIN OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES (SEE MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 9
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PAGE 03 NEW DE 01536 03 OF 03 201315Z

OF JANUARY 14) "ARE A POINTER TO THE CALLOUSNESS OF RICH AND CONSUMPTION-CRAZY COUNTRIES IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REST OF THE WORLD. THIS SERIOUS THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH IS AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE INSATIABLE APPETITE OF THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETIES, WHICH FIND THAT EVEN THE MOTHER EARTH NOW REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE POISONOUS EXCRETA THEY ARE LEAVING BEHIND. IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT SHAME FOR INDIA THAT ITS LEADERSHIP IS A PARTY TO A PROJECT TO UNDERMINE THE HEALTH OF ITS CITIZENS." MCGINLEY

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 17488 01 OF 02 171206Z
ACTION NEA-04

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 17488

FOR NEA, P/PM, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 121

- BEGIN SUMMARY: "THE TIMES OF INDIA" CARRIED A PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) WASHINGTON-DATELINE REPORT, INDIA EMERGING AS WORLD POWER: U.S.," CREDITED TO A STATE "BACKGROUND PAPER" ON U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS. IN ANOTHER WASHINGTON REPORT, "THE TIMES" SAID FORMER NSC ADVISOR POINDEXTER HAS CLEARED PRESIDENT REAGAN OF THE CHARGE OF COMPLICITY IN THE IRAN-CONTRA FUNDS DIVERSION AFFAIR. OTHER COMMENT AND COVERAGE FOCUSED ON UNCTAD AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. END SUMMARY.

- U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

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- "THE TIMES OF INDIA" PUBLISHED A PTI WASHINGTON REPORT SAYING THE STATE IN "A BACKGROUND PAPER" ON U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS HAILS INDIA AS "AN EMERGING WORLD POWER WITH WHICH THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS."

- THE PAPER NOTES, THE WIRE SERVICE ADDED, THAT THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC DIALOG WITH INDIA HAS HELPED RESOLVE SEVERAL IMPORTANT BILATERAL PROBLEMS.

- THE PTI REPORT INCLUDED STATE'S OBSERVATIONS ON U.S.-INDIA DIFFERENCES ON AFGHANISTAN AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN, ADDING, "DESPITE DIFFERENCES, BOTH THE U.S. AND INDIA ARE DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THOSE AREAS WHERE STRENGTHENED COOPERATION IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL."

- POINDEXTER TESTIMONY

- J.N. PARIMOO'S WASHINGTON REPORT IN "THE TIMES OF INDIA," UNDER A TWO-COLUMN HEADLINE, "POINDEXTER CLEARS REAGAN OF COMPLICITY," SAID FORMER NSC ADVISOR POINDEXTER TOLD THE CONGRESS THAT IT WAS HE WHO "HAD AUTHORIZED THE DIVERSION OF IRAN ARMS PROFITS TO NICARAGUAN REBELS, THUS CLEARING PRESIDENT REAGAN OF THE CHARGE OF COMPLICITY IN THE FUNDS DIVERSION."

- ACCORDING TO PARIMOO, POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY "MUST HAVE COME AS A GREAT RELIEF TO THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT NOT ALL OF IT. PART OF WHAT POINDEXTER SAID SUGGESTED THAT REAGAN MAY HAVE LIED ON ANOTHER CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE, NAMELY EXCHANGE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES FOR ARMS."

- PARIMOO FURTHER OBSERVED: "THERE ARE MANY
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DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WHAT COL. NORTH SAID TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE AND WHAT POINDEXTER TESTIFIED. THESE DISCREPANCIES WILL BE SCRUTINIZED BY CONGRESSMEN, SENATORS AND THEIR LAWYERS."

- THE BASIC FACT REMAINS, PARIMOO DECLARED, "THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN CLEARED OF THE ALLEGATION THAT HE WAS HIDING SOME UGLY FACTS FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THAT HE HAS NOT TOLD THE WHOLE TRUTH."

- UNCTAD

- UNDER AN EDITORIAL HEADLINE, "RESCUING THE DIALOG," "THE TIMES OF INDIA" SAID, "UNCTAD'S REPORTS AND RESOLUTIONS HAVE IN FACT TAKEN ON A MORE PRACTICAL AND WORKMANLIKE TONE IN THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARS THUS MEETING A PART OF THE EARLIER CRITICISM IN THE WEST THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS UNWIELDLY, PROTRACTED AND A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE CONDUCTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD WORLD HOME AUDIENCES. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE AN ATTEMPT AT UNCTAD FOR A PRACTICAL DIALOG WITH THE RICH COUNTRIES WILL BEAR GREATER FRUIT THAN IN THE PAST."

- "LOSING FAITH IN THE UTILITY OF THE FORUM," THE EDITORIAL SAID, "BECAUSE OF LACK OF U.S. INTEREST IN IT

AMOUNTS TO PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS." INSTEAD, THE
EDITORIAL SUGGESTED, "AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO
UTILIZE THE MUCH MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE OF DELEGATIONS
LIKE THE ONE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHICH HAS
DECLARED THAT ITS POSITION IS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM
THAT OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES...THE CONFERENCE CAN

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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 NEW DELHI 17488

FOR NEA, P/PM, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 121

STILL JUSTIFY ITS EXISTENCE IF IN THE WEEKS TO COME ITS
PARTICIPANTS ADOPT A PRACTICAL ATTITUDE IN PROMOTING

FREER TRADE AND FASTER GROWTH INSTEAD OF INDULGING IN FUTILE POLITICAL POSTURING."

\- PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

\- NEWS REPORTS SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT CALLED IN THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR, JAMSHED MARKAR AND ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED PLAN TO BUY MATERIAL THAT COULD BE USED TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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\- --THE GOI-CONTROLLED TV REPORTED, "WASHINGTON IS SEEKING ISLAMABAD EXPLANATION OVER THE ATTEMPT OF A PAKISTANI TO SMUGGLE OUT OF THE UNITED STATES A SPECIAL TYPE OF STEEL USED FOR MAKING NUCLEAR ARMS."

\- --A UNITED NEWS OF INDIA JULY 17 REPORT QUOTED STATE SPOKESMAN REDMAN AS SAYING, "WE HAVE DISCUSSED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE THRUST AND CONTENT OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS PART OF AN ALMOST CONTINUOUS DIALOG WE HAVE HAD WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKIDZAN." THE WIREH SERVICE ALSO SAID REDMAN DECLIZED SPECIFICNRETAILS ABOUT UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST'S MEETING WITH PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR, BUT CONFIRMED THAT THE AGENDA INCLUDED LAST WEEK'S ARREST IN PHILADELPHIA OF ARSHAD PERVEZ.

\- --MEAHWHILE, A REPORT FROM ISLAMABAD QUOTED A FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN AS SAYING PAKISTAN HAD NEVER "SPONSORED ANY VIOLATION OF THE EXPORT LAWS OF THE U.S.," ADDING "SOME INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INIMICAL TO PAKIYAN" MIGHT HAVE BEEN BEHIND "THE BIZARRE CASE."

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ACTION NEA-11

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P 040314Z AUG 87
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SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9208
INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI
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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 02244

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PK, US, MNUC
SUBJECT: REPORTS OF CONGRESSIONAL SUSPENSION OF U.S. AID
- SPARK VIGOROUS DENOUNCING OF U.S. POLICY AND
- FIRM SUPPORT FOR PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: STATE 233572

1. [redacted] SUMMARY. OBEY SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION TO SUSPEND U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN FOR A THREE-MONTH PERIOD HAS STIRRED CONSIDERABLE COMMENT AMONG POLITICIANS AND CITIZENS ALIKE. REFERENCES TO "BLACKMAIL" AND U.S. UNRELIABILITY IN PAKISTAN'S TIME OF NEED ARE MIXED WITH ASSERTIONS THAT THE GOP MUST NOT YIELD TO AMERICAN PRESSURE. WE ENCOUNTER LITTLE OR NO UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE REASONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ANGER AT EFFORTS TO SMUGGLE NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THE BASIC FRAME OF REFERENCE IN THIS OUTPOURING IS THE NEED FOR PAKISTAN TO MAINTAIN ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. END SUMMARY.
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2. (U) BOTH ENGLISH AND URDU LANGUAGE MEDIA IN LAHORE HAVE GIVEN PROMINENT COVERAGE TO THE OBEY SUBCOMMITTEE ACTION IN VOTING A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN UNTIL JANUARY 15, 1988 (REFTEL). PRESS PLAY HAS TREATED THIS DEVELOPMENT AS IF IT WERE ESTABLISHED ADMINISTRATION POLICY. THE RESULT HAS BEEN TO PROMPT NUMEROUS COMMENTS BY POLITICIANS DENOUNCING THE U.S. ACTION WHILE DEFENDING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
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3. (U) TWO THEMES PREDOMINATE. ONE IS THAT THE U.S. IS "BLACKMAILING" PAKISTAN OVER AN UNPROVEN ALLEGATION. THE SECOND IS THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD PAKISTAN BOW TO U.S. PRESSURE. FOR EXAMPLE, JAMAAT-ISLAMI LEADER MIAN TUFAIL ISSUED A STATEMENT ON AUGUST 2 DENOUNCING U.S. "BLACKMAIL" AND INSISTING THAT THE GOP NOT SUBMIT TO IT. TUFAIL ADDED THAT "SUSPENSION OF AID WOULD BE A BLESSING IN DISGUISE" IN FREEING PAKISTAN FROM DEPENDENCE ON AN UNRELIABLE AMERICA. JAMAAT-ISLAMI SECRETARY GENERAL SENATOR QAZI HUSSAIN TOOK THE SAME LINE IN A SEPARATE STATEMENT, DEFENDING THE PRESENT GOP NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS "IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY."

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4. (U) FAKHR IMAM, LEADER OF THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION GROUP (POG) IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, TOLD NEWSMEN THAT "PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, EVEN IF IT MEANS LOSING U.S. AID...PAKISTAN SHOULD FIRMLY RESIST U.S. PRESSURES AND ANY STRINGS ATTACHED TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE." SHERBAZ KHAN MAZARI, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), AND NORMALLY A PRO-U.S. MODERATE, TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN LAHORE ON AUGUST 1 THAT SUSPENSION OF U.S. AID IS "A SYMPTOM OF WHAT IS WRONG IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY" AND POINTED TO UNDUE PAKISTANI DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S.

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MAULANA HAMID MIAN, PUNJAB LEADER OF THE JAMAAT-E-ULEMA-E-ISLAM (JUI), ASSERTED THAT SUSPENSION OF U.S. AID AMOUNTED TO "INTERFERENCE IN PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS" AND WAS A "CONTEMPTUOUS" ACTION ON THE PART OF THE U.S.

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5. (U) S.M. ZAFAR, CHIEF ORGANIZER OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLES PARTY (NPP), HEADED BY MUSTAFA JATOI, AT A LENGTHY PRESS CONFERENCE ON JULY 31 REFERRED TO THE U.S. EFFORT TO "BLACKMAIL PAKISTAN TO GIVE UP ITS POLICY OF ACQUIRING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES." ZAFAR, A WIDELY RESPECTED LAHORE LAWYER BUT A HARDLINER ON NUCLEAR MATTERS, CLAIMED THAT THE PERVEZ AFFAIR "HAS BEEN BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION." ZAFAR ECHOED OTHERS IN CLAIMING THAT MARAGING STEEL CAN BE USED FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN NUCLEAR RELATED ONES ONLY. ZAFAR STATED THAT "PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY HAS THE COMPLETE BACKING OF THE NATION" AND THAT THE GOP MUST RESIST U.S. PRESSURE "EVEN AT THE COST OF AMERICAN AID. WE MUST LEARN HOW TO LIVE LIKE AN HONORABLE NATION." SHEIKH RASHID ALSO DENOUNCED U.S. "BLACKMAIL" AND OUR "ATTEMPT TO DICTATE FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN." "IT IS HIGH TIME ONCE AND FOR ALL TO REJECT U.S. AID AND OPT FOR AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY."

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6. (U) AT A ROUNDTABLE FORUM ORGANIZED BY JANG, THE

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NATION'S LEADING URDU NEWSPAPER, A PANEL OF LAWYERS AND POLITICIANS WAS EQUALLY VOCAL IN ATTACKING ALLEGED U.S. "BLACKMAIL." EX-MRD GENERAL SECRETARY MALIK QASIM WAS ECHOED BY OTHERS IN CLAIMING THAT THE U.S. WAS ATTEMPTING TO APPLY UNDUE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN TO TURN AGAINST IRAN. THE JANG FORUM WAS ALSO THE OCCASION FOR SPEAKERS TO REHASH LONGSTANDING PAKISTANI COMPLAINTS ABOU U.S. RELIABILITY, UNDUE PRESSURE REGARDING AFGHANISTAN, AND PASSING UP OPTIONS THAT MIGHT REDUCE SOVIET PRESSURE

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INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 LAHORE 02244

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PK, US, MNUC
SUBJECT: REPORTS OF CONGRESSIONAL SUSPENSION OF U.S. AID

AND TERRORIST ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN.

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7. (U) THE NATION SUMMED UP THE OVERWHELMING ATTITUDE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED, PRIVATE AS WELL AS PUBLIC, IN AN EDITORIAL ENTITLED "PUNISHING FRIENDS, U.S. STYLE". REFERRING TO "PUNITIVE ACTION TAKEN ON SUSPICION,

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WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANY DIRECT EVIDENCE," THE PAPER ALSO NOTED UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST'S VISIT TO ISLAMABAD TO "UNDERTAKE THE TIRESOME TASK ONCE AGAIN TO DELIVER WARNINGS AND EXTRACT VOWS OF NON-PROLIFERATION FROM ISLAMABAD." THE NATION WENT ON TO NOTE THAT "THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT PAKISTAN HAS ALREADY TAKEN TOO MANY VOWS ABOUT A BOMB IT IS NOT MAKING; ONE VOW THAT IT CANNOT TAKE (IS) TO FORESWEAR THE BOMB WHILE THE AMERICANS CANNOT MAKE NEW DELHI DO THE SAME. THE PAPER POINTED TO "THE GROWING INDIAN TENDENCY TO BROWBEAT

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AND COERCE ITS UNEQUAL NEIGHBORS INTO SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS. THE CURRENT UNREST IN SRI LANKA IS A CASE IN POINT; NO ONE WANTS TO SURRENDER SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE IT CANNOT STAND UP TO THREATS." THE PAPER URGED THE U.S. TO FOCUS ON U.S.-PAK "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" AND WARNED AGAINST THE "DELINKING OF PAK-U.S. INTERESTS". THOUGH THE NATION'S PARENT PAPER, NAWA-I-WAQT, HAS LONG SUPPORTED GOP POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN, THE NATION ASSERTS THAT "PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN IS CONVERGING ON THE VIEW THAT IT SHOULD CEASE TO FUNCTION AS A CONDUIT OF ARMS THAT ARE KEEPING THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE BOIL AND THUS PREVENTING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION". IF "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS IS BROKEN ON THE WHEEL OF U.S. OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR OPTION, THE STALLED IMPROVEMENT OF PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD RESTART AND HELP PAKISTAN DEFUSE TENSION ON ITS WESTERN BORDERS. THIS IS THE ADJUSTMENT WHICH LOOKS MOST FEASIBLE IF THE U.S. INSISTS ON TREATING PAKISTAN AS AN ALLY WHOSE COOPERATION IS NEEDED TO FURTHER AMERICAN INTERESTS BUT WHOSE OWN SECURITY IN THE REGION IS OF NO IMPORTANCE AND WHO CAN BE 'PUNISHED' AS AND WHEN THE CONGRESS WISHES TO APPEASE LOBBIES IN WASHINGTON".

8. [redacted] COMMENT. WE ENCOUNTER NO UNDERSTANDING AT ALL IN LAHORE OF THE REASON FOR CONGRESSIONAL ANGER AT ATTEMPTED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING. MOST ASSERT THAT THE CHARGES ARE UNPROVEN, THAT THEY ARE THE RESULT OF AN INDIAN CONSPIRACY, OR THE RESULT OF ANTI-PAKISTAN FORCES THAT SEEK EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DERAIL BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE LACK OF U.S. RELIABILITY, AN OLD THEME IN THESE PARTS, IS WHAT WE HEAR MOST OFTEN. BUSINESSMEN CITE THE CURRENT DISPUTE AS ONE MORE AMONG THE MANY FACTORS, THEY SAY, WHICH ADD TO INSTABILITY AND THEIR

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INABILITY TO PLAN FOR THE FUTURE. NO ONE, OF COURSE, EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT PAK NUCLEAR POLICY SHOULD BE CHANGED OR ADJUSTED TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS. THE LATTER ARE GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT IN LAHORE AND THE DEBATE FOCUSES INSTEAD ON THE MERITS OF ARSHAD PERVEZ, HIS EFFORTS TO BRIBE FEDERAL AGENTS, THE ISSUING OF A PHONY EXPORT LICENSE, AND THE SHADOWY FIGURE OF BRIG. INAM-UL-HAQ. UNDERLYING IT ALL IS THE CONSENSUS HERE THAT PAKISTAN MUST HAVE AND WILL NOT YIELD IN THE RIGHT TO A NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THIBAULT

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 16502

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: URDU PRESS DOMESTIC HIGHLIGHTS, AUGUST 2 -4

1. SUMMARY: URDU PRESS WAS DOMINATED BY PAKISTANI REACTION TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO SUSPEND U.S. ASSISTANCE. EDITORIALS SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO RESIST U.S. PRESSURE. THE PRESS SPECULATED THAT LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED FOR TWO MONTHS AND COMMENTED ON EVIDENCE OF A GROWING SPLIT BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-AMERICAN WINGS OF THE PPP.

2. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES:

"JANG" AUGUST 2: LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED: ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES, THE LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED FOR TWO MONTHS. SOURCES SAID PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DISCUSSED THE LOCAL BODIES ELECTION SCHEDULE WITH SENATORS, AT THE LUNCH
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HOSTED IN THEIR HONOR IN MURREE ON SATURDAY.

3. OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES:

"JANG" AUGUST 4: KHALIQ SPEAKS AGAINST PPP PRO-AMERICAN SLANT: PPP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER MAKHDOOM KHALIQUZAMAN HAS SAID THAT BENAZIR HAS COMPROMISED WITH THE KILLERS OF HER FATHER. HE SAID HE IS STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY'S PRO-AMERICAN SLANT.

4. INTERNAL SECURITY - LAW AND ORDER:

"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 3: NEW FEDERAL RESERVE POLICE TO BE FORMED: ACCORDING TO INFORMESOURCES, A FEDERAL RESERVE POLICE WILL BE FORMED TO MEET THE LAW AND ORDER SITUATION, REPLACING ARMY AND PARA MILITARY TROOPS.

5. EDITORIALS:

"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 3: AMERICAN PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN: THE AMERICAN SENATE HAS ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PROVIDE FRESH GUARANTEES REGARDING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. PAKISTAN HAS MADE SINCERE EFFORTS TO KEEP SOUTH ASIA A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE. IT HAS MADE VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO INDIA. BUT DESPITE THESE EFFORTS, NEITHER AMERICA NOR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES PRESSURE INDIA TO ACCEPT THEM. INSTEAD, AMERICA IS TRYING TO CUT BACK AID, USING THE EXCUSE OF OUR NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE ARSHAD PERVEZ SCANDAL HAS NOW BEEN FULLY EXPOSED. THOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REGRETTED THE INCIDENT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO COOL THE ANGER AND HUMILIATION SUFFERED BY THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE. IF U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS INDIA AND ISRAEL WERE THE SAME, IT WOULD NOT HAVE MATTERED TO US. BUT WHY ARE WE
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DISCRIMINATED AGAINST? ARMACOST'S VISIT TO INDIA BEFORE COMING TO ISLAMABAD EXPOSES THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST PAKISTAN. THE VISIT WAS CERTAINLY AIMED AT GETTING INDIA'S GOODWILL IN CASE OF AID SUSPENSION FOR PAKISTAN. THEREFORE, WE WANT THE GOP TO TALK TO ARMACOST FRANKLY AND TO COMMUNICATE OUR NATIONAL PRIORITIES TO HIM. IT SHOULD CATEGORICALLY STATE THAT PAKISTANIS ARE NOT WILLING TO BE BLACK-MAILED BY AMERICA

"JANG" AUGUST 2: TENSION IN THE GULF:
THE GULF SITUATION SPELLS DANGER NOT ONLY FOR THE REGION BUT FOR THE WORLD PEACE. IRAN HAS ALLEGED THAT AMERICA IS SHOWING STRENGTH IN THE GULF TO PREPARE GROUND FOR CONFRONTATION. THE INTERFERENCE OF ONE SUPERPOWER WILL CERTAINLY INVITE THE OTHER. AMERICA DISPLAYED A CAREFUL ATTITUDE WHEN A SHIP WAS HIT BY THE MINES. IT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SAME SPIRIT AND REDUCE ITS PRESENCE IN THE GULF SO THAT IT CAN BE SAVED FROM BECOMING AN ARENA FOR SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION.
"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 4:
NUCLEAR POLICY...........NATIONAL CONSENSUS:
ACCORDING TO REPORTS, PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED TO U.S. UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MICHAEL ARMACOST THAT IT IS NOT IMPATIENT FOR AID AND WILL NOT COMPROMISE ITS NATIONAL

INTERESTS FOR ITS APPROVAL. THE GOP DID NOT HESITATE TO
BE FRANK BECAUSE IT IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE CASE TO WHICH
SUSPENSION OF AID IS LINKED. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE
GOVERNMENT'S FIRM STAND AND THE REACTION OF OPPOSITION
LEADERS. SOME NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE GONE TO THE EXTENT
OF DEMANDING THE GOVERNMENT MAKE AN ATOM BOMB SO THAT WE
CAN BEEF UP OUR DEFENSE AGAINST INDIA. WE WILL LOSE

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 16502 02 OF 02 041230Z
ACTION NEA-04

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 16502

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: URDU PRESS DOMESTIC HIGHLIGHTS, AUGUST 2 -4

AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP BY DOING SO. BUT IN ORDER TO LIVE
WITH DIGNITY AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, IT APPEARS THAT
WE WILL HAVE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ON THESE LINES. WE
SHOULD PREPARE OURSELVES FOR TOUGHER TIMES IN CASE
AMERICA STOPS AID IN AN IRRATIONAL DECISION. WE MUST

PREPARE TO LIVE WITHIN OUR OWN RESOURCES.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ORIGIN INR-10

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	AID-00	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, XC, XD, PINR
SUBJECT: MEETING OF NATO EXPERTS ON EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, SEPTEMBER 16-18, 1987 (PART I)

THIS CABLE COVERS GENERAL TRENDS, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT. SUBSEQUENT CABLES WILL COVER EAST ASIA, PACIFIC, AND SOVIET TOPICS. THEMES PROPOSED BY EXPERT GROUP CHAIRMAN ARE ADDRESSED IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY SECTIONS.

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I. GENERAL TRENDS AND OUTLOOK

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1. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AND EAST ASIA OVER THE PAST MONTHS: THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL GAINS; INDIA STEPPED INTO THE SRI LANKAN TAMIL REBELLION WITH AT LEAST INITIAL SUCCESS; THE PHILIPPINES HELD A CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION AS THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS; AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE PARTY LEADER ROH TAE WOO DRAMATICALLY INITIATED THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA. THESE

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DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER, OCCURRED AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF CONSIDERABLE INSTABILITY. FRUSTRATED MILITARY ELEMENTS

IN THE PHILIPPINES CHALLENGED THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION IN A BLOODY COUP ATTEMPT; KOREAN STUDENTS AND WORKERS REPEATEDLY STAGED PROTESTS; INDIA REMAINED BESET BY ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS WITH GANDHI AND THE CONGRESS (I) PARTY UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE; PAKISTAN'S ALREADY SHAKY INTERNAL SITUATION HAS BEEN FURTHER DISRUPTED BY TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN MAJOR CITIES; AND CHINA'S POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IS UNSETTLED AS REFORMERS FIGHT TO REGAIN GROUND LOST IN HU YAOBANG'S DEPARTURE. PROGRESS IN SRI LANKA REMAINS TENTATIVE AND ETHNIC TENSIONS COULD BUILD IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. FINALLY, GORBACHEV FOLLOWED UP HIS 1986 VLADIVOSTOK ADDRESS IN A JULY INTERVIEW THAT ANNOUNCED A READINESS TO REMOVE SS-20 WARHEADS IN SOVIET ASIA AND THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR OVERTURES THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

2. THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN HAS CONTINUED TO MAKE GAINS AND MORALE IS AT AN ALL TIME HIGH. NEVERTHELESS, SOVIET FORCES MAINTAIN CONTROL OF KABUL AND MOST URBAN AREAS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KABUL REGIME HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE

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SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL. THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAMPAIGN INITIATED IN EARLY 1987 HAS EXACERBATED FACTIONAL DISPUTES AND FAILED TO GAIN SUPPORT, LEADING NAJIB TO ENRICH AND EXTEND HIS INITIAL CEASEFIRE AND "POWER SHARING" PROPOSALS. RESSURED BY THE RESISTANCE, THE EVOLVING PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION CONTINUES WITH NO SIGN THAT KABUL'S BOTTOM LINE HAS BEEN REACHED. MOMENTUM TOWARD A SETTLEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE PEAKED IN EARLY MARCH WHEN KABUL/MOSCOW PROPOSED AN 18-MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE THAT WAS COUNTERED BY PAKISTAN'S INSISTENCE ON SEVEN MONTHS. MOSCOW IS PROBABLY WAITING TO ASSESS MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAMPAIGN BEFORE RESPONDING.

3. THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN WHERE KABUL'S KHAD AGENTS ARE BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR A SERIES OF BOMBINGS. ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN RIVALRIES STRAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S INADEQUATE CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN INDIA, GANDHI FACES INCREASING CRITICISM AS CHARGES OF INDECISIVENESS, CORRUPTION COVERUP, AND INADEQUATE POLICIES MOUNT.

4. THE MOST DARING AND SUCCESSFUL FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE IN THE REGION WAS THE AIR DROPPING OF SUPPLIES TO SRI LANKAN TAMILS AND THE SUBSEQUENT PEACE ACCORD.

INDIA IS MAKING ONGOING EFFORTS TO RECONCILE THE TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN SRI LANKA, BUT TAMIL INSURGENTS

HAVE BEEN SLOW TO SURRENDER WEAPONS AND FURTHER SINHALESE OPPOSITION CAN BE EXPECTED. CRITICAL STEPS REMAIN TO IMPLEMENT THE ACCORD.

5. JAPAN IS IN THE MIDST OF IDENTIFYING A SUCCESSOR TO PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE, WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SECRETARY-GENERAL TAKESHITA THE CURRENT FRONT RUNNER AS PARTY BROKERING CONTINUES. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL JAPANESE

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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE SOVIET BLOC RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO COCOM CONTROLS, FURTHER STRAINING RELATIONS WITH THE US. TOUGH LEGISLATION IS EXPECTED TO SOON PASS THE DIET, HELPING TO KEEP TRADE TENSIONS FROM SPILLING OVER INTO THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. IN SOUTH KOREA, DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE RULING AND MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES CONTINUED ON A REVISED CONSTITUTION WITH A REFERENDUM ANTICIPATED IN OCTOBER. NEVERTHELESS, THE DOMESTIC SCENE REMAINS VOLATILE.

6. CHINA'S POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN UNSETTLED SINCE HU YAOBANG'S JANUARY FALL, A SITUATION LIKELY TO PERSIST THROUGH THE 13TH PARTY CONGRESS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE LATER THIS FALL. REFORMERS UNDER DENG XIAOPING AND ACTING PARTY CHIEF ZHAO ZIYANG HAVE REGAINED MUCH OF THE GROUND THEY LOST AS A RESULT OF GENERAL SECRETARY HU'S RESIGNATION, AND APPEAR STRONGER GOING INTO THE CONGRESS THAN AT ANY TIME THIS YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, THE OUTCOME OF THE CONGRESS IS STILL PROBLEMATIC. ITS AGENDA IS UNUSUALLY FULL, INCLUDING POLITICAL REFORM, ECONOMIC REFORM, AND PERSONNEL CHANGES. NUMEROUS COMPROMISES ON ALL THESE ISSUES ARE LIKELY.

7. ON THE GROUND IN CAMBODIA, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING HAS REMAINED LOW. VIETNAMESE/PRK FORCES CONTINUE TO CONSTRUCT BORDER BARRIERS TO RESISTANCE INFILTRATION. THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE HAS BEEN INVIGORATED BY AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN MOCHTAR AND THACH IN JULY ON TWO-STAGE INFORMAL TALKS--AN UNDERSTANDING THAT ASEAN, THE PRC, AND THE CGDK "CLARIFIED" IN WAYS UNWELCOME TO HANOI. SIHANOUK HAS SIGNALLED A READINESS TO MEET WITH PRK AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, BUT THUS FAR--DESPITE ASEAN AND CHINESE CONCERNS THAT HE MIGHT SEEK A "PRIVATE"

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ARRANGEMENT--HE HAS ADHERED LARGELY TO THE ASEAN/CGDK POSITION.

8. THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION HAS RESTORED A DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE, BUT NOW FACES THE HARDER JOB OF MAKING IT WORK, PARTICULARLY IN A NEW ERA OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS THAT WILL INEVITABLY COMPLICATE THE DECISION-MAKING

PROCESS. THE NEXT MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL TASK IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE KEY TO COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS AND REBUILDING COHESION. ALTHOUGH THE MOMENTUM OF THE CPP/NPA HAS BEEN SLOWED SINCE AQUINO'S ELECTION, ITS RELIANCE ON TERRORIST TACTICS IS UNDERMINING CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. ENDEMIC PROBLEMS OF POVERTY, PATRONAGE-STYLE POLITICS, AND CHALLENGES SUCH AS FRAGMENTATION AND LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE MILITARY REMAIN LARGELY UNADDRESSED. THE ECONOMIC UPTURN IS A BRIGHT SPOT, BUT EVEN WITH SUSTAINED FIVE PERCENT ANNUAL GNP GROWTH, PER CAPITA INCOMES WOULD NOT RETURN TO THEIR 1981 LEVEL UNTIL 1994.

II. AFGHANISTAN

1. SOVIET FORCES CONTINUE TO OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN AND RETAIN OVERALL MILITARY CONTROL. NONETHELESS, MOSCOW CAN TAKE LITTLE COMFORT FROM THE SITUATION INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. ITS PROXIES IN KABUL ARE IN WORSE SHAPE THAN EVER, WHILE RESISTANCE STRENGTH AND MORALE IS AT AN ALL TIME HIGH.

2. THE MILITARY SITUATION. THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY HAS SHOWN A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF PROGRESS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS. THE GROWING RESISTANCE CHALLENGE TO SOVIET/COMMUNIST CONTROL IS PARTLY DUE TO RAPID IMPROVEMENTS IN QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF SUPPLY.

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3. ADVANCED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED SOVIET/DRA AIRCRAFT AND PILOT LOSSES, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, CAUSED ATTACKING PILOTS TO ALTER THEIR TACTICS AND EXERCISE MORE CAUTION (IN PART BY FLYING HIGHER AND FIRING WEAPONS FROM MAXIMUM RANGE)--CUTTING THE IMPACT OF AIR POWER. EFFORTS TO DEVISE COUNTERMEASURES HAVE YET TO REDUCE THE ANTI AIR THREAT.

4. IMPROVED RESISTANCE STRENGTH IS ALSO ATTRIBUTABLE TO INCREASED TRAINING AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE (BETTER TACTICS), EXPANDED COOPERATION (INTER-GROUP FIGHTING HAS

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STEADILY DECLINED; AND THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXTENSIVE LOGISTICS NETWORK INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE INABILITY OF SOVIET/REGIME FORCES TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY, HAVE BOOSTED RESISTANCE MORALE, DESPITE OCCASIONAL FLUCTUATIONS.

5. SOVIET FORCES HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR PRIMARY STRATEGIC

GOAL: CONTROL OF KABUL, OF PRIMARY LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND OF MOST URBAN AREAS. DESPITE THEIR INCREASED EFFORTS, HOWEVER, SECONDARY CITIES HERAT AND KANDAHAR REMAIN HEAVILY CONTESTED. THE AREA AROUND THE CAPITAL, KABUL, HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF PARTICULARLY HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE SUMMER MONTHS. RURAL AREAS REMAIN OUT OF SOVIET AND REGIME GRASP, BUT NOT THEIR REACH.

6. ACR
OSS THE SOVIET BORDER. OVER THE PAST YEAR, RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES HAVE MARKEDLY INCREASED NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH--HERETOFORE CONSIDERED RELATIVELY SECURE FOR THE SOVIETS--AND EVEN SPILLED OVER THE SOVIET BORDER. IN JULY JAMIAT I ISLAMI FORCES OVERRAN THE

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REGIME GARRISON AT KALAFGAN, SOME 50 MILES FROM THE USSR. REPORTS OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHWEST PROVINCES OF FARYAB AND BADGHIS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY FREQUENT.

7. SOVIET MEDIA ACKNOWLEDGED TWO SPRING 1987 ATTACKS INSIDE THE USSR, THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED RESISTANCE ABILITY TO MOUNT SUCH ATTACKS. THE LEADING THEME WAS "DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND"--HIGHLIGHTED BY A PUBLICIZED ADDRESS BY KGB CHIEF CHEBRIKOV TO KGB BORDER GUARDS. SOVIET TROOPS BASED IN THE USSR ENGAGED IN HARSH RETALIATORY ATTACKS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN WHICH TRIGGERRED REFUGEE OUTFLOW. PARTLY AS A RESULT, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF MUJAHIDIN RAIDS ON SOVIET TERRITORY SINCE THE SPRING.

8. DRA MILITARY REMAINS INADEQUATE. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE DRA MILITARY, IN CONTRAST TO 1986, WHEN DRA PARTICIPATION IN THE ZHAWAR ASSAULT SEEMED TO INDICATE SOME INPROVEMENT. INTENSIFIED CONSCRIPTION, WHICH VIOLATED ONE OF THE REGIME'S FIRST NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROMISES, HAS MEANT INCREASED DESERTIONS--AT TIMES EN MASSE. IN SOME ENGAGEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUMMER-LONG FIGHTING AROUND KANDAHAR, DESERTIONS HAVE NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS. IRREGULAR FORCES, OR "MILITIA," HAVE INCREASED IN NUMBER, BUT PROBABLY NOT AS MUCH AS THE FUNDS SPENT TO BRIBE THEM.

WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, THEY REMAIN OF DOUBTFUL LOYALTY.

9. SUPPLIES GETTING THROUGH. ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUE TO INTERCEPT SUPPLY CARAVANS, THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS IN STEMMING THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE MUJAHIDIN. THE QUANTITY OF SUPPLIES DELIVERED TO THE FIGHTING FRONTS HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. MUJAHIDIN COMPLAINTS ABOUT INADEQUACY OF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT AND

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THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET INTERDICTION ARE REDUCED FROM LAST YEAR, AS IS THE RATE OF INFLATION IN THE COST OF TRANSPORT. NEVERTHELESS THE MUJAHIDIN CONTINUE TO SUFFER FROM SHORTAGES OF MATERIEL, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF SUSTAINED COMBAT.

10. SUMMER FIGHTING. THE JULY COMBAT IN PAKTIA WAS PROBABLY TRIGGERED BY A SOVIET EFFORT TO IMPEDE SUPPLY MOVEMENT. DESPITE ONE OF THE LARGEST ACCUMULATIONS OF ARTILLERY OF THE WAR, AND FIERCE (SOME HAND-TO-HAND) FIGHTING, THE MUJAHIDIN STOOD THEIR GROUND. THEY REPORTEDLY FEEL THEY GOT THE BEST OF THIS BATTLE AND RESISTANCE MORALE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY AT A HIGH LEVEL. MANY PARTY LEADERS WENT TO THE FIELD TO URGE ON THEIR TROOPS: INTER-GROUP COORDINATION WAS REPORTEDLY EXCELLENT. HEAVY SUMMER COMBAT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED AROUND THE KABUL AREA, ALONG THE KABUL-JALALABAD HIGHWAY, AND AROUND KANDAHAR.

11. NAJIB'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAMPAIGN. KABUL'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAMPAIGN, WHICH BEGAN AT THE START OF 1987 WITH NAJIB'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A "CEASE FIRE" AND AN INTENTION TO "SHARE" POWER CONTINUED THROUGH LATE SUMMER. BUT KABUL HAS GAINED LITTLE FROM IT. NO POLITICAL FIGURE OF STATURE HAS JOINED THE REGIME. MUJAHIDIN COMMANDERS HAVE ALMOST UNIVERSALLY SPURNED KABUL'S RECONCILIATION BLANDISHMENTS, AND ARE BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON PROSPECTIVE POST-WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS.

12. AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE DRA CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN BRIBERY. WE HAVE NO AGGREGATE FIGURES ON EXPENDITURE, BUT KABUL MEDIA REPORTED THAT 13 MILLION AFGHANIS (ABOUT 250,000 USD AT OFFICIAL RATE) OF SOVIET PROVIDED

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CONSUMER GOODS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED IN PAKITIA PROVINCE

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ALONE BY MARCH. CASH WAS ALSO DISTRIBUTED. NAJIB PUBLICLY CRITICIZED LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM SEVERAL PROVINCES FOR MISUSING SUBSTANTIAL SUMS OF SOVIET AID.

13. ALTHOUGH KABUL'S GREATLY EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF NUMBERS OF RETURNEES CONTINUE TO MOUNT, (70,000 AS OF LATE AUGUST), THE DIRECTION OF NET REFUGEE FLOW IS STILL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. REFUGEE OFFICIALS REGISTERED MORE THAN 70,000 NEW REFUGEES IN 1986. BOTH PAKISTANI AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE OFFICIALS HAVE MAINTAINED THEY SEE NO EVIDENCE OF A MEASURABLE RETURN FROM THE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVE SIMILAR REGIME CLAIMS OF MUJAHIDIN DEFECTIONS AND OF REFUGEE RETURN FROM IRAN, ARE ALSO EXAGGERATED, BUT COMPLETE INFORMATION IS HARDER TO OBTAIN

FROM IRAN.

14. POLITICAL: "SHAH" AND MATE FOR NAJIBULLAH. INTERNAL STATE OF THE KABUL REGIME: THE DRA IS SHAKIER THAN EVER. THE MORALE, COHESION, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KABUL REGIME HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY BATTERED BY A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL. THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAMPAIGN, COMBINED WITH THE MODIFICATION OF SOVIET/DRA POSITIONS (PARTICULARLY ON THE TIMING OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL) AT GENEVA, AND A VARIETY OF DIRECT INDICATIONS FROM MOSCOW HAVE FED CONCERN AMONG KABUL REGIME SUPPORTERS. MANY HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THEY WILL NOT BE AMONG THOSE LEFT BEHIND TO FACE POPULAR WRATH.

15. THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM HAS EXACERBATED ENDEMIC FACTIONAL DISPUTES. IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED MARXISTS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE KHALQ FACTION, OPPOSE THE OFFER TO SHARE POWER WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE TACTICAL BACKSLIDING ON "PROGRESSIVE" POLICIES THAT HAS

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BEEN A HALLMARK OF THE CAMPAIGN.

16. RECONCILIATION OFFER ENRICHED. THE FAILURE OF THE RECONCILIATION POLICY TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME HAS LED KABUL TO CONSISTENTLY BROADEN ITS OFFER. THE ACCESSION TO POWER OF NAJIB IN MID-1986 COINCIDED WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE "PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION," ANNOUNCED BY GORBACHEV IN JULY 1986, INCLUDING FOR THE FIRST TIME A WILLINGNESS TO BRING EXILE AND OPPOSITION GROUPS INTO THE REGIME. NAJIB'S CEASE-FIRE/NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROPOSALS OF EARLY 1987 TURNED THE APPEAL INTO AN OFFER OF A "NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT," WITH THE PROMISE, ALTHOUGH NOT THE REALITY OF SHARED POWER.

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17. SINCE THE FAILURE OF THE JANUARY CEASE FIRE CALL, GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED IN STEPPED UP RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES OVER THE WINTER, KABUL'S OFFER HAS EXPANDED AT AN ACCELERATING PACE. SOON AFTER, NAJIB OFFERED TO MEET OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVES IN A NEUTRAL SETTING--A RECOGNITION OF STATUS AS EQUALS. BY MID WINTER 1987, NAJIB HAD OFFERED TO ACCEPT AN UNDEFINED ROLE FOR EX-KING ZAHIR SHAH.

18. ON JULY 14, NAJIB EXTENDED THE (SO-CALLED) CEASE-FIRE FOR AN ADDITIONAL SIX MONTHS BEYOND ITS JULY 15 EXPIRATION DATE. HE ALSO OFFERED SPECIFIC POSTS TO THE OPPOSTION, INCLUDING MORE THAN A DOZEN CABINET SEATS AND THE POSTS OF VICE PRESIDENT AND OF DEPUTY PRIME

MINISTER. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT UNDER RECONCILIATION THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE.

19. OFFER STILL INADEQUATE. NAJIB INVITED ROYALISTS AND

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MEMBERS OF THE "MODERATE" PARTIES TO TAKE UP HIGH-LEVEL POSTS. KABUL HAS TARGETED THESE GROUPS FOR ITS APPEALS, IN APPARENT HOPE OF SPLITTING THE RESISTANCE. NAJIB PROMISED "GENUINE DIVISION OF POWER", WHILE ASSERTING THAT IT "DOES NOT MEAN THE PDPA WOULD LOSE ITS AUTHORITY." INDEED, THE OFFER DID NOT INCLUDE ANY OF THE MINISTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

20. THE DRAFT DRA CONSTITUTION THAT KABUL ISSUED JULY 15 ALLOWS FOR CHANGING THE NAME OF THE COUNTRY TO "REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN." WHILE COSMETIC, A NAME CHANGE (DROPPING "DEMOCRATIC") POTENTIALLY WEAKENS THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REGIME WITH THE APRIL REVOLUTION.

21. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION WOULD PRODUCE A GOVERNMENT FULLY DOMINATED BY ITS PRESIDENT. IT WOULD ALLOW A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM. PARTIES (WHICH WOULD BE ORGANIZED UNDER REGIME AUSPICES) WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE STATE AND RECONCILIATION, BUT WOULD BE ALLOWED SOME INDEPENDENCE.

22. NAJIB ASSERTS THAT THE DRA ALREADY IS A COALITION REGIME SINCE FIVE MINISTERS WERE MEMBERS OF PREVIOUS REGIMES AND CLAIMS THAT OPPOSITION ELEMENTS ARE ALREADY WELL REPRESENTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL ALTHOUGH DURING A JULY VISIT TO MOSCOW NAJIB SUGGESTED HE COULD SACRIFICE HIS POST AS WELL AS HIS LIFE FOR HIS COUNTRY, NO PART OF THE UNFOLDING RECONCILIATION OFFER SUGGESTS THAT HIS OWN OR PDPA DOMINANCE IS TRULY NEGOTIABLE.

23. THE RESISTANCE (PARTICULARLY THE MODERATE LEADERS REFERRED TO BY NAJIB) SWIFTLY REJECTED THE JULY 14 COALITION OFFER, AS IT HAS ALL OF KABUL'S PUBLIC RELATIONS PLOYS. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT ATTAINED CONSENSUS ON A COUNTEROFFER, THE ALLIANCE PARTIES IN PESHAWAR HAVE

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ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS STATED THAT SHOULD THE SOVIETS LEAVE, THEY WOULD NOT INDISCRIMINATELY RETALIATE AGAINST KABUL REGIME PERSONNEL, WOULD PURSUE NON-ALIGNMENT, AND WOULD MAINTAIN CORRECT RELATIONS WITH ALL OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS.

24. ALTHOUGH THE PDPA GENERAL SECRETARY HAS ACKNOWLEDGED CRITICISM FROM ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PARTY OF THE

RECONCILIATION PROCESS, NAJIB HAS STRESSED THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IS "IRREVERSIBLE." FORCED FORWARD BY CONTINUING MILITARY PRESSURE, THE UNFOLDING PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION CONTINUES AND THERE IS NO SIGN THAT KABUL'S (I.E. MOSCOW'S) BOTTOM LINE HAS YET BEEN REACHED.

25. THE QUESTION OF THE KING. FORMER AFGHAN MONARCH ZAHIR SHAH HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY MENTIONED OVER THE YEAR AS A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE, OR INTERIM FIGURE, WHOSE PARTICIPATION COULD PERMIT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ENCOMPASSING A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. ZAHIR SHAH HAS LIVED IN ROME SINCE HE WAS DEPOSED BY HIS COUSIN DAOUD IN 1973. DAOUD, WHO DECLARED A REPUBLIC, HIMSELF WAS KILLED IN THE COMMUNIST COUP OF 1978.

26. THE KABUL GOVERNMENT HAS STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE KING AND THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE INCREASINGLY PUBLIC IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT HIS RETURN IN SOME SUBORDINATE ROLE. IN A JUNE INTERVIEW IN UNITA, GORBACHEV POINTED TO THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL ROLE OF AN AFGHAN RESIDENT IN ITALY. OTHER SO VIET REFERENCES HAVE UNDERLINED THEIR INTEREST IN ZAHIR SHAH.

27. THE FORMER MONARCH HAS INSISTED HE WILL NOT RETURN

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TO AFGHANISTAN AS KING, BUT HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN PLAYING A ROLE IN THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY THAT WOULD BE AGREED TO BY ALL THE MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED. HE HAS

NOT SUCCUMBED TO THE BLANDISHMENTS OFFERRED BY NAJIB TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CURRENT REGIME, AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REFUSE ANY ROLE THAT WILL MAINTAIN PDPA CONTROL.

28. WHILE HE HAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT INSIDE AFGHANISTAN AND AMONG THE REFUGEES, THE KING REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE, MANY OF WHICH OPPOSED HIS RULE. THEY BLAME HIM FOR CREATING THE CONDITIONS THAT ENNABLED THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES TO EVENTUALLY TAKE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN.

29. ZAHIR SHAH HAS REFUSED TO MAKE ANY MOVE WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE AFGHAN CONSENSUS, AND EFFORTS ON HIS BEHALF HAVE EXACERBATED DIVISIONS AMONG THE RESISTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, SO FAR NO PARTY HAS BEEN ABLE TO NAM ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO CAN PLAY A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ROLE. THE QUESTION OF "SHAH AND MATE" REMAINS UNSETTLED.

30. DIPLOMATIC MOVES. THE DRA RECENTLY LAUNCHED A WORLDWIDE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, INVOLVING AT LEAST 66

COUNTRIES, AND HEAVILY BACKED BY THE SOVIETS. DRA EMISSARIES HAVE MADE SOME LIMITED DIPLOMATIC GAINS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY INDIA, IRAQ, AUSTRIA, GHANA AND TOGO.

31. THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF KABUL'S DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IS TO REDUCE THE OVERWHELMING VOTE CONDEMNING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. KABUL MAY PICK UP A FEW UN VOTES AND WILL PROBABLY ALSO MAKE SOME SMALL GAINS IN DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. BUT KABUL WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE ABLE TO REGAIN AFGHANISTAN'S ISLAMIC

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CONFERENCE (OIC) SEAT, OR TO ENTER THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC). THE DRA HAS FAILED TO GET A HEARING IN MANY CAPITALS.

32. UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR TURNAROUND ON THE UNGA VOTE, WHICH NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY, THE NET EFFECT ON THE AFGHANISTAN-TARNISHED SOVIET WORLD IMAGE SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE LIMITED. MORE IMPORTANT, LIMITED ADDITIONAL DIPLOMATIC ENDORSEMENTS (LIKE NON-RESIDENT AMBASSADORS) WILL NOT ADD MUCH TO THE KABUL REGIME'S COHESION OR DOMESTIC POLITICAL OR MILITARY STRENGTH.

III. SITUATION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

BANGLADESH

1. EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE END OF MARTIAL LAW, PRESIDENT ERSHAD REMAINS IN CONTROL, BUT THE SITUATION IS LESS STABLE NOW THAN EARLIER THIS YEAR. THOUGH THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION CONTINUES DIVIDED AND IS NOT AS YET A SERIOUS THREAT TO HIM, IT HAS GROWN SOMEWHAT MORE EFFECTIVE IN RECENT MONTHS, PARTICULARLY IN ORGANIZING JOINT ANTI-GOVERNMENT AGITATION. A 54-HOUR OPPOSITION-SPONSORED GENERAL STRIKE IN JULY BROUGHT THE COUNTRY TO A STANDSTILL, AND SCATTERED PROTESTS AGAINST ERSHAD AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE. SO FAR, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION AGITATION HAS FAILED TO UNSEAT ERSHAD OR FORCE PARLIAMENT TO DISSOLVE, TWO PRINCIPLE OPPOSITION GOALS.

2. THE EROSION OF ERSHAD'S SUPPORT WITHIN THE MILITARY IS A MORE PRESSING PROBLEM FOR HIM. SHOULD HE PROVE UNABLE TO MEET MILITARY EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT

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EFFECTIVENESS AND KEEP THE LID ON CIVIL DISORDER, THE ARMY COULD UNSEAT HIM. BUT IT MUST FIRST IDENTIFY AND AGREE UPON A SUCCESSOR; NONE IS APPARENT AT PRESENT. CHRONIC MILITARY DISSATISFACTION WITH ERSHAD --

PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AGAINST HIM, HIS FAMILY, AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET -- IS ON THE RISE. ERSHAD IS ACUTELY AWARE THAT, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE HE CAME TO POWER IN 1982, HE MUST RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY IF HE WANTS TO STAY IN OFFICE. TWO RECENT MOVES -- THE CONTROVERSIAL BILL HE PUSHED THROUGH THE BANGLADESH PARLIAMENT TO GIVE THE MILITARY A GREATER VOICE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING, AND SEVERAL ROUNDS OF CABINET RESHUFFLES ARE HIS ATTEMPTS TO HEAD OFF ANY MILITARY MOVES TO UNSEAT HIM.

SRI LANKA

1. THE ACCORD, A NEW START. IN AN ATTEMPT TO END FOUR YEARS OF VIOLENCE, SRI LANKAN PRESIDENT J. R. JAYEWARDENE AGREED TO GENEROUS TERMS IN THE INDIAN-BROKERED PEACE ACCORD SIGNED JULY 29. A MAJOR CONCESSION TO TAMIL DEMANDS, THE ACCORD CALLS FOR A SINGLE INTERIM PROVINCIAL COUNCIL TO REPRESENT THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES (WHERE MOST SRI LANKAN TAMILS LIVE), WITH A REFERENDUM TO BE HELD IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE BY 31 DECEMBER 1988, TO DETERMINE IF THE MERGER SHALL BE PERMANENT. THE AGREEMENT ALSO CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND MANDATES THAT SRI LANKAN TROOPS RETURN TO THEIR BARRACKS, WHILE THE TAMIL INSURGENT GROUPS SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS.

2. INDIA IS THE GUARANTOR OF THE TREATY, WITH THE RIGHT

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TO DEPLOY TROOPS IN THE TAMIL AREAS OF SRI LANKA IF REQUESTED. INDIA'S INCREASED INFLUENCE OVER SRI LANKA IS EVIDENCED IN A SIDE LETTER TO THE ACCORD IN WHICH THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT PLEDGES TO "MEET SOME OF INDIA'S

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CONCERNS" REGARDING LIMITING FOREIGN MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE PRESENCES IN SRI LANKA.

3. INSURGENT HESITANCY. ALTHOUGH MOST TAMIL MILITANT GROUPS AND THE MODERATE TAMIL POLITICAL PARTY (TULF) APPROVED THE JULY 29 ACCORD, THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) -- BY FAR THE MOST POWERFUL TAMIL GROUP - INITIALLY BALKED. INDIA EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDED IN PRESSURING THE LTTE TO ACCEPT THE ACCORD. DESPITE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, ALL OF THE TAMIL INSURGENT GROUPS HAVE BEEN SLOW IN SURRENDERING THEIR WEAPONS, AND IN THE FIRST WEEKS MADE ONLY LIMITED MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION.

4. SINHALESE OPPOSITION. IN COLOMBO AND SOUTHERN SRI LANKA, MANY SINHALESE PROTESTORS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY (SLFP), THE BUDDHIST CLERGY, AND THE BANNED MARXIST JVP PARTY, RIOTED

FOR A FEW DAYS AGAINST THE ACCORD. THEY FEAR IT WILL LEAD TO THE COUNTRY'S PARTITION AND THAT IT COULD GIVE INDIA A MAJOR VOICE IN SRI LANKAN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. ALTHOUGH RIOTING HAS ABATED, FEARS WILL PERSIST AND THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE. FURTHER SINHALESE OPPOSITION -- BOTH VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT -- CAN BE EXPECTED. FOR NOW THE RULING UNITED NATIONAL PARTY (UNP) REMAINS BEHIND JAYEWARDENE, BUT SOME UNP OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER PREMADASA, HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ACCORD.

5. PROBLEMS AHEAD. EAGER FOR A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS IN SRI LANKA, GANDHI HAS ASSUMED GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES AND THUS GREAT POLITICAL RISK. MUCH COULD GO WRONG.

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-- FOR INDIA (WITH WELL OVER 6,000 TROOPS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN THE TWO TAMIL PROVINCES OF SRI LANKA) TO IMPLEMENT THE ACCORD SUCCESSFULLY AND ESTABLISH ITS CREDIBILITY AS THE GUARANTOR, IT MUST GET THE TAMIL INSURGENTS TO SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS, WHILE PREVENTING INTERNECINE TAMIL FEUDS AND RENEWED TAMIL-SINHALESE

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CLASHES.

-- JAYEWARDENE HAS PUT HIMSELF ON THE LINE POLITICALLY AND PERSONALLY. HE WILL NEED TO PRESSURE PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY THE TREATY. HAVING AGREED TO THE ACCORD, JAYEWARDENE HAS INCREASED HIS VULNERABILITY TO DESTABILIZATION EFFORTS AND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

-- NEGOTIATIONS TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTERIM PROVINCIAL COUNCIL AND THE SPECIFIC DEVOLUTION OF POWERS PROMISE TO BE ADDITIONAL CRITICAL AND ARDUOUS -- STEPS IN THE ACCORD'S IMPLEMENTATION.

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE VERY FACT THAT GANDHI HAS INVESTED SUCH PRESTIGE AND JAYEWARDENE IS RISKING HIS LIFE MAKE THE TWO LIKELY TO PERSEVERE, WITH SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

PAKISTAN

INTERNAL SITUATION

1. PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE REMAIN UN ,

ALTHOUGH THE INTENSE DRAMA OF BENAZIR BHUTTO'S CHALLENGE TO PRESIDENT ZIA HAS SUBSIDED FOR NOW. FREQUENT VIOLENCE, EMANATING FROM INTERNAL ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN RIVALRIES OR FROM EXTERNAL SUBVERSION, CONTINUES TO OVERTAX THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT'S CLEARLY INADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER. OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL

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PUSH THE SECURITY ISSUE IN THE COMING FALL'S LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS WHICH, IF THEY ARE NOT POSTPONED, COULD REVIVE THE NOW SEMIDORMANT STRUGGLE BETWEEN BHUTTO AND ZIA.

2. BOMBINGS BECOME A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE. FOR PAKISTANIS THE MOST UNSETTLING DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAS BEEN THE SPREAD OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS FROM THE WESTERN BORDER AREAS TO PAKISTAN'S MAJOR CITIES -- RAWALPINDI, LAHORE, AND KARACHI. THOUGH GENERALLY ATTRIBUTED TO KABUL'S KHAD AGENTS, THE BOMBINGS HAVE PROVIDED LEFTWING POLITICIANS, MOST NOTABLY AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY (ANP) CHIEF WALI KHAN, WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. THEY HAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ENABLED MORE CENTRIST OPPOSITION LEADERS, SUCH AS BENAZIR BHUTTO, TO CHARGE THE GOVERNMENT WITH FAILURE TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS. THE DEATH TOLL FROM THE BOMBINGS HAS ESCALATED AT AN ALARMING PACE -- THE MOST SHOCKING WAS THE JULY 14 KARACHI INCIDENT WHICH CLAIMED

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SOME 76 LIVES, WHILE WOUNDING OVER 200. IF SUCH LARGE-SCALE TERRORIST KILLING CONTINUES, PUBLIC ANGER WILL MOUNT IN DIRECT PROPORTION.

3. ETHNIC VIOLENCE. MOHAJIR-PATHAN CLASHES IN KARACHI, WHICH HAD ABATED AFTER THE MAYHEM IN DECEMBER 1986, WERE REIGNITED IN THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE FOLLOWING THE JULY 14 BOMBING. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE LARGELY PUNJABI POLICE FORCE ITSELF BECAME THE MAIN TARGET OF MOHAJIR WRATH; IN RETALIATION AGAINST THE DEATH OF SOME OF THEIR COMRADES, THE POLICE WENT ON A SHOOTING SPREE AGAINST THE MOHAJIRS, CAUSING STILL MORE FATALITIES AND NECESSITATING INTERVENTION BY THE ARMY. RESENTMENT AGAINST PUNJABIS, PAKISTAN'S DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUP, REMAINS A DEEP-SEATED,

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EVER-PRESENT SOURCE OF ALIENATION IN SIND PROVINCE.

4. SECTARIAN TENSION. THE CREATION OF A NEW POLITICAL PARTY BY PAKISTAN'S MOST MILITANT, PRO-KHOMEINI SHIA GROUP WILL INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUNNI-SHIA CLASHES. THE TEHR
IK-E NIFAZ E-FIQH-E JAFRIA (TNFJ),
HEADED BY ARIF AL-HUSSEINI, WAS FOUNDED AT A JULY 5-6 MEETING MARKED BY STRONG ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-US RHETORIC. SUNNI-SHIA TENSION HAS BEEN FUELLED IN RECENT

YEARS BY ZIA'S ISLAMIZATION POLICIES, AND, SINCE THE END OF MARTIAL LAW, BY THE EFFORTS OF SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS TO PUSH FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND OTHER LEGISLATION THAT WOULD GUARANTEE THE SUPREMACY OF THE SHARIAT COURT AND, IN EFFECT, OF SUNNI DOGMA. IN ANNOUNCING HIS NEW PARTY, AL-HUSSEINI CLAIMED IT WAS NECESSARY TO FOUND A SHIA POLITICAL PARTY TO DRAW ATTENTION TO LEGITIMATE SHIA INTERESTS.

5. THE JULY 31 IRANIAN PILGRIM RIOTS AND CASUALTIES IN MECCA, AND SUBSEQUENT RETALIATION IN TEHRAN, HAVE FURTHER EXACERBATED SUNNI SHIA RIVALRIES IN PAKISTAN, AT THE SAME TIME THAT US INTERVENTION IN THE GULF HAS ELICITED AN ANGRY ANTI US REACTION (WITH STRONG ANTI-ZIA OVERTONES) FROM MILITANT PAKISTANI SHIAS. ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL REACTION OF PAKISTAN'S SUNNI MAJORITY TO IRANIAN CHARGES WAS RESTRAINED, HEIGHTENED TENSIONS BELOW THE SURFACE MAY RESULT IN INCREASED VIOLENCE DURING THE MUHARRAM RELIGIOUS CELEBRATION PERIOD -- ALWAYS A TROUBLED TIME IN PAKISTAN'S TOWNS AND CITIES WITH A SIGNIFICANT SHIA POPULATION.

6. THE BUDGET UPROAR. WHILE PAKISTAN'S PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN ORGANIZED BY

POLITICIANS OF VARIOUS IDEOLOGICAL STRIPES, IN EARLY JUNE THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET TURNED OUT TO BE A POLITICAL

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GAFFE WHICH BROUGHT NORMALLY APOLITICAL MERCHANTS AND BUSINESSMEN POURING INTO THE STREETS IN PROTEST, PARTICULARLY IN LAHORE. THE OBJECT OF THEIR SPONTANEOUS IRE WAS AN INCREASE IN TAXES AND FEES -- IN PARTICULAR A HEFTY "DEFENSE TAX" AND A RISE IN THE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY AND OTHER SOURCES OF ENERGY. THE GOVERNMENT BEAT A HASTY RETREAT AND SUBSQUENTLY ANNOUNCED ALTERNATIVE PLANS FOR RAISING REVENUES, INCLUDING BY ELIMINATING CORRUPTION. THE EPISODE, WHICH MUST HAVE SHAKEN PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO AND HIS PARTY, THE GOVERNING PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (PML), DEMONSTRATED HOW VOLATILE THE PAKISTANI PUBLIC CAN BE, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO POCKETBOOK ISSUES.

7. POLITICAL ACTIVITY. POLITICAL STRATEGISTS ARE NOW FOCUSING ON LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR THIS COMING FALL. WHILE THESE PROBABLY WILL BE NON-PARTY POLLS, CENTERED ON LOCAL ISSUES AND RIVALRIES, THEY WILL NEVERTHELESS BE SEEN AS A CONTEST BETWEEN JUNEJO'S PML AND BENAZIR BHUTTO'S PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP).

8. BHUTTO HAS BEEN PREPARING BY CONCENTRATING ON PARTY

ORGANIZATION. RECENT ELECTIONS FOR PARTY OFFICE HOLDERS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN THE KEY CENTRAL PROVINCE OF PUNJAB WERE AN UNPRECEDENTED EVENT IN PPP HISTORY AND ARE EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN PARTY DISCIPLINE AND EFFECTIVENESS. BENAZIR'S RECENTLY ANNOUNCED ENGAGEMENT ALSO WILL PROBABLY HELP HER POLITICALLY; MARRIAGE IS SEEN IN PAKISTAN AS THE NORM, AND WILL GIVE HER AN AURA OF GREATER MATURITY.

9. MEANWHILE, PML MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL

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LEGISLATURES HAVE BEEN USING GOVERNMENT FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THEIR DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO WIN OVER THEIR CONSTITUENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS. A RECENT PAKISTAN GALLUP POLL SUGGESTS THAT THE STRATEGY MAY BE WORKING (THOUGH RELYING ON PAKISTANI POLLS IS RISKY). RUMORS THAT THE ELECTIONS MAY BE POSTPONED SUGGEST THAT JUNEJO HIMSELF IS WORRIED ABOUT THE OUTCOME. CERTAINLY THE PUBLIC'S SENSE OF

INSECURITY, BECAUSE OF BOMBINGS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, AND HIS BLUNDER OVER THE BUDGET HAVE NOT HELPED THE PML'S IMAGE.

10. IF THE POLLS ARE HELD AND ELECTED INDIVIDUALS ASSSOCIATED WITH THE PPP OUTNUMBER THOSE WITH THE PML, BHUTTO'S CALL FOR EARLY -- I.E. PRE 1990 -- GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD GAIN LEGITIMACY. IT WOULD OPEN UP A NEW CHAPTER IN THE ZIA-BHUTTO DRAMA AND WOULD PUT MORE PRESSURE ON JUNEJO AND ZIA TO FIND A WAY TO PREVENT BENAZIR AND THE PPP FROM CONTESTING IN 1990.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

11. PAKISTAN'S PRIMARY FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAVE FOCUSSED ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND THE GULF, AND US RELATIONS. NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH INDIA, BUT THE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE INDUCED BY INDIA'S "BRASS TACKS" EXERCISE, WHICH PREVAILED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIX-MONTH REPORTING PERIOD, HAD LARGELY DISSIPATED BY MID-MARCH.

12. AFGHANISTAN NEGOTIATIONS. MOMENTUM TOWARD REACHING AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE PEAKED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, AT THE UN GENEVA TALKS HELD IN LATE FEBRUARY AND EARLY MARCH. AT THAT TIME, THE KABUL/MOSCOW SIDE CAME DOWN TO AN 18-MONTH TROOP WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE AND THE PAKISTANIS RESPONDED WITH SEVEN MONTHS. THE FLURRY

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OF SOVIET/PAKISTAN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WHICH PRECEDED THE GENEVA SESSION, HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CEASED. MOSCOW IS

PROBABLY WAITING TO SEE HOW THIS YEAR'S MILITARY OPERATIONS PROGRESS AND HOW NAJIBULLAH'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICIES FARE, BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, BEFORE RENEWING THE DIALOGUE. PAKISTAN, NO DOUBT, HOPES THAT STEADILY IMPROVING MUJAHIDIN CAPABILITIES AND SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD WILL INDUCE FURTHER FLEXIBILITY IN MOSCOW'S NEGOTIATING POSITION.

13. KABUL AND MOSCOW HAVE ALSO RETALIATED AGAINST PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE BY CARRYING THE WAR MORE DIRECTLY INTO PAKISTAN. HEAVY AERIAL BOMBING ATTACKS, IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH, ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE STAGING AREAS JUST INSIDE THE PAKISTAN BORDER, WERE ESSENTIALLY MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MUJAHIDIN, WHO, AT THE TIME, WERE ASSEMBLING THEIR SUPPLY CARAVANS AND PREPARING TO CROSS INTO AFGHANISTAN FOR A NEW YEAR OF FIGHTING. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUALLY HIGH CASUALTIES -- PRIMARILY AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN AND

REFUGEES -- THE RAIDS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION IN ISLAMABAD. SINCE THE SPRING SUCH ATTACKS HAVE DROPPED OFF DRAMATICALLY -- MOST MUJAHDIN AND THEIR WEAPONS ARE ALREADY WELL INSIDE AFG ANISTAN -- BUT THEY COULD RESUME WHENEVER THE MUJAHIDIN AGAIN PRESENT A SIMILARLY HIGH PROFILE TARGET.

14. MEANWHILE, TERRORIST BOMBINGS ATTRIBUTED TO KABUL'S KHAD AGENTS, WHICH HAVE SPREAD BEYOND THE BORDER AREAS INTO PAKISTAN'S MAJOR CITIES, ARE GREATLY INCREASING PUBLIC INSECURITY AND APPREHENSION AND ARE HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN PROVOKING PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST

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PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDIN AND FOR THE REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. PRESIDENT ZIA, HOWEVER, HAS CALLED ON PAKISTANIS TO MEET THE CHALLENGE. WE DO NOT EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ABANDON THE POLICY THAT IT BELIEVES HAS BEEN, TO DATE, VERY EFFECTIVE IN CAUSING THE SOVIETS TO MODIFY THEIR GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, ISLAMABAD WILL CERTAINLY TRY TO REINVIGORATE THE AFGHAN NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO REASSURE ITS PUBLIC.

15. PAK IRANIAN RELATIONS. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR IRAN. AWARE OF THIS, PAKISTAN SEES ITSELF AS COUNTERACTING IRAN'S DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION (PAKISTAN WILL BE REPRESENTING IRAN'S INTERESTS IN PARIS), AND HAS CONTINUED TO TRY TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS -- A PROCESS WHICH BEGAN IN LATE 1986 IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORTS TO COORDINATE POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN. ISLAMABAD MUST REMAIN WARY, HOWEVER, OF IRAN'S POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE-MAKING, BOTH THROUGH ITS

SUPPORT FOR MILITANT, PRO-KHOMEINI PAKISTANI SHIAS, WHO ARE ALSO ANTI-ZIA, AND THROUGH ITS INFILTRATION INTO PAKISTAN OF OPERATIVES SENT TO ATTACK ANTI-KHOMEINI IRANIANS. IN EARLY JULY, RAIDS BY PRO-KHOMEINI TEAMS AGAINST ANTI-KHOMEINI HEADQUARTERS IN KARACHI AND QUETTA CAUSED A NUMBER OF DEATHS, LED TO THE ARREST OF PRO-KHOMEINI ATTACKERS, AND DEMONSTRATED ALL-TOO-GRAPHICALLY THE FIREPOWER WITHIN PAKISTAN OF PRO-KHOMEINI GROUPS. THE GROWING NUMBER OF IRANIAN REFUGEES, PARTICULARLY IN KARACHI, IS ANOTHER SOURCE OF FRICTION.

16. US-PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN A MAJOR PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. CONCERN THAT DISAGREEMENT OVER PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICIES WOULD THREATEN THE PROPOSED NEW AID PACKAGE INCREASED WHEN US AUTHORITIES

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ARRESTED A PAKISTANI RESIDENT OF CANADA, ARSHAD PERVEZ, FOR TRYING TO CIRCUMVENT US LAWS CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR-RELATED MATERIAL. IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE US CONGRESS WILL TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION TO EITHER TEMPORARILY SUSPEND OR OTHERWISE CURTAIL US AID TO PAKISTAN. THE PERVEZ CASE HAS COINCIDED WITH GROWING CONCERN IN PAKISTAN OVER TERRORIST BOMBINGS, THAT SOME BLAME ON THE US, PERCEIVED AS THE ARCHITECT OF ISLAMABAD'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY. IT HAS ALSO COINCIDED WITH OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY AMONG PAKISTANI SHIAS, TO THE US PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN GULF AFFAIRS.

17. INDO-PAKISTAN NORMALIZATION ON HOLD. TENSIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, STEMMING INITIALLY FROM THE LATTER'S MASSIVE "BRASS TACKS" MILITARY EXERCISES IN LATE 1986-EARLY 1987, GRADUALLY LESSENED DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH, AS BOTH COUNTRIES REDEPLOYED THEIR FORCES AWAY FROM THE BORDER. SINCE THEN, RELATIONS HAVE BEEN ON HOLD, ALTHOUGH MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC COOPERATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RESUMED TRADE TALKS -- A SUBJECT OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO INDIA. HOWEVER, A NEW WAVE OF SIKH VIOLENCE IN INDIA THIS SUMMER IS LIKELY ONCE MORE TO PREVENT ANY PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION, FURTHER HARDENING INDIAN CONVICTIONS THAT PAKISTAN (DESPITE OFFICIAL DENIALS) SUPPORTS SIKH EXTREMISTS. (FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS SEE THE INDIA SECTION.)

INDIA

DOMESTIC SITUATION

1. GANDHI'S PROBLEMS. GANDHI'S POLITICAL SITUATION

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CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE. CHARGES OF COVERING UP HIGH LEVEL CORRUPTION AND KICK BACKS ON DEFENSE CONTRACTS WIPED OUT HIS MR. CLEAN IMAGE AND MORE DAMAGING REVELATIONS ARE LIKELY. CABINET RESHUFFLES GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF INDECISIVENESS. ALTHOUGH THE SRI LANKA ACC
ORD WILL HELP HIM, LONG-STANDING ETHNIC CONFLICTS WITHIN INDIA CONTINUE UNDERSCORING GANDHI'S POLICY FAILURES.

2. A NO-WIN IMAGE. PERHAPS MOST DAMAGING TO GANDHI

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POLITICALLY IS THE GROWING BELIEF AMONG HIS FELLOW CONGRESS (I) COLLEAGUES THAT HE CANNOT WIN ELECTIONS. SINCE MID,198, HIS PARTY HAS LOST A STRING OF STATE - ASSEMBY POLLS; IT NOW CONTROLS ONLY ABOUT ONE-HALF OF INDIA'S TWENTY-FIVE STATES. MOST DEVASTATING WAS THE PARTY'S TROUNCING THIS PAST JUNE IN THE HINDI-SPEAKING STATE OF HARYANA, WHERE CONGRESS (I) WON ONLY 5 OF 87 CONTESTED ASSEMBLY SEATS. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DEFEAT SUGGESTS THAT THE CONGRESS (I) PARTY'S POPULAR STRENGTH MAY BE ERODING IN THE HINDI BELT, WHICH CONTAINS OVER ONE-HALF THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION AND IS THE BASE OF THE RULING PARTY'S STRENGTH.

3. THE ELECTORAL LOSSES ARE ESPECIALLY BAD NEWS TO CONGRESS (I) BECAUSE THEY UNDERSCORE THE LOSS OF SUPPORT AMONG KEY GROUPS. MUSLIMS AND HINDU UNTOUCHABLES, ANGERED AT THE SURGE OF COMMUNAL RIOTING, DESERTED THE PARTY IN LARGE NUMBERS. THE CONTINUED BLOOD-LETTING IN PUNJAB BY SIKH MILITANTS ANGERED HINDUS. EVEN GANDHI'S MOVE TO REIMPOSE CENTRAL RULE IN PUNJAB AND TO ADOPT A TOUGH LAW AND ORDER STANCE THERE DID NOT SEEM TO IMPRESS MANY HINDUS.

4. CONGRESS-I DISCONTENT. SOME CONGRESS (I) DISSIDENT PARLIAMENTARIANS SIGNALLED THEIR DISCONTENT IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO PERSUADE FORMER PRESIDENT ZAIL

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SINGH -- NO FRIEND OF THE PRIME MINISTER -- TO RUN AGAINST THE PARTY'S OFFICIAL NOMINEE. ON THE EVE OF THE JULY 13 PRESIDENTIAL POLL, GANDHI EXPELLED SOME PROMINENT PARTY FIGURES, INCLUDING HIS POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS COUSIN ARUN NEHRU. AFTER HIS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WON, GANDHI EXPELLED FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER V.P. SINGH, WHOSE INVESTIGATIONS OF CORRUPTION HAD EMBARRASSED GANDHI.

5. V.P. SINGH'S EXPULSION PROVIDED THE DISSIDENTS A FOCUS AROUND WHICH TO RALLY, AND MAKE IT LESS CERTAIN

THAT GANDHI WILL SURVIVE UNTIL THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTIONS. SINGH HAS EMBARKED ON A COUNTRYWIDE SPEAKING TOUR, AND HAS DRAWN HUGE CROWDS. HE AND OTHER CONGRESS (I) DISSIDENTS IDENTIFYING WITH HIM ARE TRYING TO EXPLOIT FACTIONALISM IN CONGRESS (I)-CONTROLLED STATES. THEIR OBJECTIVE MAY BE TO TOPPLE SUCH GOVERNMENTS IN THE EXPECTATION THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM THOSE STATES WILL TURN AGAINST GANDHI. THEIR MAJOR EFFORT SO FAR IS IN UTTAR PRADESH, INDIA'S LARGEST STATE, AND THE HOME OF BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND V.P. SINGH.

6. GANDHI'S ASSETS. THE PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, STILL

RETAINS SOME FORMIDABLE ASSETS. HIS PARTY CONTROLS OVER TWOTHIRDS OF THE SEATS IN PARLIAMENT, AND AN ANTI-DEFECTION LAW REQUIRES PARTY REBELS TO VACATE THEIR SEATS, UNLESS AT LEAST ONE-THIRD THE CONGRESS (I) MEMBERSHIP IN PARLIAMENT JOIN WITH THEM IN LEAVING THE PARTY. THIS IS A SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE TO DEFECTION, AND FEW CONGRESS (I) MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WANT TO GO THROUGH WITH ANOTHER ELECTION BEFORE LATE 1989, WHEN GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE. FOR THEIR PART, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, AND

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UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW THEY SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CONGRESS (I) DISSIDENCE.

7. GANDHI'S RESPONSE. THE CHALLENGES TO GANDHI HAVE PROMPTED HIM TO TURN TO OLD LINE, LEFTIST CONGRESS (I) POLITICIANS AND ADVISORS. BESIDES ADOPTING A MORE POPULIST TONE, GANDHI HAS SLOWED THE PACE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION. HIS CONGRESS (I) WORKING COMMITTEE IN MAY PASSED A RESOLUTION WHICH WAS A RECITATION OF STANDARD THIRD WORLD SOCIALIST JARGON. WHILE TALKING ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF REVIVING THE PARTY'S ANEMIC GRASS ROOTS BASE, HE HAS DONE ALMOST NOTHING TO MAKE IT A DYNAMIC BODY. UNLESS HE SOON BEGINS TO DO SO, HE MAY FIND HIMSELF INCREASINGLY OUTMANUEVERED BY THE DISSIDENTS AND AT A DISADVANTAGE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

8. INDO-PAK NORMALIZATION STALLED. FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY-MARCH INDO-PAKISTANI AGREEMENTS REDEPLOYING TROOPS AWAY FROM THE FRONTIER, FEW SIGNIFICANT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO GET THE STALLED RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS GOING. A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES REQUIRE ACTION: BLENDING PAKISTAN'S NO-WAR PACT WITH INDIA'S TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP; FINALIZING THE 1985 ZIA/GANDHI VERBAL AGREEMENT PLEDGING EACH COUNTRY NOT TO ATTACK THE OTHER'S

NUCLEAR FACILITIES; WORKING OUT A SATISFACTORY TRADE RELATIONSHIP; DEMARCATING THE CONTESTED SIACHEN GLACIER BORDER; AND PRACTICAL STEPS TO PERSUADE EACH SIDE TO END CROSS-BORDER ASSISTANCE TO ETHNIC DISSIDENTS IN THE OTHER COUNTRY. INDIA REMAINS CONVINCED THAT PAKISTAN IS HELPING SIKH EXTREMISTS (THOUGH IT HAS, SINCE THE TWO HOME SECRETARIES MET IN DECEMBER 1986, TONED DOWN ITS CHARGES), AND PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO RECENTLY COMMENTED THAT INDIA MAY BE BEHIND PAKISTAN'S LATEST SPATE OF

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ETHNIC RIOTS.

9. US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN STILL A PROBLEM. INDIA HAS BECOME EVEN MORE CRITICAL OF THE PROPOSED NEW US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN. NEW DELHI CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT THESE ARMS ARE INTENDED FOR USE AGAINST IT, AND NOT AGAINST ANY THREAT FROM THE NORTHWEST. INDIA IS ESPECIALLY ALARMED BY POSSIBLE PAKISTANI ACQUISITION OF AN AEW CAPABILITY, ARGUING THAT SUCH A MILITARY SYSTEM IS A FORCE MULTIPLIER WHICH FORCES INDIA TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY ITS OWN MILITARY EXPENDITURES. INDIA HAS ALSO STEPPED UP ITS CRITICISM OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, PROMPTED BY THE LATEST A.Q.KHAN INTERVIEW AND THE FALLOUT FROM THE PERVEZ CASE. ITS APPROACH IS AT LEAST PARTLY DESIGNED TO EGG ON AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE NEW MILITARY AID PACKAGE FOR PAKISTAN.

10. THE SRI LANKA ACCORD. INDIA'S MOST DARING AND SUCCESSFUL FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE THIS YEAR WAS ITS MOVE TO RESOLVE THE FESTERING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA. IN EARLY JUNE, INDIA'S HUMANITARIAN AIR DROP OVER SRI LANKA -- ACCOMPANIED BY MIRAGE 2000 FIGHTERS -- WAS A THINLY VEILED WARNING THAT INDIA WAS PREPARED TO GET TOUGHER WITH SRI LANKA, IF SRI LANKAN MILITARY ATTACKS ON ITS TAMIL INSURGENTS RESULTED IN HIGH CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE GOT THE MESSAGE. HE ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIA THAT RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN A PEACE ACCORD SIGNED JULY 29 BY GANDHI AND JAYEWARDENE. INDIA ALSO CONVINCED JAYEWARDENE TO AGREE THAT COLOMBO WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY PREJUDICIAL THIRD PARTY (READ PAKISTAN AND/OR THE U.S.) MILITARY PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES IN SRI LANKA, TO WHICH

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INDIA OBJECTED, THUS GIVING INDIA AN INCREASED ROLE IN SRI LANKAN AFFAIRS.

11. INDIA APPEARS DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT A RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO MAJOR ETHNIC COMMUNITIES ON THE TROUBLED ISLAND REPUBLIC. NEW DELHI FLEW V. PRABHAKARAN,

THE LEADER OF THE LARGEST TAMIL MILITANT GROUP, TO THE CAPITAL AND AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF NEGOTIATIONS, PRABHAKARAN AGREED -- WITHOUT GREAT ENTHUSIASM -- TO HAND OVER ARMS TO THE INDIAN TROOPS DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES. INDIA WARNED THAT ITS TROOPS WOULD SEIZE ANY ARMS NOT SURRENDERED BY THE TAMIL

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MILITANTS. IT ALSO AGREED TO JOINT INDO-SRI LANKAN PATROLLING OF THE PALK STRAIT, AND TO HELP COLOMBO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN THE TWO TAMIL MAJORITY PROVINCES IF REQUESTED.

12. INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP. INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR REMAIN VERY CORDIAL. GANDHI VISITED THE USSR IN JULY TO OPEN A CULTURAL FESTIVAL, AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV HEAPED HIGH PRAISE ON HIM, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN GANDHI'S SAGGING DOMESTIC FORTUNES. INDIA APPEARS TO BE LESS ALARMED BY THE PROSPECT OF IMPROVED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, IN PART BECAUSE TENSIONS ON THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER SEEM TO HAVE ABATED, AFTER THE VISIT TO BEIJING IN JUNE BY INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TIWARI. NONETHELESS, GANDHI IS STILL ANXIOUS TO RETAIN MOSCOW'S SUPPORT; NEW DELHI'S POSITIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING AFGHAN SECRETARY GENERAL NAJIB'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORTS MAY BE DESIGNED TO REASSURE MOSCOW OF THE LASTING IMPORTANCE TO INDIA OF SOVIET FRIENDSHIP.

13. INDO-US RELATIONS. ON THE INDO-US FRONT, THE GOI CONTINUES TO CITE A "TREMENDOUS" IMPROVEMENT, WHILE STILL REGULARLY ENGAGING IN YANKEE-BASHING. THE LATTER

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APPARENTLY ORIGINATES FROM SOME OF GANDHI'S LEFTIST ADVISORS, PART OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO BUILD DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. THE JULY VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF AN INDIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DELEGATION, TO DISCUSS COOPERATION ON THE LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT, SUGGESTS THAT INDIA REMAINS CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF US HIGH TECHNOLOGY. ALSO, THE US IS STILL INDIA'S NUMBER ONE TRADING PARTNER AND THE SOURCE OF THE LARGEST NUMBER OF COLLABORATIVE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

14. SINO-INDIAN FRONT. INDIA AND CHINA EARLY THIS YEAR BEEFED UP THEIR MILITARY POSITIONS ALONG THE CONTESTED BORDER BETWEEN XIZANG (TIBET) AND THE INDIAN STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH. HOWEVER, THE HARSH RHETORIC DECLINED CONSIDERABLY IN EARLY SUMMER. THEN-FOREIGN MINISTER TIWARI VISITED CHINA IN JUNE, IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE THE CHINESE OF INDIA'S PACIFIC INTENTIONS AND TO AGREE TO ANOTHER ROUND OF THE DELAYED BILATERAL BORDER TALKS. TIWARI ANNOUNCED THAT THE TALKS WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER

THIS YEAR. TO SIGNAL ITS DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS, INDIA MAY ALSO HAVE DOWNPLAYED OR CANCELLED MILITARY MANUEVERS IN NORTHEASTERN INDIA. HOWEVER, NEITHER SIDE HAS YET INDICATED THAT IT IS PREPARED TO COMPROMISE, AND THIS COULD CREATE PROBLEMS WHEN THEY SIT DOWN TO TALK.

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15. REGIONAL COOPERATION. REGIONAL COOPERATION IS CAUTIOUSLY MOVING AHEAD IN SOUTH ASIA, DESPITE SOME PERSISTENT DISTRUST OF INDIA ON THE PART OF ITS IMMEDIATE (AND SMALLER) NEIGHBORS. THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) HELD A PRODUCTIVE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW DELHI JUNE 18-19, DESPITE FEARS THAT GENERAL ANTIPATHY TO INDIA'S FLOUTING SRI LANKAN

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SOVEREIGNTY IN AIRDROPPING RELIEF SUPPLIES TO SRI LANKAN TAMILS WOULD DISRUPT THE PROCEEDINGS. THAT IT DID NOT DO SO IS TESTIMONY BOTH TO THE LOW-KEY ORGANIZATIONS'S RESILIENCE AND TO ITS LIMITATIONS. COMMITMENT TO THE AVOIDANCE OF DIVISIVE CONTROVERSY IS BUILT INTO SAARC -- ITS CHARTER EXPLICITY EXCLUDES FROM ITS DELIBERATIONS ALL "BILATERAL AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUES."

16. SAARC ACHIEVEMENTS. SAARC WORKING GROUPS DISCUSS COOPERATION IN A BROAD ARRAY OF NON-CONTROVERSIAL FIELDS, SUCH AS AGRICULTURE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CULTURE, SPORTS, HEALTH, ETC. GIVEN THE REGION'S HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER REGIONAL GROUPINGS, PROGRESS BY THE WORKING GROUPS IS ENCOURAGING. EARLY ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDED ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL METEOROLOGICAL RESEARCH CENTER IN INDIA AND AN AGRICULTURAL INFORMATON CENTER IN BANGLADESH.

17. THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUES ON THE SAARC AGENDA SO FAR, ADOPTED AT THE INITIATIVE OF SAARC HEADS OF STATE AT THEIR LAST GET-TOGETHER, ARE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM.

- A TECHNICAL GROUP ON NARCOTICS HAS REPORTEDLY ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON A REGIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING (THOUGH DETAILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE).

-- AT THE JUNE 1987 MEETING, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS ADOPTED A LIST OF TERRORIST ACTS FOR WHICH THE "POLITICAL CRIMES" DEFENSE COULD NOT BE INVOKED TO PREVENT EXTRADITION.

18. AN INFORMAL BILATERAL FORUM. PERHAPS ITS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL STABILITY IS THAT SAARC SERVES TO FACILITATE THE CONSIDERATION OF BILATERAL ISSUES, BY

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PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TOP-LEVEL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT THE MARGINS OF MEETINGS. IN JUNE, THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN LED TO AN AGREEMENT TO CONVENE THEIR BILATERAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION, WHILE HIS MEETING WITH SRI LANKAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAMEED SIGNALLED A RELAXATION IN INDO-SRI LANKAN TENSIONS. SHULTZ

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 225

- BEGIN SUMMARY: RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION APPROVING A NEW PAKISTANI AID PACKAGE CONTINUED TO ATTRACT PRESS CRITICISM. "SHOCK FOR INDIA," A "TIMES OF INDIA" EDITORIAL, AND "INDIA'S DISCOMFITURE AND U.S. AMBIVALENCE," A COLUMN IN THE LUCKNOW "PIONEER," NOTED THAT RECENT U.S. SOUTH ASIA POLICY DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE THAT PAKISTAN HAS BEEN GIVEN THE AID IT WANTED AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICYMAKERS HAVE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE REGION HAS NOT CHANGED. MOST MAJOR DAILIES REPORTED THAT THE AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM CASE OF YOUNG SOVIET SCIENTIST ALEXANDER BABI REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND THAT THE INS
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HAS TURNED DOWN A GOI REQUEST TO DEPORT FORMER BOFORS ARMS AGENT WIN CHADHA. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE USG HAS EXTENDED ITS "SINCERE CONDOLENCES" ON THE DEATH OF TAMIL NADU CHIEF MINISTER M.G. RAMACHANDRAN, A FORMER CINEMA SUPERSTAR, AND THAT INDO-U.S. COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURE IS EXPANDING. IN A REVIEW OF 1987 U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, A PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) REPORT FROM WASHINGTON SAID THAT "THE INF TREATY ALONE APPEARS TO

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ASSURE REAGAN A PLACE IN WORLD HISTORY." (FOR AFGHANISTAN ANNIVERSARY-RELATED COVERAGE, SEE SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 84.) END SUMMARY.

- SOUTH ASIA POLICY

- RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON A NEW AID PACKAGE FOR PAKISTAN CONTINUED TO ATTRACT INDIAN PRESS CRITICISM. "SHOCK FOR INDIA," A "TIMES OF INDIA" EDITORIAL, COMMENTED THAT IN APPROVING THE NEW PAKISTAN AID PACKAGE "THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPTS TO CAMOUFLAGE THEIR PRIORITIES" AND CRITICIZED GOI FOREIGN POLICYMAKERS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE U.S. HAS CHANGED ITS PERCEPTION OF INDIA. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS:

- BEGIN TEXT: WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SOUTH BLOCK IN NEW DELHI, NO ONE CAN BE SURPRISED OVER THE DECISION OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO CLEAR A DOLS. 4.02 BILLION AID PACKAGE FOR PAKISTAN DESPITE THAT COUNTRY'S PROVEN BID TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THIS DENOUEMENT HAS BEEN PREDICTED IN THESE COLUMNS MORE THAN ONCE. EVEN SO, THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. WHICH IS
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THAT TO THE RELIEF OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN LEGISLATORS HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE THE AID WITHOUT IMPOSING ANY CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE SERVED TO RESTRAIN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SIGNED THE AID ORDER, THUS WAIVING THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT WHICH BARS ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES PRODUCING OR TRYING TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW HE IS ALSO NO LONGER REQUIRED TO CERTIFY EITHER THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT MOVING TOWARD ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON OR EVEN THAT IT HAS NOT REACHED "QUESTIONABLE" LEVELS IN URANIUM ENRICHMENT. QUITE CLEARLY CONGRESS AS WELL AS THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE CONVICTION OF THE PAKISTAN-BORN ARSHAD PERVEZ BY A U.S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY ON CHARGES OF TRYING TO SMUGGLE NUCLEAR GRADE MATERIAL TO PAKISTAN. IN THEIR EYES THE PREOCCUPATION WITH PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DRIVE MUST TAKE SECOND PLACE TO PAKISTAN'S USEFULNESS AS A "FRIEND" WHICH HELPS THE U.S. TO RESIST THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS SOVIET "EXPANSIONISM" IN THE GULF. NONE OF ALL THIS IS NEW AND IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO DESCRIBE THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT AS YET ANOTHER INSTANCE OF AMERICAN CHICANERY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPTS TO CAMOUFLAGE THEIR PRIORITIES.

- IT HARDLY NEEDS TO BE STRESSED THAT THIS TURN OF EVENTS HAS EXPOSED THE NAIVETY OF THE ARCHITECTS OF THIS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY. SOUTH BLOCK HAS BEEN UNABLE, OR UNWILLING, OR BOTH, TO ACKNOWLEDGE AMERICAN PRIORITIES FOR WHAT THEY ARE. IT FAILED TO GAUGE THE MOOD IN CONGRESS. IT ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE FLATTERED

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 225

FAR BEYOND REASONABLE LIMITS BY WASHINGTON'S BACKING FOR INDIA'S ACTION IN SRI LANKA SO FAR AS TO CLAIM

THAT IT MARKED SOME SORT OF A TURNING POINT IN INDO-U.S. RELATIONS. EQUALLY EXAGGERATED HAS BEEN THE SO-CALLED PERSONAL EQUATION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE STRUCK WITH MR. RAJIV GANDHI. ALL IN ALL, THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC RELATIONS MACHINE CREATED THE ILLUSION THAT U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA HAD UNDERGONE A SEA-CHANGE, THANKS TO THE PROJECTION OF THIS COUNTRY'S MILITARY PROWESS AND TO ITS ATTEMPTS TO LIBERALIZE THE ECONOMY ON THE ONE HAND AND TO STRIKE A BALANCE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ON

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THE OTHER. THAT ILLUSION HAS NOW BEEN SHATTERED. END TEXT.

- ASYLUM FOR SOVIET SCIENTIST

- MOST MAJOR DAILIES REPORTED ON THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE CASE OF SOVIET SCIENTIST ALEXANDER BABI, WHO TOOK REFUGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION IN NEW DELHI DECEMBER 18. ALL COVERAGE INDICATED THAT NO APPARENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN EFFORTS TO END THE DEADLOCK OVER HIS FUTURE. "TIMES OF INDIA" IN A STORY HEADLINED "AUSTRALIAN UNDECIDED ON ASYLUM TO SCIENTIST" QUOTED AN AUSTRALIAN SPOKESMAN AS SAYING CONSULTATIONS WITH INDIAN AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE CONTINUING, SOVIET DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TALK TO BABI, AND THE CASE HAS "BEEN BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF THE DELHI OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES."

- --A FRONTPAGE "STATESMAN" ARTICLE SAID: "FROM ALL AVAILABLE INDICATIONS, MR. BABI ALEXANDER IS NEITHER A CLOSET SPY NOR A SCIENTIST WORKING IN A DEPARTMENT SO SENSITIVE THAT ANY WESTERN COUNTRY WOULD WELCOME THE 25-YEAR-OLD WOULD-BE DEFECTOR WITH OPEN ARMS."

- --SEVERAL PAPERS CARRIED PTI REPORT FROM WASHINGTON SAYING "THE U.S. IS BELIEVED TO BE WATCHING CLOSELY THE ASYLUM REQUEST BY ALEXANDER BABI TO EMIGRATE TO AUSTRALIA" AND "OBSERVERS NOTE THAT THE U.S. AUTOMATICALLY GRANTS ASYLUM TO ANYONE FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR EASTERN EUROPE."

- DEPORTATION DENIAL

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\- MOST MAJOR DAILIES GAVE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE TO A PTI REPORT FROM NEW YORK STATING THAT "THE U.S. AUTHORITIES HAVE REJECTED A RENEWED DEMAND BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT FOR DEPORTATION OF MR. WIN CHADHA, FORMER AGENT OF BOFORS, WHO IS REQUIRED IN INDIA IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN INVESTIGATIONS." STORIES QUOTED AN INS SPOKESMAN AS SAYING CHADHA WAS IN THE U.S. AS A LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT AND "WE DO NOT DEPORT ANYONE UNLESS THERE IS A VIOLATION OF IMMIGRANT STATUS." TYPICAL HEADLINES WERE "U.S. REJECTS DEMAND TO DEPORT CHADHA" ("HINDUSTAN TIMES"), "U.S. REFUSES TO DEPORT CHADHA" ("FINANCIAL EXPRESS") AND "U.S. AGAIN REJECTS PLEA TO DEPORT CHADHA" ("PATRIOT").

\- U.S. CONDOLENCES

\- INDIAN MEDIA GAVE HEAVY WEEKEND COVERAGE TO MOURNING OVER THE DEATH IN MADRAS OF M.G. RAMACHANDRAN, THE CHIEF MINISTER OF TAMIL NADU. SEVERAL PAPERS QUOTED A PTI REPORT BASED ON AN EMBASSY RELEASE, SAYING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT EXTENDING THE USG'S "SINCERE CONDOLENCES" ON THE CHIEF MINISTER'S DEATH. PTI STORY SAID "THE PASSING AWAY OF MGR WAS NOTED IN LENGTHY DESPATCHES IN THE U.S. PRESS" AND THE "WASHINGTON POST" REPORTED HE WAS "A CENTRAL FIGURE IN EFFORTS TO END THE GUERRILLA WAR BY TAMIL REBELS IN SRI LANKA."

\- INDO-U.S. SCIENCE COOPERATION

\- A PTI STORY ON INDO-U.S. AGRICULTURE COOPERATION AND THE NEED FOR INCREASED DRYLAND PRODUCTIVITY WAS

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E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 225

THE BASIS FOR ARTICLES IN "NATIONAL HERALD," "ECONOMIC TIMES" AND "HINDUSTAN TIMES." THESE PUBLICATIONS REPORTED THAT A TEAM OF U.S. AND INDIAN SCIENTISTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INDO-U.S. SUBCOMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE HAVE COMPLETED A REPORT ON "THE PROBLEMS, ONGOING RESEARCH AND FUTURE PRIORITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DRYLAND AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM IN INDIA." ACCORDING TO THE STORIES, THE TEAM CONCLUDED THAT INDIA'S RURAL SECTOR WILL SOON BE FACING A "QUIET CRISIS" OF THE POST-GREEN REVOLUTION AND "BOLD" STRATEGIC PLANNING IS NEEDED IN THE COMING DECADE.
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- --"NATIONAL HERALD" CARRIED UNITED NEWS OF INDIA (UNI) REPORT THAT AN INDO-U.S. PANEL OF SENIOR SCIENTISTS HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES UNDERTAKE A MAJOR DIAGNOSTIC MONSOON RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE CONDITIONS LEADING TO INDIA'S PRESENT DROUGHT. STORY NOTED THAT OTHER NEW INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS HAVE ALSO BEEN RECOMMENDED UNDER THE BILATERAL "SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE."

- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECORD

- SEVERAL PAPERS CARRIED PTI STORY FROM WASHINGTON

REVIEWING THE YEAR'S POLITICAL HIGHLIGHTS UNDER HEADLINE "INF OUTSHINES OTHER EVENTS IN U.S." ON THE NEW AGREEMENT, PTI CONCLUDED: "AS 1987 WAS COMING TO A CLOSE, RONALD REAGAN, THE COLD WARRIOR, BECAME RONALD REAGAN THE WORLD STATESMAN AND SIGNED A TREATY WITH SOVIET LEADER MR. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN THE WHITE HOUSE TO ELIMINATE ALL THE MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ARMORY OF THE SUPERPOWERS. THEY NOW SEEM SET TO SIGN AN EVEN MORE SPECTACULAR ACCORD IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS BY 50 PERCENT.

- "THE INF TREATY ALONE APPEARS TO ASSURE REAGAN A PLACE IN WORLD HISTORY, AS IT DOES FOR GENERAL-SECRETARY GORBACHEV, THOUGH THEY WILL DO AWAY WITH NOT MORE THAN THREE OR FOUR PERCENT OF THE NUCLEAR PUNCH THEY PACK -- MANY TIMES THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER NEEDED TO DESTROY ALL HUMAN LIFE ON EARTH. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT WAS ALL THE MORE SURPRISING BECAUSE ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES WAS A MAN WHO HAD DESCRIBED THE SOVIET UNION AS "THE EVIL EMPIRE" WHOSE WORD COULD
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NEVER BE TRUSTED. NOT TOO LONG AGO REAGAN WAS STILL CALLING THE SOVIETS LIARS AND CHEATS.

- "NOT SURPRISINGLY, THEN, THOSE WHO CHEERED HIM FOR SUCH TASTELESS AND POINTLESS RHETORIC WERE ASTOUNDED, SHOCKED AND PAINED AS THEY SAW THEIR HERO SIGNING AN ACCORD WITH THE HEAD OF THE ALLEGED 'EVIL EMPIRE.'

- "HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES ACCORD AND THE SENATE SEEMS CERTAIN TO RATIFY IT NEXT YEAR DESPITE THE FULMINATIONS OF THE HARDLINE RIGHT WING.

- THE INF TREATY HAS SAVED THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY FROM AN IGNOMINIOUS END IN ANOTHER YEAR. BUT FOR IT HIS PRESIDENCY WOULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN REMEMBERED ONLY FOR THE IGNOBLE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. THERE, REAGAN DID EVERYTHING HE HAD PLEDGED NOT TO DO."

- --ON INDO-U.S. RELATIONS, THE PTI STORY SAID: "INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED TO THRIVE UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE HAD CAREFULLY CULTIVATED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI AND PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI, WHO HAS NOW MADE TWO SUCCESSFUL VISITS TO WASHINGTON. THE WORLD'S LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL DEMOCRACIES DRAMATIZED THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BY HI-TECH TRANSFER AGREEMENTS SYMBOLIZED BY THE SUPERCOMPUTER. HOWEVER, IN ONE STROKE, CONGRESS ALMOST UNDID REAGAN'S MASSIVE ACHIEVEMENT BY

EQUATING INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND
EVEN THREATENING SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA, BOTH
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL, IF INDIA DOES NOT SIGN ON

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ACTION NEA-04

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 NEW DELHI 31062

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 225

THE DOTTED LINE. FORTUNATELY, BETTER SENSE PREVAILED
EVEN WITH THE CONGRESS." ROSE

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ACTION NEA-04

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

- BEGIN SUMMARY: PRINT MEDIA DURING THE WEEKEND FOCUSED ON A UNI WASHINGTON STORY UNDER A TYPICAL HEADLINE, "U.S. CONGRESS CHOPS AID TO PAKISTAN FOR 1988" ("INDIAN EXPRESS"). COMMENT NOTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT NEW DELHI SEES THE MOVE AS "CONTAINING A MESSAGE FOR ISLAMABAD" AND THAT AMBASSADOR DEAN "WORKED HARD TO PREVENT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR SETBACK TO THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS." THE WEEKEND AND DECEMBER 21 PRESS CARRIED SEVERAL POSITIVE ANALYSES ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, STRESSING REAGAN AND GORBACHEV "HAVE MADE POSSIBLE WHAT LOOKED IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL THE OTHER DAY." "INDIAN EXPRESS"

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STAFFER LALITA PANICKER, COMMENTING ON THE INDO-U.S. VACCINE ACTION PROGRAM (VAP), SAID ALTHOUGH SOME SCIENTISTS EXPRESS FEARS INDIANS "MAY WELL BE USED AS GUINEA PIGS FOR THE U.S.'S EXPERIMENTS," VAP IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SHELVED BECAUSE IT IS A PART OF THE REAGAN-GANDHI SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE. NEWS REPORTS ON SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY'S NEW DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS FOCUSED ON HIS ASSURANCE THAT PROPOSED SOVIET-AIDED NUCLEAR PLANTS IN

INDIA WILL NOT FACE THE FUEL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE U.S.-AIDED TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER PLANT. MOST PAPERS GAVE FRONTPAGE COVERAGE TO REPORTS THAT INDIAN AUTHORITIES ARE SEARCHING FOR A VISITING 25-YEAR-OLD SOVIET SCIENTIST, WHO WAS REPORTED MISSING WHILE WITH A SOVIET TOUR GROUP IN NEW DELHI. EDITORIAL REACTION UNIFORMLY WELCOMED THE BHOPAL JUDGE'S RULING ASKING UNION CARBIDE TO PAY DOLS. 270 MILLION AS INTERIM RELIEF TO THE GAS VICTIMS. END SUMMARY

- U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

- MAJOR NEWSPAPERS DECEMBER 18 RAN A UNI STORY FROM WASHINGTON ON CUT IN U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN STRESSING, "DESPITE THE NEWS OF ARSHAD PERVEZ BEING CONVICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY ON FIVE COUNTS OF SMUGGLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL FOR DESTRUCTIVE USE IN PAKISTAN, CONGRESS COMPROMISED ON ITS NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS AND GAVE PAKISTAN A FREE HAND TO CONTINUE ITS REPORTED NUCLEAR PROGRAM."

- --K.K. KATYAL, NEW DELHI CORRESPONDENT OF "THE HINDU," SAID THE SANCTION OF THE CONGRESS "IS SEEN HERE AS CONTAINING A MESSAGE FOR ISLAMABAD. IT IS NOT
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THE SIZE BUT THE FACT OF THE CUT THAT IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. OBVIOUSLY, CONGRESS WOULD LIKE PAKISTAN TO BE HELD IN LEASH IN VIEW OF THAT COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THE INITIAL CUT WILL AFFECT THE TOTAL PACKAGE OF DOLS. 4.02 BILLION TO BE SPREAD OVER SIX YEARS."

- "INDIAN OFFICIALS," KATYAL ALSO OBSERVED, "HAVE REASON TO BE SATISFIED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCES (WHICH IS THE FINAL VIEW OF CONGRESS), BUT ARE UNHAPPY THAT THE CHECKS ON PAKISTAN, SUGGESTED BY THE HOUSE, HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED."

- "AMBASSADOR DEAN," THE CORRESPONDENT WENT ON TO STRESS, "WHO HAD WORKED HARD TO PREVENT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR SETBACK TO THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS DESCRIBED THE RECENT EVENTS AS THE 'GIVE-AND-TAKE' OF THE DEBATE AND SAID, 'WHAT COUNTS, HOWEVER, IS WHAT COMES OUT OF THIS DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, FOR AT THE END OF THE DAY, IT IS THE LANGUAGE WHICH IS FINALLY ENACTED INTO LAW WHICH REPRESENTS THE VIEW OF THE MAJORITY."

- --PRO-GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL HERALD" EDITORIALLY SAID IN PART: "THE PERVEZ CASE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE LIKE CONGRESSMEN SOLARZ AND SENATOR GLENN WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPRESS ON THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION THAT IN ITS AID POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, IT SHOULD GO BY THE LOGIC OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR-NONPROLIFERATION REGULATIONS.... EVEN IF, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, PAKISTAN STOPS SHORT OF TURNING THE

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

LAST SCREW ON THE BOMB--AND THE ACT COMES TO BE

KNOWN--AND THERE IS PROGRESS IN THE SUPERPOWER TALKS ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, THE QUALITY OF U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN WILL NOT BE AFFECTED, UNLESS THE ENTIRE U.S. OUTLOOK TOWARD GLOBAL STRATEGY UNDERGOES A CHANGE."

\- WASHINGTON SUMMIT

\- "INDIAN EXPRESS" STAFFER SUMER KAUL IN HIS ANALYSIS, "THE INF ACCORD IN PERSPECTIVE: A PROMISING
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PREAMBLE," DECLARED: "GORBACHEV AND REAGAN HAVE MADE POSSIBLE WHAT LOOKED IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL THE OTHER DAY. IF IT EARNS THEM A PAGE EACH IN HISTORY, WHETHER OR NOT THAT WAS THEIR BASIC MOTIVATION, ESPECIALLY REAGAN'S, SO BE IT. THEY DESERVE IT.

\- "THE INF ACCORD DOES NOT SPELL THE END OF THE NUCLEAR MADNESS, NOR NECESSARILY EVEN OF DEADLY RIVALRY AND STRIFE. BUT IT DOES TAKE THE HEAT OFF THE COLD WAR -- NOT BY RHETORIC BUT THROUGH CONCRETE ACTION. IF THE TWO LEADERS ALSO PULL OFF AN AGREEMENT ON THE LONG-RANGE MISSILES IN MOSCOW NEXT YEAR, THEY WILL HAVE WRITTEN A PROMISING PREAMBLE TO COMPLETE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT."

\- --"THE HINDU" CARRIED THE VIEW OF FREELANCE WRITER SRIDHAR KRISHNASWAMI THAT THE INF TREATY IS "AN EPOCH-MAKING ACCORD" AND ALSO "THE FIRST STEP TAKEN BY THE TOP POWERS DOWN THE ROAD TO WINDING DOWN THEIR AWESOME NUCLEAR ARSENAL THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL AND DEEP CUTS ON THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FRONT."

\- --"STATESMAN" STAFFER AMALENDU DAS GUPTA EXPRESSED A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT: "THE GORBACHEV-REAGAN MARCH TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE OR 'LESS-NUCLEAR' WORLD, ASSUMING THAT IT IS NOT A FICTION, WILL NOT FREE THE WORLD FROM REGIONAL TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR THREAT MAY SOMETIMES LOOM LARGE. THE SUPERPOWERS MAY BE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THEM; MORE LIKELY, THEY WILL OFTEN ABET AND INCITE, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN EVEN AFTER THE LATEST DISCLOSURES ABOUT ITS BOMB PREPARATIONS, OR FROM U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA.
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ARGUABLY A TIME MAY COME WHEN THE INDIAN NUCLEAR OPTION WILL BECOME UNNECESSARY OR IRRELEVANT. BUT THIS IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT."

- --PRO-MOSCOW "PATRIOT" NEWS ANALYSIS ASSERTED: "WHAT PERHAPS IMPRESSED THE AMERICANS MOST AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WAS NOT THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS EXPECTED, BUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS TO DISCUSS ISSUES WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA."

- --FROM WASHINGTON, GAUTAM ADHIKARI REPORTED IN HIS "THE TIMES OF INDIA" COLUMN THAT U.S. INTEREST IN INDIA "REMAINS AS PERIPHERAL AS EVER. TO MOST AMERICANS, INDIA IS SOMEWHERE OUT THERE BETWEEN EAST ASIA AND THE WEST ASIA. IT DOES NOT REALLY COUNT AS A POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC ENTITY. THE CONCEPT OF 'ASIA' TO AMERICANS SOMEHOW DOES NOT INCLUDE INDIA. THE STATE DEPARTMENT LISTS INDIA IN ITS BUREAU FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS IN WHICH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WEST ASIA OVER SOUTH ASIA IS OBVIOUS TO ANYONE WHO HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH COVERING FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THIS CITY. THERE IS A SEPARATE BUREAU FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND THAT IS THE AREA WHICH IS THE REAL ASIA AS FAR AS THE AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED.

- "ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, MORE OR LESS MADE THE POINT OBVIOUS AT THE ASIA SOCIETY HERE LAST WEEK. HE SPOKE FOR AN HOUR AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS FOR AN HOUR ON AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE INTERESTS IN ASIA. NOT ONCE DID HE MENTION INDIA IN THOSE TWO HOURS. JAPAN, THE

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

KOREAS, CHINA AND THE ASEAN NATIONS MADE UP THE RANGE OF HIS INTEREST. EVEN AT THE END, WHEN HE WAS MENTIONING A FEW PROBLEM SPOTS FOR AMERICAN POLICY, HE MENTIONED IRAN-IRAQ, OIL AND AFGHANISTAN. INDIA, IT SEEMS, IS NOT EVEN A REAL, WORRISOME PROBLEM IN THE AMERICAN SCHEME OF THE THINGS."

- INDO-U.S. VACCINE ACTION PROGRAM

- "INDIAN EXPRESS" STAFFER LALITA PANICKER IN HER ANALYSIS, "VACCINE WAR," AFFIRMED THAT THE VAP "WILL MAKE NEW AND IMPROVED VACCINES AVAILABLE" TO INDIA. BUT, SHE ADDED, SOME SCIENTISTS EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT
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THE PROGRAM "POSES A GRAVE SECURITY RISK AND INDIANS MAY BE USED AS GUINEA PIGS FOR THE U.S.'S EXPERIENCES."

- THE GOI, MS. PANICKER WROTE, "HAS AT VARIOUS TIMES ENTERED INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LIKE FRANCE, USSR AND JAPAN FOR VACCINE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: WHATEVER THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY'S RESERVATIONS MAY BE, THE PROGRAM WHICH WAS BEGUN AS PART OF THE RONALD REAGAN-INDIRA GANDHI SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SHELVED. IN FACT, THE INITIATIVE HAS RECENTLY BEEN RENEWED FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS BEYOND 1988 BY PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. AND WHEN

THIS PARTICULAR PROGRAM GETS GOING, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY MAINTAIN STRICT CHECKS ON TRIALS AND QUALITY CONTROL AND SAFEGUARD HUMAN SUBJECTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS."

\- SOVIET DEPUTY PM'S INDIA VISIT

\- NEWS REPORTS DECEMBER 19 ON SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER V. PETROVSKY'S NEW DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE RECEIVED SUCH HEADLINES AS "SOVIET AIDED N-PLANTS WON'T FACE PROBLEMS" ("THE HINDUSTAN TIMES"); "SOVIET ASSURANCE ON N-PLANTS FOR INDIA" ("PATRIOT"); AND "SOVIET UNION GOES BEYOND TREATY" ("INDIAN EXPRESS").

\- COVERAGE HIGHLIGHTED HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPOSED SOVIET AID FOR INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WILL NOT FACE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE U.S.-AIDED TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER PLANT ("HINDUSTAN TIMES" AND "PATRIOT").

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\- PETROVSKY ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID THE FINAL AGREEMENT REACHED ON THE ISSUE WOULD "NEITHER BE DETRIMENTAL TO INDIA'S INTEREST NOR TO THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION."

\- HE ALSO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE U.S. DECISION TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SAYING IT "WOULD NOT DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM PURSUING ITS PRESENT POLICY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF MASS DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS."

\- ON PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO MAKE A NUCLEAR BOMB, PETROVSKY REPORTEDLY SAID THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

\- SOVIET SCIENTIST MISSING

\- PROMINENT COVERAGE WAS GIVEN TO THE WEEKEND NEW DELHI DISAPPEARANCE OF SOVIET SCIENTIST BABI ALEXANDER, WHO WAS VISITING INDIA WITH A GROUP OF SOVIET TOURISTS. A COUNTRY-WIDE SEARCH IS UNDERWAY. "TIMES OF INDIA" REPORTED THAT "POLICE SOURCES FIRMLY BELIEVE" THAT THE CASE IS A DEFECTION. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORTED THAT IN 1985 A SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAD DISAPPEARED IN NEW DELHI AND LATER TURNED UP IN THE U.S. ASKING FOR ASYLUM.

\- UNION CARBIDE

\- NEWS REPORTS QUOTED BUD HOLMAN, A LAWYER FOR UNION CARBIDE, AS SAYING UCC DID NOT RULE OUT THE

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

POSSIBILITY OF APPEALING THE BHOPAL DISTRICT COURT'S RULING BEFORE AN AMERICAN APPELLATE COURT IF HE FELT THAT UCC'S INTEREST WOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY THE INDIAN COURT.

\- --MEANWHILE, ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS EDITORIALLY

WELCOMED THE BHOPAL COURT DECISION AS REFLECTED IN SUCH HEADLINES AS "JUSTICE AT LAST" ("THE TIMES OF INDIA"); "BHOPAL'S LONG WAIT" ("PATRIOT"); "ENDING THE LONG WAIT FOR RELIEF" "THE HINDU"); "STILL UNWILLING TO PAY" ("THE STATESMAN"); "HOPE FOR BHOPAL" ("THE ECONOMIC TIMES"); AND "MAKE UCC HONOR THE VERDICT"
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("NATIONAL HERALD").

- --COMMENTS IN "THE HINDU" AND "THE ECONOMIC TIMES" WERE TYPICAL. "THE HINDU" SAID THE ORDER "IS A WELCOME BREAKTHROUGH IN WHAT IS ADMITTEDLY AN UNPRECEDENTED LEGAL TANGLE.... IT WOULD BE A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE UCC WOULD ABIDE BY THE ORDER AND PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT OF THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS...." "THE ECONOMIC TIMES" SAID THE BHOPAL RULING "HAS NOT ONLY ESTABLISHED A LANDMARK PRECEDENT BUT ISSUED A SHARP REBUTTAL TO THE VIEW ENTERTAINED BY MANY...THAT AN OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO PROVIDE SPEEDY RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAD FALLEN A PREY TO THE WORLD'S WORST-EVER INDUSTRIAL DISASTER.... THE RULING HAS RAISED THE HOPE THAT FULL JUSTICE WILL BE DONE TO THE POISON GAS VICTIMS OF BHOPAL. MCGINLEY

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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ATHENS FOR ARMACOST PARTY

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 42 --
- ARMACOST'S VISITS TO ISLAMABAD AND DELHI

- BEGIN SUMMARY: "THE HINDU" JULY 30 CARRIED ON ED-PAGE A FOUR-COLUMN ANALYSIS, "THE U.S. AND THE PAK BOMB: THE MEANING OF THE ARMACOST MISSION," WRITTEN BY C. RAJA MOHAN, A SPECIALIST ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WITH THE THINK TANK, THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF DEFENSE STUDIES AND ANALYSES. ACCORDING TO HIM, ARMACOST "WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PRESS PAKISTAN FOR A FEW MORE GESTURES...IN ORDER TO ASSUAGE CONGRESS." THESE PRESSURES, RAJA MOHAN ARGUED, COULD RELATE TO THREE ISSUES--GRANTING OF MORE MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES, CONTINUED SUPPORT ON AFGHANISTAN AND A ROLE AGAINST IRAN. THE CONCESSIONS
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THAT PAKISTAN MAKES, HE FURTHER OBSERVED, "WOULD INDEED SET THE TONE FOR THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME IN SOUTH ASIA." BUT, HE ADDED, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN BARGAINING, "THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION DECLARATIONS AND ITS SOUTH WEST ASIA POLICY CAN NO LONGER BE PAPERED OVER." ON INDIA'S STANCE ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS THE U.S., RAJA MOHAN WROTE NEW DELHI SHOULD QUESTION WASHINGTON'S

EFFORTS "TO REGIONALIZE THE ISSUE AND IMPOSE THE DISCRIMINATORY NPT SYSTEM ON INDIA." INDIA SHOULD ALSO CAREFULLY EXAMINE, HE SUGGESTED, "THE KIND OF BARGAINING THAT ARMACOST IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN ISLAMABAD." END SUMMARY.

- FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE RAJA MOHAN ANALYSIS IN "THE HINDU":

- BEGIN EXCERPTS: THE AMERICAN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MR. MICHAEL ARMACOST IS COMING TO ISLAMABAD AND NEW DELHI THIS WEEK. PAKISTAN'S UNRELENTING AND CLANDESTINE EFFORT TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ONCE AGAIN IN FOCUS WITH THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE U.S., IS EXPECTED TO BE HIGH ON MR. ARMACOST'S AGENDA IN BOTH THE CAPITALS. THE ARREST OF MR. ARSHAD PERVEZ WHO WAS SEEKING TO SMUGGLE OUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN, IN VIOLATION OF U.S. LAWS, HAS HEIGHTENED CONCERN AMONG A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

- SOME OF THEM LIKE SENATORS JOHN GLENN AND CLAIBORNE PELL ARE ONCE AGAIN THUNDERING ABOUT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND POSSIBILITIES OF PUNITIVE ACTIONS,
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LIKE AID CUT OFF, AGAINST PAKISTAN. BUT THE REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON THAT THE U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN IS IN JEOPARDY ARE A BIT PREMATURE. THE HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE SOLARZ SUB-COMMITTEE OF HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE INDEED REVEAL THE STRONG FEELINGS ON CAPITOL HILL AGAINST THE BLATANT AND REPEATED VIOLATION OF U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS BY PAKISTAN. BUT IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT ANY ACTION, IF AT ALL, BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD WAIT UNTIL MR. ARMACOST RETURNS FROM HIS MISSION TO SOUTH ASIA.

- FOR SOME YEARS NOW IT HAS BEEN APPARENT THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS THE PURSUIT OF THE AFGHAN WAR AGAINST KABUL AND MOSCOW FOR WHICH PAKISTAN'S COOPERATION IS CRITICAL, FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM GOING NUCLEAR. IF PROCLAIMED GOALS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION HAVE TO BE SACRIFICED IN THE PURSUIT OF THE COLD WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEFENSE OF ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE GULF REGION, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED ITS READINESS TO DO SO. IT HAS FOLLOWED UP ITS FIRST ROUND OF DOLS. 3.2 BILLION AID TO PAKISTAN DURING 1981-87 WITH A SECOND PACKAGE OF DOLS. 4.02 BILLIONS TO PAKISTAN, FOR THE YEARS 1987-93.

- BUT THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN LOFTY AMERICAN PROCLAMATIONS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND ITS INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF CANNOT BE GLOSSED OVER EASILY. EVEN AS CONGRESS WAS SWEATING OUT OVER THE TYPICAL COMPROMISE BETWEEN EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE PAK BOMB AND RENEWING MILITARY AID, MR. ARSHAD PERVEZ WAS HARD AT WORK. HE WAS TRYING TO PURCHASE AN

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 18633

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC
ATHENS FOR ARMACOST PARTY

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 42 --

ALLOY--MARAGING STEEL 350

- THE STAGE HAS BEEN SET FOR A RENEGOTIATION OF THE NUCLEAR BARGAIN BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN WHEN MR. ARMACOST VISITS ISLAMABAD THIS WEEK. THE BARGAIN TILL NOW HAS BEEN, IN ESSENCE, THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT GO OVERTLY NUCLEAR, I.E. EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND THE U.S. AID WAS ASSURED. CONGRESS HAS DEMANDED A LITTLE MORE IN THE WAKE OF REPEATED DISCLOSURES ON THE CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR EFFORT OF PAKISTAN. THE ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN GAVE, INCLUDING
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THE ASSERTION THAT ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM WAS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIVE PER CENT, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPON RELATED TECHNOLOGY FROM THE U.S. HAVE NOW PROVED TO BE FRADULENT. MR. ARMACOST WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PRESS PAKISTAN FOR A FEW MORE GESTURES--HOWEVER UNCONVINCING THEY MIGHT BE--IN ORDER TO ASSUAGE CONGRESS.

- INDEED ONE OUTCOME OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR BARGAIN COULD BE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON INDIA TO ACCEPT A REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME FOR SOUTH ASIA OR A BILATERAL INDO-PAK ARRANGEMENT. PAKISTAN HAS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS PROCLAIMED ITS READINESS FOR SUCH A COURSE AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS BLESSED THIS REGIONAL APPROACH. IT IS IRONIC THAT EACH TIME A DISCLOSURE IS MADE ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TRANSGRESSIONS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO BRING INDIA INTO THE PICTURE. ONCE AGAIN, THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS TESTIFYING RECENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS BRACKETED INDIA WITH PAKISTAN.

- THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DESPITE THE REMARKABLE RESTRAINT EXERCISED BY INDIA, IS EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT 'SOUTH ASIAN' NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND WANTS THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND ENGAGE IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. ONE ONLY HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD LET MR. ARMACOST KNOW THAT THIS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A THINLY VEILED ATTEMPT TO SIDETRACK THE BASIC ISSUE OF PAKISTAN'S VIOLATIONS OF AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION LAW. OBVIOUSLY, INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ITS OWN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO REGIONALIZE THE ISSUE AND IMPOSE THE DISCRIMINATORY NPT
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SYSTEM ON INDIA.

- INDIA SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT STANDS BY ITS INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR POLICY, FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FOR UNIVERSAL, COMPREHENSIVE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY CONTROLS ON ALL NATION STATES.

- INDIA ALSO NEEDS TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE KIND OF BARGAINING THAT MR. ARMACOST IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN ISLAMABAD. THE OUTCOME OF SUCH BARGAINING IS BOUND TO HAVE A LONG-TERM IMPACT ON INDIA'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

- THE U.S. PRESSURES FOR NEW PAKISTANI COMMITMENTS COULD BE RELATED TO THREE ISSUES; GRANTING OF MORE MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES, CONTINUED SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN AND A ROLE AGAINST IRAN. HOW MUCH PAKISTAN IS WILLING TO YIELD, OF COURSE, REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

- FIRST, THE QUESTION OF BASES. FOR QUITE SOME TIME NOW, GEN. ZIA AND PAKISTANI OFFICIALS HAVE CLAIMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNMENT AND HAVE ASSERTED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE BASES TO THE U.S., EVEN AS THEY RESERVED THEIR RIGHT TO DO SO. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE PIOUS PUBLIC POSTURES, THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR TREND TOWARD DILUTION OF THIS POLICY, UNDER U.S. PRESSURE. IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT THE AMERICAN P-3 MARITIME RECONNAISANCE AIRCRAFT (EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS) HAVE HAD ACCESS TO PAKISTANI AIRFIELDS SINCE 1983. SINCE EARLY 1986, U.S. NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS HAVE FREQUENTLY DOCKED AT KARACHI AND THE CREW UNLOADED FOR 'RELIEF AND RECREATION'. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT U.S. AIR FORCE NOW OPERATES ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES NEAR PESHAWAR TO MONITOR THE SOVIET UNION. ONE OF THE OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED IN THE SALE OF AWACS TO

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 42 --

PAKISTAN IS THE STATIONING OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN PAKISTAN. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN CONDUCT JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES.

- GEN. GEORGE CRIST, WHO IS THE CHIEF OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND IS A REGULAR VISITOR TO PAKISTAN. ALL THE SENIOR PAKISTANI OFFICIALS WHO GO THE U.S. HAVE BEEN MAKING A PILGRIMAGE TO THE CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS IN FLORIDA. ONE DOES NOT KNOW THE 'WISHLIST' GEN. CRIST HAS IN RELATION TO GREATER PAKISTANI MILITARY COOPERATION, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE U.S. IS WILLING
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TO GO IN PRESSURING PAKISTAN. THE U.S. CANNOT BE AWARE OF THE INTENSE OPPOSITION WITHIN PAKISTAN TO MORE OPEN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE.

- ON AFGHANISTAN, THE ISLAMABAD REGIME HAS ALREADY ACQUIESCED IN THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR SINCE THE LAST ONE YEAR.

- MR. ARMACOST IS CERTAIN TO INSIST THAT GEN. ZIA STAY THE COURSE ON AFGHANISTAN AND REJECT THE ALLUREMENTS OF MR. GORBACHEV, AND RESIST ALL TEMPTATIONS TO SEEK A SEPARATE DEAL WITH MOSCOW.

- THE THIRD U.S. PRESSURE RELATES TO IRAN. REPORTEDLY ISLAMABAD HAS ALREADY ALLOWED AMERICAN MONITORING OF IRAN FROM PAKISTAN, BY GIVING THE U.S. ACCESS TO REGIONS BORDERING IRAN. PAKISTAN ALSO HOSTS ABOUT 10,000 IRANIAN REFUGEES, WHO ARE OPPOSED TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI.

- IT IS CLEAR THEN THAT A VARIETY OF DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SEVERELY CIRCUMSCRIBED GEN. ZIA'S CAPACITY TO MANOEUVRE. THE NUCLEAR EFFORT OF PAKISTAN IS ONCE AGAIN IN THE FOCUS AND THE U.S. PRESIDENT IS YET TO CERTIFY THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT IN POSSESSION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON. THE CERTIFICATION IS DUE BEFORE OCTOBER 1, 1987. THE MASSIVE DOLS. 4.02 BILLION AID PACKAGE IS YET TO BE STEERED SAFELY THROUGH CONGRESS. THE AWACS DECISION IS HANGING FIRE. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THE U.S.-PAKISTAN BARGAINING DURING MR. ARMACOST'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN MUST BE SEEN. THE CONCESSIONS THAT GEN. ZIA MAKES AND THE RESISTANCE HE PUTS UP, WOULD INDEED SET THE TONE FOR THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME IN SOUTH ASIA. BUT IT MUST BE
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NOTED THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE U.S.-PAK BARGAINING, THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION DECLARATIONS AND ITS SOUTH WEST ASIA POLICY CAN NO LONGER BE PAPERED OVER. NOR CAN THE CURRENT RUPTURE BETWEEN THE IMMEDIATE 'REGIME SECURITY' OF GEN. ZIA AND THE LONG-TERM 'STATE SECURITY' OF PAKISTAN. END EXCERPTS. MCGINLEY

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STATE FOR NEA/PAB

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PK, IN, UR, AF, US
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT - AMBASSADOR RAPHEL'S 9/22 "JANG" INTERVIEW

1. FOLLOWING IS USIS KARACHI PREPARED VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF AMBASSADOR RAPHEL'S FIRST PRESS INTERVIEW IN PAKISTAN. THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 22 WITH THREE SENIOR JOURNALISTS OF "JANG", THE LARGEST CIRCULATING URDU DAILY IN PAKISTAN.

2. BEGIN TRANSCRIPT.

Q. MY INTRODUCTORY QUESTION IS RELATED TO YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH OUR REGION FOR SUCH A LONG TIME. SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGION FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND IN VIEW OF YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE SITUATION, I THINK WE SHOULD BEGIN OUR DISCUSSION BY SEEKING AN OVERVIEW OF
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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AS YOU SEE THEM.
A. I KNEW YOU WOULD ASK THE TOUGHEST QUESTION. IT IS A VERY BROAD REGION AND THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF IT ARE VERY BROAD. IF I COULD FOCUS JUST ON SOUTHWEST ASIA, AS WE CALL IT, A COUPLE OF INITIAL THOUGHTS: THE REGION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND IS GROWING IN IMPORTANCE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ONE IS THAT BECAUSE OF THE ISSUES THAT PEOPLE ALWAYS THINK

ABOUT IN THE UNITED STATES, NAMELY OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF, OUR INTEREST IN ENSURING THE FREE FLOW OF OIL AND IN THE SECURITY OF THE REGION IS VERY HIGH. ANOTHER ISSUE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US, OF COURSE, IS AFGHANISTAN, AND HELPING PAKISTAN HELP THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN IN THEIR STRUGGLE. THIRD, AND THIS IS ONE WE DON'T FOCUS ON OFTEN ENOUGH IN THE STATES, IS THE IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION. PAKISTAN IS WHERE IT IS. IT CAN'T MOVE, AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE FACT THAT IT'S AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF AND TO THE NORTH IT HAS GOT THE SOVIET UNION, TO THE EAST IS INDIA -- IT'S A VERY VOLATILE REGION. PAKISTAN FOR THE LAST FORTY YEARS HAS BEEN, IN MY VIEW, A SOURCE OF STABILITY AND THE SIMILARITIES AND THE AFFINITIES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE DEEP. TO ME IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS RELATIONSHIP VERY CLOSE. I THINK SOME IN AMERICA AND SOME IN PAKISTAN THINK THAT THE ONLY REASON FOR THE RELATIONSHIP IS AFGHANISTAN. I THINK THAT'S WRONG. WE THINK WE HAD A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BEFORE AFGHANISTAN. WE HAD UPS AND DOWNS, BUT BASICALLY WE HAD A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND I'M CONVINCED IT'S GOING TO CONTINUE ONCE WE GET THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, ONE THING I MIGHT POINT OUT WHICH I

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DON'T THINK IS APPRECIATED HERE IN PAKISTAN IS THE VIEW IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT HOW WELL PAKISTAN IS DOING ECONOMICALLY. LOOK AT THE GROWTH RATES. IN PAKISTAN, FOR THE PAST FORTY YEARS, EXCEPT FOR ABOUT THE LAST FOUR YEARS OF BHUTTO, PAKISTAN HAS HAD A REAL GROWTH RATE OF FIVE, SIX, SEVEN PERCENT EACH YEAR -- THE HIGHEST IN THE REGION BY FAR. WE HAVE TO THINK THAT ONE REASON FOR THIS IS THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IN PAKISTAN AND BECAUSE PAKISTANIS ARE VERY GOOD BUSINESSMEN, BECAUSE THEY KNOW HOW TO MANAGE THEIR ECONOMY. IT'S SOMETHING I DON'T THINK IS APPRECIATED ENOUGH IN THE UNITED STATES OR PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN HAS PROBLEMS ECONOMICALLY, JUST AS WE DO, BUT GENERALLY, RELATIVE TO OTHER COUNTRIES HERE, PAKISTAN IS DOING VERY WELL.

Q. WHY WERE WE FORGOTTEN FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS, YOU KNOW, OUR FRIENDSHIP AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND (INAUDIBLE) THE UNDERSTANDING HERE WAS THAT WE WERE A FORGOTTEN PEOPLE AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES

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WAS CONCERNED?

A. I WAS THINKING "WHAT WOULD I LIKE TO ACHIEVE AFTER THREE YEARS IN PAKISTAN?" AND MY ANSWER GETS AT YOUR QUESTION. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUR RELATIONSHIP NO LONGER BE LIKE A ROLLER COASTER. WE HAVE TIMES WHEN THINGS ARE MARVELOUS AND WE HAVE TIMES WHEN THINGS ARE TERRIBLE AND IT'S ALWAYS GOING UP AND DOWN. WHAT WE'D LIKE TO SEE IS SOME STABILITY AND THAT WE BOTH HAVE AN APPRECIATION FOR ONE ANOTHER. CANDIDLY, I THINK ONE PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT OUR EXPECTATIONS OF EACH OTHER ARE

ALWAYS VERY HIGH BECAUSE AMERICANS AND PAKISTANIS AS PEOPLE ARE VERY MUCH ALIKE -- VERY FRANK, OPEN, CANDID, AND FRIENDLY -- AND SO OUR EXPECTATIONS ARE VERY HIGH. WHEN THE UNITED STATES DOES SOMETHING THAT CAUSES PAKISTAN TO FEEL LET DOWN, OR VICE VERSA, OUR REACTION IS ALWAYS VERY NEGATIVE. "HOW COULD YOU DO THIS TO A FRIEND?" IT'S ALMOST AS IF WE EXPECT TOO MUCH OF ONE ANOTHER. WE NEED A LITTLE MORE REALISM IN THE RELATIONSHIP. BY THAT I MEAN THAT THERE ARE GOING TO BE SOME TIMES WHEN OUR INTERESTS ARE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE

OF PAKISTAN AND WHEN THOSE OF PAKISTAN ARE GOING TO BE DIFFERENT THAN OURS. WHEN THAT HAPPENS THE BEST THING TO DO IS TO SAY THAT WE WILL AGREE TO DISAGREE. BUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST IS, YOU'RE RIGHT, PEOPLE HAVE SEEN IT AS MAJOR SPLITS BETWEEN US, AND IT HAS BEEN A PROBLEM. I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU OVERCOME THAT. IT'S A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU WERE HERE IN THE EARLY SIXTIES AND AGAIN IN THE LATE SEVENTIES. HOW DO YOU SEE THINGS IN PAKISTAN NOW COMPARED TO THEN?

A. I HAD A COUPLE OF VERY STRONG IMPRESSIONS WHEN I CAME BACK THIS TIME COMPARED TO THE LAST TWO TIMES. FIRST -- AND THESE MIGHT SEEM STRANGE TO YOU, BUT IT'S BECAUSE I WAS AWAY FOR PERIODS OF TEN YEARS -- IS THE EXTRAORDINARY GROWTH OF THE COUNTRY ECONOMICALLY. FOR SOMEONE WHO WAS FIRST HERE IN THE SIXTIES TO SEE IT NOW -- AND TO SEE THE RANGE OF GOODS AVAILABLE, TO SEE THE WAY PEOPLE ARE DRESSED AND THE WAY PEOPLE ARE FED -- THE COUNTRY HAS DONE VERY WELL ECONOMICALLY LOOKING OVER TWENTY YEARS. SECOND, NOW, COMPARED WITH EITHER OF THOSE TWO TIMES, I WAS STRUCK BY HOW OPEN THE PRESS IS, AND BY CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE'S MUCH MORE FERMENT GOING ON, AND POLITICALLY AS WELL. SOME PAKISTANIS MIGHT SAY THEY DON'T THINK THERE IS ENOUGH, BUT IF YOU ASK ME TO COMPARE IT WITH THE PAST, I'VE NOTICED MUCH MORE OF THAT. THE THIRD THING THAT STRUCK ME IS WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO CITIES LIKE KARACHI AND PESHAWAR IN TERMS OF THE INCREDIBLE GROWTH. I MEAN, KARACHI IS NOW ALMOST LIKE MEXICO CITY. IT'S GETTING OUT OF CONTROL AND YOU WONDER ABOUT SERVICES FOR THE PEOPLE, YOU WONDER ABOUT QUALITY OF LIFE. THE SAME THING IN A WAY IS HAPPENING

IN PESHAWAR BECAUSE OF THE AFGHANS. THE GOOD THING IS THAT IT'S A SIGN OF PROSPERITY. THE PEOPLE ARE COMING TO THE CITY TO FIND WORK. BUT IT REALLY MAKES YOU WONDER. I THINK BACK TO 1965 WHEN I ARRIVED HERE. YOU COULD DRIVE FROM THE AIRPORT ON DRIGH ROAD ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE NAVAL BASE AND THERE WAS NOTHING THERE. PECHS WAS A SMALL COLONY AND THERE WAS NO DEFENSE (HOUSING SOCIETY). YOU JUST WONDER HOW THE CITY IS GOING TO COPE WITH THIS KIND OF INCREDIBLE GROWTH.

Q. I MEAN POLITICALLY.

A. POLITICALLY, I WOULD GET BACK TO MY POINT ABOUT POLITICAL FERMENT. I THINK THERE'S A LOT MORE GOING ON

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HERE THAN THERE WAS IN 1965 IN TERMS OF EXPRESSION AND ACTIVITY AND A LOT MORE GOING ON THAN THERE WAS IN 1978 IN TERMS OF EXPRESSION AND ACTIVITY. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT THE CHANGES HERE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS HAPPENED PEACEFULLY. IF THERE HAD BEEN A REVOLUTION, EVERYONE IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE SAID, "WELL, THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE." BUT WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS LIFTED, WHEN YOU HAD THE ELECTIONS IN 1985, WHEN YOU HAD THE PARLIAMENT AND YOU HAD THE PRIME MINISTER CHOSEN AND YOU HAD BASIC RIGHTS RESTORED, AL
L OF THAT WAS DONE QUIETLY AND PEACEFULLY, AND I DON'T THINK PEOPLE IN THE STATES APPRECIATE THE CHANGES THAT HAVE HAPPENED. ONCE AGAIN, SOME PAKISTANIS WOULD SAY THERE SHOULD BE MORE, BUT THE FACT IS THAT THE COUNTRY HAS MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD DEMOCRACY, AND IT'S SOMETHING THAT IS NOT APPRECIATED ENOUGH IN OUR COUNTRY.

Q. LET'S TURN TO PAISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS. THE QUESTION, MR. AMBASSADOR, IS THAT PAKISTAN'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE 1974. CAN YOU
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OFFER ANY PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE FACTORS WHICH FORCED THE CONGRESS AT THIS STAGE TO PROPOSE SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN? WHY I SAY AID IS BECAUSE THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS.

A. A COUPLE OF THOUGHTS. FIRST, I'LL NEVER ASK YOU TO GIVE PLAUSIBLE REASONS WHY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DOES WHAT IT DOES IF YOU DON'T ASK ME TO GIVE PLAUSIBLE REASONS FOR CONGRESS| ONE USEFUL THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT CONGRESS HAS NOT PASSED THIS BILL. AS YOU KNOW, ONE COMMITTEE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS DONE IT. THE PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN OUT AGAINST IT. THE

PRESIDENT IS VERY FIRM THAT HE DOESN'T WANT THIS SUSPENSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION IS GOING TO FIGHT IT. IT STILL HAS A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE IT BECOMES LAW. THE FULL HOUSE HAS TO VOTE AND THEN THE FULL CONGRESS AS TO VOTE. I DON'T NOW WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN BUT I THINK WE HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF GETTING IT OUT, OF GETTING IT TAEN OUT OF THE LAW. WHEN THE HOUSE TOOK THIS ACTION, YOU READ HEADLINES IN THE PAPER "AID SUSPENSION", BUT WE'RE A LONG WAY FROM THERE YET. ANOTHER THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT THERE WERE SOME IN THIS COMMITTEE WHO WANTED TO DO THIS, BUT TO ME WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS WHAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO DO. WHERE IS THE ADMINISTRATION AND ON THAT IT IS VERY CLEAR.

Q. DO YOU THINK THAT THE FEELING OF THE CONGRESS, AT LEAST IN THE LOBBY OF CONGRESS, WAS THAT THE PRESSURE WAS THERE AND THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME IT?

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A. THAT'S OUR HOPE AND, AS YOU KNOW, THAT'S WHAT WE'VE DONE SO FAR. DURING THE SEVEN YEARS THAT MR. REAGAN HAS BEEN PRESIDENT WE'VE HAD A GOOD PROGRAM AND VERY GOOD COOPERATION. THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM SOME IN CONGRESS TO CUT BACK ON THE PROGRAM, BUT, YOU KNOW, HE IS A VERY STRONG PRESIDENT AND VERY EFFECTIVE AND VERY POPULAR AND OUR HOPE IS THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO PREVAIL.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, THERE IS A STRONG IMPRESSION THIS 105 DAY SUSPENSION OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS LED TO A CRISIS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND WASHINGTON.

A. I DON'T THINK THAT'S FAIR. I THINK THAT, FOR

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EXAMPLE, IT'S INTERESTING TO LOOK AT WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER SAID ABOUT THEIR MEETING. WHEN YOU READ WHAT THEY SAID THEY WERE VERY POSITIVE THINGS. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE. THE PROBLEM IS, AND IT HAS BEEN THE SAME PROBLEM SINCE 1974, THAT THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO FEEL VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE AND THEY KEEP THE PRESSURE ON TO MAKE THIS A LARGER ELEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. THE ADMINISTRATION FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION AS WELL, BUT WE THINK THAT WHAT CONGRESS IS RECOMMENDING IS NOT THE WAY TO GO ON THIS ISSUE. BUT I DON'T THINK, IF YOU TALK ABOUT THE LEADERSHIPS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, I DON'T THINK THERE'S A CRISIS BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIPS. I THINK THAT THERE ARE OTHERS THAT DON'T WANT TO SEE THE RELATIONSHIP AS

GOOD AS IT IS, BUT AT THE TOP, I DON'T THINK THERE'S A CRISIS.

Q. THERE'S NO CRISIS?

A. NOT AT THE TOP, NO.

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Q. LET ME COME BACK TO THE NUCLEAR PART. YOUR PREDECESSOR WAS HERE. WE INTERVIEWED HIM AND HE WAS POSITIVE THAT THE U.S. ANALYSTS ARE POSITIVE THAT PAKISTAN IS PRODUCING A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

A. WHO SAID THIS, I'M SORRY?

Q. MR. DEANE R. HINTON. HE SAID TO "JANG" THAT WE HAVE POSITIVE INFORMATION THAT PAKISTAN IS PRODUCING SOMETHING WHICH HAS COMPELLED US TO REVIEW THE WHOLE SITUATION. DO YOU AS AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES FEEL THE SAME?

A. EVERY YEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS TO CERTIFY TO CONGRESS THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT POSSESS A NUCLEAR DEVICE. HE CERTIFIED THAT LAST OCTOBER AND HE HAS GOT TO CERTIFY IT AGAIN THIS OCTOBER. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT HE IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO CERTIFY AGAIN THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR DEVICE. I THINK THAT WHAT AMBASSADOR HINTON WAS TALKING ABOUT WAS THAT PAKISTAN DOES HAVE A NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AND IT'S A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE AND ACTIVE PROGRAM. THE CONCERN IS OVER HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE. ONCE YOU HAVE A CAPABILITY TO HAVE A VERY ACTIVE AND FULL AND COMPLETE PEACEFUL PROGRAM, THEN OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE OTHER CAPABILITIES AS WELL. YOU CAN USE IT EITHER WAY. I KNOW (##)
ABOUT. PAKISTAN DOES HAVE A CAPABILITY AND IT IS INCREASING THAT CAPABILITY, AND IT, LIKE ALL CAPABILITIES, CAN BE USED IN SEVERAL WAYS.

Q. BUT HOW COME THE UNITED STATES IS MORE WORRIED ABOUT PAKISTAN THAN INDIA?

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A. I THINK THAT WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT INDIA. IF YOU ASK ME, OR IF YOU ASK THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN FACT, "QAT IS THE WAY TO SOLVE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SOUTH ASIA", YOU'RE GOING TO GET THE SAME ANSWER, WHICH

IS THAT IT HAS TO BE A REGIONAL SOLUTION. YOU CAN'T EXPECT PAKISTAN UNILATERALLY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. BUT, LIKEWISE, YOU CAN'T EXPECT INDIA UNILATERALLY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM HAS TO BE SOLVED BY BOTH COUNTRIES -- TOGETHER -- IN A REGIONAL SOLUTION. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU SAW ABOUT THREE MONTHS AGO THAT THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE PASSED A RESOLUTION ON THE SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR ISSUE IN WHICH THEY CALLED FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO SOLVE THE ISSUE, WHICH, OF COURSE, IS PAKISTAN'S POSITION. AND THAT'S

NOTE BY OC/T: (##)OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION AS WELL -- THAT HAS TO BE THE SOLUTION. WHERE WE DIFFER IS UNTIL THAT CAN BE DONE, UNTIL YOU CAN GET A REGIONAL SOLUTION, OUR VIEW IS THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD BE WILLING TO PUT ITS OWN PROGRAM UNDER SAFEGAURDS.

Q. UNILATERALLY?

A. UNILATERALLY. THAT'S WHERE THE TWO COUNTRIES DISAGREE, BECAUSE PAKISTAN TAKES THE POSITION THAT IF INDIA DOES IT, PAKISTAN WILL DO IT, BUT PAKISTAN POLITICALLY CAN'T DO IT UNILATERALLY. THAT'S WHERE WE DISAGREE ON THE PROGRAM.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, E PAKISTANIS FEEL A LOT OF PRESSURE FOR THE SIGNING OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. LOOKING AT INDIA'S SIZE, ITS VARIOUS NUCLEAR PLANTS, ITS CAPABILITY TO MAKE THINGS, AS WAS ALREADY SEEN IN 1974, DON'T YOU THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO PUT SIMILAR PRESSURE ON INDIA TO SIGN THE TREATY. AS OUR FOREIGN MINISTER OFFERED THE OTHER DAY, WE ARE WILLING TO DO IT IF INDIA
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AGEEES, IF WE CAN DO IT BOTH AT THE SAME TIME. WE FEEL IN PAKISTAN THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT PUTTING ENOUGH PRESSURE ON INDIA.

A. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S FAIR. EVERY TIME WE TALK TO THE INDIANS, WHEN MR. ARMACOST WAS HERE, FOR EXAMPLE, HE WAS IN DELHI FIRST, AND HE ONCE AGAIN MADE THE POINT STRONGLY TO THE INDIANS THAT WE THINK THEY SHOULD SIGN THE NPT AS WELL. NOW, WE GET THE SAME ANSWER IN NEW DELHI THAT WE GET IN ISLAMABAD ON UNILATERALLY SIGNING THE NPT. THE INDIANS SAY THEY HAVE THEIR REASONS NOT TO DO IT. BUT IT'S A POINT THAT WE CONTINUE TO MAKE IN NEW DELHI WITHOUT ANY SUCCESS.

Q. BUT WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE WILLING TO SIGN AT THE SAME TIME AS INDIA.
A. RIGHT.

Q. THE PRESSURE IS MUCH MORE ON PAKISTAN THAN ON INDIA.

A. I THINK THAT'S THE PERCEPTION BECAUSE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS MUCH CLOSER. WE DON'T HAVE A FOUR BILLION AID PROGRAM WITH INDIA. NEXT YEAR OUR ASSISTANCE TO INDIA -- NONE OF IT MILITARY BECAUSE, BY LAW, DUE TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WE CAN'T GIVE IT MILITARY AID -- THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT HAS AN EXCEPTION IS PAKISTAN -- NEXT YEAR WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A 15 MILLION DOLLAR AID PROGRAM WITH INDIA, MOST OF IT PL-480. WHEN YOU COMPARE A 15 MILLION DOLLAR PROGRAM TO A 750 MILLION DOLLAR PROGRAM, THEN OBVIOUSLY WE ARE A LOT CLOSER TO PAKISTAN THAN WE ARE TO INDIA.

Q. BUT DON'T YOU THINK, MR. RAPHEL, THAT NOT ALL OF
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THIS AID IS BECAUSE PAKISTAN IS DEARER TO YOU?

A. OH SURE, EXACTLY. EVERY COUNTRY ACTS IN ITS OWN NATIONAL INTEREST.

Q. THAT HAS LED YOU TO COME TO OUR AID. BUT INDIA IS GETTING IT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THEY HAVE A THIRTY YEAR PROGRAM. BUT E IN PAKISTAN ARE BEING PRESSURIZED ON ISSUES WHICH, ON THE OTHER SIDE, YOU ARE NOT TAKING AS SERIOUSLY AS WITH US.

A. I THINK WE'RE TAKING THEM AS SERIOUSLY, BUT THE QUESTI
ON IS WHAT MORE COULD WE DO WITH INDIA. WE CAN KEEP TALKING TO THEM, WHICH WILL DO WHATEVER GOOD THAT

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DOES, BUT WHAT IS OUR INFLUENCE IN INDIA? HOW CAN AMERICAN CHANGE INDIAN POLICY?

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, WHEN, AS YOU SAID JUST NOW, THERE IS NO CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, I THINK YOU CAN TRUST US IF WE SAY OUR PROGRAM IS ESSENTIALLY PEACEFUL. INDIA HAS PROVED THAT THEIR PROGRAM HAS NEVER BEEN PEACEFUL. THEY DID IT IN 1974 AND WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE STILL GOING AHEAD WITH IT.

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A. AS I SAY, IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF US QUESTIONING PAKISTAN'S STATEMENTS ABOUT PEACEFUL PROGRAMS. EVERY YEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN CERTIFIES THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND WE BELIEVE THAT. IT'S JUST THAT OUR POLICY, NOT JUST IN PAKISTAN BUT GLOBALLY, IS THAT EVERY COUNTRY SHOULD SIGN THE NPT. 122 COUNTRIES HAVE AND WE COOPERATE FULLY WITH ANY COUNTRY THAT SIGNS IN TERMS OF SELLING THEM REACTORS AT CUT PRICES. NOW, IF PAKISTAN DECIDES THAT IT'S NOT IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST TO SIGN THE NPT, THEN WE'LL DISAGREE ABOUT IT.

Q. SIMILARLY, SOUTH AFRICA?

A. WELL, OUR AID TO SOUTH AFRICA IS NON-EXISTENT. I GUESS IT GETS BACK TO WHAT I ORIGINALLY SAID, THE IDEA OF HAVING SUCH HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF EACH OTHER. I WOULD HOPE THAT IF WE DISAGEEE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE, THEN WE SHOULD DISAGREE. BUT IT SHOULDN'T BECOME AN ISSUE OF HIGH EMOTION ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S POSSIBLE FOR US TO DISAGREE.

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Q. BUT MR. RAPHEL, THERE IS ANOTHER DIMENSION TO THIS QUESTION OF BEING SO VERY SENTIMENTAL ABOUT IT AND THAT IS WHEN YOU SAY THAT THERE IS NO CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, BUT THERE IS A DEFINITE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES, THAT INCLUDES THE MEDIA, AS WELL AS YOUR CONGRESSMEN WHO HAVE VIEWS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION. IN THE CASE OF INDIA IT IS NOT SO. THERE IS NOT SO MUCH PUBLICITY FOR CASES LIKE ARSHAD PERVEZ AND ALL THAT. WHY IS IT SO

A. ONE REASON IS THAT, AS YOU SAID, WE ARE MUCH CLOSER TO PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN IS A MORE VISIBLE COUNTRY IN THE UNITED STATES THAN INDIA IS NOW. PART OF IT IS BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTAN. PART OF IT IS BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER OR PRESIDENT GOES EVERY YEAR NOW, SO THERE IS A LOT MORE PRESS ATTENTION. SECOND, IF SOME SECTIONS OF THE MEDIA AND SOME SECTIONS OF CONGRESS ARE CRITICAL OF PAKISTAN, MY ATTITUDE IS THAT SOMETIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HERE SAYS THINGS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES THAT AREN'T TOO NICE AND SOMETIMES YOU READ THEM IN THE NEWSPAPERS, BUT THAT'S WHAT THE SYSTEM IS ALL ABOUT. WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS HOW DO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS -- LEADERSHIPS -- FEEL ABOUT EACH OTHER. THAT'S WHAT IS REALLY KEY. I'VE NEVER GONE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SAID THAT HE'S RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT "NAWA-I-WAQT" OR "JANG" WRITES ABOUT AMERICA AND THEY DON'T COME TO US AND SAY THAT WE'RE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT "THE NEW YORK TIMES" WRITES ABOUT PAKISTAN. IT'S JUST PART OF THE PRICE THAT WE PAY.

Q. SIR, LET ME ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT THE ARSHAD PERVEZ CASE. NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD WHICH COULD PROVE PAKISTAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE
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ARSHAD PERVEZ CASE. THERE IS ALSO AN IMPRESSION THAT HE IS A TARGET MAN FOR PROHIBITING PAKISTAN ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. THE SUSPENSION OF AID SHOULD HAVE COME AFTER COMPLETE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST PAKISTAN. WHY IS THERE SO MUCH HUE AND CRY ABOUT THE ARSHAD PERVEZ CASE? (INAUDIBLE) WHY ARE WE BEING CONVICTED BEFORE ARSHAD PERVEZ HAS BEEN CONVICTED?

A. IT'S A VERY GOOD QUESTION, BUT THE WAY YOU PUT YOUR

QUESTION WAS EXACTLY THE WAY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION PUTS IT. AND THAT'S WHAT WE'VE SAID TO CONGRESS. THE TRIAL HASN'T EVEN STARTED. HOW CAN YOU FIND SOMEONE GUILTY OR A COUNTRY GUILTY BEFORE THE TRIAL HAS STARTED. SO THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION AND THE WAY YOU JUST SAID IT. I DON'T THINK PERSONALLY -- I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN WOULD AGREE -- THAT THERE IS MUCH DIFFERENCE AT ALL BETWEEN WHAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS SAYING AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS SAYING. WE BOTH AGREE THAT ARSHAD PERVEZ WAS DOING THIS. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE REASONS WHY, BUT HE WAS ENGAGED IN THIS ACTIVITY. WE BOTH AGREE THAT THERE WAS A CONNECTION BACK TO BRIGADIER INAM-UL-HUQ OF LAHORE, THAT THERE IS SOME CONNECTION THERE. WHAT WE DON'T KNOW IS WHY HE WAS DOING IT. WE DON'T KNOW WHO ELSE WAS INVOLVED AND THAT'S HOPEFULLY WHAT WILL COME OUT OF THE TRIAL. THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN SAYS IT ALSO IS GOING TO INVESTIGATE. SO THERE REALLY ISN'T, SO FAR AS I CAN SEE, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DISAGREEMENT ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED OR WHAT HAS TO BE DONE. WHERE WE HAVE MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS IS IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND, IF I CAN SAY SO, IN THE PAKISTANI MEDIA AS WELL. IN MY VIEW -- I SHOULDN'T SAY THIS TO JOURNALISTS -- ALTHOUGH I THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS ON ARSHAD PERVEZ WERE VERY CONSTRUCTIVE, THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESS IN PAKISTAN REALLY INFLAMED THE
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ISSUE. HEADLINES IN THE UNITED STATES SAID: "PAKISTAN

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BUILDING A BOMB"; HEADLINES IN PAKISTAN SAID: "AMERICA ACCUSES PAKISTAN OF BUILDING A BOMB." THEY WERE WRITING ABOUT EACH OTHER'S HEADLINES. IT HAS BECOME A REAL MAJOR ISSUE. BECAUSE THE PRESS WRITES ABOUT IT THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION IS THAT PAKISTAN IS BUILDING A BOMB, AND IT HAS GOTTEN BLOWN WAY OUT OF PROPORTION. AS I TOLD YOU, I DON'T THINK THE GOVERNMENTS REALLY DISAGREE ON THE ISSUE. PARDON ME FOR BEING SO FRANK.

Q. YOUR PRESS WAS ALWAYS FREE AND IN THIS PRESENT PERIOD WE ARE RELAXED, SO WE ARE ALSO BEHAVING THE SAME WAY.

A. THAT'S RIGHT.

Q. NOW I COME TO ANOTHER QUESTION, MR. RAPHEL. IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, AND IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES' GREAT DEFICIT, WOULD IT NOT BE ADVISABLE FOR WASHINGTON, IN ITS ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST, TO DERIVE POLITICAL STRENGTHS FROM U.S. ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

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A. IN WHICH WAY? FOR EXAMPLE?

Q. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ECONOMIC PROGRAMS ARE NORMALLY TIED TO, AS YOU SAID, SOME SORT OF SELF-INTEREST OR GLOBAL INTERESTS. BUT IF THEY ARE TIED WITH POLITICAL INTERESTS, LIKE IN PAKISTAN'S CASE THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AFGHANISTAN, AND ALL THAT (INAUDIBLE)

A. I THINK WHAT THE UNITED STATES DOES IS REALLY DO BOTH. WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE AMOUNT OF MULTILATERAL AID TO PAKISTAN, SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK, IMF LOANS TO PAKISTAN, ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK LOANS, THE IMF SOFT LOAN WINDOW, ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THAT MONEY, WHICH IS NOT TIED IN ANY WAY -- IT'S JUST A LOAN WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL TIES -- 40 PERCENT OF THAT MONEY COMES FROM THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTILATERAL AGENCIES. SO, IN A WAY, A LARGE PROPORTION OF ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WHICH ORIGINATES IN THE UNITED STATES IS WITHOUT ANY TIES AT ALL. AS FOR THE REGULAR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THERE ARE VERY FEW TIES IN THE LEGISLATION. I THINK THE ONLY REAL ONE IS THAT REGARDING ANY DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE MONEY, WHICH IS NOW ABOUT 85 PERCENT GRANT, PRODUCTS WHICH ARE USED MUST BE BOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR THAT THERE IS, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, A SENSIBLE ECONOMIC REASON. OTHER THAN THAT THERE ARE NUCLEAR PROVISIONS, BUT WE KEEP WAIVING THEM. THE ADMINISTRATION KEEPS GIVING WAIVERS TO PAKISTAN. SO THERE REALLY IS NO OTHER POLITICAL TIE UNLESS YOU WANT TO ARGUE THAT IF IT WEREN'T FOR AFGHANISTAN WE WOULDN'T HAVE THE SAME SIZE AID PROGRAM THAT WE NOW HAVE. AND THAT I DON'T KNOW; IF WE EVER GET THE SOVIETS OUT, WE'LL SEE WHAT HAPPENS.

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Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN, AS YOU YOURSELF COMMENTED, THE RELATIONSHIP, AND OF COURSE THAT INCLUDES THE AID, HAS BEEN GOING UP AND DOWN DURING THE PERIOD. AFGHANISTAN HAS COME ONLY IN 1979 BUT BEFORE THAT WE HAD THESE AID PROBLEMS AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP. THERE IS ALSO A SORT OF POLITICAL STRING ATTACHED TO IT, ISN'T THERE?

A. I THINK THE HOPE NOW, AND THIS MIGHT BE NAIVE, IS TO SEE THE RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE AS LONG AS PAKISTAN USES THE PROGRAM WELL. THAT SHOU
LD BE THE PRIMARY
DETERMINANT. THE PRIMARY DETERMINANT IS: DOES PAKISTAN HAVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE WE DO, WHICH IS NOT TO HAVE A PROGRAM ANY LONGER, IN OTHER WORDS, TO BECOME SO SELF-SUFFICIENT THAT IT DOESN'T NEED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE? A NUMBER OF PAKISTANIS HAVE SAID TO ME, AND I THINK THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT, THAT PAKISTAN DOESN'T WANT MORE MONEY FROM AMERICA. IT WANTS TO FIND A WAY, WITH AMERICA'S HELP, NOT TO NEED MONEY. THAT'S THE EVENTUAL GOAL OF OUR PROGRAM. UNTIL THAT DAY, THE BEST WORLD, THE IDEAL WORLD, WILL BE THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS POLITICALLY, AS LONG AS PAKISTAN USES THE FUNDS WELL, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A PROGRAM.

Q. WHAT HAS PROMPTED THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO TAKE OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN?

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A. I DON'T THINK A.I.D. HAS TAKEN OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN. WHAT A.I.D. DOES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WILL HAVE A DISCUSSION ABOUT A HEALTH PROJECT. THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN WILL COME IN AND SAY "THIS IS WHAT WE WANT TO DO." A.I.D. WILL SAY "THAT PART MAKES SENSE TO US, THAT PART DOESN'T; HAVE YOU THOUGHT ABOUT DOING IT THIS WAY?" THEN THERE'S A NEGOTIATION. ONCE THERE IS AGREEMENT, A.I.D. WILL GIVE A CHECK, BASICALLY, TO THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THEY WILL IMPLEMENT THE PROJECT WITH TECHNICAL ADVICE FROM A.I.D. BUT YOU DON'T HAVE A.I.D. RUNNING GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN PROJECTS. THEY ARE BASICALLY RUN BY THE MINISTRIES, BUT THERE IS A LOT OF CONSULTATION ON THE BEST WAY TO RUN THE PROJECT.

Q. LIKE SOME ROAD BUILDING AND COMMUNICATION IN BALUCHISTAN?

A. BUT THOSE ARE DONE BY THE (INTERRUPTED)

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Q. NO, FOR EXAMPLE, I'LL TELL YOU. THERE ARE SOME PROJECTS WHERE THERE ARE CONDITIONS FOR THIS OR THAT PARTICULAR ITEM. THESE ARE THE THINGS WHICH ARE DIRECT INTERFERENCE INTO THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF THE COUNTRY. AS FOR THE FEASIBILITY OF A CERTAIN PROJECT, THEY SHOULD DO IT. BUT IF YOU PUT THOSE CONDITIONS WHERE IT CONCERNS ONLY THE PROJECT AND THE PEOPLE WHO NEED THE PROJECT, THEN IT BECOMES INTERFERENCE.

A. IT'S HARD TO THINK OF ANY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY. FOR EXAMPLE, ALL THE IMF MONEY IN PAKISTAN, WHICH IS A LOT OF MONEY -- 600 OR 700 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, THE IMF WILL

SAY, "WE'LL GIVE YOU 200 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, BUT IF YOU DON'T MAKE THESE CHANGES IT'S NOT GOING TO HELP BECAUSE IT'S GOING TO CONTINUE TO GET WORSE. THESE ARE THE CHANGES THAT SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE SECTOR." THERE'S NO REASON FOR THE IMF TO PUT ANY MONEY INTO IT IF IT'S NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY PERMANENT, POSITIVE CHANGES. FOR OUR CONGRESS, AS WELL AS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WE HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SAY, "WE'RE NOT JUST GIVING AWAY 200 MILLION DOLLARS, BUT PAKISTAN IS MAKING CHANGES SO THAT WE WON'T HAVE TO DO THIS ANYMORE." THAT'S WHY YOU HAVE THOSE KIND OF CONDITIONS.

Q. (INAUDIBLE)

A. WE DON'T IMPLEMENT PROJECTS OURSELVES.

Q. YOU ARE NOT TAKING ANY PROJECTS INTO YOUR HANDS?

A. ALL THE PROJECTS ARE BEING DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
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PAKISTAN AND WE COOPERATE WITH THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ROAD BUILDING IN BALUCHISTAN IS DONE BY THE MINISTRY.

Q. ON YOUR CONDITIONS?

A. WE DO ATTACH SOME CONDITIONS AS TO HOW THE MONEY IS GOING TO BE SPENT.

Q. AND ABOUT THE SPECIFICATIONS, NO?

A. LIKE THE ROAD SPECIFICATIONS?

Q. THE SPECIFICATIONS OF ANY PROJECT. YOU DON'T INTERFERE IN THOSE AREAS?

A. NO, WE DO. FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A CONTRACT TO BUILD A ROAD IN BALUCHISTAN AND THE MINISTRY OF ROADS IS GOING TO GIVE THIS CONTRACT TO SALIM AND SONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE WILL SAY, "WHERE IS THE ROAD GOING? DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO HAVE A ROAD THERE?" THEN WE'LL NEGOTIATE THAT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. TEN, SHOULD IT BE A KUCHA ROAD OR SHOULD IT BE A PUCCA ROAD? THAT WOULD BE A NEGOTIATION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

Q. EXCUSE MY INTERRUPTION. IS THERE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN CENTCOM OBJECTIVES AND YOUR AID?

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A. NOT AT ALL. WHEN I CAME HERE 22 YEARS AGO, I READ -- IT WASN'T IN "JANG", BUT IN ANOTHER URDU NEWSPAPER -- THAT WE HAD A BASE IN GWADAR. THAT WAS 22 YEARS AGO. I SAID, "I DIDN'T KNOW WE HAD A BASE IN GWADAR." PEOPLE SAID "IT'S JUST IN THE NEWSPAPERS." TEN YEARS AGO WHEN I CAME I READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS AGAIN THAT WE HAVE A BASE IN GWADAR. STILL NONE. NOW I'M READING ONCE AGAIN THAT WE WANT A BASE IN GWADAR. WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS ORGANIZE A TOUR AND TAKE A GROUP OF JOURNALISTS DOWN TO GWADAR AND PASNI AND TURBAT AND SHOW THAT WE'RE NOT DOING ANYTHING THERE ON THE MILITARY SIDE AND REALLY DON'T HAVE ANY INTEREST IN DOING ANYTHING ON THE MILITARY SIDE. NEXT YEAR, WE ARE SPENDING 40 MILLION DOLLARS IN BALUCHISTAN WHICH IS AT THE REQUEST OF THE

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OF THE PROVINCE. A LARGE COMPONENT OF THAT 40 MILLION DOLLARS IS FOR HEALTH AND EDUCATION. WE'RE NOW SENDING ABOUT 100 STUDENTS A YEAR FROM THE MEKRAN TO THE UNITED STATES. PLUS, A LOT OF IT IS FOR ROAD BUILDING. BUT THESE ARE ROADS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS COME AND SAID "WE WANT A ROAD

FROM TURBAT TO SIBI" AND WE'VE SAID "OKAY, WE'LL HELP DO IT." BUT THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH CENTCOM AT ALL.

Q. MR. RAPHEL, PAKISTAN IS PAYING A HEAVY PRICE FOR ITS AFGHANISTAN POLICY. THE SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AT A TIME WHEN PAKISTAN IS FACING GRAVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AS A FRIEND OF PAKISTAN. WOULD THE EMERGING SITUATION LEAD TO IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS?

A. I DON'T THINK SO. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT WON'T BECAUSE, AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, AS FAR AS THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CONCERNED THERE WON'T BE AN AID SUSPENSION. WE ARE OPPOSED TO AN AID SUSPENSION AND WE'LL JUST HAVE TO WORK TO DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, SHIFTING FROM PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, SINCE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE REGION, REGARDING THE LATEST RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA, THERE IS A COMMON FEELING THAT THE INDIAN EFFORTS TO REACH THAT RECONCILIATION HAD THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO A STRONG IMPRESSION THAT IN THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING PAKISTAN, INDIA HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BY THE U.S. SOME TYPE OF A BIG BROTHER ROLE IN THE REGION. HOW WOULD YOU COMMENT?

A. FIRST, WE HAD NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RAJIV AND JAYAWARDENE. WE DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT UNTIL WE READ ABOUT IT IN THE PAPERS. SECOND, I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT EVERY COUNTRY IN SOUTH ASIA HAS A RIGHT TO ITS NATIONAL INTERGITY AND TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY

AND THAT THERE SHOULDN'T BE ANY BIG BROTHER IN SOUTH ASIA. THAT HAS EEN A VERY FIRM AMERICAN POLICY. WE ALL KNOW THAT THE REALITY IS -- AND PAKISTAN RECOGNIZES TOO -- THAT INDIA IS THE LARGEST COUNTRY IN THE REGION,

BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT INDIA SHOULD BE A HEGEMONIC POWER. WE CERTAINLY DON'T SUPPORT THAT AND IT'S NOT OUR POLICY.

Q. IN CONTINUATION OF THIS QUESTION, WE ALL KNOW THAT ETHNIC CONFLICTS ARE UNIVERSAL. IT IS CHARGED HERE, AS WELL AS BY FOREIGN EXPERTS, THAT INDIA SUSTAINED THE TAMIL ETHNIC CRISIS IN SRI LANKA IN ORDER TO HAVE A CAUSE TO INTERVENE. SIMILARLY, INDIA CAN FOMENT ETHNIC CRISES IN OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A DOMINANT ROLE. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SOVEREIGN STATUS OF SMALLER STATES IN THE REGION, ESPECIALLY IN A COUNTRY LIKE PAKISTAN? WE CAN ALWAYS EXPECT INDIA TO DO THE SAME HERE AS THEY HAVE DONE IN SRI LANKA.

A. ONE VERY GOOD THING ABOUT BEING AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN IS THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO COMMENT ON INDIAN POLICY. TO REPEAT THE POINT THAT I MADE EARLIER, AMERICAN POLICY ON RELATIONSHIPS IN SOUTH ASIA IS VERY, VERY CLEAR. AMERICA HAS NEVER BEEN IN FAVOR OF, AND HAS BEEN OPPOSED TO, ANY COUNTRY HAVING HEGEMONIC CONTROL OVER SOUTH ASIA AND DOMINATING THE REGION. THAT HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT POLICY.

Q. I READ A NEWS ITEM FROM WASHINGTON WHICH SAID THAT

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ONE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAS ASSIGNED A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ROLE TO INDIA. THEY WANT INDIA TO SOLVE THE ETHNIC PROBLEM IN SRI LANKA.

A. I DOUBT THAT'S TRUE. THE COMMITTEE CERTAINLY WASN'T SPEAKING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.

Q. "DAWN" CARRIED A STATEMENT ON AUGUST 24.

A. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THAT, BUT CERTAINLY THE ADMINISTRATION ISN'T TAKING THE POSITION THAT INDIA SHOULD TAKE IT UPON ITSELF TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. SPECIFICALLY, ON THE SRI LANKAN ACCORD, OUR VIEW HAS BEEN THAT WHAT WAS GOING ON IN SRI LANKA WAS TERRIBLE. IN TERMS OF THC CARNAE AND ETHNIC FIQHTINQ, IT WAS AWFUL FOR THE ISLAND. IF THERE CAN BE A WAY TO STOP THE ETHNIC FIGHTING WHICH ALLOWS SRI LANKA TO MAINTAIN ITS INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY, THAT'S THE ANSWER THAT WE ALL WANT TO SEE. WE DON'T KNOW YET WHETHER THIS AGREEMENT MEETS THOSE TWO OBJECTIVES.

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Q. LET US SAY, AS AN ASSUMPTION, IF INDIA DOES THE SAME THING IN PAKISTAN, WHAT WOULD BE THE STAND AND ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THAT SITUATION?

A. ONE THING THAT WE BOTH BELIEVE IS THAT NEITHER INDIA NOR PAKISTAN HAS THE INTENTION OF MOVING INTO THE OTHER COUNTRY, OF TRYING TO OVERTHROW A GOVERNMENT. WE DON'T THINK EITHER COUNTRY WANTS TO DO THAT. THE SECOND THING THAT I HAVE LEARNED IN 22 YEARS OF DIPLOMACY IS TO NEVER GUESS WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE.

Q. SO, WE WILL LEAVE IT FOR THE TIME BEING THAT YOU ARE NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON THAT. IT IS SAID THAT THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM IS THE OUTCOME OF SUPERPOWER RIVALRY AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING THE CHEAPEST WAR AGAINST THE RUSSIANS IN THAT COUNTRY. WASHINGTON, SOME MAY SAY, WOULD LIKE TO BLEED THE RUSSIANS BADLY. THIS

APPROACH IS THE GREATEST OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THE
SOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. HOW DO YOU SEE IT?

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A. FIRST, I THINK IT'S WRONG TO SAY THAT AFGHANISTAN IS THE FUNCTION OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY. I THINK THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN AFGHANISTAN IS A FUNCTION OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION INVADED, HAS 115,000 TROOPS THERE, AND WON'T GET THEM OUT. THE EASIEST QUICK SOLUTION TO AFGHANISTAN IS FOR THE SOVIETS TO GO HOME. I PROMISE WE

WON'T STOP THEM. WE DON'T HAVE BARRICADES SET UP AT THE BORDERS SAYING YOU CAN'T GO BACK. IF THEY WANT TO GOBACK THAT WOULD BE MARVELOUS. FOR PEOPLE WHO CLAIM THAT WE JUST WANT TO BLEED THE SOVIET UNION, I ALWAYS ASK THE QUESTION IN RETURN, "IF YOU WERE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND YOU WERE COMING TO THE END OF YOUR SECOND TERM WOULD YOU RATHER STAND UP AND BE ABLE TO SAY 'THE SOVIET UNION HAS LEFT AFGHANISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN IS A FREE COUNTRY' OR WOULD YOU RATHER SAY 'THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL THERE IN AFGHANISTAN'"? WHICH IS BETTER FOR THE UNITED STATES? THERE'S NO QUESTION WHICH IS BETTER FOR THE UNITED STATES -- FOR THE SOVIETS TO LEAVE, TO GET OUT -- AND THAT REMAINS THE POLICY. YOU'RE RIGHT, THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO SAY IT'S GOOD THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEING BLED, BUT THAT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE

GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AND IT'S NOT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY.

Q. WOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND KABUL FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION OF THE WAR IN KABUL?

A. ISLAMABAD HAS SAID, AND RIGHTFULLY SO, THAT IT DOESN'T WANT TO TALK TO KABUL BECAUSE THE KABUL REGIME DOESN'T REPRESENT ANYBODY EXCEPT FOR NAJIBULLAH AND SOME OTHER COMMUNISTS IN HIS GOVERNMENT. OUR POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS SAID THAT THE SOLUTION TO THIS WAR HAS TO BE FOUND IN MOSCOW, NOT IN KABUL, AND IT HAS TO BE FOUND AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, BUT NOT IN KABUL, BECAUSE THE KABUL REGIME REALLY DOESN'T REPRESENT ANYONE EXCEPT ITSELF.

Q. DO YOU THINK THAT IF THERE ARE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AN ASSUMPTION OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAN GOING THROUGH, YOU KNOW, ALL THESE VERY CIRCULAR AND LONG NEGOTIATIONS?
A. NOT AT ALL, BECAUSE THE ANSWER TO AFGHANISTAN LIES IN MOSCOW. IT DOESN'T LIE WITH NAJIBULLAH. IT LIES AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, NOT WITH NAJIBULLAH. IF HE REPRESENTS TWO PERCENT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE I WOULD BE SURPRISED. IF PAKISTAN OR WE OR ANYONE ELSE START TALKING TO NAJIBULLAH IT WOULD GIVE HIM MUCH GREATER LEGITIMACY. IT WOULD GIVE HIM A MUCH GREATER ROLE. IN MY VIEW, HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY RIGHT TO THAT BECAUSE HE DOESN'T REPRESENT ANYTHING EXCEPT HIS OWN GOVERNMENT.

Q. EXCUSE ME SIR. IN THE INDIRECT TALKS, WE ARE TALKING TO THE PEOPLE WHO COME FROM NAJIBULLAH IN ANY

CASE (INAUDIBLE)

A. BUT ONCE AGAIN, WHAT GOOD WOULD IT DO TO TALK TO NAJIBULLAH? IN OTHER WORDS, LET ME TURN THE QUESTION AROUND. IF MOSCOW DECIDES THAT IT WANTS THIS ISSUE SETTLED, WILL IT BE SETTLED? IF MOSCOW DECIDES IT DOESN'T WANT NAJIB TO DO SOMETHING, IS HE GOING TO DO IT? IS NAJIB GOING TO ACT CONTRARY TO WHAT MOSCOW SAYS? WILL HE DO WHAT MOSCOW TELLS HIM TO? I'M CONFIDENT THAT THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST IS THAT HE WILL NEVER DO ANYTHING CONTRARY TO WHAT MOSCOW SAYS. I'M CONFIDENT HE'LL DO EXACTLY WHAT MOSCOW TELLS HIM TO. SO, WHY NOT GO DIRECTLY TO THE SOURCE OF THE POWER, TO THE SOURCE OF THE AUTHORITY, WHICH IS MOSCOW? IT'S NOT NAJIBULLAH.

Q. BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION OF A GUARANTEE, OF A GUARANTEE FROM THE UNITED STATES. THAT WAS YOUR POSITION FOUR MONTHS BACK, AS I KNOW THROUGH YOUR FORMER AMBASSADOR, DEANE R. HINTON. HE SAID THAT WE WILL AGREE, OR GIVE THE GUARANTEE, WHEN CERTAIN THINGS ARE SETTLED. IF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN (INAUDIBLE) AS SUGGESTED BY AGHA SHARIFF AND THEY DECIDE SOMETHING. WOULD YOU AGREE TO ANY OF THAT DECISION?

A. WE WILL ACCEPT ANY DECISION THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT.

Q. ANY DECISION? WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE?

A. THAT'S RIGHT, BECAUSE WHATEVER THEY WANT FOR THEIR FUTURE IS FINE WITH US.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, IN CONTINUATION OF THE AFGHAN THING, ONLY THE OTHER DAY PRESIDENT REAGAN DECLARED IN THE

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE DAYS OF THE KABUL REGIME ARE NUMBERED AND THE RUSSIANS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PULL OUT. HAS THERE BEEN ANY RECENT DEVELOPMENT TO PROMPT MR. REAGAN TO MAKE THIS ASSESSMENT, OR DOES IT MEAN THAT WE ARE MOVING TOWARD A FURTHER ESCALATION OF RHETORIC?

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A. SOVIET RHETORIC HAS CHANGED CONSIDERABLY SINCE GORBACHEV HAS COME TO POWER. FOR EXAMPLE, NOW YOU HAVE THE SOVIETS SAYING -- WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER SAID BEFORE -- THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT. THEY REALLY WANT TO GET OUT AND IT'S JUST A QUESTION OF FINDING A WAY TO GET OUT. YOU HAVE THEM TALKING ABOUT A SHORTER TIMETABLE. STILL NOT SHORT ENOUGH, WE THINK, BUT A SHORTER TIMETABLE. YOU HAVE GORBACHEV SAYING THAT HIS PRIMARY CONCERNS NOW ARE THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND GETTING THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM SETTLED. SO, WHEN YOU LOOK AT WHAT THE SOVIEI UNION IS SAYING, THEN IT LOOKS LIKE IT IS MOVING TOWARD A DECISION TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. I THINK THAT'S WHAT THE PRESIDENT WAS REFERRING TO, THAT AT LEAST IF YOU LOOK AT THE WORDS THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT. NOW THE REAL QUESTION IS -- AND WE DON'T KNOW THIS YET -- WILL THE WORDS TRANSLATE INTO REAL ACTIONS ON THE GROUND? WILL WE SEE THE SOVIETS START TO GET OUT? BUT, CERTAINLY THE RHETORIC HAS CHANGED CONSIDERABLY.

Q. THERE HAS BEEN MOVEMENT IN YOUR OPINION?
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A. THAT'S RIGHT. WE'VE GOT AN INF AGREEMENT NOW AND WE'RE GOING TO HAVE THE SUMMIT, AND WE HOPE THAT ALL THIS WILL LEAD TO SOME PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN.

Q. THE OTHER MOST IMPORTANT REGION, I THINK, AFTER WE HAVE DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA, IS THE GULF. RECENT DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION OR, RATHER, I WOULD SAY INVOLVEMENT, NOT INTERVENTION, IN THE GULF HAS INCREASED TENSION IN THE GULF AREA AND HAS ALSO MADE NORMAL SHIPPING MOVEMENT UNSAFE, MORE UNSAFE THAN IT WAS PREVIOUSLY. IT HAS ALSO PUSHED IRAN CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION. HOW DO YOU THINK THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY END OF THE HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF?

A. ONE THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT OUR PROTECTION OF THESE VESSELS HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY ALL THE MODERATE ARABS IN THE AREA. TO ME, THE PROBLEM IS THAT PEOPLE AREN'T FOCUSING ON WHAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS. THE BASIC ISSUE IS, AS WAS SAID IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BY ALL 15 MEMBERS, THAT THE WAR SHOULD END. THE WAR IS NOT ENDING BECAUSE IRAN WON'T LET IT END. IRAQ WANTS TO LET IT END. ALL 15 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED FOR A RESOLUTION THAT SAID THERE SHOULD BE

A CEASEFIRE AND THAT THE WAR SHOULD END. WE'VE SAID THAT AS SOON AS IRAN ACCEPTS THAT RESOLUTION -- AND IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY PASSED -- AND AS SOON AS THERE IS PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF KEE
PING THAT SAME KIND OF FORCE THERE AND WE'LL WITHDRAW THAT FORCE. WE'LL HAVE A RESIDUAL PRESENCE, AS WE ALWAYS HAVE. BUT THE QUESTION IN MY MIND IS NOT SO MUCH WHY ARE WE ESCORTING OUR FRIENDS, OR WHY ARE WE
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PROTECTING OUR FRIENDS, AS IT IS WHY ISN'T THE WAR OVER. IT'S VERY SIMPLE WHY THE WAR HASN'T ENDED. IT'S BECAUSE IRAN DOESN'T WANT THE WAR TO END.

Q. NO, ONLY RECENTLY, THREE OR FOUR DAYS AGO, I THINK, IRAN MADE AN OFFER FOR A CEASEFIRE.
A. BUT ONLY IF FIRST THE UNITED NATIONS SAID WHO WAS THE AGGRESSOR.

Q. NO, THEY OFFICIALLY SAID THAT THEY WANT A CEASEFIRE, I THINK, NOT AN END OF THE WAR. THEY WANT A CEASEFIRE AND THEN THEY WANT A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION TO PINPOINT THE AGGRESSION.

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A. I'D BE SURPRISED IF THE IRANIANS SAID THAT BECAUSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLS FOR JSUT THAT. IT CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE, A RETURN OF PRISONERS, AND, THEN, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IT TALKS ABOUT FINDING OUT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR. NOW, IF IRAN ACCEPTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THAT'S FINE WITH US, AND THE FIGHTING WILL STOP. BUT I THINK THEY STILL WANT TO HAVE THIS COMMISSION.

Q. BUT YOUR PRESENCE IN THE GULF WILL NOT DIMINISH THE TENSION IN THE REGION.

A. I THINK HAVING A MILITARY PRESENCE THERE, NOT ONLY OURSELVES BUT THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH (INTERRUPTED) AND IF YOU HAVE A LARGER MILITARY PRESENCE, THE LEVEL OF TENSION INCREASES. I THINK THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. OUR RESPONSE TO THAT IS THAT IT'S VERY EASY TO GET US OUT, AND TO GET THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH OUT, AND TO GET THE RUSSIANS OUT.

Q. HOW EXPLOSIVE WILL IT BECOME IF THE IRANIANS DO NOT
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AGREE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION?

A. THE PROBLEM IS THAT IT HAS BEEN AN EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE GULF FOR SEVEN YEARS. WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE DEATHS ON BOTH SIDES AND THE CARNAGE, IT'S NOT AS IF THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN SHIPS IS MAKING A PEACEFUL SITUATION MORE DANGEROUS. IT HAS BEEN DANGEROUS THERE FOR A LONG TIME. WHAT I KEEP GETTING BACK TO IS THAT IF PEOPLE ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMERICAN PRESENCE OR THE ABOUT WESTERN PRESENCE OR THE SOVIET PRESENCE, THE EASIEST WAY IS TO ACCEPT WHAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SAID TO DO.

Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, I COME TO OUR QUESTION WHICH RELATES TO DEMOCRACY. IT'S A BIG QUESTION. IT IS A COMMON CHARGE THAT DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS WORLDWIDE HAVE SUFFERED BECAUSE OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DICTATORSHIPS. U.S. POLICY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF MR. REAGAN'S ADMINISTRATION WAS TO PREFER RULERS WHO SERVED U.S. INTERESTS. RECENTLY, WASHINGTON SEEMS TO HAVE REALIZED THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR MILITARY RULERS CANNOT SUSTAIN ITS INTERESTS. THIS IS REFLECTED IN MR. REAGAN'S OBSERVATION, QUOTED BY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA, MR. JAMES LIBBY. I QUOTE, "THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IS THE SUREST MEANS TO A BUILD NATIONAL CONSENSUS, WHICH IS THE FORMATION OF A TRUE STATE." CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THIS WITH REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA?

A. FIRST, I WOULD CONTEND THAT FROM THE BEGINNING THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING A MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY. WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE TEND TO FOCUS ON NICARAGUA

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BECAUSE IT GETS ALL THE PUBLICITY. BUT WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE NUMBER OF STATES THAT HAVE HAD FREE ELECTIONS AND NOW HAVE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS, COMPARED TO EIGHT YEARS AGO, IT IS MANY MORE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN LATIN AMERICA. I LIKE TO THINK THAT A LOT OF THAT IS BECAUSE OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE. YOUR'RE RIGHT, IN THE PHILLIPINES AND IN SOUTH KOREA, THERE, TOO, WE WERE VERY FIRM IN ENCOURAGING THAT MOVE TOWARD REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT PAKISTAN, OUR VIEW IS THAT PAKISTAN OVER THE PAST TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS HAS

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MADE A NUMBER OF VERY SIGNIFICANT STEPS ON THE ROAD TO

DEMOCRACY. YOU'VE SEEN MARTIAL LAW LIFTED. YOU'VE SEEN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. YOU'VE SEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARLIAMENT. WE'VE SEEN THE BASIC RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION RESTORED. WE SEE A UCH MORE OPEN PRESS -- A FREE PRESS. WE SEE MUCH MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITY THAN YOU SAW TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS AGO. WHAT PAKISTAN IS DOING, IN OUR VIEW, IS MOVING VERY MUCH IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION -- THE DIRECTION TOWARD A FREE AND OPEN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. AS ONE OF MY PAKISTANI FRIENDS SAID TO ME, THE PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE THAT PAKISTAN DID IT QUIETLY. IF EVERYBODY HAD GONE OUT INTO THE STREETS AND DONE IT, THEN THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE NOTICED. BECAUSE IT WAS DONE QUIETLY IT HASN'T GOTTEN THAT MUCH ATTENTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

Q. IN CASE THERE IS ANOTHER MARTIAL LAW IN THIS COUNTRY, WOULD YOU SUPPORT IT?

A. I TEND TO AGREE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO SAYS HE SEES NO REASON TO HAVE ANOTHER MARTIAL LAW IN PAKISTAN.
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Q. NO, LET'S ASSUME THAT THERE IS A MARTIAL LAW.

A. BUT, THEN, WE GET BACK TO MY EARLIER COMMENT THAT AFTER 22 YEARS, I HAVE LEARNED NEVER TO PREDICT WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN. YOU CAN ONLY GET IN TROUBLE.

Q. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE UNITED STATES SATISFIED WITH PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFICKING WITH THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES?

A. I THINK PAKISTAN HAS MADE INCREDIBLE STRIDES. IT LOOKS LIKE THIS YEAR THE POPPY CULTIVATION WILL BE DOWN TO 80 TONS. IT WAS 140 LAST YEAR. IN 1979, THERE WAS 800 TONS OF POPPY CULTIVATED HERE. IT HAS BEEN CUT DOWN TO ONE-TENTH, SO WE'VE REALLY MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS. EVERY TIME I THINK ABOUT NARCOTICS I THINK ABOUT WHAT PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO SAID WHEN HE WAS IN AMERICA LAST YEAR AND HE WAS ASKED, "WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM?" HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN NOW HAS 500,000 HEROIN ADDICTS. TODAY IT IS UP TO 660,000. IT'S HIGHER PER CAPITA THAN THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN'S NARCOTICS PROBLEM IS NOT AMERICA'S PROBLEM, IT'S OUR PROBLEM, AND WE HAVE TO FIND AN ANSWER FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS OF PAKISTANIS, FOR YOUNG PAKISTANIS. WE ARE GOING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM, NOT TO HELP AMERICA OUT, BUT TO HELP PAKISTAN OUT. AND WHATEVER THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO HELP PAKISTAN, WE WANT TO DO THAT. PAKISTAN HAS TAKEN IT VERY SERIOUSLY

AND HAS TAKEN, AS I SAY, A NUMBER OF VERY POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD GETTING IT UNDER CONTROL. IT'S TOUGH BECAUSE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE AFGHAN BORDER YOU DON'T HAVE PEOPLE WHO ARE THAT RESPONSIBLE. THEY DON'T CARE WHAT'S

GOING ON IN TERMS OF GROWING. BUT THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAS DONE A VERY GOOD JOB.

Q. ONE LAST QUESTION. MR. RAPHEL, PAKISTANI EXPERTS FEEL THAT NOT ENOUGH HAS BEEN DONE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF DRUG ADDICTS. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THAT?

A. WE JUST HAD OUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NARCOTICS MATTERS HERE. SHE TALKED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY BOTH RAISED THIS ISSUE AND SAID, "WE HAVE 660,000 HEROIN ADDICTS. YOU'VE GOT TO DO SOMETHING FOR THEM, BUT IT'S VERY EXPENSIVE." BOTH OF THEM SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO DO MORE, BUT THE RESOURCES AREN'T THERE. WE ARE GIVING SOME ASSISTANCE

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TO PAKISTAN IN TRYING TO HELP WITH REHABILITATION, BUT, AS YOU KNOW, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES -- WHERE WE ONLY HAVE 500,000 ADDICTS AND WE HAVE SUCH TREMENDOUS RESOURCES -- IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR US TO FIND SOME WAY TO REHABILITATE PEOPLE. IT'S BOTH HARD TO REHABILITATE AND THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU NEED IS INCREDIBLE. WE'RE TRYING TO SET UP SOME PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN TO HELP, BUT I DON'T SEE AN EASY ANSWER. IT IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT.

END TRANSCRIPT. GRAHL

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BEIRUT FOR BAGHDAD;
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1. GULF OIL CONFERENCE ENDED AFTERNOON NOV 10. MEETING DID NOT PRODUCE AGREEMENT AMONG SIX COUNTRIES REPRESENTED. COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT END OF MEETING INDICATES SAUDI ARABIA, UAE AND QATAR HAVE AGREED TO PUT INTO EFFECT SAUDI PROPOSAL FOR LOWERING OF POSTED PRICE AND HEAVY INCREASES IN TAX AND ROYALTY ON EQUITY OIL. IRAQ, IRAN, AND KUWAIT RESERVE THEIR POSITION.

2. SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, QATAR AND UAE WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR MINISTERS OF PETROLEU. IRAN SENT DIRECTOR OF ITS NATIONAL OIL COMPANY AND IRAQ UNDER SECRETARY OF PETROLEUM SHALABI. NEITHER OF LATTER WERE EMPOWERED TO COMMIT THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO SAUDI PLAN AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDINGS, WE ARE TOLD, CONSISTED MAINLY OF EXPLAINING THAT THEY WOULD RESERVE THEIR GOVERNMENTS' POSITION ON VARIOUS PROPOSALS THAT AROSE.

3. STATEMENT ISSUED BY SAUDI ARABIA, UAE AND QATAR AT END OF MEETING STATES THAT THEY WILL PUT INTO EFFECT, BEGINNING NOVEMBER 1, 1974 FOR PERIOD THROUGH JULY 1975, FOLLOWING CHANGES: POSTED PRICE IS TO BE LOWERED BY 40 CENTS; ROYAZWY RAISED TO 20 PERCENT; TAX RATE RIASED TO 85 PERCENT. WE ARE TOLD ON FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL UAE AND QATAR AGREED TO SAUDI PROPOSAL WITHOUT

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T 559814 EIA296 PAGE 02-02 NC 93804

TOR:111120Z NOV 74

CHARGES. ON HIKE IN TAXES, WE ARE TOLD SAUDIS ARRIVED WITH PROPOSAL WITH INCREASE TO 81 PERCENT; SOKHOW DURING COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS FIGURE GOT RAISED TO 85 PERCENT.

5. SAID THAT ALTHOUGH YAMANI DENIED THIS PUBLICLY, IT WAS WIDELY AGREED IN CORRIDOR DISCUSSIONS DURING MEETING THAT SAUDI PROCEDURE INPUTTING FORTH THIS PORPOSAL AT THIS TIME REPRESENTED DEAL THAT HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN KING FAISAL AND SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING LATTER'S RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT SAUDIS WOULD NOT HAVE DONE THIS UNLESS IT HAD MET WITH US CONCURRENCE.

7. MINISTER OF PETROLEUM OTAIBA AND UNDER SECRETARY ABDULLAH ISMAIL BOTH LEFT IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING FOR AL AIN TO BRIEF CHAIRMAN OF ABU DHABI NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (ADNOC), SHAIKH TAHNOON.

8. COMMENT: FROM OUR HASTY ANALYSIS, GOVERNMENT TAKE ON BARRLE OF ABU DHABI ONSHORE EQUITY CRUDE WILL BE INCREASED BY SOMETHING ON ORDD HR OF $2.25. WE DO NOT SEE THAT LOWERING OF POSTED PRICE WIL COME ANYWHERE NEAR COMPENSATING FOR UPWARD PRESSURE THIS RISE IN ROYALTY AND TAX WILL EXERT ON PRICE LEVEL. RATIONALE HEARD EVERYWHERE HERE, OF COURSE, IS THAT INCREASED GOVERNMENT TAKE IS MEANT TO COME OUT OF "HUGH PROFITS" WHICH OIL COMPANIES ARE ALLEGEDLY AMASSING. STERNER

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INFO [redacted]

ACTION #

T 603563 EIA782 PAGE 01 NC 09205

TOR:271533Z NOV 74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR Date: 11/5/98
(✓) RELEASE (✓) DECLASSIFY
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART
( ) DENY EO Citations
FOIA Exemptions ( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C Sec. TS authority to
PA Exemptions ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C

9702042

[redacted]

R 271015Z NOV 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2289
INFO RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 079
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1051
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 027
RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 624
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2070
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 486
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 054
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 494
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 90
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 026
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 082
RUFNPS/USMISSION OECD PARIS 292
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 019
BT

[redacted]

[redacted] ABU DHABI 1663
BEIRUT FOR BAGHDAD; KUWAIT ALSO FOR DOHA.
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, TC
SUBJECT: UAE MINISTER OF PETROLEUM COMMENTS ON OIL SITUATION

1. I MET WITH MINISTER OF PETROLEUM OTAIBA FOR HOUR AND HALF NOV 26 AND FOUND HIM IN GOOD-HUMORED BUT HARRASSED FRAOME OF MIND.

2. HE SAID EVERYONE WAS ANGRY WITH HIM. PRODUCING COMPANIES SAW ABU DHABI CONFERENCE DECISION AS FINAL STAB IN BACK -- HE DID NOT, OF COURSE, IMAGINE THEY WOULD BE PLEASED. CONSUMING STATES DID NOT THINK "PRICE REDUCTION" WAS ENOUGH. ON OTHER SIDE HE WAS GETTING FLAK FROM ARAB RADICALS SUCH AS IRAQ WHO WERE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO PRICE REDUCTION. ON TOP OF ALL THIS, HE WAS BEING CALLED EVERY NIGHT BY SHAKH ZAYID WHO WANTED TO KNOW WHY HE AND YAMANI HAD CREATED ALL THIS RUCKUS. (OTAIBA DID NOT MENTION IT BUT WE KNOW FROM INDEPENDENT SOURCES THAT HE ALSO GOT FRIGID RECEPTION FROM SHAIKH RASHID OF DUBAI AND SHAIKH SULTAN OF SHARJAH WHEN HE MADE TRIPS TO THESE CITIES TO "EXPLAIN" ABU DHABI RESULTS.

3. I SAID I WAS SORRY BUT I COULD NOT OFFER HIM MUCH COMFORT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. FOR PAST SIX MONTHS WE HAD BEEN TALFING TO HIMSELF AND OTHER TOP UAEG OFFICIALS TO IMPRESS UPON THEM SERIOUSNESS OF WORLD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND EVEN MORE CRITC AL CONDITIONS

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ACTION #

T 603563 EIA782 PAGE 02 NC 09205

TOR:271533Z NOV 74

WE ARE LIKELY TO FACE IN FUTURE IF PRESENT LEVEL OF OIL PRICES IS MAINTAINED. WE COULD NOT NOW REGARD WITH PLEASURE FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT EVEN HOLD LINE ON PRICES AND WHICH IN EFFECT TELLS US OUR ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN BLITHELY DISREGARDED.

4. OTAIBA SAID THAT TO CONTRARY, HE SAW ABU DHABI FORMULA AS BASICALLY RESPONSIBLE AND MODERATE RESPONSE TO PRESENT "MESSY" PRICE SITUATION. HE NEVERTHELESS AGREED WITH MY COMPUTATION SHOWING THAT ON WEIGHTED AVERAGE BARREL OF ABU DHABI ON-SHORE CUUDE (40-40-20 SPLIT) GOVERNMENT TAKE HAD INCREASED BY 46 CENTS. HE SAID THIS WAS INTENDED TO COMPENSATE FOR INFLATION ON IMPORTED GOODS. HE SAID USG SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT GULF CONFERENCE FORMULA WOULD ESTABLISH STABLE PRICUU FOR NINE MONTHS. IN CONTRAST IRAN WAS PROPOSING THAT PRICES BE CONSTANTLY READJUSTED UPWARD BY INFLATION FACTOR. OTAIBA SAID MOST IMPORTANT THING IN HIS VIEW WAS TO ESTABLISH PRICE STABILITY OVER REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

5. OTAIBA REPEATED FAMILIAR ARGUMENT THAT TAX AND ROYALTY INCREASES COULD BE ABSORBED OUT OF COMPANY PROFITS AND THERE WAS NO REASON WHY ABU DHABI ACTION WHOULD RESULT IN PRICE INCREASE AT GAS PUMP "IF CONSUMER GOVERNMENTS ARE FIRM WITH COMPANIES". OTAIBA SAID PRICE OF CRUDE WOULD NOW GO DOWN BY 38 CENTS ON BOTH BUYBACK AND INDEPENDENT SALES (HE SAID AS RESULT OF HIS LATEST TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA HE AND YAMANI HAVE NOW AGREED THAT BOTH CATEGORIES WILL BE AT 93 PERCENT OF POSTING). SURELY WE WOULD REGARD THIS AS FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. I SAID ONLY TROUBLE WITH THIS ARGUMENT WAS THAT HE WAS ONLY SPEAKING OF 60 PER CENT OF OIL. IN FACT PRACTICALLY NO ONE HAD BEEN VOLUNTARILY BUYING AT 93 PERCENT OF POSTED PRICE AND WORLD MARKET PRICE FOR OIL WAS OBVIOUSLY BASED ON BLEND OF WHICH MUCH CHEAPER EQUITY OIL WAS MAJOR COMPONENT. COST OF THIS OIL HAS NOW BEEN GREATLY INCREASED AND I HAD YET TO HEAR PERSUASIVE CASE MADE THAT THIS WOULD NOT RESULT IN FURTHER RISE IN PRICES. OTAIBA HAD NO REPLY.

6. OTAIBA THEN LAUNCHED INTO LONG JUSTIFICATION OF UAE'S CLOSE RELATONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, GIST OF WHICH WAS THAT SHAIKH ZAYID IS SO RELIEVED TO HAVE BORDER PROBLEM RESOLVED THAT HE WANTS TO DO ANYTHING SAUDIS ASK OF HIM. KING FAISAL HAD MADE PERSONAL APPEAL TO HIM AT RABAT THAT SAUDIS AND UAE SHOULD PROCEED HAND-IN-HAND ON OIL MATTERS. THIS WAS NOW OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN UAE POLICY.

7. I ASKED OTAIBA ABOUT ALGERIAN PROPOSAL TO SHIFT VENUE OF NEXT OPEC MEETING TO ALGIERS. OTAIBA SAID THIS HAD NOT SOLD WITH OPEC MEMBERS AND MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN VIENNA ON DECEMBER 12. WHAT

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T 603563 EIA782 PAGE 03-03 NC 09205

TOR:271533Z NOV 74

ABOUT ALGERIAN IDEA OF HAVING FONMINS JOIN TO PREPARE FOR OPEC SUMMIT? OTAIBA SAID THERE MIGHT BE GATHERING OF OAPEC MINISTERS IN ALGERIA NIGHT AFTER VIENNA MEETING BUT HE WBD NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IDEA OF SUMMIT. IN HIS VIEW VERY CAREFUL PREPARATION SHOULD GO INTO SUMMIT MEETINGS, AND HE DID NOT CARE FOR SITUATION WHEREBY HEADS OF STATE MIGHT MAKE DECISIONS FOR WHICH THERE WOULD BE NO RECOURSE. I SAID FOR A MOMENT THERE HE SOUNDED JUST LIKE SECRETARY KISSINGER.

8. I ASKED HIM WHETHER FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD APPROACHED UAEG ON ITS PROPOSAL FOR CONSUMER-PRODUCER-LDC CONFERENCE. OTAIBA ACKNOWLEDGED IT HAD. ALTHOUGH UAE WAS NOT ON LIST OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS, FRENCH HOPED FOR UAE SUPPORT. OTAIBA SAID CAUTIOUSLY FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS "CLOSE TO OUR THINKING" AND THAT IT WAS BEING STUDIED. HE ASKED WHAT USG THOUGHT OF IT. I SAID I HAD IMPRESSION WASHINGTON TOO WAS STUDYING PROPOSAL.

9. AT THIS POINT I HANDED OTAIBA TEXT OF SECRETARY SIMON'S SPEECH. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT MADE NO COMMENT ON ITS CONTENTS.

10. COMMENT: OIL COMPANIES HERE HAVE RECEIVED LETTER "INFORMING" THEM OF GULF CONFERENCE TAX AND ROYALTY INCREASE, AND WE ARE TOLD THAT BU DHABI EXECUTIVE COUNCIL HAS FORMALLY APPROVED THESE NEW RATES. COMPANIES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IMPLEMENTATION WILL IN FACT BE HELD UP UNTIL ABU DHABI SEES WHAT EMERGES AT OPEC MEETING. INCIDENTALLY THESE LETTERS, WRITTEN BEFORE OTAIBA TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA, SPECIFY 94.85 PERCENT OF POSTED PRICE AS BUY-BACK RATE. THIS WILL PGPSUMABLY BE CHANGED TO 93 PERCENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW OTAIBA-YAMANI AGREEMENT. STERNER

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T 605355 EIA523 PAGE 01 NC 09832

TOR:280231Z NOV 74

R 260900Z NOV 74 [redacted]
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9384
INFO RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 381
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 489
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 312
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 105
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 7244
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2575
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3021
RUQKSBH/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 511
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1207
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 554
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1620
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 735
BT
[redacted] OF 2 JIDDA 6948 [redacted]

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, SA, US, OPEC
SUBJECT: SAUDI PLANS TO REDUCE OIL PRICES; NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAMCO
REF: JIDDA 6686

SUMMARY: SAUDIS PLAN TO SELL 2 TO 3 MILLION BBLS/DAY AT PRICE NEAR BUT NOT BELOW THE AVERAGED PRICE PAID BY MAJORS. TWO ARAMCO PARENT NEGOTIATORS BACK IN RIYADH AND IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED QUICKLY (AND YAMANI IS CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL), YAMANI BELIEVES OVERALL PRICE FOR COMPANIES MIGHT ALSO BE REDUCED. STRATEGY FOR INFORMING OPEC OF SAUDI DECISION WILL BE FIRST INFORM FRENCH, BRITISH, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS IN EARLY DECEMBER JUST BEFORE OPEC MEETING. USG SHOULD REMAIN QUIET ABOUT SAUDI PLANS SO THAT RIYADH IS NOT ACCUSED OF SELLING OUT TO AMERICANS.
AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD YAMANI IT IS MISTAKE TO EXCLUDE ARAMCO PARTNERS UNLESS PRODUCTION RISE IS ALLOWED. YAMANI POINTS TO OUR STATEMENTS ON EXCESS CAPACITY TO INDICATE THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM. YAMANI

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T 605355 EIA523 PAGE 02-.. NC 09832

TOR:280231Z NOV 74

QUALIFIED HIS STATEMENTS ON EXCLUDING ARAMCO BY ASSERTING THAT IF NEW AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED WITH THE SAG, ARAMCO CAN GET ALL THE OIL IT NEEDS. IF THERE ARE DIRECT SALES AT PRICES LOWER THAN THE WORLD PRICE, THE TEMPTATION FOR SIDE DEALS AND UNDER-THE-COUNTER PAYMENTS WOULD BE IRRESISTIBLE. END SUMMARY.

1. SAUDI MINISTER OF PETROLEUM YAMANI TOLD ME THAT HE HAS FULL CABINET APPROVAL OF HIS PLAN TO SELL A "SUBSTANTIAL" QUANTITY OF SAUDI OIL AT PRICES "SUBSTANTIALLY" BELOW 93 PERCENT OF POSTED PRICE.

2. HE SAID HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF 2-3 MILLION BBLS/DAY BUT THE EXACT QUANTITY WOULD BE SET BY THE SUPREME OIL COUNCIL NEXT WEEK.

3. THE PRICE WILL BE SOMETHING NEAR - BUT NOT BELOW THE AVERAGE PRICE PAID BY THE MAJORS, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL DIFFERENT WAYS THE AVERAGE PRICE COULD BE CALCULATED - DEPENDING ON THE MIX OF EQUITY OIL AND BUY-BACK OIL THE SAUDIS USE IN THEIR CALCULATIONS.

4. HE SAID THE OVERALL PRICE COULD ALSO BE REDUCED IF THE ARAMCO PARENTS WORK OUT A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SAG. (GARVIN OF EXXON AND TAVOLAREAS OF MOBIL ARE IN RIYADH FOR TALKS WHICH STARTED NOV 23 AND CONTINUED TODAY, NOV 25). I SAW YAMANI AFTER HIS FIRST MEETING ; HE WAS ELATED; SAID THAT THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED INTIRELY. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN REACHED ON ALL IMPORTANT POINTS AND HE WAS SURE DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT TODAY (NOV 25).

5. THE NEW SAUDI OIL SALE PLAN WILL BE GIVEN TO THE FRENCH, BRITISH, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS EARLY IN DECEMBER. IT WOLLD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN OPEC IN THE DECEMBER MEETING ANYWAY, AND EVEN IF THERE ARE LEAKS THEY WILL NOT BE CRUCIAL. HE HOPES TO HAVE EVERYTHING LINED UP AT HOME AND WILL HAVE FULL SUPPORT OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT REGARDLESS OF THE OPEC REACTION.

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TOR:261922Z NOV 74

R 260900Z NOV 74
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9365
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 382
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 410
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 313
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 186
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 7245
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2576
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3022
RUQKSBH/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 512
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1208
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 555
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1621
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 754
BT
[redacted]ECTION 2 OF 2 JIDDA 6948
EXDIS

6. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES PERSISTS IN MAKING THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE WAS DISTURBED BY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE IMMINENT DROP IN OIL PRICES; THE ONLY QUESTION NOW WAS WHEN IT WOULD HAPPEN. HE SAID THAT OPEC - AND EVEN SOME SAUDIS - WILL INTERPRET THESE REMARKS AS PROOF THAT HE (YAMANI) HAS SOLD OUT TO THE AMERICANS.

7. I TOLD HIM I STRONGLY APPROVED THE IDEA OF LARGE SALES AT A LOWER PRICE - BUT THOUGHT HE WOULD MAKE A BIG MISTAKE BY EXCLUDING THE ARAMCO PARTNERS FROM BIDDING - UNLESS HE INCREASED PRODUCTION MARKEDLY AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE SALES ARE DEDUCTED FROM THE CURRENT PRODUCTION, AND ARAMCO PARTNERS CANNOT BUY OIL THEY WILL HAVE TO MEET THEIR CONTRACTS THROUGH PURCHASE ELSEWHERE THEREBY DRIVING UP OIL PRICES. HE DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD HAPPEN; SAID THEY COULD LIFT SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES IN IRAN AND ABU DHABI TO MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND HE QUOTED SCRETARY SIMON'S STATEMENT THAT THERE ARE 8 MILLION BBLS/DAY OF SPARE CAPACITY IN THE WORLD TODAY. IF THIS IS TRUE, HE SAID, AND "IT MUST BE TRUE BECAUSE SIMON SAID SO," THEN

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T 600677 EIA969 PAGE 02-02 ~~NC 00113~~ UC 09832

TOR:261922Z NOV 74

ARAMCO COULD PICK UP ANY OIL IT NEEDED WITHOUT PLACING ANY UPWARD PRESSURE ON PRICES. HE ADDED THAT IF AGREEMENT WITH ARAMCO IS REACHED NOV 25, THEN THE PARENT COMPANIES WILL "OF COURSE" BE GIVEN ALL THE OIL THEY NEED.

8. I TOLD HIM THAT ANOTHER, PERHAPS MORE SERIOUS OBJECTION WAS THAT IF OIL IS OFFERED AT A PRICE BELOW THE WORLD PRICE, THERE WILL BE MORE BUYERS THAN AVAILABLE OIL - NO MATTER WHAT QUANTITY IS OFFERED. THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE DEALS UNDER THE TABLE WILL BE IRRESISTIBLE. SOME COMPANIES MIGHT THEN MAKE GREATER PROFITS, SOME PRINCES WOULD SURELY BECOME EVEN RICHER, BUT THE CONSUMER WOULD NOT BENEFIT MUCH, IF AT ALL. HE SAID THIS COULD BE HANDLED BY HAVING AN OPEN AUCTION. GIVING EACH BIDDER A PROPORTION OF HIS OFFER WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL, BUT EVEN THEN SIDE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. HE ASKED IF I WOULD TAKE THIS UP WITH PRINCE MUSA'ID, MINISTER OF FINANCE, AND ONE OF THE FEW PEOPLE LEFT IN GOVERNMENT STILL FIGHTING AGAINST CORRUPTION. I DID THIS ON NOV 24. MUSA'ID SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM PERFECTLY, AND WOULD DO ALL IN HIS POWER TO INSURE THAT "BROKERS" NOT RPT NOT CREAM OFF ANY OF THE PRICE REDUCTIONS THE SAUDIS MAKE. (THE LOSS OF ANWAR ALI, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK, AND OMAR SAQQAF, THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REMOVES TWO OF THE STRONGEST VOICES IN THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST CORRUPTION - AND WE SEE NO ONE WHO COULD REPLACE THEM WHO WOULD HAVE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY AND WITH THE KING.)

9. YAMANI HAS SPOKEN FAIRLY FREELY TO SEVERAL NEWSMEN RECENTLY ABOUT HIS PLANS. AS SOON AS THEY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER ACCURATELY, THE IMPACT OF HIS PROPOSAL WILL SURELY APPEAR IN THE WORLD PRESS(IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY). FOR THIS REASON I HAVE REDUCED SOMEWHAT THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CABLE. AKINS

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T 562835 EIA224 PAGE 01 [redacted] NC 94813

TOR:121038Z NOV 74

R 120540Z NOV 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2234
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1020
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 023
RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 019
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 606
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2044
RUQKSBH/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 458
RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS 073
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 022
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 014
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 481
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 084
RUFNPS/USMISSION OECD PARIS 281
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 035
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 050
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 477
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 065
BT
UNCLAS ABU DHABI 1556
KUWAIT FOR DOHA
BEIRUT FOR USINT BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, OPEC, XF
SUBJ: COMMUNIQUES OF GULF oil PRODUCERS' MEETING IN ABU DHABI
REFS: A) ABU DHABI 1501 B) ABU DHABI 1516

1. ABU DHABI PETROLEUM DEPARTMENT HAS ISSUED FOLLOWING TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF MEETING OF PERSIAN GULF OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES: QUOTE: THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE STATE OF QATAR AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE SAUDI PROPOSAL WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST NOVEMBER 1974 THROUGH JULY 1975 IN VIEW OF THEIR BELIEF THAT THE OIL COMPANIES OPERATING WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIES REALIZE EXCESSIVE PROFITS ON THE EXPORT OF THEIR CRUDES AND BECAUSE THESE PROFITS ACCRUE IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL MARKET PRICES AND TAX PAID COSTS UNDER THE PRESENT TAXATION SYSTEM.

2. QUOTE: THE COUNTRIES IN [redacted] CONSIDER THAT A

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TOR:121038Z NOV 74

PORTION OF THESE PROFITS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE CONSUMER AND HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

A, TO LOWER THE CRUDE OIL POSTED PRICES BY 40 U.S. CENTS/BARREL WITH EFFECT FROM FIRST NOVEMBER 1974,

B, TO RAISE THE RATE OF ROYALTY TO 20 PERCENT.

C, TO RAISE THE RATE OF INCOME TAX APPLICABLE TO THE OIL COMPANIES TO 85 PERCENT. QUNOTE.

3, THE SAUDI PROPOSAL REFERRED TO ABOVE WAS MENTIONED IN THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE, ALSO ISSUED BY THE PETROLEUM DEPARTMENT: QUOTE: AT THE INVITATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES THE GULF OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES HELD A MEETING IN ABU DHABI DURING THE NINTH AND TENTH NOVEMBER 1974, IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE SAUDI ARABIAN PROPOSAL THAT HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE FORTY FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES HELD IN VIENNA ON 12TH AND 13TH SEPTEMBER 1974, AND WHICH ENVISAGED THE LOWERING OF THE CRUDE OIL POSTED PRICES AND THE RAISING OF THE ROYALTY AND INCOME TAX RATES APPLICABLE TO THE COMPANIES. THE MEETING UNANIMOUSLY ELECTED H.E. MANA SAED AL-OTAIBA, MINISTER OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCES AND HEAD OF THE U.A.E. DELEGATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE MEETING.

4, QUOTE: THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND THE STATE OF QATAR AGREED AT THE MEETING TO IMPLEMENT THE SAUDI PROPOSAL WHILE THE STATE OF KUWAIT RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF ONE OR MORE OF THE GULF COUNTRIES TO IMPLEMENT THE SAUDI ARABIAN PROPOSAL, PREFERRED THAT AS FAR AS KUWAIT IS CONCERNED SUCH A DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE NEXT ORDINARY CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES TO BE HELD IN VIENNA ON 12TH DECEMBER NEXT, OR AT EXTRA-ORDINARY CONFERENCE TO BE CONVENED PRIOR TO THE DATE MENTIONED.

5, QUOTE: IRAN, WHILE RESERVING ITS POSITION BELIEVES THAT THE MATTER RELATING TO DETERMINATION OF CRUDE OIL PRICES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT THE OPEC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN VIENNA ON 12TH DECEMBER 1974.

6, QUOTE, THE IRAQI DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE OIL PRICING ISSUE IS A MATTER OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL

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T 562835 EIA224 PAGE 03-03 NC 94813

TOR:121038Z NOV 74

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, AND STRESSES THAT ANY DECISION ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE O.O.P.E.C. CONFERENCE AND NOT IN THIS MEETING.

7, QUOTE, THE ABOVE MENTIONED COUNTRIES WHO INTEND TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSAL HAVE DECIDED TO SEND A MISSION TO THE O.P.E.C. MEMBER COUNTRIES TO XPLAIN THEIR POSITION PRIOR TO THE NEXT OPEC CONFERENCE.

8, QUOTE, THE THREE COUNTRIES THAT APPROVED OF THE SAUDI PROPOSAL DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT IT WITH EFFECT FROM LAST NOVEMBER 1974 THROUGH THE END OF JULY, 1975.

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T 489365 EIA854 PAGE 01 NC 68332

TOR:122221Z OCT 74

R 121455Z OCT 74 [redacted]
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8939
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDO 2983
RUFHBS/USMISSION EEC BRUSSELS 0239
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0093
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 7119 [redacted]
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2508
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1576
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0377
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0361
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0181
BT
[redacted] JIDDA 5964

DECAPTIONED

TAGS: ENRG, SA, US
SUBJ: SUPREME PETROLEUM COUNCIL APPROVES ACCEPTING RECENT OPEC PRICE INCREASES
REF : (A) LONDON 12965 (NOTAL); (B) JIDDA 5858

1. SUMMARY: OMAR SAQQAF WAS LONE VOTE FOR DEFERRAL OR CANCELLATION OF QUITO PRICE INCREASES FOR SAUDI OIL WHEN SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED ON KING'S ORDERS IN SUPREME PETROLEUM COUNCIL OCTOBER 9. YAMANI MADE ARGUMENT THAT FOR SAG UNILATERALLY TO STAY PRICE INCREASE WOULD DESTROY OPEC UNITY AND ONLY GIVE ARAMCO PARENTS FURTHER UNEXPECTED PROFITS. HE SAID THAT ONLY WAY TO DECREASE PRICES WAS METHOD HE ALREADY FOLLOWING: CONCERTED ACTION WITHIN OPEC ITSELF. HE ADVOCATED ELIMINATION OF POSTED PRICE SYSTEM AND CLAIMED CONSIDERABLE OPEC SUPPORT EXISTS FOR THIS. IN ABSENCE OF FAHD, SAQQAF WAS ISOLATED IN COUNCIL ARGUMENT OVER PRICES. AMBASSADOR DOUBTS YAMANI HAS ENOUGH OPEC MEMBERS LINED UP ON ABANDONMENT OF POSTED PRICES TO PUSH THROUGH. COMPANIES WILL CERTAINLY OPPOSE SUCH A MOVE BECAUSE OF TAX CREDIT DIFFICULTIES. END SUMMARY.

2. SAYYID OMAR SAQQAF, SAUDI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFIARS, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT (OCTOBER 10) THAT HE HAD SPENT THE PREVIOUS DAY IN A BATTLE ON OIL PRICES. HE HAD INFORMED THE KING THAT YAMANI'S PROPOSAL TO APPLY THE QUIT OAND VIENNA OPEC TAX INCREASES WOULD EMBARRASS THE KING AND [redacted]

E80 42-144-3

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THE KINGDOM (REF A); THE KING, THEREFORE, HAD ORDERED THE SUPREME PETROLEUM COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.

3. YAMANI, WHO HAD RETURNED TO RIYADH, DEFENDED HIS ACTION VIGOROUSLY. HE SAID THAT NOT RPT NOT APPLYING THE OPEC INCREASES WOULD MEAN ONLY THAT THE ARAMCO PARENTS WOULD INCREASE THEIR PROFITS. THE OIL COMPANIES KNEW IN MAY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE QUITO INCREASES AND THE PRETENSES THEY NOW MADE TO THE USA ABOUT BEING SURPRISED WERE "PURE LIES." YAMANI SAID HE STILL BELIEVED OIL PRICES SHOULD BE DECREASED AND HE REVIEWED FOR THE CONCIL EVERYTHING HE HAD DONE INSIDE OPEC TO ACHIEVE THIS. THE OPEC PRICE INCREASES WERE, BECAUSE OF HIS ACTIONS, MUCH LOWER THAN ALL OTHER COUNTRIES HAD DEMANDED. BUT SAUDI ARABIA,HE SAID, MUST RPT MUST ACCEPT THE COMPROMISE WHICH HE HAD WORKED OUT--NOT TO DO SO WOULD DESTROY OPEC.

4. YAMANI ARGUED THAT THE PRICE INCREASES COULD BE ABSORBED BY THE COMPANIES; THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DECREASE OIL PRICES WOULD BE BY CONCERTED ACTION WITHIN OPEC ITSELF. HE VOTED TO REDUCE POSTED PRICES OR, PREFERABLY, TO ELIMINATE THEM ALTOGETHER. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH OTHER OPEC MEMBERS AND HAD FOUND "CONSIDERABLE" SUPPORT. THE NEW SYSTEM, HE SAID, WOULD BE PROPOSED FORMALLY AT THE NEXT OPEC MEETING; IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED AND THE MAJOR EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE CONSUMERS WOULD BENEFIT. MARKET FORCES WOULD THEN SERVE TO SET OIL PRICES AND THE WORLD COSWD POSSIBLY SEE AN ACTUAL DECLINE IN OIL PRICES.

5. SAQQAF SAID HE STOOD ALONE IN OPPOSING YAMANI'S IMMEDIATE DEMAND FOR APPLICATION OF THE QUITO AND VIENNA INCREASES; ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SUPPORTED YAMANI, INCLUDING DIRECTOR OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AUTHORITY (SAMA), ANWAR ALI. PRINCE FAHD, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL, IS STILL NOT RPT NOT BACK FROM LONDON. (REF B) SAQQAF SAID SMANI'S POSITION SOUNDED CONVINCING AND IF POSTED PRICES ARE REDUCED, THE INCREASE IN TAXES CAN BE OFFSET COMPLETELY. I TOLD SAQQAF I SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY COUNTRY IN OPEC WOULD AGREE TO REDUCING POSTED PRICES. AND IF THE SAUDI POSITION WAS TO WORK INSIDE OPEC (SAQQAF SAID EVEN HE HAD NO DESIRE TO DESTROY OR WEAKEN THE ORGANIZATION) THEN I THOUGHT THIS ARGUMENT ON HELPING THE

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T 489365 EIA854 PAGE 03-03 NC 68332

TOR:122221Z OCT 74

CONSUMERS WAS MISLEADING.

6. COMMENT: I HAVE NOT SEEN YAMANI YET BUT ASSUME SAQQAF GAVE ME A FAIR ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE PETROLEUM COUNCIL MEETING. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT YAMANI HAS A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OPEC MEMBERS LINED UP BEHIND ANY PROPOSAL TO LOWER POSTED PRICES, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL (E.G. KUWAIT AND IRAN), PERHAPS MOST, MIGHT BE WILLING TO SWITCH FROM POSTED PRICES TO "MARKET PRICE," AS LONG AS THEIR INCOME PER BARREL REMAINED UNCHANGED OR INCREASED. THE MAIN LOSERS IN ANY SUCH SWITCH IN CALCULATION WOULD BE THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES, NOW HOLDING OIL CONCESSIONS, WHO WOULD HAVE A HARD TIME CONVINCING OUR IRS THAT THEY SHOULD STILL GET U.S. TAX CREDITS FOR WHATEVER THEY PAY THE OPEC GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR OIL. AKINS

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ACTION # [redacted]

T 264513 EIA427 PAGE 01 NC 85882

TOR:152138Z JUL 74 [redacted]

[redacted]

R 151215Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7980
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 324
RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS 331
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2230
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5341
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 267
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 211
RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1195
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 6856
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 149
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2388
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2989
RUQKSBH/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 444
RUFHSU/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 122
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1893
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 530
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1564
RUQMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 823
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 157
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 725
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 374
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 129
BT
[redacted] JIDDA 4073

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE [illegible] DATE 4/3/98

BEIRUT PASS USINT BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, SA
SUBJECT: KING FAISAL'S VIEWS ON LOWERING PRICES OF OIL
REF JIDDA 3959

1. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED KING FAISAL TODAY (JULY 14) FOR THE EFFORTS HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN TO REDUCE WORLD OIL PRICES.

2. THE KING, WHO WAS WELL BRIEFED ON THE SUBJECT, REPLIED VIGOROUSLY AND AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH THAT SAUDI ARABIA UNDERSTOOD WHY THIS SHOULD BE DONE, HOW HIGH PRICES WOULD AFFECT OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEIR ECONOMIES, AND HOW A WORLD RECESSION WOULD ADVANCE INTERNATIONAL

[redacted]

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T 264513 EIA427 PAGE 02-02 NC 85882

TOR:152130Z JUL 74

COMMUNISM, BUT HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO SUPPORT OR EVEN UNDERSTANDING FROM ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN OPEC.

3. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY "SURPRISED AND PAINED" TO HAVE HIS POSITION, HIS MINISTER, AND EVEN HIS PERSON ATTACKED BY IRAN WHICH HE HAD SUPPOSED WAS A FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE U.S. WHAT WAS PARTICULARLY GALLING WAS TO BE ACCUSED BY THE IRANIANS PUBLICLY AND IN OPEC CIRCLES OF BEING A TOOL OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.

4. HE SAID THAT MANY OF THE COUNTRIES IN OPEC HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY WITH THE U.S. AND HE ASKED WHY THE U.S. COULD NOT PERSUADE THEM NOW TO AGREE TO A LOWERING OF OIL PRICES, BUT IF PERSUASION DOES NOT WORK, HE SAID, WE MUST PUT PRESSURE ON THEM, PARTICULARLY ON IRAN. SAUDI ARABIA, HE SAID CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY, CANNOT CONTINUE TO BEAR ALONE THE BURDEN FOR ALL THE CONSUMERS. THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE MUST ALL GIVE IT CONCRETE SUPPORT DIRECTLY AND WITH THE OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES.

5. COMMENT: THE KING DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT SUPPORT HE WANTED OR WHAT ACTION HE EXPECTED. WHAT CLEARLY HURT HIM THE MOST WAS THE IRANIAN ACCUSATION, THE LACK OF PUBLICLY-EXPRESSED U.S. SUPPORT, AND THE LACK OF SUCCESS OF ANY PRIVATE ENDEAVORS THE USG MIGHT HAVE MADE IN IRAN OR ELSEWHERE IN OPEC. AKINS

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INFO [redacted]

T 427199 EIA522 PAGE 01 [redacted] NC 44828

TOR:190629Z SEP 74

R 181225Z SEP 74 [redacted]
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8243
INFO RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2194
BT
[redacted] TEHRAN 7879
EX DECAPTIONED
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, OPEC, IR, SA
SUBJ: REMARKS OF NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR
REF: TEHRAN 7611

1. NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR IBRAHIM BAKR MADE HIS COURTESY CALL ON ME MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 18. AFTER CASUAL CONVERSATION ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES IN JAKARTA, HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HAD A PLEASANT INTERCHANGE WITH THE SHAH AFTER HE PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS ON SEPTEMBER 15. HE INDICATED THAT THE SHAH MADE EVERY PRETEXT AT WANTING GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THAT THE SHAH WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE AND COLLABORATE WITH KING FAISAL IN ANY MANNER THE LATTER DESIRED. AT THIS POINT AMBASSADOR BAKR OUTLINED FOR THE SHAH THE SAUDI VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY, THE DESIRE TO SEE A WESTERN EURIPE IN HEALTHY FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITION, AND THE NECESSITY IN THIS CONTEXT FOR BEING REASONABLE ABOUT OIL PRICES OR EVEN LOWERING THEM. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR BAKR, THE SHAH'S REACTION WAS PREDICTABLE. HE CAREFULLY DEVELOPED THE WELL-KNOWN THEME THAT THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES PAID NO ATTENTION TO THE RISING COSTS OF COMMODITIES AND MANUFACTURED GOODS DURING THE PERIOD WHEN OIL PRICES WERE ARTIFICIALLY LOW AND THAT THERE WAS NO INDICATION EVEN NOW THAT THE WEST WAS TAKING ANY EFFECTIVE STEPS TO HALT INFLATION. IN FACT IT WAS GETTING WORSE. AMBASSADOR BAKR CONCLUDED THIS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION BY STATING IT WAS INDEED TRUE THAT SAUDI ARABIA, ALGERIA, AND IRAN HAD AGREED BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 12 OPEC MEETING TO KEEP OIL PRICES WHERE THEY WERE BY THE DEVICE OF THE SAUDIS DECLINING TO RUN THE OIL AUCTION WHILE THE IRANIANS REFRAINED FROM SUPPORTING THE REQUESTS OF OTHER OPEC MEMBERS FOR INCREASED PRICES. (THE FACT THAT REPORTING ON THE OPEC MEETING INDICATES A FIGHT BETWEEN THE SAUDIS AND THE IRANIANS ON PRICES APPARENTLY DOES NOT NULLIFY THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE MEETING. CF. PARAGRAPH FOUR OF REFTEL.)
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ZNY SSSSS ZZZH
R 111311Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6137
INFO RUESBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 218
RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS 294
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4928
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 226 [redacted]
RUFHBS/USMISSION EC BRUSSELS 167
RUESOR/USINT CAIRO 1010
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 48
RUQSHW/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 6304
RUESKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2188
RUHJBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 103
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2780
RUESLS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 50
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 200
RUFNPS/USMISSION OECD PARIS
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 940
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 493
RUESQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 217
RUESHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1389
RUESWO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 117
RUESTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 663
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 73
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[redacted] JIDDA 691

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD; KUWAIT PASS DOHA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, JA, US
SUBJECT: PROSPECTIVE DECREASE [redacted] IN PETROLEUM PRICES

ES 223-147-3

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T 874624 PAGE 02 NC 42878

TOR:111930Z FEB 74

REF: A) TOKYO 1485; B) JIDDA 668; C) JIDDA 5715

1. AHMED ZAKI YAMANI, SAUDI MINISTER OF PETROLEUM ASKED ME TODAY IN RIYADH (FEB 10) WHAT I THOUGHT OF HIS STATEMENT IN TOKYO ABOUT OPEC PRICES BEING TOO HIGH (REF A). I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IT WAS GREAT: TOO BAD IT DIDN'T MEAN ANYTHING. HE BRISTLED AND ASKED WHAT I MEANT. HE SAID HE HAD LETTERS FROM KING FAISAL TO THE HEADS OF STATE OF ALL MAJOR OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES. THE KING STATES THAT SAUDI ARABIA BELIEVES THE DECEMBER 22 PRICE INCREASES WERE TOO GREAT; THAT THE ECONOMIES OF MANY COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WILL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED; THAT A WORLD ECONOMIC DEPRESSION COULD BE PROVOKED AND THAT OPEC MUST NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH A CATASTROPHE WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEM AS WELL AS THE CONSUMERS.

2. I SAID THIS WAS WELCOME NEWS, BUT I HAD READ CABLES FROM ALL OTHER OPEC CAPITALS. THERE WAS NO RPT NO DISPOSITION TO DECREASE PRICES. IN FACT, IRAN, KUWAIT, ALGERIA WERE ALL TALKING OF FURTHER INCREASES ON APRIL 1. I REPEATED I WAS SORRY BUT HIS EFFORTS WERE DOOMED TO FAILURE.

3. HE SAID "YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY WRONG, I WILL WIN. AND I'LL BET YOU A HUNDRED THOUSAND RIYALS ($30,000) THAT THERE WILL BE PRICE DECREASES; I'LL GIVE YOU TEN-TO-ONE ODDS."

4. I SAID I WAS SORELY TEMPTED. BUT I COULDN'T AFFORD TO LOSE $3,000 AND I DIDN'T REALLY WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF HOPING THAT HE WOULD FAIL.

5. COMMENT: I CONSIDERED RISKING MY FORTUNE (AND MY CAREER) ON THE BET. I EVEN CONSIDERED GETTING THE ITALIANS TO STAKE ME (THE ITALIANS WOULD BE INTRIGUED BY SUCH A PROPOSAL AND THEY

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TOR:111930Z FEB 74

ARE DESPERATELY AFFECTED BY THE PRICE INCREASES.
SEE REF B). I SUPPOSE IT'S BEYOND THE CAPABILITY
OR THE INGENUITY EVEN OF THE NEW KISSINGER STATE
DEPARTMENT TO AUTHORIZE ME TO TAKE HIM UP? AFTER
ALL, IF HE WINS THE BET THE WORLD ALSO WINS AND
IF I DO, ZAKI CAN CONTRIBUTE MY WINNINGS DIRECTLY TO
CHARITY. AKINS

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Current Foreign Relations

Issue No. 25
June 20, 1973

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Current Foreign Relations

Issue No. 25
June 20, 1973

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NOTES

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E U R O P E

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

The 51st Ministeral Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Copenhagen June 14-15, reflected a broad measure of Allied cohesion on the key issues of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), the linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and the US proposal for a review of Atlantic relations.

The Ministers welcomed a reiteration of the US pledge to maintain and improve US forces in Europe, provided the Allies do likewise, and not to reduce them in the absence of reciprocal reductions by the other side. From the US point of view, this was the most successful NATO Ministerial in years. It was agreed that the next meeting will be held in Brussels December 10-11. (For discussions on the UK-Icelandic fisheries dispute see article below.)

Examination of NATO Relations

Noting that profound changes are taking place in every field of international activity, the Ministers agreed to examine their relationships in the light of these changes "in a spirit of solidarity and by a common effort." This represented a compromise following a tough statement by French Foreign Minister Jobert taking issue with the US initiative on this subject. Most other Ministers generally supported US current objectives and some specifically proposed that NATO formulate a new declaration of principles. Thus, the stage is set for later talks by the US with its Allies on the next steps in developing a set of common objectives and principles.

Agreements on CSCE

The Ministers all expressed satisfaction with the results of the multilateral preparatory talks on a CSCE. None expected the second (i.e., commission) phase of the Conference to begin

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substantive discussions before September. Many called for further Allied efforts over the summer to refine Allied positions for use in the second phase. It was generally agreed that a decision on the level of participation in the third phase should be taken in the light of progress in the second phase. The Ministers agreed that the second phase should not proceed under any artificial time limitations, and that they would inform the Finnish Government of their acceptance of July 3 as the date for the beginning of the first phase of the Conference.

Agreements on MBFR

The Ministers unanimously agreed on the paramount importance of maintaining Allied cohesion during negotiations on MBFR. They also agreed that Allied security should remain undiminished--with no change in the relative military balance between East and West--and that present NATO strategy should not be affected. There was strong support for an initial reduction in US and Soviet forces--within a general focus on stationed forces--leaving open the option of later reductions of other stationed and of indigenous forces. Only Germany pressed for guidelines allowing flexibility in dealing simultaneously with stationed and indigenous forces.

MBFR-CSCE Timing

Despite earlier indications that the Netherlands, Canada, and to a lesser degree Belgium would insist on tying the opening date for CSCE to Soviet agreement to begin negotiations on MBFR by October 30, the US approach on this issue was accepted--the Allies agreed after some debate that the two sets of talks should move ahead in parallel but not be explicitly linked. Accordingly, the communique placed the onus clearly on the Soviets to accept the October 30 date for MBFR, as the Allies upheld their part of the bargain by agreeing to begin the CSCE July 3, on schedule. (The Russians previously proposed that negotiations on MBFR should begin by the end of the year, with the precise date being fixed later by the direct participants, and Allied representatives in Vienna reacted negatively to this proposal.)

US Statements on Talks with the Soviets

In his address at the meeting, Secretary Rogers said that we did not expect the talks with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev during his visit to the US to have the dramatic ground-breaking

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character of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow last year, but that we expected them to be significant, and that we looked for a series of agreements on bilateral cooperation similar to those that were signed in Moscow in May 1972. He pointed out that we seek concrete results and not just grandiose generalities.

The Secretary noted that the implementation of the Moscow agreements has proceeded in a generally satisfactory manner, and that in addition to renewal of the US-Soviet exchanges agreement, we are now negotiating other possible agreements--e.g., on agriculture, oceanography, transportation, peaceful uses of atomic energy, and taxes. He assured the Council that there would be no decisions taken or agreements reached that would be detrimental to the Atlantic Allies, and that we would keep the NATO Allies advised as actively and fully as possible.

US View of CSCE

The Secretary pointed out to the Ministers that we have approached the CSCE with skepticism about the value of purely symbolic acts and with determination to press for progress on specific issues. He expressed our view that the initial meeting of Foreign Ministers in the CSCE should be brief--ideally no longer than a week--and that such a meeting is not the appropriate forum to carry out any extensive negotiations on points of substance. He expressed our opposition to any artificial timetable for the CSCE, stating that when we agreed to enter these talks, we agreed on the basis that we would insist on concrete results, and any artificial timetable would make it much more difficult to achieve such results.

The Secretary expressed our belief that the initial CSCE meeting of Ministers would not be the appropriate occasion to discuss drafts of any final CSCE documents which might be tabled by the Eastern powers or to seek agreement on the level of representation in the final stage of the conference.

US Views on MBFR/CSCE Linkage

In discussing MBFR, the Secretary reiterated our view that MBFR should focus initially on stationed forces and that indigenous force reductions, if any, should come in a subsequent phase. He also expressed our belief that it is important for negotiations on MBFR to begin on or before October 30. He pointed out that

we would be willing to see the first stage of the CSCE begin on schedule early in July, but that we have also told the Soviets in the strongest possible terms that we expect them to uphold their end of the agreement to begin MBFR negotiations no later than October 30.

US Stresses Need for NATO Strength

The Secretary told the Council that as we move toward negotiations on MBFR, it is more important than ever that NATO maintain its strength and that we not be misled by any euphoria about detente. He pointed out that there can be no doubt that improved relations with the USSR have come about because of the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. [redacted]

* * *

NATO MINISTERS DISCUSS UK-ICELANDIC DISPUTE

In discussions at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen June 14-15, the UK and Icelandic Foreign Ministers presented their respective positions on the fisheries dispute between their countries. A round of statements by other Foreign Ministers urged an early resolution of the dispute. Secretary Rogers took the lead in urging that a clear distinction be made between the issue of the US base at Keflavik and the UK-Icelandic problem.

Neither Iceland nor the UK showed signs of yielding its current position, but the Icelandic Foreign Minister admitted that the fisheries and base issues are separate. NATO Secretary General Luns indicated that he would continue his behind-the-scenes efforts to bring about a withdrawal of British naval vessels from the fisheries zone claimed by Iceland and subsequent cessation of harassment of UK trawlers by Iceland.

Iceland's Case

Icelandic Foreign Minister Agustsson argued that the UK had provoked Iceland by sending warships to the area, and that the



*Iceland's Agustsson--
UK Provocation
Requires UK Withdrawal*

first step to resolve the dispute should be immediate UK withdrawal. He indicated that following UK withdrawal, talks between the two countries could be resumed. He expressed concern that no progress had been made toward resolution of the issue in two weeks following an Icelandic request for NATO assistance, and he concluded that the Icelandic people would find it necessary to reassess their participation in the Atlantic Alliance if NATO could not help.

Agustsson said that a request for review of the US-Icelandic Defense Agreement under Article VII of the Agreement would be submitted to the North Atlantic Council later this month. (Article VII provides that either government may request the North Atlantic Council to "review the continued necessity" for the defense facilities in Iceland and make recommendations to the two governments; that if no understanding between the two governments is reached within six months after such a request, either government may give notice of its intention to terminate the agreement; and that the agreement will then cease to be in force twelve months after such notice.)

British Rebuttal

In a rebuttal of the Icelandic argument, British Foreign Secretary Doublas-Home recalled that he and the previous Icelandic Foreign Minister had agreed in 1961 that any future disagreements would be referred to the International Court of Justice. He said that Iceland had reneged on this agreed procedure in the current phase of the dispute, but that the International Court had nevertheless given a judgment on what a fair catch for the UK would be. He added that the UK had indicated a willingness to shave the catch to even less than the Court's judgment in an attempt to conciliate the Icelanders, but that the Icelandic harassment of UK trawlers which began 18 months ago had not ceased, and that the British Government had not been able to refuse a request of its fishermen for protection. He promised that British warships could be withdrawn if Iceland could "find some way to assure us" that the harassment would cease.

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Norwegian, Danish, and Canadian Comments

The Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed concern about the effect of the dispute on the Alliance and appealed to the UK to make the first move by withdrawing its warships so as to pave the way for renewed negotiations. The Danish Foreign Minister took the same line, admitting that the UK had a right to stay in international waters but could nevertheless make a useful gesture by withdrawing. The Canadian Foreign Minister advised the Icelanders not to bargain economics for security by linking the base and fisheries issues, but he balanced his statement by expressing the hope that the UK would take the initiative to break the impasse.

US Position

Secretary Rogers stressed that there was no need for the Icelanders to associate the base issue with the fisheries issue, pointing out that discussions on the base had begun 18 months ago--well before the current fisheries dispute--and had been proceeding in a friendly atmosphere. He said that the US for its part would continue to ensure that the base was not a source of difficulty for the Icelanders. He expressed the hope that the Icelanders would not invoke Article VII of the US-Icelandic Defense Agreement until a *modus vivendi* could be worked out.

[redacted]



Secretary Rogers--Making a Clear Distinction between the Keflavik Base Issue and UK-Icelandic Problems

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MBFR EXPLORATORY TALKS JUNE 9-15

MBFR Communique

Allied and Eastern representatives in Vienna reached *ad referendum* agreement on the text of a final communique for the exploratory talks, with only the date of the negotiations yet to be specified. The draft communique:

-- specifies Vienna as the site of the negotiations;

-- provides on agreed designation for the negotiations--namely, "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe;"

-- indicates that an agenda for the negotiations has been discussed but not agreed on;

-- describes the purpose of the negotiations as the strengthening of peace and security in all of Europe;

-- acknowledges the principle of undiminished security as the premise of the negotiations;

-- establishes the right of the direct participants to introduce into the negotiations any topic relevant to the subject matter.

Although the Soviets refused to agree to the use of the term "balanced" or its equivalent in the description of the talks or elswhere in the communique, they did agree to a reference to "associated measures." This would permit raising constraints as a topic for negotiation. The Allies in the Ad Hoc Group were on the whole satisfied with the draft communique and reported on it positively to the North Atlantic Council. According to the Soviet representative in Vienna, the text is also likely to be satisfactory to Moscow.

German Presentation to DPC

In a forthright statement of the current German position on MBFR negotiations to the NATO Defense Ministers at the meeting of the

NATO Defense Planning Committee in Brussels, German Defense Minister Leber formally enunciated his government's support for MBFR negotiations that would include both stationed and indigenous reductions.

Leber pointed out that reductions of stationed forces alone could have an impact on German public opinion which would force the German government unilaterally to reduce the Bundeswehr. Only if there were an agreement on an eventual reduction in German forces, even if implemented "some years later" than stationed reductions, would it be possible for a German government to maintain its forces at their present level in the immediate future and to sustain the current level of defense spending. Most other Defense Ministers, however, reiterated their governments' view that initial negotiations should concentrate on US and Soviet forces. [redacted]

* * *

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

RESOLVING THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY PROBLEM

Secretary Rogers presented to the Mexican Government on May 13, 1973 a new proposal for a definitive and just solution to the Colorado River salinity problem with Mexico.

Moving To Improve the Quality of Water Delivered to Mexico

When President Nixon and President Echeverria of Mexico met in June 1972, President Nixon announced that the United States would take steps immediately to improve the quality of the water delivered to Mexico, and that he would appoint a Special Representative to find a permanent, definitive, and just solution to the problem.



Mexican President Echeverria: The US Is Meeting His Concerns about the Colorado River Salinity Problem.

Under Minute No. 241, an agreement of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the salinity of the water made available to Mexico at its principal diversion point was promptly reduced by more than 100 parts per million. The former Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, subsequently took up the task of the Special Representative. He submitted his report and recommendations on December 29, 1972, and the new US proposal of May 13 is based on his recommendations.

$70 Million for Public Works Construction?

The US proposal would provide for the eventual elimination from the water delivered to Mexico of all adverse effects from the saline drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District of Arizona. The introduction of these drainage waters

occasioned the salinity problem in 1961, and the removal of their adverse effect, together with other related undertakings and understandings, would constitute the proposed solution.

Assuming that agreement can be reached with Mexico on this basis, the solution would entail the construction and later operation and maintenance by the Federal Government of extensive public works, including the construction of the world's largest desalting plant. The estimated construction cost of these works is $70 million, and annual operation and maintenance would exceed $6 million. A construction program for these works will be presented to the Congress for authorization and funding as soon as an agreement is concluded.



Mr. Brownell met with Mexican officials during the week of June 11 to discuss the US proposal with them. Officials of both governments are now considering the proposal further for the purpose of accommodating the remaining divergent views. They expect to resume their discussion July 3 in Washington. [redacted]

* * *

VENEZUELA CHALLENGES OAS CUBA POLICY--THEN BACKS AWAY

In the first week of June, Venezuela's Ambassador to the OAS let it be known among his Permanent Council colleagues that he had instructions to request a special Council meeting on June 11 to discuss OAS policy toward Cuba. He indicated that Venezuela would put forward a draft resolution tied to the principle of "plurality of ideologies" and affirming the right of each member government to establish relations with Cuba whenever it judged it convenient.

Such a resolution, he explained, would not remove the diplomatic and trade sanctions applied against Cuba by OAS Foreign Ministers

in 1964, but would merely allow each member government to assess the present Cuban threat in terms of its own interests. Presumably, the sanctions policy would remain in force, but its implementation would be left to the judgment of each government.

Venezuela Shelves Its Own Proposal

Before the week ended, however, the Venezuelan Ambassador clearly got cold feet and was uncertain as to just when the Council should meet to discuss his proposal. He appears to have judged initially that he had the votes necessary for its approval by a simple majority (12 votes), only to discover afterward that at least one supporter--perhaps Costa Rica--had defected after having second thoughts about its juridical implications. Not willing to settle for the "moral" victory claimed by Peru after a similar go-round last summer, Venezuela decided finally to put its proposal on ice for awhile.

US Position

As in the case of Peru's very similar proposal last year, the United States opposed Venezuela's initiative as being both juridically unsound and politically unwise. We could not accept the specious argument that a Council resolution which flatly contradicted the "obligatory" character of sanctions adopted under the Rio Treaty "did not alter" present OAS policy toward Cuba. Nor could we agree that the Council was free to take such action by simple majority vote, when its mandate according to the 1964 decision is limited to lifting sanctions by two-thirds vote when Cuba no longer threatens hemispheric peace and security.

In our view, the "plurality of ideologies" principle sheds no new light on the question, since it is Cuba's interventionism--not its ideology--which accounts for the present sanctions policy. So long as Cuba persists in supporting violent revolution in other countries, we believe that any relaxation of the sanctions policy would be politically unwise.

We are gratified that Venezuela's proposal was abandoned without being tested in the Permanent Council, due to lack of sufficient votes to ensure its passage. We note nevertheless that the "freedom-of-action" concept has garnered significant additional support since it was first advanced by Peru and rejected by the Council last year (7 for, 13 against, 3 abstentions). Argentina, Barbados and Venezuela have clearly moved from the abstention to the affirmative column, while the opposition of Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay seems to have weakened significantly.

OAS Special Committee To Meet in Lima

Commencing June 20th, the Special Committee established by the OAS General Assembly in Washington last April will meet in Lima to study possible reforms in the inter-American system. Whether Venezuela will attempt to use this occasion to resume its efforts on the Cuban question or await some other occasion is not clear. In any event the United States will continue to work with like-minded allies, such as Brazil, to oppose any present change, recognizing that despite our best efforts, our opponents may soon gain at least majority support for the Venezuelan proposal. [redacted]


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NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL PHANTOMS TO SAUDI ARABIA



The F-4 Phantom Jet

One of the principal US policies in the Persian Gulf since the British ended their protective treaty relationship has been to encourage friendly states in the area to assume increasing responsibility for collective security in this region. In the Gulf, the security of this area is being shared primarily by Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia must bear the primary responsibility for its own defense and to assist its smaller Peninsular neighbors. It is in this context that we have responded positively in the past to Saudi requests for the sale of military equipment and services and on which we based our agreement in principle to the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft. These responses have been weighed in light of Saudi Arabia's limited manpower availabilities.

Background

Saudi Arabia recently requested US agreement in principle to sell F-4 Phantoms as a follow-on to shorter range Northrop F-5B and

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F-5E aircraft they are now acquiring from the US. Saudi concerns have been stimulated by the growing supply of Soviet arms into South Yemen and Iraq. In South Yemen, the Soviets have stepped up their deliveries of sophisticated weapons and aircraft.

The Saudis justifiably view the radical regime in Aden as representing a military threat to: (1) North Yemen, which is practically defenseless and which depends largely on Saudi Arabia for help in maintaining its security; (2) Oman because South Yemen continues to provide the base for the communist-led insurgency in Oman's western province of Dhofar; and (3) Saudi Arabia itself--last March, South Yemeni MIG's hit a Saudi border post. The Saudis are also concerned with the threat from Iraq, which has a substantial Soviet-equipped military force including MIG 21's.

The Saudis justify the need for a longer-range aircraft to protect the wide expanse of the Kingdom and to avoid building more air bases that would be required with only the shorter-range aircraft in their inventory. Even with the F-5's they are acquiring, they cannot provide satisfactory coverage to all parts of Saudi territory. The Saudis are also looking at the latest French Mirage F-1 as an alternative.

Political/Economic Background

The US has major and vital interests in Saudi Arabia because of the need of the Western world, and now including the US, for access to the Kingdom's vast oil resources. Saudi Arabia has become the world's largest oil exporter and soon will be the largest producer. Over the next seven to ten years, it will be the only country in the world capable of expanding its production enough to cover the anticipated increase in world energy requirements. It is also a major trading partner where we have enjoyed significant balance of payments benefits (over $1 billion a year) because of our large trade surplus, remittances received from sales of services, and oil income which ARAMCO returns to the United States. We have had close relations with Saudi Arabia since World War II, and American companies have played a major role in its development. Its leadership has been moderate and constructive with most of its attention in recent years directed at developing its human and material resources and building up an infrastructure for this vast and lightly-populated country.

Military Relationship

The US has had an ongoing military supply relationship with Saudi Arabia since 1951. Over the past several years this has involved sales programs related to air defense systems to give Saudi Arabia an interceptor and airlift capability, to develop a modest naval force composed of small vessels, to have a modern logistical and vehicle repair system, and to modernize its internal security forces. These programs, which involve the sales of goods and services both on a government-to-government basis and through private American contractors, are expected to continue for a number of years because of the need for training numerous manpower skills.

Principal Considerations

In reaching agreement in principle to the sale of F-4 aircraft, the decision was taken after weighing the following factors:

(1) US interests and those of the Middle East will be best served if the US remains as the principal supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia. By responding positively now to the F-4's, it should ensure that aircraft in the post-1975 period will be of US origin and compatible with equipment now in or soon to enter the Saudi inventory.

(2) Saudi Arabia, if it acquires this aircraft will be dependent almost indefinitely on American contract support personnel. This factor plus our requirement that these aircraft cannot be transferred to third parties without our prior consent, will give us a considerable element of influence over their use.

(3) The Saudis have pointed out that US interests in the area are of growing importance, and we cannot appear to slight these interests without risking harm to our relations with Saudi Arabia.

(4) Responding positively will enable a moderate Arab regime to demonstrate the benefits of friendship with the US and bolster its ability to resist radical pressures to weaken its ties with the US.

(5) The request by the Saudis has not been made in the Arab-Israeli context (and it would be a mistake to look at it that way), but in terms of real Saudi concerns which are focused on the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is a vast

country, and the Saudis have found that even with the F-5 aircraft (and its planned air-to-air refueling capacity) now entering their inventory they will have trouble providing air defense and air cover to Saudi forces along its frontiers. The Saudis have twice been attacked by South Yemeni forces and both times have found difficulty in supporting their frontier forces who are stationed several hundred miles from the nearest Saudi air base. The Saudis thus consider a longer-range aircraft a military necessity.

(6) The time frame for delivery and numbers involved have not yet been determined. These will be worked out after a final Saudi decision to choose the F-4 has been made. (The Saudis are also considering the French Mirage.) Even then, it will be several years before the aircraft are manufactured and the Saudi manpower to operate and maintain them is trained and in place.

(7) In making a decision on F-4's, we took into account the impact this sale might have on the Middle East balance of power. We concluded to our satisfaction that if the sale is consummated, it would not destabilize the military balance between Israel and the Arab states in the latter 1970's.

US Policy Interests

We have kept in close touch with the Israelis about our interests in the Gulf. While the Israelis are in general agreement with the strategic importance of the region, they have expressed concern about the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, especially the F-4. We can understand these concerns, but do not think they override our broader policy interest of doing what we think is necessary to support Saudi Arabia, which has major security responsibilities in the Peninsula and the Gulf and whose continued close friendship is very important to us. Our positive response reflects the very high value which the US places on this policy interest. [redacted]

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
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US MILITARY SALES PROPOSALS FOR KUWAIT

Our willingness to help Kuwait with its military defenses has been based on our desire to discourage political pressure or an actual military threat from Iraq in order that: (1) our valuable economic interests in Kuwait can be protected, and (2) to assure Kuwait's continued ability to remain a major world oil supplier. While we realize that Kuwait would not be able to defend itself in the face of a large-scale invasion by an outside power, Kuwait has the capability of building up a force large enough to hold off an aggressor for a few days until help comes from other sources. Although Kuwait, unlike Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not have regional security responsibilities, we have encouraged Kuwait to work closely with Saudi Arabia and Iran and to acquire US military equipment comparable to that found in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Background

In January 1971 Kuwait was made eligible for Foreign Military Sales. Later that year Kuwait asked for an in-depth analysis of its defense requirements, and a Department of Defense Survey Team arrived in February 1972. Although not making specific recommendations, the conclusions of the Survey Team report pointed to Kuwait's acquiring F-5E aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles, Hawk anti-aircraft batteries, and an integrated air defense/command system with reasonable radar, communications, and related equipment. In February 1973 a Kuwaiti team visited US installations in Europe to look at F-5 and F-4 aircraft, improved Hawk, and command/control systems.



The Hawk Missile

In April 1973, following the March 20 border skirmish with Iraq, we sent a team in response to Kuwait's request to present a comprehensive program based on the survey

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report plus Kuwait's priority need for new motor vehicles, tanks, and some very quickly attainable air cover. In response to Kuwait's request, we demonstrated the F-8H and K Navy Crusaders. Since the F-8 is a used aircraft, which could be made available in six months, but which can be effectively used for only three or four more years, the Kuwaitis asked about a follow-on aircraft--either the "Lightweight Fighter" or the Phantom F-4 or appropriate new generation aircraft. The Kuwaitis have clearly indicated they do not desire the F-5.

While Iraqi troops have withdrawn from the Al Samitah post occupied on March 20, they still remain in other disputed areas along the frontier which Kuwait considers its territory. The Kuwaitis remain highly apprehensive because Iraqi inflexibility so far does not give them much hope for a mutually-agreed border settlement. In this emergency and over the near term, Kuwait has decided to upgrade its defensive capability and has turned to the US for assistance.

US Effort

The Defense Department team sent to Kuwait in April agreed in principle to provide equipment, training, and construction totalling $560 million. A little over half of the total is for equipment and training, and the balance is for construction. A new US sales team arrived in Kuwait on May 31 for further negotiations. No contracts on any of the offers have yet been concluded. No FMS credit is involved.

We do not expect a Kuwaiti decision on this program for several months. If a program of this nature is implemented, it is expected to take at least five years to allow for the necessary training and modest augmentation of Kuwait's armed forces which now total about 8,500. [redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS EXTENDED

On June 15 the Security Council by a vote of 14 (US) to 0, with the PRC abstaining, adopted a resolution on Cyprus virtually identical with those that have been adopted at six-month intervals in recent years.

Once Again, Six More Months

The resolution urged the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to cooperate to achieve the objectives of the Security Council, and extended the stationing of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months ending December 15 "in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

The Council's consideration of the question was relatively routine and the resolution itself was agreed to through consultations before the meeting opened. Following the vote the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece spoke, all taking a conciliatory line. All Council members except the PRC also spoke, generally indicating their support for UNFICYP's extension in order to preserve the climate necessary for continued progress in the intercommunal talks.



Cyprus: Generally Calm, but Peace Force Still Needed

US Supports a Reorganization of UNFICYP

The United States has sought over the past few months support for a reorganization of UNFICYP, both to help

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eliminate the deficit--estimated soon to reach $18.9 million--and to bring UNFICYP's size and structure into line with the functions it is actually performing.

Noting that the military situation had remained calm during the reporting period, the US Representative, Ambassador Scali, expressed "cautious optimism" about the possibilities for substantial progress and strongly urged "all sides to take full advantage of this promising atmosphere." He stressed UNFICYP's financial difficulties and regretted that effective support for it had been left to "a small number of states who continue to contribute more generously than their own interests or responsibilities would dictate."

Scali concluded by strongly supporting the Secretary-General's intention to study ways and means of reducing the UN financial and manpower commitment and make "appropriate recommendations" in his next report to the Council, and suggested that this study include creating alternative force models "based on hypothetical reductions in the neighborhood of 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of UNFICYP's current strength" of 3,144 men. [redacted]

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SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS ON MIDDLE EAST

At the request of Egypt the Security Council held ten meetings during June 6-14 to discuss the situation in the Middle East. On June 14 the President of the Council read a statement expressing the sense of the Council that the meetings should be suspended until mid-July.

Attention focused principally on a report submitted by the Secretary-General summarizing UN efforts in dealing with particular aspects of the Middle East situation (e.g., maintenance of the cease-fire, status of Jerusalem, refugees) and reviewing progress in the search for a settlement under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

Representatives of 32 countries, including 9 foreign ministers or equivalent, participated in the debate. No strikingly new ideas or proposals were set forth, and the positions of the

parties were largely predictable. The debate was by and large serious and moderate, and threats of resort to military force or action against western interests, particularly oil, were muted and indirect.

Egyptian Statement

The Egyptian Foreign Minister opened the debate indicating he would at a later date comment on the Secretary-General's report. With regard to the current situation, he said that his government had requested the Council to examine the question "after six years of effort and endurance have failed to put an end to the Israeli military occupation of our land." He noted that Egypt had called for the Council meetings that resulted in adoption of resolution 242 and said that at that time they had "called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all territories invaded in June 1967." He characterized Israel's posture since then as a demand to meet the vanquished and dictate its terms and declared that all UN resolutions on the subject "remained mere documents."

Zayyat's statement in his speech that Egypt accepted talks "without prior conditions" attracted particular attention during the debate. His subsequent explanation made clear, however, that Egypt still seeks a prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from occupied territories and considers Israel's refusal to give such a commitment to be an Israeli precondition to negotiations. He further stated that resolution 242's affirmation of "secure and recognized boundaries" for all did not mean that these should be established for Israel inside Egypt or Syria.

In conclusion, Zayyat announced Egypt's readiness to continue Jarring's talks with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace. "The price, however, has not been and shall not be the betrayal of our territorial integrity or the abandonment of the inalienable right of the Palestinians as a nation to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries." He declared that a partial or interim settlement was completely unacceptable.

Israeli Position

Israel's Ambassador Tekoah spoke immediately after the Egyptian Foreign Minister. He stated that his government had repeatedly declared that it did not wish to freeze the existing situation and enumerated Israeli efforts to reach agreement which had been rebuffed by Egypt. He also asked, as a basic question, whether

Egypt had abandoned the ultimate objective of bringing about Israel's destruction as an independent state.

With regard to the "secure and recognized boundaries" affirmed in resolution 242, Tekoah stated that the boundaries were not defined in the resolution but were subject to negotiation and agreement. In response to Mr. Zayyat's statement that Egypt accepted direct negotiations without prior conditions he stated that "Israel is prepared to enter into any free negotiations without preconditions." He ended with a call to Egypt to join Israel in building peace together.



The Suez Canal: Wider Than an Ocean

Egyptian Questions

On June 12 the Egyptian Foreign Minister put three queries to the Secretary-General, to which the latter replied on the 14th.

(1) Did the Special Representative intend to prepare aides memoires for Jordan and Syria in addition to his aide memoire of February 8, 1971, to Egypt and Israel on elements of a settlement? The Secretary-General responded that Ambassador Jarring had in 1971 indicated his intention of submitting an aide memoire relating to Israel and Jordan. Further, if Syria were to accept resolution 242 Jarring might also submit an aide memoire relating to Syria.

(2) Was the absence of reference to Gaza in the February 8 aide memoire without prejudice to the status of the strip as an

"Arab territory" which "should be de-occupied"? The Secretary-General replied that this was in essence correct.

(3) Would the Secretary-General confirm that the US Permanent Representative, in his capacity as chairman of the Four Power meeting of June 24, 1971, did inform him that the Four "welcomed and supported" the February 8, 1971, initiative of the Special Representative and believed that Jarring was acting fully in accordance with the terms of his mandate under resolution 242? The Secretary-General confirmed that this conferred the general sense of that meeting.

US Position

Ambassador John Scali addressed the Council on June 14. His theme was the need to start a genuine negotiating process between Arab and Israeli. He described this meeting as a challenge to deal responsibly with the problem of the Middle East and an opportunity to reaffirm that the Council does not consider the present situation in the area either natural or permanent.

Ambassador Scali reaffirmed the US position that resolution 242 remains the landmark it was at its adoption. It recognized that peace in the Middle East must be based on a just settlement not only of the problems arising out of the hositilities of June 1967, but also of the underlying causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He enumerated the essential elements with which the UN began the search for peace in 1967: (1) The Council had not addressed the question of who was responsible for the outbreak of the fighting in June 1967, nor did it call for unconditional Israeli withdrawal. (2) Resolution 242 did not define the terms of settlement; it defined a set of "provisions and principles" which constitute a framework for the terms of a final settlement.

After recalling the main provisions and principles of resolution 242 Ambassador Scali noted in conclusion that it called for agreement and said the United States had never seen how such agreement was possible without an ongoing, serious negotiating process, either direct or indirect, which engaged the parties themselves.

Dismissing allegations of US partisanship in the dispute, he stated the overriding interest of the US was in peace to end the fear and uncertainty of the past quarter century. The parties must come to grips with the issues of sovereignty and security. The question of boundaries must be resolved as part of an overall agreement for a new relationship among the parties re-

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placing that defined in the 1949 armistice agreements. He went on to say:

"But the fact is that resolution 242 is silent on the specific question of where the final border should be located. It neither endorses nor precludes--let me repeat: neither endorses nor precludes--the armistice lines, which existed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria on June 4, 1967, as the final secure and recognized boundaries."

He concluded by restating US determination to preserve the basis for agreement which resolution 242 represents, and to try to move forward with renewed energy. [redacted]

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INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO THE LDCs STILL A FRACTION OF WESTERN EFFORTS

In recent years Communist countries have placed increasing emphasis on foreign economic assistance as a major instrument for strengthening their political and commercial interests in the less developed countries (LDCs) of the non-Communist world. Direct comparisons between Communist and Western aid flow can be misleading--not the least of the difficulties being the definitional problem of what actually constitutes foreign aid, and the absence in Communist countries of any distinction between government and private sector activities.

Nevertheless, the orders of magnitude of available data clearly show that Communist aid efforts still represent only a small fraction of the Official Flows extended to the LDCs by the 16 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), however qualified direct comparisons must be. (Communist aid includes provision of goods and services, either as grants or on deferred payment terms. Credits allowing five years or more for repayment are included.)

DAC aid flows comprise Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). ODA is defined as "all contributions which are administered with the promotion of economic welfare of developing countries as the main objective and whose financial terms are intended to be concessional in character." OOF includes official export credits, and debt relief and contributions to multilateral institutions which are not sufficiently concessional

to classify as ODA.

Aid Commitments--Communist Aid Dwarfed by US Totals Alone

Since 1954, Communist economic credits and grants to the LDCs--grants constituting only about 5 percent of the total--have amounted to $15 billion. Almost 45 percent of these commitments were extended during the last six years. Even so, these 1967-72 Communist commitments represented less than one-tenth of the official commitments made to the LDCs over the same period by DAC members. Commitments by the US alone were more than 4-1/2 times total Communist aid commitments in the 1967-72 period.

(billions of dollars)

	DAC Commitments			Communist Economic Commitments	Communist Commitments As % of DAC Commitments	US Commitments		
	ODA	OOF	Total			ODA	OOF	Total
1967	8.4	1.3	9.7	.4	4.2 %	4.5	1.0	5.5
1968	8.1	1.1	9.2	.6	6.4 %	4.0	.8	4.8
1969	7.7	1.5	9.2	.9	9.7 %	3.3	.6	3.9
1970	8.2	2.5	10.7	1.1	10.2 %	3.3	.8	4.1
1971	9.7	3.2	12.9	1.7	13.3 %	3.9	1.1	5.0
1972	11.3	4.5*	15.8	1.7	10.9 %	4.5	1.9*	6.4
	53.4	14.1	67.5	6.4	9.5 %	23.5	6.2	29.7

*Estimate

Aid Drawings

Communist economic aid performance is even less impressive when drawings of Communist aid by the LDCs are compared with gross disbursements of official assistance by the DAC member countries. Over half of the drawings on Communist aid for the period 1954-72 occurred in the last six years. In these six years (1967-72), drawings on Communist aid averaged only about 5.5 percent of the gross disbursements effectuated by the DAC member countries.

Terms

The terms of Soviet and East European aid are generally harder than those extended by DAC member countries in their ODA programs, although they compare more favorably with DAC country OOF terms. Approximately 60 percent of 1971 DAC ODA commitments were grants, while the terms on ODA loans averaged 28.7 years, had an average interest rate of 2.8 percent, and carried an average grace period of 6.5 years. Interest rates approximating 6 percent are common in OOF transactions.

Soviet grants are the rare exception, and the terms of Soviet development credits average about 12 years with 2.5 percent

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interest. Soviet commercial credits--about one-fifth of Soviet aid in 1972--average from 8-10 years with 3-3.5 percent interest--possibly slightly higher interest in some commercial transactions --although in 1972 some credits were for 10-12 year periods, and some carried an interest rate of 2.5 percent.

(billions of dollars)

	DAC Disbursements			Communist Economic Aid
	ODA	OOF	Total	Drawn by the LDCs
1967	7.2	1.1	8.3	.5
1968	7.1	1.4	8.5	.5
1969	7.2	1.5	8.7	.5
1970	7.5	2.4	9.9	.5
1971	8.8	2.8	11.6	.7
1972	9.8	3.2*	13.0	.6
	47.6	12.4	60.0	3.3

*Estimate

The financial terms of Chinese economic aid are more generous than those of the Soviets or East Europeans. Grants account for over one-third of Chinese aid, with the remainder consisting of interest-free credits with repayment terms that average 10-20 years after a 5-10 year grace period.

Net Flow

About three-fifths of Communist disbursements in the 1967-72 period were attributable to Soviet aid. The net outflow of Soviet aid, however, is significantly reduced by a rising level of repayments. In 1972, for example, economic aid drawings of $400 million were only $140 million higher than repayments made by the LDCs to the USSR for past aid. Several LDCs are now experiencing, or are approaching, a net outflow to the USSR.

Debt service payments have had less impact on the net transfer of DAC members' ODA, although they significantly reduce the net transfer of OOF. In 1971 gross ODA disbursements totaled $8.8 billion. Amortization and interest payments on past loans totaled $1.6 billion, leaving a net transfer of $7.2 billion to the LDCs. Gross OOF disbursements in 1971 were $2.8 billion, although amortization and interest payments of $1.9 billion reduced the net transfer to $0.9 billion.

[redacted]

1971 DAC Official Flows
(billions of dollars)

	Disbursements Gross Flow	- Amortization	= NET FLOW	- Interest	= NET TRANSFER
Bilateral ODA Grants	3.6	-	3.6	-	3.6
Bilateral ODA Loans	3.9	1.1	2.8	.5	2.3
Multilateral ODA	1.3	-	1.3	-	1.3
Total ODA	8.8	1.1	7.7	.5	7.2
Total OOF	2.8	1.5*	1.3	.4*	.9
ODA + OOF	11.6	2.6	9.0	.9	8.1

*Estimate

The combined ODA and OOF gross flow of $11.6 billion in 1971 was accompanied by amortization and interest payments of $3.5 billion which reduced the net transfer by about 30 percent to $8.1 billion. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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INDOCHINA: NO PEACE AT HAND?



"...in the Eye of the Beholder"

Hanoi's and Saigon's initial public commentary on the Joint Communique signed in Paris on June 13, 1973, shows some significant divergence in the way they interpret the meaning of the latest Vietnam agreement. While both the Communists and the Saigon government use the occasion to reaffirm their intentions to comply fully with this and the earlier Paris agreement on Vietnam, there is no evidence that they are any closer to agreement on the causes of the continuing hostility or on the major issues still dividing them. Their rhetoric alone does not bode well for a quick or early solution to the conflict.

Hanoi Sees an Important Victory

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement of June 14 describes the latest Vietnam agreement as "an important victory" for the Vietnamese people. Predictably, Communist media blame the "very serious and systematic violations of the cease-fire" by the US and GVN for the continued fighting and argue that the only correct way to maintain peace is to implement

scrupulously the Paris Agreement. More significantly, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement argues that this mean strict termination of US military involvement and interference in South Vietnam and the solution of the internal problems of South Vietnam on the basis of the recognition that there exist in reality in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces.

Of the Communique's 14 points, Communist media stress the importance of four provisions regarding South Vietnam: the delineation of the territory controlled by each side, the release of arrested and detained Vietnamese civilians, the formation of the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, and the provision of democratic liberties. Of these, Hanoi clearly considers the proposed modalities to determine control of territory as being the most important to its side. On the issue of Cambodia and Laos, the Foreign Ministry statement merely repeats the language of the Communique while reaffirming Hanoi's stand that the internal affairs of Laos and Cambodia must be settled by the poeple of Laos and Cambodia without foreign interference.

Saigon Claims Reaffirmation of Paris Agreement Position

Initial South Vietnamese commentary indicates that they view the June 13 Communique as a reaffirmation of their previous position on the Paris Agreement. Of special note is the South Vietnamese claim that the Communique confirms that the GVN is the only legal government and that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam is the only legitimate army in South Vietnam. In this context Saigon stresses that Communist-controlled areas are only under temporary military control pending a political settlement. Saigon further sees the Communique as reaffirming that the implementation of "democratic liberties" is conditional on compliance with the in-place cease-fire. With regard to general elections, the South Vietnamese emphasize that the procedures for holding elections must be agreed upon before the implementation of the other political provisions of the Paris Agreement, such as the establishment of "democratic freedoms," the formation of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, and settelement of the problems related to the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam.

Saigon insists that the Communique primarily means that the Communists must stop violating the cease-fire, immediately end land-grabbing operations, and cooperate with the GVN in determining zones of control. The GVN also emphasizes those provisions calling for the Communists to cease infiltration of men and supplies from the North and to withdraw their forces from Cambodia and Laos. With the exception of a few minor concessions--such as the agree-

ment to allow the PRG delegation to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission to move into downtown Saigon--the GVN apparently sees the Communique as requiring no adjustments in its own basic position on military and political questions. [redacted]

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ALL FAA REGION HQTRS-1/700.
SECURITY BULLETIN: (RIS: CS-1600-19) ACS-88-12.
SUBJECT: RECENT INCIDENTS SUGGESTING INCREASED CONCERN FOR SECURITY OF U.S. CIVIL AVIATION.
RECENT EVENTS: DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS THAT HAVE FOCUSED ON THE SECURITY OF U.S. CIVIL AVIATION, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA.
THESE EVENTS INCLUDE:
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-- JULY 3: THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 BY THE USS VINCENNES OVER THE PERSIAN GULF.
-- JULY 5: THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL OF MOHAMMED ALI HAMMADEI IN FRANKFURT FOR THE HIJACKING OF TWA-847 IN JUNE 1985.
PAGE 3 RUKGNHA0426 UNCLAS E F T O FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
-- JULY 6: THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCING TO DEATH OF THE FIVE HIJACKERS OF PAN AM FLIGHT 73 AT KARACHI IN SEPTEMBER 1986.
ANY ONE OF THESE EVENTS BY ITSELF COULD BE CAUSE FOR CONCERN THAT U.S. CIVIL AVIATION WOULD BE AT AN INCREASED GENERAL THREAT AS A

TARGET FOR RETALIATION OR RETRIBUTION. A SERIES OF THREE SUCH EVENTS IN ALMOST AS MANY DAYS, ALL HAVING SOME CONNECTION WITH CIVIL AVIATION, SUGGESTS THAT U.S. CIVIL AVIATION COULD BE A LOGICAL TARGET OF ANY GROUP OR ENTITY WANTING TO RETALIATE IN KIND. HOWEVER, TO DATE WE HAVE NO. REPEAT, NO INFORMATION SUGGESTING A DIRECT, CREDIBLE THREAT TO U.S. CIVIL AVIATION AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THESE INCIDENTS.
FAA COMMENT: THE THREE INCIDENTS LISTED ABOVE ENCOMPASS THE THREE ENTITIES BELIEVED MOST LIKELY TO STAGE OR SPONSOR AN ATTACK AGAINST A U.S. TARGET - THE IRANIANS, HIZBALLAH, AND THE ABU NIDAL GROUP. IN ADDITION, HIZBALLAH RECENTLY CONDUCTED THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED HIJACKING OF KUWAITI AIR FLIGHT 422 WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF THE DAWA-17 FROM KUWAITI PRISONS, DID MANAGE TO GAIN WORLDWIDE PUBLICITY FOR THEIR EFFORTS WHILE ALLOWING ALL OF THE HIJACKERS TO ESCAPE. IN SUM, THE COMBINATION OF THESE RECENT EVENTS AND THE GROUPS OR STATES INVOLVED, ABSENT ANY SPECIFIC INDICATORS OR INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUGGESTS THAT THE OVERALL THREAT TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIERS HAS INCREASED AND WILL REMAIN AT SUCH A LEVEL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
REQUIRED ACTION: THIS BULLETIN, WITH THE FULL FAA COMMENTS, MUST BE PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO PRINCIPAL SECURITY INSPECTORS FOR DISSEMINATION TO ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS OPERATING SCHEDULED OR CHARTER OPERATIONS FROM ANY FOREIGN AIRPORT. IT WILL ALSO BE

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PASSED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ALL CATEGORY X AIRPORTS WITHIN THE U.S. THE CARRIERS AND AIRPORT MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL MUST BE SPECIFICALLY TOLD THAT THIS BULLETIN IS SOLELY FOR THE USE OF U.S. CARRIER AND AIRPORT AVIATION SECURITY PERSONNEL IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES AND MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY (14 CFR 191).
FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: THIS SECURITY BULLETIN MAY BE DISSEMINATED TO APPROPRIATE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS, WHICH SHOULD REFER FOR GUIDANCE TO SECSTATE 401701 (DTG: 300032Z DEC 87, SUBJ: FAA SECURITY BULLETINS).
FAA POINT OF CONTACT: L.H. BOIVIN/ACS-400, TEL: (202) 267-9075.

RAYMOND A SALAZAR
DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

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EX DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
- JUNE 1

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2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN JUNE 1 TO REPORT ON ACTIONS UNDER WAY TO RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL IS FIRM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO PROCEED, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME DELAY IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. HE SAID GEMAYEL STILL HAS KEY SUNNI SUPPORT, AND HE IS CONVINCED HE HAS THE VOTES IN THE PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY. HABIB WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEBANESE

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CONSENSUS MAY NOT LAST LONG. HABIB ADDED THAT OUR EFFORTS AND THE LEBANESE EFFORTS NOW FOCUS ON THE ARAB FORUM, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA, IN ORDER TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND TO PRESS THE SYRIANS INTO DIALOGUE WITH LEBANON AND THE UNITED STATES. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED SADLY THAT THE PLO IS RETURNING IN FORCE TO THE BEKAA AND HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT LIVING UP TO THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID THE SYRIANS

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HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM CATEGORIC STATEMENTS BEFORE, AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AS WE PURSUE EFFORTS TO GAIN RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR EVENING OF JUNE 1. BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY CABINET SECRETARY DAN MERIDOR AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER YEHUDA AVNER. HABIB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM FLATEN.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER OPENED THE MEETING SIMPLY BY TELLING HABIB HE WAS EAGER TO HEAR FROM HIM. HABIB SAID HE HAD COME TO REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL, INCLUDING A MEETING THE MORNING OF JUNE 1. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN BEIRUT FOR SEVERAL DAYS TO COORDINATE STRATEGIES WITH THE LEBANESE AND INFLUENCE THEIR POLICY AS THEY WORK TOWARD RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. HE REPORTED THAT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAD FORMALLY SUBMITTED THE AGREEMENT TO THE PARLIAMENT. HABIB REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS THE VOTES FOR RATIFICATION; HOWEVER, THE PROCESS MAY TAKE LONGER THAN HE HAD

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ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. FIRST THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND THEN TO THE FULL PARLIAMENT. THIS MAY TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK OR IT MAY TAKE A LITTLE LONGER. THE IMPORTANT THING, HOWEVER, IS THAT GEMAYEL IS FIRMLY DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD. SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD SUGGESTED IN THE JUNE 1 MEETING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MIGHT HOLD OFF A BIT. HABIB TOLD THEM THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE WISE, AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD AGREED WITH HABIB.

5. HABIB SAID THAT THE FOCUS AT THE PRESENT TIME IS TO GET ENOUGH ARAB SUPPORT TO GET A DIALOGUE STARTED WITH SYRIA. HABIB SAID THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE RENEGING AT THIS POINT ON ASSURANCES THEY MADE BOTH TO THE UNITED STATES, TO THE SAUDIS, AND TO THE LEBANESE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE SYRIANS ARE TRYING TO PRESSURE LEBANON, INCLUDING PHYSICAL THREATS TO LEBANESE LEADERS. AMIN GEMAYEL IS NOT COWED AND HE BELIEVES THAT THE PARLIAMENT IS ALSO STANDING FIRM. THE FOCAL POINT OF THE EFFORT NOW TO GAIN ARAB SUPPORT IS WITH THE SAUDIS. KING FAHD HAS SENT A PRINCE (BANDAR) TO WASHINGTON AND THE CROWN PRINCE TO SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THE LEBANESE HAVE SENT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS WEEK; HE WILL THEN GO ON TO ALGERIA. THE ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY SUPPORTIVE OF LEBANON DURING THIS MOST RECENT

PERIOD. WE AND THE LEBANESE ARE TRYING TO GET SYRIA TO ABIDE BY ITS COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND TO GET THE ARAB STATES TO PRESS SYRIA FOR NEGOTIATIONS OVER WITHDRAWAL. THE SAUDIS ARE PRESSING FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA AND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. HABIB DOUBTED THAT THE SAUDIS WILL TAKE A DIRECT LEAD, BUT THEY ARE FIRM IN THEIR BELIEF THAT ALL FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW MUCH THE SAUDIS CAN DO,

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BUT ONE SUGGESTION HAS BEEN THAT THE SAUDIS PLAY THE SAME ROLE OF "PARTICIPANT" IN THE SYRIA/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AS THE U.S. DID IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER INTERRUPTED TO NOTE THAT ACCORDING

TO INFORMATION THAT HE HAS THE SAUDIS HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT.

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7. HABIB TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS WITHIN LEBANON REMAINS INTACT. HE SAID THE SUNNI LEADERS, ESPECIALLY SAEB SALAAM AND WAZZAN, CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT, SO THERE WILL BE ENOUGH VOTES FOR PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. HE REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PRIVATE POLL IN MOSLEM WEST BEIRUT ON MAY 30 SHOWING 95 PERCENT IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SIGNED THE DECREE SENDING THE AGREEMENT TO PARLIAMENT EVEN THOUGH HE HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE.

8. HABIB SAID THAT THE SYRIANS ARE NOW THREATENING LEBANON WITH THE CREATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE "GOVERNMENT" SOMEHOW GROUPING TOGETHER KARAMI, FRANJIYAH, JUMBLATT, AND NALI BARRI. HABIB SAID THAT JUMBLATT OPPOSES THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, BUT HE IS NOT PREPARED TO JOIN THE SYRIAN SCHEME. JUMBLATT SENT WORD TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT HE IS PREPARED TO MAKE A DEAL ON THE SHOUF AND WOULD NOT "TAKE

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ACTION" AGAINST THE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH HE OPPOSED IT. THE SHI'A LEADER AND FRANJIYAH HAVE ALSO THUS FAR HELD THEMSELVES ALOOF FROM THE SYRIAN PLOT. HABIB SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE ALSO BROUGHT THE PLO BACK INTO THE BEKAA. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT THE RETURN OF THE PLO TO THE BEKAA WAS A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT THAT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN AUGUST. HABIB AGREED, AND THEN OFFERED CONDOLENCES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FOR THOSE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN LOST AS A RESULT OF THE RENEWED PLO ACTIONS. HABIB ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ARAFAT WHO HAS SAID THAT HE WILL WITHDRAW WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT ARAFAT MAY NO LONGER BE IN CONTROL. THE SPLIT IN THE PLO SEEMS TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. IT HAS HAPPENED NOT ONLY IN THE BEKAA BUT ALSO IN DAMASCUS. IT SEEMS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO RADICALIZE THE PLO UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL.

9. HABIB THEN REPORTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE DRAMATIC APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BEFORE 20,000 SUNNI MOSLEMS IN WEST BEIRUT. HE SAID THAT GEMAYEL SPOKE IN FRONT OF THAT GROUP ABOUT HOW THE AGREEMENT WAS GOOD FOR LEBANON AND HE NOTED THAT IT WAS LEBANON'S INTENTION TO STAY A PART OF THE ARAB WORLD, BUT LEBANON WOULD DECIDE IN WHAT WAY TO DO SO. HABIB SAID THAT GEMAYEL WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH THIS DRAMATIC PUBLIC APPEARANCE IN WEST BEIRUT WAS ACCLAIMED.

10. HABIB NOTED THAT EVERYONE IN LEBANON HAS AGREED THAT THE FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW AND THEREFORE THERE WAS FULL SUPPORT NOW FOR THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HABIB ADDED, THE SUPPORT IS FRAGILE AND WITH THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE SYRIANS TO UNDERCUT HIM, TIME MAY BE AGAINST PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. AMIN GEMAYEL IS NOT DISSATISFIED WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER ARABS, ESPECIALLY EGYPT, WHICH HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE AND HELPFUL RECENTLY ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON WITH THE SUNNIS BY WAY OF ITS INTERESTS SECTION IN

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BEIRUT.

11. TO SUM UP HABIB SAID THAT THE FORUM FOR ACTION NOW IS AN ARAB FORUM, ESPECIALLY FOCUSSED ON THE SAUDIS AND THE ALGERIANS. THE SAUDIS WANT TO SEE A U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, BUT HABIB SAID "IT WILL NOT INCLUDE ME" SINCE THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID THAT HABIB IS THE AMERICAN "MOST HOSTILE TO ARAB INTERESTS."

12. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED WITH DEEP SADNESS THAT THE SITUATION IS DIFFICULT. THE PLO IS BACK, NOT ALL OF THEM, BUT A SERIOUS SEGMENT, AND THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING CASUALTIES. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED HABIB FOR HIS CONDOLENCES ON THE LOSSES AND ASKED WHAT CAN BE DONE TO GET SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. HABIB NOTED THAT

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13. BEGIN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD WAS PRESENTLY IN LIBYA. HABIB NOTED THAT ASSAD IS OFF LINING UP THE LUNATICS AND IF THAT IS ALL HE GETS, WE MAY BE BETTER OFF. HE SAID THE OTHER ARABS ARE STILL SYMPATHETIC TO LEBANON. THE KEY PLAYERS AT THIS MOMENT ARE SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA. HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO ALGERIA, TUNISIA AND MOROCCO.

14. HABIB NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND AS A FALLBACK TAKING THE ISSUE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE TO PRESS SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE TO WITHDRAW. THEY BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS AGREED ON AT FEZ IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A STRONG CASE TO PRESENT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE, ESPECIALLY RIGHT NOW AS THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE EVEN QUESTIONING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. HABIB REPORTED THAT ONE OF GEMAYEL'S AIDES HAD ASKED HIM IF RATIFICATION NOW WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE LEVEL OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT IT WOULD NOT. HE SAID THE SAUDIS WERE SUPPORTING THE AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF LEBANON THEY WANT TO SEE. AMIN GEMAYEL AGREED WITH HABIB, AND IS PRESSING FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY SYRIAN

REPLY TO THE U.S. DEMARCHE. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD NOT LIKED IT, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A TOUGH CONVERSATION FOLLOWING THE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE, BUT THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN A FORMAL REPLY FROM SYRIA.

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HE SAID THAT KHADDAM HAD DENIED THAT SYRIAN MILITARY MOVEMENTS HAD ANY AGRESSIVE INTENT.

16. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED IF IT WASN'T A SURPRISE TO HABIB THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID THEY WON'T WITHDRAW. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM AMERICANS ALL THESE MONTHS THAT SYRIA WOULD GET OUT. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD US AND THEY HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THE SYRIANS MAY NEVER HAVE BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED. THEREFORE, PERHAPS THEY HAD FELT THAT THEIR ASSURANCES OF WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW WERE THEORETICAL. THEY HAD ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE A DEADLOCK, BUT THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED HAD GIVEN THE LEBANESE A CHANCE TO GET A HEAD START TO MAKE THEIR CASE BEFORE THE ARAB WORLD, BEFORE THE SYRIANS GOT ACTIVE.

17. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD GONE TO DAMASCUS AND HAD RECEIVED A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE SYRIANS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS REPLIED THAT THAT VERY RESPONSE MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SYRIANS TO BELIEVE, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PAST HISTORY OF INFLUENCE IN LEBANON, THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE TURNED OFF FOLLOWING THEIR ADVICE TO SALEM.

18. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF WE HAD ANY MORE INFORMATION ON SYRIAN MILITARY INTENTIONS TOWARD ISRAEL. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT AS FAR AS MAJOR MILITARY MOVES ARE CONCERNED, WE AGREE WITH THE CURRENT ISRAELI ASSESSMENT THAT

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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EXDIS

THE RECENT SYRIAN EXERCISE WAS NOT A SCREEN FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. THE PRESENT SYRIAN DEPLOYMENTS IN LEBANON DO NOT PUT THEM IN A GOOD POSITION FOR ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. WE BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT READY FOR A SERIOUS WAR, BUT ARE PROBABLY PERMITTING CERTAIN PLO OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVOKE ISRAEL TO RESPOND IN WAYS THAT WOULD GIVE SYRIA A PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE AND AT THE SAME TIME DISRUPT THE LEBANESE POLITICAL CONSENSUS.

19. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN NOTED THAT ASSAD HAD SAID IN LIBYA THAT HE WOULD FIGHT THE AGREEMENT TOOTH AND NAIL UNTIL IT WAS BEATEN. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT ASSAD HAS MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS IN THE PAST WHICH HE HAD EVENTUALLY FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET A DIA-

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LOGUE GOING WITH THE SYRIANS. THE LEBANESE ARE THINKING OF GOING TO THE ARAB LEAGUE IF THEIR EFFORTS WITH THE SAUDIS AND THE ALGERIANS ARE NOT FULLY SUCCESSFUL. THE ALGERIANS ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF THEIR PAST CLOSENESS WITH THE SYRIANS. LEWIS ADDED THAT THE ALGERIAN CREDENTIALS IN THE ARAB WORLD ARE EXCELLENT, AND ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WOULD HELP PREVENT THE SYRIANS FROM GETTING BROAD-BASED ARAB SUPPORT FOR THEIR REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT. LEWIS REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALGERIANS AS INTER-MEDIARIES IN THE AMERICAN CRISIS WITH IRAN. HABIB ADDED THAT HE HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO WORK CAREFULLY WITH THE ALGERIANS.

20. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID BUT FOR THE TIME BEING "WE DON'T SEE LAND." LEWIS REPLIED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING WE MUST JUST KEEP SENDING OUT THE DOVES IN SEARCH OF SOME DRY LAND.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED AGAIN WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET

THE SYRIANS TO KEEP THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. LEWIS AND HABIB THEN DESCRIBED THE EFFORTS THAT WE HAVE MADE WITH THE EUROPEANS AND NOTED THE FRENCH DESIRE TO BE HELP-FUL. LEWIS NOTED THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL NERVES AND GOOD DIPLOMACY.

22. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE LEBANESE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAS PUBLISHED A MAP ON WHICH THE NAME OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN ERASED. SO, WHILE THEY ARE TRYING TO SELL THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO OTHER ARABS, THE LEBANESE DO NOT HESITATE TO TAKE "ANTI-ISRAEL ACTS." HABIB SAID HE WISHED HE HAD KNOWN OF THIS MOVE. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE RAISED THIS "STUPID ACTION" WITH THE

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LEBANESE IN BEIRUT. HE SAID THESE ACTS HAVE NO PLACE IN THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP, BUT ADDED HE DID NOT KNOW THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION WHO IS NOT PART OF THE MAINSTREAM OF LEBANESE POLICY MAKING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

23. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCLUDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS QUITE WORRIED. HE SAID ISRAELIS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR NERVE BUT THE PROBLEM IS THAT "THE MAIN EXPECTATIONS OF ALL OF US DIDN'T COME TRUE." LEWIS SAID WE WILL CON-TINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH, THAT WE WILL INFORM THE GOI OF EVENTS AS THEY TAKE PLACE. THE PRIME MINISTER CON-CLUDED THE MEETING BY THANKING HABIB FOR ALL THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE.

24. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, US, XF
SUBJECT: AMB. HABIB'S DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON

[redacted]

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD PRIVATE DINNER WITH FON MIN CHEYSSON ON FEB 6 IN PARIS. CHEYSSON WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT A LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD LEAD TO DE FACTO

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PARTITION BETWEEN ZONES OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN CONTROL, LEAVING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ISOLATED IN BEIRUT. CHEYSSON STRESSED FRENCH INTENTION TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO AMIN GEMAYEL, AS INDICATED BY THEIR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS. CHEYSSON WAS VERY SATISFIED TO HEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT IS STICKING FIRMLY TO THE US POSITION OF INSISTING ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON AGREED TO CONFIRM DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS

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THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. CHEYSSON WILL VISIT DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND BAGHDAD AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY.

3. FONMIN CHEYSSON GAVE PRIVATE DINNER FOR HABIB EVENING OF FEB. 6. ALSO PRESENT WERE QUAI SECGEN GUTMANN, MIDEAST EXPERT DELAYE, AND EMBASSY PARIS DCM. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS HABIB INFORMED CHEYSSON THAT USG HAD REJECTED SHARON'S PROPOSAL FOR A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR A PARTIAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. US WOULD ONLY ACCEPT SUCH A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IF IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. NEVERTHELESS, HABIB THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT SHARON MIGHT CARRY OUT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL UNILATERALLY, WHICH COULD LEAD TO A BLOOD-BATH AGAINST THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF. SHARON SEEMED DETERMINED TO SHOW THAT THE MNF COULD NOT ENSURE ORDER IN LEBANON, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO OUR INSISTENCE ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AND OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

4. CHEYSSON FULLY AGREED THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD

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BE UNACCEPTABLE, AND TOOK DEEP SATSIFACTION IN HABIB'S ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH POLICY WAS TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO AMIN GEMAYEL, WHO HAD BEEN "MIRACULOUSLY ELECTED" AND WHO NEEDED TO EXPAND HIS AUTHORITY OR FACE "SARKISIZATION" (I.E. EBBING AWAY OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY). FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT ALMOST ANY POLICY OR REQUEST FROM AMIN WHICH IS WITHIN REASON. THIS WAS WHY FRANCE HAD IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE MNF WHEN AMIN REQUESTED THEM, EVEN THOUGH THE FRENCH DID NOT THINK THEY WERE REQUIRED. FRANCE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND IN MORE TROOPS IF THIS WERE NECESSARY. CHEYSSON APPEARED TO BELIEVE THE US WAS ALSO SENDING ADDITIONAL TROOPS, BUT HABIB TOLD HIM THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. NEVERTHELESS, CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT SENDING OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS WAS DONE IN CONSULTATION WITH US (HERNU-WEINBERGER PHONE CONVERSATION), AND HABIB RESPONDED THAT WE VALUED AND APPLAUDED THE FRENCH ROLE.

5. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT IF THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT SOON TOWARD WITHDRAWAL THE SITUATION COULD EVOLVE TOWARD A DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON, WITH ISRAELI AND SYRIAN DOMINATION OF LARGE PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTED TO BEIRUT AND A SMALL SURROUNDING AREA.

[redacted] CHEYSSON SAID
IT WAS TERRIBLE FOR FRANCE TO SEE THIS COMING AND
TO BE UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HABIB SAID THE
SYRIANS AND THE PLO WERE COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW AT THE

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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EXDIS

SAME TIME AS THE ISRAELIS, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO DOUBT THIS. HE SAID CHEYSSON COULD HELP BY CONFIRMING DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. CHEYSSON SAID HE WOULD DO THIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK, WHEN HE WILL VISIT AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD.

6. CHEYSSON WAS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ. HE SAID HE FACED DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD BECAUSE THE IRAQIS HAVE RUN OUT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES AND ARE UNABLE TO REPLENISH THEM BECAUSE OF LOW OIL PRODUCTION. THEY WANT CREDIT AND THE FRENCH

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WANT TO HELP THEM, BUT FRANCE ALSO HAS BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENT PROBLEMS.

HE CITED
THE CUTOFF OF IRAQI OIL EXPORTS THROUGH THE TRANS-
SYRIAN PIPELINE AS THE GREATEST BLOW TO IRAQ IN ITS
CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE SOVIETS
MIGHT BE BEHIND THIS, AND WAS SUSPICIOUS THAT IRAQ
MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE
USSR.

IN GENERAL, CHEYSSON FEARED THAT A LACK OF PROGRESS
COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS AN OPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
AND HE CITED THE INSTALLATION IN SYRIA OF SAM-5'S, MANNED
BY SOVIET PERSONNEL, AS SHOWING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE
DETERMINED TO PLAY A ROLE.

7. DELAYE, WHO HAD BEEN ON A SPECIAL MISSION TO LEBA-
NON A FEW DAYS AGO AND HAD SEEN AMIN, SAID THE SITUATION
OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IMPROVING. THE
LEBANESE ARMY WAS NOT BEING STRENGTHENED BUT, ON THE
CONTRARY, WAS "ROTTING." CHEYSSON SAID THE ISRAELIS
WERE WORKING INTENSELY AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL IN
SOUTHERN LEBANON TO DEVELOP A MILITIA IN ADDITION TO
HADDAD'S FORCES. THIS WAS PART OF A LONG-TERM
ISRAELI PROGRAM TO DOMINATE SOUTHERN LEBANON.
CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH POLICY CONTINUES TO BE TO FAVOR
IN PRINCIPLE INTERNATIONAL FORCES (I.E. RELATED
TO THE UN), BUT THAT WHEN SUCH FORCES CANNOT BE
DEVELOPED FOR POLITICAL REASONS,AS IN THE SINAI
OR BEIRUT, MULTINATIONAL FORCES ARE ALSO ACCEPTABLE.
CHEYSSON THOUGHT A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH
WAS DESIRABLE, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE
EVEN IF SOME NEW ADJUSTMENTS TO THE UNIFIL MANDATE MIGHT

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BE NECESSARY.

8. THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.
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E DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB FOR THE SECRETARY

9302566

E.O. 12065: 3/11/92 (HABIB, P.C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH CHEYSSON - MARCH 11

1. [redacted]

2. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET THIS EVENING WITH CHEYSSON FOR ABOUT FORTY MINUTES. I BRIEFED HIM ON MY TRIP TO THE AREA IN GENERAL TERMS. HE POSED SOME QUESTIONS AND MADE SOME POINTS WHICH HE MAY BRING UP ALSO IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU ON FRIDAY, NAMELY:

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-- CHEYSSON NOTED THAT IN HIS RECENT VISITS TO ABU DHABI AND BAGHDAD, HE HAD HEARD VIRTUALLY NO TALK ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS, THE PLO OR ISRAEL; THE FOCUS WAS ON IRAN AND A POTENTIAL IRANIAN THREAT.

-- CHEYSSON WAS CONVINCED FROM HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL THAT THE ISRAELIS FEEL STRONGLY NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO HAVE REAL PROBLEMS OR CRISES WITH THE US. MARESCA

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O.12065: RDS-1,2,3,4-3/4/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, SY, SA, IS, JO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS IN JORDAN WITH KING,
- CROWN PRINCE, PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER,
- ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

1. [redacted]

2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR VIETS AND DAS DRAPER, AND OFTEN BY DCM DJEREJIAN AND POLOFF IMBRIE, I HAD USEFUL AND LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS WITH JORDANIAN LEADERS, BEGINNING WITH KING HUSSEIN BUT INCLUDING THE CROWN PRINCE, PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM, ARMED FORCES CHIEF GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ROYAL COURT COUNSELOR LAWZI, AND OTHERS. I MENTIONED TO THE KING THE GOOD WORDS THE

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PRESIDENT HAD SAID ABOUT HIM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF JORDAN. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS I MADE TO ALL:

-- I DESCRIBED THE TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES ENTRUSTED TO ME ON THIS TRIP: (A) PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND (B) ANALYZING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION. I REVIEWED FAIRLY FULLY MY DISCUSSIONS IN INSRAEL, LEBANON AND SYRIA, WITH THE

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EXCEPTION OF PORTIONS OF MY TALK WITH ASSAD.
-- I REVIEWED RECENT DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS THREATENING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND OUR EFFORTS TO FORESTALL MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION OR FURTHER CHALLENGES AND PROVOCATIONS FROM EITHER THE PALESTINIANS OR THE SYRIANS. GIVEN THE MOOD IN ISRAEL, WHICH I DESCRIBED GRAPHICALLY, I SAID THAT ANY PROVOCATIONS COULD BRING ABOUT A STRONG REACTION AND UNPREDICTIBLE FORMS OF ESCALATION. ALTHOUGH DUE TO OUR EFFORTS THE ISRAELIS HAD HELD OFF GOING NORTH IN RESPONSE TO RECENT INCIDENTS, A SUCCESSFUL PALESTINIAN ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD SET THINGS OFF. I ASKED THAT JORDAN USE ITS INFLUENCE IN ALL APPROPRIATE QUARTERS TO FORESTALL A DANGEROUS BLOW-UP. I NOTED THAT BEGIN HAD ASSURED ME THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE.

-- I DESCRIBED THE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE JULY CEASE-FIRE, AS WELL AS OUR CONCLUSION THAT THE RECENT FATAH OPERATIONS ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BECAUSE THE OPERATION HAD ORIGINATED IN LEBANON.

-- I EXPLORED BRIEFLY HOW UNIFIL'S EXPANSION COULD BE USED TO PROMOTE A MORE STABLE SITUATION.

-- AS FOR THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SITUATION, I UNDERLINED

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THE IMPORTANCE OF RE-ENGAGING THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS IN ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (AFC) ACTIVITIES DESPITE SYRIAN INFLEXIBILITY. I ASKED FOR APPROPRIATE JORDANIAN COOPERATION IN THIS AREA AS WELL, AND THIS PRODUCED AN EXCHANGE OF INTERESTING IDEAS (SEE BELOW).

3. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS MADE BY KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY WERE THE FOLLOWING:

-- THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION (AS WAS THE CASE ALSO EARLIER WITH BADRAN) AS TO WHETHER A PALESTINIAN OPERATION MOUNTED FROM SYRIA, NOT FROM LEBANON, WHICH CROSSED JORDAN INTO THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL WOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION. I NOTED THAT I HAD SPECIFICALLY CAUTIONED ASSAD NOT TO ALLOW SUCH A PALESTINIAN ADVENTURE. WHILE IT COULD BE SEEN AS NOT A TECHNICAL VIOLATION, THAT WOULD NOT BE THE ISRAELI

VIEW. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COULD
SPARK A SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI REACTION WHICH, HOWEVER,
IN MY OPINION WOULD BE DIRECTED AT THE PLO BUT NOT
JORDAN, SINCE ISRAEL GAVE JORDAN CREDIT FOR BLOCKING
INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS.

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
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EXDIS

-- HE SAID THAT JORDAN REMAINED DETERMINED TO CONTROL BORDER INFILTRATIONS BUT COULD NOT TOTALLY SEAL IT OFF. HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME THE U.S. PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO PREVENT INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE RIVER. JORDAN WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL REGARDING LEBANESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. JORDAN HAD GOOD CONTACTS WITH CHAMOUN AND HIS

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SUPPORTERS, WITH WALID JUMBLATT OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, AND WITH SHI'A AND SUNNI MUSLIM LEADERS, AS WELL AS AMIN GEMAYEL, WHO HAD VISITED AMMAN RECENTLY.

-- IF THE AUTONOMY TALKS REACHED AN IMPASSE, HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. POSITION WOULD NOT REMAIN STATIC AND WOULD REFLECT THE NEED FOR AN ALTERED STRATEGY. HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD STICK TO ITS ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AS MEANING THE RETURN OF TERRITORY IN EXCHANGE FOR FULL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

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WITHOUT MENTIONING JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS EXPLICITLY, HE NOTED THAT THE U.S.HAD TO CONTINUE A SENSIBLE ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH KEY COUNTRIES; HE RECALLED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED BY THE WEST--AS IN NASSER'S CASE YEARS AGO--HAD LED TO GREATER DEPENDENCE UPON THE SOVIETS, WITH ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR THE REGION'S STABILITY.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM EXPLORED WITH ME A STILL SOMEWHAT AMORPHOUS APPROACH, WHICH HE OUTLINED SUBSEQUENTLY IN MY PRESENCE TO BADRAN AND THE KING, WHO NODDED GENERAL ASSENT. KASIM HAD BEEN INTRIGUED WITH THE RECENT ACTION OF THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT PROPOSING THAT KUWAITI SUBSIDIES TO SYRIA BE ENDED (KASIM ARGUED THAT THIS STEP WAS TAKEN NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE HAMA INCIDENT AND THE NEED TO SHOW SYMPATHY TO THE SUNNI MUSLIMS IN SYRIA, BUT ALSO BECAUSE KUWAIT REGARDS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAN IN THE WAR WITH IRAQ AS AGAINST KUWAIT'S MOST IMPORTANT INTERESTS).

5. BOILED DOWN, KASIM'S IDEA IS TO BUILD ON THIS KUWAITI ACTION SO AS TO MOBILIZE BROADER GULF AND SAUDI PRESSURE AGAINST SYRIA TO ACHIEVE "COMPREHENSIVE" OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING INTER ALIA SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AND SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE IN BROAD ARAB EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND HELP BRING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THERE. KASIM, HOWEVER, DID WANT TO COUPLE THESE OBJECTIVES TO WHAT HE IMPLIED WOULD BE THE AIM OF PERSUADING SYRIA TO JOIN IN A UNITED ARAB STAND AGAINST THE IRANIAN THREAT. THIS IS WHY HE ADVOCATED NOT USING "PREMATURELY" WHATEVER LEVERAGE COULD BE DEVELOPED FROM A COMMON GULF STAND (MEANING NOT USING SUCH LEVERAGE FOR LEBANON OR CEASE-FIRE OBJECTIVES EXCLUSIVELY). THE CLEAR NEXT STEP IN KASIM'S PLAN IS TO ENCOURAGE

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SAUDI ARABIA TO END ITS SUBSIDIES TO SYRIA.

6. HE ALSO THREW OUT AS HIS PERSONAL IDEA PUTTING MORE TEETH IN UNIFIL'S ABILITY TO CONTROL ITS AREA, AND POSSIBLY DEPLOYING THE FORCE INTO OTHER REGIONS OF LEBANON.

7. I DID NOT RESPOND TO HIS THOUGHTS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT I WOULD THINK THEM OVER CAREFULLY. VIETS

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4 5/12/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, IS, LW, SY, XF, PINT
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI MILITARY DELEGATION, MAY 12

1. [redacted]

2. I MET WITH ISRAELI MILITARY DELEGATION AT 1000 LOCAL ON 12 MAY. THE ISRAELI SIDE, HEADED BY DEPUTY MOD ZIPORI, INCLUDED LT. GEN. EITAN, IDF COS; MGEN. ADAM, EITAN'S DEPUTY; MGEN SAGI, DMI; MFA DEPDIRGEN BAR-ON, AND AMBASSADOR SASSON. ON OUR SIDE THE TEAM CONSISTED OF MYSELF, AMB. LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, POLCOUNS HILL AND AMEMB DATT HOAG.

3. I OPENED THE MEETING BY REITERATING FOR ZIPORI ET AL MY MISSION OBJECTIVE OF RESOLVING THE CURRENT SITUATION BY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT I UNDERSTAND FULLY THE ISRAELI MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THEY ARE FACING COMPARED WITH WHAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE AROUND ZAHLE HAD BEEN.

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4. GEN. SAGI BEGAN BY GIVING ME HIS VIEW OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE. FOR THREE YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A SYRIAN SA-6 BRIGADE ALONG THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER. THIS BRIGADE HAS CONTAINED 5 BATTERIES, 4 OF WHICH ARE USUALLY A FEW HUNDRED METERS INSIDE SYRIA ALONG THE BORDER AND 1 ORGBH A DISTANCE OF
3 TO 5 KM. DEPENDING ON THE SEASON OF THE YEAR.
FOR THE PAST FEW MONTHS ONLY 1 OF THE 2 SA-6 POSITIONS

WERE OCCUPIED, THE ONE CLOSER TO THE BORDER. THIS SITE IS ONLY 1 OR 2 KM. FROM THE SYRIAN BORDER. THE GROUND FORCES CONSISTED OF 1 ARMORED BRIGADE AND 1 INFANTRY BRIGADE ACCORDING TO SAGI.

5. DURING THE EARLY APRIL CLASHES IN ZAHLEH THE NORMAL 2 COMMANDO BATTALIONS IN THE AREA WERE INCREASED TO 7 BY DRAWING FORCES FROM HOMS, HAMA AND ALEPPO. FROM THE SOUTHERN BIQA 2 TANK BATTALIONS WERE MOVED UP TO THE ZAHLE AREA. SYRIA HAD HELD POSITION IN SHTAWRAH, HAMASNA, AND AL METN BUT NEVER IN ZAHLE OR ON THE SANNIN HEIGHTS. THE ROUTE THROUGH THE SANNIN TO ZAHLE WAS USED BY THE PHALANGISTS AS A RESUPPLY ROUTE THAT AVOIDED THE SYRIAN DOMINATED MAIN BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY. THIS BACK ROUTE WAS ALSO USED IN PROVIDING PHALANGE ARTILLERY SUPPORT AGAINST THE SYRIAN OFFENSIVE AROUND ZAHLE.

6. WHILE IT WAS NOT PRESENTED IN EXACTLY THE FOLLOWING FASHION, THE SUM TOTAL OF SAGI'S PRESENTATION ON THE SAM STATUS WAS AS FOLLOWS: (A) STATUS QUO ANTE: THERE WAS A SA-6 BRIGADE OF FIVE BATTERIES, UP TO FOUR OF WHICH WERE NORMALLY JUST INSIDE SYRIA, AND ONE TO TWO ON THE SEASON. (B) NEW SITUATION: THREE NEW SA-6 BATTERIES

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WERE PLACED DEEP INSIDE LEBANON IN THE ZAHLE AREA. BEYOND THIS, THERE APPEAR TO BE AS MANY AS TWO MORE SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE BORDER AREA, BUT TECHNICALLY ON THE LEBANESE SIDE (ISRAEL HAS NOT YET FINALLY CONFIRMED THE SECOND OF THESE TWO NEW SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE BORDER AREA). BEYOND THIS, THERE ARE TWO NEW SA-3 BATTERIES ON THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AREA, AND TWO NEW SA-2 BATTERIES ON THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AREA. AS THE ISRAELIS VIEW IT, THERE ARE NOW A TOTAL OF TEN SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE COMBINED ZAHLE AND BORDER AREAS, AND TWO BATTERIES OF SA-2'S AND TWO BATTERIES OF SA-3'S ON THE SYRIAN SIDE, MAKING FOURTEEN BATTERIES IN THE COMBINED BORDER AND ZAHLE AREAS. NOTE: AS WILL BE EVIDENT IN OTHER HABIB MISSION REPORTING, HABIB IS MAKING A DISTINCTION--IN THE POLITICAL APPROACH--BETWEEN THE SAM'S (THREE BATTERIES) IN THE ZAHLE REGION AND THE SAM'S IN THE BORDER AREA, WHETHER ON THE LEBANESE OR SYRIAN SIDE.

7. SAGI SAID THAT THE ZAHLE SA-6 SITES COVER SYRIAN FORCES ON THE SANNIN MOUNTAIN BUT THE SA-2'S AND SA-3'S ARE MOST HARMFUL TO ISRAELI FLIGHTS AS THE COVERAGE FROM THESE MISSILES REACHES TO THE SUBURBS OF BEIRUT. SAGI NOTED THAT SYRIAN-CHRISTIAN FIGHTING CEASED WHEN THE MISSILE CONFRONTATION BEGAN.

8. ON THE GROUND SYRIA HAS BROUGHT THE 91ST ARMORED BRIGADE FROM THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION TO THE BORDER AREA BUT NOT INTO LEBANON. ONE MECHANIZED BATTALION HAS BEEN MOVED INTO THE AREA SOUTHEAST OF ZAHLEH TO PROTECT THE THREE SA-6 MISSILE BATTERIES THERE.

9. IN ADDITION TO MOVEMENT IN LEBANON, SAGI OPINED THAT

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IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE SYRIANS HAVE BEGUN PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR GENERAL WAR. TROOPS ON LEAVE HAVE BEEN CALLED BACK TO THEIR UNITS; SOME RESERVES HAVE BEEN CALLED UP; TROOPS IN MILITARY COURSES HAVE BEEN SENT BACK TO THEIR UNITS; DOCTORS ARE BEING RECRUITED; FUEL SUPPLIES, AMMUNITION, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, MISSILES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT ARE BEING CHECKED; AND THE SYRIAN AIR FORCE IS ON ALERT HAVING FINISHED ITS PREPARATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR. MIG-23'S HAVE BEEN MOVED FORWARD TO MEZZE AIRFIELD AND SYRIA INTENDS TO MOVE SYRIAN MIG-17'S FROM THE SYRIA-IRAQ BORDER TO MEZZE AND SU-22'S TO DAMASCUS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THESE AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS MEAN A SHORTENING OF THE RANGE TO TARGETS IN ISRAEL, ACCORDING TO SAGI.

10. ON THE GOLAN YESTERDAY SAGI SAID THAT SYRIAN TROOPS WERE ON ALERT FEVERISHLY DIGGING TRENCHES AND BUILDING POSITIONS. SAGI ANTICIPATES FULL EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT ON THE GOLAN VERY SOON WHICH, HE NOTED WRYLY "WILL NOT COOL OFF THE SITUATION."

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11. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SYRIAN BUILD-UP I ASKED SAGI

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FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN INTENT IF ISRAEL HITS THE SYRIAN MISSILES. SAGI ANSWERED THAT BECAUSE OF THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE SITUATION THE QUESTION WAS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER. AT FIRST ISRAEL THOUGHT THE MISSILES WERE FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AROUND ZAHLEH AND AS A SHOW OF FORCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SYRIA IS THE ONLY ARAB COUNTRY FIGHTING ISRAEL. SAGI SEES SYRIAN CONFIDENCE GROWING EACH DAY AND THAT SYRIANS ARE NOW PREPARED FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE MISSILES. AS TIME PASSES MORE "SHOWS OF GOOD WILL FROM SYRIA'S ARAB BROTHERS" ARE MADE, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, ALGERIA, LIBYA AND EVEN JORDAN.

12. TO A SERIES OF MY QUESTIONS SAGI RELATED THAT SYRIA HAS NEVER FIRED MISSILES AT ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. HE NOTED THAT TODAY (12 MAY) AT 0500 LOCAL THE SYRIANS HAD FIRED TWO SA-6 MISSILES FROM THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. SAGI SAID THAT OF THE SA-6 BATTERIES NEER ZAHLEH ONE OF THE THREE HAS ITS RADAR OPERATING ALL OF THE TIME. HE DOUBTS THAT MORE SAM'S WILL BE DEPLOYED FOR THE TIME BEING AS THERE ARE NOW MORE THAN TWO FULL BRIGADES IN THE AREA. HE EXPECTS MORE RADARS AND MORE ZSU-23'S AND 57MM AAA TO MOVE INTO LEBANON. PERHAPS LATER MORE SA-2'S AND SA-3'S WOULD BE MOVED IN.

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13. I ASKED ABOUT LOCATION AND CAPABILITY OF SA-9 MISSILES IN LEBANON AND HOW THESE MISSILES AFFECT ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE PLO. SAGI SAID THAT THE SA-9'S HAD BEEN MOVED IN ON 10 APRIL AND HAD FIRST BEEN LOCATED NEAR DAMUR ON 16 APRIL. THE SA-9'S ARE MOUNTED ON VEHICLES WITH A 15-16000 FT ALTITUDE CAPABILITY WHILE THE HAND HELD SA-7'S ARE GOOD ONLY TO 7000 OR 8000 FEET. THE SA-9'S WERE BROUGHT BY THE LIBYANS TO THE JABRIL GROUP AND ARE MANNED BY LIBYAN CREWS. SAGI RELATED

INDICATIONS THAT 4 RECENT IL-76 FLIGHTS FROM BENGHAZI TO DAMASCUS HAD BROUGHT MORE SA-9'S DESTINED FOR THE PLO. GEN EITAN ADDED THAT THE SA-9'S AFFECT THESE OPERATIONS SEVERELY AS BOTH THE "TERRORIST" TARGETS AND THE SA-9 MISSILES WERE MOBILE.

14. TO MY QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY IN LEBANON, SAGI SAID THAT THERE WAS NO LOW LEVEL FLIGHT ACTIVITY IN THE BIQA. THE RECONNAISANCE FLIGHTS TO THE NORTHERN PART OF LEBANON WERE HIGH ALTITUDE AND WERE CONDUCTED FROM 2 TO 5 TIMES A WEEK DEPENDING ON SYRIAN ACTIVITY. USUALLY THE SAME ROUTES ARE FLOWN ONE OF WHICH IS OVER THE BIQA ACROSS ZAHLEH. BOTH VERTICAL AND SIDE LOOKING PHOTOS ARE TAKEN.

15. AT THE CONCLUSION OF GEN SAGI'S BRIEFING, I THANKED HIM FOR HIS EXCELLENT BRIEFING AND TOLD HIM THAT THE BRIEFING"REALLY HELPED ME PUT MY FINGER ON THE PROBLEMS." GEN EITAN, TRUE TO HIS NATURE, RIPOSTED THAT YOU "NEED A FIST NOT A FINGER" WHEN YOU DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS.

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16. EITAN THEN LAUNCHED INTO HIS VIEW OF CURRENT CRISIS SAYING THAT ASSAD IS AFTER SOMETHING MORE THAN MISSILES. HE NOTED THE SYRIAN BUILD-UP AND SAID THE PREPARATIONS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS PART OF AN

ORDINARY EMERGENCY OR AS PART OF AN EFFORT SIMILAR TO THAT PRIOR TO THE 73 WAR. ACCORDING TO EITAN, MOVEMENTS FORWARD OF MIG-23'S AND SU-22'S COULD BE INTERPRETED AS OFFENSIVE. RELOCATION OF FRRG MISSILES NEAR DAMASCUS COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. PREPARATION AND MOVEMENT OF HEAD-QUARTERS ARTILLERY IS AN OFFENSIVE MOVE. MANNING OF NEW POSITIONS ON THE GOLAN COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. MOVEMENT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION ON THE GOLAN TO NEW POSITIONS AS RECENTLY OBSERVED COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. MANNING OF POSITIONS IN MILITARY HOSPITALS, DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES, HEAVY ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION COULD BE INTERPRETED OFFENSIVELY OR DEFENSIVELY. THESE SYRIAN MOVES AND SYRIAN PRONOUNCEMENTS EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR UNINTENTIONALLY HAVE INCREASED SYRIAN SELF CONFIDENCE--POSSIBLY WITH SOVIET BACKING.

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17. EITAN CONTINUED THAT THERE HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE LIBYAN BACKING OF THE PLO THROUGH AIRLIFT OF WEAPONRY CHANNELED THROUGH SYRIA. SOME OF THE ARMS SHIPPED SUCH AS SA-9'S ARE RARELY FOUND EVEN IN THE EAST BLOCK COUNTRIES. LIBYANS RATHER THAN PLO CONTINUE TO MAN SUCH EQUIPMENT.

18. AT THIS POINT WE GOT INTO A VERY ANIMATED DISCUSSION INVOLVING THE SOVIET POSITION ON LEBANON. EITAN SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE DECLARED THE BIQA PART OF THE DEFENSIVE LINE OF SYRIA AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECOGNIZED THIS CLAIM. ONLY AFTER THIS RECOGNITION HAD THE SYRIANS DEPLOYED MISSILES IN THE BIQA. SAM LEWIS AND BILL BROWN STRONGLY REFUTED THIS STATEMENT NOTING THAT THE STATEMENT, ATTRIBUTED BY LE MONDE TO SOLDATOV, WHO HAD NOT BEEN IN THE AREA AT THE TIME, HAD LATER BEEN OFFICIALLY REFUTED AND RIDICULED BY THE SOVIETS. EMBASSY TEL AVIV IS IN THE PROCESS OF DOCUMENTING THIS FOR THE ISRAELIS.

19. I ASKED EITAN WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY ABOVE NORMAL RECENT RESUPPLY OF THE SYRIANS. EITAN ANSWERED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INCREASING DELIVERY OF T-72'S BUT THAT WAS PART OF A STANDING AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE THEN OFFERED A FARMING ANSWER TO MY QUESTION. HE SAID THAT IF YOU WANT TO RAISE A GOOSE WITH A LARGE LIVER YOU MUST FORCE FEED THE GOOSE. SYRIA IS LIKE A GOOSE THAT YOU CANNOT GET ANY MORE FEED INTO.

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20. EITAN NEXT OUTLINED WHAT HE SEES AS THE 3 MAIN SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN LEBANON. FIRST, THEY ARE TRYING BY ALL MEANS TO DOMINATE LEBANON WHILE CHRISTIANS WHO ARE STILL INDEPENDENT TO AN EXTENT ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO INTERFERE. SECOND, THE SYRIANS ARE TRYING TO DO WHAT THEY SAID IN 1976-- MAKE THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER PART OF THE CONFRONTATION LINE. THIRD, ENABLE THE PLO TO ACT AGAINST ISRAEL OR OTHER TARGETS IN THE AREA.

21. EITAN OBSERVED THAT WHENEVER THERE WERE ATTEMPTS TO FIRE KATYUSHA ROCKETS ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER INTO ISRAEL EITHER IN THE SOUTH NEAR EILAT OR IN THE NORTH ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER THESE ATTEMPTS WERE ALWAYS SYRIAN SPONSORED. ALSO, WHEN HEAVY FIRING TOOK PLACE IN ZAHLEH OR BEIRUT THERE WAS ALSO FIRING ON ISRAEL'S NORTH FRONTIER. NOW THERE IS NO FIRING ON OUR NORTH FRONTIER BUT THERE IS IN BEIRUT. BEFORE KHADDAM WENT TO LEBANON THERE WAS FIRING ON ZAHLEH. THIS IS PART OF SYRIAN TACTICS, PART OF THEIR WAY OF CONDUCTING DIPLOMACY. TO MY QUESTION EITAN INDICATED THAT THE KATYUSHAS IN BEIRUT HAD COME FROM THE SOUTH, NOT FROM THE SANNIN RIDGE.

22. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, EITAN ANSWERED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS WENT DEEPER THAN JUST SUPPLIES. THE SYRIANS HAD REQUESTED THAT SOVIET SHIPS VISIT SYRIAN PORTS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED.

23. I ASKED WHETHER THE SAM'S THAT WERE NOW ON THE

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BORDER HAD BEEN DIRECTED IN DEFENSE OF DAMASCUS OR FOR OTHER PURPOSES. GENERAL SAGI ANSWERED SAYING THAT THE SA-2'S AND 3'S HAD COME FROM DAMASCUS DEFENSE AND THAT THE SA-6'S THAT HAD LONG BEEN ON THE BORDER WERE 70 KM FROM DAMASCUS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE DEFENSE OF DAMASCUS. ACCORDING TO SAGI TO SAY THAT THESE SA-6'S CONTROLLED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO DAMASCUS WAS AKIN TO WHAT THE SYRIANS ARE SAYING ABOUT THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE BIQA FOR DAMASCUS DEFENSE. ISRAEL DOESN'T AGREE WITH THIS SAGI SAID.

24. ZIPORI THEN MADE HIS PRESENTATION BEGINNING WITH WHAT HE SEES AS TWO BASIC PROBLEMS SYRIA IS FACING. THE FIRST OF THESE IS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM WHEREIN AN UNPOPULAR MINORITY ALAWITE REGIME IS IN POWER. THE PROBLEM IS SUCH THAT POLICE HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND THE ARMED FORCES HAVE HAD TO BE CALLED IN ON MANY OCCASIONS. THE SECOND PROBLEM HAS TO DO WITH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. ASSAD WANTS TO BE NUMBER 1 IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT HAS FAILED. WITH

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TENSIONS RISING THE NECESSITY FOR ARABS TO RALLY TOGETHER MAY SERVE THE PURPOSES OF ASSAD. I TOLD ZIPORI THAT I AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE A SHORT TERM CONSEQUENCE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS.

25. ZIPORI COMMENTED THAT TENSIONS OR HOSTILITIES SERVE THE RUSSIANS. IF THERE IS A SETTLEMENT, THE RUSSIANS CAN CLAIM CREDIT FOR RESTRAINING SYRIA AND IF THERE ARE HOSTILITIES THEN BIG BROTHER CAME TO HELP. I NOTED THAT WE WOULD ADD A THIRD ITEM--THAT THE CRISIS SERVES TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION.

26. ZIPORI THEN VERY CANDIDLY STATED "TO BE HONEST SOME OF OUR MOVES MAY HAVE AFFECTED SOME SYRIAN COUNTER MOVES." BUT AFTER 73 ISRAEL MUST BE CAUTIOUS. THE SYRIANS KNOW WE HAVE REINFORCED OUR FORCES. THEIR MOVES MAY BE RELATED TO OURS. "THE PRIME

MINISTER HAS SAID AND I SAY WE NEED FREE SKIES IN LEBANON AND WE WILL NOT LET THEM GO. WE ARE AT WAR WITH THE TERRORISTS AND CANNOT TAKE CHANCES. WE MUST KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON. IF WE WANT TO KEEP THE NORTHERN AREA OF ISRAEL SECURE, WE MUST KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON", ZIPORI STATED. HE CONTINUED SAYING THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK SYRIA AND WAS NOT A THREAT TO SYRIA. HE OBSERVED THAT SYRIA HAD A STANDING REGULAR ARMY WITH THE BEST SOVIET WEAPONS WHILE ISRAEL HAS A RESERVE ARMY.

27. ZIPORI COMMENTED THAT EVERY DAY THE STATUS QUO CHANGES. I REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED THE STATUS QUO WAS SOME TIME AGO AND THAT I HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS 1 APRIL 81 OR 1 DEC 80 DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE.

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ZIPORI SAID "THEY MUST KNOW WE ARE WORKING ON VERY SHORT TERMS." TO THIS I RESPONDED THAT IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD THAT I HAD NOT CLEARLY STATED AND WOULD NOT STATE ANY DAY OR HOUR BUT HAD CLEARLY INDICATED A SHORT TERM TIME FRAME TO HIM. ZIPORI ADDED THAT ISRAEL CAN DEAL THE BLOW ANY DAY ANY TIME BUT THAT HE WISHED THE WHOLE SITUATION WERE DEFUSED AND "THE SOONER THE BETTER."

28. AT THIS POINT A NOTE WAS PASSED IN TO EITAN AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES IN SYRIA BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW WIDESPREAD IT WAS.

29. EITAN NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN PREPARATORY STEPS IN THE NORTH AND WANTED SYRIA TO KNOW. SYRIA INITIALLY DID NOT TAKE ANY STEPS ON THE GOLAN. AT PRESENT EITAN SEES SYRIAN MOVES AS PLANNED WITH DATES AND TIMES IN MIND. EITAN BELIEVES SOVIET BACKING HAS TAKEN ON A NEW DIMENSION SINCE SOVIET NAVAL UNIT HAS MOVED SOUTH OF CYPRUS. THE MOSKVA IS ACCOMPANYING VESSELS WHICH IS SOMETHING NEW, PERHAPS SOMETHING ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO GET USED TO. IN RESPONSE I ASKED WHAT IT WAS THAT SYRIA HAD DATES AND TIMES FOR. TO THIS EITAN ANSWERED THAT IN LEBANON IT COULD BE A STRIKE AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SYRIAN EFFORT TO DETER ISRAEL FROM HELPING THE CHRISTIANS. THERE IS NO NEED OF A SPECIFIC SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS AS THE SYRIANS HAVE BROUGHT FORWARD THEIR MIG-23'S AND SU-22'S AND THE 91ST BRIGADE IS ALREADY IN THE BORDER AREA.

30. SAGI THEN GAVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL

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SITUATION WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A DETERIORATING CRISIS THAT WAS SNOWBALLING. SAGI SAID HE WOULD NOT ACCUSE ASSAD OF INGENIOUSLY PLANNING ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED BUT ASSAD KNOWS THE POTENTIAL GAINS AND RISKS OF WHAT HE IS DOING. IN ZAHLE AND SANNIN WHEN HE STARTED, ASSAD CONTINUED ON IN THE FACE OF WORLD CRITICISM TO REACH A PAX SYRIANA IN LEBANON. NOW HE IS MOVING TO FULL SCALE PREPARATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR IN LEBANON.
REDSLIGHT ASSAD WILL NOT MOVE UNITS FROM ZAHLE.
WAR IN LEBANON IS SERVING ASSAD'S OWN INTERESTS. THIS IS NOT A NEW IDEA AND GOES BACK TO 1979. ASSAD SEES THAT
MAYBE THIS IS A SOLUTION TO HIS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD PROBLEM IN SYRIA AS HE RAISES AN EXTERNAL ENEMY TO GAIN INTERNAL BACKING. AT THE END OF 1979 AND START OF 1980 ASSAD WAS FORCED TO SEND HIS OWN ARMOR AGAINST HIS OWN PEOPLE. HE CAME BACK TO THE EXTERNAL ENEMY IDEA SIX MONTHS AGO AS THOUGHTS OF SYRIAN DECISION-MAKERS TURNED TO WAYS TO REDUCE SYRIAN ISOLATION. ASSAD THOUGHT THAT IF HE WENT BACK TO THE ARABS WITH THE "DIRTY BOOTS" OF DEFENDING ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL--THE ONLY ARAB COUNTRY DOING ITS JOB--THEN THE ARABS WOULD BE FORCED TO SUPPORT SYRIA. ALSO THIS IS THE LAST YEAR

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ASSAD CAN BRING SADAT BACK TO THE ARAB LINE AND DESTROY

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THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLAINED, ACCORDING TO SAGI, IN THAT ASSAD IS NOT AFTER FULL SCALE WAR BUT WILL RISK IT FOR LIMITED WAR IN LEBANON. SAGI BELIEVES THAT NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE AS ASSAD WILL NOT CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVES.

31. AT THIS POINT I SAID THAT ASSAD MUST HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ON A LIMITED WAR BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTIES AS TO HOW LIMITED ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE IT. ALSO THERE WAS POTENTIAL BACKLASH FROM OTHER ARABS OVER POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN A WAR WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT I WAS GLAD THAT ZIPORI DID NOT WANT THE SITUATION TO GO THAT FAR.

32. SAGI NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY MADE THE OIL THREAT. HE CONTINUED, SAYING THAT THINKING AS THE SYRIANS THINK THERE ARE MANY SOVIET INTERESTS THAT WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY WAR IN LEBANON. I ANSWERED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT IF THE SITUATION GETS OUT OF HAND IT WILL AFFECT U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS GLOBALLY. THE SECRETARY WANTS TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE A DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT AND WE DON'T WANT THEM BACK AS THEY COMPLICATE THE SITUATION IN MANY WAYS.

33. NEARING THE END OF THE MEETING AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED SAGI HOW THE IRAQIS FIT INTO THIS SITUATION. SAGI RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A PUZZLE BUT THAT ULTIMATELY A SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR COULD BRING AN END TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR JUST AS THE 73 WAR (SIC) SERVED TO END FIGHTING WITH THE KURDS.

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34. TO MY FINAL QUESTION ON EFFECT OF AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFLICT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE AREA PARTICULARLY WITH [

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35. COMMENT: THE OVERALL TENOR OF THE MEETING WAS OPEN AND FRIENDLY AND NOT AS STRIDENT AS ANTICIPATED. EITAN'S FLEXIBILITY IN VIEWING A NUMBER OF SYRIAN MOVES AS POSSIBLY OFFENSIVE, POSSIBLY DEFENSIVE, WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING. ZIPORI COMMENTED ON DEPARTURE, "OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU FOR YOUR SUCCESS."

36. FOR DEPARTMENT: PLEASE PASS TO DIA. GROVE

OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O: MR. MANN

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PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: SOPN, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: MEDIA COMMENTARY: LEBANON CONFLICT

FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MEDIA OF JUNE 20-21.

1. BEGIN JUNE 20:
-- MARY MCGRORY, WRITING IN THE POST AND THE SUN, SAYS: "GO HOME, MR. BEGIN, GO HOME." SHE SUGGESTS THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT IN A MOOD RIGHT NOW TO HEAR HIS PROTESTATIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND ASKS WHETHER THIS SECURITY HAS TO BE PURCHASED BY THE SLAUGHTER OF INNOCENTS IN TOTAL DISREGARD FOR "A DECENT RESPECT FOR THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND." SHE CLOSES: "WE ARE TOLD YOU INSIST ON COMING BECAUSE IF YOU CANCELLED, PEOPLE WOULD
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THINK YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO BE ASHAMED OF. IN OUR OPINION, YOU DO."

-- HAROLD SAUNDERS, WRITING IN THE TIMES, CALLS ON THOSE WHO SEE OPPORTUNITY ARISING FROM THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION OF THE 1982 WAR TO PROVE THEIR POINT BY ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR PEACE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: (A) ISRAEL MUST BE ENABLED TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY BEFORE THE OCCUPATION HARDENS; "THIS IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION. ISRAEL'S REMAINING CREDIBILITY

AS A NATION CLAIMING TO WANT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS DEPENDS ON IT;" (B) TO ENSURE A SAFE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, A STRENGTHENED U.N. FORCE MUST BE PUT IN PLACE QUICKLY WITH AN EFFECTIVE MANDATE; (C) A NEW COMPACT MUST BE NEGOTIATED IN LEBANON WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT; THIS NEGOTIATION CAN PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A MODERATE ARAB ROLE IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE; (D) ISRAEL;S AND PALESTINIANS MUST BE BROUGHT TO COME TO TERMS WITH EACH OTHER; (E) THE U.S. MUST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE LARGER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

-- DAVID SHIPLER, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM JERUSALEM, DESCRIBES THE NEW SENSE OF ISRAELI GRANDEUR WHICH IS SHAPING A NEW VISION: THE PLO, DEFEATED MILITARILY, WILL DISINTEGRATE POLITICALLY, LEAVING THE FIELD OPEN TO MODERATE ARABS WILLING TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL; LEBANON, UNDER A CHRISTIAN-LED GOVERNMENT, WILL BE WILLING TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL. PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM IS DEAD.

-- THOMAS FRIEDMAN, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM BEIRUT, BELIEVES "THL FATE OF LEBANON HANGS AS MUCH IN THE BALANCE TODAY AS IN THOSE ANXIOUS WEEKS BEFORE THE
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REPUBLIC WAS FOUNDED IN 1943." HE EXAMINES ALL THE VARIOUS LEBANESE PRESSURES THAT WILL SHAPE THAT COUNTRY'S FUTURE AND CONCLUDES: "MORE THAN A FEW PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED HALF-JOKINGLY THAT TO SPARE THE COUNTRY THE AGONY OF A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, THE POPULAR AMERICAN MEDIATOR, PHILIP C. HABIB, WHO IS OF LEBANESE MARONITE EXTRACTION, BE INDUCED TO TAKE THE JOB."

-- HENRY TANNER, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM DAMASCUS, SAYS THE DEFEAT OF THE PALESTINIANS MAY MAKE THE QUEST FOR PEACE EVEN HARDER. FOR ONE THING, THIS WAR IS THE FIRST TRULY PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WAR, AND THE PLO HAS GAINED A MEASURE OF DE FACTO RECOGNITION. AMONG OTHER THINGS, AMBASSADOR HABIB IS NEGOTIATING WITH IT, PERHAPS INDIRECTLY, AND THE CEASEFIRE IN QUESTION IS A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. HAS TAKEN A HEAVY BLOW. CAMP DAVID IS ANOTHER APPARENT CASUALTY OF THE FIGHTING. THE SOVIET UNION IS WIDELY ASSUMED TO BE DESTINED FOR A KEY ROLE IN ANY NEW APPROACH TO PEACE THAT EMERGES. THE PLO WILL SEEK ITS NEW PROTECTOR IN EGYPT, AND, AS EGYPT MOVES BACK TO THE CENTER OF ARAB POLITICS, THERE WILL BE INCREASING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI FRICTION.

-- FLORA LEWIS, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM PARIS, SAYS THE RETICENCE OF MOST ARAB STATES IN REACTING TO THE ISRAELI

INVASION IS DUE NOT SO MUCH TO DISTASTE FOR THE PLO AND ARAB

DISSENSION, BUT REFLECTS RATHER A FEAR OF IRAN AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT SWEEPING MOSLEM SOCIETIES. THIS IS THE PRESENT DANGER FOR THE GULF. ISRAEL HAS NOW INFLICTED A PROFOUND NEW HUMILIATION, HIGHLIGHTING THAT ARAB LEADERS REALLY HAVEN'T SUCCEEDED IN FINDING THE BASIS FOR A SENSE OF NATIONAL DIGNITY AND PRIDE.ARMS SALES ARE
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NOT A CURE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO MINIMIZE-THE HUMILIATION AND AVOID SPAWNING FURTHER -FANATICISM IF REASON IS TO HAVE A CHANCE. SOME REAL PROGRESSTOWARD RESOLVING THE LONG ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS CRUCIAL. VICTORY IS THE TIME FOR MAGNANIMITY, FOR SENSIBLE CALCULATION OF THE LONG-TERM THREAT. IT IS FOR ISRAEL TO MAKE THE GRAND AND TRULY HEROIC GESTURE, BY OFFERING-- PAL:STINIANS PEACEFUL CONTROL OF THEIR-OWN DESTINY, WHICH IS WHAT AUTONOMY HAS TO MEAN.

-- JOHN LE CARRE, WRITING IN THE POST, BELIEVES THE SAVAGE IRONY OF THE LEBANESE INVASION IS THAT-VIOLENCE HAS MADE VICTIMS OF BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELIS: "THE INVASION WAS A MONSTROSITY, LAUNCHED ON-SPECIOUSLY ASSEMBLED GROUNDS, AGAINST A PEOPLE WHO -ON THE ISRAELIS' OWN ADMISSION CONSTITUTE NO SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT---- TOO MANY ISRAELIS, IN THEIR CLAUSTROPHOBIA, HAVE-PERSUADED THEMSELVES THAT EVERY PALESTINIAN MAN AND WOMAN-AND CHILD IS BY DEFINITION A MILITARY TARGET, AND THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BE SAFE UNTIL THE PACK OF THEM ARE SWEPT AWAY.- IT-IS THE MOST SAVAGE IRONY THAT BEGIN AND HIS GENERALS CANNOT SEE HOW CLOSE THEY ARE TO INFLICTING UPON ANOTHER PEOPLE THE DISGRACEFUL CRITERIA ONCE INFLICTED UPON THEMSELVES. IT IS WORSE STILL THAT THEY HAVE SO FAR TAKEN THEAMERICANS WITH THEM."

-- AN EDITORIAL IN THE SUN SEES THE P O DEFEAT AND THE DISARRAY AMONG ARAB STATES AS GIVING EGYPT AN OPPOR- TUNITY TO REASSERT ITS NATURAL LEADERSHIP-IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT COULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, THUS SPEEDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IT COULD HELP DRAW JORDAN INTO THE CAMP DAVID AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- WILLIAM CLAIBORNE, WRITING IN THE POST FROM JERUSALEM, SAYS ISRAEL HAS EMERGED AS A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH-IN

AN ENTIRELY NEW LIGHT BY BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. FOR ONE THING, THE ISRAELI VICTORY RAISES THE SERIOUS QUESTION OF WHETHER ISRAEL IS NOW BEYONDTHE-REACH OF AMERICAN LEVERAGE FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE. BUT,-AS SOME ISRAELI OFFICIALS SEE IT, "WHO RUNS THE SHOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW? THE ANSWER IS THE UNITED STATES AND - ISRAEL." AND THE SOVIET UNION IS THE BIG LOSER.

-- JOSEPH KRAFT, WRITING IN THE POST, SAYS A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER HAS OCCURRED IN FAVOR OF THE WEST FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI AND BRITISH VICTORIES.

3. BEGIN JUNE 21: UNCLASSIFIED

-- ANTHONY LEWIS WARNS ISRAEL IN THE TIMES AGAINST A "MAXIMALIST" APPROACH TO SUBDUING PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. DRAWING ON AN ARTICLE IN THE JUNE ISSUE OF "MOMENT" MAGAZINE BY ISRAELI ACADEMIC AND FORMER CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, LEWIS POINTS TO OCCASIONS IN MIDEAST HISTORY WHEN MILITARY EXTREMISM HAS SERVED POLITICAL ENDS BADLY. HE ARGUES THAT THE UNCOMPROMISING POINT OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY SHARON ET AL WITH RESPECT TO WIPING OUT THE PLO IS A MODERN RECRUDESCENCE OF SUCH VAINGLORIOUS AND SELF-DEFEATING EXTREMISM.

-- EVANS AND NOVAK, WRITING FROM CAIRO IN THE POST, SAY US "IMPOTENCE OR UNWILLINGNESS" TO PREVENT ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON HAS RAISED EGYPTIAN FEARS CONCERNING THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES: A) AN ISRAELI AGREEMENT WITH HADDAD OPENING THE WAY FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, B) SOVIET FORCES IN SYRIA TO COUNTER A US PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND C) DESTABILIZATION OF HUSSEIN BY REFUGEES FROM THE FIGHTING.
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QUOTING A "TOP OFFICIAL" UNDER MUBARAK, E&N SAY INFO HAS REACHED CAIRO CONCERNING A SYRIAN REQUEST TO MOSCOW FOR "DIRECT SOVIET PARTICIPATION" IN THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE. THEY ARGUE THAT THE ANTI-CAMP DAVID CAMP IN EGYPT HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE INVASION AND BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO PRESS FORWARD TOWARDS 'FULL AUTONOMY' FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THEY CLAIM THAT HAIG ESPECIALLY IS SEEN BY SOME EGYPTIANS AS A COLLABORATOR WITH THE ISRAELIS. "THE QUESTION BEING ASKED IS THIS: IS HAIG, DESPITE PROTESTATIONS, MOVING TOWARD A MODIFIED U.S.-ISRAELI CONDOMINIUM TO SAFEGUARD WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ISRAEL IN THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN VICAR AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES IN THE ROLE OF ACOLYTES?" HAIG

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//ZFF FOR TEL AVIV O N L Y//

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING MAY 17, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS JOHN HUGHES.

Q. ANYTHING ON THE SYRIANS CUTTING THE BEIRUT TO DAMASCUS HIGHWAY?

A. NO. AS YOU HEARD FROM SECRETARY VELIOTES, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT.
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Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE REPORT THAT LINKS IRAN TO THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT?

A. WE TRADITIONALLY HAVE NOT GOTTEN INTO INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND THAT DOES DERIVE, IF I UNDERSTAND THE REPORT, FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, SO WE WOULDN'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT.

Q. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE TIMES, URGED SHULTZ TO GET BACK TO THE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. DOES THE SECRETARY HAVE ANY RESPONSE TO THAT?

A. HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY PLANS TO GO BACK TO THE AREA. AS YOU KNOW, HE HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN AMB. HABIB AND AMB. DRAPER. AMB. DRAPER IS IN THE AREA; I THINK PHIL HABIB WILL BE BACK IN THE AREA LATER THIS WEEK.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AMB. HABIB GOING TO DAMASCUS?

A. I WOULDN'T RULE IT OUT.

Q. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT VELIOTES WAS TELLING US BEFORE, I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HABIB MIGHT, IN FECT, UNDERTAKE SOME FORM OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS.

WAS THAT THE INTENT?

A. I DON'T THINK IT WAS THE INTENT. WE'VE JUST SEEN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE. THAT HAS GONE FORWARD IN A VERY SATISFACTORY WAY. I'M SURE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE INVOLVED IN WHATEVER DISCUSSIONS ARE APPROPRIATE WITH THE SYRIANS.

I DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS IN HAND AT THE MOMENT, BUT I THINK IT'S A LITTLE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT SHUTTLE

DIPLOMACY OR SPECIFIC VISITS.

Q. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW ON ISRAELI RADIO THIS MORNING AS SAYING HE IS GOING TO SIGN A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT THIS AFTERNOON WITH AMB. LEWIS. IS A SIMILAR AGREEMENT BEING SIGNED HERE, AND CAN YOU GIVE US SOME INKLING OF WHAT IS IN THIS?

A. NO, I'M REALLY GOING TO HAVE TO REST ON SEC. VELIOTES' EXPLANATION AND REMARKS EARLIER THIS MORNING.

Q. NOW, SINCE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, WILL YOU RELEASE IT HERE IN FULL AS WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, CAMP DAVID AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST AGREEMENTS?

A. I'M NOT SURE WHAT WE WILL RELEASE, BUT WE WILL RELEASE SOME ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT. IT'S OBVIOUSLY INCUMBENT UPON US TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS FIRST BEFORE WE MAKE IT PUBLIC.

Q. WHICH COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS WILL THE PACKAGE BE GIVEN TO....FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE?

A. I DON'T KNOW, BUT I THINK THAT WOULD BE LOGICAL. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE SENATE LAST NIGHT, AND HE IS GOING TO BE BRIEFING THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TOMORROW MORNING, I THINK AT BREAKFAST.

Q. YOU JUST SAID PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLASSIFIED. THAT IS THE THING: IF IT IS CLASSIFIED, THAT IS GOING TO HOLD THE ARABS FROM COMING FORWARD TO AGREE ON THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT.

A. I DON'T AGREE WITH YOUR THESIS. I THINK THE ARAB

COUNTRIES HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT TRANSPIRED.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ARAB REACTIONS, IN GENERAL?

A. FROM IRAQ WE HAVE HAD FAVORABLE REACTION. I THINK WE HAVE HAD FROM JORDAN A FAVORABLE REACTION. WE HAVE HAD FROM EGYPT A VERY STRONG SUPPORTIVE REACTION. YOU SAW WHAT THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT JIDDAH AIRPORT AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY. THOSE WORDS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES.

SO THERE ARE FOUR GOVERNMENTS RIGHT THERE THAT LEAP IMMEDIATELY TO MIND WHO HAVE SPOKEN OUT, AND I AM SURE OTHERS ARE DOING AND WILL DO SO.

Q. THE AGREEMENT AS PUBLISHED IS VERY SPECIFIC THAT IT WILL TAKE EFFECT WHEN THE DOCUMENTS OF RATIFICATION ARE EXCHANGED, WHEN THE INSTRUMENTS ARE LEGALLY EXCHANGED. IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT WHAT HABIB WILL BE DOING NOW IN THE REGION WILL BE NEGOTIATING A NEW SET OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DEAL WITH WHEN THOSE INSTRUMENTS WILL BE EX-CHANGED.

A. NO, I THINK YOU ARE WRONG IN THINKING THERE IS ADDI-TIONAL NEGOTIATION ON THAT. THERE IS NO PROBLEM. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THERE IS NOT A NECESSITY FOR FURTHER NEGOTIA-TIONS ON THAT POINT. IT IS SIMPLY A TECHNICAL POINT.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THE AGREEMENT? DURING THAT TIME PERIOD, BETWEEN THIS DAY AND WHENEVER IN THE FUTURE THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO FINALLY LEAVE, IF THEY DO, WILL ANY OF THOSE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT COME INTO EFFECT?

A. THAT IS WHAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO NEGOTIATE. A LOT OF THE AGREEMENT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL
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BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE FUTURE.

Q. THERE ARE REPORTS TODAY OUT OF THE WEST BANK OF CLOSING UNIVERSITIES, SUCH AS THE WOMEN'S TEACHERS COLLEGE IN RAMALLAH, AND PLACING MORE PEOPLE IN THE TOWN OF ESSERT. ARE YOU AWARE OF THESE THINGS, AND DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT?

A. NO. SHULTZ

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JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ICRC, PLO, IS, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FAMILIES OF FIVE ISRAELI MIAS

1. [redacted]

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET FOR ONE HOUR MORNING OF MARCH 3 WITH MEMBERS OF THE FAMILIES OF THE FIVE ISRAELIS MISSING IN ACTION LEBANON. SISTER OF MISSING TANK CREWMAN YEHUDA KATZ OPENED THE MEETING BY READING A MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE FIVE FAMILIES. TEXT OF MESSAGE IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH NINE BELOW.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SYMPATHY WITH THE PLIGHT OF THE FIVE FAMILIES. HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOR THE GOVERNMENT

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OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD FORGET THE PRISONERS. HE ASSURED THE FAMILIES THAT THEIR PAIN WAS VERY MUCH ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S MIND, AS WELL AS HIS OWN, AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NEVER FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH HIM. HE ADDED THAT HE ALWAYS FOLLOWED THROUGH ON REQUESTS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE PRISONER ISSUE, AND ADDED THAT OCCASIONALLY HE GOES BEYOND THE REQUESTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE IS COVERED.

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4. HE EMPHASIZED THAT NOT A WEEK GOES BY THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE SYRIANS. THE ICRC RAISES IT EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE ISSUE IN FRONT OF THE SYRIANS AS OFTEN AND IN AS MANY WAYS AS POSSIBLE. HE OBSERVED THAT THE SYRIANS SOMETIMES REPLY THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE TAKING UP THE ISSUE, BUT SHOULD LEAVE IT IN THE HANDS OF THE RED CROSS, ADDING THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT AS AN ANSWER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON A HUMANITARIAN BASIS.

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5. HE STRESSED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE FAMILIES TO REMEMBER AT ALL TIMES THAT THE GOI WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, AS WILL THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES THAT THE ISSUE OF THE POWS/MIAS MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THERE WILL BE ANY WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THEY UNDERSTAND THIS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN AUGUST WITH THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT, AND WE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION THERE WITH PRISONERS AND REMAINS IN PLO HANDS. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT MORE INFORMATION WOULD BECOME AVAILABLE IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN

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FORCES FROM LEBANON BEGAN, BUT CAUTIONED THE FAMILIES NOT TO LET THEIR HOPES GET TOO HIGH. HE STRESSED THAT THEY MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE FAITH THAT EVERYTHING THAT COULD BE DONE WOULD BE DONE.

--

6. THE FAMILIES ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO PASS A LETTER AND A GIFT(A COPY OF THE KORAN) FROM THEM TO PRESIDENT ASSAD AND TO SEEK THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN GETTING MORE INFORMATION FROM THE SYRIANS ON THE MISSING MEN. MAKING CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT DELIVER THE GIFT AND LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF, AMBASSADOR HABIB PROMISED TO ENSURE THAT THE PACKAGE WOULD GET TO DAMASCUS FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. HE SAID HE WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF APPROACHING THE SOVIETS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD PROVE FUTILE.

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7. FOR DAMASCUS: WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APPRDACH ON THE ISSUE TO THE SYRIANS THROUGH THE SOVIETS, AND WHETHER SUCH AN AP- PROACH MIGHT BETTER BE MADE THROUGH EMBASSY DAMASCUS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY THERE, OR VIA ANOTHER CHANNEL, E.G., THE ISRAELIS GETTING A MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS THROUGH THEIR OWN DEVICES.

--

8. AFTER THE MEETING HAD BROKEN UP, MR. AND MRS.

BAUMEL STAYED BEHIND FOR A FEW MOMENTS TO ASK AMBASSADOR HABIB ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR REQUESTING FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH THE FORMER PRESIDENT.

9. COMMENCE TEXT OF FAMILIES' PRESENTATION:
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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00
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P 031424Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1956
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 03007

DEAR AND ESTEEMED AMBASSADOR HABIB:

WE HAVE GATHERED HERE, 5 BROKEN FAMILIES OF 5 MISSING SOLDIERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE AGAINST THE SYRIANS, ON 11TH JUNE 1982, AND NEVER AGAIN WERE SEEN. FOR THE LAST 9 MONTHS, WE PHYSICALLY LIVE BUT THIS CANNOT BE NAMED LIFE. WE MOVE CONSTANTLY FROM HOPE TO DESPAIR NOT KNOWING WHETHER OUR BOYS ARE STILL ALIVE OR GOD FORBID--DEAD.

[redacted]

DURING THESE 9 MONTHS WE HAVE GONE THROUGH ENORMOUS TROUBLES AND EFFORTS TRYING TO RECEIVE A SIGN OF LIFE FROM OUR DEARS.

ON 15 AUGUST 1982 ISRAEL EXCHANGED, THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, LISTS OF PRISONERS WITH SYRIA. ISRAEL SUBMITTED A FULL LIST AND THE SYRIANS ADMITTED IN HAVING 1 BODY AND 3 PRISONERS ALIVE. ONE OF THEM IS LIBERMAN WHOSE 3 OTHER MEMBERS OF CREW

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ARE STILL MISSING.

SINCE IT ALL HAPPENED IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE SYRIANS, AND SINCE THE BATTLE WAS AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES, IT IS BEYOND ANY QUESTION THAT THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FATE OF OUR 5 MISSING SOLDIERS. THERE'S NO WAY THAT SYRIA WON'T BE ABLE TO FIND OUT, SINCE THE BOYS WERE LEFT ALIVE, THE AREA OF SULTAN YACOB IS SMALL AND THE TANKS WERE DRAGGED BY THEM WITHIN FEW HOURS AFTER CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO FORCE.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, WHEN REALIZING THAT THE SYRIAN LIST OF PRISONERS WAS NOT COMPLETE, IMMEDIATELY ASKED FOR DETAILS REGARDING OUR 5 MISSING SOLDIERS. ONLY 6 WEEKS LATER, SYRIA RESPONDED TO THAT APPEAL SAYING: "THEY ARE NOT WITH US."

DURING THAT PERIOD ON THE 4TH OF JULY 1982 AN EXHIBITION-ISTIC BURIAL OF FOUR COFFINS TOOK PLACE IN DAMASCUS. THIS BURIAL RAISES TOO MANY QUESTIONS. THE 4 NAMES GIVEN BY THE SYRIANS PROVED TO BE WRONG, AND THE PICTURES OF LIVING SOLDIERS POSTED ON EACH COFFIN PROVE THAT NO IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE.

--

THE CEREMONY ITSELF WAS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION AS TO HOW TO BURY AN ENEMY'S BODY. BESIDES, WHERE WERE THE BODIES BETWEEN 11TH JUNE AND 4TH JULY? WHERE IS THE FIFTH? IF THEY HONOR ENEMY'S BODY SO MUCH, HOW COME THEY DID NOT BURY THE DEAD PILOT?

THE PRISONER LIBERMAN WAS SURELY INTERROGATED

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REGARDING THE MEMBERS OF HIS CREW. THERE IS NO WAY THAT SUCH A TERRIBLE MISTAKE OF GIVING WRONG NAMES COULD HAPPEN. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND BASIC NORMS, ACCORDING TO THE BIBLE, THE KORAN AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

NONETHELESS, SINCE ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD LET AUSTRIAN PATHOLOGISTS TO MAKE IDENTIFICATION, WE RELEASED ON 8/12/82 2 FISHERMEN AS A GESTURE, EVER SINCE, THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT PERMITTED SUCH IDENTIFICATION TO TAKE PLACE. DURING ALL THIS PERIOD, VARIOUS RUMORS AND DECLARATIONS WERE MADE:

1) AHMED GIBRIL CLAIMED TO HAVE "MORE" PRISONERS APART FROM THE 2 KIDNAPPED SOLDIERS.

2) ABU ZIAD, PALESTINIAN COMMANDER OF THE BEKKA VALLEY DECLARED BEFORE CBS CORRESPONDENT THAT: "THE FATE OF AT LEAST FIVE OTHER ISRAELIS NOW IN PALESTINIAN HANDS RESTS WITH NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS."

3) THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE REPORTED AT FIRST STAGES THAT THE SYRIANS HOLD MORE PRISONERS THAN HAD BEEN REPORTED.

4) THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS CLAIMED TO FEEL AND SUSPECT THAT SUCH CONCEALMENT OF PRISONERS REALLY EXISTS.

5) MUZTAFA TELATH, A SYRIAN MINISTER, TOLD THE RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE IN DAMASCUS THAT THEY HAVE MORE PRISONERS IN THEIR HANDS.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03007 03 OF 03 031435Z
ACTION NEA-11

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P 031424Z MAR 83
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[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 03007

IT ALL LEADS SIR TO VERY ABSOLUTE AND DECISIVE CONCLUSIONS:
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1) THAT SUCH A BLACKOUT COMES TO COVER THAT THE 5 BOYS ARE ALIVE.

2) THAT THE ONE AND ONLY PURPOSE OF THE SYRIANS IS TO CAUSE BEWILDERNESS, SORROW AND FEAR ON OUR SIDE.

PLEASE BEAR IN MIND SIR THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO WITHDRAW ONE INCH FROM LEBANON BEEORE ALL PRISONERS, ALIVE OR DEAD,RETURN TO ISRAEL. WELL, IT IS NOT ONLY A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION, BUT A NATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT WE'LL NEVER LEAVE ISRAELI SOLDIERS UNDER HOSTILE HANDS. PLEASE REMEMBER, SIR, 2 DIFFICULT PERIODS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FIRST WHEN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF SOLDIERS WERE MISSING FROM VIETNAM, AND THE SECOND, WHEN AMERICAN

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DIPLOMATS WERE KIDNAPPED IN IRAN.

WE ARE QUITE SURE THAT SYRIAN MOTHERS OF 293 SYRIAN PRISONERS NOW HELD IN ISRAEL MISS THEIR CHILDREN AS MUCH AS WE DO, YET THEY ARE SURE ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THEIR CHILDREN, SINCE ISRAEL OBEYS ALL LAWS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. TO OUR GREAT SORROW, WE CANNOT BE THAT SURE REGARDING OUR PRISONERS IN SYRIA.

THE JEWISH RELIGION, SIR, INSTRUCTIONS US TO FULFIL HUNDREDS OF LAWS REGARDING ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE, YET IN CASE OF LIFE DANGER, THE DUTY OF SAVING HUMAN LIIE OVERRIDES THESE LAWS.

WE KNOW YOUR DEDICATION AND EFFORTS YOU HAVE PUT IN TRYING TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEM, AND BRING US SALVATION. YOU ARE OUR ONLY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SYRIANS. WE ASK YOU TO GO TO DAMASCUS AND DEMAND UNEQUIVOCALLY FROM PRESIDENT ASSAD TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER, OR TO TAKE SOME UNUSUAL STEP AND PUT AN END TO THIS HORRIBLE NIGHTMARE. MAY GOD BE WITH YOU. THANK YOU. END TEXT.
LEWIS

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PAGE 01 ROME 04771 01 OF 02 261057Z
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EXDIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/26/02 (BRIDGES, PETER S.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IT, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS

1. [redacted] ~~ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RABB, MADE WHAT WE THINK WERE VERY USEFUL CALLS FEBRUARY 25 ON FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY GENERAL MALFATTI AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR BOTTAI. WITH EACH, HABIB OUTLINED HIS INTENTIONS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING MISSION, STRESSING OUR GRATITUDE FOR THE RECENT ITALIAN DEMARCHES, PARTICULARLY TO THE PLO, AIMED AT LESSENING THE HEAT IN AND AROUND LEBANON. HABIB ALSO EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION FOR ITALY'S ROLE IN THE MFO, AND INVITED AN ITALIAN CRITIQUE OF AND COMMENTS ON HIS MISSION.

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3. BOTH BOTTAI AND MALFATTI STRESSED ITALY'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORTS. MALFATTI BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT LEBANESE SITUATION WAS BOTH DANGEROUS AND IMPORTANT; THE WEST HAD A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF LEBANON, WHICH FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD HAD MANAGED SUCCESSFULLY TO HOLD TOGETHER THE DIVERSE ELEMENTS WITHIN ITS BORDERS. IF LEBANON SHOULD BE DESTROYED, MALFATTI THOUGHT THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANCE OF A PALESTINIAN SOLUTION, AND IF LEBANON SHOULD BE

PARTITIONED IT WOULD BE AT BEST ONLY A TEMPORARY SOLUTION WHICH WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE THREAT OF WAR. HABIB SAID HE WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS LAST, SINCE SOME EUROPEANS ON OCCASION SEEMED TAKEN WITH THE IDEA OF "CANTONIZATION", WHICH WAS NONSENSICAL.

4. MALFATTI SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO ARRIVE AT THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL DATE OF APRIL 25, WHILE AVOIDING A SITUATION IN WHICH ISRAEL DECIDED IT MUST COMPENSATE ON ONE SIDE FOR WHAT IT WAS LOSING ONANOTHER. IT WAS CRUCIAL TO THIS END THAT THE ISRAELIS BE CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT LET THEM DOWN. HABIB SAID THAT HE WOULD IN FACT ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES TO THE ISRAELIS WHEN HE VISITED THERE.

5. MALFATTI CONTINUED THAT ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL FACT WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT FOR NOW PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE MUST KEEP THEM OUT. AT THE SAME TIME, AS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED ON FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO WHEN HE RECENTLY VISITED THE AREA, WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF ARABS IN THE MODERATE CAMP. TO DO THAT, WE MUST MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE MODERATES TO SAY THAT THEIR

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LINE BROUGHT SOME SUCCESSES. HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE ITALIANS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SHOW ANY SUCH SUCCESSES. MALFATTI COMMENTED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT IF ISRAEL DID TAKE SOME UNTOWARD STEP IN LEBANON, THIS COULD ALSO BE SEEN IN PART AS A FAILURE OF SAUDI POLICY. MALFATTI CONTINUED THAT THE SITUATION IN SYRIA WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR CONCERN. ALTHOUGH SYRIA WAS WEAK AND KUWAIT WAS REPORTEDLY REFUSING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, SYRIA MIGHT IN THE ITALIAN VIEW BE TEMPTED TO CARRY OUT SOME SORT OF DIVERSIONARY ACTION IN LEBANON.

6. THE MAIN THING, MALFATTI THOUGHT, WAS TO HAVE A PROCESS, AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE MODERATES THAT WE WERE DOING ALL POSSIBLE. MALFATTI ASSURED HABIB THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAN EFFORTS. HABIB ASSURED MALFATTI THAT WE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ASK THE ITALIANS TO HELP OUT WHERE WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL.

7. DISCUSSING ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL, MALFATTI SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO IMPRESS ON THE ISRAELIS WHAT TALLEYRAND SAID TO NAPOLEON: "ONE COULD ALWAYS USE BAYONETS, BUT ONE COULD NOT SIT ON THEM." HABIB AGREED,

NOTING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE UNDERSTANDABLY ALWAYS PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR OWN SECURITY AND THAT BEGIN'S DECISION TO EVACUATE THE SINAI HAD INDEED BEEN A MAJOR DECISION. MALFATTI REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BE ASSURED OF AMERICAN SOLIDARITY.

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PAGE 01 ROME 04771 02 OF 02 261058Z
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[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 04771

EXDIS

8. MALFATTI SAID THAT LOOKING BEYOND LEBANON, THE SITUATION IN IRAN, AND PARTICULARLY THE NEW SOVIET EFFORT THERE, HAD THE ITALIANS WORRIED, AS DID THE PAKISTAN SITUATION. THIS ARGUED ALL THE MORE FOR TAKING STEPS WHERE POSSIBLE NOW TO CONSOLIDATE THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY AND NOT FOR THE RECORD, THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION HAD GONE ON FOR THIRTY YEARS AND COULD CONTINUE, BUT THE LEBANESE

SITUATION COULD NOT CONTINUE AS IT WAS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEBANESE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT EASIER TO RESOLVE THAN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HABIB INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT AND CONCLUDED THAT AMERICAN AND ITALIAN VIEWS ON LEBANON SEEMED VERY CLOSE.

9. AMBASSADOR HABIB DID NOT SEE THIS CABLE BEFORE HE LEFT ROME.
RABB

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*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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PAGE 01 STATE 320485 TOSEC 140029
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DECAPTIONED

EXDIS [illegible] FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 12/3/01, (BREMER, L.P.)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.) PFOR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S SPECIAL CABLE HIGHLIGHTS, NUMBER 2, DECEMBER 3, 1981

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FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK/TODEP 3014

1. (U) UN: WALDHEIM WITHDRAWS CANDIDACY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHDREW HIS CANDIDACY FOR A THIRD TERM IN OFFICE. HE CONVEYED HIS DECISION IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. (REUTER 002)

2. (U) ISRAEL: CABINET APPROVES DRAFT OF EUROPEAN MFO ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ISRAELI CABINET APPROVED THE AMENDED DRAFT OF THE US-ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PARTICIPATING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REQUESTING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF ITS PRINCIPLES. (TEL AVIV 18533)

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 320485 TOSEC 140029

3. [redacted] VIETNAM: ASEAN JOINT DEMARCHE TO FRENCH. A SINGAPORE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO A JOINT DEMARCHE IN PARIS ON THE ISSUE OF AID TO VIETNAM, AND THAT SINGAPORE WOULD BE PLEASED IF SECRETARY HAIG RAISED THE SUBJECT WITH THE FRENCH. THE ASEANS BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL SIGNAL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS WAIVERING ON THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA, AND

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THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MAY FOLLOW THE FRENCH EXAMPLE. THEY FEEL STRONGLY THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON HANOI SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. (SINGAPORE 12129)

4. [redacted] HABIB MISSION: PRESS REPORTS OF SYRIAN REJECTION INCORRECT. PRESS REPORTS THAT SYRIA HAS REJECTED A US MEDIATING ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ARE INCORRECT. AT NO TIME DURING THE MEETINGS BETWEN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND AMBASSADOR HABIB DID THE SYRIANS REJECT A MEDIATING ROLE FOR THE US; THE MOU ISSUE DID NOT ARISE DURING THE ASSAD-HABIB MEETING. (DAMASCUS 7602)

5. [redacted] CYPRUS: ANKARA ECHOES DENIALS OF A MILITARY BUILDUP. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MILITARY, ASSURED AMBASSADOR STRAUSZ-HUPE THAT TURKEY HAS NOT INCREASED ITS FORCE STRENGTH ON CYRPUS. REPAIRED MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO CYPRUS AFTER SERVICING AND AN INSPECTION TEAM RECENTLY VISITED THE ISLAND. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ATTRIBUTED OTHER REPORTS TO THE WORKINGS OF THE "RUMOR MILL." (ANKARA 9052, EXDIS)

[redacted]

6. [redacted] IRAN: PAKISTANI AND TURKISH LEADERS SEEK TO STABILIZE IRAN. DURING RECENT TALKS IN ISLAMABAD, PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ AND TURKISH HEAD OF STATE GENERAL KENAN EVREN DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE MORIBUND PAK-TURK-IRANIAN COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AS A VEHICLE FOR STABILIZING IRAN. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS NOW ENJOY BETTER RELATIONS AND EXPANDED TRADE, AND PRESIDENT ZIA HAS NAMED AN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN TO FILL THE POST VACANT SINCE 1980. (ISLAMABAD 16128, 16130; ANKARA 9008)

7. [redacted] PAKISTAN: AFGHAN HELICOPTERS STRAFE CIVILIAN TARGETS. AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS STRAFED TWO PAKISTANI BUSES, KILLING FIVE AND WOUNDING THREE PEOPLE DECEMBER 2. THE AFGHAN AIRCRAFT ALSO ROCKETED A PAKISTANI FRONTIER POST IN THE SAME AREA OF BALUCHISTAN DURING THE MOST SERIOUS AFGHAN INCURSION YET. THE ATTACKS WILL INCREASE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE GREATER PROTECTION IN THE BORDER REGION. (ISLAMABAD 16117)

8. [redacted] ETHIOPIA: FOREIGN MINISTER DISAVOWS FURTHER WORSENING OF RELATIONS WITH US. DURING A MEETING WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER FELEKE SAID ETHIOPIA WILL TAKE NO STEPS TO WIDEN THE RIFT BETWEEN

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ADDIS ABABA AND WASHINGTON UNLESS "PUSHED TOO FAR." FELEKE DESCRIBED THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AS PURELY DEFENSIVE, AND SAID THE US AND NATO REPRESENTED THE ONLY THREATS TO THE REGION. (ADDIS ABABA 3602)

STOESSEL

NOTE BY OC/T: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH S/SO PER. MS. POWELL.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT007426

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ACTION SS-25

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 7426

EXDI DECAPTIONED

NEA PASS AMB DRAPER AND AMB DILLON

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EPER, PINT, LE,IS, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI

1. [redacted] ~~ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: ON OCTOBER 17, I VISITED TRIPOLI AND MET SEPARATELY WITH FORMER PM KARAMI AND SAMPLE OF MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS. KARAMI, UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE, WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF US ROLE IN MIDEAST AND LEBANON AND NEGATIVE ON GEMAYEL'S FIRSTHWEEKS IN OFFICE--PARTICULARLY HIS AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CURB PHALANGE. KARAMI ALSO MINIMIZED DANGER OF PLO IN NORTH LEBANON. HE IS, HOWEVER, PLAYING POSITIVE ROLE AS MEDIATOR OF TRIPOLITANIAN FEUDING. HIS REMARKS ON GEMAYEL WERE PROBABLY INTENDED TO

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INFLUENCE OUR ADVICE TO HIM.

3. SA"PLE OF MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS WAS, ON CONTRARY, EAGER FOR CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM COOPERATION IN LEBANON FREE OF FOREING FORCES (INCLUDING PLO), ANXIOUS FOR CONTINUED US COMMITMENT TO LEBANON, AND CONCENRED THATHTRIPOLI NOT BECOME SYRIAN-PALESTINIAN BATTLEFIELD. THIS REPRESENTS SHIFT IN SUNNI THINKING. END SUMMARY.

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4. ON OCTOBER 17, I SPENT MOST OF THE DAYLIGHT HOURS IN TRIPOLI (LEBANON). THROUGH A TRIPOLITANIAN FRIEND, I WAS ABLE TO MEET INFORMALLY WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI AND WITH A SAMPLE OF TRIPOLI'S MIDDLE -CLASS SUNNIS. WHILE KARAMI WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF EVENTS PAST AND PRESENT, THE LATTER WERE REMARKABLY UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.

5. MY MEETING WITH KARAMI, HELD WITHOUTHPUBLICITY AT HIS HOME, GAVE HIM HIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY IN MONTHS TO VOICE HIS POSITION TO AN AMERICAN VISITOR. HE WAS THEREFORE UNUSUALLY ELOQUENT. OUR MEETING, HELD IN A ROCOCO ROOM FULL OF PHOTOS OF KARAMI WITH WORLD LEADERS, INCLUDING EISENHOWER AND BULGANIN, LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF. AFTER LUTLINING THE BROAD LINES OF THE DRAPER MISSION, I ASKED KARAMI FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE. HE IMMEDIATELYHTURNED THE TABLES AND LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY RETROSPECTIVE OF THE LAST 35 YEARS.

6. KARAMI'S PRESENTATION, OBVIOUSLY MADE WITH HIS SYRIAN "PROTECTORS" IN MIND (THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEVERAL ATTEMPTS ON HIS LIFE), FOLLOWED LINES PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF ISRAEL AND THE US. IN BRIEF, HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REGION IS ALL THE FAULT

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OF THE US. IT HAS GIVEN ITS "CHILD", ISRAEL, EVERYTHING IT HAS ASKED FOR WITHOUT EXERCISING ANY CONTROL OVER ITS BEHAVIOR; THIS RESULTED MOST RECENTLY IN THE INVASION OF LEBANON. THE US HAS ALSO PROMOTED ARAB DISUNITY AND ISOLATED EGYPT FROM ITS ARAB BROTHERS. IT HAS REFUSED AGAINST ALL LOGIC TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO. IT HAS ENCOURAGED THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOW SEEM INACTIVE, IT IS KEEPING UP ITS CONTACTS IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WILL SOON HAVE NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT.

7. MOVING TO THE PRESENT TO COMMENT ON US SUPPORT FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, KARAMI EXPRESSED AN EQUALLY CRITICAL SERIES OF JUDGMENTS:
-IT WAS A MISTAKE TO ELECT A PRESIDENT FROM THE PHALANGE. A NON-PARTY PRESIDENT WOQLD HAVE BEEN MORE DISPOSED TOWARD TRUE RECONCILIATION AMONG LEBANESE. THE FIRST ELECTION--THAT OF BASHIR GEMAYEL--WAS A FRAUD. DEPUTIES WERE FORCED TO VOTE FOR HIM.
--AMIN GEMAYEL, NOW THAT HE HAS BEEN ELECTED, SHOULD DESIST FROM HIS EFFORTS TO IMPOSE ONE-MAN RULE. LEBANON HAS NO TRADTION OF STRONG PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN THE AMERICAN STYLE, AND NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO TRY TO IMPOSE IT. PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S ECLIPSE IN RECENT DAYS IS A CLEAR SIGN OF GEMAYEL'S AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES.

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

NEA PASS AMB DRAPER AND AMB DILLON

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

--GEMAYEL SHOULD NEVER HAVE IGNORED THE UNANIMOUS ADVICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AND OPTED FOR A NON-POLITICAL CABINET OF INEXPERIENCED UNKNOWNS WITHOUT ROOTS AMONG THE PEOPLE. THIS IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF GEMAYEL'S INTENTION TO ATTEMPT ONE-MAN RULE.
--THE POLITICIANS ARE THE ONLY PEOPLE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THE POPULATION, AND GEMAYEL WILL INEVITABLY FIND HE HAS MADE A MISTAKE AND RETURN TO THE POLITICIANS SOONER OR LATER.
--IT IS IDLE TO ARGUE THWT GEMAYEL TRIED TO FORM A CABINET OF POLITICIANS BUT COULD NOT DO SO. THE FORMATION OF CABINETS ALWAYS TAKES A LONG TIME INLEBANON, AND GEMAYEL REFUSED TO BE PATIENT. "HASVI IS THE DEVIL'S WORK". SAID KARAMI.
--IT IS CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL INTENDS TO SURROUND HIMSELF

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WITH PHALANGE PARTY STALWARTS. IN EFFECT, THE PHALANGE WILL BECOME THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.
--GEMAYEL'S PRIORITIES IN HIS FIRST WEEKS INDICATE CLEARLY THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHALANGE. INSTEAD OF MOVING TO DISMANTLE THE PHALANGE "STATE WITHIN A STATE", WHICH HAS SHAMELESSLY ESTABLISHED ITS OWN ADMINISTRATION IN LARGE AREAS OF LEBANON AND INTERRUPTED THE FREE PASSAGE OF TRAFFIC ON LEBANON'S INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAYS, GEMAYEL HAS PREFERRED TO DISPLACE SHI'ITE

SQUATTERS BY DESTROYING THEIR SHELTERS. THESE SQUATTERS HAD NO BAD INTENTIONS; THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO BUILD TEMPORARY SHELTER UNTIL THEY COULD RETURN TO THEIR RORIGINAL HOMES IN BEIRUT AND OTHER AFFECTED AREAS.
--GEMAYEL SEEMS BENT ON MAINTAINING THE RABIDLY CON-FESSIONAL CHARACTER OF THE ARMY LEADERSHIP. THUS, HIS EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE BY USE OF THE ARMY ARE BOUND TO FAIL.

8. HAVING TRIED, MOSTLY VAINLY, TO GET KARAMI TO THINK IN MORE POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT I SUCCEEDED IN SWITCHING THE SUBJECT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. AGAIN, KARAMI HAD ONLY NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS:
--ISRAEL HAS EVIL INTENTIONS IN LEBANON. ITS SEARCH FOR "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS" IN THE SOUTH IS A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CONTROL. ITS SUBTLE PROMOTION OF THE IDEA OF A DRUZE "PRINCIPALITY" REVEALS ITS DESIRE FOR PARTITION.
--THE SYRIANS ARE IN LEBANON LEGITIMATELY, AND NO ONE SHOULD EQUATE THEIR PRESENCE WITH THAT OF THE ISRAELIS.
-THE PLO PRESENCE IN NORTHERN LEBANON POSES NO PROBLEM TO ANYONE. WHY, AFTER THE MASSACRES OF SABRA AND

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SHATILA, SHOULD ANYONE BE SURPRISED THAT THE PALESTINIANS WISH TO RETAIN AN ARMED PRESENCE?

IN CLOSING, KARAMI EMPHASIZED THAT THE ESSENTIAL AND URGENT STEP REQUIRED WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIAN AND PLO PRESENCE WOULD THEN SORT ITSELF OUT RAPIDLY. AT THATHPOINT, TOO, IF GEMAYEL HAD NOT CHANGED HIS APPROACH, HE WOULD BECOME FARI GAME FOR THE POLITICIANS. AT PRESENT, KARAMI AND OTHERS WERE PUTTING OFF REAL POLITICAL ACTION AGAINST GEMAYEL, BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT TO IMPEDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ONCE THE ISRAELIS WERE GONE, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE OPEN SEASON.

10. AT A LONG LUNCHEON MEETING WITH A SAMPLE OF 12 OF TRIPOLI'S MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS, INCLUDING A FORMER MUFTI, A MERCHANT, AN ARCHITECT, AN ENGINEER, AND OTHERS, I HEAR A VERY DIFFERENT STORY. THE FORMER MUFTI, WHO SERVED AS SPOKESMAN (WITH THE OTHERS AGREEING AUDIBLY), MADE MOST OF THE POINTS:
--LEFT TO THEMSELVES, MADE MOST OF THE POINTS:
--LEFT TO THEMSELVES,LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS COULD GET ALONG JUST FINE. PIERRE GEMAYEL HAD SAID SO, AND THZ MUFTI AGREES WHOLEHEARTEDLY.
--THE FOREIGNERS,INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS, SHOULD BE EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY. ANYONE WHO

CLAIMS DIFFERENTLY, AND SPECIFICALLY RASHID KARAMI, IS OBVIOUSLY AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE.

--WHEN THE LEBANESE ARE LEFT AMONG THEMSELVES, THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SO-CALLED LEBANESE LEFT WILL BE REVEALED FOR WHAT IT IS: THE OPPORTUNISTIC POWER TRIP OF A FEW MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS, EACH OF WHOM INSISTED ON FORMING HOS OWN "PARTY" AND NONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN ABLE TO ATTRACT A SIGNIFICANT FOLLOWING.

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

NEA PASS AMB DRAPER AND AMB DILLON

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

--TRUE LEBANESE, BOTH CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM, ARE LEBANESE FIRST AND KEENLY DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THEIR RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS. IN THE CASE OF ISLAM PARTICULARLY, THESE ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH LEFTIST IDEAS.
--IT IS TRUE THAT, THANKS TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE POWER OF THE HIRED PRESS, THE LEBANESE LEFT HAS BEEN ABLE TO FRIGHTEN THE MARONITES INTO BELIEVING THEIR EXISTENCE IS AT RISK. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE SUNNI COMMUNITY HAS NEVER SOUGHT TO COALESCE AROUND STRONG ANTI-MARONITE LEADERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE MARONITES THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE SUNNIS ARE HONORABLE.
--THE NEW CABINET SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED WITH EXPERIENCED POLITICIANS CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THEIR
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FOLLOWERS. (THIS WAS THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH THE SAMPLE OF SUNNIS AGREED WITH KARAMI).
--THE US MUST MAINTAIN ITS LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO LEBANON. THE FUTURE OF LEBANON IS WITH THE WEST, BUT IT HAS ALL TOO OFTEN BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THE PAST BY SHARP SWINGS IN US ATTENTION.
--IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO TRIPOLI THAT THE FOREIGN FORCES BE REMOVED FROM LEBANON. UP TO NOW, TRIPOLI HAS BEEN SPARED SERIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN

FIGHTING. HOWEVER, IF THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO HAVE A SERIOUS FALLING-OUT, TRIPOLI MAY BECOME THEIR BATTLEGROUND, I.E., A NEW WEST BEIRUT.

11. COMMENT: IT WAS ENCOURAGING TO VISIT TRIPOLI. PHYSICALLY AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, ITS LIFE APPROXIMATES THAT OF LEBANON BEFORE 1975. AS SUCH, IT CAN SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. UNLIKE WEST BEIRUT AND THE SOUTH, WHICH HAVE BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED AND IN WHICH LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED, WOUNDED, OR DISPLACED, AND UNLIKE EAST BEIRUT AND MOST OF THE CHRISTAIN MOUNTAIN, IN WHICH THE POPULATION IS TRYING, SOMETIMES DESPERATELY, TO LIVE A BRITTLE BUT VERY SUPERFICIAL FORM OF LA DOLCE VITA, TRIPOLI CONTINUES TO LIVE AT ITS OWN PACE, WITH ITS TRADITIONS AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT LARGELY INTACT. THE STREETS ARE ANIMATED, THE SHOPS FULL, AND THE PEOPLE GENERALLY HAPPY. THE FIGHTING THAT OCCASIONALLY OCCURS HAS BEEN LARGELY CONFINED, AT LEAST SO FAR, TO THE NORTHERN SUBURBS OF THE CITY, AND HAS GENERALLY BEEN LIMITED TO INTERNECINE FIGHTING AMONG VARIOUS TRIPES OF LEFTISTS. THE SYRIANS, FOR THEIR PART, STAY OUT OF THE CENTER OF THE CITY.

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12. RASHID KARAMI, FOR ALL OF HIS SYRIAN-SINSPIRED PESSIMISM, IS PLAYING A VERY USEFUL ROLE AS MEDIATOR OF THE CITY. HE TOLD ME THAT HE SAW HIMSELF AS A PEACEMAKER. BEYOND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO EXPOSE HIMSELF TO THE VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROAD TO BEIRUT, HE FELT HIS ROLE IN THE CITY WAS SUCH THAT HE COULD NOT ABSENT HIMSELF DURING RECENT MONTHS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL MANEUVERS IN BEIRUT.

13. SETTING ASIDE KARAMI'S CRITICISM OF THE LAST 35 YEARS AND HIS PREDICTABLE VIEWS ON THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO, HIS DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WAS IN ONE SENSE POSITIVE. HE KNEW HE WAS ADDRESSING THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A GOVERNMENT WITH SOME INFLUENCE ON GEMAYEL, AND HIS CRITICISM OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WAS COUCNED IN VERY RELAXED TERMS, AS IF TO WARN US GENTLY OF MATTERS WE SHOULD TAKE UP WITH GEMAYEL BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

14. THE MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS WITH WHOM I SPOKE WERE LIKEWISE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR INTERLOCUTOR, BUT THEIR STATEMENTS WERE REMARKABLY POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MARONITE-SUNNI COOPERATION. THEY CLEARLY FELT THEMSELVES THREATENED BY THE RISE OF LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN TRIPOLI, AND THEY PROBABLY SAW THEIR SALVATION IN A STRONG--ALBEIT CHRISTIAN-

DOMINATED--CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, ALLIED WITH THE WEST. THIS REPRESENTS A REAL SHIFT IN SUNNI THINKING.

15. IN SUM, MY VISIT TO TRIPOLI WAS QUITE ILLUMINATING AND WELL WORTH THE DRIVE. FOR THE RECORD, THE CHECKPOINTS THAT NOW EXIST ON THE ROAD BETWEEN AMSHIT AND TRIPOLI ARE: PHALANGE (INCLUDING CUSTOMS CONTROL), LEBANESE ARMY, FRANJIYYA'S "MARADA FORCES". AND THE SYRIAN "DETERRENT FORCES" NONE BUT THE PHALANGE MAKES ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO CHECK EVERY

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AMCONSUL QUEBEC
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AMCONSUL CALGARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 07761

USIA

AGENCY FOR P/M (INFO P/R); P/GF; P/FW; P/FN; VOA/BXN;
P/PFE; EU
STATE FOR EUR/CAN; EUR/PA
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN '88.

1. THERE WAS ONE ITEM ON ISRAEL IN CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS SEPT. 22, AND THREE ON THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN. EXCERPTS FOLLOW.

2. TORONTO SUN COLUMNIST ERIC MARGOLIS WROTE A PIECE ENTITLED: "ISRAEL'S EYE IN THE SKY." "THE ARAB NATIONS
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OF THE MIDEAST WILL NOW HAVE TO GET USED TO THE

UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING THAT SOMEONE IS LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS. THE SOMEONE IS, OF COURSE, ISRAEL WHICH JUST LAUNCHED ITS FIRST SATELLITE ON MONDAY....

3. "WHAT PRECISELY WAS LAUNCHED INTO LOW ORBIT REMAINS SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. THE BEST GUESS IS THAT IT WAS EITHER A TEST PACKAGE DESIGNED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A FORTHCOMING LAUNCH OF A SPY SATELLITE OR AN ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING SYSTEM TO MONITOR ARAB COMMUNICATIONS....
4. "ISRAEL HAS LONG PUT INTENSE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI-CONTROLLED CHANNEL ON U.S. SPY SATELLITES. THE U.S. MILITARY RESISTED THIS BUT WAS FORCED BY CONGRESS TO GRUDGINGLY SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH EDITED SATELLITE IMAGERY AND ELECTRONIC DATA AMERICA'S ARAB ALLIES WERE OUTRAGED THAT SUCH DATA WERE PASSED ON TO THEIR ENEMY.

5. "THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCH IMAGERY WAS SEEN IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR... SATELLITE PHOTOS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. ALLOWED IRAQ TO SEE WHERE IRANIAN ATTACKS WOULD BE MOUNTED AND TO PREPARE COUNTERMEASURES. EVERYTHING IRAN DID WAS OBSERVED BY U.S. SATELL
TES AND QUICKLY RELAYED
TO BAGHDAD. DEPRIVED OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, IRAN LOST ITS ONLY CHANCE TO WIN THE WAR.

6. "AN ISRAELI SATELLITE WILL PERFORM A SIMILAR USEFUL ROLE. IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO SECRETLY MASS TROOPS FOR A SURPR
SE ATTACK ON
ISRAEL....MONDAY'S LAUNCH ALSO DELIVERED ANOTHER MESSAGE TO THE ARAB STATES. THE MISSILE THAT LOFTED THE

SATELLITE WAS LIKELY AN ISRAELI-BUILT JERICHO II....LAST AUGUST, THE SOVIET UNION PROTESTED TO ISRAEL AFTER THE JERICHO WAS TEST-FIRED INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE MISSILE'S RANGE PUTS THE SOUTHERN USSR UNDER RISK OF ISRAELI NUCLEAR STRIKES....

7. "HOW ISRAEL, WITH A CHRONICALLY AILING ECONOMY, AND UNDER A TIGHT AUSTERITY PROGRAM, MANAGED TO FIND THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS NEEDED TO BUILD A SPY SATELLITE SYSTEM REMAINS A MOST INTRIGUING MYSTERY. ONE MUST

WONDER IF THIS HUGELY EXPENSIVE PROJECT WAS NOT FUNDED BY THE U.S. THROUGH TOP-SECRET 'BLACK PROGRAMS.'... ISRAEL HAS CONFIRMED IT IS A MINI-SUPERPOWER, AND PERHAPS THE WORLD'S FOURTH OR FIFTH-RANKING MILITARY POWER....

8. "ISRAEL IS A WHOLE MILITARY GENERATION AHEAD OF THE ARABS AND WILL LIKELY REMAIN SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE GREATEST DANGER IS NO LONGER ARAB ARMORED DIVISIONS BUT THE SEETHING REVOLT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE MORAL ROT IT IS CAUSING INSIDE ISRAEL. THE TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN TURNED BY ISRAEL INTO A MAMMOTH PENAL COLONY FOR PALESTINIANS...."

9. THE TORONTO STAR'S WASHINGTON COLUMNIST BOB HEPBURN WROTE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER THE HEADLINE, "TO BUSH, MEDICARE FIRST STEP TO COMMUNISM." "GEORGE BUSH, THE AMERICAN SUPER-PATRIOT LAST SEEN WRAPPING HIMSELF IN THE STARS AND STRIPES AT A NEW JERSEY FLAG FACTORY, IS RAISING CANADA-BASHING TO NEW HEIGHTS OF LUNACY.

10. "IT STARTED LAST MONTH WITH HIS STRIDENT DEFENCE OF

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 CIP-0:
PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /023 W
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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AMCONSUL MONTREAL
AMCONSUL TORONTO
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 OTTAWA 07761

USIA

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E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN

DAN QUAYLE, HIS RICH RUNNING MATE WHO SERVED HIS COUNTRY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR BY WRITING PRESS RELEASES FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.... BUSH HAILED QUAYLE AS A TRUE AMERICAN, INSINUATING THAT AMERICANS WHO MOVED TO CANADA WERE A BUNCH OF SNIVELLING TRAITORS. TODAY, MANY OF THOSE AMERICANS ARE HARDWORKING CANADIAN CITIZENS.

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11. "NOW BUSH AND HIS SLEAZEBALL HANDLERS ARE INDIRECTLY LASHING OUT AT CANADA'S UNIVERSAL HEALTH

INSURANCE SCHEME, SUGGESTING IT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF A COMMUNIST PLOT TO RUIN THE ECONOMY....THE BUSH GOAL IS TO SCARE THE LIVING DAYLIGHTS OUT OF AMERICANS. WHY? BECAUSE BUSH FEARS MANY AMERICANS MIGHT VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE MICHAEL DUKAKIS BECAUSE OF HIS PROMISE TO PUSH FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE....

12. "DUKAKIS PROPOSED TUESDAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRE EMPLOYERS TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THEIR WORKERS....HIS PLAN IS BASED ON A SIMILAR SCHEME APPROVED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN HIS HOME STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. THE ROOTS OF THAT PLAN EMERGED FROM DUKAKIS' CLOSE INVESTIGATION OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM....

13. "BUSH HATES THE CANADIAN SYSTEM. HE HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED MANDATED INSURANCE BENEFITS.... AMERICAN HEALTH CARE FOR THE WORKING POOR IS A NATIONAL DISGRACE. BESIDES SOUTH AFRICA IT IS THE ONLY MAJOR COUNTRY THAT FAILS TO PROVIDE BASIC HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS....

14. "DUKAKIS SEEMS EAGER TO EMBRACE FOREIGN SOLUTIONS -- MANY OF THEM CANADIAN -- TO DEEP-SEATED PROBLEMS. HE FAVORS CANADA'S APPROACH ON ACID RAIN, NOTICE OF PLANT CLOSINGS, AND NOW ON MEDICAL INSURANCE. HOWEVER, BUSH IS TYING HIMSELF EVER CLOSER TO AMERICAN IMAGES: THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE, THE FLAG, THE RIGHT FOR EMPLOYERS TO LET THEIR LOW-PAID WORKERS FEND FOR THEMSELVES ON HEALTH CARE, THE THINLY VEILED FOREIGN BASHING...."

15. THE NEXT CAMPAIGN ITEM APPEARED IN THE OTTAWA

CITIZEN AND WAS WRITTEN BY SOUTHAM NEWS' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT PETER CALAMAI UNDER THE HEADLINE, "DIRTY TRICKS SURFACE IN U.S. ELECTION, AS IN PAST." "FOR U.S. POLITICS, IT WAS A TYPICAL WEEK IN THE DIRTY TRICKS DEPARTMENT. THE DEMOCRATS STARTED A RUMOR THAT A TOP CAMPAIGN AIDE TO GEORGE BUSH WAS ONCE ARRESTED IN NEW YORK'S CENTRAL PARK ON A FIREARMS CHARGE. THE REPUBLICANS TRIED TO REVIVE A STORY THAT MICHAEL DUKAKIS IS HOMOSEXUAL....

16. "VETERAN CAMPAIGN-WATCHERS CITE THREE DEVELOPMENTS

WHICH ARE PUSHING THE POLITICKING TOWARDS THE NASTIER END OF THE SPECTRUM: THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPELLING NATIONAL ISSUES, THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF DIRECT MAIL AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND THE CONTINUED RISE OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL CONSULTANTS...."

17. "JESSE IS DUKE'S ALBATROSS" WAS THE TITLE OF A TORONTO SUN PIECE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON COLUMNIST ALLAN FOTHERINGHAM. "THERE IS ONE PARTICULAR IMAGE THAT REMAINS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN STEAMY ATLANTA IN JULY. IT IS THE SIGHT OF JESSE JACKSON ON STAGE, AND ALL THE JACKSON CHILDREN ON STAGE... - ALL OF IT TAKING UP AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME IN A CONVENTION THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO MICHAEL DUKAKIS....

18. "JACKSON, WITH HIS ENORMOUS EGO, EXTRACTED SO MUCH FROM DUKAKIS IN RETURN FOR BEING A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE TEAM THAT IT LEFT THE QUESTION OF WHO ACTUALLY IS IN CHARGE OF THE PARTY. IT ESPECIALLY LEFT THE QUESTION WITH THE VOTERS DUKAKIS NEEDS MOST IN NOVEMBER: THE

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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AMCONSUL TORONTO
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AMCONSUL VANCOUVER

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E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN

SO-CALLED 'REAGAN DEMOCRATS.' RONALD REAGAN RAN AWAY
WITH THE 1980 ELECT
ON AND SCORED A LANDSLIDE IN 1984 BY
STEALING AWAY THE WHITE, BLUE-COLLAR VOTE IN THE
SOUTH....

19. "POOR DUKAKIS, WITH ALL HIS OTHER PROBLEMS, CAN'T

REALLY WIN WITH GUY WHO HOGGED ALL THAT TIME IN
ATLANTA. HE KNOWS THAT THOSE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS DON'T

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FANCY JACKSON IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND HE DOESN'T WANT TO REINFORCE THOSE VIEWS BY EMBRACING JESSE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MUST FIND SOMETHING USEFUL FOR JACKSON TO DO --- OR RISK THE TICKING GRENADE CALLED JESSE BLOWING UP A MAJOR DISPUTE, TO THE DELIGHT OF THE BUSHITES...."

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*** Current Classification *** [redacted]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

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DATE= 10 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE S/FPC/CDR Date: FEB 12 1997
( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY
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MR Cases Only:
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SUBJECT= POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT IN GAZA

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TAGS= KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS, PLO

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2088
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[redacted]SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT IN GAZA

1.[redacted]

2. SUMMARY. GAZA CONTACTS, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT TRENDS IN GAZA AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE PNC MEETINGS:

-- THE ANTICIPATED PNC DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 181 WILL BE A POSITIVE FORWARD STEP BUT WILL NOT, ALONE, ACHIEVE VERY MUCH.

-- THE UPRISING IS ROOTED DEEP IN GAZA SOCIETY AND WILL CONTINUE, BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO ADVANCE A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

-- THE ISRAELI ELECTION SET BACK CHANCES FOR A

[redacted]

SOLUTION - IT PERPETUATED THE STALEMATE IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND STRENGTHENED RELIGIOUS FORCES HOSTILE TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

-- JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PRESSURE IS ESSENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION.

-- THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY IF, AS EXPECTED, THE PNC SANCTIONS A TWO-STATE SOLUTION (THOUGH IT MAY HOLD ON TO THE IDEA OF A UNIFIED, ISLAMIC PALESTINE AS AN ULTIMATE GOAL).
-- A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM MUST DEAL WITH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF PALESTINIAN SECURITY. A PALESTINE BUSY CREATING ITSELF WON'T BE INTERESTED IN AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL.

-- IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE WHAT GAZA LEADERSHIP WILL EMERGE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION. INTIFADA LEADERS ESSENTIALLY DO THE PLO'S BIDDING AND WOULD DO SO IF PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION BROUGHT AN END TO THE INTIFADA. MODERATES SYMPATHETIC TO THE PLO ARE THE MOST LIKELY CORE OF POST-INTIFADA GAZA LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY

3. IN NOV 8 VISIT TO GAZA, POLOFF SPOKE TO LONG-TIME EMBASSY CONTACTS, LAWYER/POLITICAL ACTIVIST [redacted] LAWYER/WRITER/PUBLISHER [redacted] AND MEDICAL DOCTOR/HEAD OF GAZA RED [redacted]

CRESCENT SOCIETY [redacted] AND [redacted] WERE WILLING TO TALK AT LENGTH AND EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS. [redacted] WHO HAS LONG FOLLOWED A PRO-PFLP LINE, STRONGLY CONDEMNED UNSTINTING U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND SAID THE U.S. COULD INFLUENCE ISRAEL BY THREATENING TO CUT AID. HE FLATLY REJECTED AUTONOMY FOR THE TERRITORIES. HE WORRIED ABOUT PRESSURE FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA. HOWEVER, HE LIMITED HIMSELF TO THESE FEW POINTS, SAYING THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES WITH A U.S. EMBASSY REP.

PNC MEETINGS
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4. BOTH [redacted] AND [redacted] WERE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PLANNED NOV 12-15 PNC MEETINGS IN ALGIERS, THOUGH NEITHER PREDICTED ANY DRAMATIC

BREAKTHROUGHS. [redacted] SAID A PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE BASED ON UNGA 181. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAEL WAS BOUND TO OPPOSE THE TERRITORIAL LOSS 181 IMPLIED, BUT IT SHOULD LOOK BEYOND THAT TO THE RECOGNITION OF TWO STATES -- ISRAEL AND PALESTINE -- IMPLIED BY ACCEPTANCE OF 181. FURTHERMORE, 181'S TERRITORIAL "LINES" WERE ONLY A STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. [redacted] WAS A BIT MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE PNC WHICH, HE THOUGHT, WOULD SAY THE "RIGHT THINGS" BUT HAVE LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT IN MOVING ISRAEL OFF THE MARK.

POST-ELECTION ISRAEL
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5. BOTH [redacted] WERE DEEPLY

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[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT

DISAPPOINTED IN THE ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS. THEY AND MOST GAZANS HAD HOPED FOR A LABOR WIN. LABOR HAD DONE NOTHING FOR THE PALESTINIANS, BUT ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS BETTER THAN LIKUD'S. [redacted] WAS CONVINCED THAT THE JERICHO BUS FIREBOMBING HAD COST LABOR SEATS, AND MENTIONED THAT SOME GAZANS EVEN BELIEVED THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN HATCHED FOR THAT VERY PURPOSE. (HE DID NOT SAY WHOM THE CONSPIRACY THEORISTS CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE.) [redacted] WAS APPALLED THAT PALESTINIANS' FUTURE APPEARED TO BE IN THE HANDS OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED RELIGIOUS FANATICS. HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES MIGHT DIFFER ON ANNEXATION OF THE TERRITORIES -- IN HIS VIEW, THEY WERE ALL COMMITTED TO A "GREATER ISRAEL." ALTHOUGH [redacted] FELT LABOR AND LIKUD MIGHT TRY TO ESCAPE FROM THE "BLACKMAIL"

[redacted]

[redacted]

OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES THROUGH A TEMPORARY NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTORAL REFORM, THIS PROSPECT MEANT NO MOVEMENT TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

6. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS HELD THAT THE INTIFADA WOULD CONTINUE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE PNC AND/OR ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FORMATION PRODUCED. IT NOW HAS A LIFE OF ITS OWN. PALESTINIANS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO THE PAIN AND DEPRIVATION IT BRINGS. PEOPLE ENDURE, NOT BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF BREAKING RANKS, BUT BECAUSE SUFFERING IS SO WIDELY SHARED THEY WOULD BE ASHAMED NOT TO BEAR THEIR SHARE OF THE BURDEN. WHEN SO MUCH IS ALREADY LOST, THE THREAT OF MORE LOSS HAS LITTLE POWER TO FRIGHTEN.

7. ALTHOUGH THE INTIFADA WOULD ENDURE, [redacted] FELT THAT NEITHER IT NOR PNC ACTION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MOVE ISRAEL TOWARD NEGOTIATION WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. THE INTIFADA INCONVENIENCED, BUT DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGE ISRAEL. PALESTINIANS WERE SUFFERING FAR MORE THAN WAS ISRAEL. BUT [redacted] WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT APPARENT U.S.-SOVIET COMMON INTERESTS IN RESOLVING REGIONAL DISPUTES (HE CITED ANGOLA, AFGHANISTAN, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR) WOULD BRING

CONCERTED PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND THE OTHER MAJOR ACTORS.

LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA: HAMAS AND THE PLO
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8. AS HE HAS IN THE PAST [redacted] MINIMIZED THE STRENGTH AND IMPORTANCE OF HAMAS. [redacted] WAS LESS [redacted]

[redacted]

CATEGORICAL. HOWEVER, BOTH HELD STRONGLY THAT HAMAS WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, EVEN THOUGH ITS COVENANT FLATLY REJECTS SUCH A SOLUTION. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT HAMAS IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO STAND AGAINST (WHAT HE PREDICTS WILL BE) MAINSTREAM PLO POLICY [redacted] OOK THE LINE THAT HAMAS IS ESSENTIALLY PACIFISTIC AND PRAGMATIC. IT WOULD NOT USE VIOLENCE TO UNDERMINE PLO POLICY AND, INSTEAD, WOULD BE INCLINED TO GO ALONG WITH A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, WITH THE JUSTIFICATION THAT IT IS SIMPLY A STEP TOWARD THE ULTIMATE GOAL -- A UNIFIED, ISLAMIC PALESTINE. ALTHOUGH THEY BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SHAIKH AHMAD YASIN IS THE PRE-EMINENT GAZA HAMAS FIGURE, THEY MINIMIZED HIS INFLUENCE [redacted] RECALLED WIDESPREAD GAZA EXPECTATIONS THAT YASIN'S INTERVIEW ON ISRAELI TELEVISION IN SEPTEMBER WOULD BE A BOMBSHELL. INSTEAD, IT WAS A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT.)

PIECES OF A SOLUTION
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9 [redacted] ACCEPTED TRANSITIONAL STEPS TO THE FINAL GOAL BUT FOCUSED ON DIFFERENT ASPECTS. [redacted] DID NOT SEE INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS SHOULD ISRAEL UNILATERALLY GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO GAZA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WEST BANKERS MIGHT VIEW GAZAN ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH A DEED AS BETRAYAL OF THE WIDER CAUSE, BUT (WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL) IMPLIED THAT IT COULD BE TURNED INTO A FIRST STEP TOWARD OVERALL PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE. IN SUCH A CASE, HE SAID, GAZA WOULD HAVE TO HAVE U.N. SUPERVISION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, EGYPTIAN "POLICE" ASSISTANCE. HE THOUGHT

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[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT

MUBARAK MIGHT WELCOME A LIMITED, TRANSITIONAL ROLE THAT WOULD ENHANCE HIS ALREADY CENTRAL ROLE AS A BROKER AMONG THE TERRITORIES, KING HUSSEIN, AND ARAFAT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, GAZA'S ONLY FUTURE LAY WITH THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN.

10. [redacted] OOK IT AS GIVEN THAT THE IMMEDIATE GOAL WAS GAZA/WEST BANK INDEPENDENCE. ONCE THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED, PALESTINE MIGHT THEN CONSIDER THE OPTION OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER THE SECURITY THREAT FROM AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE HAD TO BE MET. THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT WAS A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINE WHICH WAS, ITSELF, PROTECTED FROM ISRAEL BY GUARANTEES, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION, BUILT INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT OBJECT TO THE EMPLACEMENT OF

[redacted]

[redacted]

ISRAELI EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS ON PALESTINIAN SOIL TO SATISFY ISRAEL THAT PALESTINIAN TERRITORY OR AIR SPACE WOULD NOT BE USED (WHETHER PASSIVELY OR ACTIVELY) BY ANY OTHER POWER TO FACILITATE ATTACK. [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE EXAMPLE OF THE PEACE WITH EGYPT SHOULD SHOW ISRAEL THAT MUTUAL GUARANTEES ARE POSSIBLE (AND HE CONTENDED THAT CONTINUING NON-RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE COULD EVEN UNRAVEL THE PEACE WITH EGYPT). FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE WOULD BE TOO CONSUMED WITH ITS OWN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT TO GIVE ANY THOUGHT TO AGGRESSION.

11. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL WAS EXPERIENCING A DANGEROUS RADICALIZING PROCESS THAT WOULD, FINALLY, BE A GREATER SECURITY THREAT THAN ANY OUTSIDE FOE. HE CITED THE RESURGENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AS EVIDENCE.

12. [redacted] CONTENDED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT FEAR FLOODS OF PALESTINIANS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMELAND. LIKE THE JEWS, MANY WOULD CHOOSE TO STAY WHERE THEY ARE.

13. FINALLY, BOTH [redacted] CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP IN A POST-INTIFADA GAZA. [redacted] WAS CAUTIOUS. HE SAID THAT, WITH THE "STONE GENERALS" OF THE INTIFADA CROWDING THE STAGE, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE ROOM FOR ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP. [redacted] ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTENDED THAT, ALTHOUGH POTENTIAL LEADERS MIGHT EXIST AMONG THE YOUNG INTIFADA "LEADERS" (DIFFICULT TO KNOW BECAUSE THEY ARE SO SECRETIVE), THEY WERE

[redacted]

REALLY MORE FOOT-SOLDIERS THAN LEADERS, AND WERE SUBJECT TO PLO DISCIPLINE. ALTHOUGH, LIKE [redacted] HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR TO THE LATE RASHAD SHAWWA (WHO WAS HIMSELF ECLIPSED BY THE INTIFADA), HE CONTENDED THAT HE, TOGETHER WITH [redacted], [redacted] BANKER AND BUSINESSMAN) WERE THE ONES WHO COULD MOST READILY CONSOLIDATE

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THE GAINS A PLO-LED INTIFADA HAD MADE.

14. COMMENT: THIS IS A LIMITED VIEW OF CURRENT GAZA "ESTABLISHMENT" OPINION. THOUGH THE SOURCES ARE AMONG GAZA'S BEST-INFORMED AND -CONNECTED, THEIR SECULAR OUTLOOK MAY MAKE THEM UNDERESTIMATE THE CAPACITY OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE TO HINDER A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND THEIR MARGINALITY TO THE INTIFADA MAY MAKE THEM BLIND TO THE STRENGTH OF LEADERSHIP THAT COULD EMERGE FROM THE STREETS. ALTHOUGH PNC "SUCCESS" MIGHT GIVE GREATER WEIGHT TO THEIR VIEWS AND STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE LEADERSHIP VACUUM IN GAZA OR UNDERESTIMATE THE TENSIONS LYING BENEATH INTIFADA UNITY, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTERS IN THE POLITICAL BACKWATER OF GAZA.

15. BY MOST PALESTINIAN STANDARDS, [redacted] AND [redacted] OPINIONS FALL INTO THE "MODERATE" CATEGORY. BY MOST ISRAELI STANDARDS, THEY ARE JUST ANOTHER DRESSING FOR SALAMI TACTICS TO GAIN BACK ALL OF "PALESTINE." A STARTING POINT OF INDEPENDENCE REMAINS BEYOND THE PALE FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS. MOST STRIKING IS THE SENSE THAT THESE PALESTINIANS, ALREADY DISAPPOINTED IN

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[redacted] SECTION 04 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT

ISRAELI ELECTIONS, ARE PREPARED TO BE DISAPPOINTED IN THE PNC, AND SEE THE UPRISING CONTINUING, BUT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE UPRISING IS UNLIKELY TO FORCE ISRAEL TO MOVE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. PICKERING

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TAGS= PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

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(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION)
AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH
CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE

EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- MUBARAK STATES THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS UPHELD ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO EGYPT AND EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WILL COMPLY WITH THE TABA ARBITRATION JUDGMENT.

-- ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR HANI AL-HASSAN SAYS PALESTINIAN PLANNING WILL CAUSE A "PRACTICAL COLLAPSE" OF ZIONIST IDEOLOGY.

-- JIMMY CARTER MEETS HANI AL-HASSAN IN CAIRO.

-- USAID TO PROVIDE CAIRO AIRPORT WITH SECURITY EQUIPMENT.

-- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPT AND SOME GULF COUNTRIES MIGHT GRANT THE US MILITARY FACILITIES IN RETURN FOR AID AND ARMS.

-- AL-WAFD REPORTS MUBARAK INSTRUCTED PRIME MINISTER SEDKY NOT TO RAISE PRICES OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES.- UNCLASSIFIED

ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

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1. STATEMENTS BY MUBARAK. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 HIGHLIGHT MUBARAK'S STATEMENTS TO REPORTERS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE NDP YOUTH MOVEMENT. ALL PAPERS QUOTE MUBARAK AS SAYING "I DON'T THINK THAT ISRAEL WOULD STALL ABOUT COMPLYING WITH THE TABA VERDICT IF IT IS IN FAVOR OF EGYPT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT ISRAEL WILL OBSERVE ITS OBLIGATIONS; IT HAS NEVER BREACHED ITS TREATIES." MUBARAK STRESSED THAT PEACE IS THE GUARANTEE OF STABILITY IN THE REGION, ADDING THAT IF THE ISRAELI PEOPLE WANT TO RAISE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING THEY SHOULD ABANDON WARS, DIVISION, AND TERRORISM. ANSWERING A QUESTION ABOUT

SHARON'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE ANNEXATION OF PARTS OF THE WEST BANK, MUBARAK SAID, "SHARON HAS ALWAYS BEEN LIKE THIS; LET HIM THINK THE WAY HE WANTS. THERE ARE ALSO SOME WHO CALL FOR A COUNTRY (GREATER ISRAEL) FROM THE NILE TO THE EUPHRATES. I BELIEVE THERE ARE PEACE-LOVING FORCES IN ISRAEL; PEACE FOR ISRAEL IS BETTER THAN WAR, AND I SUPPORT ALL THE FORCES IN ISRAEL THAT ADVOCATE PEACE." MUBARAK AFFIRMED THAT THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV HAD EXTENDED ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS UNDER THE OCCUPATION, FOR EXAMPLE BY BUILDING HOSPITALS. MUBARAK CALLED UPON THE PLO TO ISSUE A BALANCED POLITICAL STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. MUBARAK EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT A STATEMENT BY AN ARAB OFFICIAL IN WHICH THE LATTER REJECTED ISRAEL AND THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND CALLED FOR AN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. ON EGYPT'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUBARAK EMPHASIZED THAT EGYPT

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SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

DOES NOT HAVE SECRET AGREEMENTS OR TREATIES WITH ANY
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FOREIGN COUNTRY, ADDING THAT EGYPT REJECTS THAT ITS TERRITORIES BE USED FOR AGGRESSION ON ANOTHER COUNTRY. "WE HAVE BALANCED RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE SPECIAL WITHOUT THE IMPOSITION OF ANY DEMANDS ON OUR SOVEREIGNTY OR WILL. WE ALSO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USSR."

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2. STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT. AHRAM AUGUST 20 QUOTES ARAFAT AS SAYING THAT EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ARAB FOLD HAS PUT AN END TO SYRIA'S CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. ARAFAT ADDED THAT THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE IDEA OF FORMING A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE WAS AIMED AT COVERING UP THE SUSPICIOUS DEALS CONCLUDED BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE US IN LEBANON AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARAB NATION. ARAFAT FURTHER ATTACKED SYRIA'S CAMP MASSACRES AND ITS STAND ON THE GULF WAR. ARAFAT ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BY SAYING THAT ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH US INTERESTS.

3. INTERVIEW WITH ARAFAT'S ADVISOR. IN AN INTERVIEW TO

AHRAM AUGUST 19, ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR HANI AL-HASSAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ANNEX THE WEST BANK AND GAZA NOT ONLY BECAUSE THERE ARE RACISTS IN ISRAEL WHO WANT THIS AREA TO BE PURELY JEWISH BUT ALSO BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE EGYPT THE RIGHT TO RENOUNCE SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY. THE US WANTS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED AT THE CURRENT STAGE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY ANNEXATION OR BY IMPOSITION OF A POLITICAL FORMULA ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. AL-HASSAN ADDED THAT CAREFULNESS AND PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS WOULD ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER ISRAEL AND WOULD CAUSE A "PRACTICAL COLLAPSE" OF ZIONIST IDEOLOGY.
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PAPERS AUGUST 21 REPORT THAT FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER MET WITH HANI AL-HASSAN DURING HIS TWO-DAY VISIT TO CAIRO. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO SAID KAMAL.

PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT THAT MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ABU MAZIN STATED THAT EGYPT HAD REJECTED A SEPARATE SOLUTION TO THE GAZA ISSUE BECAUSE SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. ABU MAZIN ADDED THAT MUBARAK TOLD HIM THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A MEETING BETWEEN MURPHY AND PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES AND THAT AMBASSADOR WISNER HAD INFORMED MUBARAK THAT MURPHY WOULD MEET WITH A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION BUT MURPHY RETRACTED HIS DECISION. IN THE SAME ITEM, GUMHOURIYYA QUOTES FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID AS STATING THAT EGYPT REJECTS ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS A PALESTINIAN TERRITORY BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE IMPOSITION OF SOLUTIONS BY FORCE WOULD NOT LEAD TO RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

4. EGYPT/JORDAN. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN WILL VISIT EGYPT IN SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH MUBARAK.

5. EGYPT/MOROCCO. GUMHOURIYYA AUGUST 21 REPORTS KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WILL VISIT EGYPT IN NOVEMBER AS A RETURN VISIT FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT TO MOROCCO EARLY THIS YEAR.

6. EGYPT/ISRAEL. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORTS STATE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI ANNOUNCED EGYPT'S CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUED POLICY OF REPRESSION, EXPULSION, AND DETENTION AGAINST THE

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. GHALI DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI PRACTICES
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AS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND AN OBSTACLE TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. EGYPT/US. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT MFA FIRST UNDERSECRETARY OSAMA AL-BAZ RECEIVED SECRETARY SHULTZ AT CAIRO AIRPORT. IN A VERBAL MESSAGE DELIVERED BY SHULTZ TO MUBARAK, PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED THE US COMMITMENT TO GIVING IMPETUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND BOOSTING EGYPT'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.

ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH AID TO PROVIDE CAIRO AIRPORT WITH SECURITY EQUIPMENT THROUGH A GRANT OF DOLLARS 5.2 MILLION. PAPERS NOTE THAT AMBASSADOR WISNER AND AID DIRECTOR BROWN DISCUSSED WITH TOURISM MINISTER FOUAD SULTAN THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING EQUIPMENT FOR A HOSPITAL IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH FOR DIVERS. SEPARATELY, AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS THE PRESIDENT OF AL-AZHAR UNIVERSITY LEFT FOR THE US FOR TEN-DAY VISIT. AHRAM AUGUST 20 REPORTS USAID AGREED TO EARMARK DOLLARS 20 MILLION AS A GRANT TO DEVELOP AND MODERNIZE IRRIGATION IN 15,000 FEDDANS IN ASWAN. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS THAT THE US AND JAPAN WILL PROVIDE LE 44 MILLION TO RENEW WATER NETWORKS IN 11 GOVERNORATES. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT USAID WILL EXTEND A GRANT OF DOLLARS 50 MILLION TO FINANCE ELECTRICITY NETWORKS IN ALEXANDRIA.

AKHBAR EL-YOM'S EDITOR IN CHIEF IBRAHIM SA'DA WRITES FROM PARIS AUGUST 20 ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CONCERN OVER THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SA'DA NOTES THAT EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTS DUKAKIS OVER BUSH BECAUSE OF A SENSE THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT PAID SUFFICIENT
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ATTENTION TO EUROPEAN CONCERNS. THE ARTICLE FURTHER NOTES THAT THROUGHOUT THE PAST WEEKS, THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN QUIET AND BORING AND DUKAKIS HAS TAKEN A SOLID LEAD. HOWEVER, WHEN BUSH ANNOUNCED HIS CHOICE OF DAN QUAYLE AS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, INTEREST IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN GREW BECAUSE QUAYLE GIVES THE BUSH CAMPAIGN SOME OF THE SAME STRENGTHS AS DUKAKIS, I.E. YOUTH AND IMPULSIVENESS.

8. EGYPT/USSR. AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS FM ABDEL MEGUID CONFERRED WITH THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN CAIRO ON BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

GUMHOURIYYA'S EDITORIALIST HASSAN SHUKRY AUGUST 19 WRITES THAT THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE REGION COULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A GREATER ROLE BY THE SOVIETS. THE EDITORIALIST EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES EXPECT THE USSR TO CHANGE ITS PRESENT ROLE AND BE A PRINCIPAL PARTNER IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI "EQUATION" IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AND GUARANTEE JUSTICE AND PEACE.

9. EGYPT/BULGARIA. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT AN EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION HEADED BY DEPUTY SPEAKER AHMAD MUSA WILL VISIT SOFIA SEPTEMBER 10 FOR ONE WEEK.

10. EGYPT/POLAND. AHRAM AUGUST 20 REPORTS EGYPT AND POLAND SIGNED A PROTOCOL FOR ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, AND TRADE COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE, ELECTRICITY, HOUSING, CONSTRUCTION, RAILWAY, AND MARITIME

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INCREASING "UNCONVENTIONAL" EXPORTS TO POLAND.
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11. EC ASSISTANCE. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT THE EC AGREED TO EXTEND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF 3 MILLION EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNITS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES WORKING IN THE FIELD OF INDUSTRY.
12. EGYPT/NORTH KOREA. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS

AN ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROTOCOL WILL BE SIGNED NEXT WEEK IN CAIRO DURING THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE TO START AUGUST 25 FOR FIVE DAYS. NORTH KOREA WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.

13. EGYPT/PAKISTAN. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION HEADED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID LEFT FOR ISLAMABAD TO ATTEND THE STATE FUNERAL FOR PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA.

14. EGYPT/SAUDI ARABIA. GUMHOURIYYA AUGUST 20 QUOTES A SAUDI OFFICIAL AS STATING THAT KING FAHD'S VISIT TO EGYPT IS DEFINITE AND THAT THE DATE WILL BE ANNOUNCED AFTER IT IS SET.

15. PETROLEUM PRICES. AL-AHRAM REPORTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM AUTHORITY ANNOUNCED THAT THE EXPORT PRICE OF PETROLEUM INCREASED BY DOLLARS 1.40 PER BARREL STARTING TODAY AND FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS.

DOMESTIC NEWS

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16. CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSITION. AHRAM'S EDITOR IN CHIEF IBRAHIM NAFEI AUGUST 19 CRITICIZES THE OPPOSITION PARTIES FOR THEIR OBJECTION TO THE EXTENSION OF THE EMERGENCY LAW

ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE APPLICATION OF DEMOCRACY. NAFEI REFERS TO THE RECENT JAILBREAK OF JIHAD MEMBERS AND THEIR PLANS TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND WRITES THAT EGYPT'S SECURITY AND STABILITY WOULD NOT BE MAINTAINED IF ORDINARY LAWS WERE APPLIED.

17. RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS. AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS THE MINISTER OF AWQAF AND THE MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC ANNOUNCED THEIR READINESS FOR A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH LEADERS OF AL-JIHAD ORGANIZATION ABOUT RELIGIOUS MATTERS. THEY NOTED THAT AL-JIHAD HAD ASKED THEM TO RESIGN WITHOUT ANY DIALOGUE OR DISCUSSION. THE MUFTI ASSERTED THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO A FEROCIOUS CAMPAIGN AIMED AT DESTROYING THE YOUTH.

18. ECONOMIC POLICY. WEEKEND PAPERS REPORT PRIME MINISTER SEDKY WILL HOLD A MEETING WITH THE ECONOMIC GROUP

TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE PROPOSAL TO RAISE THE INTEREST RATE ON SAVINGS BY 2-3 PER CENT. (AL-WAFD AUGUST 20 NOTES THAT THERE IS A DIVISION INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OVER THIS PROPOSAL). SEPARATELY, PAPERS REPORT THAT REMITTANCES OF EGYPTIAN EXPATRIATES ARE EXPECTED TO REACH DOLLARS 7.15 BILLION THIS YEAR. IN A SEPARATE ITEM, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO ALLOCATE 60 PER CENT OF BANK DEPOSITS FOR LOANS TO PRODUCTIVE PROJECTS BY THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. IN ANOTHER SEPARATE ITEM, AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS THAT A NEW SYSTEM WILL BE APPLIED ALLOWING WORKERS AT PRIVATE SECTOR AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES TO OWN SHARES IN THE COMPANIES' CAPITAL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS EARMARKED LE 100 MILLION AS LOANS TO THE COMPANIES WISHING TO APPLY THIS SYSTEM.

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REPORTEDLY, EIGHT COMPANIES HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED

REQUESTS TO OBTAIN LOANS.

19. AGRICULTURAL POLICY. PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT AGRICULTURE MINISTER WALLY ISSUED A DECREE ALLOWING FARMERS TO DELIVER CORN OPTIONALLY AND RAISING THE PRICE OF CORN DELIVERY TO LE 45 PER BUSHEL. AS FOR WHEAT, PRODUCTION THIS YEAR IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE TO 30.3 MILLION TONS, WHICH IS 700,000 TONS MORE THAN LAST YEAR. AN ADDITIONAL 100,000 FEDDANS WILL BE PLANTED WITH WHEAT NEXT YEAR IN ORDER TO STEP UP PRODUCTIVITY TO 30.5 MILLION TONS.

20. MUBARAK/NDP YOUTH. IN HIS MEETING WITH THE NDP YOUTH, MUBARAK ANNOUNCED THAT 35,000 FEDDANS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE YOUTH IN OCTOBER FOR CULTIVATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SMALL PROJECTS. MUBARAK AFFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING "UNCONVENTIONAL" SOLUTIONS TO THE ISSUES OF PRICE INCREASES AND HOUSING. MUBARAK SPOKE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY THE GOVERNMENT IS FACING IN APPOINTING GRADUATES AND CALLED UPON THE YOUTH NOT TO WAIT FOR A GOVERNMENT JOB BECAUSE IT PAYS VERY LITTLE. MUBARAK EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' CALL FOR FORMING A COALITION GOVERNMENT, ADDING THAT "THEY FORGET

ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY THE COUNTRY IS ENJOYING." ALL PAPERS AUGUST 21 HIGHLIGHT THAT MUBARAK WILL DISTRIBUTE 90,000 LAND TITLE DEEDS IN SEPTEMBER TO FARMERS.

21. OBJECTION TO FORMATION OF A NEW PARTY. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 21 REPORT THE POLITICAL PARTIES COMMITTEE ISSUED A DECREE OBJECTING TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW PARTY CALLED "YOUNG EGYPT."

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22. ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES EXECUTIVE REGULATION. AL AKHBAR REPORTED THAT PRIME MINISTER ATEF SEDKY WILL HOLD A MEETING TOMORROW WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY YOUSSRI MOUSTAFA TO DISCUSS THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE LAW.

23. TV NEWS. NEWS ITEMS ON TV AUGUST 20 WERE AS FOLLOWS: ABDEL MEGUID HEADS DELEGATION TO ATTEND PAKISTANI PRESIDENT'S FUNERAL; IRAN-IRAQ CEASE-FIRE IN EFFECT; DEMONSTRATIONS IN GHAZA; PNC MEETING IN TUNIS; KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO ABU DHABI; CHOLERA CASES IN SUDAN; US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

24. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR AUGUST 21: USD 1 EQUALS PT 230.0 (BUYING) AND PT 230.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

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25. MILITARY FACILITIES TO THE US. AL-WAFD AUGUST 19 REPORTS THAT THE US IS CURRENTLY CONTACTING EGYPT AND SOME GULF COUNTRIES TO REACH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS GRANTING THE US MILITARY FACILITIES AS A MEANS OF GIVING THE US ADMINISTRATION THE ABILITY TO CONFRONT ANY CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTION TO INCREASING MILITARY AID AND PROVIDING ARAB COUNTRIES WITH CERTAIN KINDS OF ARMS. EGYPTIAN-GULF CONTACTS ARE BEING HELD TO ASSESS THE US REQUEST AND ADOPT A UNIFIED STAND TOWARDS IT.

26. INSTRUCTIONS BY MUBARAK. AL-WAFD AUGUST 20 REPORTS MUBARAK HAS RECENTLY GIVEN STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO PRIME

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SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

MINISTER SEDKY TO FREEZE THE GOVERNMENT PLAN FOR RAISING
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PRICES OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES AND ABOLISHING SUBSIDIES DUE TO THE CURRENT SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND SECURITY CIRCUMSTANCES. MUBARAK UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY OF REJECTING THE IMF DEMANDS FOR INCREASING THE PRICES OF BREAD, WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND TRANSPORT.

27. EGYPT/ISRAEL. SAWT AL-ARAB AUGUST 21 REPORTS THE MFA SUMMONED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO AND INFORMED HIM THAT AN ISRAELI DIPLOMAT AND HIS WIFE WERE ACCUSED OF SHOP-LIFTING AUGUST 16 AT A SUPERMARKET IN GIZA. THE ISRAELI SUPPOSEDLY INSULTED THE POLICE AFTER THEY ARRESTED HIM.

28. EGYPT/US. SAWT AL-ARAB NOTES THAT A US EMBASSY REPORT INDICATED THAT EGYPT IS SUFFERING A TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE US AMOUNTING TO 1.7 BILLION DOLLARS.

29. ISLAMIC GROUP WARNING. AL-WAFD AUGUST 21 REPORTS THE ISLAMIC GAMAAT IN THE AREA OF AIN SHAMS, WHERE THE RECENT POLICE-ISLAMIC GAMAAT DISTURBANCES TOOK PLACE, ADDRESSED A WARNING TO THE INTERIOR MINISTER AGAINST HIS USING REPRESSION AND THREATENED TO ESCALATE TENSIONS NATIONWIDE.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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SUBJECT= ARAB LEAGUE DEMARCHE ON U.S.-IRAQI DISPUTE - AND ISRAELI SATELLITE

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 299492

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DEMARCHE, SATELLITE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATION, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= PREL, US, XF, TS, IS, IR, AL

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SUMMARY

2. ARAB LEAGUE SYG KLIBI IS CRITICAL OF U.S. TACTICS IN CONFRONTING IRAQ OVER CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AND SUGGESTS THAT THE USG SHOULD ENLIST GULF STATES AND ARAB LEAGUE TO PURSUE SUCH ISSUES. HE IS FEARFUL THAT IRAN WILL BE PERMITTED TO RE-ARM AND SWITCH FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO ARMED CONFRONTATION AFTER A BREATHING SPELL. ISRAEL'S SATELLITE HAS ALSO TOUCHED A NERVE. ON LEBANON, THE SYG FAVORS EITHER ELECTION OF RAYMOND

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EDDE OR CONTINUATION OF THE AL HOSS GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

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3. AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY POLCOUSELOR, CALLED ON ARAB LEAGUE SYG KLIBI AT HIS REQUEST SEPT. 21 TO DISCUSS THE GULF AND OTHER REGIONAL QUESTIONS. KLIBI WAS JOINED BY HIS DIRECTOR FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AHMED EL HERGUEM.

4. THE FOCAL POINT OF THE MEETING WAS A LOW-KEY DEMARCHE ON U.S. HANDLING OF IRAQI CW. NOTING RECENT STORMY RELATIONS, KLIBI QUESTIONED THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. RAISED THE ISSUE. IF U.S. OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN POLITICAL -- I.E. TO HUMILIATE OR EMBARRASS IRAQ -- IT SUCCEEDED. HOWEVER, IF U.S. OBJECTIVE WAS HUMANITARIAN, THEN U.S. TACTICS WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OVERALL, IRAQI POLICY HAS EVOLVED IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION IN RECENT YEARS TO THE POINT THAT IRAQ NOW CONTRIBUTES TO THE MODERATE ARAB CONSENSUS RATHER THAN CHALLENGING IT. THE U.S. APPROACH RISKS RADICALIZING IRAQ AND OFFENDING AMERICA'S FRIENDS IN THE GULF. A FAR BETTER APPROACH, KLIBI SUGGESTED, WOULD HAVE BEEN TO WORK THROUGH MODERATE GULF STATES OR EVEN THE ARAB LEAGUE.

5. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT U.S. GOAL WAS INDEED HUMANITARIAN, BUT BROADLY CONCEIVED. RECENTLY, THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED SIGNIFICANT EROSION IN THE PROHIBITION OF CW. THE U.S. BELIEVES THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST RETURN TO THE POST-WWI CONSENSUS IN THIS REGARD. IN GENERAL, THE U.S. VALUES ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WHICH HAS COME OUT OF THE WAR AS A REGIONAL POWER. THE U.S. IS NOW TRYING TO

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DE-EMOTIONALIZE THE ISSUE AND RETURN IT TO THE REALM OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ' AND THE USG RESPONSE SHOULD FACILITATE THAT EFFORT.

6. RAISING A NEW ISSUE, KLIBI THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RE-ARMING OF IRAN. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP, NOTABLY RAFSANJANI, MAY APPEAR RELATIVELY MODERATE, BUT IT MAY BE DISSEMBLING. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE STRETCHED OUT FOR SIX MONTH OR SO TO ALLOW IRAN "TO CATCH ITS BREATH" THEN FIGHTING RESUMED. ALTERNATELY, RAFSANJANI MIGHT BE THRUST ASIDE BY MILITANTS. HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD MAINTAIN ITS EFFORTS TO DISSUADE OTHERS, SUCH AS CHINA, NORTH KOREA, EVEN EUROPEANS, FROM RE-ARMING IRAN.

7. AMBASSADOR AGREED. ONE SHOULD NOT PRESUME THAT THE CURRENT CEASE FIRE WILL ENDURE INDEFINITELY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT IRAQI AND IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL CONFER WITH UN SYG IN NEW YORK IN EARLY OCTOBER, THEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME SUBSEQUENTLY IN GENEVA. KLIBI VOLUNTEERED THAT THE GULF STATES WOULD BE URGING IRAQ TO TAKE FLEXIBLE POSITIONS.

8. KLIBI THEN NOTED NEWS OF ISRAEL'S LAUNCH OF A "MILITARY" SATELLITE. THE ARAB STATES, KLIBI SAID, HAD HOPED THAT AN END TO GULF FIGHTING MIGHT PERMIT ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO RE-ORIENT THEMSELVES IN PEACEFUL DIRECTIONS. WITH THE HELP OF THE GERMANS, FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICANS, ISRAEL HAD NOW SHARPLY ESCALATED TENSIONS. HE RECOMMENDED THE

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ACTION NEA-11

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INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
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[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 TUNIS 09857

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XF, TS
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE DEMARCHE ON U.S.-IRAQI DISPUTE
U.S. CAREFULLY STUDY RECENT STATEMENTS CARRIED BY THE ALGERIAN NEWS AGENCY TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THE EVOLVING ARAB POSITION.

9. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT ISRAEL FOR YEARS HAD REQUESTED UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO U.S. SATELLITES, WHICH U.S. CONSISTENTLY HAD DENIED. NO DOUBT THIS WAS ONE FACTOR IN ISRAEL'S DECISION TO GO IT ALONE. AS FOR LAUNCH AND SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY, THERE WERE NUMEROUS SOURCES, INCLUDING THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA AND CHINA. IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A QUESTION OF A COUNTRY'S TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL. KLIBI WONDERED WHAT THE U.S. AND ISRAELI REACTION WOULD BE IF AN ARAB STATE WERE TO LAUNCH A MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE.

10. KLIBI ALSO RAISED LEBANON. HE REGRETTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN "SELLING"

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THE U.S.-SYRIAN COMPROMISE CANDIDATE IN LEBANON. DRAWING FROM REFTEL AND PRESS GUIDANCE, AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF U.S. EFFORT. HE NOTED THAT A/S MURPHY HAD TWO NOTABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHICH THE CHRISTIANS SHOULD CREDIT. FIRST, SYRIA HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS FIRST THEN REFORM. SECOND, SYRIA HAD WITHDRAWN ITS PRIMARY CANDIDATE. AND, THE COMPROMISE ONE WAS AFTER ALL A MARONITE. KLIBI AGREED AND SAID DAHER HAD EVEN TAKEN POSITIONS INDEPENDENT OF SYRIA ON FOUR OR FIVE OCCASIONS IN THE PAST. OTHER POSSIBILITIES, HOWEVER, MIGHT INCLUDE RAYMOND EDDE'S ELECTION OR CONTINUATION OF THE AL HOSS GOVERNMENT. AMBASSADOR NOTED EDDE HAD BEEN AWAY FOR MANY YEARS AND QUESTIONED WHETHER HE COULD BE APPROVED BY THE CURRENT LEBANESE PARLIAMENT. HE RE-EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHES TO SUCCESSFUL HOLDING OF ELECTION.

11. IN CLOSING, AMBASSADOR RAISED PEACE PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, HE NOTED, THE POSITIVE REACTION OF BASSAM ABU SHARIF TO SECRETARY SHULTZ SPEECH OF SEPT. 16

WHICH CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH [illegible] CLOVIS MAKSOUD'S TOTALLY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT. KLIBI TOOK THE POINT, NOTED IN TURN FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS' POSITIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF HIS TALK WITH ARAFAT AND OBSERVED THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A VEHICLE TO MAKE PROGRESS AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS.

COMMENT

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11. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MAKSOUD CLEARS HIS REMARKS WITH TUNIS, BUT WE NEVERTHELESS FELT HIS RECENT NEGATIVISM WARRANTED MENTION. BY CONTRAST, ARAB LEAGUE HQ. HERE HAS TRIED TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOST RECENTLY A NOTE PRAISING U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION (SEPTEL).

12. ACTION FOR ALGIERS. KLIBI DEFLECTED A REQUEST FOR FURTHER SPECIFICS ON THE ALGERIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ISRAELI SATELLITE. APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION YOU CAN SUPPLY.

13. BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

PELLETREAU.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS
(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION)

AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- MUBARAK WINDS UP A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA.

-- EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL STATES THAT QUICK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VERDICT ON TABA WOULD LEAD TO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

-- COLUMNISTS COMMENT ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE.

-- RIOT IN UPPER EGYPT IN PROTEST AGAINST GOVERNMENT POLICY.

-- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPT DENOUNCED ISRAEL'S METHODS OF DIVIDING THE ARABS; RUNS FIRST INTERVIEW TO APPEAR IN OPPOSITION PRESS WITH RETIRED ISRAELI GENERALS HARKABI AND YARIV.

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ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

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1. MUBARAK'S EUROPEAN TOUR. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL WEEKEND PAPERS REPORTS MUBARAK'S TALKS IN YUGOSLAVIA ON VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE GULF WAR, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, FOREIGN DEBTS, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN STATEMENTS TO TV, MUBARAK CALLED UPON THE PLO TO MAKE WELL-STUDIED DECISIONS SO THAT THEY MAY NOT BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF DURING THE ISRAELI AND US ELECTIONS. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON BOOSTING JOINT COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS AND THE EXCHANGE OF EXPERTISE, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY. REPORTEDLY, YUGOSLAVIA WILL SUPPORT EGYPT'S STAND TOWARDS

THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 25 REPORT MUBARAK'S ARRIVAL IN LONDON TO HOLD TALKS WITH THATCHER, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AND THE BAHRAINI PRIME MINISTER.

2. ARAFAT LEAVES CAIRO. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 23 REPORT ARAFAT LEFT CAIRO AFTER A ONE-DAY VISIT DURING WHICH HE HELD TALKS WITH MUBARAK AND GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO EGYPTIAN TELEVISION. ARAFAT RENEWED HIS CALL UPON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, NOTING THAT THE PNC WOULD DISCUSS SEVEN OPTIONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN ALGIERS NEXT MONTH. IN HIS TV INTERVIEW, ARAFAT CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO AND ESTABLISH A "COURAGEOUS" PEACE, ADDING THAT THE UPRISING WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL "VICTORY" OR PEACE IS ACHIEVED.

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3. TABA. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS A HIGH-LEVEL EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL AFFIRMED THAT THE VERDICT ON TABA WILL BE IN FAVOR OF EGYPT, NOTING THAT QUICK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VERDICT WOULD LEAD TO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE SUBJECT OF CONFLICT. IN A RELATED ITEM, AHRAM REPORTS THAT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TAMIR WILL DISCUSS WITH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS IN GENEVA MEANS OF CARRYING OUT THE AWARD.

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AKHBAR EL-YOM SEPTEMBER 24 NOTES THAT MUBARAK HAD REFUSED AN ISRAELI OFFER TO CONSIDER THE HOTEL IN TABA A JOINT PROPERTY WITH 49 PER CENT FOR THE ISRAELI SIDE AND 51 PER CENT FOR THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. MUBARAK INFORMED THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BUILD A HOTEL ON A LAND THAT WAS NOT THEIRS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS THAT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AWARD, EGYPT WILL PUBLISH A WHITE BOOK ON TABA INCLUDING ALL DOCUMENTS, MAPS, AND PROCEEDINGS.

4. ON THE ISRAELI SATELLITE. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS

THE USSR ANNOUNCED THAT THE ISRAELI SATELLITE 0FEK I COULD LEAD TO A NEW ESCALATION IN THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID THAT MOSCOW UNDERSTANDS ARAB FEARS ABOUT THE LAUNCHING OF THIS ISRAELI SATELLITE FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY SINCE ISRAEL INSISTS ON PROCEEDING WITH ITS MILITARY PROJECTS WHILE NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

AKHBAR'S DAILY COLUMNIST ABDEL MONEIM MURAD SEPTEMBER 23 COMMENTS ON THIS EVENT AND ACCUSES THE ARABS OF BEING LAZY AND BACKWARD BECAUSE THEY ONLY THINK ABOUT FOOD AND SEX, WHILE ISRAEL - A SMALL COUNTRY THAT IS NOT WEALTHY - HAS
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MANAGED THROUGH HARD WORK TO ACHIEVE A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP AND SURPASS ALL THE ARABS. THE COLUMNIST FURTHER CRITICIZES THE "STUPID" ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH THINK THAT THE US AND ISRAEL AIM AT INTRODUCING FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE THEIR POPULATION SO THAT THEY MAY NOT POSE A DANGER TO THEM.

GUMHOURIYYA'S COLUMNIST AWATEF ABDEL GALIL SEPTEMBER 24 WRITES THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE SATELLITE IS NOT ESPIONAGE, BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IT WANTS THROUGH US SATELLITES. NOTING THAT ISRAEL CAN NOW HIT ANY SPOT IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD WITH A NUCLEAR MISSILE, THE COLUMNIST CONCLUDES THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF LAUNCHING THE SATELLITE IS TO SERVE ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST AIMS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

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5. INTERVIEW WITH PERES. FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN A ROW, AHRAM RUNS AN INTERVIEW WITH AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL. THIS TIME AHRAM INTERVIEWS PERES, WHO SAID THAT HIS MEETING WITH ABDEL MEGUID, PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND SHULTZ IS AIMED AT GIVING MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HOWEVER, PERES NOTED, THE MEETING WOULD HAVE LITTLE POSITIVE EFFECT BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS STILL DO NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL OR RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PERES EXPRESSED RESPECT FOR MUBARAK'S CONTINUOUS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE.

ON THE SAME PAGE, AHRAM COMMENTS ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE AND WRITES THAT IT IS AIMED MAINLY AT OBLITERATING THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN BY SURPRISE AS OCCURRED IN THE OCTOBER WAR.

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6. EGYPT/US. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 24 REPORT EGYPT AND THE US CONCLUDED A DEAL, WHEREBY THE FORMER WILL GET PILOTLESS BEACH CRAFT PLANES TO MONITOR EGYPTIAN SHORES AND DETECT ANY ATTEMPT BY FOREIGN SHIPS TO GET RID OF WASTE NEAR EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 22 REPORTS THAT USAID DECIDED TO DOUBLE ITS FINANCING TO THE COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY FROM DOLLARS 20 MILLION TO DOLLARS 40 MILLION.

7. EGYPTIAN-ARAB RELATIONS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS EGYPT OBTAINED ITS FIRST LOAN FROM THE ARAB MONETARY FUND SINCE APRIL, WHEN THE FREEZE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP WAS TERMINATED. THE LOAN AMOUNTS TO DOLLARS 18.3 MILLION WITH AN ANNUAL INTEREST RATE RANGING BETWEEN 3.75 AND 4.75 PER CENT TO BE REPAID OVER FOUR INSTALLMENTS EVERY SIX MONTHS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS TO TAKE PLACE AFTER A GRACE PERIOD OF 18 MONTHS. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION WILL DISCUSS A MEMORANDUM IN ITS MEETING SEPTEMBER 25 ON EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ORGANIZATION.

8. EGYPT/KUWAIT. AKHBAR EL-YOM SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION FROM THE ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION LEFT FOR KUWAIT TO DISCUSS CONCLUDING A DEAL, WHEREBY EGYPT WILL PROVIDE KUWAIT WITH MODERN EGYPTIAN-MADE JEEPS.

9. EGYPT/UAE. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 23 REPORT THAT TWO AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED WITH UAE AT THE END OF THE TALKS CURRENTLY HELD IN CAIRO. THE FIRST AGREEMENT IS FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION, AND THE SECOND IS FOR ACTIVATION OF TOURISM THROUGH ESTABLISHING A TOURIST COMPANY WITH
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CAPITAL OF LE 100 MILLION. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON ESTABLISHING A JOINT COMMITTEE TO BOOST AND FOLLOW UP COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

10. EGYPT/IMF/IBRD. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION NOW IN WEST BERLIN WILL HOLD TALKS WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS THE IMF HAILED THE SOUNDNESS OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE WHICH RESULTED IN INCREASING THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY 4 PER CENT.

11. EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL APPROVED. AHRAM REPORTS THE INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE IN SOFIA CONDEMNED ISRAELI ACTS OF REPRESSION AGAINST UNARMED PALESTINIANS AND CALLED FOR PUTTING AN END TO THESE INHUMAN PRACTICES. THE CONFERENCE AGREED TO A PROPOSAL BY THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION REGARDING THE DISPATCHING OF A FACT-FINDING COMMISSION TO THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS PERES ANNOUNCED AFTER MEETING WITH MITTERRAND THAT HE IS READY TO GIVE UP GAZA AND PARTS OF THE WEST BANK THAT CONTAIN A CLEAR ARAB MAJORITY.

12. EGYPT/CHINA. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 26 REPOTS EGYPT AND CHINA SIGNED AN AGREEMENT FOR EXCHNGING PROFESSORS, SENDING EGYPTIAN DELEGATES TO STUDY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA, AND RECEIVING CHINESE STUDENTS TO STUDY ARABIC IN EGYPT.

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DOMESTIC NEWS
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13. STRIKE IN MAHALLA. WEEKEND PAPERS REPORT THAT 45
WORKERS FROM MISR SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY, LOCATED IN
THE INDUSTRIAL CITY OF AL-MAHALLA AL-KUBRA NEAR

ALEXANDRIA, HAVE BEEN JAILED ON CHARGES OF RIOTING, RESISTING AUTHORITIES, AND IMPEDING PRODUCTION. THE WORKERS HAD SHOUTED ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS, ANNOUNCED A SIT-IN STRIKE, AND CALLED FOR CASHING THE ANNUAL SCHOOL BONUS, WHICH WAS NOT PAID TO WORKERS BY THE GOVERNMENT THIS YEAR.

14. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION REGULATION. AKHBAR SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS ON NEW AMENDMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE REGULATION OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION LAW. THE AMENDMENTS INCLUDE PERMITTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO EXTEND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS TO FIVE YEARS INSTEAD OF FOUR.

15. MEAT BOYCOTT. AKHBAR SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS HOUSEWIVES IN ALEXANDRIA ADDRESSED A WARNING TO BUTCHERS AND FISH AND POULTRY MERCHANTS TO REDUCE THEIR PRICES WITHIN A WEEK OTHERWISE A BOYCOTT WILL BE ANNOUNCED. THIS DECISION BY THE HOUSEWIVES WAS MADE AFTER STUDYING THE PROFIT MARGIN IN ALL SUPPLY COMMODITIES.

16. ARMS PRODUCTION. AHRAM REPORTS STATE MINISTER FOR MILITARY PRODUCTION GAMAL AL-SAYYID AFFIRMED THAT THE LOCAL ARMS INDUSTRY SAVED 40 PER CENT OF ITS IMPORT COSTS. HE ADDED THAT EGYPT'S PROGRAM TO MANUFACTURE THE M1A1 TANK WAS PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO PLAN, NOTING THAT EGYPT WILL MANUFACTURE 90 PER CENT OF THE TANK IN A FEW

YEARS.

17. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 22 REPORTS THE PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INCREASED BY 100 PER CENT DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AGRICULTURAL BANK SAID THAT THE BANK ALLOCATED LE 284 MILLION LAST YEAR TO FINANCE AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, BUT ONLY 45 PER CENT OF THIS AMOUNT WAS USED.

18. TV NEWS SEPTEMBER 24: MUBARAK ARRIVED IN LONDON FOR A THREE-DAY VISIT AFTER WINDING UP HIS VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA; THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF UAE LEAVES CAIRO; THE SITUATION IN LEBANON; ISRAELI RAID ON TWO PALESTINIAN SITES IN SIDON RESULTING IN THE KILLING OF 33 PALESTINIANS; CLASHES BETWEEN ISRAELI FORCES AND PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF A PALESTINIAN CHILD; US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ABOUT

MONITORING THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDERS BY SATELLITES; THE MINISTER OF AWQAF RECEIVES HIS JORDANIAN AND IRAQI COUNTERPARTS; SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA; THE HEAD OF THE EGYPTIAN RADIO AND TV FEDERATION RECEIVES THE VISITING AFRICAN MINISTERS OF INFORMATION.

19. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR SEPTEMBER 22: USD 1 EQUALS PT 231.0 (BUYING) AND PT 231.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

20. EGYPT/ISRAEL. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS STATE

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI STRONGLY DENOUNCED A REPORT BY AN ISRAELI PAPER THAT MUBARAK INFORMED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS WILLING TO CONCLUDE A RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. GHALI DESCRIBED THIS AS A GROUNDLESS LIE AND EXPRESSIVE OF "CHEAP" METHODS INTENDED TO DRIVE A WEDGE AMONG THE ARABS. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS ISRAEL INFORMED EGYPT OF ITS PROTEST AGAINST THE INCREASED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE PLO AND THE RECENT MUBARAK-ARAFAT MEETING. THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED A STATEMENT CLAIMING THAT ARAFAT'S VISIT TO CAIRO WAS A VIOLATION OF THE PEACE TREATY AND THAT EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN CONTACTS WOULD IMPEDE PEACE EFFORTS IN THE REGION.

AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 DEVOTES A WHOLE PAGE TO ISRAELI FOREIGN RELATIONS. HALF OF THE PAGE IS A REPORT ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE OFEK-I SATELLITE, IN WHICH AL-WAFD EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT TEL AVIV IS GETTING READY TO DEAL A QUICK PRE-EMPTIVE BLOW INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN A WAR AGAINST THE ARABS.

ON THE OTHER HALF OF THE PAGE UNDER THE TITLE "THE

GENERALS OF WAR CALL FOR PEACE", AL-WAFD RUNS AN INTERVIEW WITH RETIRED ISRAELI GENERAL HARKABI AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE YARIV, WHO SAID THAT ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS A NECESSITY TO GUARANTEE ISRAELI SECURITY. HARKABI NOTED THAT OTHER RETIRED GENERALS AND US JEWS SUPPORT THIS IDEA TOO BUT THEY ARE AFRAID OF VOICING THEIR OPINION FOR FEAR OF TERRORISM OF JEWISH EXTREMISTS. HARKABI POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD THE PLO SHOULD BE CHANGED, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE

RECENT CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE PLO. (NOTE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE ARE AWARE OF AN OPPOSITION PAPER PUBLISHING INTERVIEWS WITH ISRAELIS.)

21. DEMONSTRATIONS. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ISLAMIC GAM'AAT AND INHABITANTS BROKE OUT IN AL-MINYA IN PROTEST AGAINST THE PRICE INCREASES AND THE SIEGE LAID TO AL-RAHMAN MOSQUE, THE STRONGHOLD OF THE ISLAMIC GAM'AAT. LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED DENOUNCING THE GOVERNMENT FOR "ROBBING AND STARVING THE PEOPLE." AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 ADDS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BROKE OUT IN SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNORATES IN UPPER EGYPT IN PROTEST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE ANNUAL SCHOOL BONUS TO GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS.

22. ANOTHER TOUR BY MUBARAK. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 CLAIMS THAT MUBARAK WILL MAKE A TOUR OF EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES IN JANUARY TO CONSOLIDATE EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES.

23. ITALIAN PROPOSAL. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS THAT ITALY HAS EXPRESSED READINESS TO HOST EGYPTIAN-IRANIAN TALKS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF RELEASING THE EGYPTIAN PRISONERS IN IRAN.
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:
DEFINING THE ISSUES

REFS: A) STATE 303639, B) JERUSALEM 3004

1. [redacted]

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
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2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS POSING AN INCREASING CHALLENGE TO SECULAR NATIONALIST PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE WEST BANK. RECENT WEEKS HAVE SEEN DIRECT CHALLENGES BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-CREATED GROUP "HAMAS" TO THE PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) WHICH CURRENTLY LEADS THE UPRISING. THIS

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CHALLENGE, WHICH HAS MET WITH MIXED SUCCESS, HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF LEAFLETS CRITICAL OF UNLU AND THE PLO, ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ALTERNATIVE STRIKE DAYS, AND EVEN CLASHES IN CERTAIN LOCALITIES. THUS FAR, HAMAS HAS DEMONSTRATED STRENGTH IN

THOSE AREAS WHERE EXISTING ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT: NABLUS AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, WHERE IT SEEMS TO BE BEST ORGANIZED; THE RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA; AND HEBRON. ITS ATTEMPTS TO MAKE INROADS INTO THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR HAVE BEEN RESISTED BY LOCAL RESIDENTS. HAMAS REMAINS WEAK IN COSMOPOLITAN EAST JERUSALEM. WHATEVER THE CURRENT ACTUAL STRENGTH OF HAMAS--AND ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY--IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN BECOMING A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF THE INTIFADA ON THE WEST BANK.

3. HAMAS IS NOT THE ONLY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP FUNCTIONING ON THE WEST BANK. THE FATAH-AFFILIATED "ISLAMIC JIHAD"--NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE SHIITE GROUP OF THE SAME NAME FOUND IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE--WAS CRIPPLED BY THE KILLING OF THREE SENIOR LEADERS IN CYPRUS. IT HAS NOT RECOVERED TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT PLAYER IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. OTHER SMALL, SHADOWY GROUPS ALSO RISE AND FALL, CREATING LITTLE MORE THAN A RIPPLE.

4. THIS REPORT IS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY. ISLAMIC

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FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE; UNDERSTANDING THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND EXTERNAL GOALS WILL TAKE MUCH TIME AND PATIENCE. THIS IS A FIRST PASS AT THE SUBJECT ON THE WEST BANK, BASED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON CONTACTS FROM JERUSALEM AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK CITY OF NABLUS. WE HAVE LESS COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN WEST BANK. GAZA HAS ITS OWN PATTERN OF ISLAMIC POLITICS. WE WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN ON EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ISLAMIC POLITICAL TIES WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

HAMAS--BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

5. HAMAS IS A CREATION OF THE MUSLIM

BROTHERHOOD (MB), WITH TIES TO THE MB THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THE NAME "HAMAS" WAS APPARENTLY CHOSEN IN FEBRUARY 1988, BUT NOT USED EXTENSIVELY UNTIL MAY. AN ACRONYM FOR "ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT," THE WORD ITSELF IS ARABIC FOR "ZEALOTS."

6. ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE WEST BANK HAVE STRONG ISLAMIC CONVICTIONS, THEY TEND TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES POLITICALLY IN SECULAR TERMS. ISLAM HAS, HOWEVER, PLAYED A ROLE IN WEST BANK POLITICS SINCE THE LATE 1940S, WHEN THE MB FIRST CAME TO THE WEST BANK. THE MB WAS SHORTLY AFTER DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

PALESTINIANS BY ITS SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN IN HIS POWER STRUGGLE AGAINST PM NABULSI IN THE MID-50S. DURING JORDANIAN RULE, IT WAS TIGHTLY MONITORED BY JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT GAIN SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE UNTIL THE MID- TO LATE-70S, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK.

7. IN 1976, M0 SUPPORTERS ATTACKED AND BURNED A NABLUS THEATER SHOWING AN "IMMODEST" PLAY. THIS IS OFTEN CONSIDERED THE BEGINNING OF THE MB'S EMERGENCE AS A VIABLE POLITICAL FORCE IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS BUILT A POWER BASE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY, WHERE THEY GAINED CONTROL OF THE STUDENT COUNCIL IN 1978. THIS SURGE IN POPULARITY WAS PROBABLY DUE

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TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS: 1) THE RISE OF KHOMEINISM IN IRAN, WHICH GAVE FUNDAMENTALISM A BOOST THROUGHOUT THE MUSLIM WORLD; 2) THE DISCREDITING OF TRADITIONAL ARAB LEADERS IN THE WAKE OF SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM; 3) A LARGE INFLOW OF MONEY FROM THE MB IN JORDAN AND EGYPT; AND 4) THE DENIAL BY FUNDAMENTALISTS THAT THEY BELONGED TO THE FORMERLY DISCREDITED MB-- INSTEAD, THEY CALLED THEMSELVES THE "INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC BLOC."

8. SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AT AN-NAJAH, AS ELSEWHERE IN THE WEST BANK, HAS EBBED AND FLOWED ACCORDING TO THE PLO'S FORTUNES AND THE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD. SECULAR LEADERS.IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, AIDED BY PLO MONEY, WORKED TO CONTAIN THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND REDUCE THEIR INFLUENCE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS LOST CREDIBILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE PLO BORE THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHTING DU8ING THE 1982 INVASION OF LEBANON AND DURING THE PERIOD OF ARAFAT-HUSSEIN RECONCILIATION. THEY HAVE GAINED STRENGTH WHEN THE PLO APPEARED WEAK AND DIVIDED.

9. BY THE END OF 1987, FUNDAMENTALISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK HAD

ACHIEVED AN UNEASY STATUS QUO MARKED BY OCCASIONAL VIOLENT CLASHES. IN NABLUS THE FUNDAMENTALISTS TENDED TO BE RESENTED BY THE SECULAR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSOFEARED.

10. WHEN THE INTIFADA BEGAN, THE MB ACTED DECISIVELY TO SEIZE A ROLE. SEVERAL FACTORS

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CONTRIBUTED TO THE MB DECISION TO INVOLVE ITSELF FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ISLAMIC JIHAD HAD WON CONSIDERABLE PRESTIGE FOR ITS ROLE IN GAZA, AND THE MB FEARED LOSING SUPPORT AND CREDIBILITY IN THE FUNDAMENTALIST COMMUNITY. INDIVIDUAL MB MEMBERS WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTIFADA; THE MB LEADERSHIP FEARED THAT IF MEMBERS COULD NOT USE THE MB AS A VEHICLE FOR PARTICIPATION, THEY WOULD TURN TO OTHER FUNDAMENTALIST OR NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS. MB LEADERS BELIEVED, THEN AS NOW, THAT THE INTIFADA WILL BE CARRIED TO A CONCLUSION. THEY WANTED A SAY IN THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, THE MB HAD A READY-MADE ORGANIZATION PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK. ACCORDINGLY, THE MB CREATED HAMAS IN FEBRUARY 1988 AND BEGAN ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE UPRISING.

HAMAS--STRUCTURE
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11. THE MB HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO, WITH A BRANCH IN AMMAN. SUB-BRANCHES ARE PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK (NABLUS) AND GAZA. THE HEAD OF THE MB IN THE WEST BANK REPORTEDLY IS NABIL BUSHTAWI, OF NABLUS. OTHER KEY WEST-BANK FIGURES FROM NABLUS ARE SHEIKH SAID BILAL AND HAMID BITAWI.

12. THE RELATION BETWEEN CAIRO, AMMAN, THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA REMAINS UNCLEAR, AS IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NABLUS LEADERSHIP AND OTHER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. THERE ARE STRONG LINKS WITH CAIRO AND AMMAN, AND SOME MB LEADERS MAY HOLD POSITIONS IN JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE. APPARENTLY, KY DECISIONS ARE MADE IN CAIRO AND AMMAN, BUT LOCAL UNITS RETAIN CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION. MONEY FLOWS IN FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN, AS WELL AS BEING RAISED LOCALLY THROUGH THE MOSQUES.

13. THE MB IN NABLUS REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEMBERS HEADED BY A 4 OR 5 MAN COMMITTEE. THE LEADERSHIP CONSISTS OF MUSLIM SHEIKHS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AT AN-NAJAH AND BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITIES, INSTRUCTORS AT THE KULLIYET AL-DAWA (AN ISLAMIC COLLEGE AFFILIATED

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WITH JERUSALEM UNIVERSITY, LOCATED IN BEIT HANINA, NORTH JERUSALEM), EMPLOYEES OF THE ISLAMIC WAQF, A SHARIA JUDGE, AND VARIOUS MERCHANTS. THE "FOOT SOLDIERS" OF HAMAS/MB IN NABLUS CONSIST OF DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS FROM THE POORER SECTIONS OF THE OLD TOWN (CASBAH). THIS NETWORK SEEMS TO BE STABLE--FEW ARRESTS, FEW DEFECTIONS, FEW NEW CONVERTS.

14. THE LEADERSHIP MAKES USE OF THE MOSQUES TO PLAN, PROSELYTIZE, INSTRUCT, AND RAISE MONEY. THIS IS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE HAMAS POSSESSES OVER THE UNLU, SINCE MANY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNIVERSITIES, CHARITIES, AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES THROUGH WHICH THE UNLU COULD OPERATE HAVE BEEN CLOSED BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

HAMAS--METHOD OF OPERATION

15. ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT BY TIGHTLY KNIT CELLS OF AS FEW AS FIVE MEMBERS. OUTSIDERS RARELY PARTICIPATE IN HAMAS ACTIONS, A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE FROM INTIFADA ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL, WHICH DERIVE CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH FROM THE SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS. HAMAS ALSO SEEKS MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR ITS ACTS. BEFORE A STRIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, RED SPRAY-PAINTED INSTRUCTIONS--BOLDLY SIGNED "HAMAS"--ARE IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT AREAS OF HAMAS INFLUENCE. AS A RESULT OF ITS PENCHANT FOR TIGHT CONTROL AND PUBLICITY, HAMAS TENDS NOT TO COOPERATE IN

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UNLU-ORGANIZED ACTIONS. IN NABLUS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN IMPROMPTU BLOOD DRIVES ORGANIZED ON SHORT NOTICE BY POPULAR COMMITTEES TO TREAT WOUNDED PALESTINIANS.

16. HAMAS USES DIFFERENT METHODS TO ENFORCE ITS STRIKE CALLS, DEPENDING ON ITS STRENGTH IN THE TOWN INVOLVED. IN RAMALLAH AND THE BEIT HANINA

NEIGHBORHOOD OF NORTH JERUSALEM, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS FOLLOWERS REPORTEDLY WERE ON THE SCENE TO ENFORCE THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. ALTHOUGH NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN THESE AREAS, THERE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTATIONS WITH UNLU SUPPORTERS ON PRIOR OCCASIONS. NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN NABLUS, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE UNLU CHOSE NOT TO TEST HAMAS' STRENGTH. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, HAMAS HAS FIREBOMBED CHRISTIAN SHOPS THAT SOLD LIQUOR OR OTHERWISE DEFIED ITS ORDERS. IN BETHLEHEM, TIRES WERE BURNED AND THERE WERE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN HAMAS AND UNLU SUPPORTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. SOME SHOPS WERE INTIMIDATED INTO CLOSING EARLY. HOWEVER, MOST STAYED OPEN. IN JERUSALEM, HAMAS WAS NOT IN EVIDENCE, AND THE STIKE CALL WAS LARGELY IGNORED.

HAMAS--RELATIVE REGIONAL STRENGTH
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17. HAMAS APPEARS TO BE STRONGEST IN GAZA. IN THE WEST BANK, IT SEEMS TO BE BASED IN THE TOWNS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHERE THE INHABITANTS ARE RELATIVELY HOMOGENEOUS AND HAVE A RELIGIOUS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

BENT. ITS PRIMARY WEST BANK STRONGHOLDS, IN DESCENDING ORDER OF INFLUENCE, APPEAR TO BE NABLUS, RAMALLAH, AND HEBRON. HAMAS IS PRESENT IN JERUSALEM, PARTICULARLY THE BEIT HANINA NEIGHBORHOOD IN NORTH JERUSALEM NEAR RAMALLAH. IN DOWNTOWN EAST JERUSALEM AND THE OLD CITY, HAMAS IS PRESENT BUT WEAK, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE COSMOPOLITAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS. HAMAS IS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS FOOTHOLD IN THE CHRISTIAN AREA OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, THOUGH THUS FAR ITS INTIMIDATION TACTICS HAVE NOT PROVED SUCCESSFUL. (IN FACT, HAMAS ACTIONS IN THESE CHRISTIAN AREAS HAVE LED TO THE REAPPEARANCE OF HAMAM, THE "CHRISTIAN" RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHOSE ACRONYM FORMS THE

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ARABIC WORD FOR "DOVE.") WE DO NOT YET HAVE A GOOD FEEL FOR HAMAS IN HEBRON, THOUGH WE KNOW IT HAS BEEN ACTIVE. THE AUGUST 21 AND SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE CALLS WERE OBSERVED THERE. IN ADDITION, ITS INHABITANTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE STRONG RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HERE AS ELSEWHERE MUCH OF HAMAS' STRENGTH DERIVES FROM THE POPULATION'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PLO.

18. HAMAS IS THOUGHT TO BE WEAK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHERE THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY LACKED INFLUENCE AND ORGANIZATION, AND IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, WHERE SECULAR NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS (FATAH, PFLP, COMMUNISTS, ETC.) REMAIN

FIRMLY ENTRENCHED. AN INTERESTING EXCEPTION IS NEW ASKAR CAMP WHERE, BECAUSE OF THE ARREST OF ALMOST THE ENTIRE FATAH LEADERSHIP, HAMAS HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOVE IN AND ORGANIZE.

19. IT IS DIFFICULT ACCURATELY TO GAUGE HAMAS' STRENGTH FROM THE SUCCESS OF ITS STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS HAS CHOSEN ITS DAYS WISELY--AUGUST 21 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTEMPT TO BURN THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE, A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST, AND SEPTEMBER 9 WAS BOTH A FRIDAY, WHEN MANY SHOPS ARE CLOSED ANYWAY, AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW MONTH OF THE INTIFADA, AGAIN A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST. THUS, HAMAS WAS CALLING FOR STRIKES ON DAYS THAT PEOPLE CUSTOMARILY MARK WITH STRIKES AND PROTESTS AND DID NOT ACT AGAINST THE FLOW OF THE INTIFADA.

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HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL

20. MANY WEST BANKERS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL ACTIVELY SUPPORTS HAMAS IN AN EFFORT TO DIVIDE PALESTINIANS AND WEAKEN THE INTIFADA. THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT HAMAS OPERATIVES ACT BOLDLY IN DISTRIBUTING THEIR LEAFLETS. SHOPKEEPERS IN JERUSALEM AND NABLUS REPORT THAT, WHEREAS UNLU LEAFLETS ARE DISTRIBUTED SECRETLY FOR FEAR OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES, HAMAS OPERATIVES WALK INTO SHOPS AND PRESENT THEIR LEAFLETS DIRECTLY TO THE OWNERS. MAYOR FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM CLAIMS THAT MEMBERS OF SOME WELL KNOWN FAMILIES WHO COLLABORATE WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SEEN AMONG HAMAS STREET GANGS IN BETHLEHEM. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE MASSIVE ARRESTS--AND THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF MANY MB LEADERS--RELATIVELY FEW HAMAS LEADERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED. IN RECENT WEEKS, FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS HAVE GIVEN INTERVIEWS TO ISRAELI PUBLICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE LANDED SECULARIST LEADERS IN DETENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT, WHILE ISRAELI FORCES MAY BE TURNING A BLIND EYE TO HAMAS ACTIVITIES, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL IS PROVIDING ACTIVE SUPPORT.

HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP

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TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

21. HAMAS' FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AS SET OUT IN ITS AUGUST 18 CHARTER (REF B), PUT IT IN OPPOSITION TO THE SECULAR LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA. ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER, HAMAS CONSIDERS ALL OF PALESTINE AN ISLAMIC "WAQF," OR TRUST FROM GOD. CEDING ANY PART OF IT TO A

JEWISH STATE WOULD VIOLATE THAT TRUST. HAMAS OPPOSES THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION TOWARD WHICH THE PLO SEEMS TO BE INCHING. IT OPPOSES THE CREATION OF A SECULAR STATE IN PALESTINE, AS CALLED FOR IN THE PLO COVENANT. INSTEAD, IT DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. IT ALSO OPPOSES CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE. AS HAMAS LEAFLET NO. 28 SUCCINCTLY PHRASED IT, "NEGOTIATION WITH THE ENEMY IS

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RETREAT AND CAPITULATION." INSTEAD, HAMAS CALLS FOR LIBERATING ALL OF PALESTINE THROUGH JIHAD--BOTH ARMED STRUGGLE AND PROSELYTIZING.

24. THIS HAMAS/UNLU COMPETITION HAS LED TO A BATTLE OF LEAFLETS AND STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS LEAFLETS EXCORIATE THE PLO--PARTICULARLY FATAH--AND THE UNLU FOR CAPITULATING TO THE ZIONIST ENEMY. UNLU, IN RESPONSE, ACCUSES HAMAS OF SERVING ISRAEL BY DIVIDING THE UPRISING. AT THE SAME TIME, UNLU INVITES HAMAS TO JOIN THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP.

25. HAMAS, TO DATE, HAS REJECTED ALL CALLS FOR UNITY WITH UNLU. ONE EXCUSE OFTEN HEARD IS THAT HAMAS WILL NOT SIT ON THE SAME COMMITTEE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. OTHERS SAY IT WILL NOT SIT WITH ANY LEFTIST GROUP, SUCH AS THE PFLP. OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING SOME CLOSE TO THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP IN NABLUS, HAVE TOLD US HAMAS HAS AGREED IN PRIVATE TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND WILL SOON JOIN NOT ONLY THE UNLU BUT THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AS WELL. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, HAMAS IS MAINTAINING ITS PUBLIC STANCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNLU IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ITS ORGANIZATION.

24. UNDOUBTEDLY, THERE ARE CONTACTS AND EVEN OCCASIONAL COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. HOWEVER, RECONCILIATION AND/OR UNITY BETWEEN THEM SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. HAMAS APPEARS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF CREATING AN

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ISLAMIC STATE IN ALL OF PALESTINE. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE WITH THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS THAT CANNOT BE PAPERED OVER. IT IS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT THE UNLU AND HAMAS WOULD FORGE A PERMANENT ALLIANCE.

25. MOST IMPORTANTLY, HAMAS RETAINS ITS FEAR OF BEING COOPTED INTO THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND BECOMING IRRELEVANT. THIS FEAR WAS ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS SPURRING THE CREATION OF HAMAS. IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THE MB WOULD SACRIFICE ITS CREATION NOW, JUST WHEN IT IS GAINING ACCEPTANCE AS A PLAYER. HOWEVER, SHOULD HAMAS FAIL TO MAINTAIN ITS FOOTHOLD AND BECOME THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION OR IRRELEVANCE, IT MIGHT AT THAT POINT CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH THE SECULARIST NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP OF THE UNLU FOR TACTICAL REASONS.

HAMAS--PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
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26. GAUGING THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF HAMAS IS A RISKY ENDEAVOR. IN MANY REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS ARE HELD IN HIGH REGARD, AND SUPPORT FOR HAMAS APPEARS TO DERIVE MUCH OF ITS STRENGTH FROM THAT TRADITIONAL RESPECT RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS CHOICE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST AND SECULAR OPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HAMAS IS BEING TAKEN INCREASINGLY SERIOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK. WHETHER THAT IS BECAUSE OF ACTUAL STRENGTH AND

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

INFLUENCE, OR MERELY DUE TO INSPIRED SELF-PROMOTION, WE CANNOT SAY. IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE HAMAS PHENOMENON WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FUTURE CALCULATIONS.

27. ALTHOUGH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM WILL REMAIN A FEATURE OF THE WEST BANK LANDSCAPE, IMPORTANT FACTORS WORK AGAINST IT BECOMING A PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OR REPLACING THE SECULARIST STRAIN IN WEST BANK POLITICS. WEST BANKERS AS A WHOLE ARE WELL EDUCATED, MUCH TRAVELED, AND CAPITALISTIC IN ORIENTATION. THEY ARE UNLIKELY WILLINGLY TO TURN TO THE NARROW ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD VIEW, NO MATTER HOW DEEP THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP.

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28. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MB HAS HAD ONLY A BRIEF AND UNDISTINGUISHED HISTORY IN THE WEST BANK. IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT, THE INTIFADA ENJOYS VERY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG WEST BANKERS, WHO ARE GENERALLY OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO DISRUPT THIS UNITY AND THREATEN THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF

THE UPRISING. THUS FAR, PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, AND SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY COST FREE. IN A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, MUCH OF THAT SUPPORT COULD MELT AWAY.

29. IN ADDITION THE WEST BANK, UNLIKE GAZA, CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HAMAS IS MEETING RESISTANCE IN THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, EVEN TO THE POINT OF STIMULATING THE REACTIVATION OF A RIVAL CHRISTIAN GROUP. STILL, HAMAS HAS EXTENDED ITS INFLUENCE TO THE LARGELY CHRISTIAN RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA, PROVING THAT IT CAN SURVIVE IN A MIXED CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ENVIRONMENT. THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS IS ALSO SLOWLY BEING DILUTED AS CHRISTIANS EMIGRATE TO FRIENDLIER CLIMES.

30. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE FACTORS WORKING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE, THERE ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH FUNDAMENTALIST STRENGTH COULD GROW TO THE POINT THAT HAMAS WOULD BECOME A SPOILER IN ATTEMPTS TO BRING PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH WIDESPREAD DECAPITATION THROUGH ARREST OF THE UNLU LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY, GIVEN ITS

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OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT, ISRAELI EFFORTS TO DO SO TEND TO PROMOTE HAMAS IN SPECIFIC AREAS, SUCH AS IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEW ASKAR CAMP GIVEN ABOVE.

31. WEST BANKERS ARE BOTH RELIGIOUS AND NATIONALISTIC. THUS FAR, THEIR POLITICS HAVE FOLLOWED THE NATIONALIST BENT OF THEIR CHARACTER AND CULTURE. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE PLO BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE PLO IS THE ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. THEY HAVE THEREFORE CONTINUED TO BACK THE PLO DESPITE MANY DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND THE MAJORITY ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE PLO FAIL TO OVERCOME ITS IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS AND TAKE INITIATIVES THAT WILL LEAD TO A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, THE UNITY OF THE INTIFADA COULD BEGIN TO FRAY ONE CAN IMAGINE A SCENARIO

IN WHICH PFLP, DFLP, AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, WHO ARE NOW WORKING WITH FATAH, COULD REVERT TO MORE EXTREME POSITIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE SECULAR-NATIONALIST PRAGMATIC CONSENSUS THAT IS THE DOMINANT FEATURE OF THE INTIFADA COULD CRUMBLE, AND FUNDAMENTALISM COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT NEW INROADS, ESPECIALLY AMONG DISPOSSESSED GROUPS. THUS, ALTHOUGH A MASS-BASED FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO EMERGE, THE FUNDAMENTALISTS COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GROWING DESPAIR AND SECULAR-NATIONALIST DISUNITY TO FURTHER ITS POLICIES OF

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

CONFRONTATION AND REJECTION.

32. DESPITE THE AVOWED ANTI-ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF HAMAS, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE MAIN CONTEST WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING, BE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE UNLU. THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON ONE MAINSTREAM OPPONENT AT A TIME--THE WAFD IN EGYPT, THE BAATH IN SYRIA. ITS CURRENT OPPONENT IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR THE SOULS OF PALESTINIANS IS THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE UNLU, FATAH. UNTIL THIS STRUGGLE IS DECIDED, HAMAS IS UNLIKELY TO DIRECT ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY AGAINST ISRAEL.

ISLAMIC JIHAD

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33. THIS REPORT HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON HAMAS/MB BOTH BECAUSE HAMAS IS THE MAIN FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP ON THE WEST BANK, AND BECAUSE WE HAVE SO LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES. ISLAMIC JIHAD, THE ONLY OTHER SUCH GROUP WITH A SIGNIFICANT WEST-BANK FOLLOWING, WAS ESTABLISHED BY ABU JIHAD TO ENHANCE FATAH'S APPEAL WITH RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS. ALTHOUGH IT HAS IN THE PAST CLAIMED INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS SUCH AS THE OCTOBER 1986 ATTACK AT THE DUNG GATE, IT WAS DECAPITATED WHEN THREE SENIOR LEADERS WERE ASSASSINATED IN CYPRUS. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT ITS CURRENT INFLUENCE ON THE WEST BANK IS MINOR AND THAT IT IS INCAPABLE OF ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MAINSTREAM FATAH ORGANIZATION ON THE WEST BANK. IT SEEMS TO BE DOING MOST OF ITS ORGANIZING IN WEST BANK PRISONS, WHERE A STRICT QUOTA SYSTEM AMONG GROUPS IS ENFORCED BY THE PRISONERS. WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ON LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC JIHAD ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA, OR WHETHER THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN FACT THE SAME.

QUESTIONS
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34. THIS BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK DOES NOT ADDRESS SEVERAL ISSUES OF CONTINUING IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS KEY FIGURES IN MB/HAMAS AND ISLAMIC JIHAD; COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HAMAS UNITS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, GAZA,

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CAIRO, AND AMMAN; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC JIHAD AND HAMAS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA; AND FATAH-HAMAS RELATIONS. WE WILL BE EXPLORING THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE REPORTING.
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BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

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SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

9 JANUARY

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"
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1. RD CARRIES THE DECISION OF POLITBURO OF THE CC/BCP AND OF THE PARTY'S BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL CONTROL-AUDITING COMMISSION FOR POLITICAL REHABILITATION OF PEOPLE REPRESSED IN THE PERIOD OF ZHIVKOV'S RULE. THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE MENTIONED: GEN. BORIS KOPCHEV; GEORGI CHANKOV; BORIS TASKOV; A GROUP INCLUDING NIKOLA KYFARDZHIEV, VESELIN DASHIN, GEORGI MILEV, KHRISTO PRODANOV, IVAN DIONISIEV, ILIYA ALKOV AND BENJAMEN VARON; IONKO PANOV AND DOBRI TERPESHEV; ANOTHER GROUP INCLUDING ANTON YUGOV, TODOR ZCEZDOV, TODOR KORDOVSKI, SLAVCHO GILIN, KOSTA CHEKALAROV, AND NIKOLA GRUNCHAROV; TSOLO KRUSTEV, IVAN
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TODOROV-GORUNYA, GENERAL TSVETKO ANEV AND OTHERS FROM THEIR GROUP; THE DEFENDANTS AT THE PLEVEN TRIAL: KRISTO KUMANOV, MARIN PATSEV AND SIMEON PROKOPOV; AND ALL BCP MEMBERS EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN PLEVEN FOR TIES WITH THEESE DEFENDANTS.

2. PRESIDENT MLADENOV MET WITH USSR PRIME MINISTER NIKOLAY RIZHKOV.. THEY DISCUSSED THE NECESSITY OF RADICAL CHANGES IN CEMA ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING MARKET MECHANISMS.

3. MLADENOV ALSO MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALL-NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. THEY DISCUSSED IDEAS AND PROPOSALS FOR PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF BULGARIA AND FOR NORMALIZATION OF THE PRESENT ETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

4. RD REPORTS ON THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PUBLIC COUNCIL FORMED TO DISCUSS THE NATIONAL QUESTION. GOVERNMENT AND BCP LEADERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS PARTICIPATED. THE COUNCIL ISSUED AN APPEAL FOR ENDING STRIKES AND MEETINGS DURING THE PERIOD OF CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL. EVERY EVENING BULGARIAN TELEVISION WILL AIR A DETAILED REPORT ON THE SESSIONS, AND A COMMUNIQUE WILL BE ISSUED ON EACH DAY'S WORK. NO NAMES OF PARTICIPANTS ARE MENTIONED.

5. THE DUNAVSKA KOPRINA SILK FACTORY IN RUSE HAD TO CLOSE TEMPORARILY DUE TO A LACK OF FUEL. LACK OF FUEL WAS ALSO BEHIND THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF THE BREAD-MAKING PLANT IN VRATSA, WHERE CITIZENS THEN HAD TO SUFFER FROM BREAD-SHORTAGES.

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6. THE BUREAU OF THE OBLAST BCP COMMITTEE IN HASKOVO REJECTED ACCUSATIONS THAT THE WAVE OF PROTESTS IN THE REGION AGAINST THE MINORITY-RIGHTS DECISIONS OF 29 DECEMBER WAS ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED BY THE NOMENCLATURA CADRES OF THE PARTY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE BUREAU DECLARED ITS SUPPORT OF THE DECISIONS BUT HAS SOME QUARREL WITH THE WAY IN WHICH THEY WERE MADE, ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE BUREAU SESSION PRESIDED OVER BY THE OBLAST FIRST SECRETARY AND POLITBURO MEMBER IVAN IVANOV.

7. THE SITUATION IN BULGARIA IS TENSE, SAYS KHRISTO TANEV FROM SOFIA. BULGARIANS FROM KHASKOVO, KURDZHALI AND OTHER REGIONS ARE NOT PROTESTING AGAINST THE TURKISH-ARABIC NAMES OF THE MUSLIMS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS RITES. THEY ARE AGAINST THE "TRADE" IN THEIR NATIONALITIES. ONE CAN HAVE ONLY ONE MOTHER AND ONLY ONE NATIVE LAND. YET JOURNALISTS, POETS, WRITERS, LAWYERS, AND TEACHERS FROM THE MUSLIM POPULATION ARE NOT SAYING A WORD, TANEV NOTES.

8. THE FIRST ISSUE OF THE INFORMATION BULLETIN "REFORMA" OF THE IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL CIRCLE "REFORMA" HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. "REFORMA" WAS ESTABLISHED BY BCP MEMBERS AT THE HIGHER MINING & GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE. ITS TASK IS TO DO AWAY WITH THE NOMENCLATURA CADRES IN THE PARTY.

9. THE INITIATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALIST

REVIVAL "EDINSTVO" (UNITY) SENT AN OPEN LETTER TO BCP MEMBERS. THE COMMITTEE EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF CHANGES IN THE PARTY AND POINTS OUT THE NECESSITY OF ELECTING A NEW, UNCORRUPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

10. PETUR EVTIMOV, JOURNALIST AND COUNSELOR AT THE

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ALSO POINTS OUT THE NECESSITY OF PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE HIGH ECHELONS OF THE PARTY.

11. FOREIGN MINISTER BOIKO DIMITROV ARRIVED IN KUWAIT. UPON HIS ARRIVAL HE DECLARED THAT "WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW IN BULGARIA CREATES CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING BETTER RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBOR TURKEY. WE DO NOT HAVE IN MIND ONLY TO NORMALIZE OUR TIES BUT TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS

WHICH ARE BASED ON EQUALITY, MUTUAL ADVANTAGE, AND RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRIES."

12. THE EMBASSY OF KUWAIT IN SOFIA ISSUED A DECLARATION REJECTING ALLEGATIONS OF ITS HAVING PROMISED TO PAY 6 BILLION US DOLLARS FOR THE RESTORATION OF MUSLIM NAMES IN
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BULGARIA. THE STATE OF KUWAIT TOOK UPON ITSELF THE NOBLE MISSION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LESSENING OF TENSION BETWEEN BULGARIA AND TURKEY, THE DECLARATION NOTES.

13. THE HOLY SYNOD OF THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH PRESENTED A STATEMENT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IT SUPPORTS THE STRIVING FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRY. THE SYNOD NOTES THE NECESSITY OF ITS ESTABLISHING REGULARIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE. IT ALSO HAS DEMANDS CONCERNING STATE RETURN OF MONASTERIES, CHURCHES AND OTHER PREMISES CONVERTED INTO MUSEUMS AND OTHER TYPES OF USES.

14. ON 19 JANUARY THE PERMANENT COMMISSION FOR PROTECTION AND RESTORATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT WILL HOLD A SESSION WHICH WILL DISCUSS THE BILL ON LAND-USE AND A REPORT OF THE EXPERT ECOLOGICAL COMMISSION ON THE PROJECT FOR EXPANDING THE PLANT FOR MICRO-IONIC SUBSTANCES IN PESHTERA.

15. DELEGATIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES ARRIVED IN SOFIA TO ATTEND THE 45TH CEMA SESSION: VIETNAM, GDR, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, THE USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. A DELEGATION FROM CUBA IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE LATER.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
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16. "OTECHESTVEN FRONT" CARRIES A MESSAGE FROM NIKOLAY YANAKIEV, AN EXPERT FROM THE WEST GERMAN FIRM KRUPP, TO THE WORKERS OF THE "RADOMIR-METAL" FIRM. HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO HIS EFFORTS TO HELP THE FIRM BECOME A PROFIT-MAKING ENTERPRISE WERE BLOCKED BY PEOPLE WHO STILL
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WORK IN THE FIRM. NOW YANAKIEV IS SUGGESTING CONCRETE MEASURES FOR SAVING THE FIRM FROM BANCRUPTCY.

17. THE SAME ISSUE OF OF CARRIES AN OPEN LETTER BY EDVIN

SUGAREV (EDITOR OF THE INDEPENDENT, SAMIZDAT JOURNAL "NOST"), WHO APPEALS FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND WARNS THAT THE NOMENCLATURA CADRES WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SPLITS WITHIN THE BCP AND OFFICIAL AND INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND THUS CREATE THE DANGER OF ANOTHER DICTATORSHIP.
18. "KOOPERATIVNO SELO" CARRIES THE APPEAL OF AN INITIATIVE COMMITTEE FOR ORGANIZING A NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVIVAL OF THE BULGARIAN VILLAGE.

19. "TRUD" CARRIES A BALLOT PAPER FOR PARTICIPATION IN A REFERENDUM ORGANIZED BY THE BULGARIAN TRADE UNIONS. THE PURPOSE OF THE REFERENDUM IS TO STUDY PUBLIC OPINION ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES AND TO WORK OUT THEIR PLATFORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE. THE BALLOT PAPER CONTAINS QUESTIONS ABOUT PROPERTY IN BULGARIA (COOPERATIVE, STATE, PRIVATE), WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ORGANIZATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE WORKPLACE AND IN OTHER INSTITUTIONS; AND WHETHER THE BULGARIAN TRADE UNIONS SHOULD PARTICIPATE, WITH THEIR PLATFORM AND CANDIDATES, IN THE FREE ELECTIONS IN MAY 1990. THERE ARE ALSO QUESTIONS ABOUT WAYS TO OVERCOME THE ETHNIC CRISIS IN BULGARIA AND WHAT OTHER DEMANDS THE BULGARIAN TRADE UNIONS SHOULD RAISE AT THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF "ROUND-TABLE" TALKS.

20. SIMEON VLADIMIROV, A MEMBER OF THE TRANSLATORS UNION, DESCRIBES THE TORTURE OF WOMEN IN IRANIAN PRISONS. VLADIMIROV SAYS THAT "REGRETTABLY, THE BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT EXPRESSED ANY PROTEST SO FAR BEFORE THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES." ALSO, A GROUP OF BULGARIAN

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CITIZENS TOOK A PROTEST PETITION SIGNED BY 300 BULGARIAN INTELLECTUALS TO THE IRANIAN EMBASSY. HOWEVER, THE IRANIAN CONSUL REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE PETITION AND DECLARED THAT THE 117 WOMEN SENTENCED TO DEATH IN IRAN ARE SOVIET AND AMERICAN SPIES AND WILL BE EXECUTED.

21. "NARODNA ARMIA" CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR PETUR-EMIL MITEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COORDINATION COUNCIL OF THE BCP "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE" ACTIVIST GROUP. HE NOTES THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE HAVE SHOWN INTEREST AND SUPPORT FOR THE PLATFORM OF THE GROUP; THAT THE GROUP DOES NOT WANT ANY TIES WITH ASO (THE "ALTERNATIVE SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION" BCP FACTION) BUT IS INTERESTED IN THE IDEAS WHICH ARE COMMON TO THE TWO GROUPS: I.E., DESTALINIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMATION OF SOCIETY; THAT "ROAD TO
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EUROPE" IS FOR DE-POLITIZATION OF THE ARMY; AND THAT THE OUTRAGEOUS ATTITUDES AGAINST THE MUSLIM POPULATION CONSTITUTES THE GREATEST CRIME OF ZHIVKOVISM. PROF. MITEV INSISTS ON ANNOUNCING THE PLATFORM OF THE GROUP TO ALL COMMUNISTS WHO CAN ORGANIZE CKUBS AND PREPARE LISTS WITH THE NAMES OF PEOPLE WHO SUPPORT THE PLATFORM. THUS, AT THE CONGRESS OF THE BCP AT THE END OF JANUARY, IT WILL BECOME CLEAR HOW MANY DELEGATES WILL REPRESENT THE PLATFORM AND WHAT ITS INFLUENCE IS.

22. THE WORKERS AT THE FORGING UNIT OF PLANT NO 5 OF THE HEAVY MACHINE-BUILDING WORKS IN RADOMIR HAVE BEEN ON STRIKE FOR FOUR DAYS. THEIR DEMANDS ARE: FIXED WAGES, "NORMAL WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS," AND NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE COMBINE. VREME.

23. "ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME" PUBLISHED SOME OF THE DEMANDS OF THE ALL-NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. THESE WILL BE PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL

ASSEMBLY: THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE RESOLVED AFTER THE NATIONAL ONE, AND LAND SHOULD NOT BE SOLD TO BULGARIANS WITH MUSLIM NAMES; AND THE LAW ON DUAL CITIZENSHIP SHOULD BE ABOLISHED. A COMMENTARY BY IVAN STAEVSKI NOTES THAT SOME PEOPLE ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ETHNIC PROBLEM AND WANT TO PRESERVE FEUDALISM ESTABLISHED DURING THE TOTALITARIAN REGIME.

24. THE TURKISH NEWSPAPER "CUMHURIET" WROTE THAT, AFTER THE RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA, THE QUESTION ABOUT REACHING A GENERAL IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT WILL NO LONGER BE PRESSING. HOWEVER, ANOTHER TURKISH NEWSPAPER, "MILLIET," WROTE THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE DIFFICULT FOR TURKEY TO FIND A
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SATISFACTORY ANSWER ON THIS ISSUE. ZZ.

25. ZHELYU VLADIMIROV, PH.D., OFFERS A SHORT ANALYSIS OF THE AGGRAVATED NATIONAL QUESTION IN BULGARIA. HE GIVES ATTENTION BOTH TO THE REASONS FOR THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE BULGARIAN POPULATION AGAINST THE DECISIONS OF 29 DECEMBER, AND TO THE REASONS WHY MUSLIMS WERE LEAVING BULGARIA LAST SUMMER. NARODNA MLADEZH.

26. BOGOMIL GERASIMOV, IN "VECHERNI NOVINI," 8 JANUARY, CARRIES AN ARTICLE CRITICIZING THE US INTERFERENCE IN PANAMA.

DURZHAVEZ VESTNIK, ISSUE 3

THE STATE COUNCIL RELIEVED ANDREY BUNDZHULOV AS FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND APPOINTS:
IVAN PENEV TENEV TO THE POST.
OTHER APPOINTMENTS:
IVAN KRUSTEV KAMENOV - FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION, ARCHITECTURE AND URBANIZATION.
KUPEN STEFANOV KUPENOV - DEPUTY MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION, ARCHITECTURE & URBANIZATION
LYUBEN STOILOV PETROV - DEPUTY MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION, ARCHITECTURE & URBANIZATION
TODOR ANGELOV TODOROV - DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION.
POLANSKY

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AGENCY FOR FISCHMAN, P/GG, P/PPA, P/RC, P/P, P//W, P/FN,
VOA NEWS/CA

WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP (TEELEY/GREEN), NSC

STATE FOR AF/I (FAIRCHILD), AF/P, AF/C

E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION TO BREZHNEV'S DEATH, NOVEMBER 14-15

1. THE KINSHASA FRENCH LANGUAGE DAILY, SALONGO, ON NOVEMBER 14, CARRIED AN ARTICLE THAT OPENED WITH THE THOUGHT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO BEGIN SPECULATION ON "WHAT HAPPENS AFTER BREZHNEV". THE WRITER NOTED THAT CONDOLENCE MESSAGES FROM AROUND THE WORLD WERE GENERALLY "CAUTIOUS" IN TONE, THOUGH BREZHNEV WAS GENERALLY HAILED AS A "GREAT MAN". THE ANALYSIS PROCEEDS SITH A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, RATHER THAN ANSWERS. WHAT WILL BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOWARD THE ISSUE OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS? WILL THE NEW LEADERSHIP FEEL ITSELF FREE TO DISENGAGE FROM AFGHANISTAN? WHAT ABOUT ITS POSITION
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ON ARMS LIMITATIONS?

2. ON NOVEMBER 15 THE FRENCH LANGUAGE DAILY ELIMA CARRIED

A FRONT PAGE COMMENTARY BY ITS ASSISTANT EDITOR UNDER THE HEADLINE, "THE KING IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE KING." THE WRITER SUGGESTS THAT, AFTER ALL, THE NEW LEADER, ANDROPOV, WILL INEVITABLY FOLLOW THE POLICIES OF HIS PREDECESSOR. THESE ARE POLICIES, HE CONTINUES, THAT HAE GUIDED RUSSIA FOR TWO DECADES. AND, EVERY WORLD LEADER HAS BEEN FORCED TO TAKE BREZHNEV INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING HIS POLICIES, HE CONTINUES.

3. SINCE THE YALTA CONFERENCE, THE COMMENTARY CONTINUES, WORLD LEADERS HAVE NO CHOICE. THEY BELONG TO EITHER THE COMMUNIST OR CAPITALIST CAMP. BREZHNEV'S DEATH, THE AUTHOR GOES ON, WILL CHANGE NOTHING. THE TWO SUPER POWERS WILL CONTINUE THEIR ACTIONS AND COUNTER-ACTIONS AS IN THE PAST. HE THEN RECONSTRUCTS SOVIET REACTIONS TO KENNEDY'S BAY OF PIGS INVASION WHICH FAILED, US REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE POSTURES OF BOTH POWERS ON QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT. THE WRITER ADDS, "NOW IT IS MR. ANDROPOV'S TURN TO HEAD UP THE SOVIET BLOC. HE FOLLOWS BREZHNEV WHO WAS AN EXPANSIONIST IN HIS THIRD WORLD POLICIES. BREZHNEV, HE CONTINUES, WITNESSED AMERICA'S "STAMPEDE" OUT OF VIETNAM, ITS HUMILIATION IN IRAN, KISSINGER'S SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE NAMIBIA PROBLEMS, MASSACRES IN LEBANON." THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT WASHINGTON NOW SEES THE TIME AS RIPE FOR AN EFFORT AT COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE WITH THE NEW LEADER, ANDROPOV. "BUT, IN REALITY, THINGS WILL GO ON AS IN THE PAST AND BOTH SIDES WILL KEEP A WARY EYE ON EACH OTHER," THE ARTICLE ENDS. FENHAGEN
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04658 01 OF 02 151743Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4658

NODIS DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3,4 7/15/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS PINT, PLO, LE, IS, XF, SY
SUBECT: HABIB MISSION:FALLBACK OPTION

REF: BEIRUT 4166

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE WAY THINGS STAND, THE IMPASSE WHICH WE NOW FACE MAY BE WITH US FOR AN INDEFINITE BUT PROLONGED PERIOD. IF WE SET ASIDE A MILITARY SOLUTION AS UNACCEPTABLE, THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT CARNOT BE LEFT TO SMOLDER READY TO BURST INTO FLAMES AT THE FIRST STRAY SHOTS.

3. AT PRESENT, THERE IS NOWHERE FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS TO GO.

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WE SEEM TO HAVE STRUCK OUT WITH SYRIA. THIS CONCEIVABLY

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COULD CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE SAUD-KHADDAM VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IT IT DOES NOT CHANGE AND NO OTHER ARAB DESTINATION ARISES, THEN I PROPOSE WE SHIFT OUR POSITION. WE SHOULD NOT BE LEFT WITH NO OPTIONS EXCEPT PROLONGED IMPASSE OR ISRAELI ASSULT ON WEST BEIRUT.

4. THEREFORE, I SUGGEST WE BEGIN TO EXPLORE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE DEAL:
--()A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.
-- (B) PLO AGREEMENT FOR ALL LEADERS, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT.
--(C)) THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR OFFICES (SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN), PLUS THEIR FAMILIES IF THEY WISH AND THE SYRIANS AGREE, WILL GO TO SYRIA.
-- (D) ALL OTHER PLO COMBATANTS, WITH THEIR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT FOR A PLACE OR PLACES TO BE DETERMINED IN NON LEBANON. THE CAMPS WHERE THEY WILL BE LODGED WILL BE UNDER LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL. WHEN THEY ARRIVE THEY WILL PLACE THEIR ARMS IN AN ARMORY SEPARATE FROM BUT NEAR THE CAMPS, AND UNDER THE JOINT CONTROL OF THEIR OWN LEADERS AND THE LEBANESE ARMY.
--(E) THE MOVEMENT OF PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMABANTS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER AMERICAN GUARANTEES FOR THEIR SAFETY, WITH THE COOPERATION AND PRESENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND UNITED NATIONS (UNTSO) OBSERVERS.
AAKF) A MULIT-NATIONL FORCE WILL BE AVAILABLE, ON THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, TO ASSURE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT AND THE SAFETY OF THE REMAINING PALESTINIANS IN BEIRUT.

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--(G) INITIAL (NON-U.S.) ELEMENTS OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL START TO ARRIVE AND BEGIN THEIR TASK AS THE PLO ELEMENTS BEGIN TO LEAVE BEIRUT. WHEN THE PLO DEPARTURE IS WELL UNDERWAY, ALL THE MULTI-NATIONL FORCE WILL BE IN PLACE AND THERE WILL BE NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN ISRAELI LINES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT.
-- (H) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT. AS A FIRST TASK, THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND THE LEBANESE

ARMED FORCES WILL SECURE THE AIRPORT AREA, TAKE OVER POSITIONS ON THE DEMARCATION LINE, AND TAKE CONTROL OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS, SPARE ARMS AND MUNITIONS BELONGING TO THE PLO. (THEMNF WILL ASSIST IN THE SAFE DISPOSAL OF SUCH ITEMS.)

--(I) SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED ELEMENTS, WHETHER PART OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE OR OTHERWISE PRESENT, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT FOR SYRIA AT THE TIME AS THE PLO COMBATANTS MOVE AND WITH THE SAME GUARANTEES FOR THEIR SAFTEY.

--J) WHEN THE PLO COMBATANTS FROM WEST BEIRUT ARE GATHERED ITHERN LEBANON, THOSE OF THEM WHO HOLD CITIZENSHIP IN OR HAVE VALID PSSPORTS FROM ANY ARAB COUNTRY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THAT COUNTRY WITHIN TWO WEEKS, UNDER ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED WITH RECEIVING COUNTRIES. PLO COMBATANTS WHO ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR RELOCAION IN ANY OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NON-ARAB COUNTRIES, WILL ALSO BE TRANSPORTED TO THOSE COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD INCLUDE PALESTINAN MEMBERS OF MILTARY UNITS FORMED IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS EGYPT, IRAQ AND JORDAN FOR SERVICE IN THE PALESTINE

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4658

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LIBERTATION ARMY (PLO). (NOTE: WE RECOGNIZE THAT JORDAN MIGHT WANT TO REJECT SOME PALESTINIANS EVEN WITH NOMINAL JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP, BUT WE WOULD URGE ACCEPTANCE OF A MAXIMUM NUMBER.) IN THIS STAGE, WE WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE A WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT. AT SUCH TIME AS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE REMAINING PALESTINANS TO MOVE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY THEY WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO.

--K) THE ABOVE ACTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OTHER FOREIGN ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON ON THE DEMAND AND UNDER TERMS THAT WILL BE AGREED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THOSE FORCES. THIS WILL INCLUDE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES, AND SO-CALLED VOLUNTEER ARMED ELEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE FROM IRAN AND SOUTH YEMEN, IF THE LATTER HAVE NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN PREVIOUSLY. IN THIS STAGE, PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS FROM AREAS OUTSIDE BIRUT WILL BE DISARMED AND JOIN THOSE REMAINING IN THE NORTHERN

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CAMPS OR DEPART THE COUNTRY.

--L) A PROBLEM INHERENT IX THIS OR ANY SCHEME FOR GETTING

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THE PLO OUT OF LEBANON DERIVES FROM THE PRESENCE OF THEIR FAMILIES IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. WE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED OR THEIR LOCATION, OR HOW THE IDF OCCUPATION IS AFFECTING THEM. IN CONDIDERUNG THIS MATTER WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FAMILILULD STAY WHERE THEY ARE PENDING THE FINAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE COMBATANTS. MORZOVER, THIS REINFORCES OUR BELIEF THAT ALL - OR ALMOST ALL - PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON EVENTUALLY. ONLY THOSE WHO CAN BE PEACEFULLY ABSORBED INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY SHOULD REMAIN. AS AND WHEN COMBATANTS MOVE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, THEIR FAMILIES CAN GO WTH THEM. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE TO HAVE THE FAMILIES JOIN THEIR MEN IN THE CAMPS. THIS WOULD MERELY RE-CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH LARAGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE GATHERED UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE INA POSITION TO REJECT LEBANESE AUTHORITY. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT SOME OF THE PLO CONTATANST DO NOT LEAVE LEBANON BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO PLACE TO GO THEN THEY WILL JUST HAVE TO STAY HERE -UNARMED D UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY. HOPEFULLY, THERE WILL NOT BE SO MAY IN THIS CATEGORY THAT A STRONG GOL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE THEM AND KEEP THEM DISARMED. ALL OF US- AMERICANS, ISRAELIS LEBANESE AND OTHER ARABS- MAY HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE PROBABLY NEVER WILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE A TOTAL SOLUTION UNTIL THE PALESTIANS HAVE A HOMELAND.

5. I RECOGNIZE THAT THESE PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST STAGE ARRANGEMENTS MEAN THAT THERE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE A RELATIVELY QUICK AND CLEAN EXODUS FROM LEBANON OF ALL THE

PLO COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT. THUS, THESE PROPOSALS WILL POSE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS FOR THE LEBANESE, BUT THEY MAY BE DESPERATE ENOUGHT TO LOOK UPON THEM AS A SHORT-TERM WAY OUT. WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TIME IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS. I MENTIONED ONLY SOME OF THE PROS AND CONS IN REFTEL AND IN THIS MESSAGE. THUS, WHILE I SUGGEST WE DISCUSS THESE PROPOSALS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND AGREE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM THEM THAT ARE REASONABLE, WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROCEED SO LONG AS WE ARE SATIFIED. IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES, LD OPEN UP THIS LINE OF DISCUSSION WITH KIMCHE ON

SATURDAY IN BEIRUT, AND FOLLOW THAT UP IMMEDIATELY BY TALKING TO THE LEBANESE. AT SUCH TIME THEREAFTER THAT IT WOULD BE DEEMED USEFUL, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO ISRAEL AND SYRIA TO PURSUE THE MATTER.
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STADIS///
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12065:RDS 3 6/6/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~S - ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS THE REVISED VERSION OF MC FARLANE'S MEMO TO CLARK FOR THE PRESIDENT ON LEBANON. IN OUR VIEW IT BORDERS ON THE SOPHOMORIC, BUT IS HARMLESS, IF NOT USELESS. STATE, JCS, CIA, AND OSD HAVE ALL BEEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE MEMO. THE MEMO ALONG WITH THESE AGENCY COMMENTS WILL BE SENT TO THE PARTY THROUGH WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT OTHER AGENCY VIEWS ARE AT THIS STAGE, BUT EXPECT THAT DOD WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, AND URGE THAT WE ISSUE TOUGH WARNINGS TO THE ISRAELIS NOW, EVEN BEFORE HABIB HAS HAD A CHANCE TO WORK WITH BEGIN AND OTHERS, ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR

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FAILURE TO WITHDRAW. PARA 4 CONTAINS STATE COMMENTS

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SUBMITTED TO MC FARLANE.

3. BEGIN TEXT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: HOW TO PURSUE OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON

ISRAEL'S INVASION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON COULD HAVE SEVERE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERESTS, AND FORCES US TO IMMEDIATELY REEXAMINE HOW TO PURSUE OUR POLICY GOALS IN LEBANON. TO THAT END, THIS MEMORANDUM ANALYZES THE LINKAGES BETWEEN POSSIBLE ACTIONS THAT WE MAY TAKE IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS AND THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF STABILIZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LEBANON THROUGH PHIL HABIB'S MISSION.

BACKGROUND TO THE ISRAELI INVASION

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION, WE HAVE TRIED TO DIMINISH THE TERRORIST THREAT WHICH ISRAEL FACES ON ITS NORTHERN BORDER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGED BY PHIL HABIB, WHILE SAVING MANY LIVES, WAS UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC PROBLEM OF LEBANON'S POLITICAL INSTABILITY. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELIS CONCLUDED THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ISRAEL AND ELSEWHERE OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS WERE ACTUALLY ASSISTED BY THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH PROTECTED PALESTINIAN FORCES IN LEBANON FROM ISRAELI ATTACK. WHILE WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY COUNTERED THIS ISRAELI ARGUMENT, OUR EFFORTS TO HELP THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL AND THEREBY DIMINISH THE THREAT HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IT APPEARS THAT FOLLOWING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE INITIATED BY THE BLACK JUNE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT (BLACK JUNE DOES NOT BELONG TO THE PLO), THE

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ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CHOSE TO ELIMINATE THE PLO THREAT BY FORCE.

U.S. POLICY

YOU RECENTLY DECIDED THAT IT HAD BECOME IMPERATIVE FOR US TO REINVIGORATE AND GO BEYOND THE CEASE-FIRE. OUR POLICY WAS THUS FRAMED TO DEMONSTRATE TO ISRAEL (AND OTHER PARTIES) THAT WE CAN AND WILL DIMINISH THE SECURITY THREATS TO ISRAEL BY DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF

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LEBANON IN A STRATEGIC CONTEXT. THIS WOULD HAVE INVOLVED A COORDINATED APPROACH AMONG KEY EUROPEAN AND ARAB FRIENDS TO: STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HELP RESTORE AND PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE, REDUCE SYRIAN INFLUENCE, AND LESSEN THE PLO THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. DEPENDENT ON HOW PHIL'S DISCUSSIONS EVOLVED, OUR PLAN WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ESTABLISH A "CONTACT GROUP" AND PERHAPS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT A LATER STAGE WHICH COULD PROVIDE THE FACTIONS IN LEBANON WITH A MECHANISM AND AN EXCUSE TO WORK OUT A VIABLE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

THIS LEBANON POLICY WOULD SUPPORT THE TWO CENTRAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY: (1) MAINTAINING THE U.S. AS THE SOLE OUTSIDE POWER THAT CAN MOVE THE REGION TOWARD PEACE; AND (2) STRENGTHENING THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. IS ABLE AND DETERMINED TO LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS AND PROTECT ITS FRIENDS.

WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE HAVE HAD TO WALK A FINE LINE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES WHILE MEETING THE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY EXPECTATIONS OF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS. IN THE WAKE OF EGYPT'S PEACEFUL RECOVERY OF SINAI, IT APPEARED YOUR ACTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. AND ENCOURAGED ARAB EXPECTATIONS THAT U.S. ACTIONS WOULD LEAD TO REAL PROGRESS

IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. OUR RECENT ACTIVISM IN SUPPORT OF A MEDIATED OUTCOME OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR HAS ALSO BOLSTERED MODERATE ARAB CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. REMAINS VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE GULF STATES.

OBVIOUSLY, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES WILL HAVE NEARLY OPPOSITE EXPECTATIONS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN LEBANON. WHILE THE ARABS WILL PRIVATELY EXPECT A DEGREE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, GIVEN OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY, THEY WILL ALSO LOOK FOR SIGNS OF EFFECTIVE U.S. ACTIONS TO EXTRACT THE ISRAELIS FROM LEBANON AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THE ISRAELIS WILL HOPE FOR U.S. SUPPORT, BUT PROBABLY EXPECT CONSIDERABLE U.S. PRESSURE AND A PERIOD OF STRAINED RELATIONS.

NEXT STEPS AND LONG-TERM POLICY

IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS, THE EXPECTATIONS OF REGIONAL STATES AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTERESTS, WE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE CURRENT GAME PLAN FOR LEBANON STILL REPRESENTS A VIABLE STRATEGY FOR MEETING THE CONCERNS OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, THE LEBANESE AND SYRIA. THE BASIC CRITERION AGAINST WHICH ARAB STATES WILL MEASURE OUR POLICY WILL BE OUR ABILITY TO SECURE A PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. WHILE ARAB LEADERS WOULD APPRECIATE TOUGH U.S. RHETORIC THAT CONDEMNS ISRAEL AS WELL AS THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, WHAT MATTERS IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IS WHETHER WE SUCCEED IN ENDING THE FIGHTING, REMOVING ISRAELI FORCES, STABILIZING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON, AND TAKING ACTION TO ENSURE AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF ISRAELI INCURSIONS. THOUGH THE CHALLENGE

TO PHIL HABIB HAS CERTAINLY BEEN COMPLICATED, THE GAME PLAN FOR LEBANON OUTLINED ABOVE REPRESENTS THE BEST

APPROACH FOR ACHIEVIN; OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WHILE MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR FRIENDS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, YOU MUST CONSIDER WHAT PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC STEPS TO TAKE IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PHIL HABIB'S LONGER-TERM EFFORT. OBVIOUSLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT STATE TO INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR-TERM IS ISRAEL. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENT CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW AND THE PALESTINIANS TO STOP USING LEBANON AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL IS BALANCED AND SHOULD NOT COMPLICATE PHIL'S EFFORT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT MAKES CLEAR OUR LONG-TERM GOAL OF SEEKING TO STABILIZE THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION.

DEPENDING ON HOW HABIB IS RECEIVED IN ISRAEL, OVER THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS, OUR INTERESTS MAY DEMAND THAT WE CONDEMN ISRAEL AND/OR USE STRONG SANCTIONS AGAINST IT. HOWEVER, THE ESCALATION OF OUR PUBLIC RHETORIC DURING HABIB'S VISIT MAY PRODUCE EVEN MORE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS AS THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT CONCLUDES THAT U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAELI SECURITY IS BEING FUNDAMENTALLY WEAKENED. CLEARLY, BEGIN MAY BARGAIN EXTREMELY HARD FOR A REPLACEMENT FORCE MUCH STRONGER

THAN UNIFIL IF ISRAEL IS TO WITHDRAW.

IN THE U.N., WE HOPE THAT JEANE WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE AND VOTE FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE CONDEMNATION OR SANCTIONS. SUCH A RESOLUTION COULD SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION FOR OUR EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE STABILIZATION OF LEBANON. LOOKING WELL DOWN THE ROAD, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNIFIL, PERHAPS TO INCLUDE U.S. PARTICIPATION, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND AN

ELIMINATION OF PALESTINIAN ENCROACHMENTS. FURTHERMORE, A BEEFED UP UNIFIL IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, MIGHT BE ABLE TO REPLACE THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO URGE RESTRAINT, SEEK THEIR VIEWS AND COOPERATION IN OUR EFFORT TO INTERNATIONALIZE LEBANON, AND THROUGH PHIL HABIB'S MISSION, TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

THE SOVIET MILITARY POSITION WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES ENGAGE IN COMBAT. THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY MIGHT PROVIDE AIR

DEFENSE HELP IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON SYRIAN POSITION IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT BECOME MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING SYRIAN FORCES IF ISRAEL ATTACKED INSIDE SYRIA. OUR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE COMPLICATED AT EVERY STEP BY THE SOVIETS. THEIR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE BEST SERVED BY PROLONGING ARAB OUTRAGE OVER THE ISRAELI INVASION AND BY LINKING THE U.S. TO IT. THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON OFFERS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SOVIETS IN THIS REGARD. THEY WILL NOT BE HELPFUL DIPLOMATICALLY; THEIR MISCHIEF-MAKING ALREADY IS APPARENT AT THE U.N. THEY WILL COMPLICATE AND TRY ACTIVELY TO THWART A SOLUTION IN LEBANON THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE THEM IN A MAJOR WAY. TO PRECLUDE SOVIET MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTIONS, WE

SECRET

SHOULD INFORM THEM DIPLOMATICALLY THAT OUR FLEET MOVE-
SECRET
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MENTS/DISPOSITIONS ARE NOT BEING MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION.

SUMMARY

IN SUM, PHIL HABIB'S MISSION DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. BUT WE MUST TRY TO DEFUSE THE CONFLICT. YOU MAY HAVE TO TAKE BOLD AND STERN MEASURES TO ACHIEVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. END TEXT

4. WE FEEL THAT OUR APPROACH AT THIS POINT SHOULD BE TO RETAIN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION AS POSSIBLE WHILE WE SEE HOW PHIL'S EFFORTS PROCEED. WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE OR DECIDE ON FUTURE SPECIFIC ACTIONS NOW WHICH COULD COMPLICATE PHIL'S EFFORTS WITH BEGIN WHO IS THE KEY TO A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. ONCE PHIL HAS PROBED THE ISRAELI POSITION AND POSSIBLY THAT OF SOME OF THE OTHER KEY PLAYERS, WE WILL WANT TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT OUR OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING THE KIND OF SOLUTION WHICH CAN QUICKLY BRING ABOUT A HALT TO THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON, CESSATION OF PLO ROCKET AND MILITARY ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND A STRENGTHENED STRATEGIC BUFFER ON ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. IF BEGIN IS RESOLUTELY DETERMINED TO PURSUE A SOLUTION WHICH JEOPARDIZES OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE OR UNDERCUTS OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN U.S. LEADERSHIP OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WE WILL HAVE TO BE FIRM IN OUR NEXT STEPS.

AS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE IN THIS DIRECTION IN CONNECTION WITH BRINGING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

AS A FINAL POINT, WHILE WE MAY HAVE TO THINK ABOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, FEW ISSUES ARE SO SENSITIVE.
SECRET
SECRET

5. NOTE: MCFARLANE TELLS ME HE FEARS WEINBERGER WILL
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TRY TO GET TO CLARK BACK CHANNEL ARGUING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOW INSTRUCT PHIL TO THREATEN BEGIN WITH THE DIREST OF CONSEQUENCES IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY.

YOU WILL WANT TO GET TO CLARK IN THE MORNING TO KEEP HIM ON THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW.   STOESSEL

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 0723/02 (VELIOTES, N. A.)
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US
SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI
(S/S 8221682)
REF: CAIRO 17985

1. [redacted]

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ACTION MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY FROM NEA:VELIOTES.

3. ISSUE FOR DECISION

WHETHER TO SEND THE ATTACHED LETTER TO EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI.

4. ESSENTIAL FACTORS

EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI RESPONDED TO WALT STOESSEL'S JULY 15 LETTER ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BY WRITING YOU JULY 20. ALI CONGRATULATED YOU ON YOUR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES AND DISCUSSED EGYPT'S VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE LEBANESE SITUATION, THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND THE RECENT ETHIOPIAN ATTACK ON SOMALIA. SINCE THIS IS YOUR EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUE'S FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE TO YOU I BELIEVE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE. PHIL HABIB'S IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN CAIRO TO MEET WITH ALI AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD MAKE A RESPONSE FROM YOU NOW PARTICULARLY TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE OUR PROPOSED DRAFT (PARA 6) URGES THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT SOME OF THE WEST BEIRUT PLO FIGHTERS AND REITERATES OUR INTEREST IN INCLUDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

-- THAT YOU SEND THE LETTER IN PARA 6 TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI.

6. BEGIN TEXT.

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DEAR MR. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER:

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-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 2? AND FOR YOUR CONGRATULATIONS ON MY NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. AS MY RECENT MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL INDICATED, I PLACE THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY AND WELL WITH YOU AS WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A JUST AND STABLE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THAT SPIRIT, I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN WITH YOU WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A REGULAR AND FRANK DIALOGUE.

-- THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS THE MOST URGENT CHALLENGE FACING US. THANKS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S TRULY HEROIC EFFORTS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FACILITATE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW REACHED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. FOR THEM TO SUCCEED, THE ARAB NATIONS MUST AGREE TO ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FORCES NOW IN WEST BEIRUT. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM ON JULY 19 AND 20 TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THESE MEETINGS WERE HELPFUL IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT. WE NOW HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF SYRIA TO TAKE THE LEADERS AND OFFICES OF THE PLO FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED A GENERAL COMMITMENT THAT OTHER ARAB STATES MAY BE READY TO RECEIVE CONTINGENTS OF THE REMAINING FORCES.

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB IS NOW FOLLOWING UP ON OUR MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM BY VISITING VARIOUS REGIONAL CAPITALS. HE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT AND THE URGENT NEED TO FIND

DESTINATIONS FOR THE REMAINING PLO FORCES. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO VISIT EGYPT AS PART OF THIS TRIP TO MEET WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT EGYPT WILL JOIN WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO RELOCATE THE PLO AND I BELIEVE WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE CONDITIONS FOR EGYPT'S PARTICIPATION THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. I KNOW YOU SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON SITUATION. BY AGREEING TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER STATES IN RELOCATING THE PLO, EGYPT COULD PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

-- AS YOU NOTE IN YOUR LETTER, THE CRISIS IN LEBANON UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WE WILL NEED TO WORK HARD WITHIN UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, OUR COMMON POLICY AND THE ONLY APPROACHES
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AGREED TO BY ISRAEL. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER ON THIS SUBJECT OFTEN AND IN DETAIL IN THE PERIQD AHEAD.

-- I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. OUR POSITION ON THE WAR ITSELF REMAINS CONSTANT: WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING SUPPORTED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND HAVE MADE THIS ONCE AGAIN QUITE CLEAR PUBLICLY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 12. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE MAKING AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR TERRITORY. WE CONTINUE IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CONSTRUCTIVELY CAN TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. OF COURSE THE WAR HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE TWO COMBATANTS. AS YOU KNOW, A MAIN THRUST OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE WAR HAS BEEN TO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES, WHO FEEL A SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR OWN SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED TENSIONS IN THE REGION. IN LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN INVASION ATTEMPT, WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, REASSURING THEM OF OUR SUPPORT. IN ADDITION, WE ARE MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR FRIENDS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE KEEPING A VERY CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION.

-- E RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO DEAL WITH THEM. ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, WE HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES IN AN EFFORT TO BRING HOME TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ATTACK ON SOMALIA. I THINK THIS WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT WE SUPPLEMENTING OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY AIRLIFTING EMERGENCY MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT MAY BETTER DEFEND ITSELF. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS WORRISOME, I BELIEVE THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT CAN DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE THREAT.

-- IN CLOSING, LET ME REITERATE THAT I PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON STRENGTHENING THE ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARDS THIS END.

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END TEXT. STOESSEL
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 0723/02 (VELIOTES, N. A.)

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI (S/S 8221682)

REF: CAIRO 17985

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1. [redacted]

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COLLEAGUE'S FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE TO YOU I BELIEVE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE. PHIL HABIB'S IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN CAIRO TO MEET WITH ALI AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD MAKE A RESPONSE FROM YOU NOW PARTICULARLY TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE OUR PROPOSED DRAFT (PARA 6) URGES THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT SOME OF THE WEST BEIRUT PLO FIGHTERS AND REITERATES OUR INTEREST IN INCLUDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

-- THAT YOU SEND THE LETTER IN PARA 6 TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI.

6. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER:

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-- AS YOU NOTE IN YOUR LETTER, THE CRISIS IN LEBANON UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WE WILL NEED TO WORK HARD WITHIN UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, OUR COMMON POLICY AND THE ONLY APPROACHES AGREED TO BY ISRAEL. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER ON THIS SUBJECT OFTEN AND IN DETAIL IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

-- I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. OUR POSITION ON THE WAR ITSELF REMAINS CONSTANT: WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING SUPPORTED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND HAVE MADE THIS ONCE AGAIN QUITE CLEAR PUBLICLY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 12. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE MAKING AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR TERRITORY. WE CONTINUE IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CONSTRUCTIVELY CAN TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. OF COURSE THE WAR HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE TWO COMBATANTS. AS YOU KNOW, A MAIN THRUST OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE WAR HAS BEEN TO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES, WHO FEEL A SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR OWN SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED TENSIONS IN THE REGION. IN LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN INVASION ATTEMPT, WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, REASSURING THEM OF OUR SUPPORT. IN ADDITION, WE ARE MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR FRIENDS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE KEEPING A VERY CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION.

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-- IN CLOSING, LET ME REITERATE THAT I PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON STRENGTHENING THE ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARDS THIS END.

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UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMACY REGARDING VIETNAM, JULY 1954-SEPTEMBER 1956

Research Project No. 756
June 1971

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 12/1/97
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FOREWORD

This history of American policy and diplomacy regarding Vietnam, July 1954-September 1956, was prepared at the request of U and P. It is one of a group of completed or projected historical studies on our policies concerning Indochina and Vietnam which collectively span the entire period since the outbreak of World War II.

Touched on only peripherally in the underlying account is the broad subject of economic and financial aid extended by the United States to South Vietnam, to the refugees from North Vietnam, and to the French military establishment in Indochina. Likewise treated only in highlights is the controversy over proposed nationwide elections to effect reunification of Vietnam, for that subject is covered in detail in a special paper issued under the title, "The Question of Nationwide Elections in Vietnam, 1954-1960" (Historical Office Research Project No. 833).

The research and writing for the present paper were done by Benjamin Bock and Cora H. Feld, with the assistance of Helene L. De Long, under the immediate direction of Peter V. Curl, Chief of the Area Studies Branch, Historical Studies Division.

Edwin S. Costrell
Edwin S. Costrell
Chief, Historical Studies Division
Historical Office

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UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMACY REGARDING VIETNAM, JULY 1954-SEPTEMBER 1956

SUMMARY

After the signing of the Vietnamese cease-fire on July 20, 1954 and the adoption of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the next day--instruments which in effect split Vietnam along the 17th parallel--the United States gave energetic support to South Vietnamese efforts to win security and stability and, as a corollary, gain full sovereignty. There were three main aspects to this effort by the United States. First, with regard to Southeast Asia as a whole (explicitly including South Vietnam), the United States sparked the creation of an international security organization. Secondly, it provided political backing and increased economic and military aid to the Saigon Government. Thirdly, it backed South Vietnamese moves which gradually rid Vietnam of the French presence, both political and military. French withdrawal, in turn, required the working out of a modus vivendi to assure preservation of the Geneva Accords for which, with respect to South Vietnam, the French had assumed responsibility. These objectives were more or less satisfactorily met by the fall of 1956.

The concept of a collective defense organization to deter any further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia had been broached by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in late March 1954, but, because of British and French reluctance to move at that time, it was only after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference in July 1954 that the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty could be negotiated; it was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could not adhere to the Treaty, because the Geneva Accords barred them from entering into any alliances, but a protocol extended its protection to them even without their participation.

As for American policy regarding the situation in South Vietnam, the United States pinned its hopes (with some initial reluctance and several subsequent second thoughts) on Ngo Dinh Diem, installed as Prime Minister on July 7, 1954, just two weeks before the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. Diem's intense nationalism (his principal recommendation for office) made him, preforce, anti-French. Clinging to substantial lingering stakes in Vietnam, the French became correspondingly anti-Diem. Thus, Diem's first year in office became a question of survival as,

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generally with American backing, he successfully resisted (a) the threat of a French-sponosored coup, (b) outright rebellion by the Buddhist sects (a development which the French interpreted as demonstrating Diem's weakness and thus as grounds for replacing him), (c) French demands for broadening the base of the Diem Government with ingredients which from Diem's and the American point of view, would have served only to weaken the authority of the central government, and (d) French schemes to bring Chief of State Bao Dai back from France to Saigon to take a direct part in the government of South Vietnam.

Throughout the first year of the Diem regime, the United States and France periodically tried to reconcile their respective policies in Vietnam. In talks in Washington in September 1954, continued in Paris in October, Secretary Dulles prevailed upon the French Government to give Diem a "fair and reasonable chance" of success. This agreement was almost immediately threatened, however, when, without prior consultation with France and pursuant to an earlier National Security Council decision to negotiate directly with the Government of South Vietnam rather than through the French as theretofore, President Eisenhower sent his famous October 23, 1954, letter to Premier Diem proposing a program of direct American aid to Vietnam. To work out the details of such a program, the President despatched General J. Lawton Collins to Saigon as Special United States Representative.

Displeased as the French were about the Eisenhower letter and suspicious as they were about the Collins mission, both Washington and Paris mustered a semblance of restored harmony by delegating to their envoys in Saigon greater responsibility for fashioning joint Franco-American policy in Vietnam. This move proved initially to be a success, for, by early December 1954, Collins and General Paul Ely, French Commissioner-General in the Associated States and Commander of the French Union Forces, had reached agreement on the recovery of American military equipment shipped to the French in Vietnam prior to the cease-fire and, of critical significance, on the organization and American role in the training of the Vietnamese armed forces.

The shaky French government of Premier Pierre Mendes-France stopped just short of repudiating what General Ely had agreed to in Saigon with respect to putting the United States in charge of training the Vietnamese armed forces.

Fearful of criticism from the Right that the Collins-Ely understanding was a "sellout", and of criticism from the Left that the new arrangement violated the Geneva Accords, the French Government stalled for two months, advancing what Secretary Dulles dubbed "sterile" arguments. The French finally agreed, however, in early February 1955, to transmittal of rephrased training plans to the Saigon Government -- with the original Collins-Ely understanding as the chief operating paper. Thereupon, Premier Diem announced, on February 12, 1955, that, effective that day, the Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, had assumed principal responsibility for the training of the Vietnamese armed forces, under the overall authority of the Commander of the French Union Forces.

In side talks on Indochina at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris in December 1954, Secretary Dulles had agreed to Mendes-France's proposal that Collins and Ely assess the strengths and weaknesses of Diem and (as understood by the French), should the balance prove unfavorable, suggest alternatives in a joint report to be submitted by the end of January 1955. Attempts at a joint report foundered, however, on the fact that the Diem Government had not had sufficient time in which to demonstrate its worth (in particular, in carrying out the seven-point reform program which Collins and Ely had suggested in November 1954) and on the clear desire of Paris to replace Diem with Bao Dai -- a proposal which Washington insisted had to be "slapped down". As a result, only Collins drew up a report at the end of February, concurred in privately but unofficially by Ely, recommending retention of Diem on the principal ground that there were no satisfactory alternatives.

A mid-February letter from Eisenhower to Bao Dai, praising Diem's efforts at reform to date, and Secretary Dulles' visit to Saigon on March 1, 1955, appeared to confirm the American commitment to the Diem Government. Confidence was temporarily shaken in mid-March by the revolt of the armed forces of the Buddhist religious sects (banded together as the "United Front of Nationalist Forces"), and even General Collins became briefly of the opinion that Diem should be replaced, possibly by Bao Dai. The regular army remained loyal to the government, however, and, with its help, Diem not only put down the rebellion but also wrested control of the national police from the Binh Xuyen sect, the most powerful of the Buddhist groups in the area of Saigon. By this victory, accomplished on his own, Diem strengthened immeasurably his position in South Vietnam.

The revolt and supression of the Buddhist sects proved to be a development which widened the breach between the United States and France with respect to Vietnam. Albeit with privately expressed doubts, the United States supported Diem throughout the crisis; the French did not. Seizing upon the revolt as concrete evidence of Diem's incapacity to govern, Paris pressed once again for the return of Bao Dai. To this suggestion the United States agreed, on condition that Bao Dai's role would be limited to persuading the Binh Xuyen to relinquish their hold of the police establishment. The French wanted much broader responsibilities to be assigned to the Vietnamese Chief of State. However, Diem's success in coping with the Binh Xuyen removed Bao Dai from any further American consideration of his return to Vietnam in even a limited capacity.

Further proof of a Franco-American split on Vietnam was produced at the May 7-11, 1955, NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, where, in side talks which intensively reviewed the situation in Vietnam, the United States turned down the French proposal that it share with France America's emerging function as chief foreign adviser to the Diem government. A tenuous compromise was reached on the French desire for a precipitate military withdrawal from Vietnam whereby, in return for the United States' agreeing to accept the temporary retention of Bao Dai as Chief of State and to attempt to persuade the Diem Government to moderate its anti-French posture, the French would gradually reduce the French Expeditionary Corps in proportion to an increase in effective South Vietnamese defense forces and, although reluctant to do so, would pledge to support Diem. The Paris talks broke up with the despatch of separate instructions to American Ambassador Reinhardt and General Ely in Saigon, the chief difference between the messages being that the United States advocated disbanding the Binh Xuyen and amalgamating the other Buddhist sects into "the normal life" of the community, while the French stressed the need to bring the sects into the government and to discover some capacity in which Bao Dai might usefully serve.

An immediate and unfavorable reaction to the Paris talks was registered by General Ely, who felt unable to carry out his new instructions, said so, and resigned. The designation of Ely's successor became an issue between France and the South Vietnamese. The latter succeeded, with American moral support but with no intervention, in wresting from the French a further

recognition of sovereignty. The civilian and military functions of the senior French representative in Vietnam (formerly combined under Ely) were split. General Pierre Jacquot succeeded Ely as Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces; Henri Hoppenot assumed Ely's civilian duties with the title of High Commissioner to the State of Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese Government had been displeased with the Paris talks: it had not been asked to send a representative, and, despite American assurances, it became quite uneasy about the agreement to retain Bao Dai as Chief of State. Diem therefore proposed that representatives of the United States, Britain, and France meet with him in Saigon to review the Paris agreements. The United States discouraged this proposal, for it wished to pursue an independent policy in Vietnam rather than be bound by what would appear to be a neocolonialist common approach with Britain and France. Diem therefore proceeded unilaterally to rid himself of Bao Dai by national referendum -- a step the United States felt might better have been delayed until the election of a National Assembly, for, pending the establishment of an elected body, Bao Dai represented the legitimacy of the Diem government.

With the deposition of Bao Dai as Chief of State and the approval of Diem as President of the Republic of Vietnam by the obviously rigged referendum of October 23, 1955, the Saigon Government became increasingly eager to achieve its final attribute of full sovereignty by speeding the departure of the French Expeditionary Corps from Vietnam. That the French would withdraw had been agreed upon at the Paris talks, and negotiations to this end had begun in June between French and South Vietnamese representatives. These negotiations bogged down almost immediately over the Vietnamese demand that, in return for Saigon's agreeing not to disturb the cease-fire (the preservation of which was the chief function of the French military in Vietnam), the French give a formal pledge of support, not just of the South Vietnamese Government, but of Diem personally as its head. The Vietnamese broke off the negotiations in October, by which time the French had already withdrawn most of the Expeditionary Corps.

The rapidity of the French withdrawal made increasingly pressing some kind of decision on the future of the Geneva Accords. This point was stressed in the Fourth Interim Report

of the International Control Commission, submitted to the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen on October 1, in which the Commission observed that inheritance of France's obligations under the cease-fire by South Vietnam, which had not signed the agreement, would, in effect, invalidate its provisions. Since the cease-fire was the sole authority for the Commission's existence, the ICC raised the question of its own future. The Co-Chairmen met in mid-November to consider the Commission's report and, on December 20, sent out letters to all the Geneva Conference powers and the countries represented on the ICC. They stressed the important function of the Commission, drew attention to its predicament, and invited the suggestions of the addressees.

In light of the fact that most of the provisions of the cease-fire had, in fact, been carried out, Washington toyed briefly with the idea of letting the Geneva Accords "die a natural death". This concept was vigorously opposed by Ambassador Reinhardt in Saigon, who considered the ICC as a major deterrent to the reopening of hostilities in Vietnam. When, in their response to the Co-Chairmen's letter of December 20, the Chinese Communists proposed a reconvening of the Geneva Conference -- a step which the United States wished to avoid at all costs -- Washington realized that the existing cease-fire machinery would have to be preserved.

In order to secure the Geneva Accords, the American and British Ambassadors in Saigon launched into what turned out to be a three months' effort to pry out of a reluctant South Vietnamese Government a declaration of intent to preserve the cease-fire following French withdrawal. The early release of such a declaration became important when, on January 19, 1956, the Diem Government asked the French to remove the remainder of their forces; to this request the French agreed, and they set April 15 (later moved up to the 28th) as the date on which the French High Command would be dissolved. Pressure built up further when, in late February, the Indian Government suggested that, prior to reconvening the Geneva Conference (as urged by the Chinese Communists), the Co-Chairmen meet to discuss the future of the Geneva Accords; such a meeting would presumably be held during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Britain scheduled for mid-April, and the British wished to have the Vietnamese declaration in hand before meeting with the Russians. Secretary Dulles' talk

with Diem in Saigon on March 14 resulted in Vietnamese argeement to a declaration, and the hard drafting began. The product was completed and sent to the British Foreign Ministry on April 3. It pledged the Vietnamese Government to "uphold existing conditions of the present state of peace."

The Geneva Co-Chairmen (represented by the Marquess of Reading for the United Kingdom and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for the Soviet Union) met in London from April 11 to May 8, 1956, and accepted the South Vietnamese declaration of April 3 as adequate basis on which to preserve the Geneva Conference arrangements in Vietnam despite French withdrawal. They so informed the other Geneva powers and urged the International Control Commission to continue to serve. At the insistence of the Russian Co-Chairman, they drew attention to the fact that negotiations between South and North Vietnam for the holding of nationwide elections to unify the country -- as specified both in the Geneva Conference Final Declaration and in the cease-fire -- had not been conducted, and they declared that this step should be taken. As the British subsequently explained, the reference to elections was the price they had paid to prevent the Russians from acceding to the Chinese demand for reconvening the Geneva Conference.

The United States was generally pleased with the outcome of the London talks. The Co-Chairmen had emerged as "the institutionalized arbiters of the implementation of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam", in this capacity replacing the Geneva Conference. Although the issue of elections had been raised, the Co-Chairmen had not set a date for holding them, and most of the Geneva powers were in tacit agreement that satisfactory conditions did not exist for holding elections by July 1956, as prescribed in the Geneva Conference Final Declaration.

Sanction for maintaining the status quo having been given by the Geneva Co-Chairmen, South Vietnam and France resumed negotiations in June on the differences remaining between them with respect to which cease-fire functions each would assume. The chief stumbling block was the fact that South Vietnam refused to pay the local expenses of the International Control Commission and to sit with the North Vietnamese on the Joint Armistice

Commission, for to take on either of these responsibilities would imply Saigon's acceptance of the Geneva Accords. By September, the French had agreed to retain both duties: to finance the ICC, subject to later negotiations with the Vietnamese respecting reimbursement, and to serve on the JAC until such time as its functions might be taken over by the ICC.

The final matter to be resolved because of French withdrawal from Vietnam was the training of the Vietnamese armed forces. With the introduction of MAAG into Vietnam in 1950, the United States had become involved, in an advisory capacity, in helping the French train the Vietnamese Army. At the time of signature of the cease-fire in Vietnam in 1954, MAAG personnel stood at a figure of 342 -- one which, by the terms of the cease-fire, could not thenceforth be exceeded. The break-up of the French military establishment in Vietnam posed the problem of how to increase the American training complement without violating the Geneva Accords.

In early February 1956, Secretary Dulles came up with the ingenious proposal that there be established under MAAG a group of 350 additional personnel to constitute a "Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission" (TERM) whose ostensible purpose would be to recover and preserve American military equipment being left in Vietnam by the French but whose real purpose would be to train the Vietnamese forces. Initially, Britain and Canada expressed doubts about TERM, and the French quite bluntly opposed it -- the former on the ground that introduction of TERM would upset the delicate negotiations with the Russians on the Vietnamese succession, and the latter on the ground that TERM clearly violated specific provisions of the Geneva Accords. However, when Prime Minister Nehru posed no objection after Secretary Dulles outlined TERM to him in New Delhi in mid-March (although Ambassador Cooper expressed fear that Nehru did not understand TERM's real mission), the doubters and opponents swung into line.

In the interest of abiding by the Geneva Accords, the United States could not introduce TERM into Vietnam without the foreknowledge and consent of the International Control Commission. Notification to the ICC was to take the form of a communication from the Government of South Vietnam to be transmitted by the French High Commissioner to the ICC. At the urging of the Department of State (in turn, under pressure from the Pentagon), the American Embassy and Vietnamese Foreign Office

[redacted]

undertook in late April the drafting of such a communication in order that ICC approval might be obtained in time to permit the arrival of the first contingent of TERM on May 30. Several revisions were required to satisfy Indian demands that the notification play down the military aspects of TERM's mission.

Preoccupied with determining the legality of its own functions on an ad hoc basis beyond July 1956, the International Control Commission did not officially begin to consider the application for the admission of TERM until the end of May, although notification of TERM's impending arrival and purpose had been in its hands since April 25. Believing that the ICC had had ample time to be seized of the question, the United States proceeded to fly the first contingents of TERM to Saigon on May 30 -- a date which represented a three week's postponement of the original plans of the Department of Defense. There ensued several exchanges between the ICC and the Government of South Vietnam respecting the Commission's rights of inspection of the number and movements of TERM personnel. The Indian Chairman of the Commission was anxious to have the role of the ICC broad enough with reference to TERM's operations to forestall the possibility of an adverse minority report by the Polish member at such time as the Commission ruled on TERM's legality under the Geneva Accords. The Saigon Government provided the ICC with some, but by no means all, of the information the Commission requested. By the end of August, TERM had rounded out its full complement, and South Vietnam dropped its correspondence with the ICC on the subject of TERM. Thus, technically, TERM was introduced into Vietnam without ICC approval.

Concomitantly with the introduction of TERM, the South Vietnamese Government transferred responsibility for training its armed forces from the defunct French High Command to the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, to be directed by the Chief of MAAG with a French military representative in a subordinate role. This move virtually completed the two-year process of eliminating French influence in South Vietnam.

Chapter I

IMMEDIATE POST-GENEVA POLICY, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1954

With the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, the United States sought by various means to shore up South Vietnam against the Communists. This was the purpose of energetic American efforts to assure the establishment of a stable and independent non-Communist government in Saigon. It was one objective, too, of renewed and intensified efforts to promote the creation of a collective defense arrangement for Southeast Asia.

Negotiation of the Manila Pact, With Protocol

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, with a Protocol extending its protection to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, only a month and a half after the Geneva Conference. Months earlier, on March 29, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles had publicly expressed the view that "united action" was needed in Southeast Asia to meet the Communist threat,[1] but the British and French had declined to consider participating in a collective arrangement of this kind before the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. In a joint communiqué of June 28, however, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill had affirmed that they would press forward with plans for collective defense in Southeast Asia irrespective of whether the negotiations at Geneva were successful,[2] and an Anglo-American working group had then been set up to study, *inter alia*, the question of the defense of Southeast Asia. Also, the ANZUS Powers--Australia, New Zealand, and the United States--meeting in Washington on June 30, 1954, had issued a communiqué emphasizing that Southeast Asia was an area in which all three countries were vitally concerned.[3] On the strictly

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[1] *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446), vol. II, pp. 2373-2381.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 1705-1706.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 2332-2333.

[redacted]

military side, discussions covering Southeast Asia had been held, June 3-11, in the so-called Five-Power Staff Agency (established by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand in January 1953).[1] At the same time, supplemental talks had proceeded between the United States and other countries: in Manila, with the Philippine Government; in Geneva, with representatives from South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and in Washington, with the Thai Embassy.

Immediately following the Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles chaired a high-level meeting in Washington on July 24--attended by Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Robert Cutler, Chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, and Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration--to discuss the next steps to be taken with regard to Southeast Asia. Dulles informed the meeting that the joint U.S.-U.K. Study Group had produced a report which consisted primarily of an agreed draft security treaty. On the basis of this report, Dulles said, he believed that the United States should move ahead quickly with those countries in the area which were willing to join in a Southeast Asia Pact, the primary purpose of which would be to deter open aggression by the Chinese Communists. Another important objective would be to combat subversion and infiltration in the non-communist states of the area. This could be done principally by helping to build up local security forces, by providing economic support, and possibly by offering underground intelligence support.

The Secretary added that the two primary advantages to the United States in the proposed treaty would be that it would give the President discretionary authority which he did not then have for use in the event of overt Chinese aggression in the area, and it would insure the support of other nations in any actions the United States was forced to take. The Secretary stated that he did not see any necessity for a large NATO-type organization, but that, from the military standpoint, the United States should proceed rapidly with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, to draft a treaty which could "draw a line" to include the Associated

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[1] United States Policy on Indochina in the Period of the Geneva Conference, Indochina Phase, May 8-July 21, 1954 (P/HO Research Project No. 478, top secret), pp. 5, 31, and 48-50.

[redacted]

States of Indochina even though they could not be members. Asked for amplification concerning where the line would be drawn, the Secretary replied that what was inside the line was not so important as the notice given to the world that, if the line were crossed, the United States would retaliate.

The type of alliance contemplated, Dulles said, would probably not attract any adherents beyond the seven original members. On the other hand, a treaty which contained provisions regarding the economic welfare of the area, while it might eventually attract some of the Colombo powers and Japan, would delay the formation of a defense arrangement if the United States waited for some of these powers to join.[1]

Throughout the negotiations which led to the Manila Conference, the British Government tried to persuade the Colombo Powers to associate themselves with a proposed guarantee or defensive treaty. By August, the United Kingdom had received an affirmative answer from Pakistan, negative answers from India, Burma, and Indonesia, while the Government of Ceylon announced that it would not attend but was prepared to keep an open mind on the subject. Since the United States did not wish invitations extended to the prospective participants which would make it appear that the West was engineering the meeting, it was agreed that the governments willing to participate should issue declarations simultaneously, stating their intent to conclude a collective defense arrangement.

The United States wanted to announce the plans for the forthcoming conference as soon as possible and named August 7 as the preferred date. The French, on the other hand, wished to defer the announcement of the meeting until August 21. The French maintained that it was necessary to make sure that there would be no pretext for breaking the Armistice arrangements, pointing out that August 7 was the date when the final phase of the cease-fire agreements would go into effect in Cambodia and August 11 the date when the Armistice would become effective

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[1]Summary of Meeting on Southeast Asia, July 24, 1954, top secret (SEAP Special 1).

in South Vietnam.[1] A compromise was reached, and on August 14, 1954, the simultaneous declarations were issued, each government stating that it would attend a meeting at Baguio, the Philippines, from September 6 to 8, 1954 to draw up a collective defense treaty for Southeast Asia.[2]

After several days of preliminary meetings among the technical working groups, the Conference opened on September 6--at Manila rather than Baguio because of communications arrangements. The Foreign Ministers of all the countries except the United Kingdom and France attended. Foreign Secretary Eden sent the Marquess of Reading, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, in his place, and French Premier and Foreign Minister Mendès-France asked Guy La Chambre, Minister for Relations with the Associated States, to lead the French Delegation. The State of Veitnam had requested permission to send an observer to the Conference, but none of Governments represented, except the United States, wished to allow the Saigon Government to have any connection with the proceedings, even on an informal basis. Secretary Dulles therefore concluded that the South Vietnamese request, if formally presented to the Conference, would be rejected, causing general embarrassment to all concerned.[3]

At the First Plenary Session, Dulles declared that the United States felt a sense of common destiny with the countries of Southeast Asia. He stated further that the countries represented were united by a common danger stemming from international Communism and its insatiable ambition. He drew attention to the absence of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam from the Conference but said that he hoped it would prove possible to "throw some mantle of protection" over those states.[4]

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[1]Memorandum by Nunley (RA) of conversation among de Juniac and Pelletier of the French Embassy, Merchant (EUR), and Galloway (C), Aug. 5, 1954, secret; Summary of Meeting in the Secretary's Office, Aug. 5, 1954, secret (SEAP Special 2).

[2]Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 264.

[3]From Manila, tel. SECTO 2, Sept. 2, 1954, secret.

[4]Manila Conference, Verbatim Proceedings of the First Plenary Session, Sept. 6, 1954, unclassified.

At the Second Plenary Session--the Conference having moved into closed proceedings after the opening session--the French delegate suggested, in connection with Article III of the proposed Treaty, which dealt with economic cooperation, that Laos, Cambodia, and South Veitnam should be included in the Treaty, inasmuch as the French regarded the Geneva Agreements as "a still precarious pacification". Secretary Dulles wished to preserve the wording of Article III as it appeared in the draft, and, in particular, from the legal point of view, he did not want states specified in the body of the treaty other than the parties to it. Furthermore, the Conference representatives recognized that South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were definitely precluded from membership by the terms of the Geneva Agreement.[1]

To get around these difficulties, the French, in the Third Plenary Session, on September 7, again stated that one of the main concerns of the French Government since the signing of the Geneva Agreements was to make Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam eligible "in respect of the advantages to be derived from the present Treaty." These advantages were the economic measures provided in Article III and the guarantees of security found in Article IV. The French preferred that these provisions be taken care of by a separate Protocol which would be an integral part of the Treaty. They felt that this procedure would have the further advantage of preserving Article III intact, "as we all wish," and of preserving at the same time the right of non-members other than the Indochinese States to accede to the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.[2]

The conferees agreed to the French proposal. They drafted a brief Protocol which designated "for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Veitnam" and stated "that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III."

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[1]Manila Conference, Second Plenary Session, Sept. 6, 1954, top secret.

[2]Manila Conference, Verbatim Proceedings of the Third Plenary Session, Sept. 7, 1954, top secret.

The Treaty and Protocol were signed on September 8. With the subsequent depositing of instruments of ratification with the Government of the Philippines, the Treaty and Protocol entered into force on February 19, 1955.[1]

Developments Leading to the Franco-American Minute of Understanding on Support of Diem and Direct U.S. Aid to Vietnam

Concurrently with providing protection for the State of Vietnam under the provisions of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States sought to strengthen the government in Saigon in order to create stability in a land which had known little peace since 1941 and which was soon to achieve full independence from the French. The government in power at the time of the conclusion of the Geneva Conference was that of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, installed only two weeks earlier.

Initial Assessments of Diem and His Prospects. In the course of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, it had become increasingly apparent that Chief of State Bao Dai intended to appoint Diem to replace Prince Buu Loc as Premier of the Vietnamese Government. Ngo Dinh Luyen, Diem's brother, in the capacity of personal representative of Bao Dai, presented word of this possibility to the head of the American Delegation at Geneva, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, on whose recommendation representatives of the Paris Embassy held two interviews with Diem (then in Paris).[2]

The Embassy reported that Diem appeared "too unworldly and unsophisticated to be able to cope with the grave problems and unscrupulous people he will find in Saigon." On balance, however,

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[1] American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 912-916.

[2] Memorandum by Bonsal (PSA) of conversation between Smith (U) and Ngo Dinh Luyen, Geneva, May 18, 1954, top secret; memorandum by Bonsal (PSA) of conversation with Ngo Dinh Nuyen, Geneva, May 20, 1954, top secret; from Geneva, SECTO 261 (repeated to Paris and Saigon), May 20, 1954, top secret.

the Embassy favored Diem's appointment "but only in the realization that we are prepared to accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this Yogi-like mystic could assume the charge he is apparently about to undertake only because the standard set by his predecessors is so low." The Embassy also conceded that Diem's elevation was a "step in right direction and diametric change from prototype of suave Europeanized money-seeking dilettante represented by [former Premiers] Buu Loc, Tran Van Huu, and General Xuan, all of whom have failed so miserably."[1]

With regard to **Diem's** views on matters of substance, the Paris Embassy found the likely Premier-designate receptive to the idea of early signature of the two basic treaties, already initialed in draft, by which the State of Vietnam would receive independence from France and become a member of the French Union. Diem also approved the proposal that the United States take over from the French much of the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces. On the question of establishing an elected National Assembly, the Embassy reported Diem as having "strong reservations", believing that elections would be risky "for the foreseeable future" and that an Assembly created "by 'designation'" would have to have only very limited authority. Diem viewed with favor, however, the Embassy's suggestion that the Assembly might be a constitutional Assembly empowered to act only in an advisory capacity.[2]

From Saigon, Robert McClintock, the American Chargé, reported elation in Hué at the prospect of Diem's return to Vietnam as Premier--Diem's early career had been as administrator under the Emperor Bao Dai in the ancient capital of Annam. McClintock cautioned, however, that "this enthusiasm in Hué should not ... be interpreted as representative of national spirit, since Diem is identified with Central Vietnam and with Catholic faction." Describing Diem as a "not dynamic leader", McClintock hazarded the guess that "his acknowledged integrity

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[1] From Paris, tel. 4251, May 24, 1954, secret; from Paris, tel. 4542, May 26, 1954, top secret.

[2] From Paris, tel. 4538, May 26, 1954, secret.

might prove real asset"; at the same time, McClintock admitted that Diem's "integrity might also make it most difficult for many officials at all levels in government cooperate under any administration headed by him."[1]

The French were somewhat cynical about Bao Dai's motives in selecting Diem as Buu Loc's successor. As Robert Tezenas du Montcel, French Minister for the Associated States, put it to a member of the American Delegation at the Geneva Conference, whenever, in the past, Bao Dai had spoken of the possibility of giving Diem the post of Premier, it had been with the idea of "breaking his back". McClintock, too, was wary and offered his view that "Bao Dai and company may wish to appoint honest mystic like Ngo Dinh Diem to head what is left of government in Vietnam in order to be scapegoat in event French should agree to cease-fire and armistice with Viet Minh."[2]

Whatever Bao Dai's motives, Ngo Dinh Diem was formally named Premier on June 16, and his government was installed on July 7. As events developed, it was with Diem, first as Premier of the State of Vietnam and then as President of the Republic of Vietnam, that the United States had to deal for the ensuing nine years.

<u>Thwarting of Early Efforts To Oust Diem</u>. Late in July, the French Government made known its dissatisfaction with Diem. In Paris, on July 27, Guy La Chambre, the new Minister for the Associated States in the Mendès-France cabinet, told Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon that Diem was unsuitable as Premier because the bulk of his support came from the Catholic provinces in Annam, thus alienating the sects in the southern provinces (a situation which, perhaps unbeknownst to La Chambre, Ambassador Heath in Saigon was attempting to remedy by urging various political groups and the sects in the south to rally around Diem).[3]

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2532, May 25, 1954, secret, and tel. 2564, May 27, 1954, confidential.

[2]Memorandum by Bonsal (PSA) of conversation with Tezenas du Montcel, Geneva, May 22, 1954, top secret; from Saigon, tel. 2564, May 27, 1954, confidential.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 327, July 26, 1954, secret; tel. 348, July 28, 1954, confidential.

La Chambre added, however, that, because of Diem's "high moral standing", he should probably be included in any successor government.[1] Washington immediately asked for clarification of French intentions respecting Diem.[2] La Chambre replied, on the 30th, that Paris was undecided about continuing support of Diem and was sending Claude Cheysson, Mendès-France's chef de cabinet and former deputy political adviser to the French Commissioner-General in Vietnam, out to Saigon on a fact-finding mission.[3]

Cheysson returned to Paris with an extremely gloomy picture of the inactivity of the Government of South Vietnam. Representatives of the American Embassy in Paris talked with both La Chambre and Cheysson on August 11 and reported that the latter termed the Diem Government the most hopelessly ineffective of all Vietnamese Governments to date. La Chambre quoted from the most recent report by the French Commissioner-General in Vietnam, General Paul Ely, to the effect that the incapacity of the Government was exceeded only by its self-conceit. The Diem Government had reached few decisions and had taken little action on the most pressing problems--in particular, with respect to evacuation of non-communist Vietnamese from North Vietnam. The French in Vietnam had had to take a direct hand in coping with this particular problem. La Chambre admitted that this was bad politically but said that the French could not do otherwise, given the do-nothingness of the Vietnamese Government.[4]

Matters became further complicated when, also on August 11 and presumably on the basis of similarly disturbing reports from Saigon, Bao Dai announced his intention to return to Vietnam "in the near future". This announcement caught all involved completely off base. Putting as happy a construction as he could on this latest development, La Chambre told American Embassy officials that, in view of the "uselessness" of the Diem Government, Bao Dai's return to Vietnam would not be

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[1]From Paris, tel. 366, July 27, 1954, secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 366, July 28, 1954, secret.

[3]From Paris, tel. 438, July 30, 1954, secret.

[4]From Paris, tel. 598, Aug. 12, 1954, secret.

likely to worsen the situation; if Bao Dai proposed to take an active part in administrative affairs, his return might even prove useful. Taking a contrary view, Cheysson expressed his fear that, because of the widespread opposition to Bao Dai throughout Vietnam, the return of the Chief of State might drive many Vietnamese into the arms of the Viet Minh. The Embassy concluded that La Chambre proposed to do nothing to prevent Bao Dai's move and that Cheysson wished there were some means of preventing it.[1] Washington's reaction was that Bao Dai was "of course an obstacle on road to progress whether in France or Viet Nam" but that "he can do more harm at present in Viet Nam than he can [in] France."[2]

In a move to reverse the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, Secretary Dulles proposed, in a personal communication to Premier Mendès-France on August 18, that President Eisenhower address a message to "the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam" in which he would "express on behalf of the American people his and their appreciation of the efforts of the Vietnamese Government and people in the struggle for freedom and the readiness of the American people to continue to aid in this struggle."[3] The French reply came in the form of an aide-mémoire of August 26 in which it was pointed out that it "would be regrettable if the message which President Eisenhower proposes to address to the Prime Minister of Vietnam was drafted in such a way that it appeared destined less to the Chief of the Vietnamese Government than to Diem personally." The French also observed that, much as they might wish that a message from the American President would "confirm support of the free world to the Vietnamese National Government, the more France would consider it dangerous that the message would be designed to consolidate the position of a man whose conduct has been demonstrated to be largely ineffectual and whose public support diminishes every day."[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] To Paris, tel. 603, Aug. 18, 1954, secret.

[3] To Paris, tel. 610, Aug. 18, 1954, secret.

[4] To Paris, tel. 737, Aug. 28, 1954, secret.

Toward the end of August, Ambassador Heath reported from Saigon that no less than two plots were afoot for the replacement of Diem. One was sponsored by the "confessional groups"--the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen Buddhist sects--aided and abetted by General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army; these plotters were not in agreement, however, on a successor for Diem. The other plot was purely French, with the design of replacing Diem with former Premiers Tran Van Huu as the new Premier and Nguyen Van Tam as Minister of the Interior (and in charge of the Sureté). The second plot had come so close to fruition by August 26, according to Heath's account, that "operations for its execution would probably have started if I had not stated very firmly to General Ely and his Deputy Bordaz yesterday evening that Diem must be given another chance to come to terms with sects and set up capable government"--a course which Heath had been urging on Diem.[1]

Upon receipt of this information, the Department of State instructed Ambassador Dillon in Paris to convey orally to Premier Mendès-France or La Chambre the following:

> "Department of State deeply disturbed at reports that French authorities in Indochina apparently actively encouraging change of government there. Such activities contradict repeated assertions by Mendès-France and La Chambre regarding independence of Vietnam. If carried out such projects will destroy confidence Vietnamese in their true independence. Department trusts reports do not reflect French Government's intentions."

The Department also instructed Heath in Saigon to warn General Ely "that while U.S. Government respects right of Vietnamese to select their own leaders, choice of a person such as Huu identified with idea of coalition government with Vietminh would make it impossible for us to request U.S. Congress for assistance to free Vietnamese Government which we desire to render." He was also to warn the sects "that coup d'état against Diem would produce most unfortunate effect in U.S. including doubts as to stability and prospects of free Vietnam."[2]

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 759, Aug. 27, 1954, secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 733,(tel. 811 to Saigon), Aug. 28, 1954, secret.

Accordingly, representatives of the Embassy saw La Chambre on the morning of the 30th and afterwards reported that he felt a change in the Saigon Government "in near future indispensable". The French were described, however, as "determined not pull strings or try force any Veitnamese Government out of office or into being." Nonetheless, the French felt that Tam ought to be Minister of Interior in any Vietnamese Government in order to counter Viet Minh pressures. La Chambre also informed the Embassy that Bao Dai had decided not to return to Saigon at that time.[1]

Throughout the first half of September, the French continued to press Diem to bring Tam into his cabinet despite the fact that Diem had made it quite clear he could not stand Tam and would rather resign than accept him.[2] The Department therefore instructed Embassy Paris, on September 17, to deliver orally to Mendés-France or La Chambre its strongest message to date on the matter of French meddling in Saigon. "To cause the Deim Government to fall by the forced inclusion of a Minister unacceptable to Diem," the message stated, "would appear to be highly inconsistent with French assurances to the United States of the independence of Viet-Nam and would also deprive any successor government of the nationalist support indispensable to a viable government in Viet-Nam by the demonstration of foreign ability to appoint and remove its government at will." The message concluded with the warning that "there should be no misunderstanding regarding the fact that American aid could not be furnished to a government in Viet-Nam which failed to include substantial nationalist support."[3]

When read the contents of the Department's message on the following day, Mendés-France pleaded ignorance of machinations in Saigon to force Tam into the Diem Government. He commented, however, that the South Vietnamese Government was "clearly disintegrating". He observed, further, that it was important that the United States and France concert their policies with respect to Indochina rather than work at cross purposes and that

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[1] From Paris, tel. 873, Aug. 30, 1954, secret.

[2] From Saigon, tel. 842, Aug. 31, 1954, secret.

[3] To Paris, tel. 997, Sept. 17, 1954, secret.

it was for this reason he was sending Ely and La Chambre to Washington for high-level talks--a proposal which Acting Secretary Smith had approved on September 14.[1] Mendès-France agreed to instruct the French in Saigon to "go easy" until these talks had been held.[2]

From the American viewpoint, it was highly desirable that the Diem Government receive the acknowledged support of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects (both of which had a genuine religious base with considerable religious and political following in South Vietnam) prior to the opening of the Washington talks, scheduled for September 27. To this end, the American Embassy in Saigon had for some time been conducting negotiations, which, toward the end of September, began to show signs of bearing fruit. Disruption threatened, however, when, on September 21, "General" Le Van Vien, head of the Binh-Xuyen (a group which controlled much of the police and a substantial number of South Vietnam's gambling establishments), announced to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao that he had just returned from Paris with a mandate from Bao Dai to form a new government. He added that La Chambre had told him he "would find that there was something changed" in the American point of view about supporting Diem.

On the afternoon of the 21st, the Counselor of Embassy, Randolph A. Kidder, allayed the fears of the representatives of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. He assured them that the United States position had not changed, that the United States would continue to support the legal Government of South Vietnam, and that it would view with extreme disfavor any use of force to change the Government. He added that the United States was not wedded to any particular Government, but that, even in case of legal and peaceful change, the United States would have to take a look at the new Government, its representative nature, and its anti-Communist orientation, and review the American position on military and economic aid in the light of these findings. Kidder said that he had no knowledge of any "mandate" granted to Le Van Vien.[3]

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[1] To Paris, tel. 990, Sept. 17, 1954, confidential.

[2] From Paris, tel. 1171, Sept. 18, 1954, top secret.

[3] From Saigon, tel. 1154, Sept. 21, 1954, top secret.

On the basis of Kidder's reassurances, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects announced their full accord on the desirability of supporting Diem. On September 24, Diem, in turn, announced the formation of a new cabinet which contained several members from the two sects.[1] With these moves, the prospects of obtaining French agreement to support Diem in the forthcoming Washington talks seemed distinctly brighter.

The Question of American Direct Aid to Vietnam, Training of Vietnamese Forces, and Support of the French Expeditionary Corps. Although there was no formal agenda for the Washington talks, several practical matters besides support of Diem were bound to come up for discussion and solution. The United States was anxious to obtain French acceptance of the principle of direct American aid to South Vietnam and of American sharing with the French the task of training the South Vietnamese armed forces. The French desired assurances of continued American support for the French Expeditionary Corps in South Vietnam during the period of its phased withdrawal from the area.

The concept of direct aid became national policy with the approval, on August 12, of a new National Security Council paper on the Far East. With reference to the Associated States of Indochina, the paper stated that, "working through the French only insofar as necessary," the United States should "assist Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam to maintain (1) military forces necessary for internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the maintenance and strength of non-Communist regimes and comparing favorably with those in adjacent areas." This statement flowed logically from the precepts that the United States should "urge the French to promptly recognize and deal with Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam as independent sovereign nations" and should "strengthen U.S. representation and deal directly, wherever advantageous to the U.S., with the governments of Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam."[2] "The furnishing, as far as possible, of direct assistance to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as well as to the forces

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[1] From Saigon, tels. 1185 and 1188, Sept. 23, 1954, and 1213, Sept. 24, 1954, all top secret.

[2] National Security Council 5429/1, Aug. 12, 1954, top secret.

of other free nations in the area including those of France located in such Associated States" became law by Section 121 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, approved on August 26.[1]

That the South Vietnamese would be agreeable to receiving aid directly from the United States and American trainers for their armed forces had been evident since May--indeed, Bao Dai had suggested these measures.[2] The French, on the other hand, were reluctant to bring the United States into Vietnam with such an independent role, and raised the Geneva Accords as a legal obstacle to such a course. The French presented this argument in their response to Secretary Dulles' formal proposal in his letter of August 18 to Premier Mendès-France, mentioned earlier.

In that letter Dulles had written: "In addition to military material assistance and economic aid, we are prepared to give direct assistance to the Associated States, including budgetary support, in addition to the support furnished by the French Union." He had added: "We believe presently some and eventually all of this aid should be given directly rather than through the French Government, as has been done previously." "This approach", Dulles explained, "seems to us in keeping with the independent status of these states and necessary to help them to develop their self-confidence and self-reliance."

Dulles had then turned to the subject of military training, saying, "We are also prepared to consider the requests of the Associated States such as have been made by Viet-Nam and Cambodia to undertake direct military training of their armed forces [and] ... are prepared to consider the establishment of training missions in their territories." He pointed out "that General Ely and General [John W.] O'Daniel have already discussed at least the possibility of a training function for our present Military Aid Advisory Group."[3]

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[1] 68 Stat. 837.

[2] Memorandum by Bonsal (PSA) of conversation with Ngo Dinh Luyen, Geneva, May 20, 1954, top secret.

[3] To Paris, tel. 610, Aug. 18, 1954, secret.

In their reply of August 26, the French observed that, with reference to direct American aid to the Vietnamese National Army, it "would appear dangerous with regard to the agreements of Geneva for U.S. not to supply end items through intermediary of France." They also argued for "strict coordination on spot" if the development of the Vietnamese armed forces was to conform to the Geneva Accords, and, for this purpose, they suggested that "mixed committee be constituted [in] Saigon, under General Ely, to realize this coordination." They cautioned that "any agreement for military aid that the U.S. enters into directly with Vietnam" might be viewed "as an alliance contrary to the Geneva agreements".

On the matter of American trainers for the Vietnamese armed forces, the French conceded that "before Geneva" they had seen "advantages" to this kind of American aid. The terms of the Vietnamese cease-fire had, however, complicated this possibility. In the first place, some of the Geneva Conference powers would interpret the introduction of an American training mission as establishment of a foreign military base in violation of the cease-fire. Furthermore, the French Foreign Ministry argued, "if one can admit ... that provisions of agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam strictly interpreted authorizes replacement, man for man, of MAAG personnel ..., it would appear to be out of question ... to replace those members of this body who perform administrative functions with training personnel."[1]

The French were quick to note that Secretary Dulles had made no mention in his August 18 message of continuing American budgetary support of the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam. This omission had been deliberate, for the matter was considered in Washington as an "open question". Ambassador Dillon explained this to La Chambre in Paris and added that, for the question to be resolved, it would be necessary for the United States to be informed of French thinking on the size of the expeditionary force to be left in Indochina "and related data". La Chambre agreed to provide full information as soon as possible and indicated that General Ely's initial thinking was that the French Expeditionary Corps would be reduced from its existing

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[1] To Paris, tel. 737, Aug. 28, 1954, secret.

strength of 180,000 to 150,000 by the end of 1954 and to 100,000 by the end of 1955, with a compensating increase in the size of the Vietnamese National Army from its current total of 155,000.[1]

In view of the wide disparity of points of view revealed in Secretary Dulles' letter of August 18 and the French aide-mémoire of the 26th, Dillon urged the Department to hold in abeyance the question of financial support for the FEC until a satisfactory agreement had been reached with the French on future United States relationships with the Associated States. He proposed this delay "in order not [to] undercut our bargaining position."[2] It was to resolve these differences, too, that the Washington talks were held at the end of September.

<u>The Washington Talks and the Smith-La Chambre Minute of Understanding, Initialed September 29, 1954</u>. It was the French who proposed, in mid-September, that high-level talks be held in Washington in an attempt to reconcile French and American policies in Indochina. Edgar Faure, the Finance Minister, was scheduled to attend the meeting of the International Monetary Fund, September 24-27, and the French suggested that La Chambre and General Ely fly over to join him for attendant Indochina talks. Washington approved.[3]

When Diem got wind of the scheduled talks, he asked Ambassador Heath in Saigon whether he should not appoint a special envoy to the talks and insist that any discussions relating to Vietnam be tripartite in nature. Washington instructed Heath to inform Diem that the United States had no list of specific subjects the French might wish to raise and presumed that the talks would deal primarily with United States financial support of the French Expeditionary Corps, which was

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[1] From Paris, tel. 873, Aug. 30, 1954, secret.

[2] From Paris, tel. 945, Sept. 2, 1954, secret.

[3] From Paris, tel. 1113, Sept. 15, and to Paris, tel. 990, Sept. 17, 1954, both confidential.

a bilateral problem. Washington added that Vietnamese officials would be kept abreast of developments.[1]

On the morning of September 25, La Chambre and Acting Secretary Smith held a preliminary exchange of views on the nature of the political problems in Vietnam requiring solution--Laos and Cambodia were not discussed. Smith produced a report by Senator Mansfield which stated that only the kind of government which Diem envisioned--a government "free of corruption and dedicated to achieving genuine national independence and internal amelioration"--was worthy of United States support.[2] The Acting Secretary emphasized that Senator Mansfield's views would have great influence in Congress, "particularly with Democrats".

La Chambre acknowledged Diem's honesty, incorruptibility, and strong nationalism but expressed concern at Diem's apparent inability to produce an efficient government capable of eliminating corruption and of meeting Communist infiltration. Conceding that, with the reorganization of his cabinet on September 24, Diem had the nominal support of two of the three sects, La Chambre observed that the continued opposition of the powerful Binh Xuyen sect and of Chief of Staff General Hinh (i.e., most of the Army) made Diem very weak to counter the Viet Minh. One also had to keep in mind the fact that Bao Dai still had the authority to "unmake" governments in Saigon whenever he did not agree with France and the United States. For the time being, the French wished to retain Bao Dai in the event it proved necessary to have the French Expeditionary Corps restore order in South Vietnam, and Bao Dai's assent would be required to give such action a "cloak of legality". At the conclusion of the meeting, Smith stressed the need for a "positive political program to save what had been salvaged at Geneva."[3]

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 1088, Sept. 18, and to Saigon, tel. 1127, Sept. 20, 1954, both secret.

[2]From Berlin, tel. 212, Sept. 24, 1954, secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 1217 (1113 to Paris, 1749 to London), Sept. 25, 1954, top secret.

At the first formal meeting of the Washington talks, on September 27, both sides agreed that "France and U.S. support Diem in establishment and maintenance of strong anti-Communist and Nationalist Government and to that end will jointly urge all anti-Communist elements in Vietnam to cooperate fully with Diem Government to counter vigorously Viet Minh and build strong free Vietnam." No sooner had the meeting adjourned than La Chambre received and communicated to Smith a message from Paris to the effect that, in two interviews with the French, Bao Dai had expressed astonishment at the "unusual" intervention by the United States and France in Vietnamese affairs by holding the Washington talks without Vietnamese representation--an act he found "incompatible with independence". Bao Dai had obviously also been piqued by receipt of a telegram from Diem declaring that Diem could not be withdrawn as Premier without causing an immediate stoppage of American aid to Vietnam. In Bao Dai's view, the retention of Diem would increase political chaos and risk bloody incidents in Saigon which could only profit the Viet Minh. The Vietnamese Chief of State was therefore considering the formation of a new government under General Nguyen Van Xuan, a former Vice Premier and Premier.[1]

Acting Secretary Smith and La Chambre immediately sent a joint message to Saigon requesting the views of Ambassador Heath and Jean Daridan, Deputy French Commissioner-General, on Bao Dai's proposed course of action.[2] Smith followed this up with a personal message to Heath asking whether, with French and United States support, it would be possible to "make a synthetic strong man" out of Diem and to "associate with him competent people who may compensate for his deficiencies in administrative ability and governing capacity." Coming to the crux of the matter, Smith asked: "Can there be built around Diem, on basis of his honesty, integrity and sincerity, a government which with our combined support will be relatively enduring and may eventually attract the allegiance of the three sects and the Army?"[3]

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 1240, Sept. 28, 1954, top secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 1240 (1135 to Paris, 1776 to London), Sept. 28, 1954, top secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 1254, Sept. 28, 1954, top secret.

While awaiting word from Saigon, the negotiators in Washington turned, on September 28, to economic and military matters. Edgar Faure, the French Finance Minister, made a formal request that the United States supply financial assistance in support of the French Expeditionary Corps for calendar year 1955. Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, replied that the request would be considered and explained that the United States Congress would have to be consulted on this matter.[1] The military discussions dealt with the role of the FEC in Indochina, the development of an autonomous Vietnamese Army, and the problems relating to the evacuation of military and civilian personnel and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, in which operations United States Navy vessels were assisting the Vietnamese and French authorities.[2]

When La Chambre and Ely met with Smith on the 29th, the conferees had before them "a joint expression of views of Daridan and Heath" respecting Bao Dai's proposed replacement of Diem with Xuan. Daridan and Heath agreed that, "if it is French and U.S. policy to support Diem at this time, there is nothing more that can be done here [in Saigon]." They suggested that Heath proceed to Cannes, via Paris, to make representations to Bao Dai in Diem's favor. If these proved unavailing, "then appointment of Xuan might result in quick but only very temporary solution of crisis." Both Daridan and Heath were of the opinion that "Xuan would not be acceptable Prime Minister for long term solution and enduring government."[3]

Smith also had the benefit of views of certain other French and Vietnamese officials in Saigon (reported by Heath) who pointed out that Xuan was a French citizen and a French general officer "who has practically forgotten his native tongue." Because Xuan lacked "any real force of his own

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[1]To Paris, tel. 1157 (1277 to Saigon, TOSEC 5 to London), Sept. 29, 1954, secret.

[2]To London, tel. TOSEC 4 (1154 to Paris, 1264 to Saigon), Sept. 28, 1954, confidential.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 1265, Sept. 28, 1954, top secret.

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behind him, he would be pawn of Hinh and [the] Binh Xuyen."[1] Heath then added some views of his own to the effect that Diem could be brought through the existing crisis "if we remain united and firm and if Diem Government accepts some necessary compromises", such as appointing Xuan as Defense Minister and Vice President. Heath concluded, however, that, "while Diem is only man now in sight with character enough to form and head an enduring government, we must be looking around urgently, as so far we have been doing without success, for a relief pitcher and get him warming up in bullpen," for "Diem's intrinsic faults may yet create a situation making his replacement necessary."[2]

La Chambre agreed that Heath should visit Bao Dai in Cannes on the premise that, in the "first phase", France and the United States should bolster Diem without reservations and give him a chance to succeed. At the same time, La Chambre pointed out, the seriously deteriorating situation in Vietnam could not brook long delays. Thus, should Diem fail despite "our real thorough assistance", it might prove necessary to ask Bao Dai to delegate powers to former Premier Buu Loc, Diem's immediate predecessor, to settle matters by forming a government of national union with himself or someone else as Premier and with Diem in the cabinet. La Chambre and Ely agreed that Xuan should not be made Premier; both concurred with Heath, however, that Xuan might be made Minister of Defense if such an appointment would help to reconcile Diem and General Hinh. Smith pronounced himself gratified at the French stand and agreeable to their suggestion for an alternative to Diem, should need be.[3]

Supported by the views of Heath and Daridan from Saigon, Smith and La Chambre then initialed a Minute of Understanding. Its political provision concerning Diem remained as agreed upon on the 27th. On the question of direct aid, the Minute specified that "the channel for French and U.S. economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to it." At the request of the French, the following sentence was added: "Such programs will be planned

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[1] From Saigon, tel. 1266, Sept. 28, 1954, top secret.

[2] From Saigon, tel. 1270, Sept. 29, 1954, top secret.

[3] To Saigon, tel. 1296, Sept. 30, 1954, secret.

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and closely coordinated to assure maximum effectiveness through appropriate machinery to be established in agreement with the interested Governments." Finally, the Minute stated that French and United States support of the independence of the Associated States would "include the completion of the transfer of powers in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, to the free governments of these States on an orderly and progressive basis."[1]

Having transmitted the text of the Minute of Understanding to their respective representatives in Saigon, Smith and La Chambre held a brief supplementary meeting on September 30. They sent a joint message to Heath and Daridan in which they acknowledged that it would be "prudent bear in mind possibility that despite our best efforts he [--Diem--] may be unable maintain strong government due opposition factors beyond his control." They mentioned the possibility of bringing in Buu Loc but added that "we would be unwilling to in any way prejudice Diem's effort ... by allowing it be known we considering successor." Smith and La Chambre concluded that "we should base our judgment of Diem's success henceforth on basis fair and reasonable chance with wholehearted U.S.-French backing in order he be able take advantage additional support."[2]

Thus, in a little over two months following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, the United States achieved its immediate objectives respecting Vietnam--through the SEATO "umbrella", an outside guarantee against aggression and subversion; through the Smith-La Chambre "Minute", a paper promise from the French favoring complete independence and internal stability. In the ensuing nine months, the United States and France attempted, with diminishing success, to correlate by action their respective understandings of what Smith and La Chambre had agreed to in Washington.

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 1297, Sept. 30, 1954, secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 1327, Oct. 1, 1954, top secret.

Chapter II

THE BREAKDOWN OF FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN VIETNAM, OCTOBER 1954-MAY 1955

The Smith-La Chambre "Minute of Understanding" represented the high point in cooperation between the United States and France regarding Vietnam; thereafter, the semblance of harmony deteriorated rapidly. Very soon, despite the "Minute of Understanding", there was renewed wrangling about the respective roles of the United States and France in Vietnam and the question of retaining Diem as Prime Minister.

French Consideration of "Another Structure of Government" in Saigon; NSC Decision To Bolster Diem

The decision by France and the United States to give the Diem government full support for a trial period had no immediate effect on Diem's own position in Saigon. General Hinh and the Army continued to refuse to take orders from Diem unless General Xuan were appointed Minister of Defense; Xuan refused to accept the post unless he were also made Vice Premier. The Binh Xuyen continued their active opposition to Diem.

As agreed by Smith and La Chambre in Washington, Ambassador Heath flew from Saigon to Paris and called on Bao Dai at Cannes on October 3 to enlist his support in the Vietnamese governmental crisis. As the Department of State instructed Heath, what the United States hoped for was some kind of action by Bao Dai which would "at least neutralize active opposition" of the Binh Xuyen and General Hinh. If Bao Dai declined active cooperation, it was hoped that he would grant "a reasonable period of time during which, with our support and in absence of organized or inspired opposition, Diem can make an effort, and we hope achieve, a strongly nationalist, anti-Communist government."[1]

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[1] To Paris, tel. 1194, Oct. 1, 1954, top secret.

Bao Dai told Heath that he had no objections to Diem's remaining in office, despite the fact that he was, in Bao Dai's opinion, neither a natural statesman nor overly intelligent. To succeed, Bao Dai added, Diem would need to change his entourage. Bao Dai felt that, in view of the political situation in Saigon, General Hinh should be retained as Chief of Staff in order to hold the Army together; he felt also, however, that Hinh should take orders from the Diem Government. Respecting General Xuan, Bao Dai expressed little confidence in either his loyalty or ability, and, in fact, Bao Dai declared that he could rely more on Diem's loyalty than on that of any other candidate for Premier. Heath concluded that, "at least in the future", Bao Dai would not try to dismiss or even undermine Diem.[1]

Upon his return to Saigon, Heath, in cooperation with General Ely, tried manfully in the ensuing weeks to remedy some of Diem's problems. But General Hinh remained adamant in his opposition, and there was evidence that the Binh Xuyen were about to toss in their lot with the Army and stage a coup against Diem. On October 22, Heath expressed his discouragement in a cable to the Department:

> "For more than 40 days Diem and General Hinh have been deadlocked. And 40 days have been largely lost which government with necessary cooperation of army should have employed in establishing its authority over provinces, extirpating Viet Minh infiltration and terrorism, and winning rural population. Fault certain initially was Hinh's but failure to find compromise solution is in large part due to Diem's lack of personality, his inability to win over people of opposite views, his stubborness and intransigence, his general political ineptitude, and his slowness in decision and action. We have by our advice partially remedied some of his deficiencies. We have kept him from doing certain things that would have been bad for his government, and have gotten him to take certain steps to improve his administration, but we have had

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[1] From Paris, tel. 1413, Oct. 4, 1954, secret.

to compete with his own willfulness and entourage of personal friends and family members whose advice has generally been bad."[1]

It was against the background of political stalemate in Saigon that Secretary Dulles discussed Vietnam with Premier Mendès-France in Paris on October 20 while attending the Nine-Power Meeting on European Security. The French Premier agreed with Dulles that the situation in Saigon was serious. While remaining "firm" regarding the importance of giving Diem every chance, Mendès-France nonetheless said that plans should be laid for "another structure of government" in Vietnam in the event Diem should fail. Mendès-France's phrase, which he declined to elaborate for Dulles, roused suspicions in the Department that the French were hankering to reestablish in South Vietnam a political system similar to that of the Cochinchinese Republic of 1946, which was based on police and military power and had strong colonialist overtones. Such a system, the Department felt, "would create conditions in South Viet-Nam analagous to those which ended by delivering to Viet Minh northern half of Viet-Nam, even though it might in the short run restore internal order."[2]

Developments in Vietnam were deemed sufficiently critical that the National Security Council became seized of the question at its October 22 meeting. The Council noted, as the Department paraphrased the Council's proceedings for Dulles in Paris, that the Diem Government was still immobilized by the opposition military clique, that the French had not been actively working to consolidate the Diem Government, and that some new and immediate United States moves were necessary in order to attempt to break the "paralyzing impasse since time is running out and Diem government will otherwise collapse." The National Security Council contemplated two "new and immediate moves": (1) delivery of a letter (which had been drafted a few weeks before) from President Eisenhower to Diem reiterating United States support of the Government of Free Vietnam and suggesting immediate discussions regarding direct United States aid,

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 1536, Oct. 22, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Paris, DULTE 5, Oct. 21, 1954, top secret; to Paris, TEDUL 11, Oct. 21, 1954, top secret.

and (2) initiation of an immediate limited military advisory and training program by MAAG Saigon. In addition, at the President's "suggestion", Dulles was again to see Mendès-France, reveal to him the steps the United States was going to take (with the hope of French agreement), and review Washington's understanding of the Smith-La Chambre "Minute".

Accordingly, Dulles saw the French Premier on the morning of the 23rd and told him that, in implementation of the "Minute" of September 29, the United States and France could best further free world objectives in Vietnam by giving support and assistance to a government of national union under Diem. The United States believed, Dulles added, that the French could still bring much more pressure on the military cabal than had been exerted to make peace with Diem so that his government might proceed with urgent internal tasks--Dulles explained that he was not referring to the top French authorities in Saigon but to the "underlings". In moving immediately to carry out direct assistance programs and to step up MAAG training of Vietnamese military personnel, Dulles said, the United States hoped to strengthen Diem. If a government of national union were not formed, or, if formed, did not receive the full and unreserved support of the National Army and other groups and personalities throughout free Vietnam, or if Diem were removed from office or effectively prevented from developing a broad government, Dulles warned, the United States would have to reconsider its aid to Vietnam--in particular, whether the United States could continue even limited, short-term assistance to prevent a critical emergency. Dulles reminded Mendès-France that Congressional support was needed for any aid to Vietnam and cited Senator Mansfield's recent report in which the Senator had said:

> "Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is doubtful that, under the pressure of time, a more satisfactory substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does, will be found. ... In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, I believe that the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free Vietnam."[1]

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[1] Report on Indochina: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, October 15, 1954 (Committee print, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.), p. 14.

Mendès-France replied that the French were prepared to carry out their part of the Washington agreement to the full until such time as the Diem government became hopeless. He believed, however, that the United States and France should have some alternative plan in mind to substitute for the Diem formula when and if it failed. The Premier said that the French were studying a plan whereby a person would be sent to Vietnam to act as the delegate of Bao Dai--"a sort of viceroy"--who would have no powers to interfere in the government but who would serve the purpose of retaining the prestige of legitimacy which came from Bao Dai and of avoiding the undesirable effect of Bao Dai himself returning to Vietnam.

Dulles responded that he had no objection to the French plan, provided the man sent to Saigon did not interfere in politics.[1] The Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs took a somewhat different view, declaring that sending a "viceroy" to Saigon would complicate matters by "further weakening Diem's authority" unless the "viceroy" did nothing at all, in which case his being in Saigon "would be pointless."[2]

<u>Implementation of the NSC Decision: (1) The "Crash Program" for Improving Vietnamese Armed Forces</u>

Pursuant to the National Security Council decision of October 22, the Departments of State and Defense sent a joint directive to Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel in Saigon which read, in part, as follows:

"(1) It is U.S. Government policy to support the Government of Free Vietnam under the Premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem and to assist that Government (a) to promote internal security and political stability in Free Vietnam, (b) to establish and maintain control by that Government throughout the territory of Free Vietnam, and

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[1] To Paris, TEDUL 14, Oct. 22, 1954, top secret; from Paris, tel. 1717, Oct. 23, 1954, secret.

[2] Memorandum by Robertson (FE) to the Secretary, Oct. 25, 1954, secret.

(c) effectively to counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the 17th parallel.

"(2) It is realized that the principal stumbling block to effecting the policies outlined above is concerned with the loyalty of the existing Vietnamese armed forces, and particularly the loyalty of the Chief of Staff of those forces, General Hinh. It is further apparent that any long range program of aid for and training of these Vietnamese armed forces can have no appreciable effect on the immediate situation. It is therefore directed that the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG collaborate in setting in motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces. For this purpose the assets of all U.S. Government agencies in Free Vietnam will be concentrated as necessary in the hope that within the immediate future (the next month or so) the present Diem government can be strengthened to such an extent that longer range programs can be decided upon with a reasonable expectation of success. The details of 'how' are left in the hands of the Ambassador and General O'Daniel. ...

"(3) Financial limitations are not prescribed for this crash program, as it is considered here that necessary resources are now available to Ambassador and MAAG Saigon for such actions as may be practical. Speed is essential to achieve success.

"(4) If it is considered necessary, you both are authorized at any time to inform French authorities, Vietnamese authorities, and General Hinh personally of U.S. objectives and to further state without equivocation that no long range support to the Vietnamese armed forces will be programmed or extended by the U.S. as long as there is the slightest doubt as to the loyalty of the Chief of Staff or other high officers in those forces. ..."

The directive then proceeded to make the far-reaching proposal that, should it be determined "that it is not practical to work with the existing Vietnamese armed forces organization," Heath and O'Daniel, "upon receipt of concurrence from Departments State and Defense," inform Diem "that the United States is willing to commence immediately the organization of a national police or constabulary separated from the present Vietnamese armed forces" if Diem could select someone deemed by the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG "competent to command such an organization".

Heath was also requested to undertake the necessary negotiations with the Saigon Government and the local French authorities to obtain agreements "(a) ensuring US MAAG Saigon will have the necessary authority, responsibility and freedom of action to carry out the above program; and (b) assuring the cooperation, coordination and assistance from Vietnamese and French authorities and personnel at all levels in Free Vietnam." Finally, Heath and O'Daniel were assured that "the Department of State will undertake to obtain appropriate understanding and means of augmenting the MAAG strength as required," but that, in the meantime, existing MAAG personnel would have to accomplish the objectives set forth in the directive.[1]

On October 24, General O'Daniel and a representative of Embassy Saigon called on General Hinh and, after listening patiently to his lengthy account of grievances against Diem, received his assurance that he would issue a statement in support of the Government of the State of Vietnam, without, however, mentioning the Diem government in particular. In return, Hinh hoped that Diem would issue instructions that the distribution of all tracts against the Army be stopped immediately.[2]

The Embassy and MAAG Saigon had completed, by October 27, an outline of steps to be taken to implement the "crash program" requested by the Departments of State and Defense. By way of a "kick-off", they recommended the issuance of two statements. One, by Diem, would outline a general program designed to strengthen the country in its common fight against communism in which all forces of the nation, including the Army, would have roles to play. The statement would assure the Army that its development would be fostered, its integrity preserved, and its legitimate military rights protected. The second statement, by Hinh, would declare the loyalty of the Army to "the present legal government".

With respect to the Government, the Embassy and MAAG proposed a housecleaning of the Presidential office and a revamping of the cabinet to bring in more capable individuals, particularly in the Ministry of Interior. A general statement on land reform

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 1679, Oct. 22, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 1575, Oct. 25, 1954, top secret.

was required at an early date. Heath and O'Daniel urged that "Diem get out of Palace and among people, including inspection tours of Armed Forces," and suggested a "coordinated and effective publicity campaign on large scale through Vietnamese Information Ministry with support and advice from USIS and other appropriate U.S. agencies."

With respect to the Army, the Embassy and MAAG proposed that, with General Ely's concurrence, Diem and Hinh agree to accept American officers at headquarters "with a view to establishing and extending American influence in Army." Heath and O'Daniel contemplated "immediate introduction three MAAG officers into headquarters staff Vietnamese Armed Forces, one MAAG officer into Defense Ministry and one MAAG officer in each of three Vietnamese Regional Military Headquarters." They recommended that the Vietnamese military be better organized and instructed to carry out the pacification program, and they foresaw an early need for General Hinh to issue instructions prohibiting members of the Armed Forces from engaging in political activities. It would also be necessary to obtain from Generals Ely and Hinh agreement that French officers holding key posts in the Vietnamese Armed Services be gradually supplanted by Vietnamese officers, with the French remaining as advisers only. The Embassy and MAAG also believed it important that Ely "be kept informed of crash program activities and his advice, cooperation and support solicited and geared into program" while, in return, Ely would "be persuaded to police more effectively his subordinates."

With respect to the size of MAAG, General O'Daniel estimated the need for 215 officers, 69 enlisted men, 57 American and 172 Vietnamese civilians for training and advisory roles. In addition, 58 military and 145 civilian spaces would be needed "to fulfill MAAG administrative and end-item functions." O'Daniel assured the Department that the military spaces contemplated would be kept within the 342-man strength of MAAG as of the date of the Vietnamese cease-fire.[1]

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[1] From Saigon, tel. 1609, Oct. 27, 1954, secret; from CHMAAG Saigon, Army message MG 3381-A, Oct. 27, 1954, secret.

Implementation of the NSC Decision: (2) The Eisenhower Letter to Diem and French Reaction Thereto

The second of the one-two punches ordered by the National Security Council was the delivery of a letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Diem which had been signed and dated by the President on October 1 and held for use at an appropriate time. The letter, which Diem agreed to have made public, was delivered on the afternoon of October 23. In it the President said, in part:

> "We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
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> "The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. ..."[1]

The French hit the roof. Mendès-France telephoned Ambassador Dillon on Sunday, October 24, to state that, based on reports from General Ely and La Chambre (the latter was en route from Saigon to Paris), Eisenhower's letter was a "clear-cut violation" of the agreements reached during the Washington talks. He felt that the letter went far beyond anything he had understood Secretary Dulles to imply in their conversation of

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[1]*American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, pp. 2401-2402.

the day before. Mendès-France made a personal request that delivery of the Eisenhower letter be held up until its contents could be discussed with La Chambre on the following day--a request which, of course, it was too late to consider.[1]

Incensed as they were about the Eisenhower letter, the French took even more particular exception to the phrase in the Department's instructions to Dulles following the National Security Council meeting of the 22nd in which it was stated that "the French have not been actively working to consolidate the Diem Government". (The instructions had been shown to French officials in both Paris and Saigon.) In a lengthy discussion with Dillon on October 25, La Chambre declared that this statement was untrue and a direct personal reflection on himself, General Ely, and the honor of the French Government.

The French also considered that the United States decision to initiate a military advisory and training program under MAAG was diametrically opposed to the agreement reached in Washington in September. While agreeing that the channel for United States aid should be direct to the individual Associated States, the French were of the opinion that a firm decision had been reached in Washington that tripartite committees should be set up in each of the Associated States to decide what form French and United States aid should take and how it should be divided. La Chambre also pointed out that unilateral direct military aid would create difficulties because France was a guarantor of the Vietnamese cease-fire and hence had to be fully informed regarding both imports of material and changes of military personnel.

La Chambre wound up the long interview with the impassioned statement that "we prefer to lose in Vietnam with the U.S. rather than to win without them," and "we would rather support Diem, knowing he is going to lose, and thus keep France-U.S. solidarity than to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world if this meant breaking Franco-U.S. solidarity." He concluded by praising the teamwork that had evolved between Ely and Heath in Saigon and expressed the hope that existing difficulties could be promptly settled so that Ely and Heath could get on with the job.[2]

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[1] From Paris, tel. 1718, Oct. 24, 1954, top secret.

[2] From Paris, tel. 1737, Oct. 25, 1954, top secret.

On October 30, Dillon delivered to Mendès-France a personal message from Dulles in which the Secretary declared that the United States did not have the "slightest idea of questioning the good faith" of the French Government in carrying out the agreed policies of the two countries in Indochina. He pointed out, however, that "many French officials have not concealed their belief that Diem has failed, creating an impasse in Saigon, and that he should be replaced." Dulles explained that he considered the delivery of President Eisenhower's letter to Diem to be in "furtherance of the understandings reached in Washington," and designed to stimulate the Vietnamese Government under Diem--"and particularly the Vietnamese military organization"--to concentrate on imperative tasks which required urgent Vietnamese attention.

With respect to the French view that tripartite groups were to be set up in each of the Associated States, Dulles said that there was "no question concerning need and importance of coordination." He observed, however: "I am certain that you fully recognize also that the U.S. alone must of necessity control and administer funds which are appropriated by our Congress for direct aid." In lieu of formal tripartite machinery to administer aid programs, the Secretary favored informal coordination which would provide a "full exchange of views and information to prevent duplication and wasted effort and to avoid action without our knowing each other's views and without pooling our knowledge of the facts."

Dulles acknowledged that "there may remain some differences of emphasis between us on certain details on procedure or timing, but I am sure we are in agreement on our basic goals" in Indochina. The Secretary concluded: "I am convinced France and the U.S. must work for establishment of a government of national union around Diem to enable us to succeed in reaching our common goal of a strong and independent government in Free Vietnam."[1]

Mendès-France told Dillon that his main concern was that the United States and France work so closely together on a day-to-day basis that there could be no possibility for them to be played off one against the other in Vietnam. He expressed

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[1]To Paris, tel. 1565, Oct. 29, 1954, top secret.

the opinion that it would have been better if, in view of the time which had elapsed since the Washington talks, the United States had conferred with the French prior to the delivery of the Eisenhower letter to Diem, both regarding its contents and the date and method of delivery. He also said that, according to the information he had received, there had been no improvement in the situation in Saigon but, rather, a continuation of the steady deterioration which had characterized South Vietnam for some time.[1]

At the request of Mendès-France, Dillon took up Dulles' message with La Chambre, who accepted the text "with little comment". La Chambre suggested that one way of improving United States-French coordination of policy and of avoiding misunderstandings would be to delegate a greater degree of authority to the top American and French representatives in Saigon. These individuals, according to La Chambre, could study problems on the spot, make formal recommendations, and take joint action on their own responsibility.[2]

<u>Despatch and Initial Recommendations of the Collins Mission</u>

The suggestion made by La Chambre to Ambassador Dillon that the United States and French representatives in Saigon be given a greater degree of authority struck a responsive chord in Washington. On November 1, 1954, Dulles sent a message to Mendès-France saying that President Eisenhower agreed with the suggestion and had designated General Joseph Lawton Collins, USA, as Special United States Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to coordinate United States activities designed "to help meet the threats to Vietnam's independence and security."

Dulles explained that Collins' mission, which was expected to last from sixty to ninety days, was of a temporary nature and that, after the departure of Ambassador Heath, General Collins would have "broad authority to direct, utilize and control all agencies and resources of the US Government with respect to

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[1]From Paris, tel. 1839, Oct. 30, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 1835, Oct. 30, 1954, top secret.

Vietnam." Dulles stated that Collins' previous wide contacts with French officials, particularly with General Ely, would enable him "to provide effective assistance in helping to meet urgent tasks in Vietnam." Dillon was instructed to convey this message and report urgently so that a public announcement of the mission could be made.[1]

A similar message was sent to Ambassador Heath, with instructions to report President Diem's reaction and to inform General Ely.[2] In a separate message to Heath, Secretary Dulles explained that Collins' mission was two-fold: to "bridge the gap" between Heath's departure and the arrival of his successor (who at that time was to be Julian F. Harrington, Consul General in Hong Kong) and, at the same time, to inaugurate the United States "crash program" of aid to Vietnam. Dulles added that, since the military aspect of this crash program was so important, Washington believed that Collins' presence would be particularly useful.[3]

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[1]To Paris, tel. 1608, Nov. 1, 1954, top secret. General Collins had served as United States Army Chief of Staff, 1949-1953, and in that capacity had visited Vietnam. At the time of his appointment to Saigon, he was the United States Representative on the Military Committee of NATO, from which position he was relieved to undertake his new mission. General Ely had been French representative on the NATO Standing Group in Washington in 1953.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 1809, Nov. 1, 1954, top secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 1807, Nov. 1, 1954, top secret. The idea of sending a "special emissary on temporary mission" to cover the hiatus between Heath's departure and the arrival of the new Ambassador had been put forth by Dulles early in September. Heath (who had been assigned to Saigon in June 1950) was due to leave around December 1, 1954. (From Manila, DULTE 9, Sept. 5, 1954, top secret; to Manila, TEDUL 31, Sept. 8, 1954, secret.) As it developed, Harrington was not assigned to Saigon; G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of Embassy in Paris, whose appointment was confirmed April 20, 1955, was sent in his stead.

Mendès-France was described as "pleased and entirely agreeable" to the immediate announcement of the Collins mission.[1] After thinking it over for about three hours, Diem informed Heath that he would be happy to welcome Collins in his new capacity, but he asked that the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington be consulted prior to the public announcement.[2] General Ely had some doubts about the wisdom of sending Collins to Saigon. He stated that such action would create a very bad impression in France and in Free Vietnam and would be exploited by the Viet Minh. He also said that such a move would be taken to mean that the United States was going to take over Indochina.[3]

After receiving the approval of Paris and Saigon, Dulles conferred with President Eisenhower and General Collins on November 3, 1954. Dulles carried with him to the White House a suggested letter of instructions to General Collins which was approved by the President. The letter outlined the basic policies of the United States as follows:

"1. To maintain and support a friendly and independent non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to assist it in diminishing and ultimately eradicating Communist subversion and influence.

"2. To assist the Government of Viet-Nam to develop and maintain forces necessary for internal security and to foster economic conditions which will strengthen and promote the survival of a Free Viet-Nam.

"3. To provide United States assistance directly to the Government of Viet-Nam and to coordinate information and exchange of views on such assistance with Vietnamese and French authorities.

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[1]From Paris, tel. 1858, Nov. 2, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 1675, Nov. 2, 1954, top secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 1686, Nov. 3, 1954, top secret. The Department sought to allay Ely's apprehensions (to Saigon, tel. 1867, Nov. 5, 1954, secret).

"4. To encourage expanding relationships between Free Viet-Nam and its non-Communist neighbors, and support for Free Viet-Nam by the free world."

The letter also stated that the principal task of the General's mission was to coordinate and direct a program in support of the "legal government of Viet-Nam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem" to enable the government to "(a) promote internal security and political and economic stability, (b) establish and maintain control throughout the territory, and (c) effectively counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the military demarcation line [the 17th parallel]." The letter expressed the hope that the General would obtain the cooperation of the French authorities in the discharge of his mission.[1]

The White House made public the despatch of the Collins Mission on November 3, 1954,[2] and General Collins was en route the following day.[3] He arrived in Saigon on November 8.[4]

When passing through Manila, on November 7, General Collins called on President Ramon Magsaysay and asked that the Philippine Government give consideration to an "early recognition" of Diem's government. Magsaysay replied that, as long as the French "were really controlling" the Government of Vietnam, the Philippines could not extend recognition to Diem. He stated that he was willing, however, to cooperate in training Vietnamese military forces. Magsaysay suggested

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[1]Text of letter enclosed in Memorandum for the President, carried by Dulles to the White House, Nov. 3, 1954, top secret; memorandum by Dulles (S) of conference with President Eisenhower and General Collins, Nov. 3, 1954, secret. Apparently the President's letter of instructions to General Collins was put on White House stationery, but no copy has been found in the Department's files.

[2]Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 777-778.

[3]Circ. tel. 229 to Bangkok, Canberra, Djakarta, and other posts, Nov. 4, 1954, secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 1806, Nov. 12, 1954, official use only.

that the Vietnamese follow the scheme which he had used in the pacification of the Huks (in Central Luzon a few years earlier) and pointed out that the Vietnamese military forces could play an important role in pacification of the countryside, resettlement, and in building public works in new settlements. He agreed with the concept of organizing Vietnamese forces for internal security and relying on the recently concluded Manila Pact for the protection of Vietnam against external aggression.[1]

After being at his post for one week (and in response to Secretary Dulles' request made in connection with the forthcoming visit of Mendès-France to Washington[2]), General Collins submitted a long report on the requirements of the military situation in South Vietnam. Collins based his recommendations on the fact that "General Ely has questioned validity of our assumption that we can rely on threat of action under Manila pact to dissuade Viet Minh from renewing military operations against free Vietnam." Collins reported: "I agree with him that, until after the period now scheduled for elections [July 20, 1956], it will be necessary maintain sufficient combat forces, both French and Vietnamese, to furnish reasonable assurance that country could not be quickly overrun pending action by Manila pact powers."

Collins opened his report with a not very encouraging appraisal of Diem, whom he described as "a small, shy, diffident man with almost no personal magnetism" and as one who "evidently lacks confidence in himself and appears have an inherent distaste for decisive action." Collins acknowledged that he was "not now prepared to express a general judgment on Diem," but he confessed that he was "by no means certain he [Diem] has inherent capacity to manage country during this critical period," and Collins observed that "each passing day of indecisiveness is bound to lessen any confidence that people may have in his [Diem's] government."

Collins then proceeded to comment on the important question of the "pervasive" French presence in Vietnam. He pointed out that "if expeditionary corps were withdrawn

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 1789, Nov. 10, 1954, top secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 1939, Nov. 11, 1954, secret.

prematurely, results could be disastrous." He cautioned, too, that "it would be unwise for us to attempt to displace French capital and French advisers in fields of banking, currency controls and allied business matters," for "any such move could impose on us obligations which might be onerous and long drawn out as those we assumed in Philippines and Korea."

Taking these considerations into account, Collins formulated his military recommendations, which boiled down basically to the following four points:

(1) It was essential that a portion of the French Expeditionary Corps be retained to provide protection to Free Vietnam against external aggression.

(2) The United States should continue to subsidize the French Expeditionary Corps financially (in the amount of at least $100,000,000) during the calendar year 1955, as encouragement to the French to retain sufficient forces there.[1]

(3) The Vietnamese defense forces should be reduced from 170,000 to approximately 84,000 military personnel (principally Army, with small elements of Navy and Air Force) by July 1, 1955, at an annual cost to the United States of about $200,000,000, and the Vietnamese National Army should be placed under Vietnamese command and control no later than that date.

(4) The United States should assume training responsibility for the Vietnamese National Army on January 1, 1955, with French cooperation, and utilizing French training personnel.[2]

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[1]Before departing from Saigon, Ambassador Heath, too, had stressed the importance of the retention of the French Expeditionary Corps and recommended that the United States continue to support it in 1955 on a financial scale somewhat reduced from that of 1954. (From Saigon, tel. 1761, Nov. 8, 1954, secret.)

[2]From Saigon, tel. 1830, Nov. 15, 1954, top secret.

These recommendations Collins drew up in the form of a "Minute of Understanding on Development and Training of Autonomous Vietnam Armed Forces" which he submitted to General Ely for approval. On November 16, Ely and Collins conferred, and Ely indicated his readiness to accept the terms of the "Minute" except for the provision that all French personnel would gradually be removed from advisory positions. Ely maintained that no French Government or Assembly would agree to having U.S. personnel completely replace the French in training the Vietnamese armed forces.

Ely then raised the subject of general U.S. policy in Indochina and noted two tendencies. He pointed out that, formerly, the United States had urged France to build up the Vietnamese forces to a point where they could replace the French Expeditionary Corps; now, the United States contemplated a much smaller Vietnamese force to be given the limited mission of maintaining internal security. Ely did not object to this change, for he felt that the Vietnamese did not have the resources and trained personnel to raise a force of 200,000. At the same time, however, the United States was expecting the FEC to defend Vietnam against external aggression while reducing the aid necessary to maintain the FEC in the face of growing strength of the Viet Minh. As Ely saw it, the U.S. solution seemed to be to urge French ratification of the Manila Pact without suggesting how military action of the Manila Pact powers could be concerted and brought to bear in an emergency.

Collins replied that the basic assumption in the United States was that the Communists were not likely to renew overt aggression in Indochina and that therefore large forces in Vietnam, which in any case could not alone assure the defense of the country, were not essential. The concept was to develop such minimum blocking forces as would convince the enemy that he would be opposed and could not attack cheaply and easily overrun territory before the signatories of the Manila Pact could take action against the aggressor. Collins also assured Ely that he had recommended that the United States provide some support for the FEC "for some time to come".[1]

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 1854, Nov. 16, 1954, secret.

Franco-American Discussion of Vietnamese Policy, Washington, November 18-20, 1954

It was against the background of growing French suspicion of American motives and policy in Vietnam, as revealed in the first week of the Collins mission, that Premier Mendès-France came to Washington on November 18 for an intensive review of French and United States policies in Europe, North Africa, and, especially, Southeast Asia. In his discussions with Secretary Dulles, Mendès-France reaffirmed French policy as being to assist in building a strong, free Vietnam as a counterpart to Communist North Vietnam. Dulles stated that a compromise with the Communists would mean loss of the area. He also stated that the United States objective was, if possible, to build indigenous power, authority and military strength within the formula of national independence, which would mean, Dulles observed, a gradual lessening of the French role and activity.

Mendès-France showed particular sensitivity to actions tending to liquidate the French position in Indochina. He recognized United States primary responsibility in Asia, but emphasized that the French could make a contribution. Dulles denied that the Far East was an exclusive responsibility of the United States and pointed out that both France and Britain had interests in the area. He explained that the United States had no desire to supplant the French in Indochina, but he expressed the belief that French authority and control would be replaced by indigenous forces. He added that the United States purpose in Indochina was not to compete with the French for influence and popularity, but to try to save Free Vietnam.

On the question of coordination of aid, Mendès-France pressed for formal tripartite committees with periodic review at the governmental level. Secretary Dulles agreed to such review, but rejected fixed machinery of formal tripartite or bipartite committees for field coordination. Dulles indicated that he preferred the flexibility of the informal method of coordination by the respective representatives in the field, in cooperation with appropriate officials of the local government. He agreed on the need for the French and United States representatives to work closely and informally together to avoid overlapping and any tendency on the part of local governments to play off the French and Americans against each other. When Mendès-France suggested including the United Kingdom in the coordinating committees, the Secretary replied that flexibility

was required and that inclusion of the United Kingdom would lead to a request from Australia and others to be included, which would make coordinating machinery unwieldy.[1]

Dulles and Mendès-France incorporated their conclusions on the question of coordination of aid in common instructions sent to the French and United States representatives in the three Associated States. These instructions stated that the conferees had decided to hold periodic bilateral discussions in Washington to "supplement" the aid provisions of the Smith-La Chambre "Minute of Understanding" of September 29.[2]

Respecting the political situation in South Vietnam, Dulles emphasized the importance of having the United States and France work together in support of a government formed around Diem. Mendès-France stated that the French had agreed in the September talks to support Diem although they had not been optimistic about his abilities. He also said that the French believed that, within a few months, they and the Americans would be forced to consider the replacement of Diem. The French Premier said that he had no one to propose at that time, but he stressed his belief that some Vietnamese who had worked with the French in the past had much better records than did Diem. He went on to say that the time had come for France and the United States to give Diem some specific advice, particularly with respect to agrarian reform, establishment of an efficient administration, and attention to the rural areas.

Mendès-France suggested that Diem be given a certain amount of time to work out a program and that the United States and France consult in a month or two to see what action he had taken. Mendès-France asked if the United States was prepared to make a joint approach to Diem along this line. Dulles replied that, although he had no objection, he believed that experts should get together to define specific proposals to be made and decide on the question of timing and manner of presentation. He also said that, while the United States was agreeable to working with France on this matter, it did not want to be committed to making a joint approach in every case, and that it reserved the right to consult alone with the Diem government.

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2070 (161 to Phnom Penh, 108 to Vientiane), Nov. 22, 1954, secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 2055 (159 to Phnom Penh, 105 to Vientiane), Nov. 20, 1954, secret.

Mendès-France introduced the matter of Bao Dai, stat that he wanted to return to Vietnam, and asked for an expr of United States views. Dulles replied that, while not in position to advise, the United States was opposed to Bao D. returning.

On the question of French relations with the Viet Minh Mendès-France explained that he had designated Jean Sainten as Delegate General of France in North Vietnam in August of 1954 for the purpose of looking after French interests in t north. Dulles expressed concern lest the proposed letter t the Viet Minh authorities setting forth Sainteny's terms of reference should be taken to imply recognition of the regim which question the United States wished to avoid.

The Secretary went on to say that there appeared to be belief in some quarters that a compromise between North and Vietnam was inevitable, but the United States felt that a rapprochment would inevitably result in the loss of the ar to the Communists. He also stated that, if the Viet Minh go a majority in the national government as a result of the nati wide elections scheduled to be held by July 1956, the minori would not long survive; the object, therefore, was to build a strong anti-Communist government in South Vietnam, one not se ing accommodation with the Viet Minh. Mendès-France expresse agreement, saying that cooperation between North and South Vietnam would have bad results and that the only thing to do was to develop political strength in South Vietnam as a count to the north.[1]

With respect to the military aspects of the Vietnamese problem, Mendès-France objected particularly to those portions of Collins' proposed "minute of understanding" dealing with th training of the Vietnamese Army which would lead to the displacement of French military influence by that of the United States. The Secretary replied that the basic question was who was to be responsible for the training, also which method- United States or France--were to be used. He also indicated that, if the training job were to be a United States responsibility, this did not mean that French personnel were to be

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2112, Nov. 24, 1954, secret.

eliminated. The conferees decided to refer the training issue back to Collins and Ely for further study and agreed recommendation.

Mendès-France stated that the French Expeditionary Corps would be reduced to 100,000 men by the end of 1955 and expressed hope that the United States would continue to support the Corps financially. The Secretary replied that this question had to be considered in connection with other United States programs--economic and technical aid, and other military aid in Indochina.

On the matter of the size of the Vietnamese forces, the Secretary explained that the United States theory was to have adequate local forces to maintain order against subversion and to serve as a small blocking force against external attack, with reliance for the principal deterrent on the obligations under the Manila Pact. He also said that the United States did not feel it was possible to build up local forces strong enough to throw back an invasion, and that United States support of Vietnamese forces would cost about $200,000,000 a year. Mendès-France said that he understood the general principles, which appeared sensible to him, and added that this question should be studied by military experts on the spot and left up to Generals Ely and Collins, whose recommendations Paris would accept. He also commented that he could not see what a Vietnamese National Army of about 90,000 men could accomplish except, perhaps, maintain internal order.[1]

Although the conferees in Washington had "supplemented" the Smith-La Chambre "Minute of Understanding" to the extent of making a rather vague concession to the French request for joint Franco-American planning at the local level in Saigon, the November talks proved very inconclusive. Indeed, they had served largely to point up continued divisions between Washington and Paris regarding the respective roles France and the United States were to play in Vietnam. In furtherance of their efforts to reach a better understanding and in accordance with their agreement "to hold periodic bilateral discussions in Washington at a high level to review developments, exchange information and evaluate progress," Secretary Dulles and Mendès-

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2046, Nov. 19, 1954, top secret, and tel. 2126, Nov. 26, 1954, secret.

France tentatively set December 22 as the next occasion on which to conduct such a review.[1] It soon became obvious that there would also be "corridor discussions" about Vietnam at the mid-December NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, and the United States set about preparing the position it would take in these discussions.

Collins' Further Recommendations on Vietnam, and the Ely-Collins Memorandum on Training of Vietnamese Forces by MAAG, Initialed December 13, 1954

The views of General Collins in Saigon were to influence the position taken by the United States in its talks with the French in Paris. In the execution of his mission, Collins worked closely with both President Diem and General Ely. After having been in Saigon for three weeks, Collins reported that he expected to concentrate on developing, in cooperation with the French, a series of programs for buttressing South Vietnam, covering the following major fields: (1) Vietnamese Armed Forces, including size, composition, mission, training, use in pacification and development of loyalty to the civil government; (2) strengthening Diem's Government, including rendering advice on filling Cabinet posts; (3) resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; (4) land reform; (5) formation of a National Assembly; (6) financial and economic programs, including United States direct aid to Vietnam; and (7) educational and technical training.[2]

A week later, on December 6, Collins informed Washington that his negotiations with the French in developing agreed programs were proceeding satisfactorily. He stated that Diem was still his "chief problem" and gave examples of Diem's lack of administrative ability and political finesse in organizing an effective government. One of the problems concerned the reluctance of Diem to appoint Dr. Phan Huy Quat as Minister of Defense, the post Quat had held in the Buu Loc Cabinet during the first half of 1954. The appointment of a vigorous Minister of Defense had become all the more important with Bao Dai's

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2055, Nov. 20, 1954, secret.

[2]From Saigon, tels. 2004, 2024, Nov. 29, 30, 1954, both secret.

dismissal of General Hinh as Vietnamese Chief of Staff.[1] Collins also commented on the conflicting pressures to which Diem was subjected--the sects, his family, "to say nothing of the French and Americans"--as well as Bao Dai's "long-distance wire pulling" and influence in Vietnamese Army circles and in other fields. Collins concluded that, while the situation was not entirely hopeless, it was essential that some thought be given to finding an alternative to Diem "acceptable to Vietnamese, French, Bao Dai and ourselves." Collins' final sentence was: "Nevertheless, we shall be forced to this expedient if Diem has not demonstrated by about January 1 that he is capable of governing."[2]

At the request of Secretary Dulles, Collins' analysis of the situation was discussed with Senator Mike Mansfield by Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson on December 7, 1954. The Senator stated that the United States should continue to exert its efforts and use its resources, even if it might cost a lot, to hold Vietnam as long as possible, and that any other course would have a disastrous effect on Cambodia, Laos, and Southeast Asia. The Senator saw no alternative to Diem as Prime Minister and, while recognizing Diem's weaknesses as an administrator and manager, Mansfield felt that the United States should continue to back Diem, who represented what small hope there might be in building something in Vietnam. The Senator was certain that the refugees and many of the Catholic bishops and church officials would oppose the replacement of Diem, and he was against relinquishing even the small chance the United States had with Diem for some unknown and untried combination.

The Senator expressed the opinion that Diem, unlike most of the Vietnamese, really was honest, incorruptible and a devoutly dedicated nationalist as well. In the Senator's opinion, General Collins' time limit of January 1 was playing with political dynamite, because it would give Diem an awfully short time in which to show results or be replaced. Senator Mansfield thought that Diem should be encouraged not only to

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[1] From Saigon, tel. 2006, Nov. 29, 1954, secret.

[2] From Saigon, tel. 2108, Dec. 6, 1954, top secret.

delegate responsibilities to trusted and capable ministers, but also to accept a certain amount of compromise.[1] Senator Mansfield's views were transmitted without comment by the Department to General Collins the following day.[2]

In reply to the Department's request for his views, for use in connection with the expected corridor discussions of the Indochina problem at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris,[3] General Collins, on December 13, submitted a long report on the confusing and chaotic political scene. He said that, according to Diem, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sect leaders in the government had declared that they would withdraw and had threatened open rebellion if Quat were appointed to the post of Minister of Defense. General Ely, however, supported Quat's appointment. Collins stated that he was convinced that Diem and his brothers (Luyen and Nhu) were "afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Quat or any other strong man", and that "they may also fear Quat as potential successor to Diem and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of any post in government."

As Collins saw it, there were three possible courses of action for the United States in Vietnam: (1) continue support of the Diem Government, (2) support the establishment of another government "which may be able to save the situation", or (3) gradually withdraw support from Vietnam. Collins indicated that there were risks in pursuing the first course. He went on to say that, since he had grave misgivings about Diem's chance of success, he believed that the United States should consider replacing Diem, and he suggested two alternatives: (a) have Bao Dai name Quat to replace Diem as President of the Council of Ministers, or (b) have Bao Dai return to Vietnam, "assume Presidency of Council and rally entire nation to unified action." Although he considered American withdrawal the least

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[1]Memorandum by Young (PSA) of conversation among Mansfield, Robertson (FE) and Morton (H), Dec. 7, 1954, top secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 2333, Dec. 8, 1954, top secret.

[3]To Saigon, tels. 2305, Dec. 7, 1954, secret, and 2378, Dec. 10, 1954, top secret.

desirable course of action, he stated that "in all honesty and in view of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be only sound solution." In summarizing his report Collins stated that he wanted to reserve final judgment on Diem until the early part of January, and that alternatives to the support of Diem should be thoroughly explored within the United States Government. He recommended that Washington "continue to support Diem at Paris", and that the United States not consider with the French the alternatives regarding the establishment of another government "until after I have communicated my final judgment to Department."[1]

Assistant Secretary Robertson again consulted Senator Mansfield, who, on December 15, reiterated his previously expressed views. The Senator continued to believe that the United States should support Diem but make clear the desirability and necessity for Diem to cooperate with the United States in return. Senator Mansfield feared that replacement of Diem would create seriously increased confusion and even anarchy. According to the Department, the Senator was of the opinion that, "if Diem and Vietnamese cannot with our support create reasonable effective setup in Vietnam, or if French are sub rosa manipulating deal with Viet Minh at expense Free Vietnam, only choice for US is withdrawal effort bolster Free Vietnam." With regard to Bao Dai's return to Saigon, the Senator expressed considerable skepticism and reluctance.[2]

The failure of Diem to appoint Quat as Minister of Defense was the final development which convinced Collins, on December 16, that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam." Collins again suggested that consideration be given to the return of Bao Dai to Saigon in an effort "to galvanize the country into unified action," and help resolve the parochial attitudes of the contending political factions. In this report, Collins recommended re-evaluation of United States plans for assisting Southeast Asia. He also recommended that, while supporting Diem for a short while longer, the United States should not conclude formal agreements to assume responsibility

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2250, Dec. 13, 1954, top secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 2444, Dec. 15, 1954, top secret.

on January 1, 1955, for training Vietnamese forces or for giving direct military aid for specific force levels "until decision reached in Washington as to our ultimate policy and commitments" in Vietnam.[1]

The American commitment to take over the training of Vietnamese forces had already been made by Collins himself three days earlier. Following four weeks of negotiation, Collins and Ely initialed, on December 13, 1954, a memorandum of understanding on the development and training of autonomous Vietnamese Armed Forces which was designed to reflect United States and French cooperative efforts in Vietnam. The main feature of this understanding was that the Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), using both United States and French personnel, would be responsible, effective January 1, 1955, for the organization and training of the Vietnamese military forces. He would perform this duty under the overall authority of the Commander-in-Chief in Indochina (General Ely) who had the responsibility for the strategic direction of the French and Vietnamese forces to secure Vietnam against external aggression and internal subversion. The understanding also provided that (1) France would grant "full autonomy" to the Vietnamese Armed Forces by July 1, 1955; (2) the Vietnamese force structure which the United States would support would be reduced to approximately 84,000 by that date; (3) the US-French arrangement provided for in the memorandum was subject to the consent of the Government of Vietnam.[2]

Washington approved the Collins-Ely memorandum on December 16 and voiced hope that Paris would do likewise in the immediate future.[3] What General Ely was willing to agree to in Saigon proved more difficult, however, to sell to the Government of Premier Pierre Mendès-France in Paris.

Talks on Vietnam at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 16-18, 1954

With the ink scarcely dry on a paper it was unlikely the French would accept without modifications, and with the future

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2303, Dec. 16, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2261, Dec. 14, 1954, confidential.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 2457, (2249 to Paris), Dec. 16, 1954, secret.

indicated that this raised a real problem with respect to training the Vietnamese and would require continuing the use of French military personnel. Eden seemed much reassured.

As the meeting was breaking up, Dulles said he agreed with a suggestion which had been made that the informal bilateral U.S.-French meeting to be held in Washington for an exchange of views on Indochina should be expanded to include the United Kingdom. Dulles stressed the need for secrecy, in view of the unfavorable reaction which would be caused in Australia and New Zealand and the Associated States if word leaked out the Big Three were discussing Indochina, a caveat with which Eden fully agreed.[1]

Tripartite discussions (Dulles-Eden-Mendès-France) on Indochina took place on December 18. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Dillon, and General Ely were among the advisers present. With respect to Vietnam, the discussion focused on the Diem leadership and the possibility of alternative solutions. In response to the French idea that alternatives be considered, Dulles defended Diem as the best man available in spite of failings; he added, however, that the United States was not committed to Diem in any irrevocable sense. Dulles also said that, while developments had confirmed United States fears as to Diem's limitations, no substitute for him had yet been proposed. Dulles expressed the view that the United States and France should continue to

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settlement. (British Embassy memorandum, undated, attached to memorandum by Young (PSA) to Snow (L/FE), Dec. 1, 1954, confidential.) In an opinion of December 6, 1954, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, Conrad E. Snow, intimated that he was in agreement with this British legal interpretation of the Geneva settlement. (Memorandum by Snow (L/FE) to Young (PSA), Dec. 6, 1954, confidential.)

[1]From Paris, tel. SECTO 11, Dec. 17, 1954, secret. The Australian Government let it be known in Paris and Washington that it had a vital interest in Far Eastern matters and that it wanted to be included in discussions dealing with the problems of Southeast Asia. (From Paris, tel. 2573, Dec. 16, 1954; memorandum by McConaughy, CA, of Conversations between Robertson, FE, and Australian Ambassador Sir Percy Spender, Dec. 18, 1954; both secret.)

back Diem, but should exert more pressure on him to make necessary changes. Ely characterized Diem as an extremely pig-headed man who became more so under pressure and pointed out that to exert too much pressure on Diem was not in keeping with the new independent status of Vietnam. As for issuing an ultimatum to Diem, Dulles stated that he was opposed to doing so "until we know what we would do if it were rejected."

Mendès-France suggested that Bao Dai could be useful to put an alternate plan into effect if an ultimatum to Diem failed. Dulles felt that if an approach to Bao Dai were to be made "we must go to him prepared with our own ideas and not simply to accept his." Mendès-France then stated that the French were prepared to request Bao Dai to establish a viceroy in Saigon who would act as "supreme arbitrator to settle squabbles." Eden agreed that a "royal commission" of some sort should be set up. Dulles said that, in considering a viceroy, the conferees were advancing into the second problem without having solved the first, which was to create machinery "to implement our ideas." He went on to say that "we must exhaust all our pressures on Diem to get things done before considering alternate solutions." He also said that investigation of an alternate solution must be done carefully and that, for the present, Diem must be supported.

Mendès-France agreed, and he summarized the discussion by stating that he had three points he wanted Collins and Ely to study: (1) support of Diem,[1] (2) alternatives to Diem, "including Bao Dai", and (3) question of timing. With reference to the last point, Mendès-France asked: "How much further delay [by Diem] can be tolerated?" He went on to say that the conferees must set a deadline, and that Collins and Ely must come to a conclusion and make precise recommendations so that the conferees could take necessary decisions.

Secretary Dulles stated that a fourth point had to be added, namely, that, if the United States should decide that there was no good alternative to Diem, it would have to re-appraise its policy and consider how much more investment it

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[1]Subsequently, Ambassador Dillon reported to the Department that the French Premier's first point was the possibility of appointment of a viceroy. (From Paris, tel. 2697, Dec. 26, 1954, top secret.)

would be prepared to make in Indochina. After indicating that, for the United States, the question of Vietnam had domestic political overtones, since Senator Mansfield and Congressional Committees were "intensely interested" in the problem, the Secretary stated his belief that even the slight chance of success in Vietnam was worth considerable investment. He said that the United States had to think of what might happen in adjacent countries--Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Malaya. Dulles pointed out that the United States situation was different from that of the French, that the latter had an investment in lives and property in Vietnam whereas the United States was concerned with the effect that the fate of Vietnam would have on the rest of Southeast Asia. Mendès-France sympathized with the United States problem and hoped that the United States would not arrive at a negative conclusion. In indicating agreement, Eden stated that he felt that even an additional single year of sustained effort would help everywhere, and that "we must try to keep up the fight in order to give confidence to others" in the area.

Eden brought up the question of training of Vietnamese forces and asked about the United States position on introducing new military advisers and possible conflict with the Geneva Agreements. Dulles stated (and Admiral Radford confirmed) that, while the United States was rotating MAAG personnel, it was not increasing the number. Ely stated that the Collins-Ely memorandum of understanding on training remained within the framework of the Geneva Accords. Mendès-France said that the French Government would have to study the text of the memorandum from the legal point of view to insure that it was fully in accord with the Armistice. He stated that determination of the legality of the Collins-Ely memorandum was particularly important because the Viet Minh had already protested officially to the International Control Commission regarding the United States assumption of training responsibility. Secretary Dulles expressed general agreement with the principle that the Geneva Accords should not be broken but stated that interpretation of them must not be so refined as to prevent substitution of more competent for less competent personnel. Following a general discussion on Viet Minh protests of violation of the Geneva Accords, Dulles concluded by saying that it would be unfortunate if the Western Powers were to find themselves on the defensive in this matter in the light of the smuggling of military material into North Vietnam from China and the persecution of Catholics by the Viet Minh.

During the discussions, Mendès-France stated that he doubted it was necessary to hold the projected tripartite meeting in Washington on December 22 as planned. Dulles agreed, and Eden concurred, with the proviso that the meeting be postponed rather than cancelled. Mention was made that the meeting might be held in the latter half of January. By that time, Dulles stated, the problems to be decided would be so basic that the Ministers would probably want to decide them personally rather than have them considered by a working group. Mendès-France and Eden concurred, with Eden adding that a working group meeting might be useful in any event for purposes of information and coordination.[1] After a prolonged discussion, the conferees decided not to issue any communiqué on the conversations.[2] In accordance with previous practice, the representatives of the Associated States in Paris were informed of the discussion.[3]

Negotiation of a Substitute for the Ely-Collins Memorandum

Upon returning to Washington from Paris, Dulles reviewed the basic factors of the Vietnamese problem in messages of December 24, 1954, to Collins in Saigon and Dillon in Paris. Dulles pointed out that (1) the situation in South Vietnam had not disintegrated since the Geneva settlement; (2) since the withdrawal of United States support would hasten a Communist takeover of Vietnam and have adverse repercussions in all of Southeast Asia, United States investment in Vietnam was justified even if only to buy time to build up strength elsewhere in the area; and (3), unless the situation in Free Vietnam clearly appeared hopeless and rapidly disintegrating, the United States had no choice but to continue its aid to Viet-Nam and its support of Diem for there was "no other suitable leader known to us." Dulles went on to say that French and Vietnamese approval of the Collins-Ely memorandum of understanding on training of the Vietnamese Army was the

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[1]From Paris, tel. 2599, Dec. 19, 1954, secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 2601, Dec. 19, 1954, top secret.

[3]From Paris, tel. SECTO 24, Dec. 19, 1954, secret.

basic need and that "only when we have taken steps reorganize and revitalize National Army can we hope for improved security condition and lessening Communist influence [in] Free Viet-Nam."[1] In another instruction of the same day to the American Embassy in Paris, the Department characterized the Collins-Ely memorandum as the keystone of the effort to create a strong, stable Vietnam.[2]

Although French officials in the Quai d'Orsay and in the Ministry for the Associated States appreciated the urgency of the American request for approval of the Ely-Collins memorandum, they indicated to the American Embassy on December 27 and 31, 1954, that the French Government objected to the form rather than the substance of the memorandum. The question of the legality of substituting training personnel for administrative personnel in the MAAG was not disputed. The French officials stated that Paris did not want to present to the Vietnamese Government what would appear to be a signed Franco-American agreement which it had no choice but to carry out, and that the memorandum of understanding would have to be redrafted to take the form of recommendations for consideration by the Vietnamese Government.

The Embassy in Paris commented to the Department on December 31, 1954, that the French attitude was prompted to a considerable extent by internal political considerations.[4] Ambassador Dillon had reported a few days earlier that the Collins-Ely memorandum posed a major political problem for the Mendès-France government which might cause considerable delay in its approval. He said that a bilateral United States-French agreement giving the United States primary responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army would be unpopular with all shades of opinion in the French National Assembly. Dillon explained

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2585 (2324 to Paris), Dec. 24, 1954, top secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 2323, Dec. 24, 1954, top secret.

[3]From Paris, tels. 2703 and 2770, Dec. 27 and 31, 1954, both top secret.

[4]From Paris, tel. 2776, Dec. 31, 1954, top secret.

that the Socialists and Left Wing elements would oppose it as provocative and in violation of the Armistice, and that the Right Wing elements would probably oppose it as an unacceptable abdication on the part of France. Dillon also stated that public knowledge of such an agreement would form a valid reason for an interpellation in the National Assembly which the Mendès-France government could probably not survive.[1]

The official French position was finally communicated to the United States on January 7, 1955. The French proposed that the text of the Collins-Ely memorandum be altered and recast in the form of joint recommednations to the Vietnamese Government. In addition, the French Embassy handed the Department a note which made the following points in favor of the suggested changes: (1) The sovereignty of Vietnam gave it the right to determine the conditions of training and the structure of its army; hence, the United States and France could only make recommendations. (2) The French High Command, which was responsible for the execution of the Cease-Fire Agreement, could not accept any measure which did not conform to that Agreement and, in this connection, (a) the size of the MAAG could not be augmented beyond the 342 present when the cease-fire went into effect, and (b) the substitution of training personnel for administrative personnel within this ceiling should be accomplished discreetly in a manner acceptable to the ICC.[2]

Collins, who felt that the French were stalling, was greatly disturbed by this attempt to rewrite the memorandum of understanding. He pointed out from Saigon, on January 9, 1955, that the French proposal made no reference to granting autonomy to the Vietnamese forces and that it included circumscribing details which would tend to hamstring the implementation of the training program. Collins urged a "flat refusal" of the French proposal and stated that he would not agree to it "unless

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[1]From Paris, tel. 2697, Dec. 26, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 2870, and to Paris, tel. 2766, both Jan. 7, 1955, top secret.

specifically instructed by high authority."[1] Three days later, Collins strongly recommended that the Department urge the French Government to abandon its proposed revision of the memorandum and to authorize Ely to work out with Collins the details of the implementation of the signed document.[2]

Instead of rejecting the French revision, the Department on January 14, 1955, instructed the American Chargé in Paris to explain the United States position to Mendès-France in the following terms:

> (1) Collins had no intention of presenting the memorandum of understanding to the Vietnamese Government; instead, he intended to negotiate United States direct aid and Vietnamese force levels with Diem on the basis of the agreed understanding between himself and Ely on those matters requiring French-United States concurrence.
>
> (2) Furthermore, Collins had no intention of derogating from Vietnamese sovereignty; it was his desire to enhance it.
>
> (3) The joint recommendations proposed by the French were consistent to a degree with the Collins-Ely memorandum, but they omitted certain points which the United States considered to be important.
>
> (4) The Department assumed that the French Government did not wish to repudiate or to change the substance of the memorandum.

The Chargé was also to seek specific confirmation that the French would negotiate with the Vietnamese to bring about the autonomy of the Vietnamese armed forces by July 1, 1955. If Mendés- France agreed to the foregoing, the Chargé was to seek his further

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2660, Jan. 9, 1955, top secret. Collins also expressed to Ely his concern over the French Government's delay in approving their joint memorandum. (From Saigon, tel. 2663, Jan. 10, 1955, top secret.)

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2707, Jan. 12, 1955, secret.

agreement that he and Secretary Dulles would instruct Ely and Collins to proceed in a manner consistent with their signed understanding.[1]

When the American Chargé saw Mendès-France on January 16, 1955, the latter confirmed the Department's assumption with respect to the French Government's attitude on the substance of the Collins-Ely understanding and on the autonomy of the Vietnamese armed forces. Mendès-France stated that his only concern had been to avoid any grounds for belief that the understanding violated the Geneva Armistice.[2] In a discussion with the American Chargé the next day, officials of the Quai d'Orsay stated that the French Government was prepared to give the United States assurances regarding the autonomy of the Vietnamese armed forces.[3]

It soon developed that there was no meeting of the minds between Washington and Paris as to which document--the Collins-Ely understanding or the French revision of January 7--was to be the controlling one. On January 18, the Department reiterated the United States position to Pierre Millet, French Minister in Washington, as follows:

(1) The United States had no intention to pass the Collins-Ely memorandum on to the Vietnamese or to make it public.

(2) Because the memorandum was a United States-French agreement, the Department considered that this text should be the basis for field implementation.

(3) If the French had to make some public explanation in the future, the Department had no objection to their using the revised version as a purely French description of the Collins-Ely

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[1] To Paris, tel. 2526, Jan. 14, 1955, top secret.

[2] From Paris, tel. 2996, Jan. 16, 1955, top secret.

[3] From Paris, tel. 3010, Jan. 17, 1955, top secret.

memorandum, so long as the December 13 agreement remained the only agreed official basis for field operations.[1]

Officials of the Quai d'Orsay, however, made it clear to the American Embassy that the French Government was not prepared to accept or formally approve the December 13 document as the basis for an approach to the Vietnamese Government.[2]

The French position was further clarified by Minister Millet in Washington on January 21, 1955, when he informed the Department that the French Government wanted the French revision of January 7 to be the controlling document defining the U.S.-French relationship, and that the French wanted to give this text to the Vietnamese. In reply to Millet's inquiry as to what were the substantive differences between the two documents, Department officials pointed out that the French revision omitted any mention of autonomy of the Vietnamese Army, and they also indicated that the provisions governing the role of the MAAG required improvement. Department officials told Millet that, in view of General Collins' imminent return to Washington, the question of revising the agreement which he had prepared with Ely would be discussed with him.[3]

After taking the matter up with General Collins, Secretary Dulles sent a personal message to Mendès-France, on January 24, 1955, in an effort to resolve the impasse. Dulles wrote that the two points of difference could be taken care of by two letters. In the first instance, General Ely would send a letter to Diem stating that the Vietnamese National Army would be completely autonomous by July 1, 1955. Dulles explained that, although this was a matter to be agreed to between France and Vietnam, it was also a prerequisite to American financial support of the Vietnamese Army and to American assistance in training that Army. Ely would then send a letter to Collins outlining the role of the MAAG and specifying that:

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[1]To Paris, tel. 2579, Jan. 19, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tels. 3045 and 3064, Jan. 19 and 20, 1955, both top secret.

[3]To Paris, tel. 2615 (3058 to Saigon), Jan. 22, 1955, top secret.

"It is agreed that United States personnel will be assigned, together with French personnel, as advisers to and instructors of the Vietnamese armed forces. All U.S. and French advisory and training personnel assigned or detached to the Vietnamese armed forces will be under the direction of the Chief MAAG acting under the general authority of General Ely. As the efficiency of the Vietnamese armed forces increases, the number of US and French advisers and trainers will be decreased."

Dulles went on to say that, since the two questions could be settled in this manner, there was no longer any need for the Collins-Ely memorandum or the French revision thereof, and that these two letters would take the place of that memorandum. Dulles closed his message with the statement:

"I hope you will agree with me that this suggestion will permit us to end an argument which seems to me increasingly sterile. I also am sure that you understand that agreement on these two open matters is a prerequisite to the United States making the massive investment to preserve South Vietnam in freedom which is our purpose."[1]

Mendès-France's views were communicated to the American Embassy in Paris by Jacques Roux, Director of the Far East Section of the Quai d'Orsay, on January 28. Roux stated that the French Government accepted Dulles' suggested letters, except that it wanted the first two sentences in the letter on the MAAG from Ely to Collins to be combined to read:

"It is agreed that all US and French advisory and training personnel assigned or detached to the Vietnamese Armed Forces will be under the direction of the Chief MAAG acting under the general authority of the Commander in Chief."

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[1] To Paris, tel. 2629, Jan. 24, 1955, top secret. Dulles also emphasized the importance he attached to the resolution of these questions when the newly appointed French Ambassador, Maurice Couve de Murville, called on him on January 28. (Memorandum by Merchant (EUR) of conversation between Dulles and Couve de Murville, Jan. 28, 1955, secret.)

At the same time, the French Government wanted its January 7 proposal used in approaching the Vietnamese Government in order (1) to underline the joint nature of this Franco-American undertaking and (2) to have an agreed document that could, if necessary, be made public and should questions be raised in the French Parliament.[1]

Although somewhat skeptical of the efficacy of using the French proposal of January 7 as an "agreed document", the Department accepted the French counter-proposal. On February 1, the Department instructed the American Embassy in Paris to inform the Quai d'Orsay that the two letters in question and the text of the French proposal of January 7 would constitute a satisfactory substitute for the original Collins-Ely memorandum. At the same time the Department revised the proposed letter from Ely to Collins to read:

> "It is agreed that all U.S. and French advisory and training personnel assigned or detached to the Vietnamese Armed Forces will be under the direction of the Chief MAAG acting under the general authority* of the Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces in Viet-Nam. As the efficiency of the Vietnamese Armed Forces increases, the number of U.S. and French advisors and trainers will be decreased".[2]

The Quai d'Orsay accepted this revision[3] and informed the American Embassy on February 3 that General Ely was being instructed to proceed accordingly.[4]

After the issues had thus been resolved, Edgar Faure, the French Foreign Minister, formally replied under date of February 8, 1955, to Dulles' message to Mendès-France. Faure stated that

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[1]From Paris, tel. 3195, Jan. 28, 1955, top secret.

*Subsequently changed by agreement to read "overall authority".

[2]To Paris, tel. 2726, Feb. 1, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Paris, tel. 3240, Feb. 2, 1955, top secret.

[4]From Paris, tel. 3255, Feb. 3, 1955, top secret.

he was pleased with United States assurances that the training program would be in conformity with the provisions of the Cease-Fire Agreement, that the number of United States military personnel present at the time of the cease-fire would not be exceeded, and that the introduction of instructors and advisers would be carried out "progressively and discreetly."[1]

After General Collins returned to Saigon, General Ely delivered the requisite letters to Diem and General Collins on February 11, 1955, and, on the same day, Generals Ely and Collins submitted to Diem the joint recommendation of the French and United States Governments relative to the organization and training of a Vietnamese Armed Force of 100,000 men.[2] It had taken three months of intensive effort to obtain French agreement for the United States to assume the responsibility for training the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

The next day, at a press conference, Diem announced that, effective immediately, the MAAG would assume the responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army. In making this announcement Diem stated that this was being done at his request. (He had formally made such request in a letter to Collins dated January 19, 1955.) He also stated that the question had been under study and discussion since before the Geneva settlement and pointed out that both American and French personnel would be employed in this undertaking.[3]

<u>Agreement on the Size of the Vietnamese Military Establishment and on the Amount of American Financial Support</u>

While Washington sought to obtain French approval for the United States to assume responsibility for training the Vietnamese Armed Forces, General Collins in Saigon conducted

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[1]Translation of letter from Faure to Dulles in tel. 3397 from Paris, Feb. 11, 1955, secret. Mendès-France had been overthrown on February 5, 1955, when he failed to obtain a vote of confidence on his North African policy.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 3343, Feb. 11, 1955, confidential. The English texts of the three documents are in this telegram.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 3414, Feb. 15, 1955, unclassified.

conversations with the Vietnamese authorities, on the one hand, and with General Ely, regarding the number of the Vietnamese military personnel the United States would be prepared to train and support. Collins' original recommendation to Washington provided for the reduction of the Vietnamese Armed Forces from about 170,000 to approximately 84,000 military personnel, plus 4,400 civilians, by July 1, 1955. The mission of this force would be to maintain internal security and to provide a small "blocking force" in conjunction with the French Expeditionary Corps, pending the arrival of outside assistance, should the Viet Minh resume military operations.[1] Ely agreed very reluctantly to this recommendation and expressed doubt that a force of this reduced size would be adequate for the tasks at hand. The initial Vietnamese reaction to the proposed reduction was unfavorable.[2]

Following a discussion with the Vietnamese Defense Minister, Ho Thong Minh, on December 20, 1954, Collins reported that Minh continued to be strongly opposed to the proposed reduction on the ground that it would render the Army too small to deal effectively with the sects, and cause the bulk of the discharges to seek enlistment in the armed forces of the sects as an alternative to unemployment, thereby increasing the bargaining power of the sects. Minh also indicated that such a rapid reduction would have an adverse effect on the country and on the political situation. Collins informed Washington that he was prepared to negotiate an extension of the period of phased reduction of the Vietnamese forces beyond the target date of July 1, 1955.[3]

The Vietnamese General Staff was thinking in terms of a force of 150,000.[4] At a meeting with Collins on January 5,

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 1830, Nov. 15, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2024, Nov. 30, 1954, secret. Collins was perturbed when news stories appeared in Saigon regarding his proposals for the size of the Vietnamese forces and the United States training of same. (From Saigon, tel. 2267, Dec. 14, 1954, secret.)

[3]From Saigon, tel. 2453, Dec. 24, 1954, secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 2581, Jan. 5, 1955, top secret.

1955, Minh presented his counter-proposal providing for a reduction by July 1, 1955, to 150,000, which strength would be maintained until December 31, 1955, to be followed by reduction to a level of approximately 88,000 by March 1956. Minh emphasized that, for political reasons, the Vietnamese Government felt it essential to be able to say that the Armed Forces were being maintained at 150,000 during 1955. Collins refused to accept this proposition.

After this meeting, Collins recommended to Washington that the phase-down period be extended so that, by December 31, 1955, the force would consist of 100,000 military personnel, including 10,000 trainees--single men--who would have been drafted about September 1, 1955, for a 16 weeks training period, after which they would remain on active duty for 20 months, thus making a compulsory service period of two years. Beginning on January 1, 1956, additional groups of 10,000 would be drafted every four months, with concurrent discharge of an equal number of men from the regular force. Collins explained that it would cost the United States less money to develop such a conscript force, since the men would be paid at a reduced rate, than to continue payment on the French system under which the Government supported the soldier's family.[1] General Ely, with whom Collins discussed this recommendation on January 8, 1955, indicated general agreement with the new force levels.[2]

In the days that followed, Collins continued his negotiations with Minh. On January 17, 1955, Collins told Diem that he was near agreement with Minh on force levels. In a separate conversation the same day, Collins likewise informed Ely of this development.[3] Two days later, Collins showed Ely the drafts of letters he had suggested that Diem and Minh send him regarding United States assistance and training of the armed forces, as well as the structure and force level of same. Collins explained that this seeming Vietnamese initiative would put the Vietnamese Government in a better light if the texts were to become public. Ely reiterated his agreement with this procedure and suggested a

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2676, Jan. 10, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2663, Jan. 10, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 2811, Jan. 17, 1955, secret.

few modifications in the draft of the Diem letter. After this conversation with Ely, Collins saw Diem and Minh, who agreed to the draft letters and the Ely modifications. Both Vietnamese officials insisted, however, that the period of conscript service be reduced from 24 to 18 months, which Collins accepted.[1]

Accordingly, Diem wrote Collins, on January 19, 1955, formally requesting the United States to furnish financial support to the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and to assume full responsibility for training said forces under the "overall authority of General Paul Ely as Commander in Chief, and with cooperation of French mission for military aid." Diem stated that he had authorized his Defense Minister to obtain Collin's concurrence in a program for the re-organization of the armed forces developed by the Ministry of National Defense. Minh's letter to Collins of the same date outlined a program for reducing the armed forces by stages until the force level reached 100,000 military personnel by December 31, 1955. Minh stated that, beginning on September 1, 1955, a national selective service program would be instituted with the induction of the first group of 10,000 trainees for 18 months' compulsory service, and that a like number would be drafted each four months thereafter. Minh also stated that the trainees would be paid 50 piasters a week for the first four months, after which they would receive 100 piasters per week. Collins acknowledged both letters in his reply to Diem on January 20, 1955. Collins stated that he was pleased to accept the program proposed by Minh as a basis "for final negotiations in determining financial and training support" to be given by the United States to this program.[2]

Pursuant to the suggestion from Collins, in which Ely concurred,[3] Diem issued a press statement on January 20, 1955, which gave the gist of the contents of this exchange of letters.

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2875, Jan. 21, 1955, secret

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2876, Jan. 21, 1955, secret. Washington had announced on December 31, 1954, that, effective January 1, 1955, it would furnish financial aid directly to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, for the purpose of strengthening their defense against the threat of Communist subversion and aggression, pursuant to section 121 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. (Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 51.)

[3]From Saigon, tel. 2876, Jan. 21, 1955, secret.

In this statement, Diem indicated that he had discussed the question of United States assistance with General Ely "who is in full accord, provided that such assistance be given in accord with existing agreements",[1] meaning thereby the Geneva settlement.

While Collins was negotiating the question of force level in Saigon, Washington was preparing for a review of United States policies and operations in the Associated States. In this connection Collins suggested that he return to Washington for consultations.[2] President Eisenhower approved the suggestion and requested Collins to be in Washington prior to the National Security Council meeting scheduled for January 27, 1955.[3] Collins departed Saigon on January 21, 1955.[4]

Collins submitted a detailed report of his mission, dated January 20, 1955, for consideration by the National Security Council. He recommended that the United States continue to support military and non-military assistance programs in Vietnam, and estimated that the cost of these to the United States would amount to $327.3 million in calendar year 1955 and $196.6 million in calendar year 1956. He also outlined the composition of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in 1956, when it would be made up of 100,000 military personnel and 4,400 civilians. Collins concluded his report by stating:

"In view of the importance of Vietnam to all of Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the United States should expend the funds, material, and effort required to strengthen the country and help it retain its independence. I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free, even with our aid. But I know that, without our aid, Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism. If the chances of success are difficult to calculate, the results of a withdrawal of American aid are only too certain, not only

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2877, Jan. 21, 1955, unclassified.

[2]From Saigon, tels. 2455 and 2663, Dec. 25, 1954 and Jan. 10, 1955, both top secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 2873, Jan. 13, 1955, top secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 2876, Jan. 21, 1955, secret.

in Vietnam but throughout Southeast Asia. Such a withdrawal would hasten the rate of Communist advances in the Far East as a whole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism. In my opinion, the chance of success is not only worth the gamble; we cannot afford to let free Vietnam go by default."[1]

The National Security Council, President Eisenhower presiding, discussed Collins' report on January 27, 1955, and "approved in principle the programs of military and non-military aid for South Vietnam, and the general order of magnitude of the costs thereof, subject to action by responsible departments and agencies to screen such programs in detail and to determine the availability of funds therefor in accordance with the normal budgetary process".[2]

Collins returned to Saigon on February 9, 1955.[3] Pursuant to instructions from the Department,[4] the requisite agreements governing economic assistance and United States financial assistance for the Vietnamese Armed Forces for the calendar year 1955 were concluded by exchanges of notes between the American Embassy in Saigon and the Vietnamese Government between February 21, 1955, and April 23, 1955.[5]

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[1]Collins to Secretary of State, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council", Jan. 20, 1955, top secret. The report was reproduced and circulated within the Department under cover of a memorandum by W. K. Scott, Director, Executive Secretariat, Jan. 24, 1955, top secret.

[2]NSC Action 1316, Jan. 27, 1955, top secret. A copy of this action was sent to Saigon for information. (To Saigon, instruction A-88, Feb. 8, 1955, top secret.)

[3]From Saigon, tel. 3328, Feb. 10, 1955, secret.

[4]To Saigon, tels. 3366, Feb. 9, 1955, secret, 3368, Feb. 9, 1955, limited official use, and 3400, Feb. 10, 1955, confidential.

[5]The economic assistance agreement consisted of the Embassy note of February 21, 1955, and Diem's reply of March 7, 1955; the financial assistance agreement consisted of the Embassy note of April 22, 1955, and Diem's reply of April 23, 1955. The texts of these notes are enclosed in despatch 304 from Saigon, Mar. 17, 1956, confidential.

American Efforts To Stave Off Renewed French Attempts To Replace the Diem Government

The Question of a Collins-Ely Joint "Reevaluation" of Diem's Prospects. At the tripartite conversations in Paris on December 18, 1954, Dulles had accepted Mendès- France's proposal that Collins and Ely study the question of what needed to be done to improve the situation in South Vietnam and to make recommendations so that necessary decisions could be taken. As developments unfolded, it appeared that there was no meeting of minds as to what had been agreed upon at the Paris conversations. After returning to Washington, Dulles informed Collins and Dillon, on December 24, 1954, that, although a study by Collins and Ely of alternative leaders to Diem was among the points on which Dulles had agreed with Mendès-France, he had not agreed that Collins and Ely should establish a deadline for the replacement of Diem by another man. Dulles also stated that it had been agreed that Collins and Ely would report late in January on the overall situation.[1]

From Paris, on January 6, 1955, Ambassador Dillon reported that La Chambre, in a conversation, had expressed disappointment with the results of the conversations held on December 18. According to Dillon, La Chambre indicated that the French Government was still thinking in terms of an alternative to Diem. La Chambre stated that he was convinced that the only possible workable solution was that Bao Dai return immediately to Saigon to help solve the interminable conflicts between the sects and the Diem government, that a new government be oraganized with former Premier Tran Van Huu as Prime Minister and, possibly, former Premier Nguyen Van Tam as Minister of the Interior and that Diem might take part in such a government.[2]

On returning to Saigon, Ely raised with Collins, on January 8, 1955, the question of the proposed joint review. Ely indicated that agreement had been reached in the Paris conversations that two of them should review the situation as of January 15, report on the chances of success of the Diem Government, and recommend

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2585 (2324 to Paris), Dec. 24, 1954, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 2866, Jan. 6, 1955, secret.

possible alternatives. Collins stated that, as he understood it, no date had been specified for such a reevaluation. Collins also told Ely that, until France accepted the memorandum of understanding of December 13, 1954, on training of the Vietnamese forces, and until a definite agreement had been negotiated on United States direct support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, there was little sound basis for a reevaluation of the Vietnamese situation. Collins went on to say that he was willing to meet with Ely for reevaluation at any time, that he felt that Diem was beginning to make progress on their 7-point program,[1] and that the only conclusion that could be reached at that time was that he and Ely would have to continue to support Diem until there was a fair chance to learn the results of these programs.[2]

At a subsequent meeting with Collins, on January 14, 1955, Ely asked how they should go about carrying out their instructions to make a joint assessment of the situation. Collins reiterated that Diem was making progress on their 7-point program, except for the point calling for broadening of the government. He stated that then was not the time to consider a possible alternative to Diem, for the latter had not yet had full opportunity to put the program into effect. Collins also said that he believed that the assessment might be begun in the first week in February and be completed by February 10. Ely commented that he hoped that Diem could succeed, but, should that not turn out to be the case within the next few weeks, Ely felt that he and Collins would have no alternative but to accept the principle of suggesting the return of Bao Dai either to support Diem, or, if necessary, to deal with the question of his replacement.

Ely went on to say that "it is Bao Dai or nothing if Diem does not measure up." Collins stated that he was willing to consider this suggestion, but that he considered it inopportune to discuss this matter because, if their discussion leaked out, it would have the effect of weakening Diem's position vis-à-vis the sects. When Ely said that his suggestion was not intended to undermine Diem, and that he felt it might be a tragic mistake

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[1]See above, p. 54.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 2663, Jan. 10, 1955, top secret.

to gamble everything on one single man, Collins replied that, after their February analysis, there would still be time to consider an alternative and to make recommendations within 24 hours.[1]

In Washington, meanwhile, the French Embassy informed the Department of State, on January 10, 1955, that Paris suggested that a tripartite Ministerial-level meeting for a review of the Indochina situation be held during the first week in February after the Collins-Ely joint recommendations had been submitted. A Department officer commented that, in his personal view, there was some question whether it would be feasible for Collins and Ely to make such a joint evaluation in the absence of United States-French agreement on the training of Vietnamese forces and on a security program in Vietnam.[2]

The French Embassy representative also informed the Department that Ely had returned to Saigon with instructions to continue efforts to broaden the base of the Diem Government and to work out an eventual formula for "changing" the Diem Government. In the latter respect, Bao Dai was to be associated with the change in some way, but his exact role was to be decided only after consultation between Ely and Collins. When informing the American Embassy in Saigon of this development, on January 13, the Department stated that the United States had made no commitment at Paris to replace Diem or to associate Bao Dai with any such change, except in the event that Diem's failure to make progress made an alternative desirable. The Department also stated that the United States intended to continue firm support for Diem and a government of national union around him.[3]

In a separate message to Collins on the same day, Dulles said that he did not accept the thesis that a deadline should be established by which, assuming that no spectacular progress had been made, Diem would be replaced by any of the candidates suggested by the French, including Bao Dai. Dulles also said

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 2772, Jan. 15, 1955, secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 2514 (2870 to Saigon), Jan. 13, 1955, secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 2872, Jan. 13, 1955, secret.

that, on the basis of Collins' reports, he believed that Diem was beginning to make steady, if undramatic, progress, and "in any event we do not see, nor have you reported, a preferable alternate", and he added, "therefore, you should not join with Ely in any joint recommendation in this respect."[1] Paris continued to maintain the view, however, that Collins and Ely had a mandate from the December 18 Paris conversations to study the question of eventual alternatives to Diem, should the latter fail, and to submit recommendations to their respective Governments for consideration at the next Indochina review.[2]

Washington was very much concerned with French insistance that an alternative to Diem be considered by Collins and Ely. In a letter, dated January 20, 1955, to Theodore C. Achilles, Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris, the Counselor of the Department, Douglas MacArthur II, wrote of this concern and stated that Washington was not willing to consider alternative solutions at that juncture. MacArthur wrote in part:

> "At a time when Diem at long last appears to be moving ahead in the right direction and making some real progress, with corresponding indications of substantial popular support, it would be madness and folly to get involved in an academic exercise where we would have no alternative to put forward and would be unwilling to agree to any alternative which the French might put forward. If the French have an alternative, and with Ely to put it forward, they are at liberty to do so; but it would be slapped down insofar as we are concerned."

MacArthur asked Achilles to attempt to dissuade French officials from continuing to insist on a discussion of alternatives and added: "I repeat, we are concerned about French insistence because we do not know what is really eating them and what ulterior motives some of them may have in insisting on this exercise at this time when real progress appears to be in the making by Diem."

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 2873 (2520 to Paris), Jan. 13, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 2987, Jan. 14, 1955, secret; tel. 3034, Jan. 18, 1955, top secret.

Achilles replied, on January 27, 1955, that it would be impossible to dissuade French officials from continuing to insist that any plan they might be concocting be given at least a hearing. He stated that the French officials' analyais of the situation did not permit them to accept the United States thesis that Diem's improvement had completely obviated the need for a change of some kind. Achilles said in part:

> "As to what is really eating the French, I think it is a combination of factors whose relative importance is hard to evaluate. One is a sincere belief that Diem is personally incapable of doing the necessary job, has too many cards stacked against him, and does not represent even the best available solution. ... Another is the widespread opinion in Parliamant and the press that the Diem formula was forced on the Government against its better judgment and accepted only in the general interests of Franco-American relations. Mendès wishes to be able to point to the fact that he has at least tried to get us to change. The extent to which less creditable motives, such as jealousy of U.S. influence in Vietnam, the desire to replace 'anti-French' Vietnamese by pro-French ones, or more sinister thinking along 'Sainteny' lines enters into the picture is hard to say."[1]

Two days later Achilles reported that French officials, including Mendès-France, persisted in their view that the Collins-Ely review should include the question of alternatives to supporting the Diem Government.[2]

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[1]Letter, MacArthur to Achilles, Jan. 20, 1955; letter Achilles to MacArthur, Jan. 27, 1955; both personal and secret, both attached to memorandum by MacArthur (C) to Young (FE) and Tyler (WE), Feb. 1, 1955, secret. A month earlier Ambassador Dillon had summarized French opinion regarding Diem as follows: "Unfortunately Diem is universally considered in France to be a failure who owes his position solely to U.S. support. French Government has clearly intimated in repeated statements to Assembly that Diem is American protégé whom they support in order to ensure continuing American aid to South Vietnam." (From Paris, tel. 2697, Dec. 26, 1954, top secret.)

[2]From Paris, tel. 3201, Jan. 29, 1955, secret.

While Collins was in Washington, he called on the French Ambassador, Maurice Couve de Murville, on January 31, 1955. Collins stated that Diem's position had improved and that Diem had shown evidence of a capacity to govern. He also stated that Diem should be supported, that France and the United States should continue their cooperation, and that there was a fifty-fifty chance that Vietnam could be saved. Collins emphasized that it was probably too late for the French or the Americans, alone or together, to try to remove Diem, and that the attempt would be chaos. In answer to the French Ambassador's question about the Collins-Ely joint report, Collins stated that he and Ely could submit a report to their respective Governments at any time. He suggested, however, that it would not be very illuminating to make that effort in mid-February, for the various programs were just getting under way and were too new to be profitably evaluated.[1]

Upon returning to Saigon on February 9, 1955, Collins called on Ely to review developments. In reporting this conversation, Collins stated that Ely made no mention whatever of reevaluation of the situation or of the prospects of the Diem Government.[2] From all indications, Collins and Ely at no time submitted "joint recommendations" to their respective Governments as envisaged at the Paris conversations of December 18, 1954. At Ely's suggestion, however, Collins prepared a study of the situation, dated February 25, 1955, a week in advance of Secretary Dulles' scheduled visit to Saigon. This study came to the following conclusions:

"1. With French and American assistance the Diem Government has developed a sound and progressive program in the fields of military affairs, resettlement of refugees, agrarian reform, a Provisional National Assembly and fiscal affairs.

"2. No progress has been made in persuading Diem to broaden the base of his Government.

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[1]Memorandum by Young (FE:PSA) of conversation among Collins, Couve de Murville, and Tyler (WE), Jan. 31, 1955, secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 3328, Feb. 10, 1955, secret.

"3. To replace Diem at any time between the present and July 1956[1] would seriously retard these essential programs, if not fatally obstruct them.

"4. The solution is not to replace Diem, but, while continuing to press him to broaden his Government, fully and faithfully to support him. At the same time he should be stimulated and encouraged to realize all phases of his program.

"5. Without such support, Vietnam is almost certain to be lost to Communism. If the above measures are fully adhered to, there is a fair chance of saving Vietnam."

The study was discussed with Ely, who indicated general agreement with the paper as a whole and specific, though unofficial, agreement with the conclusions. Ely stated that, since there was no pressure to finalize a joint report, the study could be completed at some later date. The study was shown to Dulles during his visit to Saigon.[2]

<u>The Eisenhower-Bao Dai Exchange of Letters, February 19 and March 5, 1955</u>. While in Washington, Collins had recommended that a letter from President Eisenhower to Bao Dai would be useful in outlining United States policy with respect to Vietnam and its support of the Diem Government. The Department felt that such a letter would be timely in view of the long period since the United States had had official contact with the Vietnamese Chief of State and of rumors that pressure was being brought to bear on Bao Dai to remove Diem.[3] Accordingly, President Eisenhower sent a letter, dated February 19, 1955, in which he stated that he was gratified to learn from General Collins that Diem was making "distinct progress", and that Collins believed that there was a good chance that Vietnam could remain free if there was continued effective action on the Diem

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[1] I.e., the date set by the Geneva Conference for all-Vietnamese elections.

[2] Collins to Young, Mar. 10, 1955, top secret, enclosing draft study, Feb. 25, 1955, top secret.

[3] Memorandum by Robertson (FE) to The Secretary, Feb. 16, 1955, confidential.

Government's programs. Eisenhower went on to say that Diem's programs of land reform and reorganization of the Armed Forces should, when fully carried out, further increase the stability and unity of the government. Eisenhower concluded with the statement that the United States Government intended to continue its support of Diem's Government.[1]

Pursuant to instructions,[2] Eisenhower's letter was delivered on March 1 to Bao Dai at Cannes by a member of the American Embassy in Paris. At the same time, the Embassy's emissary orally conveyed a message from Collins,[3] which had been approved by the Department,[4] to the effect that he (Collins) was concerned with the activities of the Binh Xuyen sect which were hampering Diem's efforts to consolidate his position. Collins suggested that Bao Dai revoke his decrees of the previous year by which he had vested control of the police and <u>sureté</u> in the Binh Xuyen and turn over these functions to the Diem Government.

While pleased to receive Eisenhower's letter, Bao Dai was not enthusiastic about Collins' suggestion, in part because he had doubts that Diem would be equal to the task. Bao Dai stated that he did not think that removing the police and <u>sureté</u> from Binh Xuyen control would really help the political situation. He acknowledged the importance of having a Prime Minister in whom the United States had full confidence and stated that, with this in view, he had given Diem full powers and freedom of action to choose means to achieve the basic objective of countering Viet Minh subversion and developing a strong Vietnam capable of resisting Viet Minh attraction. Bao Dai also indicated that he did not think that Diem was making a sufficient effort to reconcile the differences between various elements of Vietnamese

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[1]Text of letter, Eisenhower to Bao Dai, Feb. 19, 1955, in Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 423.

[2]To Paris, tel. 2956 (3607 to Saigon), Feb. 21, 1955, confidential. This instruction contains the text of the letter and suggests that Bao Dai's views on developments in Vietnam be solicited.

[3]From Saigon, tel.3564 (sent to Paris as Saigon's 976), Feb. 25, 1955, secret.

[4]To Paris, tel. 2995, Feb. 25, 1955, secret.

Dulles told Diem that the United States Government had a great stake in him and Vietnam and that the United States had, through its efforts and aid and moral support, contributed to Diem's position of security in the country. Therefore, it was essential that Diem take those actions necessary to strengthen his Government. Dulles said that, since Diem was secure, he could afford to bring into his government men tho might otherwise be his political opponents, and the Secretary indicated that, in time of national crisis, differing elements must work together.

Dulles also said that he hoped Diem would realize that what he did in Vietnam was important to the United States in the cause of freedom throughout the world, and he added that, if there were failure in Vietnam, United States prestige would be gravely affected. Dulles pointed out that the United States Congress and American public opinion had accepted the United States policy of support for Diem and Free Vietnam and that the policies of the Diem Government would largely determine the continuation of that support. Dulles also told Diem that the French Government was giving evidence of supporting him and was not seeking to replace him, and the Secretary explained that, whereas over the past few months the French had wanted to discuss what should be done if Diem failed, they had recently dropped the subject.

In reply to Dulles' statement regarding the necessity of bringing in highly qualified people into the Government, Diem talked about the need to restore security. He stressed the fact that the people of Vietnam needed a feeling of security and that the guarantee of such security was the most important task facing him and his Government. Diem also described the difficulties he was having in controlling the sects and indicated that he suspected that the sects were receiving some support from French elements in Vietnam. He then touched on the problem of resettlement of refugees from North Vietnam, and on French efforts to arrive at a modus operandi with Viet Minh by which, according to Diem, the French were trying to safeguard their economic and cultural interests in the North as a pretext for the establishment of a political relationship with Hanoi.[1]

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[1] From Manila, tel. SECTO 50, Mar. 1, 1955, top secret.

After leaving Saigon, Dulles wrote to President Eisenhower that he had been favorably impressed by Diem "who is much more of a personality than I had anticipated." Dulles continued:

> "He is not without defects, but his merits seemed greater than I had thought. Collins and Ely have done a superb job. ... Great difficulties remain, but their magnitude is less than six months ago."[1]

On returning from his travels in Southeast Asia, Dulles made a radio and television address on March 8, 1955. With respect to the situation in Vietnam, he enumerated three "abnormal" problems facing the Government in Saigon in developing an efficient government of its own "in substitution for French rule": (1) absorption and resettlement of refugees from the North, (2) the parochial attitude of the sects, who were withholding allegiance from the central government, and (3) the threat of the Communists in North Vietnam as well as those who had remained in the South. Dulles described Diem as a "true patriot, dedicated to independence and the enjoyment by his people of political and religious freedoms", and stated that he was convinced that the Diem Government "deserves the support which the United States is giving to help to create an efficient, loyal military force and sounder economic conditions."[2]

<u>Divergence of French and United States Policies Toward the Diem Government During the Insurrection of the Sects</u>

<u>Ultimatum of the Sects to Diem and Abandonment of Proposed Joint Franco-American Representations to Diem and the Sects, March 21-27, 1955</u>. The simmering controversy between the Diem Government and the sects, who had their own armed forces, entered a new phase on March 21, 1955. Some of the sect leaders, representing elements of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen, had formed a coalition under the banner of the "United Front of Nationalist Forces" early in March. The coalition issued a

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[1]Text of letter, Dulles to Eisenhower, in tel. DULTE 18 from Manila, Mar. 1, 1955, top secret.

[2]Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, Mar. 21, 1955, pp. 461-462.

manifesto which called for a government of national union and denounced dictatorship.[1] The situation was complicated by the fact that the Binh Xuyen controlled the Saigon police, and Diem had plans to use the National Army to wrest control from the Binh Xuyen.[2]

The coalition presented an ultimatum to Diem on March 21, demanding a reorganization of the Government within five days--the composition of the new government to meet with the approval of the sects.[3] In effect, the dissident sect leaders were challenging Diem's efforts to consolidate his authority.

In a talk with Diem on March 22, Collins assured him that United States policy remained unchanged and advised Diem to stand firm. In this conversation, Diem indicated that, if the sects resorted to violence in Saigon, he would use the National Army to maintain order.[4] It soon became apparent that the leader of the Binh Xuyen, Le Van Vien, was Diem's principal antagonist.[5]

The French authorities in Paris wanted to avoid, at any cost, having the Diem-sect controversy develop into an armed conflict. On March 23, they urged a joint Franco-American approach to Bao Dai in order to provide time to negotiate a modus vivendi.[6] The following day, the French proposed that a joint Franco-American démarche be made in Saigon by Ely and Collins to Diem, on the one hand, and the sect leaders, on the other, urging a political settlement and a broadening of the

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 3754, Mar. 8, 1955, confidential.

[2]From Saigon, tels. 3328, Feb. 10, 1955, secret; 3906, Mar. 15, 1955, secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 4038, Mar. 22, 1955, official use only.

[4]From Saigon. tel. 4050, Mar. 23, 1955, secret.

[5]From Saigon, tel. 4078, Mar. 23, 1955, secret.

[6]From Paris, tel. 4074, Mar. 23, 1955, secret.

Vietnamese Government. The French submitted to Washington for its consideration the text of joint instructions to Ely and Collins for use in such a joint approach.

Washington's initial reaction was largely negative. The Department informed the French Minister, Pierre Millet, on March 25, that it seemed hardly necessary to urge Diem to get in contact with the sects in view of the fact that he had repeatedly invited them to meet with him. The Department also stated that the tenor of the draft instructions to Collins and Ely implied an equality of status between the Government and the sects. In the Department's view, the sects were rebels motivated by selfish considerations and were acting against the legal Government. The Department felt that the emphasis should be on a strong joint French-United States warning to the sects, informing them that both countries opposed their threatened violent action. The Department stated that the French should inform the sects that the French Expeditionary Corps, at the request of the Diem Government, would prevent the movement of sect forces into Saigon.[2]

Collins, in a conversation with Ely on March 27 after the latter's return from Paris, raised the question of a joint démarche. Ely stated that, since neither of them had received instructions, discussion of this matter could be postponed until later. Collins reported that he had the impression that Ely was not eager to go ahead with the joint approach.[3] Apparently nothing came of this proposal, and, in any event, it was soon overtaken by the developments in Saigon.

<u>United States Support of Diem's Resistance to the Binh Xuyen Sect, March 29-31, 1955</u>. Diem was determined to take over the headquarters of the National Police and Sureté, which were in Binh Xuyen hands, and Collins advised against the use of force.[4] Fighting broke out during the night of March 29-30,

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[1]From Paris, tel. 4107, Mar. 24, 1955, secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 3384 (4165 to Saigon), Mar. 25, 1955, secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 4159, Mar. 28, 1955, secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 4194, Mar. 30, 1955, secret.

United States Rejection of the French Proposal To Request Bao Dai's Intervention in the Crisis Between Diem and the Sects, April 2-5, 1955. The search for a solution to the crisis continued through April. Ely proposed to Collins, on April 2, that the United States and France agree to ask Bao Dai to arbitrate the crisis. Under Ely's proposal, Bao Dai was to ask Diem, the sect leaders, and other Vietnamese political figures to come to Paris for consultations and conferences in order to achieve a political solution. At the same time, Bao Dai was to proclaim a ten-day truce, beginning at the expiration of a three-day truce arranged locally by Ely and Collins. Ely stated to Collins that the United States and France should advise Bao Dai of solutions the two countries considered desirable. Collins recommended that Washington accept Ely's proposal in principle, subject to his working out details of consultations and specific United States-French solutions to be recommended to Bao Dai.[1]

Paris, which had already formally requested U.S.-French discussion of the crisis,[2] supported Ely's proposal and indicated that it was ready to act jointly with the United States in making the requisite démarche to Bao Dai.[3] Washington, however, saw little merit in Ely's proposal. Dulles informed the French Ambassador, on April 3, that the situation was very complicated and that, although it was difficult to know exactly what to do, he doubted that calling the Vietnamese together in Paris was a good solution. Dulles expressed the view that the Binh Xuyen challenge to Diem struck at the fundamental issue of the authority of any government in Vietnam. In Dulles' opinion, the Binh Xuyen should be treated differently from the other two sects (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao), for it was not a religious organization with some popular support. Dulles said that the French Government should allow Diem to reestablish his authority and not restrict his means of doing so, and he added that, if the French assured Diem of moral and logistic support, the challenge from the Binh Xuyen might evaporate or be contained. If, with French support, Diem's impaired authority should be somewhat

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 4301, Apr. 2, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tels. 4285, 4286, Apr. 2, 1955, both secret.

[3]From Paris. tel. 4292, Apr. 3, 1955, top secret.

improved, the United States would be prepared to exert pressure on Diem to strengthen his administration by bringing other elements into his Government. There was no need to go to Paris for this purpose, Dulles stated, for France and the United States, with their respective resources, could exert more influence in Saigon, once Diem's central authority was established.

Dulles pointed out that, if Diem's authority were successfully challenged and he were immobilized, then no government would be able to operate in Vietnam, and the whole structure might collapse. Dulles warned that United States assistance of some $300 to $400 million was involved, and the United States did not anticipate any results from a Paris meeting with Bao Dai which would justify continuing such large-scale expenditures. The propaganda effects would also be bad in Asia were Diem to be summoned to Paris by Bao Dai for a conclave, with gangster rebels and sect leaders defying him.[1]

Dulles explained Washington's lack of enthusiasm for Ely's proposal in greater detail in an instruction to Saigon, Paris, and London. He stated that to accept Ely's proposal "is to commit ourselves to unknown proposition and uncertain results." In place of Ely's proposal, Dulles stated that he would prefer a formula to resolve matters in Saigon, one which would not involve Diem's departure from Saigon, his meeting on an equal plane with rebel gangsters, or a key role for Bao Dai. Dulles added that it would seem more in keeping for the French to propose that Bao Dai summon the Binh Xuyen leader, Le Van Vien, to France to take away his police powers if Bao Dai's intervention were actually needed. Dulles wrote that, unless some understanding could be worked out with the French, they should know that the United States would be compelled to reconsider its policy of support for Vietnam, and he added that the United States could not envisage any person, aside from Diem, whose presence at the head of the Vietnamese Government could justify United States financial and other support on a scale large enough to give him even a reasonable chance of success. With

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[1]To Paris, tel. 3507 (4308 to Saigon, 5053 to London), Apr. 3, 1955, secret.

respect to a démarche to Bao Dai for a ten- or fifteen-day truce, as distinct from his calling a meeting in Paris, Dulles wrote that he wanted additional information before committing the United States to a truce. The American Embassies in Paris and Saigon were instructed to convey the United States position to the French authorities, and the American Embassy in London was instructed to explain Washington's views to Eden.[1]

The tenuous truce arranged between the sects and the Government after the fighting on March 29-30 was to expire on April 6. Paris was thus anxious to have a joint United States-French démarche made to Bao Dai on April 4, asking him to telegraph Diem and the sect leaders to prolong the truce for at least two weeks in order that the United States and France might have time to work out a common solution of the crisis.[2] Washington decided not to go along with such a request to Bao Dai. Instead, Washington instructed Collins to see Diem and recommend that he agree to an extension of the truce by 48 hours, allowing time for the French to consider the United States position and for the development of a coordinated United States-French position.[3]

The British Foreign Office agreed substantially with Washington's views and with the points made by Dulles to the

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 4309 (3506 to Paris, 5054 to London), Apr. 3, 1955, top secret. Dulles sent a personal message to Collins the following day in which he explained the reasoning behind the United States position and stated: "I thought we felt when I was in Saigon [March 1] that the decision to back Diem had gone to the point of no return and that either he had to succeed or else the whole business would be a failure." (To Saigon, tel. 4330, Apr. 4, 1955, secret.) For further background on United States thinking, see tel. 4331 to Saigon, Apr. 4, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tels. 4300, 4302, 4305, Apr. 4, 1955, all top secret.

[3]To Paris, tel. 3510 (4318 to Saigon, 5059 to London), Apr. 4, 1955, top secret. As a consequence of efforts by Collins and Ely in Saigon, and by Bao Dai from France, the truce was extended, first, to April 20 and, subsequently, to May 1.

French Ambassador.[1] The French "preliminary views", communicated to Ambassador Dillon on April 5 by Armand Bérard in Prime Minister Faure's office, indicated that basic differences remained as to the correct policy to pursue in the crisis.[2]

Collins cautioned Washington that adopting a rigid position in support of Diem would not allow the United States any room for maneuver in the event that Diem resigned, were relieved by Bao Dai, or were otherwise forced out of the Government. Collins pointed out that Diem was "nearly running a one-man show with his two brothers Luyen and Nhu", and that no new man could be persuaded to enter the Government. Collins stated that, although he was sure the Vietnamese Army could drive the Binh Xuyen out of Saigon and take over the police headquarters, the latter might go underground. Collins, moreover, doubted that the Binh Xuyen could be separated from the other sects. Collins also reported that Ely had clearly indicated that the French Expeditionary Corps would not actively participate in any action against the Binh Xuyen or other sects.[3]

<u>French Rejection of the United States Proposal To Employ Bao Dai's Influence in Removing the Vietnamese Police From Binh Xuyen Control, April 6-9, 1966</u>. As a means of resolving the principal issue--control of the police--Collins and Ely recommended, on April 6, that the United States and French Governments "make a joint approach to Bao Dai to secure his agreement to back Diem fully, not only in dismissing [the police chief, Lai Van] Sang, but [also] in removing police entirely from Binh Xuyen control."[4] Washington concurred in this recommendation and instructed the American Embassy in Paris to obtain the French Government's agreement to such a joint undertaking.[5]

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[1]From London, tel. 4396, Apr. 5, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 4328, Apr. 5, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 4348, Apr. 5, 1955, top secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 4349, Apr. 6, 1955, top secret.

[5]To Paris, tel. 3560 (4366 to Saigon), Apr. 6, 1955, top secret.

Paris objected, however, to this proposed course of action because of its limited terms of reference. As described by Ambassador Dillon, the French believed that such a démarche would be inadequate, for it addressed itself to only one detail of the basic problem, which was to achieve a "broadened Government of National Union which would have real support of majority if not all Vietnamese factions." The French also believed that Bao Dai would not agree to action limited to removal of the police from Binh Xuyen control, but that he might agree to take action if the joint approach were put in a larger context of broadening Diem's Government to give representation to all factions of Vietnamese political life.[1]

Washington had previously, on April 1, authorized the American Embassy in Paris to approach Bao Dai or his representative to explain United States policy of support for Diem and to request that Bao Dai use his influence in having the sects accept the authority of the Central Government and accede to a political settlement.[2] These instructions were confirmed a few days later.[3] Accordingly, a member of the American Embassy had an interview, on April 8, with Nguyen De, Bao Dai's Chief of the Imperial Cabinet, and learned that Bao Dai, who had granted Diem "full powers" in June 1954, had lost confidence in Diem's ability to govern. De explained that Bao Dai felt that Diem should be replaced and that the United States and France should agree to the creation of a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders", representing all anti-Communist factions in Vietnam, to take over the executive role of governing the country. Such a governing body, in which Diem could represent the Catholic element, would function under Bao Dai's overall direction, and the latter's function would be that of "Supreme Arbitrator".[4] Washington apparently did not react immediately to this suggestion.

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[1]From Paris, tel. 4376, Apr. 7, 1955, secret. See also tel. 4395 from Paris, Apr. 9, 1955, top secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 3498, Apr. 1, 1955, top secret.

[3]To Paris, tel. 3562, Apr. 7, 1955, top secret.

[4]From Paris, tels. 4383, 4396, Apr. 8 and 9, 1955, both top secret.

[redacted]

Reactions to the Ely-Collins Recommendation To Replace the Diem Government, April 7-9, 1955. About the same time, Collins reported, on April 7, that Ely had come to the conclusion that Diem could no longer be saved and that, in the interest of Vietnam and the Free World, Diem had to be replaced.[1] In a personal letter to Dulles, Collins, who had previously expressed his doubts about Diem's capacity to govern,[2] strongly supported Ely's conclusions and said that Diem lacked the "personal qualities of leadership and the executive ability successfully to head a government." Collins stated that Tran Van Do, the Foreign Minister, or Dr. Phan Huy Quat, a former Defense Minister, could successfully head a successor government.[3]

Collins' two messages of April 7 were shown to Senator Mansfield, whose reactions were (1) that the United States should continue to support Diem, even though it might mean difficulty with the French, and (2) that dropping Diem would probably lead to chaos and disintegration in Vietnam and would have a bad effect on United States prestige in Asia.[4] Dulles

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 4382, Apr. 7, 1955, top secret. French officials in Paris supported Ely's views. (From Paris, tel. 4395, Apr. 9, 1955, top secret.)

[2]From Saigon, tel. 4263, Mar. 31, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Saigon, tel. 4399, Apr. 7, 1955, top secret. Collins' opinion of Diem at this period may be of interest. On Arpil 9 Collins reported: "Diem's virtues as anti-French leader have been tarnished by his dependence on his brothers which has led to quite general feeling that a Ngo family dictatorship is in effect being established. Few nationalists outside his family and immediate entourage would lift a finger in Diem's defense." (From Saigon, tel. 4448, Apr. 9, 1955, top secret.) The following day he wrote: "The root of the trouble is not in any divergence of U.S. and French views with regard to Sect rebellion. Real reason that I feel it would be best to accede to replacement of Diem is that Diem himself ... simply cannot successfully rule this country alone with the advice of his brothers and a handful of other advisors who have no public standing of consequence." (From Saigon, tel. 4452, Apr. 10, 1955, top secret.)

[4]Memorandum by Young (PSA) of conversation with Senator Mansfield, Apr. 8, 1955, top secret.

[redacted]

therefore replied to Collins, on April 9, that, whereas the United States had proceeded on the assumption that Diem should be backed against any who might challenge him, the French had supported him only on the assumption that the Binh Xuyen would also be supported as an autonomous authority, and that when that sect challenged Diem he would not be allowed to use force to assert his authority over it. Dulles emphasized that any central government must have control over the national police. He pointed out that, if the French view pervailed, it would gravely weaken United States influence for the future in Vietnam and elsewhere. If Diem were removed, Dulles continued, his downfall might be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as an example of the United States paying lip service to a nationalist and then forsaking a true nationalist leader when "colonial interests" put enough pressure on the United States. Dulles also pointed out that there would be strong opposition in the Congress if Diem were replaced under existing circumstances and that Senator Mansfield "is adamantly opposed to abandonment of Diem under present circumstances." Dulles wondered whether there were not some intermediate solution by which Diem could assert his authority over the Binh Xuyen and at the same time broaden his government by bringing other elements into it.[1]

<u>United States Examination and Rejection of French Proposals for Alternatives to the Diem Government, April 10-18, 1955</u>. In reply to Dulles, Collins reiterated that Diem was too inflexible and had to be replaced. He also stated that the French should propose a successor, one who would have to be acceptable to the United States.[2] Washington therefore prepared to consider the question of the necessity of replacing Diem, and asked for Collins' views on timing and form of such action.[3]

After receiving this information,[4] the Department instructed the American Embassy in Paris to inquire of the Quai d'Orsay

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[1]To Saigon, tel. 4438, Apr. 9, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Saigon, tel. 4452, Apr. 10, 1955, top secret. For Collins' recommendations on successive steps to be taken to replace Diem, see tel. 4448 from Saigon, Apr. 9, 1955, top secret.

[3]To Saigon, tel. 4466, Apr. 11, 1955, top secret.

[4]From Saigon, tel. 4487, Apr. 12, 1955, top secret.

what the intentions of the French Government were with respect to Ely's conclusion that Diem should be replaced. The instruction stated that, "without prejudice to our present position", Washington wanted detailed and specific answers to the following questions:

"a. Who would succeed Diem with best prospects carry out governmental programs and strengthen Free Vietnam?

"b. When is it proposed that any change would take place?

"c. What action would be taken to ensure governmental control of National police now under Binh Xuyen?

"d. What procedure would be followed in any proposed change?

"e. How do French propose to ensure sects' support of a new government?

"f. What support could new government count on from French forces?"

The Department suggested that the French send a representative to Washington in order to discuss the matter effectively.[1]

The French Foreign Ministry replied that it would send the questions to Ely with the request that he submit a detailed plan for action after coordination with Collins. The suggestion that the French send a representative to Washington was not well recieved, on the grounds that such action would be unproductive until a plan was set by Ely and coordinated with Collins.[2]

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[1]To Paris, tel. 3622 (4487 to Saigon), Apr. 12, 1955, top secret. On April 11, Dulles called in the French Ambassador to emphasize that any successor to Diem must be a genuine nationalist and not a French puppet, and said that it was essential that the United States and the French should cooperate fully. (Memorandum by Merchant (EUR) of conversation between Dulles and Couve de Murville, Apr. 11, 1955, secret; see also tel. 4514 to Saigon (3631 to Paris), Apr. 13, 1955, secret.)

[2]From Paris, tel. 4436, Apr. 13, 1955, top secret. On the same day, the French Ambassador delivered to the Counselor of the Department a message from his Government requesting that someone be sent from the Department to Paris for discussion on the Vietnam crisis. (Memorandum by Hoey (PSA) of conversation among Couve de Murville, MacArthur (C), and Tyler (WE), Apr. 13, 1955, secret.)

When Collins reported, on April 14, that Ely proposed that the two of them submit joint recommendations and joint answers to the Department's questions to Paris,[1] the Department emphasized that what it wanted was a unilateral French evaluation of Ely's recommendations and not any joint recommdndations.[2]

Although French officials disliked the idea of having to develop a unilateral proposal for the replacement of Diem,[3] the Quai d'Orsay finally, on April 17, submitted answers to Washington's six questions as follows:

"(1) The person designated to succeed Diem would have to be an indisputable nationalist, and not labelled as a man particularly favorable to France or the United States.

"(2) A decision ought to be reached urgently in view of the tense situation in Saigon.

"(3) Since the Binh Xuyen had already promised to place the police under a new government, the Chief of State would state precisely that the change of government <u>ipso facto</u> meant that the new government would name the chief of police.

"(4) As concerned procedure, the United States and France should agree on the formation of a new government, then approach Bao Dai secretly with the recommendation to obtain his agreement, after which Bao Dai could convoke a conference at Cannes of various political leaders to announce his program, which would include the creation of a Supreme Council and the setting of a date for elections.

"(5) the sects would support a new government by participating in the Supreme Council and in a government of national union.

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[1]From Saigon, tel. 4529, Apr. 14, 1955, top secret.

[2]To Saigon, tel. 4537 (3653 to Paris), Apr. 14, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Paris, tel. 4498, Apr. 16, 1955, top secret.

"(6) Since Vietnam was independent, the French forces there would no longer be intended to reinforce any particular Vietnamese government."[1]

The Ambassador explained that the French felt it necessary to turn to Bao Dai to effect a change in the government in Saigon because there was no electoral body in Vietnam. Dulles asked why an electoral body could not be set up, and stated that the spectacle of the French, with or without the United States participating, "suddenly yanking Diem out of office and going through the motions of having him replaced by Bao Dai at Cannes would be unedifying." The Ambassador summarized the conversation by saying that the problems requiring solution were (1) the need to make a change and (2) the choices if a change were to be made. Dulles agreed and said that, in any change, Diem's strength should be retained as an asset for the Government of Vietnam and not as a force against it.[2]

<u>Short-lived Diem Proposal To Form an "Interim Government" Pending Election of a Constituent Assembly, April 13-19, 1955</u>. While Paris and Washington were endeavoring to reach agreement on a common policy, the political pot continued to boil in Saigon. Collins reported, on April 13, that Diem was considering formation of an "interim government" to hold office pending general elections for a constituent assembly to be held possibly in two months.[3] Dulles seized upon the idea and instructed Collins to explore this possibility, saying that a "locally selected successor government would be infinitely preferable to one hand-picked by France and U.S. and rubberstamped by Bao Dai."[4]

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[1]Translation of French aide-mémoire in tel. 4503, from Paris, Apr. 17, 1955, top secret; French text of aide-mémoire enclosed in desp. 2216 from Paris, Apr. 18, 1955, top secret.

[2]To Paris, tel. 3697 (4603 to Saigon), Apr. 18, 1955, top secret. The American Embassy in London was instructed to inform the British Foreign Office of this conversation. (To London, tel. 5376, Apr. 20, 1955, top secret.)

[3]From Saigon, tel. 4502, Apr. 13, 1955, top secret.

[4]To Saigon, tel. 4516, Apr. 13, 1955, top secret.

thereby replacing Diem, and (2) a Council of National Union, made up of various political factions, the sects, and other groups in the Vietnamese body politic except the Communists. The Council was to serve until a National Assembly had been established. Before proceeding with this plan, Bao Dai indicated that he wanted the backing of the United States and France.[1]

The Department's initial reaction to Bao Dai's proposal was that, because the whole Vietnam problem was being reviewed in consultation with Collins, it was not in a position to comment.[2] When Bao Dai's representative informed the Embassy in Paris that Bao Dai felt he could no longer delay putting the plan into effect and that he would act on April 27,[3] The Department replied, on April 25, that it hoped that Bao Dai would take no action, pending Collins' return to Saigon, and added that, if Bao Dai were to take precipitate action, the United States "would have to review its position as to its continuing support of Vietnam."[4] Bao Dai's rejoinder, on April 26, was that he had to act in order to avoid disaster.[5] The following day, however, he agreed to delay action, on the understanding that Washington's views on his plan would soon be forthcoming.[6] The Department continued to emphasize its hope that Bao Dai would refrain from any irrevocable action until Collins returned to Saigon and reviewed the situation with Ely.[7]

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[1]From Paris, tel. 4576, Apr. 21, 1955, top secret. The American Embassy in Saigon thought that Bao Dai's plan was French-inspired. (From Saigon, tel. 4780, Apr. 24, 1955, top secret.)

[2]To Paris, tel. 3772, Apr. 22, 1955, top secret.

[3]From Paris, tel. 4641, Apr. 25, 1955, secret.

[4]To Paris, tel. 3803, Apr. 25, 1955, secret.

[5]From Paris, tel. 4659, Apr. 26, 1955.

[6]From Paris, tel. 4671, Apr. 27, 1955, secret.

[7]To Paris, tels. 3830, Apr. 27, 1955, top secret; 3850, Apr. 28, 1955, confidential. For reports by an officer of the American Embassy in Paris of interviews with Bao Dai on April 28

(Footnote continued on following page.)

Temporary United States Agreement With the French on the Need To Replace Diem, April 22-30, 1955. Collins arrived in Washington on April 22 and made an informal report on the Vietnamese situation to President Eisenhower.[1] Following full consultations which Collins had with Department officials and Congressional leaders running over a number of days, Washington concluded that some change in the political arrangements in Vietnam was inevitable. Washington was prepared to consider Diem's being replaced and sought unequivocal French assurances for full backing of any new political arrangement in Saigon, as well as clarification of French policy toward North Vietnam.[2] What Washington wanted, in essence, was French concurrence that a new government would control the police and have the allegiance of the sects and the support of Bao Dai. Washington also wanted Collins, on returning to Saigon, to reivew the situation with Ely.

Dulles, with Collins present, made these points to the French Ambassador on April 28, and Ambassador Dillon in Paris was instructed to take the matter up with the French Prime Minister. Dillon was directed to state that the crisis in Vietnam had forced the United States to review its basic policy, resulting in the conclusion that no government in Vietnam would succeed, even with full United States support,

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and 29, at the latter of which Bao Dai asked that the United States urge Diem to go to Cannes for consultations, see tels. 4743 and 4746 from Paris, Apr. 30, 1955, both top secret. The United States did not accede to this request. (To Paris, tel. 3888, Apr. 30, 1955, top secret.)

[1]Memorandum by Hoover (U) for the Secretary, Apr. 23, 1955, confidential.

[2]To Paris, 3828 (4756 to Saigon), Apr. 27, 1955, top secret. United States views on procedures for creating a new government structure in Saigon, including the appointment of a new Prime Minister by Bao Dai, which were to be presented to the French, are contained in tel. 3829 to Paris (4757 to Saigon), Apr. 27, 1955, top secret. This instruction was cancelled five hours after it was dispatched, possibly because of developments in Saigon. (To Paris, tel. 3837 (4766 to Saigon), Apr. 27, 1955, secret.)

unless it enjoyed Nationalist Vietnamese support, unambiguous French support, and full support by Bao Dai. Dillon was also to say that, to obtain United States support, any future government in Vietnam, whether or not it included Diem, had to be clearly assured of:

"1. The full and unqualified support of France, thereby dispelling any ambiguity with respect to North Viet-Nam.

"2. Bao Dai must ensure that the legal government has full authority, including control of the police and the military forces of Viet-Nam.

"3. Bao Dai and the French must wholeheartedly assist by every means available to them in integrating the sects into the normal life of Viet-Nam, in relieving them of their feudal powers and territorial control and integrating their private armies into the national army."[1]

Dillon made his representations to Prime Minister Faure on April 29, against the background of fighting in Saigon. Faure said that he was in full accord with the principles enunciated by the United States, that the sole preoccupation of the French Government was to preserve Vietnam for the Free World, and that the belated favorable response by the United States to earlier French representations might prove to have been too late in view of events in Saigon. Faure also stated that the French Government had no intention of getting into any quarrel with the United States over South Vietnam and that the French would not act independently of the United States unless the situation there developed to the point of forcing evacuation of the area.[2] The formal French reply to Dillon's representation, contained in an aide-mémoire of April 30, indicated that, although the French agreed with the principles for a solution of the governmental problem in Vietnam as enunciated by the United States, they regretted that agreement on how to proceed had not been reached previously. The aide-mémoire stated, in part, that, because the United States had

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[1]To Paris, tel. 3849, Apr. 28, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. 4740, Apr. 29, 1955, top secret.

The conversations dealing with Vietnam, beginning with the first Ministerial meeting on the evening of May 7, were long, drawn out, brutally frank, and sometimes acrimonious. The principal point at issue was the by then perennial question of support or abandonment of Diem.

Premier Faure, who headed the French delegation, expressed France's continued disillusionment with Diem without, however, being able to come up with a satisfactory alternative. Faure therefore proposed, by way of solution, that, if the United States were disposed to help protect French civilians and interests in South Vietnam and the refugees from North Vietnam who had migrated to the South, France might withdraw all of its military forces from Vietnam. By this move, France would obviate the cause for any further South Vietnamese charges of French "colonialism" and respond to Diem's demand that the French quit Indochina altogether.

In an effort to be conciliatory, Dulles suggested that the common interests of the United States and France were too great to be jeopardized by a difference of opinion on Vietnam. He therefore made a counter-proposal that, if it would solve the problem, the United States would withdraw from and drop its support of South Vietnam. He added that Franco-American differences had to be resolved, for, without such a reconciliation, the United States Congress would probably discontinue the aid program. Dulles explained that the choice for the United States was to support Diem or withdraw. In this connection, he assured Premier Faure that the proposal he had made would be weighed carefully.[1]

Dulles then fired Faure's proposed solution back to Washington and Embassy Saigon for comment.[2] In his message to President Eisenhower, the Secretary conveyed his guess that the French were not bluffing and that Faure's proposal to withdraw the French Expeditionary Corps "may be the agreed solution."[3]

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[1]From Paris, tel. SECTO 8, May 8, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tels. DULTE 8 and 9 (the latter sent to Saigon as Paris tel. 717), May 8, 1955, top secret.

[3]Letter, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 7, 1955, sent as tel. DULTE 2 from Paris, May 7, 1955, top secret.

The President replied that the United States could not afford to have forces committed in "such undesirable areas" as Vietnam. The Department of Defense informed Dulles that the United States could not guarantee the security of French nationals should the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn and recommended, as an immediate joint objective, "the utmost in cooperation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, United States, and French Governments toward the restoration of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam." The Department of State gave its opinion that withdrawal or reduction of the French Expeditionary Corps would not be "without positive political value in Viet-Nam and possibly to France although we recognize such might diminish whatever deterrent value FEC presence against Communist aggression constitutes." The Department also stated that, from the political point of view, it would be advantageous to France and the Free World if the French were to negotiate with Diem regarding at least a limited withdrawal of the FEC. Such negotiations might result in France's retention of certain limited FEC functions, such as patrolling the demarcation line, occupation of Tourane and perhaps other bases, and participation in the training of the Vietnamese Army, rather than having France face a Vietnamese request for complete withdrawal. Collins reported from Saigon that there were significant military as well as economic reasons for the retention of the French Expeditionary Corps and that, from the political standpoint, the presence of French forces exerted a desired moderating influence on developments in Vietnam.[1]

Armed with these somewhat conflicting views from Washington and Saigon, Dulles endeavored to work out some sort of compromise solution. At the second tripartite Ministerial meeting on May 10, the Secretary declared that, if the French were to withdraw their forces, the United States would use such influence as it had with any Vietnamese government to protect French lives and property. Dulles then asked whether, in return, the French might not bring themselves to support Diem with a strengthened government pending the development of electoral procedures to establish a new government which might or might not include Diem.

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[1]To Paris, tel. TEDUL 2, May 8, 1955, top secret; to Paris, tel. TEDUL 9, May 9, 1955, top secret; to Paris, tel. TOSEC 10, May 9, 1955, top secret; and from Saigon, tel. 5154 (sent to Paris as Saigon tel. 1323), May 9, 1955, top secret.

Premier Faure agreed, provided that the "strengthened government" were one of national union which would include the sects and that the Diem government cease its anti-French propaganda. Dulles cautioned that the United States could not dictate to Diem, who had a mind and will of his own and was not in the United States' pocket, and it might be impossible to force Diem to take into his government men who opposed him.[1]

At their meeting on Wednesday, May 11, Premier Faure and Secretary Dulles got down to brass tacks--i.e., what was to be committed to paper. The French proposed that a short paper be drafted on the points of agreement in order that instructions to the United States and French representatives in Saigon might be in harmony. Dulles preferred that each country draw up its own instructions, which would then be shown to the other for comment before being put into final form. This procedure was adopted.[2]

Dulles' instruction to Saigon, addressed to the new Ambassador, G. Frederick Reinhardt (who, at the time, was in Washington), emphasized support for the Diem Government as an "independent and sovereign government" which the United States wanted to see strengthened. In pursuit of this objective, the Ambassador was to "maintain contact" with his French and British colleagues. The instructions stated that (1) the lawful government should exercise "unquestioned authority" over the National Army and the National Police, (2) the Binh Xuyen should be disbanded, (3) the other sects should be amalgamated into the normal life of Vietnam, and (4) the development of electoral machinery and representative processes should be encouraged. The instructions directed the Ambassador to exert himself to bring about a cessation of anti-French propaganda on the part of the Vietnamese Government and stated that the United States believed that nationwide free elections, pursuant to the Geneva settlement, should be held in July 1956. The instructions went on to say that the French Expeditionary Corps would be progressively reduced, consistent with the increased capability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and that a pause in the reduction would come when some minimum level had been reached. The instructions also stated

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[1]From Paris, tel. SECTO 36, May 11, 1955, top secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. SECTO 42, May 12, 1955, secret.

that the United States believed that freedom could be saved in Vietnam if violent revolutionary forces were brought under control and that Diem should be in a position, with support from the French and the United States, to adopt moderate and constructive policies in developing a national government.[1]

The French instructions of May 14 to Ely were similar, in the main, to the United States instructions. The principal differences were that (1) the French put great stress on broadening the political base of the Diem Government in order to settle more easily the problem of the sects, and (2) the instructions asked for Ely's suggestions as to what action might be taken by the three powers (U.S., U.K., and France) to insure the legal *status quo* of Bao Dai and, if the need arose, to utilize his influence to assist the Diem Government's pacification efforts.[2]

The Paris conversations marked, in effect, the end of the policy of joint action by the United States and France in Vietnam. The United States emphasis on parallel but unilateral action allowed Washington considerable leeway to pursue an independent course and, at the same time, to maintain the possibility of cooperation with France when desirable or necessary. Although only dimly envisaged at the time, the decisions taken at Paris paved the way for the United States to shoulder a greater share of responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam as French power in the area receded, but without the authority which grounded forces in being, such as the French Expeditionary Corps, represented.

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[1]From Paris, tel. SECTO 46 (sent to Saigon as Paris' POLTO 33), May 13, 1955, secret.

[2]From Paris, tel. SECTO 42, May 12, 1955, secret.

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DOC_NBR= 75NEWDE01979

FILM= D750049-0903

DATE= 11 FEB 75

TYPE= TE

FROM= NEW DELHI

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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SUBJECT= PRESS CRITICISM OF REPORTED U.S. ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN CONTINUES

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS COMMENTS, ARMS, ANTIAMERICAN FEELING, MILITARY SALES

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ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 ACDA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07

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UNCLAS NEW DELHI 1979

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR,IN,PK,US
SUBJECT: PRESS CRITICISM OF REPORTED U.S. ARMS SALES TO
PAKISTAN CONTINUES

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE INDIAN PRESS COVERAGE FEB. 11 OF PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S ABC TELEVISION INTERVIEW WAS LIMITED TO BRIEF WIRE SERVICE ACCOUNTS WHICH APPEAR NON-PROMINENTLY IN MOST DELHI PAPERS. AIR/TV DID NOT BROADCAST THE INTERVIEW STORY. COMMENTS WERE BOTH CRITICAL AND BALANCED.
END SUMMARY.

1. CREDITED TO THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, MOST PAPERS CARRIED BRIEF ITEMS ABOUT THE BHUTTO INTERVIEW.ONLY THE COMMUNIST DAILY PATRIO AND THE STATESMAN GAVE THE STORY ANY SPECIAL PLAY ON FRONT PAGES. HEADLINES RELFECTED DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS: "BHUTTO CITES 'VOLATILE REGION' FOR U.S. ARMS" (STATESMAN); "BHUTTO OPTIMISTIC GETTING ARMS" (INDIAN EXPRESS); "NO FINAL DECISION ON U.S. ARMS AID TO PINDI" (TIMES OF INDIA), AND "'IF ARMS FOR IRAN, WHY NOT FOR PINDI?'" (PATRIOT).

2. THE NEWS ACCOUNTS QUOTED THE PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER WAS "HOPEFUL" THE U.S. WOULD LIFT ITS ARMS EMBARGO ALTHOUGH A "FINAL DECISION" HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN. SEEKING "PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS," MR. BHUTTO DEFENDED HIS REQUEST BY SAYING THAT PAKISTAN WAS IN A "VOLATILE REGION." THE ITEMS ALSO QUOTED THE PREMIER
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SAYING THAT WHILE INDIA HAS BEEN RECEIVING "MASSIVE SOVIET ARMS," THE U.S. HAD CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN.

3. THE STATESMAN FIRST EDIT, "THE REAL TEST,"COMMENTED: "JUDGEMENT NEEDS TO BE SUSPENDED UNTIL IT IS KNOWN WHAT, IN FACT, WILL BE SUPPLIED" BECAUSE "THE TEST WILL BE IN THE NATURE AND VOLUME OF SUPPLIES." IT STRESSED THAT NEW DELHI "CANNOT DENY PAKISTAN THE RIGHT TO ARM ITSELF WITH EXTERNAL AID" BUT "CAN OBJECT TO AN INCREASE IN ISLAMABAD'S MILITARY STRENGTH THAT MIGHT REASONABLY BE REGARDED AS A THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY OR TO REGIONAL STABILITY."

4. THE PAPER ALSO EDIT-PAGED EDITOR N.J. NANPORIA'S "ONE POINT OF VIEW" COLUMN IN WHICH HE NOTED THAT INDO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE "THIN AND GETTING THINNER." REFERRING TO THE REPORTED U.S. DECISION TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PAKISTAN, HE COMMENTED: "NEW DELHI SEEMS TO BE FOREVER PROTESTING ON THIS ISSUE...A BAN IS AT BEST AN ARTIFICIAL AND TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT..AND IT IS, MOREOVER, NOT SOMETHING ON WHICH INDO-US RELATIONS CAN BE BASED." HE CHARGED THAT NEW DELHI'S EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPROVAL "HAVE THE HOLLOW RING OF BEING ONLY FOR THE RECORD" AND "WHAT IS BEING PLAYED IS DOMESTIC POLITICS." IN THIS CONTEXT, HE QUESTIONED: "WHAT THEN IS THE POINT OF CHAVAN'S PROTEST? IS IT REALLY ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON OR TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA AND THE CONGRESS 'PROGRESSIVES?'"

5. IN FURTHERCOMMENT, NANPORIA HELD THAT "SOUTH BLOCK..HAS YET TO GRASP THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE, AND PARTICULARLY THEIR BEARING ON WEST ASIA AFTER THE USE OF THE OIL WEAPON...BHUTTO AND WASHINGTON ARE MAKING MOVES IN FOREIGN POLICY AND, MEANWHILE, NEW DELHI IS PLAYING PARTY POLITICS. IN THE RESULT WASHINGTON HAS VIRTUALLY WRITTEN IT OFF IN FOREIGN POLICY TERMS... NEW DELHI'S EFFORTS TO CULTIVATE WEST ASIA HAVE YIELDED LITTLE... AND IT IS RIDICULOUS TO ASSUME THAT IT CAN MAKE ANY HEADWAY IN WEST ASIA UNTIL IT DEFINES ITS ATTITUDES TO THE UNITED STATES WITH CLARITY AND CONVICTION; AND THIS IT CAN DO ONLY BE MEANS OF FOR-EIGN POLICY AND NOT BY PLAYING POLITICS AT HOME."

6. ALL INDIA RADIO BROADCAST COMMENTS FROM "AN AUTHORITY ON MILITARY AFFAIRS" AND A "POLITICAL EXPERT." DISCUSSING THE MILI-TARY ASPECTS OF THE BHUTTO VISIT, LT. COL. GAUTAM SHARMA OBSERVED THAT"AMERICA IS INTERESTED IN STRENGTHENING PAKISTAN BY GIVING MORE

ARMS" SO THAT IT CAN "WATCH THE ACTIVITIES OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION" FROM PAKISTAN. ALSO, "WHILE REMAINING IN THE PAKISTAN TERRITORY, AMERICA CAN PRESSURIZE US AND OUR POLICIES." DR. SATISH KUMAR POINTED OUT THAT "AMERICA WANTS TO CONTINUE ITS IN-

FERFERENCE IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD" AND WOULD LIKEPAKISTAN "TO ALWAYS DEPEND" ON THE U.S. "FOR SOMETHING OR THE OTHER" SO THAT TENSION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT CONTINUES.SCHNEIDER

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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Needs explanation of Bhutto's fears. Baluchistan etc.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger HK

Subject: Visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

I. PURPOSE

Pakistan occupies a strategic position athwart the approaches to the Persian Gulf and on the southern flanks of the USSR and China. Recurrent disputes between India and Pakistan have been a serious de-stabilizing factor regionally and have threatened great power involvement because each has relied on outside support. We wish to stand aside from these regional disputes, but we have important historical and security ties with Pakistan. We share with China and Iran a deep concern to maintain Pakistan's political and economic viability as an element in regional stability. We strongly support but have avoided involvement in the "Simla" process of reconciliation among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh that followed the 1971 war.

Prime Minister Bhutto comes to Washington at this time to (1) establish a personal relationship with you; (2) seek reassurance that improving Indo-U. S. relations are not at Pakistan's expense; (3) obtain a lifting of our embargo on the sale of weapons to Pakistan and (4) get additional concessional food commitments.

Your purpose in this meeting will be to:

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-- reaffirm our long-standing support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity;

-- inform Bhutto that we are prepared to lift the arms embargo to permit limited cash sales on a case-by-case basis;

-- encourage his continued commitment to a process of reconciliation in South Asia;

-- engage Bhutto in a dialogue about Pakistan's nuclear intentions, with a view toward forestalling a decision to develop a nuclear explosion;

-- inform Bhutto of our willingness to provide additional P. L. 480 wheat.

II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

A. Background

We have long had good relations with Pakistan, although they cooled considerably in the 60s as Pakistan moved closer to China and the U. S. imposed an arms embargo on both sides during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Relations became very close in 1971 when we sought to prevent the war with India that resulted in Pakistan's loss of its Eastern Wing (now Bangladesh). In the aftermath of that war, we have been highly supportive of Pakistan, most notably with more than half a billion dollars of economic assistance. We have also given high visibility to our assurances of support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity (most specifically when Bhutto visited President Nixon here in September 1973).

Bhutto has sought additional support, however, in the form of arms sales which have remained under embargo to both India and Pakistan since 1965 (although we do sell spare parts, non-lethal items and some ammunition). While Pakistan is able to buy modern arms from France and China, Bhutto regards our

[illegible] cannot get enough from China + very little [redacted] from France which drives very hard bargain.

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embargo as both discriminatory and illogical, especially in view of Pakistan's CENTO membership, the 1959 U. S.-Pakistan defense agreement and current U. S. policy of selling arms to Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. In urging an end to the embargo, Bhutto seeks both the political reassurances this step would represent, and access to sophisticated weapons at lower prices than are available from European sources.

Can do better than this

While we have been sympathetic to Bhutto on this issue, we have held off a decision because of our desire to avoid Congressional complications, to improve our own relations with India and to encourage direct negotiations between India and Pakistan for normalization of their relations.

A related security issue is Pakistan's nuclear development program. There is considerable evidence that Pakistan is now embarked on a program that could in time give it the option to duplicate India's nuclear explosion last May. Pakistani development of a nuclear explosion would be a set-back to our broad non-proliferation goals and add a new element of instability in South Asia. While we recognize that Bhutto would face severe domestic political problems if seen to be yielding to U. S. pressure to forego the nuclear explosion option, he himself has publicly related his nuclear intentions to Pakistan's ability to obtain suitable conventional arms for its security.

In addition to action on arms, Bhutto wants to obtain additional concessional food from the U. S. under P. L. 480 and CCC credits. Pakistan has been approaching food self-sufficiency for several years but a disappointing wheat crop in 1974, a current severe drought, and damage to its large new dam at Tarbela have necessitated wheat imports of some 1.5 million tons in this fiscal year. Pakistan thus far has arranged for commercial and concessional imports of about a million tons (including 100,000 tons under P. L. 480). Bhutto would like to obtain an additional 200,000 tons

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under P. L. 480 and 200,000 tons under CCC credits. Pakistan also imports about $150 million in vegetable oil and would like to have concessional sales from the U. S.

Pakistan's general economic situation, while better than that of its South Asian neighbors, is somewhat fragile. Pakistan faces a balance-of-payments problem only partially alleviated by support from Iran and other oil producers. Although nominally welcoming foreign investment, a number of American investors (fertilizers, oil refinery, pharmaceuticals) have found their experiences unsatisfactory. There is little new investor interest, except in oil and gas exploration. Pakistan continues to place a high value on economic assistance from the U. S. and other members of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium.

B. <u>Strategy</u>

Our basic policy toward Pakistan in recent years has been to provide political and psychological support for its independence and territorial integrity, and economic assistance to buttress its viability. We have avoided direct involvement in regional disputes, while encouraging Pakistan to negotiate directly its bilateral problems with India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. This strategy has had some success. Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan has recovered well from the trauma of 1971, and has engaged in a fundamental process of reconciliation with India under the Simla Agreement signed with Mrs. Gandhi in mid-1972. Pakistan has recognized Bangladesh, although important differences remain to be sorted out. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan are poor, but tensions have subsided in recent months.

We believe we should now go one step further in strengthening our relations with Pakistan, by lifting the embargo on sales of lethal weapons to Pakistan. This decision will cause some problems

with Congress and an adverse reaction from India. In order to deal with this we intend to limit sales to a cash basis only and, at least initially, to items that have a clearly defensive purpose. It is important Bhutto understand that continuing Congressional concern over arms sales requires that we move cautiously on the types and amounts of arms that we sell to Pakistan. We also want to emphasize in this context our strong belief that Pakistan's ultimate security lies in continued progress toward economic viability and in continued commitment to the process of normalization with India.

Informing Bhutto of your decision on arms provides an opportunity to begin a dialogue with him on nuclear issues. Ideally we would like to see Pakistan renounce a nuclear explosion option and agree to place all its future nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. However, we recognize that such a far-reaching commitment would be politically difficult for Bhutto to make, and we are not seeking to make this a quid pro quo for the lifting of the arms embargo. Nevertheless, in terms of our interest in containing Congressional and Indian reaction on arms supply, we would like to see Bhutto indicate publicly a non-proliferation stance.

On economic issues, we are prepared to be forthcoming on P. L. 480 wheat and to indicate continuing support with our bilateral aid programs. We have already signed an agreement for 100,000 tons of wheat and we can now provide an additional 150,000 tons. We hope to be able to provide up to 120,000 tons more but final decisions on this have not yet been made. We are not providing any vegetable oil under P. L. 480 this year, and the Pakistanis are aware of our position. We have earmarked $78 million in loans and grants for our bilateral aid program in FY 75. There have been some difficulties in programming these funds against specific projects, but we are sorting these out. One area where we hope to be helpful is in the provision of funds, through the World Bank, to help meet the

estimated $60 million repair costs for unanticipated damages to the Tarbela Dam, but this will depend on Congressional action.

III. TALKING POINTS

Security and Nuclear Issues

-- We continue to value highly our close relations with Pakistan. There has been no change in our long-standing support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.

-- We have been deeply impressed by the progress Pakistan and India have made over the past three years in normalizing their relations under the Simla process. We know that you are committed to peace and stability in South Asia and we share that commitment.

-- We hope very much that Pakistan will also play its part in building a mutually beneficial relationship with Bangladesh and in improving relations with Afghanistan.

-- We are aware of your security concerns. I have had the opportunity to discuss them directly with Minister Aziz Ahmed during his earlier visit, and you have discussed them on several occasions with Secretary Kissinger.

-- There has been, and still is, serious Congressional opposition to American arms sales abroad. However, we believe that in the climate of normalization that has taken place in South Asia, there will now be a better understanding in this country of a modification of our policy.

-- I have therefore decided to lift the embargo on the sale of lethal arms to Pakistan and India. We will in the future consider Pakistan's requests on a case-by-case basis, keeping in mind in the process the outlook for peace in South Asia, and the sensitivities of our own Congress.

-- Given the Congressional climate, our sales must be on a cash basis only.

-- In implementing this new policy which replaces an embargo now ten years old, we will need to move cautiously with full regard for what our political processes will support. We will of course first expect to hear from you where your priority needs are. From our viewpoint we would like to place emphasis in areas such as air defense that will be seen as clearly enhancing Pakistan's defensive requirements. We will want to avoid items which may be viewed as particularly sensitive in the South Asian context at this time.

-- We are deeply committed to the process of normalization and reconciliation in South Asia, and Pakistan's policies in this area will affect what we can do in implementing an arms sales policy. We have made it clear that we do not intend to upset by our actions the regional balance. We therefore do not expect to become a major arms supplier, nor do we seek to supplant Pakistan's other suppliers such as China and Western European countries.

-- We would like to see all major arms suppliers to South Asia exercise restraint.

-- You have publicly linked the lifting of our arms embargo to the question of whether or not Pakistan should pursue a nuclear explosives program. We share your deep concern with the implications of the Indian explosion, but we also believe that the damage to international non-proliferation efforts and the threat to regional security would be substantially increased should Pakistan try to emulate the Indian example.

-- We hope that the action we are taking will encourage you to avoid the politically risky and costly development of nuclear explosives. Over the long run, our relations would be affected if Pakistan were seen to be working toward a nuclear explosion.

-- It would be most helpful to us in dealing with Congressional and Indian criticism if you could publicly provide some assurances of Pakistan's peaceful intentions in regard to nuclear development. Assurances from you would also strengthen multilateral efforts to keep India from developing nuclear weapons systems.

-- Looking ahead, we will welcome continuing discussions with you on nuclear issues, both in terms of deepening our bilateral cooperation and on the vital issue of safeguards. On the latter question, we hope that you would give consideration to placing all your nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

-- We will need a little time to complete our own processes of Congressional notification before we can announce the lifting of the embargo. We will, of course, also inform the Indians before we announce the change. We expect to make the announcement in about two weeks, and we will inform you when we are ready to go public.

-- In the meantime, we will need your cooperation in avoiding leaks or unnecessary speculation. We will respond to press inquiries by saying that you have conveyed your security concerns to us during your talks here and that we continue to keep our policy under close review.

Food and Economic Assistance

-- We have given priority consideration to Pakistan's food requirements and we intend to be as helpful as we can within our own budgetary and supply constraints.

-- We are now prepared to provide an additional 150,000 tons of Title I wheat bringing our FY 75 total to 250,000 tons. We hope that we will be able to provide another 120,000 tons, but we have not yet completed our review of allocations for the remainder of the year.

[redacted]

-- With this expected level of 370,000 tons under P. L. 480, we do not plan to make CCC credits available for additional commercial purchases.

-- Unfortunately our own supply position on vegetable oil precludes shipments under P. L. 480 in this fiscal year.

-- We intend to continue our bilateral economic assistance programs to Pakistan at a high level. Although there have been some difficulties in programming specific projects, we will continue to work closely with your government to achieve a program that will contribute to Pakistan's development and well-being.

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, February 6, 5:00 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

Prime Minister Bhutto has a number of pressing concerns which have brought him back to Washington so soon after his last official visit in September, 1973. His agenda includes: (1) establishing a personal relationship with the new Administration; (2) seeking assurance that improving Indo-U. S. relations are not at Pakistan's expense; (3) a lifting of our embargo on the sale of weapons to Pakistan; and (4) additional concessional food commitments.

II. BACKGROUND

We have long had good relations with Pakistan, although they cooled considerably in the 60s as Pakistan moved closer to China and the U. S. imposed an arms embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Relations became very close in 1971 when we sought to prevent the war with India that resulted in Pakistan's loss of its Eastern Wing (now Bangladesh). In the aftermath of that war, we have been highly supportive of Pakistan, most notably with more than half a billion dollars of economic assistance. We have also given high visibility to our assurances of support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity (most specifically when Bhutto visited President Nixon here in September 1973).

Bhutto has sought additional support, however, in the form of arms sales which have remained under

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embargo to both India and Pakistan since 1965 (although we do sell spare parts, non-lethal items and some ammunition). While Pakistan is able to buy modern arms from France and China, Bhutto regards our embargo as discriminatory, especially in view of Pakistan's CENTO membership. In urging an end to the embargo, Bhutto seeks both the political reassurances this step would represent, and access to sophisticated weapons at lower prices than are available from European sources.

While we have been sympathetic to Bhutto on this issue, we have held off a decision because of our desire to avoid Congressional complications, to improve our own relations with India and to encourage direct negotiations between India and Pakistan for normalization of their relations.

A related security issue is Pakistan's nuclear development program. There is considerable evidence that Pakistan is now embarked on a program that would in time give it the option to duplicate India's nuclear explosion last May. Pakistani development of a nuclear explosion would be a set-back to our broad non-proliferation goals and add a new element of instability in South Asia. While we recognize that Bhutto would face severe domestic political problems if seen to be yielding to U. S. pressure to forego the nuclear explosion option, he himself has publicly related his nuclear intentions to Pakistan's ability to obtain suitable conventional arms for its security.

In addition to action on arms, Bhutto wants to obtain additional concessional food from the U. S. under P. L. 480 and CCC credits. Pakistan has been approaching food self-sufficiency for several years but a disappointing wheat crop in 1974, a current severe drought and damage to its large new dam at Tarbela have necessitated wheat imports of some 1.5 million tons in this fiscal year. Pakistan thus far has arranged for commercial and concessional imports of about a million tons (including 100,000 tons under P. L. 480). Bhutto would like to obtain an additional 200,000 tons

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under P. L. 480 and 200,000 tons under CCC credits. Pakistan also imports about $150 million in vegetable oil and would like to have concessional sales from the U. S.

Pakistan's general economic situation, while better than that of its South Asian neighbors, is somewhat fragile. Pakistan faces a balance-of-payments problem only partially alleviated by funds from Iran and other oil producers. Although nominally a socialist state, Pakistan welcomes foreign investment. However, a number of American investors (fertilizers, oil refinery, pharmaceuticals) have found their recent experience unsatisfactory. There is little new investor interest, except in oil and gas exploration. Pakistan continues to place a high value on economic assistance from the U. S. and other members of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium.

III. <u>THE VISIT</u>

The Prime Minister will have had substantive meetings with the President and Secretary Kissinger, as well as a full schedule of meetings with key legislators and newsmen. Secretary Schlesinger is also calling on him. On February 7 he flies to New York where his formal activities include a large luncheon hosted by David Rockefeller and a lunch at Gracie Mansion the following day. He will make a short official visit to Romania on his way back to Pakistan.

Bhutto should be largely satisfied by the results of his discussions here. He is being informed that we will announce the lifting of our arms embargo in about two weeks, following notification of Congress and the Indian Government. This removes the major irritant in our otherwise excellent relations. Bhutto views this as the vital test of the seriousness of our public commitment to Pakistan's security and integrity. Because he sees this issue primarily in political terms, we expect that he will understand the limitations within which we intend to implement the new policy. We will permit <u>cash sales only</u>, and

in a case-by-case review of each request, we will take into consideration: (1) Pakistan's requirements, with primary emphasis on defensive needs; (2) the continued prospects for peace in South Asia; and (3) the sensitivities of our own Congress to the sale of major weapons systems in politically volatile areas.

We have also raised our concern that, should Pakistan opt to follow the Indian lead in developing nuclear explosives, this would be destabilizing regionally and constitute a serious blow to our general non-proliferation objectives. Ideally, we would like to see Pakistan renounce the nuclear explosion option and agree to place all its future nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. We have suggested that some public reassurance on this score would be helpful to us in containing the Indian and Congressional reaction to our lifting of the arms embargo.

On economic issues, we have been forthcoming on P. L. 480 wheat and can indicate continuing support through our bilateral aid programs. We have already signed an agreement for 100,000 tons of wheat for this fiscal year and can now offer an additional 150,000 tons. We hope to be able to provide up to 120,000 tons more, and we are informing Bhutto of this intention. We are not providing any vegetable oil under P. L. 480 this year, and the Pakistanis are aware of our position. We have earmarked $75 million in loans and grants for our bilateral aid program in FY 75. There have been some difficulties in programming these funds against specific projects, but we are sorting these out. One area where we hope to be helpful is in the provision of funds to meet part of the estimated $60-70 million repair costs for the damages to Tarbela Dam, built under World Bank auspices, but this will depend on Congressional action.

IV. COURTESY POINT

-- We deeply regret the tragic loss of life in the recent Pakistani earthquake, but we are pleased

to note the generous international response to this disaster. (An estimated 5,000 lives were lost; approximately $43 million in aid has been provided--all but $1 million of it from oil producers. The USG donated $225,000 toward the relief effort.)

V. TALKING POINTS

-- As one of my first acts in the diplomatic field since becoming Vice President, it is a particular pleasure for me to meet with the leader of a country which is such a close and good friend of the United States.

-- You have many admirers in this country who have observed the skill and determination with which you have led your country out of the diplomatic, political and economic difficulties of 1971. We are happy that the United States has been able to be of assistance, particularly in the area of development aid. (We have provided over $500 million since 1971; the cumulative total since the early '50s has been over $4.5 billion.)

-- I know that the embargo on arms sales has been a source of major concern to you. We hope that our lifting of the embargo will encourage you to continue to pursue in a confident manner the very important process of political normalization with India and your other neighbors.

-- We share your deep concern with the implications of the Indian nuclear explosion, but we hope that Pakistan will not follow the Indian lead. Such a move would be costly, a source of instability regionally, and a serious blow to international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

-- I understand that Pakistan is experiencing serious balance of payments difficulties, despite considerable assistance from Iran and the Arab oil producers. We are pleased that we have been able to help through provision of substantial levels of P. L. 480 grain, which Pakistan would otherwise have had to purchase on the world market.

-- We hope that Pakistan will use its position of influence with many of the important oil-producing states to urge a statesmanlike approach to pricing policies which takes into account the general economic good and especially the plight of the poorer consumer nations such as Pakistan itself.

June 8, 1995

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To: Ms. Denise Revels Robinson
Director of Children and Family Services

From:

Re: Dawn Bonn and Associates

I sincerely appreciate the time you gave me yesterday with respect to my recent involvement with Dawn Bonn and Associates.

I am inclosing the "summary of events" that we discussed as well as other correspondence that has changed hands during this time. I am confident that we can eventually see justice prevail if my concerns are directed to the proper authorities of The State of Minnesota, which appears to be our first matter of business.

In addition to our conversation yesterday I had neglected to mention that I was told by Mr. Igell Hansen, the head of the American Embassy in Paraguay, that he was currently investigating the Mid-Wife involved in our adoption as blank documents and birth certificates were found in her possession. Mr. Hansen has stated to me that phone records have tied this person to Dawn Bonn. Do I believe these children were twins ..... would you?

Thank you once again for your efforts and I look forward to hearing from you sometime next week. My phone number, Monday through Friday from 9:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. is:

Regards.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR Date: 11/5/97
(4) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY
(4) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART
( ) DENY
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions (b)(6)
PA Exemptions
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority to:
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

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UNCLASSIFIED

06-08-1995 12:09PM FROM

Summary of Events

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This letter is intended to be a general description of the events that have taken place regarding the failed adoptions of Martin and Martina Areco Aguilera.

Sometime in mid-September, 1994 we learned about the availability of Martin and Martina Areco Aguilera from an agency, Today's Adoption, that operates out of Pennsylvania. My wife did some preliminary credibility checking of Today's Adoption and was told in no uncertain terms by several state regulatory bodies that we should not enter into any business arrangements with this entity.

Through normal networking processes here in Chicago we learned about an agency in North St. Paul, Minnesota that does most if not all of their adoption placements out of Paraguay, where Martin and Martina were born. We contacted Dawn Bonn at Dawn Bonn and Associates (DBA) and questioned her in a consultant manner to see what she made of the situation. She told my wife that with the name of the attorney she might be able to find out more information for us. Subsequently, she told us that she worked with this attorney frequently, and was surprised that Today's Adoption had been given this referral in the first place. Upon contacting the attorney in Paraguay, she was told that she could place these children with us (through DBA) if we were interested. My wife then repeated the same credibility investigation that she had performed with the first agency and discovered no major problems concerning Dawn Bonn and Associates. Based on this information we began the adoption process by signing their contract and sending her our initial payment. At this point we were told how very important it was to fax our signed Power of Attorney to her, as this would initiate our paperwork in the Paraguayan systemand hold the children for us. We were clearly told that the children were not able to leave the country until four months had passed from the time they were given up for adoption, and that they had been given up at birth on September 10, 1994.

At this time we were instructed by Dawn Bonn to send her the following checks: A check made out to DBA for $ 4,100.00 covering the International application, child finding, phone and courier fees, and an additional check made out to her lawyer in Paraguay, Ms. Carmen Airaldi, for the sum of $15,000.00 representing 50% of the actual International Apoption Fee. Both of these checks were sent of September 26, 1994 as instructed.

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June 8, 1995

To: Ms. Denise Revels Robinson
Director of Children and Family Services

From:

Re: Dawn Bonn and Associates

I sincerely appreciate the time you gave me yesterday with respect to my recent involvement with Dawn Bonn and Associates.

I am inclosing the "summary of events" that we discussed as well as other correspondence that has changed hands during this time. I am confident that we can eventually see justice prevail if my concerns are directed to the proper authorities of The State of Minnesota, which appears to be our first matter of business.

In addition to our conversation yesterday I had neglected to mention that I was told by Mr. Igell Hansen, the head of the American Embassy in Paraguay, that he was currently investigating the Mid-Wife involved in our adoption as blank documents and birth certificates were found in her possession. Mr. Hansen has stated to me that phone records have tied this person to Dawn Bonn. Do I believe these children were twins ..... would you?

Thank you once again for your efforts and I look forward to hearing from you sometime next week. My phone number, Monday through Friday from 9:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. is 312-460-1441.

Regards,

From that point on we waited until we were instructed to travel to Paraguay. We arrived in Paraguay on Sunday December 18th and that evening we received the babies for us to care for and be with throughout that week. This was to be the first of two scheduled visits to Paraguay as adopting in Paraguay is now recommended to be a two-trip process because of the legal work involved. From the period of September 26, 1994 until December 23, 1994 we had several conversations with Dawn Bonn and were clearly told that our second and last visit to Paraguay would be in "Early February," shortly after the courts reopened from their annual summer recess--the entire month of January--even though the children were eligilble to leave on their four-month-old birthday (January 10, 1995). As I indicated in my letter to Dawn Bonn dated January 16, 1995, which I have included for you today, we were told on December 23, 1994, one day before we were to leave Paraguay, that we would not secure custody of the children until possibly April, 1995. This was a major disappointment to us. We believe Dawn Bonn knew or should have known that this was the case prior to our traveling to Paraguay in December. All she had to have done was to monitor the progress of our adoption with her representative, Ms. Airaldi, and she would have discovered that the court papers were not filed until December 8, 1995 (per Ms. Airaldi on December 23, 1995)--and that it is four months from this date that determines when the adoption can be finalized. Through our many conversations with her, Dawn Bonn knew that it was of major concern to us to get the children out in early February as five-month-olds. We were very concerned about the long-term effects of foster care, particularly because there were fifteen children in the home that these children were in. We believe she was grossly negligent, if not self-serving, in not notifying us that they would not be available until they were seven months old. Had we been given this information at that time we very likely would have decided to wait for another referral. This error possibly occured because of the vast number of cases DBA chose to process at the end of the year. In November, Dawn Bonn told my wife that she was handling approximately one hundred adoptions at that time. We met many DBA families who were in Paraguay for their second visit during the last two weeks of December and it was very clear to us that they were her first priority. As this was only our first visit, we did not have to clear all of the legal hurdles before the court recessed for an entire month.

In addition to the aforementioned time delay, the other major concern we were presented with was the health of Martina. While in Paraguay our time was fully consumed doing whatever we could with whatever medical resources that we knew to be available to attempt to determine if Martina was, in fact, a healthy child. From the moment we received her on that Sunday evening we knew she was not a normal, healthy child. What we did not know was if her condition was temporary or permanent. We compared her to our own children at that age, and to her twin brother, and found her extremely lethargic and dazed. All along we attempted to give her the benefit of the doubt by hoping that her state of health was primarily due to the lack of stimulation she had been subjected to throughout her short life, even though her brother did not show those symptoms. We visited two pediatricians, took blood tests, shot extensive video footage and even went as far as having an

MRI performed. Throughout our visit in Paraguay we called Dawn Bonn daily in Minnesota to alert her to the medical trials and tribulations as we went along. It was obvious to us through her lack of concern that we were not a priority at that time, and so we decided to attempt to resolve this health issue upon our return to the states.

We returned to the Chicago area in early January, and formulated a "game plan" with Dawn Bonn to attempt to put the health issue to rest. It was the first time I felt that she had any genuine concern for our problem and she quickly acknowledged that it had been so hectic for her trying to get all of the other children out by year-end that she now finally had a chance to "hear" our concerns. She resolved during that conversation on January 7, 1995 to do the following: She would call down to Paraguay and have Martina seen by the following group of doctors: a pediatrician, an audiologist, an infant physical therapist as well as a pediatric neurologist. (Why hadn't she suggested those doctors while we were in Paraguay, we wondered?) On Wednesday, January 11th she contacted us and told us Martina had been seen by the Embassy pediatrician and that he thought she was fine and would not refer her to see any other medical doctors. Otherwise stated, she told me I should trust this one doctors' opinion and take this child to be my own with no further consultations. This was clearly not going to happen. and I had already taken our extensive video footage and the MRI to a pediatric neurologist here in Chicago only to discover that he had some serious concerns about the health of the child based on what he had seen.

During that phone call on January 11, 1995 it was then that Dawn Bonn stated that we would never get the information that would make us comfortable with this adoption. She said that she knew the signs of an adoption that had "gone bad" and suggested, "why don't we just call this off and I'll give you your money back." We clarified that the money would include both the $ 4,100.00 we paid to her, as well as the $22,500.00 that we had given Ms. Airaldi to date. (We had given Ms. Airaldi an additional $7,500.00 on December 23, 1994 while in Paraguay per explicit instructions from Dawn Bonn.) It was obvious to me that all other monies we expended along the way would be out of our pocket and would be our costs of this failed adoption. This includes all travel expenses, as well as considerable medical and phone bills. We responded to Dawn by stating that we thought it would be best to think it over for one or two days and we would get back to her. During that time my wife and I conceded that Dawn Bonn was no longer "on our side" in that if she really wanted to assist in determining the health status of the child she would have found a way for her to be seen by these other medical professionals, perhaps even having us fly in doctors from outside of Paraguay (which we were prepared to do). Instead, it was obvious to us that she had no interest in continuing the process. This decision-making process was terribly painful as we had become extremely emotionally involved with, and committed to these children in the months that had gone by. We phoned her on January 15, 1995 and accepted her offer to abort the adoption and I acknowledged all of the discussed terms in my letter to her dated January 16, 1995. There was absolutely no response on her behalf to the terms of the letter as I had

indicated she do within ten day upon receipt (We have the green, signed return-receipt with her signature).

Needless to say, February 5, 1995 (the deadline for payment as outlined by my letter) came and went and all I have had are a series of promises made by her to pay me by such and such a date (as outlined in my recent letter dated March 10, 1995). She has made comments to the effect that she has been dealing with Ms Airaldi for eleven years and has yet to have a problem with funds being returned. She has also made the implication that because I made the bulk of the checks out to Ms. Airaldi, my refund is a problem between me and Ms. Airaldi. She has tried to make me feel that she has no resonsibility for these funds when we all know that Ms. Airaldi is clearly her agent and all monies paid to Ms. Airaldi were at the direction of Dawn Bonn & Associates. In any event, if Dawn Bonn had been dealing in good faith I would at the very least have had the check for $ 4,100.00 that I paid directly to her. I cannot begin to tell you how disgusted my wife and I are at this whole situation. Dawn Bonn has been a major source of aggravation and heartache for us particularly since the February 5th date passed. When this is over we have serious plans to contact all State and Federal regulatory departments, as well as all adoption related referring bodies to notify them of her mishandling of our situation.

Additionally, we feel it is important to give you the following information even though we do not know the impact it may have actually had on our case. While in Paraguay we uncovered a major fraud. The children's initial blood tests (which we had received from Today's Adoption along with copies of the children's birth certificates) were reported to us on the stationary of a prominent laboratory in Asuncion, Paraguay. This clinic is owned, or partially owned by Dr. Fructos, the physician used by the U.S. Embassy to clear adopted children prior to the Embassy granting their exit visas. At Dawn Bonn's suggestion we visited the clinic to have Dr. Fructos evaluate Martina. We showed him the paperwork as background information in hopes it would assist in his evaluation of her. At that time it was discovered that someone had forged both the test results and a clinicians' signature onto the clinic stationary. Their lab results are always computer generated and someone had gone out of their way to white-out the middle of the computer paper and type in the lab results while leaving the letterhead on top and at bottom. I mention this because Dr. Fructos was the doctor that later told Dawn Bonn that he would not refer Martina to any further physicians. (Even Dawn Bonn had thought that was odd because, as she told us, that 1) he refers many, many children to specialists, and 2) he gets referral fees each time he does so.) After re-doing the tests and finding them to be identical to the originals, we were told by the head of the clinic that a law suit would be forthcoming against both the current attorney and whomever had brought the children to her for adoption. Importantly, this episode was*also* of great interest to Mr. Igell Hansen, the head of the American Embassy in Asuncion, and we had lengthly discussions with him regarding this matter. I am convinced that he would also view the current business practices of Dawn Bonn' regarding my refund as serious violations if we were to alert him of them. Please keep this in mind for future leverage if necessary. This would also directly effect Ms.

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Airaldi as she deals with the Embassy directly and Mr. Hansen loves to hear about these type of things.

I think I have given you enough to go on for now. Ideally I would like to have no further contact personally with Dawn Bonn and would like you to instruct her accordingly when you write her. She can be reached at:

Dawn Bonn & Associates
2206 Ariel Street
North St. Paul, MN 55109
Phone (612) 779-0273 FAX (612) 779-7122

My address is as follows:

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience regarding your fee structure, et cetera. Thank you for your time and concern.

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Dawn Bonn and Associates
2206 Ariel Street
North St. Paul, MN
55109

January 16, 1995

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Dear Dawn,

This letter serves to confirm our conversation yesterday agreeing that we have decided not to adopt Martin and Martina Areco Aguilera. This decision is a result of, but is not limited to the following reasons:

1. We have determined based on available test results and consultations with experts both in Paraguay and in the U.S., that the health of Martina is, in our opinion, questionable, and therefore subject to further tests and consultations which, we are told, are unavailable at the present time.

2. Additionally, we find the unexpected time delay from "early February" per Dawn Bonn and Associates (given to us on several occassions prior to leaving for Paraguay) to our understanding on December 23, 1994 from Ms. Carmen Airaldi that we would not secure custody of the children until March or possibly April 1995, to be both incompetent and unnacceptable.

We understand that we will be receiving a refund in the sum of $ 26,600.00 by February 5, 1995. This includes $ 22,500.00 paid to Ms. Carmen Airaldi as well as $ 4,100.00 paid to Dawn Bonn and Associates. The refund at present shall exclude travel and medical expenses aproximating $ 9,000.00 paid by ourselves relating to our trip to Paraguay from December 18 to December 23, 1994, as well as miscellaneous expenses incurred prior to, during and subsequent to the aforementioned trip which are particularly related to the health of the children.

<u>Please respond to us within ten days of receipt of this letter if you are in disagreement with the aforementioned facts pertaining to our subsequent refund.</u>

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To: Dawn Bonn and Associates
Attention - Dawn Bonn

From: [redacted]

Date: March 10, 1995

Re: Adoption Refund

This FAX serves to document the events of the past two weeks as well as to inform Dawn Bonn and Associates of our following course of action.

<u>Saturday, February 25, 1995</u>

Dawn Bonn contacted [redacted] and stated the following:

"I will be sending you my check for $ 4,100.00 on Monday, February 27, 1995 and I should be getting the balance of $ 22,500.00 by the end of next week."

Eight days went by and there was no contact by either party and no check or checks were received.

<u>Sunday, March 5, 1995</u>

Dawn Bonn contacted [redacted] and stated the following:

"Tomorrow I will be sending you my check for $ 4,100.00 as well as a partial payment of $ 7,500.00 of the additional $ 22,500.00. I expect to have the balance of $ 15,000.00 by the end of the week." In addition she stated that she should be able to get to the bank that Monday but in any event she would "DHL - overnight" the payment by Tuesday at the latest.

<u>Friday, March 10,1995</u>

[redacted] has yet to receive any check or checks from Dawn Bonn and Associates. The entire sum of $ 26,100.00 was indicated in his letter dated January 16, 1995 as to have been payable on or about February 5, 1995. As of today March 10, 1995, [redacted] has retained Mr. Ronald Mesbesher of the law firm Meshbesher & Spence to represent him in this matter.

cc. Mr. Ronald Meshbesher

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Asunción, 6 de marzo de 1995.-

Apreciados Señores Brown:
[redacted]

Con gran sorpresa, nos hemos enterad que han desistido de la adopción de los menores Martín y Mar [redacted] Areco Aguilera. Les hacemos aber, que si en otro moment deciden adoptar, estamos a sus ordenes, para ayudarles en tod lo que esté en nuestras manos.-

Con relación a su pedido de devoluci de lo abonado por este caso, les solicitamos una espera de 30 (Treinta) días contados a partir de la fecha de la presente ca

En la espera de una respuesta favora ble a este pedido, nos despedimos de Ustedes muy cordialmente

Dra. Carmen Coronel de Airaldi

Dra. María Luisa Vera de López

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DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES

Consulting Firm for International Adoption in Affiliation with Summit Adoption Home Studies, Inc.

2206 Ariel Street
North St. Paul, MN 55109 USA
Phone (612) 779-0273
Fax (612) 779-7122

REFUND RECEIPT

Dawn Bonn & Associates (DBA) has refunded $4,000.00 to [redacted] for payment they made for DBA's child finding service. This a the full and final refund from DBA.

In addition, Carmen Arialdi (through DBA) has refunded $7,500.00 to Mark and Carol for payment they made from international adoption fees. An additional $15,000.00 is still outstanding from Carmen Arialdi and will be refunded as expeditiously as possible.

Dated: Mar 30/95

Dawn Bonn
DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES

UNCLASSIFIED

April 18, 1995

To: Dawn Bonn and Associates
From:
Attn: Dawn Bonn
Re: Balance of Refund

We are in receipt of your "Refund Receipt" dated March 30, 1995 along with the two seperate checks amounting to a partial payment of $ 11,500.00 of the $ 26,500.00 owed to us. We have also received the letter dated March 6, 1995 written to us by Ms. Carmen Airaldi, which you forwarded to us, indicating that the balance was to be remitted to us within 30 days. It is currently 13 days beyond the 30 day time period indicated and we are now questioning the status of these funds.

Please Fax us at ( ) as soon as possible with an indication as to when we may expect this final balance owed. Thank you for your cooperation.

cc: Mr Ronald Graham, Better Business Bureau of Minnesota ✓

UNCLASSIFIED

DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES
Consulting Firm for International Adoption
2206 Ariel Street
North St. Paul, Minnesota 55109
(612) 779-0273

May 12, 1995

Minnesota Better Business Bureau
2706 Gannon Road
St. Paul, Minnesota 55116

To Whom It May Concern:

Dawn Bonn and Associates (DBA) have been informed by the Attorneys, DeAiraldi and DeLopez that they are sorry for the delay due to the slow-down in the court system.

The attorneys currently have three adoptions that will be completed in the month of May 1995. The second half of the international fee is due at that time for each of these adoptions. Therefore, DeAiraldi and DeLopez will have two of these families forward their checks ($7,500.00) to DBA who will in turn forward them to the ( ) family.

Sincerely,

Dawn M. Bonn

Dawn M. Bonn
Dawn Bonn & Associates

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DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES
Consulting Firm for International Adoption in Affiliation with Summit Adoption Home Studies, Inc.

2206 Ariel Street
North St. Paul, MN 55109 USA
Phone (612) 779-0273
Fax (612) 779-7122

PARAGUAY
CHILD FINDING SERVICE AGREEMENT

THIS INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION SERVICE AGREEMENT is made as of the ____ day of ____________, 19___, by and between DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES, and ____________ and ____________ (collectively the "Adopting Parents").

FEES - EXPLANATIONS AND CONDITIONS

1. Fees and Explanations. The fees for the services provided by DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES (hereinafter "DBA"), along with an explanation, are as follows:

   a. Application Fee: $100.00, payment due with completed application. Covers costs of initiating a case file. Fee is non-refundable.

   b. International Child Finding Fee and Phone and Courier Fee: $2,400.00 (for one child) and $1,800.00 (for each additional child), due upon acceptance of referral in cashier or personal check made payable to Mary B. Bonn. Covers cost of the child finder in locating and matching a child for referral and the maintenance of our international referral system; and for numerous contacts and passage of documents between organizations, governments and the State of Minnesota. If Adopting Parents terminate the adoption process before accepting referral, they are liable for such pro rata charges. If Adopting Parents terminate the adoption process after accepting referral, fee is not refundable.

   c. International Adoption Fee: The fee is $15,000.00 per child. The Lawyer is paid in two installments. They are as follows:

      1) 50% (in a certified check) due upon acceptance of referral, made payable to: (Lawyer's Name) and sent to DAWN BONN & ASSOCIATES to forward;

      2) 50% (the balance) due on the day the Paraguayan adoption court papers are finalized and signed.

   THIS FEE MAY BE SUBJECT TO CHANGES BY ORGANIZATIONS OR PERSONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BEYOND THE CONTROL OF DBA, AND DBA ASSUMES NO LIABILITY FOR ANY CHANGE IN THIS FEE FROM THE AMOUNT ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED. Payments may be due well in advance of actual placement of the child and are not refundable.

   d. State Licensed Adoption Agency Fee: Effective August 1, 1994, Minnesota State Law requires that all adoption consulting services/child finding facilitators be affiliated with a Minnesota state licensed adoption agency. Therefore, DBA has chosen Summit Adoption Home Studies, Inc. ("Summit"), 1389 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105, as its sole affiliate. Summit's role is

to review and verify each home study for the clients of DBA. Upon Summit's approval, a referral letter from Summit will be attached to the home study and returned to DBA for further processing.

[illegible] When [illegible]
in the amount of $250.00 (Minnesota residents) or $300.00 (out-of-state clients) made payable to Summit Adoption Home Studies, Inc., for the state licensed adoption agency fee. DBA will forward your payment and home study to Summit.

[illegible]
child's documents (Medical, Visa, Passport and Departure Tax). Note: DBA is not responsible for expired INS documents. (See "Current Paraguay Expenses" in pink information packet for more detail.)

f. *Miscellaneous Fees:* If additional fees are required by others to complete the adoption process, the Adopting Parents will be notified in advance and shall be responsible for the payment.

2. Conditions Relating to Fees. The terms and conditions relating to the payment of fees for services provided by DBA are as follows:

a. No further case progress will take place when any fees are past due.

b. Fees are an obligation of the Adopting Parents to pay in full when due. Fees are not subsequently refundable except as described on page 1, paragraph b and are subject to collection by DBA when due, plus all associated collection costs, including reasonable attorney fees, whether the adoption process continues to completion or not. Adopting Parents understand that if they elect to discontinue the adoption process, they are liable for such pro rata charges, up to the full fee.

c. Estimates of charges due to others are provided for information purposes only. DBA estimates have in the past been accurate and complete. However, Adopting Parents understand that DBA is unable to: guarantee or enforce the charges of others, guarantee that no new categories of charges will be required, or guarantee that dates scheduled for overseas trips may not be canceled or rescheduled because of events beyond its control. All such costs are solely the Adopting Parents' risk and responsibility.

GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. Adopting Parents understand that DBA cannot promise or guarantee a specific foreign court date or a maximum elapsed time for implementing or finalizing the adoption process in the court system of the foreign country selected. Adopting Parents agree that, to facilitate the adoption process and minimize any possible disruption with the international child finding network of DBA, they will:

a. not travel to the selected foreign country to participate in any way in the adoption process without a travel date first having been authorized by DBA;

b. not travel to the selected foreign country to participate in any way in the adoption process if DBA advises against doing so;

Adopting Parents understand that any violation of these conditions may result in DBA terminating the adoption process without in any way relieving Adopting Parents of their obligation to pay such pro rata charges, up to the full fee.

2. Adopting Parents understand and acknowledge that any child or children referred to them by DBA

may be examined by doctors of their own choosing in the foreign country selected prior to the adoption being finalized, that Adopting Parents themselves accept full responsibility for the adequacy and cost of any such medical examination and that DBA cannot guarantee the future health or medical condition of the adopted child.

Adopting Parents understand, acknowledge and agree that when the final adoption decree has been granted by the foreign court,

a. the child becomes their absolute and sole responsibility; and

b. upon returning to the United States, they will finalize the adoption under U.S. law in the time prescribed and will take all steps necessary to have the child naturalized as a U.S. citizen within not more than five years after the date of the final U.S. adoption decree; or

c. finalize in country of residency.

No Guarantee of Placement. This Agreement is not intended to guarantee placement of a child. Efforts to adopt children from a foreign country may involve circumstances which are beyond the control of DBA. Such circumstances may interfere with or interrupt the adoption process. DBA takes all reasonable precautions to anticipate and avoid such risks, but cannot assure its efforts will always prove successful. The Adopting Parents understand that placement of a child is not guaranteed and, except as noted on page 1, paragraph b in this Agreement, failure to adopt a child does not in any way relieve the Adopting Parents of their obligation to pay DBA for its fees when due.

Representatives of the Adopting Parents. The Adopting Parents hereby represent and acknowledge that they have read and understand this Agreement and the consequences hereof. The Adopting Parents acknowledge that they have received adequate opportunity to read and consider this Agreement.

______________________________ ______________________________
Adopting Father's Signature Date

______________________________ ______________________________
Adopting Mother's Signature Date

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this ________
day of ________________
19____

____
Notary Public

UNCLASSIFIED

Revised - 10/17/94

06-08-1995 12:23PM FROM TO 901159521213728 P.16

(All expenses quoted in U.S. dollars and subject to change at any time)

)NAL ADOPTION FEE

. . . . $ 15,000.00

fee is paid in two installments. They are as follows:

;0% (in a certified check) due upon acceptance of referral, s payable to: (Lawyer's Name) and sent to DAWN BONN & OCIATES to forward; and

emaining 50% (in a certified check) due on the day the Paraguayan tion court papers are finalized and signed.

)NAL APPLICATION, CHILD FINDING, PHONE AND COURIER FEES

. . . .	$ 100.00
. . . .	2,400.00
nal child	1,800.00

acceptance of referral, please send a cashiers check, payable to Mary B. Bonn, to the dress: 2208 Ariel Street, North St. Paul, MN 55109

NSED ADOPTION AGENCY FEE

ion of this fee, see "Child Finding Service Agreement" (green packet), section 1., paragraph d.)

ption Home Studies Inc.	(in state) $	250.00
. . . .	(out of state)	300.00

)N FEES & AUTHENTICATION FEES

will bill you for your Translation and Preparation of Documents

nd Preparation of Documents . . . . $ 700.00

)n of Documents by Consulate of Paraguay (average cost $550.00):

ee (per document)	$ 43.00
orney	35.00
thentication (per document)	27.50

cation: To be done by you at your state's Secretary of State Office or in the county otary is registered. (For MN residents the cost is approximately $6.00 per document.)

FEES

ments - Medical, Visa, Passport (per child) . . . . $ 350.00
must be paid while you are in Paraguay.)

OUS FEES

orney (second trip only - for absent parent)	$ 100.00 - 150.00
Psychological Evaluation	250.00 - 350.00
x for Parent(s) (per person)	16.00
per month)	200.00 - 300.00

charged for foster care only in the event your child remains in foster care longer than the signing of the Final Decree.)

THESE EXPENSES DO NOT INCLUDE HOTEL OR AIRFARE

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EXCISE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-0
8824665 INCOMING

4 P B1

PAGE 01 OF 02 QUITO 10645 00 OF 03 152245Z 7558 000288 SS02929
--15/2306Z

ACTION OFFICE ARA-02
INFO SSS-01 SSSA-01 SSI-02 SSO-01 HR-01 INR-01 P-02 O-01
C-02 T-01 PM-01 SP-01 SSE-01 OCT-01 PA-01 IO-01 UNA-01
/021 A1 PEM
OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE DODE NSAE
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INFO TRIP-01 K-01 SSEX-02 SS-01 ARA-01 /006 A4 PRS

ACTION SS-00

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O 152223Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3492

[redacted] QUITO 10645

EXDIS

S/S FOR CLEARANCE

E.O. 12356 DECL OADR
TAGS OVIP SHULTZ, GEORGE P., CI
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH CHILEAN
FOREIGN MINISTER RICARDO GARCIA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY

DURING A 45-MINUTE MEETING ON AUGUST 10, THE SECRETARY AND CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER RICARDO GARCIA DISCUSSED CHILE'S ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS, THE FORTHCOMING PLEBISCITE IN CHILE, AND TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AFTER RECOGNIZING CHILE'S IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC PROGRAM, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN THAT STEPS SUCH AS LIFTING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING OPPOSITION PARTIES EQUAL ACCESS TO TELEVISION BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE PLEBISCITE IS FAIR AND ITS RESULTS RECEIVED AS LEGITIMATE BY THE CHILEAN PEOPLE. HE ALSO STRESSED U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT WITH CHILE'S FAILURE TO COOPERATE IN BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WASHINGTON ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR ORLANDO LETELIER. IN RESPONSE,

B1

IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE

PAGE 01 QUITO 10645 00 OF 03 152249Z 7558 000288 SS02929

PROGRESS MADE IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, CONTRASTING THIS TREND WITH THE POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ECONOMIC CHAOS THAT CHARACTERIZES THE SOVIET-SUPPORTED MARXIST GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA. BOTH AGREED THAT NICARAGUA THREATENS DEMOCRATIC NATIONS OF THE REGION AND LAMENTED THE IRONY OF NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA AND CUBA'S FIDEL CASTRO ATTENDING THE CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY ACCOMPANYING ECUADORIAN PRESIDENT RODRIGO BORJA'S INAUGURATION IN QUITO.

THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED IN THIS MEETING BY ARA ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELLIOTT ABRAMS, DAS ROBERT G. GELBARD, AND SOUTHERN CONE DIRECTOR RICHARD B. HOWARD (NOTETAKER). ON THE CHILEAN SIDE, FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY OCTAVIO ERRAZURIZ, AMBASSADOR GASTON ILLANES, AND JAIME SINCLAIR (NOTETAKER) ATTENDED THE MEETING.
END SUMMARY

3. AFTER OPENING AMENITIES, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD CONTINUED TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE WITH GREAT INTEREST, NOTING THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH CHILE HAS MADE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND IN ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT ITS ECONOMY COULD SERVE AS A MODEL FOR OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. IN CONTRAST TO CHILE'S POSITIVE ECONOMIC RECORD, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE ARE CONTINUING CONCERNS REGARDING CHILE'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION. HE HOPED THAT CHILE'S FORTHCOMING PLEBISCITE WILL BE FAIR AND LEGITIMATE. FROM THE USG'S PERSPECTIVE THERE ARE PLUSES AND MINUSES. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE STATE OF EMERGENCY CURTAILING CERTAIN CIVIL RIGHTS HAS NOT BEEN LIFTED AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PROVIDED EQUAL ACCESS TO TELEVISION BY THE OPPOSITION. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE SEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS. OVERALL, HOWEVER, THE US REMAINS CONCERNED THAT THE PLEBISCITE PROCESS BE HONEST AND LEGITIMATE. FINALLY, BUT NOT LEAST, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES IS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT CHILE'S FAILURE TO COOPERATE IN BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LETELIER MURDER AND OBSERVED THAT THIS IS A CONTINUING AND LONGSTANDING SOURCE OF FRICTION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE COMING PLEBISCITE, GARCIA SAID THAT

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EXDIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed: transferred to IM/IS/FPC
Cat. B - Transferred to IM/IS/FPC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly, Jr.
Date: 6-27-95

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INCOMING

Department of State

IN NICARAGUA WHICH IS HEAVILY ARMED, SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND A THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS. ORTEGA'S VISIT TO QUITO IS AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID, BUT HOPEFULLY WE WILL BE GONE BEFORE HE ARRIVES. GARCIA AGREED AND MADE A SIMILAR REFERENCE TO FIDEL CASTRO'S UNWELCOME PRESENCE. IT IS A SAD IRONY, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED IN CONCLUDING THE MEETING, THAT THESE TWO TOTALITARIAN LEADERS HAVE COME TO QUITO FOR THIS CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY. (THE SECRETARY'S PARTY WAS UNABLE TO REVIEW THIS CABLE BEFORE DEPARTURE.) HOLWILL

(B1)

EXDIS

8. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED TO GARCIA'S LENGTHY EXPOSITION BY RE TERAT NG THE USG S INTENTION TO CAREFULLY WATCH THE PLEB SCITE PROCESS. IN RESPONSE TO GARCIA S OBSERVAT ON THAT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY MAY BE LIFTED NOTWITHSTAND NG THE CONTINUED THREAT OF TERRORISM BY COMMUNISTS WHO WANT TO PREVENT THE PLEBISCITE, THE SECRETARY ASKED "WHEN?" GARCIA REPLIED, "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

9. CONCLUDING THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION, THE SECRETARY TOLD GARCIA THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE WATCHING THE SITUATION IN CHILE CAREFULLY AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE REALITY WHICH WE SEE. HE TOLD GARCIA THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS WOULD CONTINUE TO SAY WHAT WE BEL VE. WE WILL DO WHAT IS BEST AND HOPE FOR THE BEST, THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED.

10. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, GARCIA ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. NOTING THAT THERE ARE NOW FOUR DEMOCRACIES -- NOT JUST ONE -- THE SECRETARY CONTRASTED THIS PROGRESS WITH THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ECONOMIC CHAOS

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

INFORMATION

[redacted]

TO: The Secretary

FROM: ARA - Elliott Abrams

SUBJECT: The Chilean Plebiscite -- Will Pinochet Let the Opposition Compete or Take Dramatic Steps to Thwart Them?

SUMMARY

Under Mr. Whitehead's lead we are trying to make sure that the Pinochet clique in the Army does not act in desperation to cancel or nullify the October 5 plebiscite if it looks like the "No" vote is winning. For now Chile is relatively calm with all partisan campaigning officially ended. In the media contest, the GOC maintained its large quantitative publicity advantage over the opposition but the "No" used its free television time to good effect.

Credible intelligence reports of military contingency planning to nullify the plebiscite (a la Haiti) seem to reflect GOC fears that opposition momentum is gaining. Polls still still vary substantially, with some pro-GOC groups predicting a 5-6 point victory by the "Yes" and opposition-oriented pollsters claiming the "No" will win by as much as 20 per cent. Most political observers, including the Embassy, predict a "No" win, but there is no agreement on the margin of victory. A narrow "Yes" win cannot be discounted, but the "No" campaign seemed to be surging in the final weeks.

The government could use violence as a pretext to cancel or nullify Wednesday's vote. The electoral process itself is well-organized with many safeguards to prevent fraud. A "Yes" victory, however, would almost certainly provoke charges of fraud from both the democratic opposition and the far left in Chile. We are monitoring plebiscite-related developments closely, particularly any risk to American observers. Whatever the outcome, Chile is entering a new phase likely to be marked by considerable unrest and uncertainty. End of Summary

ARMY CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DISRUPT THE PLEBISCITE.

We have reliable intelligence that elements of the Chilean army have a plan to suspend Wednesday's scheduled plebiscite, using violence as a pretext, if Pinochet appears to be losing. Given the seriousness of these reports, John Whitehead called in the Chilean Ambassador Sunday and asked him to tell Pinochet that we are very concerned and that the plan should not be carried out or there will be serious consequenses for Chile's relations with the U.S. and the world. The Ambassador later gave us a flat denial of such plans from the Interior Minister and informed us that the issue would be raised at a Cabinet meeting. Ambassador Barnes and senior U.S. military are passing similar warnings to the Chilean military. The British, who are close to the Chileans, are also weighing in at our request.

VOTE PREDICTION: THE "NO" IS FAVORED

The "No" campaign has built impressive momentum in recent weeks and appears to have the clear edge, although a "Yes" surprise cannot be discounted. Polls which have been sponsored by groups close to both camps still diverge substantially but our Embassy reports that there is a general public sense that the "No" has stuck together in the campaign, gained momentum, and will win.

WILL THE VOTE BE CLEAN?

Most observers, including the "no" campaign leaders, predict that the plebiscite vote itself will be generally clean and free of major fraud. The system contains important built-in safeguards, the most significant being the presence of representatives of legal opposition parties at the polls to monitor the balloting and vote-count. The ability of the "No" campaign to distribute its people to as many polling places as possible, especially in rural areas, will be a key factor. It is doubtful that Pinochet could manipulate the vote itself or carry out fraud on a scale which could overcome a clear "No" victory.

FOREIGN "OBSERVERS"

Hundreds of foreign dignataries, including large numbers from the U.S., are in Chile to watch the vote. Perhaps the largest and most visible group is that assembled by the NDI

under the sponsorship of the NED which includes several former heads of state and important U.S. political figures. The head of the National Republic Institute and several other Americans with a more conservative orientation will also visit Chile to observe the plebicite. The presence of so many visitors should keep pressure on the GOC for a fair vote. The visitors will have no official observer status but the government is not expected to hinder them in any way. The Embassy has cautioned the numerous American observers -- some of whom are U.S. Congressmen -- to be careful and to keep in close touch with the Embassy.

VIOLENCE: THE WILD CARD

The plebiscite campaign was not marred by serious violence. To enhance prospects of a "No" victory, the Communist Party has apparently reined in its armed wing, the Manuel Rodriguez Front (FPMR) and will probably do so until the evening of October 5. Intelligence reports indicate that the FPMR may, however, break its "truce" after the polls close either to stir up trouble by inciting to violence crowds celebrating a "No" victory or by encouraging people to take to the streets to protest "fraud" should the "Yes" be declared the winner. Other ultra-left groups could also cause trouble. Such acts, however initiated, could play into GOC contingency plans to nullify the vote.

WE WILL MONITOR CLOSELY

As we track the plebiscite, we are also keeping a close eye on the risks to U.S. observers. Our Embassy has positioned officers in several cities to get a fuller picture of events on Wednesday as Chileans vote and as the votes are counted. However the plebiscite turns out, we expect greater agitation and new uncertainties to affect all aspects of life in Chile. The military's role will be critically important in determining how matters develop and whether a reasonable dialogue with the opposition will be possible.

Drafted: PDeShazo/RHoward
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Cleared: ARA:MSkol

UNCLASSIFIED EXCISE

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April 5 1994

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Senator Charles Grassley
135 Hart Senate Office Bdlg.
Washington D C. 20510

Dear Senator Grassley:

As an Indian American, I wish to bring to your attention some recent moves by the Clinton Administration to supply offensive, lethal weapons, including F-16 fighters to Pakistan bypassing the Congressional restrictions. These F-16 fighters are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction: nuclear bombs and chemical weapons.

The Bush Administration was on the verge of declaring Pakistan a terrorist nation Pakistan has been actively funding, training, and supplying weapons to Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists, who are killing innocent people in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Bombay. These terrorists have been responsible for attacks on civilians in other parts of the world, too.

With funding from Iran and Libya, Pakistan has already produced a nuclear bomb. All these years, Pakistan has told the United States of America and the rest of the world lies about its nuclear weapons program (and kept on producing nuclear bombs). President Clinton would be making a big mistake if he believed that Pakistan would do what it says. Libya and Iran have a desperate desire to have nuclear devises to spread their version of religious fundamentalist revolution, undermine the moderate Islamic nations, and to settle their score with "The Great Satan - USA." Pakistan does not have a history of a stable democracy Pakistan is a theocratic state, ruled by military dictators for most of the years, since its birth. Nuclear devices and F-16 fighters, in the hands of a future military dictator of Pakistan or Libya or Iran, are a sure prescription for Grand Calamity.

The notion of military parity between India and Pakistan is as smart a notion of military parity between the USA and Cuba! India is the second largest country and the largest democracy in the world, ninth biggest GDP-economy in the world, a secular country that has never initiated aggression against any country. India has been a victim of aggression from Communist China in 1962, from military dictators in Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971

Supply of nuclear capable F-16 fighters to Pakistan by the USA will be viewed as a very hostile act by India and Indian people. It will adversely affect the growing political and economic ties between the USA and India. It will also force India to commit additional resources to their military to match the threat posed by the nuclear capable hostile Pakistani leadership. The USA can really help the situation by not providing any offensive arms to Pakistan. The USA can help the people of Pakistan by uplifting their living standards. We want them to be happy and prosperous. Let us help them enjoy a better quality of life by helping them build a modern, industrial, secular nation. Supplying F-16 fighters and other lethal military hardware will be counter productive to the world peace and US principles.

I also urge you to use your good offices to persuade the Clinton Administration to name an Ambassador to India. As an Indian American, I am disappointed that even after 15 months in office, the Clinton administration has not named an ambassador to India, the world's largest democracy and a great emerging market for US companies'

What about US jobs, making F-16 fighters? This is an argument frequently made to promote and justify the same of such lethal offensive weapons. The US can export computers, telecommunications equipment, industrial goods to the rest of the world and have more American jobs

I believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should reevaluate the roles of Mrs Robin Raphael, Dy. Sec. for South Asia in the State Department. I believe that Mrs. Raphael is not the most suitable person to guide the US Foreign Policy in South Asia. I feel that much of the anti India rhetoric of the Clinton Administration is a result of close ties that the Raphael family had to military dictators of Pakistan. Just to refresh your memory, Mrs. Robin Raphael's late husband was a close friend of Gen. Zia, late president/dictator of Pakistan. Mr. and Mrs. Raphael were frequent beneficiaries of generous hospitality of Gen. Zia. Mr. Raphael was in the same aircraft with Gen. Zia when is crashed and killed Gen. Zia, Mr. Raphael, and others. We understand that Robin Raphael has met with Pakistani trained terrorists in clandestine fashion and several occasions. Robin Raphael has had too much personal attachment and family tragedy in Pakistan. With all due respect to her, it is difficult to believe that she can be impartial or objective in her assessment of the situation in that part of the world. The long term relationship between the people of the USA and India is too important to be left to any individual's personal pride, prejudice, and tragedy.

Sincerely,

EXCISE (E9)

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 05513 01 OF 02 071651Z
ACTION SS-00

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[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 005513

DEPARTMENT FOR D STAFF, SA/INS

CINCPAC FOR FPA

LONDON FOR JOHNSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (TALBOTT, STROBE), PREL, IN, IR, US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DINESH SINGH

1. [redacted] -- ENTIRE TEXT

[redacted]

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PAGE 02 NEW DE 05513 01 OF 02 071651Z

2. SUMMARY. DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT CONVEYED TO INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DINESH SINGH IN AN APRIL 7 MEETING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA. TALBOTT TOLD SINGH THAT WASHINGTON VIEWS INDIA AS AN IMPORTANT ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HOPES TO USE A MAY VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER RAO TO THE U.S. TO SET THE TONE FOR A NEW ERA OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NEW DELHI. SINGH

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[redacted] END SUMMARY.

BUILDING BROADER INDO-U.S. RELATIONS

3. DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, AS IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY SRINIVASAN, MPHASIZED THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH INDIA. TALBOTT TOLD SINGH PRESIDENT CLINTON WANTS TO USE A RAO VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MAY TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF GLOBAL ISSUES. MOREOVER, TALBOTT INDICATED BOTH PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WANT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE VISIT. TALBOTT SAID RAO NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE U.S. DELIVERY OF F-16S TO

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PAKISTAN COMING ON THE HEELS OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, BECAUSE THE INTIATIVE IS ONLY IN THE VERY EARLY STAGES OF DISCUSSION. TALBOTT WENT ON TO PRAISE INDIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM, SAYING THE CHANGES OPENED NEW VISTAS FOR BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THIS IS REFLECTED, TALBOTT TOLD SINGH, IN THE POSSIBLE VISIT OF COMMERCE SECRETARY RON BROWN TO INDIA LATER THIS YEAR.

4. SINGH [redacted]

[redacted] TALBOTT

[redacted] HE NOTED THAT AMERICANS ADMIRE INDIA AS A PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC STATE. HE NOTED THAT INDIA HAS NOT DISINTIGRATED -- AS HAVE SEVERAL OTHER STATES -- ALONG ETHNIC OR SECTARIAN LINES PRECISELY BECAUSE IT HAS DEEPLY-ROOTED DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS. TALBOTT SAID PRESIDENT CLINTON SEES THE END OF THE COLD WAR AS PRESENTING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RELATIONSHIP AND HOPES TO USE A WASHINGTON MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RAO TO MOVE TOWARD THAT END.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE WITH PAKISTAN

5. SINGH

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PAGE 04 NEW DE 05513 01 OF 02 071651Z

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 05513 02 OF 02 071651Z
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[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 NEW DELHI 005513

DEPARTMENT FOR D STAFF, SA/INS

CINCPAC FOR FPA

LONDON FOR JOHNSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (TALBOTT, STROBE), PREL, IN, IR, US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DINESH SINGH

6. TALBOTT:

7. TALBOTT ASKED FOR SINGH'S COOPERATION IN CONVENING A MULTILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION CONFERENCE. SINGH

TALBOTT SUGGESTED U.S. AND INDIAN EXPERTS SIT DOWN THAT AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL FURTHER. SINGH AGREED AND DAS EINHORN SUBSEQUENTLY MET INDIAN COUNTERPARTS LATER IN THE AFTERNOON.

IRAN
----

8. TALBOTT ASKED SINGH IN THE WAKE OF THE FOREIGN [redacted]

PAGE 03 NEW DE 05513 02 OF 02 071651Z
MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO TEHERAN FOR HIS VIEWS ON IRANIAN INTENTIONS IN THE REGION. SINGH

9. THE MEETING LASTED FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR. JOINING SINGH IN THE INDIAN DELEGATION WERE FOREIGN SECRETARY SRINIVASAN, INDIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. RAY, THE MEA JOINT SECRETARY FOR THE AMERICAS PURI, AND DIRECTOR OF THE MEA AMERICAS DESK CHAKRAVARTY. TALBOTT WAS JOINED BY A/S RAPHEL, CHARGE BRILL, DAS EINHORN, D EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT NULAND, D SPECIAL ASSISTANT WITHERS, AND POLOFF BUCH (NOTETAKER).

10. DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT CLEARED THIS CABLE.
BRILL

[redacted]

PAGE 04 NEW DE 05513 02 OF 02 071651Z

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

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[redacted] STATE 087351

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PINR, PREL, ECON, PM
SUBJECT: :TFPM01: PANAMA TASK FORCE SITUATION REPORT NO. 9: SITUATION AS OF 1700 03/20/88

1. SITUATION IN PANAMA HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY CALM SINCE THE NORIEGA REGIME DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY ON FRIDAY.

2. PRESS COVERAGE HIGHLIGHTED STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY SHULTZ ON NBC THAT GENERAL NORIEGA MUST LEAVE "...SOONER OR LATER. THE SOONER THE BETTER..." AND THAT NORIEGA'S
[redacted]

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PAGE 02 STATE 087351

SUPPORT IS "COMPLETELY ERODING." ABC INTERVIEWED (ON DAVID BRINKLEY'S "THIS WEEK") NORIEGA'S PILOT, PANAMA DEFENSE FORCES (PDF) MAJOR AUGUSTO VILLALAZ, WHO IS NOW IN THE U.S. VILLALAZ SAID THAT MOST PDF OFFICERS THINK NORIEGA MUST GO, BUT THAT THE GENERAL RETAINS ENOUGH LOYAL PERSONNEL TO FEEL FAIRLY SECURE AND IS, THEREFORE, UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT THE LATEST USG PROPOSAL FOR HIS DEPARTURE. HE INDICATED THAT NO USG AGENCIES WERE INVOLVED IN THE RECENT BARRACKS COUP ATTEMPT, WHICH HE SAID FAILED BECAUSE A KEY PDF PLOTTER REPORTED THE SCHEME. VILLALAZ DESCRIBED HIS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN FLYING ARMS FOR NORIEGA FROM CUBA. HE SPECULATED THAT THE ARMS-NOW AT THREE LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PANAMA CITY--MAY

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HAVE BEEN DISBURSED FOR CONTINGENCY USE BY NORIEGA LOYALISTS TO FIGHT A GUERRILLA WAR.

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3. WASHINGTON POST CARRIED STORY ALLEGING THAT FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS SOUGHT TO INDICT NORIEGA IN 1980 FOR ILLEGALLY BUYING AND TRANSPORTING 2 MILLION DOLLARS IN ARMS BUT WERE PREVENTED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. THE STORY ASSERTS THIS WAS BECAUSE THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS FEARFUL OF UPSETTING PANAMA WHICH HAD COOPERATED IN PROVIDING A HAVEN FOR THE DEPOSED SHAH OF IRAN.

4. MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

[redacted]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10 CIAE-00
EB-08 DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NEA-06 NSC-01 NSAE-00
HA-08 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09 AIT-02 PA-01 OMB-01
SMS-01 SAL-01 ACDA-12 ICAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /118 W
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AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
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AMEMBASSY MANILA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AIT TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
ARMY COLLEGE CARLISLE PA
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 10496

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/4/92
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, CH
SUBJ: NEW TRENDS IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 1/14/98
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RECENT TACTICAL CHANGES IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY ARE RELATED TO SINO-AMERICAN STRAINS OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CHINA, AND CHANGES IN THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET AND U.S. POLICIES AS PERCEIVED IN BEIJING. THE SHIFT IN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL STANCE ALSO REPRESENTS A LONG-TERM EFFORT TO HEIGHTEN CHINA'S INDEPENDENT WORLD ROLE, BUT REFLECTS PRAGMATIC AND NON-IDEOLOGICAL CALCULATIONS THAT HAVE NOT AFFECTED CHINA'S POLICIES ON MAJOR ISSUES OR ITS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.

3. THE NEW CHINESE POSTURE IS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAT CHINA'S ANTI-SUPERPOWER LINE OF THE EARLY 1970S. CHINA'S MOVES OVER THE PAST YEAR CAN IN FACT BE SEEN AS A FURTHER STEP IN THE RATIONALIZATION OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THIS INVOLVES AN EFFORT TO UNDERSCORE CHINA'S CONCERN WITH PEACE, TO APPEAR LESS OBSESSED WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO GAIN A BIT MORE MANEUVERING ROOM BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, IS STILL PERCEIVED AND PORTRAYED AS THE MAJOR THREAT TO AN EQUILIBRIUM OF WORLD POWER AS WELL AS TO CHINA'S OWN SECURTY. CHINA'S DEVELOPING TWO-TRACK APPROACH TOWARD ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IS ALSO IN LINE WITH CHINA'S LONG TERM GOAL OF REWAXING TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS ALONG

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OR NEAR ITS BORDERS TO THE EXTENT VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS ALLOW. BUT BEIJING IS EVIDENTLY SERIOUS WHEN IT PROCLAIMS THAT ONLY BASIC CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY CAN BRING ABOUT ANY FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

4. MEANWHILE, CHINA CONTINUES TO REAFFIRM ITS STRATEGIC INTEREST IN STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN THE VIABILITY OF THE U.S-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND OF NATO. THER IS NO INDICATION THAT BEIJING'S DOUBLE HEGEMONY RHETORIC IS SEROUSLY AIMED AT WEAKENING THE TIES OF ANY COUNTRY TO THE U.S. THE SHIFT IN CHINA'S INTER- NATIONAL STANCE IS PRIMARILY ONE OF IMAGE AND RHETORIC. DESPITE ITS BALLYHOO OVER THE THIRD WORLD, CHINA HAS NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, INCREASED ITS MATERIAL INVESTMENTS IN ITS THIRD WORLD DIPLOMACY. OVERALL, CHINA'S MORE INDEPENDENT POSTURE IS NOT THREATENING TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS, AND TO THE EXTENT IT ENHANCES CHINA'S INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD, IT MAY ACTUALLY SERVE THOSE INTERESTS BECAUSE BEIJING'S THIRD WORLD GOALS REMAIN THE PROMOTION OF STABILITY AND THE WEAKENING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO OVER-REACT PUBLICLY TO CHINA'S ANTI-SUPERPOWER RHETORIC. END SUMMARY.

5. OVER THE PAST YEAR THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL IMPORTANT TACTICAL CHANGES IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. THESE HAVE INCLUDED:

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-- A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON CHINA'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD AND ON THE ANTI-SUPERPOWER SHIBOLETH,

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ACTION EA-12

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AIT TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLASSIFIED

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
ARMY COLLEGE CARLISLE PA
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU

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-- INCREASED CRITICISM OF THE U.S., AND A DIMINISHING OF THE IMAGE OF U.S.- CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION AS

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REFLECTED IN THE FADING OF ANTI-SOVIET INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT THEME, AND

-- EXPANSION OF NON-POLITICAL TIES WITH MOSCOW.

THESE TACTICAL SHIFTS ARE TO SOME EXTENT RELATED TO STRAINS WITH THE U.S. OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE AS WELL AS TO CHINESE DOMESTIC POLITICS.

6. IF U.S.-CHINA STRAINS OVER TAIWAN ARE AMELIORATED AND THE DENGISTS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION AT THE UPCOMING 12TH PARTY CONGRESS, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME SLOWING OR MODIFICATION OF THE RECENT TRENDS IN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL STANCE.

7. BUT THE TACTICAL SHIFTS WE HAVE SEEN OVER THE PAST YEAR HAVE A MORE BASIC AND LONGER TERM RATIONALE, SPRINGING FROM BEIJING'S PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANT CHANGES IN WORLD POLITICS AND CHINA'S INSTINCTIVE DRIVE TO MAXIMIZE ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE. THE PERCEIVED CHANGES INCLUDE REDUCTION IN THE IMMEDIATE INTENSITY OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO CHINA AND IN SOVIET ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, A SIGNIFICANT U.S-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT SEEMS TO THE CHINESE MUCH LESS LIKELY THAN IN THE 1970S.

8. THE WORSENING OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH OUR BEST EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES AS WELL AS WITH THE THIRD WORLD HAS ALSO INFLUENCED CHINA'S DECISION TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE U.S. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT RECENT PEACE MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POPULAR BASE AND THAT THERE

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IS A NEW WAVE OF RESENTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST THE "SUPERPOWERS". CHINA HAS TRIED TO GET ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THESE TRENDS BY EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE POSITIONS OF THE U.S. ALLIES IN THEIR DISPUTES WITH THE U.S., DISPLAYING SYMPATHY FOR CONCERNS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT ALTHOUGH NOT ITS SPECIFIC GOALS, INCREASING ITS CRITICISM OF SUPERPOWER HEGEMONY, ESCALATING ITS ATTENTION TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND IN GENERAL, SUPPORTING THIRD WORLD POSITIONS WHEREVER THEY OPPOSE THOSE OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

9. THE NEW CHINESE POSTURE IS MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN ITS ANTI-SUPERPOWER LINE OF THE EARLY 1970S. ONE NEW FEATURE IS A MAJOR EFFORT TO UNDERSCORE CHINA'S CONCERN WITH PEACE. BEIJING NO LONGER ASSERTS THAT WAR IN INEVITABLE, AND IT HAS MODERATED ITS OPPOSITION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DETENTE. IN PRINCIPLE, IT NOW SUPPORTS ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, EVEN INCLUDING U.S.-SOVIET START NEGOTIATIONS. CHINA HAS ALSO COME FORWARD WITH ITS FIRST SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL, WHICH INCLUDE EVENTUAL REDUCTION OF CHINA'S OWN TOKEN NUCLEAR FORCES. AS ANOTHER ELEMENT IN THEIR NEW IMAGE, THE CHINESE ALSO WANT TO APPEAR LESS OBSESSED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO SHOW THAT THEY CAN SHARPLY CRITICIZE BOTH SUPERPOWERS WHILE DEALING WITH BOTH ON A PRACTICAL BASIS.

10. IN SOME WAYS, CHINA'S NEW INTERNATIONAL STANCE MOVES THE PRC IN THE DIRECTION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. AS A CONTINENTAL, NUCLEAR POWER, CHINA OBVOUSLY CAN NEVER FIT INTO A YUGOSLAV IMAGE. BUT SOME OF THE FEATURES OF BELGRADE'S FOREIGN POLICY SEEM APPEALING TO MANY CHINESE LEADERS. YUGOSLAVIA'S MAJOR SECURITY CONCERN IS ALSO THE SOVIET UNION AND IT HAS HAD COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. YET THE

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YUGOSLAVS BY THEIR POSITIONS ON WORLD ISSUE AND THROUGH THEIR PROMINENT ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT HAVE MAINTAINED A BALANCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THE STRONG IMAGE OF AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR.

11. CHINA'S NEW POSTURE, HOWEVER, HAS NOT INVOLVED ANY SHIFT IN ITS BASIC STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OR ITS STAND WITH THE MODERATE WING OF THE THIRD WORLD ON MAJOR WORTLD ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA, AS WELL AS ON MULTILATERAL QUESTIONS LIKE LOS AND GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL PERCEIVED AND PORTRAYED AS THE MAJOR

THREAT TO AN EQUILIBRIUM OF WORLD POWER AS WELL AS TO CHINA'S SECURITY. CHINA CLEARLY SEES A VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST IN COUNTERING THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE IN AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, BACKING THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN AND THAILAND, AND MAINTAINING PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT ALSO CONTINUES TO REAFFIRM ITS STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THE CONTINUED VIABILIT
Y OF THE
U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND OF NATO.

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12. THE CURRENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP ALSO CLEARLY ATTACHES STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH [redacted]

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THE U.S., AND EVEN IF STRONGER CRITICISM OF THE U.S. PERSISTS, THE BASIC COMMONOLITY OF SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS WILL CONTINUE. THIS WILL BE SO EVEN IF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS ARE DOWNGRADED OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE, ALTHOUGH SUCH AN EVENT COULD SERIOUSLY DAMPEN THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF A SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

13. THUS, THE SHIFT IN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL STANCE IS PRIMARILY ONE OF IMAGE AND OF RHETORIC. DESPITE THE BALLLYHOO ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THIRD WORLD, CHINA HAS NOT INCREASED ITS AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, WHILE EXPOUNDING THIRD WORLD UNITY AND PROFESSING NEUTRALITY IN SUCH INTERNECINE THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS AS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, CHINA HAS SOLD AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WEAPONS TO IRAQ FOR FINANCIAL GAINS BUT ALSO FOR GEO-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THAT COINCIDE WITH OUR OWN. LIKEWISE, THEIR CONTINUED AND COSTLY SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN -- ITS MAJOR COMMITMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD -- HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THIRD WORLD UNITY.

14. CHINA'S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ITS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE BY STRESSING ITS CONCERN FOR PEACE AND BY ABANDONING A STARK INTI-SOVIET APPROACH TO BUILDING RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD CAN BE SEEN AS FURTHER STEPS IN THE RATIONALIZATION OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY BY PRAGMATIC POLICYMAKERS. WHILE THE CHINESE CLEARLY HOPE TO WEAN STATES LIKE IRAQ AND ANGOLA AWAY FROM

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MOSCOW, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT BEIJING'S DOUBLE HEGEMONY RHETORIC IS SERIOUSLY AIMED AT WEAKENING THE TIES OF ANY COUNTRY TO THE U.S.

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15. SO FAR, CHINA HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF MODERATE THIRD WORLD STATES IN ITS CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, AND IT HAS BEEN MOST CAUTIOUS ABOUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. IN EUROPE AND EVEN MORE SO IN JAPAN. IN THE ASEAN STATES AND SOUTH ASIA, BEIJING ALSO DISPLAYS NO DESIRE TO UNDERMINE U.S. INFLUENCE; ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS ENCOURAGED GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THESE AREAS AND WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, CLEARLY WELCOME AN IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS. IN LATIN AMERICA, CHINA'S PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSITIONS REMAIN IN LINE WITH THOSE OF MODERATE STATES SUCH AS VENEZUELA AND MEXICO.

16. THE RELAXATION OF NON-POLITICAL TIES WITH MOSCOW HAS MORE SUBSTANCE, BUT IT ALSO REPRESENTS NO BASIC CHANGE IN CHINA'S STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION. RECENT MOVES WITH THE USSR ARE INTENDED TO GIVE CHINA MORE FLEXIBILITY IN ITS DIPLOMACY AND ENHANCE ITS NEW, MORE INDEPENDENT IMAGE WHILE GAINING A BIT MORE MANEUVERING ROOM BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

17. CHINA'S DEVELOPING TWO TRACK APPROACH TOWARD ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, IS ALSO IN LINE WITH CHINA'S RESOURCES ON ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND, TO THE EXTENT VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS ALLOW, RELAXING TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS ALONG AND NEAR ITS BORDERS. BUT BEIJING IS EVIDENTLY SERIOUS WHEN IT PROCLAIMS THAT ONLY BASIC CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES AFFECTING CHINA'S VITAL INTERESTS CAN BRING ABOUT ANY FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

18. CHINA'S ANTI-SUPERPOWER RHETORIC IS, OF COURSE, IRRITATING, AND ITS OCCASIONAL APPLICATION OF THE HEGEMONIC LABEL TO THE U.S. FLIES IN THE FACE OF FACT AND REASON. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TELL THE CHINESE THIS AND TO CAUTION THEM THAT WHILE WE FULLY EXPECT SHARP

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CRITICISM FROM BEIJING ON MANY ISSUES, QUESTIONING OF U.S. FUNDAMENTAL MOTIVES CAN ONLY ERODE SUPPORT WITHIN THE U.S. FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP.

19. BUT, OVERALL, CHINA'S NEW, MORE INDEPENDENT POSTURE IS NOT THREATENING TO OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND TO THE EXTENT IT ENHANCES CHINA'S INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD IT MAY ACTUALLY SERVE THOSE INTERSTS. THIS IS BECAUSE BEIJING'S DIPLOMACY IN THE THIRD WORLD IS STILL DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT COUNTERING AND WEAKENING SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE MORE SUBTLE APPROACH THAT BEIJING IS NOW EMPLOYING BY DOWNPLAYING THE ANTI-SOVIET BASIS OF ITS DIPLOMACY -- FOR EXAMPLE WITH LIBYA AND SYRIA -- SHOULD MAKE THEIR EFFORTS MORE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, CHINA'S GENERAL GOAL IN THE THIRD WORLD CONTINUES TO BE STABILITY, AND WHILE IT SIDES WITH THE THIRD WORLD ON ISSUES OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, IT FOLLOWS THE LEAD OF MIANSTREAM AND MODERATE REGIONAL FORCES IN DOING SO.

2. CONSEQUENTLY, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO OVER-REACT PUBLICLY TO CHINA'S ANTI-SUPERPOWER RHETORIC. TO DO SO WOULD GIVE IT A DIGNITY IT DOES NOT DESERVE, AND PROVOKE A POLEMATICAL EXCHANGE, WHICH WOULD SERVE NEITHER OUR INTERESTS NOR THOSE OF THE REALPOLITIK PRACTIONERS IN BEIJING.

21. WE CAN EXPECT THAT CHINA'S IDENTIFICATION WITH AND CRITICISM OF THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO VARY OVER THE YEARS DEPENDING ON BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THE HANDLING OF THE ENOTIONAL TAIWAN ISSUE. CHINESE CONSERVATIVES (MEANING NEO-MAOISTS AND STALINISTS) ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH CLOSE RELATION

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WITH THE U.S. AND WILL TEND TO PUSH FOR PUTTING MORE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THEY ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY GEO-POLITICAL REALITIES, AND WHEN AND IF THE PERCEIVED WILL TEND TO LEAN TOWARD THE U.S. BUT ANY CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK TO MAXIMIZE CHINA'S INDEPENDENT WORLD ROLE AND TO THE EXTENT THAT OBJECTIVE REALITIES PERMIT, AND WE SHOULD SEE THIS AS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT. HUMMEL

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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 12159

E.O. 12356: DECL:

TAGS: PEPR, PORG, CH,

SUBJ: PRE-UNGA CONSULTATIONS IN BEIJING

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

AMBASSADOR SHERMAN AND DAS STREEB MET AUGUST 31 AND

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SEPTEMBER 1 WITH XIE QIMEI, DIRECTOR OF MFA'S INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT, AND EXCHANGED VIEWS IN A FRIENDLY AND DIRECT FASHION ON A WIDE NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE AND TECHNICAL TOPICS.

3. THE VISIT AND THE CONSULTATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO THE EMBASSY, PROVIDING A BOOST TO OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CONTACT WITH THE MFA ON UN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS MATTERS. ASIDE FROM A FEW NUANCES,

THE CHINESE STATEMENTS DID NOT DEPART FROM STANDARD POSITIONS ESPOUSED IN THE PAST. FHE CHINESE INDICATED SUPPORT FOR UN SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAELI CREDENTIALS IN THE UNGA AND IAEA. THEY SAID BEIJING WOULD SUPPORT THE MAJORITY VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF PUERTO RICO'S INSCRIPTION ON THE UN AGENDA. THE CHINESE ASKED FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CGD.

THEY CAUTIONED THE U.S. IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS OVER AFGHANISTAN, STATING THAT MOSCOW HAD NO INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A GENUINE DIALOGUE ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT WAS USING THE TALKS WITH THE U.S. TO CREATE AN IMAGE OF PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN WHEN THERE IS NONE. SHARPLY ATTACKING THE U.S. OVER "CONNIVANCE" AT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, XIE CALLED FOR CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY, INCLUDING A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. ON NAMIBIA, THE CHINESE CALLED FOR GRANTING INDEPENDENCE TO NAMIBIA PRIOR TO SECURING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, XIE BLAMED A U.S./USSR "FAILURE OF RESPONSIBILITY" FOR THE RESULTS OF SSOD II AND PRESENTED BEIJING'S OWN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN DETAIL, POINTING OUT THE "MANY DIFFERENCES" BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND SOVIET POSITIONS. XIE INDICATED CHINA WILL NOT SUPPORT A U.S. PROPOSAL

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FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS REPORTING OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE CHINESE SAID U.S. REMARKS IN THE THIRD
COMMITTEE AND AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, AND THE LIKE, WERE IMPLIED ATTACKS ON CHINA. THEY INDICATED THAT CHINA WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND TO THESE ATTACKS IF THEY CONTINUED.

4. ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, CHINA CALLED FOR FURTHER U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AND DID NOT RESPOND TO U.S. CRITICISM THAT A SMALL GROUP OF LDC'S HAD PREVENTED AGREEMENT ON THE VERSAILLES TEXT. CHINA SUPPORTS THE PRESENT AGENDA FOR UNCTAD VI. XIE SAID CHINA WAS STUDYING THE TEXT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO SIGN AND RATIFY. THE CHINESE GAVE SUPPORT TO UNIDO AS A SPECIALIZED AGENCY, WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS, INCLUDING MAJORITY FUNDING BY DEVELOPED STATES. XIE ALSO SAID CHINA WOULD SUPPORT PRESENT UNIDO DIRECTOR KHANE CONTINUING IN OFFICE. END SUMMARY.

5. XIE'S REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW ON THE TOPICS COVERED. AMBASSADOR SHERMAN'S OR DAS STREEB'S REMARKS ARE REPORTED AS NECESSARY ON POINTS OF REBUTTAL OR ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION.

ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS
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6. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS IN THE 37TH UNGA, PERHAPS A MOVE TO SUSPEND ITS CREDENTIALS. ONLY ISRAEL IS TO BLAME IF THIS HAPPENS. IF ISRAEL CONTINUES ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, CHINA WILL SUPPORT SANC
IONS AGAINST THE GOI
IN THE UN. ISRAEL SHOULD OBEY THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, CEASE ITS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW FROM

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LEBANON COMPLETELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY. THE U.S. ATTITUDE IS CRUCIAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER ISRAEL MEETS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7002
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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THIS REQUIREMENT.

PUERTO RICO
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7. CHINA'S POLICY INCLUDES FOUR PRINCIPLES: (A) TO SUPPORT FULLY PUERTO RICO'S NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO RESPECT THE WISHES OF THE MAJORITY OF PUERTO RICO'S POPULATION, (B) TO OPPOSE ALL EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN PUERTO RICO'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, (C) TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS
ON THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER AND HOW TO PUT THE ISSUE OF PUERTO RICO TO

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A·VOTE, AND (D) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS FREE OF ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. AMBASSADOR SHERMAN RESPONDED BY WARMLY WELCOMING CHINA'S OPPOSITION TO EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE.

MIDDLE EAST
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8. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON TOOK PLACE WITH U.S. SUPPORT AND CONNIVANCE, IS A VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND BASIC INTERNATIONAL NORMS, A PROVOCATION TO THE ARABS, AND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE STEADY DETERIORATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. CHINA STRONGLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL AND SUPPORTS THE PLO, THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, AND THE ARMY AND PEOPLE OF SYRIA. THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD RECOVER THEIR NATIONAL RIGHTS, RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND AND ENJOY THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PLO, AS THE JUST REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. U.S. FAVORI'

TOWARD ISRAEL HAS ISOLATED THE U.S. FROM THE UN MAJORITY. ARAFAT HAS MADE GREAT CONCESSIONS, YET THE U.S. STILL FAVORS ISRAEL. THIS CREATES GREATER RESENTMENT AMONG ARAB STATES AND GIVES THE USSR AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEDDLE. THE U.S. SHOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND REFRAIN FROM NEW PROVOCATIONS. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO THE LEBANON CRISIS, HOWEVER, AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION MUST BE SOLVED. THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO.

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AFGHANISTAN
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9. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. WE FULLY AGREE WITH THE U.S. THAT THERE SHOULD BE NEW PRESSURE TO COMPEL THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW. WE HOPE THE UNGA WILL PASS GOOD RESOLUTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT ENCOMPASSING THE MAIN POINTS OF PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS: (1) IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, (2) FREEDOM FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, (3) GUARANTEES FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND NATIONAL STATUS OF THE AFGHAN STATE, AND (4) CREATION OF CONDITIONS ENABLING AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME. WE HOPE CHINA AND THE U.S. CAN COORDINATE SUPPORT WITH PAKISTAN AND OTHERS IN ADOPTING THIS SORT OF RESOLUTION.

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--. A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN MUST BE BASED ON THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS AND MUST BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN. THE USSR IS TRYING TO USE OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND FORCE IT TO RECOGNIZE A SOVIET FAIT ACCOMPLI IN AFGHANISTAN. IN FACT, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS A PRECONDITION FOR RESOLVING THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM. WE APPRECIATE THE U.S. INFORMING US OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING, HOWEVER, AND THE U.S. SHOULD NOT RELAX ITS PRESSURE AND SHOULD MAINTAIN HIGH VIGILANCE AS TO THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS.

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR
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10. CHINA IS FRIENDLY WITH BOTH COUNTRIES AS MEMBERS OF THE THIRD WORLD, HAS A NEUTRAL STANCE TOWARD THE CONFLICT, AND CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE PEACEFULLY THE PROBLEM. GREAT POWERS MUST NOT

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MEDDLE IN THE WAR. CHINA APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS OF

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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TE NAM COUNTRIES AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO MEDIATE A PROMPT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

KAMPUCHEA
----

11. CHINA IS HAPPY WITH THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION, FEELS IT ALREADY HAS BEEN VERY BENEFICIAL, AND 8OPES THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE U.S.,

WILL GIVE THE CGDK FULL SUPPORT AND AID. WE AGREE THAT THE CGDK SHOULD ENCOUNTER NO PROBLEMS WITH CREDENTIALS. WE SHOULD USE THIS SESSION TO BROADEN SUPPORT ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IN GAINING SUPPORT AMONG

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WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE U.S. SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH FRANCE, AUSTRIA, HOLLAND, IRELAND, AND OTHERS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

-- THE CREDENTIALS QUESTION INVOLVES THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WHICH SHOULD REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF STATES. CHINA PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING LIST OF POSSIBLE MEMBERS FOR REFERENCE: PERMANENT MEMBERS - U.S.,
)
AND CHINA; ASIA - PHILIPPINES OR BANGLADESH; AFRICA - TWO SEATS FROM LIBERIA, NIGERIA, OR ONE OTHER; SOUTH AMERICA - COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, OR URUGUAY; WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER - ONE SEAT FROM AMONG WEST GERMANY, YUGOSLAVIA, NEW ZEALAND OR CANADA.

-- ASEAN IS DRAFTING A RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH CHINA CONSIDERS IS FAIRLY GOOD. IT ENCOMPASSES ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PAST RESOLUTIONS: (1) FOREIGN TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW, (2) THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE MUST FREELY CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE, AND (3) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KAMPUCHEA. WE ARE STUDYING THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE ICK.

-- VIETNAM HAS SUBMITTED AN ITEM CONCERNING PEACE AND COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHICH THEY WANT REGISTERED ON THE AGENDA WITHOUT A VOTE. IF ASEAN WANTS TO EXCLUDE THE ITEM, WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

-- VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL IS THE KEY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA. SINCE VIETNAM HAS NOT WITHDRAWN, THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT YET RIGHT FOR A

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SETTLEMENT. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS A FACADE FOR CONTINUED VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, DESIGNED TO SOW DISSENSION IN ASEAN AND CONFUSE WORLD OPINION. THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NO DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS PROPOSALS -- ALL ARE MEANT TO CIRCUMVENT UN RESOLUTIONS AND ESTABLISH THE

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VIETNAMESE AS RULERS OF INDOCHINA AND GIVE HENG SAMRIN THE SEMBLANCE OF LEGITIMACY. IF VIETNAM ENDED ITS AGGRESSION AND WITHDREW ITS TROOPS, CHINA COULD IMMEDIATELY NORMALIZE RELATIONS.

NAMIBIA
----

12. CHINA SUPPORTS THE NAMIBIAN STRUGGLE. IT ALSO STANDS BY UN RESOLUTION 435 AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS. WE BACK THE AFRICAN PROPOSALS FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACT THAT NAMIBIA IS NOT INDEPENDENT. THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION IS SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA.

-- U.S. FAVORITISMTOWARD SOUTH AFRICA HAS ENCOURAGED THE SAG TO STIFFEN ITS RESISTANCE. LINKING A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WITH A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION HAS COMPLICATED THE SITUATION. THE U.S. SHOULD CHANGE ITS POLICY AND NOT LINK CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. ONCE NAMIBIA IS INDEPENDENT, AND THERE IS NO THREAT TO ANGOLA FROM SOUTH AFRICA, THE CUBAN TROOPS WILL HAVE NO EXCU3E TO STAY. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WILL MOUNT FOR A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR ANGOLA AND OTHERS TO CHALLENGE THE CUBAN PRESENCE. NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE WILL THUS FACILITATE THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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13. IN THE FOUR YEARS SINCE SSOD I, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS GROWN MORE TENSE. IN SSOD II THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS ON THE REVIEW OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF SSOD I. THE MAIN REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF SSOD II IS THAT THE USSR AND U.S. FAILED TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO IMPLEMENT SERIOUSLY A DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

-- CHINA PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS AT SSOD II BASED ON TWO PRINCIPLES. FIRST, STATES SHOULD DISCUSS WAYS TO

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SAFEGUARD INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SUPERPOWERS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN REDUCING ARMS, (2) NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME, (3) MEDIUM AND SMALL SIZE COUNTRIES ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES, (4) THERE SHOULD BE STRICT AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF ARMS REDUCTION, AND (5) ALL STATES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY.

-- SECONDLY, CHINA PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING MEASURES TO BRING AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO
HE ARMS RACE: (1) ALL
NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD AGREE ON THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (2) PENDING SUCH AGREEMENT, NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR REGIONS, AND (3) NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD MAKE A NON-FIRST USE PLEDGE TO EACH OTHER.

-- CHINA MADE A PROPOSAL THAT NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD STOP

EXPERIMENTING, PRODUCING, AND IMPROVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES AND SHOULD START REDUCING NUCLEAR ARSENALS UNDER MUTUALLY AGREED CONDITIONS. WHILE THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS UNDERWAY, STATES SHOULD ALSO CARRY OUT A CONVENTIONAL ARMS DISARMAMENT PROGRAM. STATES SHOULD PLEDGE NOT TO USE CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND SHOULD PROHIBIT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

-- CHINA NOTED THE SOVIET PLEDGE OF NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA MADE THIS PLEDGE 18 YEARS AGO AND HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. THE USSR ANNOUNCED ITS NO FIRST USE PLEDGE ONLY AFTER

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IT HAD AMASSED A NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND GAINED SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. MOREOVER, THE USSR DID NOT PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. THUS, THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND CHINESE POSITIONS. ONLY CHINA PROPOSED IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO HALT THE ARMS RACE -- MEASURES WHICH ARE PART OF AN INTEGRAL WHOLE TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT.

-- THERE IS NOW TO BE A WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE TEST BAN
TREATY, AND A U.S. CONCESSION MADE THIS POSSIBLE. BUT NOW THE U.S. IS OPPOSED TO DISCUSSING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. IN OUR VIEW, ONLY WHEN A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS LINKED TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CAN SUCH A MEASURE CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD PEACE. WE DO NOT OBJECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP. WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE GROUP, HOWEVER.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
----

14. CHINESE OPPOSITION TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INCLUDES OPPOSITION TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT CB WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED RECENTLY, AND CHINA SUPPORTS THE INVESTIGATION INTO THIS SUBJECT.

-- THE CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED SHOULD PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING AS WELL AS THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS. HE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL - TO WHICH THE U.S. AND CHINA HAVE ADHERED - - IS INSUFFICIENT. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ONLY PROHIBITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN TIME OF WAR. THERE SHOULD BE A 0ROHIBITION OF USE DURING ANY SORT OF ARMED CONFLICT. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A STRICT VERIFICATION MECHANISM. A NEW

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CONVENTION WILL NOT DIMINISH BUT WILL IMPROVE THE

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125 PROTOCOL. WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER THE
CHINE
SE VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS MEASURES TO
REPORT MILITARY EXPENDITURES

15. WE UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE OF THE PROPOSAL IS NOT TO REDUCE MILITARY SPENDING BUT TO UNIFY REPORTING SYSTEMS. A TRIAL REPORTING SYSTEM HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR TWO YEARS. FEW COUNTRIES HAVE PARTICIPATED - IN 1980 THERE WERE NINETEEN, AND IN 1981 THERE WERE

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TWENTY-ONE. PEOPLE FEEL THE REPORTING IS VERY COMPLICATED. THERE IS A LACK OF CONSENSUS CONCERNING REPORTING. INDIA THINKS THAT ONLY THE FIVE OR SIX COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST MILITARY BUDGETS SHOULD REPORT. YUGOSLAVIA SAYS ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE USSR WILL REPORT ACCURATE FIGURES. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IS SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. AND

CHINESE MISSIONS IN NEW YORK OR GENEVA HOLD MEETINGS OF EXPERTS FROM TIME TO TIME TO CARRY ON A TECHNICAL DIALOGUE ON THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF INTEREST IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. ON THE WORKING GROUP FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, AMBASSADOR SHERMAN SAID THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE; BUT WITHOUT PROVISION FOR ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE, THE U.S. WILL NOT PROCEED TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

IDEOLOGY IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
----

16. IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE AND BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE U.S. AND CHINA HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS. CHINA IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE U.S./USSR DEBATE. THE U.S. HAS INTRODUCED IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THESE TWO FORA -- CRITICIZING SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, THE COLLECTIVE ECONOMY, MARXISM, AND LENINISM. THIS IS VERY INAPPROPRIATE. CRITICIZING SUCH CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA IS AN IMPLIED ATTACK AGAINST CHINA. WE CALL ON THE U.S. SIDE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT; OTHERWISE, CHINA WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE A PUBLIC RESPONSE.

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-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN REITERATED THAT U.S. REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NOT INTENDED AS INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS OF ANY STATE. THE U.S. DOES NOT CRITICIZE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ENJOY POPULAR SUPPORT, AND DOES NOT TAKE THE POSITION THAT BECAUSE ACOVERNMENT IS SOCIALIST, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT NECESSARILY DOES NOT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF ITS PEOPLE OR THAT IT ABUSES ITS PEOPLE'S HUMAN RIGHTS. THE U.S. ALSO DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEW THAT A COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS ABOVE CONSIDERATION MERELY BECAUSE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM IS DIFFERENT.

IAEA (ISRAEL AND NAMIBIA SEATS)
----

17. THERE ARE OBSTACLES TO CHINA PARTICIPATING NOW IN THE IAEA. WE SUPPORT, HOWEVER, THE POSITION THAT UNLESS ISRAEL PLACES ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SUPERVISION BEFORE THE 26TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF IAEA IN SEPTEMBER 1982, THAT IAEA SHOULD CONSIDER SUSPENDING ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP. ON THE QUESTION OF THE NAMIBIA SEAT, THE QUESTION WILL ARISE AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE THIS YEAR. WE SUPPORT A NAMIBIA SEAT IN IAEA.

MICRONESIA TERRITORIES
----

18. CHINA SUPPORTS THE ASPIRATIONS OF PEOPLES IN

COLONIAL AND TRUST TERRITORIES TO GAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THE U.S. SHOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES AND COUNTRIES. THE PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC IS NOT COMPLETE. THE U.S. FIRST ANNOUNCED THAT THE TRUST TERRITORY STATES WOULD GAIN INDEPENDENCE IN 1981, AND THIS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 1984. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE U.S. PLANS TO END

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TE TRUSTEESHIP.
-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN BRIEFED THE CHINESE ON THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING TERMINATION OF THE

TRUST TERRITORIES SUPERVISION FOR T
E VARIOUS PACIFIC
ISLANDS.

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GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. (GN)

19. WORLD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE VERY SERIOUS. THE U.S. HAS TRIED TO SHIFT ITS ECONOMIC BURDENS TO LDC'S, A POLICY WHICH HAS ONLY SERVED TO WORSEN THEIR PLIGHT

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WHILE CREATING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET XPANSION.
REVITALIZING THE WORLD ECONOMY REQUIRES SETTING UP NIEO, BUT RIGID U.S. VIEWS HAVE OBSTRUCTED GN. CHINA IS AWARE OF U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EXISTING COMPETENT ORGANIZATIONS. THE REAL KEY TO FUTURE PROGRESS, HOWEVER, IS WHETHER THEU.S. IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE INSTEAD OF ESTABLISHING STILL FURTHER PRECONDITIONS.

-- DAS STREEB RESPONDED THAT A SMALL GROUP OF LDC'S HAD PREVENTED THE LARGE MAJORITY FROM ACCEPTING THE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THAT HAD EMERGED FROM VERSAILLES.

UNCTAD VI AGENDA

20. CHINA SUPPORTS THE AGENDA PUT FORWARD IN JUNE-JULY BY THE TDB CHAIRMAN AND HOPES THAT THE U.S. WILL LISTEN TO THE REASONABLE VIEW OF THE MAJORITY OF LDC'S. CHINA FEELS REMOVING PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS SHOULD BE A KEY AGENDA ITEM. IT OPPOSES PLAYING UP THE ROLE OF GATT COMPARED TO UNCTAD. CHINA ALSO OPPOSES INTRODUCING EAST WEST TRADE DISPUTES INTO UNCTAD VI.

LAW OF THE SEA (LOS)

21. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A SINGLE COUNTRY'S VIEWS TO BE ENTIRELY INCORPORATED INTO A COMPLEX AGREEMENT. WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL RECONSIDER ITS POSITION. FOR OUR OWN PART, WE ARE STILL STUDYING THE TREATY AND WILL NOT MAKE A DECISION ON SIGNING OR RATIFYING THE TREATY UNTIL OUR STUDY IS COMPLETE.
UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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22. AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY READJUSTING ITS NATIONAL ECONOMY, CHINA WILL MAINTAIN ITS 1981 LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP. THE LDC'S DEMAND THAT THE DC'S INCREASE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDP WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS AND HELP THE LDC'S FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIES.

-- ON THE ISSUE OF DESERTIFICATION, CHINA URGES AID TO THE SAHEL AND TO SUDAN PURSUANT TO THE TWO RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED AT THE 36TH UNGA. WE SUPPORT THE CALL FOR INCREASING AID FOR DESERTIFICATION PROJECTS. WE NOTE THAT THE UN IS STUDYING FORMATION OF AN ORGANIZATION FOR THIS PURPOSE.

UNIDO
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23. CONCERNING AN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BANK, CHIA SUPPORTS THE PROPOSAL PROVIDED THAT IT WILL (A) BE A GLOBAL ORGANIZATION, (B) BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF LDC'S, AND (C) RECEIVE A MAJOR SHARE OF ITS FUNDING FROM DC'S WITH LDC'S CONTRIBUTING ACCORDING TO ABILITY. CHINA WELCOMES NEWS THAT THE NEW UNIDO CONSTITUTION ELEVATING UNIDO TO THE STATUS OF SPECIALIZED AGENCY APPEARS TO BE MOVING SMOOTHLY THROUGH THE U.S. SENATE AND THAT ACTION ON RATIFICATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. CHINA FAVORS AN EARLY CONFERENCE OF RATIFYING COUNTRIES. WE NOTE THAT UNIDO'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S TERM OF OFFICE EXPIRES AT THE END OF 1982. CHINA WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOMEONE FROM THE LDC ASSUME THE POST, BUT WILL AWAIT G-77 CONSIDERATION TO SEE IF A CONSENSUS EMERGES ON A CANDIDATE. CHINA BELIEVES DIRECTOR KHANE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB AND COULD SUPPORT HIS EXTENSION.

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AMINISTRATIVE BUDGET OF UN

24. CHINA HOPES THAT DIFFERENCES ON ZERO GROWTH CAN BE RESOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS. MORE RECENT RESOLUTIONS HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF THE CLEAR MAJORITY REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLES STRUGGLING FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AS SWAPO AND THE PLO. WE LACK FAMILIARITY WITH SALARIES/SUBSIDIES AND MUST FURTHER CONSIDER THIS ISSUE. ON A GENERAL NOTE, THE U.S. SHOULD AVOID GENERATING TOO MANY CONFRONTATIONS WITH LDC'S. THE MAIN REASON THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ICSC LOST HER SEAT LAST YEAR WAS HER NEGATIVE

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ATTITUDE TOWARDS LDC'S.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR VISIT TO CHINA

25. THE SYG MET TWICE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA, AND ONCE WITH DENG XIAOPING AND WITH ZHAO ZIYANG. IN HIS TALKS WITH HUANG HUA, THE SYG EXCHANGED VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UN. THE SYG WAS CONCERNED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS UNSETTLED. THERE ARE MANY HOT SPOTS, AND SOME GOVERNMEN,SATEDLY VIOLATE UN RESOLUTIONS AND DO NOT USE THE UN TO SETTLE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. DENG AND ZHAO EXPLAINED CHINA'S BASIC FOREIGN POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE. THIS POLICY INCLUDES THIRD WORLD UNITY, OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONISM, AND SUPPORT FOR

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WORLD PEACE. HUM
MEL.

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INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
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CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU POUCH
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI POUCH

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 08 BEIJING 19499

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH
SUBJECT: CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A FIVE-YEAR REVIEW

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS ONE OF A SERIES OF CABLES SUMMARIZING DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES OVER THE FIVE YEARS SINCE PIVOTAL EVENTS AT THE END OF 1978: SINO-AMERICAN NORMALIZATION, THE ASCENDANCY OF REFORMERS LED BY DENG XIAOPING AT THE HISTORIC THIRD PLENUM, THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY, AND CHINESE APPREHENSION ABOUT SOVIET-BACKED VIETNAMESE PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA.

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3. SUMMARY: CHINA'S NATIONAL GOALS REMAIN SECURITY, REUNIFICATION, AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION THAT WILL ALLOW CHINA TO ATTAIN OVER TIME A POSITION OF GLOBAL INFLUENCE. CHINA HAS SINCE 1979 IMPROVED ITS SECURITY POSITION BY NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, STEADILY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, AND SEEKING SOME SMALL REDUCTION IN TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. CHINA NEVERTHELESS CONTINUES TO VIEW THE SOVIETS AS THE MAIN THREAT TO CHINA'S SECURITY AND HAS GROWN

INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE MAIN THREAT TO CHINA'S SECURITY.

4. CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS THAT NORMALIZATION WITH THE UNITED STATES WOULD FORCE TAIWAN INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON REUNIFICATION HAVE NOT BEEN REALIZED, AND CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. STOOD BEHIND TAIPEI'S RECALCITRANCE PUT MAJOR STRAIN ON THE RELATIONSHIP IN 1981-82. THE AUGUST 1982 JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND THE FURTHER ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES TO MEET CHINESE NEEDS FOR SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY HAVE EASED THESE TENSIONS, BUT CHINA REMAINS ULTRA-SENSITIVE TO REAL OR IMAGINED ENCROACHMENTS ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

5. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE U.S. OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE, COMBINED WITH CHINA'S OWN LONGSTANDING DESIRE FOR INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN THE THIRD WORLD, HAVE PUSHED CHINA TO PROCLAIM THE "INDEPENDENCE" OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND PUBLICLY IDENTIFY ITSELF WITH THIRD WORLD POSITIONS. MUCH OF THIS REMAINS IN THE REALM OF RHETORIC BUT THE CHINESE HOST MANY THIRD WORLD LEADERS EACH YEAR AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITIONS IN WORLD COUNCILS. FOR CHINA THIS IS AN INEXPENSIVE POLICY, ONE WHICH THE UNITED STATES OFTEN DOES NOT LIKE, BUT

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WHICH HAS NOT BECOME A MAJOR IRRITANT TO RELATIONS. CHINESE POLICIES HAVE, HOWEVER, BECOME MUCH MORE CONSISTENT AND PREDICTABLE AND, TO SOME DEGREE, MORE RESPONSIBLE DESPITE THE FELT NEED TO TAKE CHEAP RHETORICAL SHOTS FROM TIME TO TIME TO GUARANTEE THEIR CREDENTIALS IN THE THIRD WORLD.

6. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING ASIAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DRIVEN BY CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET UNION'S GROWING ASSERTIVENESS (E.G., SOVIET-BACKED VIETNAMESE ACTIONS IN KAMPUCHEA, SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC). TO COUNTER WHAT CHINA DESCRIBES AS THE SOVIET "SOUTHWARD STRATEGY," CHINA HAS (A) STRENGTHENED ITS RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, SO THAT THEY ARE NOW THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN; (B) SUPPORTED ASEAN EFFORTS TO GET VIETNAM OUT OF KAMPUCHEA; (C) SOUGHT TO DAMPEN ASEAN FEARS OF CHINESE INTENTIONS IN THE AREA; (D) INCREASED INDIRECT AND SEMI-OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH SOUTH KOREA AND BECOME MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA (WHILE APPARENTLY EDGING OUT THE SOVIETS IN THEIR BATTLE FOR INFLUENCE IN PYONGYANG); (E) SOUGHT TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND TO SETTLE SINO-INDIAN BORDER ISSUES; AND (F) MAINTAINED ITS TRADITIONALLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH

PAKISTAN.

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7. CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS HAS INCREASED QUANTITATIVELY AND BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS, CHINA HAS SHOWN INCREASED INTEREST AND EXPERTISE IN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, INCLUDING THEIR PROPAGANDA DIMENSION. CHINA STILL REFUSES TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND ITS PUBLIC POSITION ON NUCLEAR

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DISARMAMENT REMAINS SIMPLISTIC, BUT THANKS LARGELY TO

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JAPANESE EFFORTS, CHINA HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN OPPOSING SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20 MISSILES IN THE EAST.

8. CHINA'S PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS DO NOT LOOK ALL THAT BAD. CHINA IS NOT FACED WITH THE PROSPECT OF ANY MAJOR REALIGNMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES, AND IT HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF MANEUVERING ROOM. WHETHER IT WILL BE ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THESE OPPORTUNITIES WILL DEPEND ON THE STABILITY OF ITS INTERNAL LEADERSHIP

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AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS MORE INNOVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW:

9. CHINA'S NATIONAL GOALS AND INTERESTS, AS SEEN BY THE CHINESE ELITE, REMAIN: THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY UNDER A SINGLE SOVEREIGNTY; THE RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE WITH OTHER ADVANCED SOCIETIES; FREEDOM FROM EXTERNAL INVASION, INTIMIDATION OR HUMILIATION; AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OVER TIME OF A POSITION OF GLOBAL PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE. OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY HAS CONTINUED TO SHIFT IN RESPONSE BOTH TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND TO CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR IMPACT ON BEIJING'S CRUCIAL CONCERNS ABOUT TAIWAN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY, AND CHINA'S GLOBAL IMAGE AS AN INDEPENDENT "GREAT POWER."

10. 1978 ENDED WITH BEIJING OPTIMISTIC TAIPEI WOULD BE FORCED BY SINO-AMERICAN NORMALIZATION TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL END TO THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR AND MOVE TOWARD REINCORPORATION INTO CHINA. THE BREAKTHROUGHS IN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND JAPAN SEEMED TO PROMISE EASY ACCESS TO THE CORNUCOPIA OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL AND A MAGICAL PATH TO CHINESE MODERNIZATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GROWING SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA INFLAMED CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT AND POSSIBLE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA (A CONCERN THAT WAS DEEPENED BY THE USSR'S INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN A YEAR LATER). IN RESPONSE, THE CHINESE SOUGHT SECURITY IN A "UNITED FRONT" WITH THE WEST, I.E.,

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WITH THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, AGAINST THE SOVIET BLOC. BUOYED BY U.S. RECOGNITION, CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE REACHED NEW HEIGHTS.

11. BY 1981-82, THINGS HAD CHANGED. TAIPEI'S STONY REJECTIONS OF BEIJING'S OFFERS OF RECONCILIATION, AND BEIJING'S SUSPICIONS THAT WASHINGTON STOOD BEHIND TAIPEI'S RECALCITRANCE CAUSED THE CHINESE TO PROVOKE A NASTY CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. DESIGNED TO FORCE A CLARIFICATION OF WASHINGTON'S INTENTIONS. THE CHINESE FOUND THAT THEIR OPENING TO THE WEST WAS NOT A PANACEA FOR THEIR OWN BACKWARDNESS. THEY FURTHER DISCOVERED THAT NOT ALL IN THE WEST SHARED THEIR OWN ENTHUSIASM FOR THE RAPID EMERGENCE OF A "STRONG, POWERFUL, MODERN SOCIALIST" CHINA. WESTERN (ESPECIALLY AMERICAN) AMBIVALENCE ABOUT THIS, AS EXPRESSED IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY, WAS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED BY THE CHINESE AS ACTIVE HOSTILITY TO CHINA'S MODERNIZATION. AS CHINESE FRUSTRATION ROSE, SO DID THE PITCH AND FREQUENCY OF CHINESE CHARGES OF WESTERN -- PARTICULARLY AMERICAN -- UNFRIENDLINESS. MEANWHILE, THE CHINESE CAME INCREASINGLY TO SEE THE SOVIETS AS IMMOBOLIZED BY OVEREXTENSION ABROAD AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION AT HOME. THE SOVIET THREAT BEGAN TO SEEM BOTH LESS IMMINENT AND MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL MANIPULATION. THE CHINESE MOVED TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW. FINALLY, AS GLOBAL RECESSION AND INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS (NAMIBIA, ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS, CENTRAL AMERICA) COMPLICATED WESTERN (ESPECIALLY U.S.) RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF CLOSE CHINESE STRATEGIC ASSOCIATION WITH A U.S.-LED "UNITED FRONT" TOOK ITS T
OLL ON CHINA'S
IMAGE AS AN INDEPENDENT WORLD POWER. BEIJING COMPENSATED

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WITH A TURN TOWARD STRIDENT ECHOING OF THIRD WORLD RHETORIC.

12. AS 1983 ENDS AND 1984 BEGINS, CHINESE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE BASED ON GREATER PESSIMISM AND REALISM ABOUT KEY ISSUES THAN WAS THE CASE FIVE YEARS AGO. THE TAIWAN ISSUE SEEMS FAR LESS AMENABLE TO NEAR-TERM SOLUTION THAN IT DID. WASHINGTON HAS PROVEN LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHINESE PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE THAN BEIJING HAD HOPED. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO PERIODIC REMINDERS TO AMERICANS OF THE LIMITS OF

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THEIR TOLERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRC HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO REALIZE THAT ONLY TAIPEI -- NOT WASHINGTON -- CAN CONCLUDE THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR WITH IT. IT HAS HAD INCREASINGLY TO DEAL WITH AND ACCEPT TAIWAN AS A DISTINCT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENTITY IN ORDER TO APPEAL TO IT. IT HAS ALSO HAD TO ACCEPT THE NECESSITY FOR PATIENCE. BEIJING'S EXPECTATIONS THAT IT COULD ACCOMPLISH REUNIFICATION BY DEALING FIRST WITH TAIWAN, THEN WITH HONG KONG, HAVE BEEN BELIED, AND ITS PRIORITIES REVERSED BY CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND ITS CONTROL.

13. EVEN AS THE U.S. DECISION TO LIBERALIZE TECHNOLOGY

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TRANSFER HAS CEMENTED CHINESE RELIANCE ON THE WEST AS THE SOURCE OF IDEAS, CAPITAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR CHINA'S MODERNIZATION, A SOBERED CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAS HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT, WHILE FOREIGN PARTICIPATION MAY ACCELERATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IT IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR OFTEN PAINFUL DOMESTIC REFORM AND SELF-HELP. CHINA'S LEADERSHIP HAS ALSO COME TO SEE THAT CHINA CAN GAIN NEITHER TAIWAN, NOR SECURITY, NOR PRESTIGE WITHOUT MODERNIZING THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL BASE AND RAISING CHINESE LIVING STANDARDS.

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14. THE SOVIET THREAT TO CHINA IS NOW SEEN BY THE CHINESE AS MORE LONG TERM THAN IMMEDIATE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION. THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS IS DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO REDUCE THE SHORT-TERM DANGER OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THEM[redacted]SO TO ADDRESS THE LONG-TERM THREAT OF

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SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT THROUGH THE CREATION OF A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND MILITARY BASES IN INDOCHINA, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CAPACITY TO DEVASTATE CHINA WITH SS-20 MISSILES BASED IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST, AND THE ABILITY SPEEDILY TO CONQUER THE CHINESE CAPITAL WITH ARMORED AND MOTORIZED FORCES ONLY DAYS AWAY IN MONGOLIA.

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15. FINALLY, THE CHINESE HAVE COME TO SEE THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN BUILDING PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AS BEST SERVED BY OSTENTATIOUS DISASSOCIATION FROM THE POLICIES AND POSTURES OF BOTH "SUPERPOWERS," PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION WITH THIRD WORLD POSITIONS, AND AVOIDANCE OF SUPPORT FOR EITHER SIDE IN DISPUTES WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD. THIS IS AN INEXPENSIVE POLICY. THE SUPERPOWERS ARE OFFENDED BY CHINESE RHETORIC, BUT ARE PREPARED TO TOLERATE IT, GIVEN THEIR AWARENESS OF THE HOLLOWNESS OF CHINESE PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT MATTERS OVER WHICH THEY HAVE NO INFLUENCE AND THEIR INTEREST IN BEIJING'S COOPEPATION ON THOSE ISSUES WHERE CHINESE SUPPORT CAN BE IMPORTANT. THE CHINESE HAVE LEARNED TO SUBSTITUTE RHETORIC ABOUT SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR THE PROVISION OF ECONOMIC AID TO OTHER LDC'S.

16. CHINA ENTERS 1984 SOBERED, MORE PATIENT, AND MORE CYNICAL THAN IT CAME TO 1979. THE LAST FIVE YEARS HAVE SERVED TO TURN CHINA INWARD AND TO REINFORCE ITS DEDICATION TO "MODERNIZATION" AS ITS FOREMOST GOAL. TO ACHIEVE

THIS END, CHINA NEEDS A "PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT." CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY FOCUSSED ON THIS OBJECTIVE AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT TERM, WHILE RELEGATING A MORE ACTIVE FOREIGN POL3CY TO THE DAY WHEN CHINA MAY BE ABLE TO FACE THE SUPERPOWERS ON A MORE

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EQUAL BASIS.

17. THE MOST STRIKING DEVELOPMENT IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS MAY NOT BE ANY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED ABOVE, BUT RATHER THE CHINESE

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EMBRACE OF JAPAN. THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING USHERED IN BY THE CONCLUSION OF THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY HAS BEEN NURTURED BY EXCEPTIONALLY SKILLFUL JAPANESE DIPLOMACY. HU YAOBANG'S RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN CAPPED THIS EFFORT. IT ESTABLISHED TOKYO AS THE FOREIGN CAPITAL WITH WHICH CHINA ENJOYS ITS MOST INTIMATE RELATIONS. DESPITE

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THEIR CLOSE TIES TO THEIR FORMER COLONIAL SUBJECTS IN TAIWAN, THE JAPANESE HAVE MANAGED TO AVOID ENTANGLEMENT IN THE CONTINUALLY ERUPTING SINO-AMERICAN DISPUTES OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE. SUPPORTED BY A HUGE AID PROGRAM AND MASSIVE TRADING COMPANY PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE VAST EXPANSE OF CHINA, THE JAPANESE ARE CHINA'S PRINCIPAL FOREIGN TRADING PARTNERS. WHILE THE MEMORY OF 55 MILLION WAR DEAD AND AWARENESS OF THE VIEWS OF OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES CAUSE THE CHINESE TO SOUND AN OCCASIONAL CAUTIONARY NOTE AGAINST JAPANESE REMILITARIZATION, BEIJING IS COMFORTABLE WITH JAPAN'S STEADY, ANTI-SOVIET DEFENSIVE BUILD-UP. THE CHINESE SEE JAPAN AS A MAJOR WORLD ECONOMIC POWER UNSULLIED BY POLITICAL ASSOCIATION WITH CAUSES UNPOPULAR IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEY ARE TEMPTED BY THOUGHTS OF SINO-JAPANESE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP.

18. CHINESE POLICIES TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY LARGELY SUCCESSFUL RIVALRY WITH THE USSR FOR INFLUENCE IN NORTH KOREA AND BY ENHANCED AWARENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND ITS LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICO-MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND NORTH. AS A RESULT, BEIJING HAS BEGUN QUIETLY TO INCREASE UNOFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH SEOUL, AND SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE U.S. AND JAPAN IN EXPLORATION OF WAYS TO ENSURE CONTINUING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA.

SOUTHEAST ASIA:

19. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS IN NORTHEAST ASIA, THE CHINESE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON REDUCING OR ELIMINATING PAST SOURCES OF FRICTION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, NORMALIZING RELATIONS, AND EXCLUDING SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE LATTER HAS

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SEEMED THE DOMINANT CHINESE CONCERN. IRONICALLY, THE CHINESE, WHO FOUGHT FOR DECADES TO EXCLUDE A HOSTILE U.S. FROM THE REGION AND TO TOPPLE GOVERNMENTS THEY REGARDED AS TOO RESPONSIVE TO U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN INTERESTS, NOW

FIND THEMSELVES ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THE U.S. AND THESE SAME ASEAN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST SOVIET-BACKED COMMUNISTS. CHINA HAS EMERGED AS ONE OF THE KEY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTORS, ALONG WITH THE U.S., OF THAILAND'S SECURITY AGAINST VIETNAMESE ATTACK. IT HAS WORKED HARD TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ASEAN GROUP, ABANDONING MATERIAL SUPPORT OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES (AS ALWAYS BURMA SEEMS ODD MAN OUT), AND TO CULTIVATE CORRECT AND INCREASINGLY CORDIAL STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES, AND -- TO A LESSER EXTENT - MALAYSIA. WHILE NORMALIZATION WITH INDONESIA (WHICH REMAINS TRAUMATIZED BY ALLEGED CHINESE COMPLICITY IN THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP OF 1965, AS WELL AS RIVEN BY SUSPICION OF ITS ETHNIC CHINESE POPULATION) HAS ELUDED IT, BEIJING HAS EACILITATED SINO-INDONESIAN TRADE, AND MANAGED A SORT OF NORMALIZATION WITH SINGAPORE, THROUGH THE WARY EXCHANGE OF GOVERNMENT "TRADE OFFICES."

20. VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO DOMINATE AND ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN INDOCHINA, AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUPPORTING HANOI'S AMBITIONS IN THE REGION HAVE GIVEN CHINA SHARED INTERESTS WITH ASEAN AND THE U.S., HELPING TO PROMOTE RAPPROCHEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, ASEAN'S UNDERSTANDABLE SUSPICIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHINESE ASPIRATIONS FOR A MORE ASSERTIVE -- EVEN "HEGEMONIC" -- ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA HAVE ENSURED THAT CHINA CONTINUES TO BE HELD AT ARM'S LENGTH BY MOST ASEAN NATIONS.

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21. DESPITE THE FAILURE OF ARDUOUS CHINESE EFFORTS TO BROKER A SETTLEMENT OF THE COMMUNIST REBELLION IN BURMA IN 1980, AND AMPLE GROUNDS FOR SUSPICION THAT THE BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP) REMAINS WEDDED TO SUPPLY LINES EXTENDING ACROSS THE SINO-BURMESE BORDER, BEIJING'S RELATIONS WITH RANGOON REMAIN SURPRISINGLY CORDIAL. BURMA IS NO DOUBT AWED AND INTIMIDATED BY PROXIMITY TO THE CHINESE COLOSSUS, APPEASED BY CHINESE ECONOMIC AID, AND INURED TO SEPARATIST REBELLION IN ITS FAR-FLUNG REGIONS. (THE BCP POSES NO CURRENT THREAT TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RANGOON.) IN ANY EVENT, THE BURMESE CONTINUE TO TOLERATE

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A DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY IN CHINESE RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY THAT OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION WOULD NOT.

SOUTH ASIA

22. THE SAME EMPHASIS ON A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, EXCLUSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND CONSOLIDATION OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH BORDERING STATES IS APPARENT IN CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. IN ADDITION TO CULTIVATING INCREASINGLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH STATES UNEASILY SITUATED ON INDIA'S PERIPHERY SUCH AS NEPAL, BANGLADESH AND SRI LANKA, THE CHINESE HAVE WORKED HARD OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS TO ACHIEVE NORMALIZATION AND A BORDER SETTLEMENT WITH INDIA. PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN EASILY WON, BUT IT HAS BEEN STEADY AND SIGNIFICANT.

23. PAKISTAN REMAINS A SPECIAL CASE AMONG CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS -- BEIJING'S MOST CONSTANT AND RELIABLE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN WITH ISLAMABAD. CHINA'S CONCERN WITH THE STRATEGIC THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS BOLSTERED SINO-PAKISTANI COOPERATION AND TENDED FURTHER TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR ALLIANCE. THE CHINESE TAKE PLEASURE AND COMFORT IN THE RESUMPTION OF U.S.-PAKISTAN SECURITY COOPERATION, THOUGH DISTRESSED BY THE INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE REGION THAT BROUGHT IT ABOUT.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

24. WITH SOME 50 DIVISIONS AND A WIDE RANGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED ALONG ,HE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER (INCLUDING

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STRIKE FORCES DEPLOYED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO BEIJING IN THE FICTIONALLY INDEPENDENT STATE OF MONGOLIA), THE SOVIETS POSE THE ONLY THREAT OF ATTACK ON THE CHINESE HEARTLAND. OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE USSR HAS ADDED A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN VIETNAM, A MAJOR INCREASE IN ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, AND VIRTUAL ANNEXATION OF OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN'S WAKHAN CORRIDOR TO THE THREAT IT POSES TO CHINA. THE SOVIETS ARE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY (AS IN INDIA) INVOLVED IN EVERY THREAT TO CHINA'S SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE U.S.-EQUIPPED CHINESE FORCES ON TAIWAN.

25. THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO SOVIET PRESSURE AND ENCIRCLEMENT HAS BEEN BASED ON RECOGNITION OF CHINESE WEAKNESS AND VULNERABILITY AND THE UNLIKELY PROSPECT OF REAL IMPROVEMENT. WHILE SOBERLY REALIZING THIS, THE CHINESE HAVE DECIDED TO GO AHEA, WITH "CONSULTATIONS" WITH THE SOVIETS. THOUGH THEY NO LONGER ESPOUSE A "UNITED FRONT" WITH THE WEST, THE CHINESE REMAIN ACUTELY CONSCIOUS THAT THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON THE EAST-WEST STRATEGIC BALANCE. WHILE STRESSING THEIR ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET INVASION AND TO CONDUCT WAR OVER DECADES IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, THE CHINESE HAVE BOOSTED THEIR INVESTMENT IN AN INCREASINGLY LESS VULNERABLE "FORCE DE FRAPPE" (MOST RECENTLY WORKING TOWARD ADDING A FLEDGING SLBM CAPABILITY TO THEIR NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES). MORE IMPORTANT, THEY HAVE EMBARKED ON A POLICY OF LIMITED DETENTE WITH THE SOVIETS, DOLING OUT JUST ENOUGH PROGRESS ON MINOR BILATERAL TRADE AND CULTURAL INTERACTION IN THEIR DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW TO KEEP THE SOVIETS TALKING.

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26. MEANWHILE, THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO PURSUE OPENINGS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THEY ARE CONSCIOUS OF THEIR INABILITY TO SUSTAIN DEFIANCE OF THE USSR IN PLACES TO WHICH IT IS SO NEAR AND FROM WHICH THEY ARE SO FAR. THEIR ONE EFFORT TO FOSTER AN EE CLIENT STATE IN ALBANIA WAS A DISASTER. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR PURSUIT OF MORE MODEST AIMS IN ROMANIA, WITH WHICH THEY HAVE THEIR MOST IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH A NOMINAL SOVIET ALLY, AND THEY CONTINUE TO DO WHAT THEY CAN TO BUTTRESS YUGO-

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SLAV INDEPENDENCE. (OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, SINO-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS HAVE GROWN IN BOTH SCOPE AND INTIMACY.)

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WESTERN EUROPE

27. THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE BROUGHT CONSOLIDATION IN CHINESE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, WHOSE SECURITY IS LINKED BY THE SOVIET THREAT TO CHINA'S OWN. THE CHINESE HAVE ACHIEVED AN OPENING TO THE EUROPEAN LEFT, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH EURO-COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES AND SOME FLIRTING WITH THE PEACE MOVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THEY REMAIN MOST COMFORTABLE WITH EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVES WHOM THEY VIEW AS LESS NAIVELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS. CHINA'S CONTINUING STRESS ON EUROPEAN UNITY AND ITS INTEREST IN A GREATER WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO ITS MODERNIZATION ARE NICELY DEMONSTRATED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PERIODIC CONSULTATION IT HAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE EC.

28. THOUGH GENERALLY EXCELLENT, CHINESE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE ARE NOT, HOWEVER, WITHOUT THEIR SORE SPOTS. PRINCIPAL AMONG THESE IS THE DUTCH DECISION TO BREAK RANKS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AD TO ESTABLISH AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN. THIS CHALLENGE TO BEIJING'S VITAL INTERESTS IN LIMITING TAIPEI'S FREEDOM OF ACTION AND PUSHING IT TOWARD ACCOMMODATION SETS A PRECEDENT THE CHINESE ARE VERY CONCERNED TO REVERSE. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.K. ARE COMPLICATED BY THE ISSUE OF HONG KONG REVERSION. THIS IS AN ISSUE THE CHINESE DID NOT WISH TO ADDRESS, BUT WHICH THE BRITISH ULTIMATELY PERSUADED THEM THEY COULD NOT AVOID IF THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN HONG KONG WERE TO BE PRESERVED. THE PROSPECTS THAT A DEAL WILL BE STRUCK SEEM GOOD; HOW WELL IT WILL WORK IS ANOTHER QUESTION.

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OCEANIA, AND INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL:

29. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE IMPROVED STEADILY OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG'S VISIT TO THE AREA IN EARLY 1983 HELPED TO EXPAND THE RELATIONSHIP FROM A BASIC TRADE ORIENTATION TO A BROADER OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. THESE RELATIONS REMAIN DOMINATED BY TRADE: CHINA RUNS A LARGE TRADE

DEFICIT WITH AUSTRALIA DUE TO WHEAT SALES, AND HAS HAD ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS IN GETTING AUSTRALIA TO TAKE INCREASED SHIPMENTS OF CHINESE TEXTILES. CHINA FULLY RECOGNIZES THAT AUSTRALIA HAS A STRONG SECURITY INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS RECENTLY SHOWN SOME UNHAPPINESS WITH THE HAWKE GOVERNMENT'S MORE FREE-WHEELING STYLE WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM, IT HAS SO FAR MUTED ITS PUBLIC CRITICISM, APPARENTLY CONTENT TO LET THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TAKE THE LEAD IN CRITICIZING AUSTRALIAN POLICY.

30. THE INDIAN OCEAN IS AN AREA WHERE CHINA CAN ACT ONLY AS AN OBSERVER, AS IT PRESENTLY LACKS THE MILITARY WHEREWITHAL TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE THERE. IT HAS GIVEN LIP SERVICE TO MRS. GANDHI'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, AND THE DEPARTURE OF BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET PRESENCE FROM THE AREA. FOR THE MOMENT HOWEVER, CHINA IS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN WHICH MIGHT BE REDIRETED TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA AND JAPAN IN TIMES OF CRISIS.

AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND LATIN AMERICA:

31. CHINESE INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD LIE IN THE

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
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EXPANSION OF CHINESE EXPORTS AND THE CULTIVATION OF A REPUTATION FOR RELIABLE FRIENDSHIP AGAINST THE DAY WHEN CHINA BECOMES A GLOBAL POWER. DRAWING ON ITS TIME-TESTED CAPACITY T
O PROVIDE OUTSTANDING HOSPITALITY AN,
FLATTERY TO VISITING GUESTS, THE CHINESE HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR RELATIONS WITH A STEADY STREAM OF AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE. PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG'S 1983 VISIT TO AFRICA WAS CHINA'S WAY OF ANNOUNCING TO THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT IT HAD RE-DISCOVERED AFRICA AND WAS READY TO WORK TO ERODE SOVIET GREATER POLITICAL INFLUENCE THERE. TO THIS END, THE CHINESE HAVE BEGUN

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COURTING SOVIET-CLIENT STATES IN THE REGION, IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA. (CHINA SUPPORTED UNITA AGAINST THE MPLA IN THE 1970'S). THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO MUTED THEIR PREVIOUSLY STRIDENT CRITICISM OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA AND BROUGHT THEIR POSITION ON NAMIBIA INTO PUBLIC ACCORD WITH THAT OF THE "FRONTLINE STATES," OPPOSING EFFORTS TO LINK NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. THE SAME TENDENCY TO PLAY TO THE AFRICAN CROWDS IS APPARENT ON CHAD. CHINA HAS SAID LITTLE BEYOND VOICING SUPPORT FOR OAU POSITION.

32. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CHINA'S BEST RELATIONSHIPS REMAIN WITH EGYPT, JORDAN AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES, AND -- WITHIN THE PLO -- WITH YASSER ARAFAT. OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE CHINESE HAVE MARCHED IN LOCK-STEP WITH ARAB OPINION ON ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTIONS. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING. CHINA HAS NO CARDS TO PLAY AT PRESENT, AND SEES ITS PRINCIPAL INTEREST AS THE CULTIVATION OF FRIENDLY, AND COMMERCIALLY PROFITABLE RELATIONS WITH ARABS. CHINA'S POLICY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ

WAR IS COMPLETELY CYNICAL -- PUBLICLY IT PROCLAIMS ITS NEUTRALITY AND CALLS FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING; AT THE SAME TIME IT NOT-SO-SECRETELY MAKES MASSIVE WEAPONS SALES TO IRAQ, AND SMALLER SALES TO IRAN.

33. BECAUSE IT HAS ONLY RECENTLY GOTTEN THE UPPER HAND IN ITS BATTLE FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES, LATIN AMERICA IS STILL UNKNOWN TERRITORY FOR CHINA'S SEN9OR LEADERSHIP, THOUGH IT IS INCREASINGLY THE FOCUS OF CHINESE TRADE PROMOTION EFFORTS. CHINA STILL TENDS TO VIEW LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO SOVIET-CUBAN [redacted]

EXPANSIONISM, BUT ALSO PLAYS TO THE LATIN MAJORITY WITH POLITICAL SUPPORT ON THRID WORLD ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THEM, E.G. THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:

34. OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS, CHINA HAS ALSO EMERGED AS AN EFFECTIVE PARTICIPANT IN SOME OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS. CHINESE DIPLOMATS HAVE MANAGED TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR CHINESE CANDIDACIES BY ENGAGING IN THE REQUISITE VOTE-TRADING. BEIJING HAS CONSISTENTLY POSITIONED ITSELF SO THAT IT CAN SIDE WITH THE DOMINANT THIRD WORLD MAJORITY ON MOST ISSUES WHICH ARE BROUGHT TO INTERNATIONAL FORA, BUT IT HAS ALSO MASTERED THE FINE ART OF "TAKING A WALK" WHEN IT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO TAKE A CLEAR POSITION ON A DIFFICULT ISSUE.

A2MS CONTROL:

35. CHINESE KNOWLEDGE AND SOPHISTICATION ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, HAS DEVELOPED REMARKABLY IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. IT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN THE GENEVA CD. ON MORE GENERAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, CHINA HAS NOW ABANDONED THEIR ALOOFNESS AND COME FORWARD WITH ITS OWN PROPOSAL. THE CHINESE POSITION IS SIMPLISTIC AND PROPAGANDISTIC -- THE SUPERPOWERS MUST AGREE TO A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BEFORE CHINA WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO MULTILATERAL ARMS REDUCTION TALKS -- BUT IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST SIGN OF CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO DEAL ITSELF INTO THE DISARMAMENT GAME. CHINA'S DECISION TO JOIN THE IAEA

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SUBJECT: CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A FIVE-YEAR REVIEW

ALSO MARKS A SHIFT TOWARD GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, THOUGH LIKE INDIA, CHINA REFUSES TO ADHERE TO THE NPT.

36. THE AREA WHERE CHINA IS SHOWING A MORE REALISTIC ATTITUDE IS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET SS-20'S TARGETED AGAINST EAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC. THANKS LARGELY TO JAPANESE EFFORTS TO SENSITIZE THE CHINESE TO THE THREAT THESE MISSILES POSE TO THEIR COMMON SECURITY, CHINA IN 1983 SIGNALED TO THE SOVIETS THAT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE SS-20

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THREAT. THE CHINESE ARE FOLLOWING SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON INF EXTREMELY CLOSELY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CONSULTING WITH THE JAPANESE. THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN WILLING TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE, BUT CHINA IS NOW IN A POSITION WHERE IT CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY PURSUE ITS OWN INTERESTS IF THE RESULTS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT SATISFACTORY.

37. CONCLUSION: ON THE EMOTIONAL ISSUE OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE BEEN A SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR CHINA, AND IT CAN CLAIM NO EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESSES. ON THE SURFACE, AT LEAST, TAIWAN IS AS PROSPEROUS AND RECALCITRANT AS EVER, AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER HONG KONG HAVE OPENED CHINA'S EYES NOT ONLY TO THE DIFFICULTIES THAT A FORMAL TAKEOVER WILL ENTAIL, BUT ALSO CAUSED THE HONG KONG RESIDENTS THEMSELVES TO VOICE THEIR UNEASINESS ABOUT CHINESE RELIABILITY AND COMPETENCE. BECAUSE OF THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT FOR CHINA, THESE REUNIFICATION ISSUES ARE STILL THE MOST DIFFICULT FOR IT TO DEAL WITH EFFECTIVLEY, AND THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WILL BE A FU2THER TEST OF CHINA'S FLEXIBILITY AND PRAGMATISM.

38. ASIDE FROM THIS EMOTIONAL ISSUE, CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY HAS DEMONSTRABLY GAINED IN BOTH SOPHISTICATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. THE THREAT TO CHINA'S SECURITY FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN OFFSET BY IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS BY CHINA'S OWN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SOME REDUCTION IN THE BILATERAL TENSIONS THROUGH THE SERIES OF SINO-SOVIET "CONSULTATIONS." CHINA HAS BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE A GOOD DEAL OF

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MANEUVERING ROOM FOR ITSELF IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD BY ADOPTING A MORE AVOWEDLY "INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY AND REFLEXIVELY SUPPORTING THE THIRD WORLD CONSENSUS ON CONTENTIOUS GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES.

39. CHINA'S ABILITY TO ENHANCE ITS OWN INTERNATIONAL POSITION WILL DEPEND FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THE STABILITY OF ITS INTERNAL LEADERSHIP AND SECONDLY ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS M RE INNOVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES. ANOTHER CONVULSIVE INTERNAL UPHEAVAL COULD RAPIDLY WIPE OUT THE GAINS CHINA HAS MADE

INTERNATIONALLY. ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WOULD SIMILARLY LIMIT CBINA'S ABILITY TO MANEUVER. IN LATE 1983, HOWEVER, CHINA LOOKS TO HAVE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR A RELATIVELY SMOOTH LEADERSHIP TRANSITION, AND ITS ECONOMIC SITUATION IS THE BEST IT HAS BEEN IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS. CHINA IS LIKELY TO REMAIN A DYNAMIC, ACTIVE, SOMETIMES DIFFICULT AND INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ACTOR ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. HUMMEL

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AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE
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DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION
COMMERCE FOR JEAN GRIER IN GENERAL COUNCILQS OFFICE, DAS
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
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SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 03/27/97

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(1) YEN LOANS AT CROSSROADS; NEED STILL REMAINS, BUT APPEAL HAS WEAKENED; SOME ASIAN COUNTRIES "NO LONGER NEEDED THEM"

(2) 'KAZAMIDORI' COLUMN: WHY CAN'T THEY SPEAK STRAIGHT FROM THE HEART? IT'S TIME TO FILL THE PERCEPTION GAP ON JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS, OKINAWA ...

(3) CHANGED TIDE OF JAPAN-U.S. FRICTION; JAPAN NEEDS TO ALTER POLICY COURSE IN RESPONSE TO WORLD

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(4) IS DEREGULATION A PANACEA? (PART 4) -- UPHOLDING CULTURE; SENSE OF ALARM TOWARD AMERICANIZATION

(5) "AINU BILL" SUBMITTED, BUT NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THEIR BEING "AN ABORIGINAL PEOPLE"; CONTENT ONLY SHOWS CULTURAL PROMOTION

ARTICLES:

(1) YEN LOANS AT CROSSROADS; NEED STILL REMAINS, BUT APPEAL HAS WEAKENED; SOME ASIAN COUNTRIES "NO LONGER NEEDED THEM"

NIHON KEIZAI (PAGE S42) (EXCERPTS)
MARCH 9, 1997

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) PROJECTS FINANCED BY YEN LOANS ARE NOW REACHING A TURNING POINT. JAPAN HAS DISBURSED ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF YEN LOANS AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR ITS ODA PROGRAM. HOWEVER, RECENTLY SUCH AID-RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AS BURMA (MYANMAR) AND IRAN HAVE DECLARED THAT JAPAN'S YEN LOANS ARE "NO LONGER NEEDED." THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING YEN-LOAN PROJECTS HAVE NOW BEEN ALTERED BY POLITICAL FACTORS, AS IN THE CASES OF BURMA AND IRAN, AS WELL AS BY ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AID-RECIPIENTS AND THEIR INCREASED REPAYMENTS.

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ACCORDING TO THE OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND (OECF), THE IMPLEMENTING ORGAN FOR JAPAN'S ODA PROJECTS, YEN LOANS DISBURSED IN FISCAL 1995 TOTALED 655.4 BILLION YEN (EXCEPTING DEFERRED DEBT TRANSACTIONS), ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF ALL ODA OUTLAYS. APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE YEN LOANS WERE PROVIDED TO THE ASIAN REGION. SOME OBSERVERS POINTED OUT THAT JAPAN IS IN A STATE OF "AID FATIGUE" BECAUSE THE VOLUME OF YEN LOANS IN REAL TERMS IS NOW TENDING TO DECLINE DUE TO THE REDUCTION IN THE BUDGET FOR ODA-RELATED PROGRAMS.

ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK, WHEN AN AID-RECIPIENTS' PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) REACHES AROUND 5,500 DOLLARS, BASED ON NATIONAL INCOME LEVELS, THOSE RECIPIENTS NO LONGER NEED JAPAN'S YEN LOANS. SINGAPORE AND SOUTH KOREA HAVE LONG AGO GRADUATED FROM THE RANKS OF AID RECIPIENTS. IN ADDITION, THE OUTLOOK IS THAT THE

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AMCONSUL NAHA
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AMCONSUL SAPPORO
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DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
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GNP OF MALAYSIA AND THE THAILAND WILL REACH THAT LEVEL BY THE YEAR 2010. THE SHARE OF CONTRACTS AWARDED TO COUNTRIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ' CORPORATIONS FOR AID PROJECTS FINANCED BY YEN LOANS REACHED APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT IN FISCAL 1995. THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAS STEADILY RISEN.

YEN LOANS ARE FACING AN ADVERSE WIND BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH BEING EXPERIENCED BY ASIAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE INCREASES IN REPAYMENTS OF LOANS BY THE AID-RECIPIENTS. SINCE THE THE
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JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES ONLY YEN-DENOMINATED LOANS, AS THE YEN HAS APPRECIATED, THE REPAYMENT AMOUNT (IN DOLLAR TERMS) HAS SWOLLEN. FURTHERMORE, SINCE YEN LOANS ARE LONG-TERM FINANCING, YEN-LOAN

RECIPIENTS HAVE TO SHOULDER THE EXCHANGE RISKS, SO AS A RESULT, SUCH FINANCING HAS LOST ITS APPEAL.

THE MAJOR ROLE THAT YEN LOANS HAVE PLAYED HAS BEEN IN PROVIDING FINANCING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ORDER FOR THEM TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURES. THERE ARE REGIONS, SUCH AS AFRICA, WHERE THE NEED FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE HAS GROWN. THERE IS ALSO ROOM FOR YEN LOANS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMATION OF DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR. "IT IS NOT THAT THE NEEDS FOR YEN LOANS HAVE DECREASED" (OECF), BUT WHAT IS BEING URGED NOW IS A REVIEW OF THE WAY THAT JAPAN IMPLEMENTS ITS YEN LOANS, NOW THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS GREATLY CHANGING.

(2) 'KAZAMIDORI' COLUMN: WHY CAN'T THEY SPEAK STRAIGHT FROM THE HEART?

IT'S TIME TO FILL THE PERCEPTION GAP ON JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS, OKINAWA ...

HISAYOSHI INA, EDITORIAL STAFF MEMBER

NIHON KEIZAI (PAGE 2) (FULL)
MARCH 24, 1997

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EMOTIONAL DEBATES REALLY BOTHER ME. IN ONE STUDY GROUP SESSION, I HEARD A TRADING COMPANY EMPLOYEE SAY THAT "JAPAN WOULD ONLY CHANGE IF MORE MEMBERS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES DIE." THERE WAS ALSO A SCHOLAR WHO CRITICIZED THE JAPANESE MEDIA FOR BEING UNUSED TO COVER TERRORISM OR WARFARE, REMARKING THAT "WE HAVEN'T LOST ENOUGH JAPANESE JOURNALISTS YET."

WHENEVER I REFER PARTICULARLY TO OKINAWA OR JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THERE ARE ALWAYS RESPONSES FROM BOTH THE SO-CALLED RIGHT AND THE LEFT. IN ONE MAGAZINE ARTICLE, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE FELLOW WHO PROFESSES HIMSELF TO BE A "WRITER" MADE UP SOMETHING THAT I HAD NEVER WRITTEN, EVEN PUTTING IT IN QUOTATION MARKS, AND THIS "WRITER" ---

PREMISING HIMSELF ON THAT -- PROCEEDED TO CRITICIZE
ME.

PERHAPS, THOSE ARGUMENTS THAT EXTOL THE BEAUTY OF

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DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4011
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE
AMCONSUL NAHA
AMCONSUL NAGOYA
AMCONSUL FUKUOKA
AMCONSUL SAPPORO
FBIS OKINAWA JA
FBIS RESTON VA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
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DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION
COMMERCE FOR JEAN GRIER IN GENERAL COUNCILQS OFFICE, DAS
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 03/27/97

DEATH, AS WELL AS THE EMOTIONAL ANTI-U.S. ARGUMENTS, ARE A MEANS TO EXPRESS THE FEELING OF BEING BLOCKED IN. LYING BEHIND THEM IS THE SITUATION OF MODERN TIMES THAT WE FIND OURSELVES IN.

TO EXPRESS THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOUND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, THE WORDS "DEVELOPMENT DICTATORSHIP" ARE OFTEN USED. IN FACT, JAPAN ALSO HAD ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT DICTATORSHIP, A SYSTEM CALLED "THE IRON TRIANGLE OF POLITICAL, BUREAUCRATIC, AND BUSINESS CIRCLES." JAPAN IS NOW
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BEING CALLED ON TO RESTRUCTURE ITSELF, WHICH MEANS DESTROYING THAT SYSTEM. THE SEIGE MENTALITY FEELING WE SEE REFLECTS HOW DIFFICULT THAT WORK WILL BE, AND THE EMOTIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE PROBABLY THE SOUNDS OF THE FRICTION INVOLVED IN THAT PROCESS.

IF I MAY TOUCH ON THE PROBLEMS INVOLVING OKINAWA -- BEING PREPARED THAT THIS WILL GIVE RISE TO FRICTION -- MANY OF THOSE PROBLEMS APPEAR TO HAVE ARISEN FROM THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LOGIC OF THE 'MILITARY' THAT IS READIED FOR POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES AND THAT OF THE 'PEOPLE' USED TO LIVING IN PEACETIME.

IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR, A U.S. MILITARY JET DROPPED A BOMB INTO THE SEA. IF A PLANE HAS TO LAND AT A BASE WITH A BOMB THAT COULD NOT BE DROPPED DURING ITS TRAINING DUE TO A MALFUNCTION, THERE WOULD LIKELY BE A SERIOUS ACCIDENT. EVEN IF THE BOMB IS DROPPED INTO THE SEA TO AVOID THAT SITUATION, ITS SAFETY DEVICE IS LOCKED, SO THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEM ... THIS MIGHT BE THE MILITARY'S LOGIC.

THEIR CONDUCT, IN OTHER WORDS, FOLLOWS THEIR MANUAL. SO, THEIR REPORTING OF IT TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO DELAYED. SUCH ACTION LED TO FRICTION WITH THE LOGIC OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE. HAVING LEARNED A LESSON FROM THAT, THEY NOTIFIED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OF THE INCIDENT OF THEIR

MISTAKEN FIRING OF DEPLETED-URANIUM BULLETS, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS ONE YEAR AFTER THE INCIDENT ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE. BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL A MONTH LATER

THAT THE FACT WAS MADE KNOWN TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC, AND SUCH A DELAY RESULTED IN FURTHER COMPLICATING THE PROBLEM.

IN THAT INCIDENT, THERE WERE THREE PROBLEMS: (1) U.S. FORCES USED DEPLETED-URANIUM AMMUNITION IN THEIR TRAINING, GOING AGAINST THEIR OWN REGULATIONS; (2) THEY REPORTED IT TO JAPAN ONE YEAR AFTER THAT; AND (3) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FURTHER DELAYED DISCLOSURE OF THE FACT FOR A MONTH. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WAS (1), BUT THERE WAS EVEN A MOMENT WHEN IT APPEARED TO BE (3).

WHAT IF THE INCIDENT WAS MADE PUBLIC IN JANUARY 1996 RIGHT AFTER ITS OCCURRENCE? THE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED IN OKINAWA WAS STILL FRESH IN PEOPLE'S MEMORIES, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD YET

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
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TO VISIT JAPAN. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO

ISSUE THE JAPAN-U.S. JOINT SECURITY DECLARATION IN APRIL. EVEN IF THE U.S. HAD AT LEAST ENTERTAINED SUCH A FEAR AND ABSTAINED FROM MAKING IT PUBLIC, THAT WOULD BE NO WONDER.

MAKING IT PUBLIC THIS JANUARY RIGHT AFTER THE U.S. SIDE'S NOTIFICATION ALSO WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN STRENGTHENING ANTI-U.S. CRITICISM IN JAPAN. SO, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED AN ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY, AND PROBABLY THOUGHT OF MAKING IT PUBLIC WHEN ITS OUTCOME TURNED OUT TO BE 'NOT GUILTY.'

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IN ACTUALITY, HOWEVER, PUBLIC ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON (3), THAT IS, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION COVER-UP. IRONICALLY ENOUGH, IT RESULTED IN MINIMIZING ITS REPERCUSSIONS ON JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS. EVEN SO, WHY ARE THE JAPANESE AND U.S. OFFICIALS SO NERVOUS ABOUT INFORMATION DISCLOSURE? THEY PROBABLY MADE SUCH A JUDGMENT FOR FEAR OF EMOTIONAL REACTIONS, BECAUSE IMMATURE ARGUMENTS FULL OF WATERY LOGIC ARE CONSPICUOUS IN THIS SPHERE.

FOR EXAMPLE, ONE NEWSPAPER TOOK UP THE CASE OF THE SOBE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IN ITS EDITORIAL, ENTITLED: "KEEP CALM ABOUT THE 'LEGAL VACUUM'." THE EDITORIAL SAID THAT A "VACUUM" TO BE CAUSED UNTIL THE LAND EXPROPRIATION COMMISSION (OF OKINAWA PREFECTURE) ISSUES ITS ARBITRATION WOULD NOT INSTANTLY IMPAIR THE U.S. MILITARY'S FUNCTIONS. IN THE CASE OF SOBE, THERE WAS ONLY ONE LANDOWNER. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THERE ARE ABOUT 3,000 LANDOWNERS. THIS DIFFERENCE WAS IGNORED IN THAT EDITORIAL.

AS DID THAT EDITORIAL, THERE ARE ALSO VOICES CALLING STRONGLY FOR A CUTBACK OF THE MARINES STATIONED ON OKINAWA. IT WAS REPORTED AS IF PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO IN HIS MEETING WITH U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT HAD CALLED FOR IT. IN FACT, HOWEVER, HE ONLY ASKED FOR "JAPAN-U.S. CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE TROOP STRENGTH OF U.S.

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FORCES IN JAPAN." THE JOINT SECURITY DECLARATION ALSO REFERS TO THAT. IT'S PREMISED ON JAPAN'S STEPPING UP ITS DEFENSE COOPERATION, BUT ONLY FEW ARGUMENTS HAVE TOUCHED ON THAT.

THE IMPORTANT THING IS NOT TO PLAY OUT A FANTASY OF DISARMAMENT. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD BE WORKING TO FILL THE PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLE IN A STEADY WAY, BUT INSTEAD ....

(3) CHANGED TIDE OF JAPAN-U.S. FRICTION; JAPAN NEEDS TO ALTER POLICY COURSE IN RESPONSE TO WORLD ECONOMIES BECOMING BORDERLESS

ASAHI (PAGE 4) (FULL)
MARCH 23, 1997

WITH THE OFFICIAL INSTALLATION OF CHARLENE BARSHEVSKY AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), U.S. TRADE POLICY UNDER THE SECOND CLINTON

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DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4013
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AMCONSUL SAPPORO
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FBIS RESTON VA
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DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WO
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DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 03/27/97

ADMINISTRATION WILL BE SET IN MOTION IN LATE MARCH. IN THE FIRST-TERM OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION,DISPUTES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. BROKE OUT MAINLY IN KEY AREAS WHERE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN COMPANIES COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER TO DOMINATE WORLD MARKETS, FOR INSTANCE, IN THE AUTOMOBILE AND SEMICONDUCTOR SECTORS. THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION HAS NOW SHIFTED TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN CARGO-HANDLING SERVICES, THE JAPANESE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM INVOLVING THE LARGE-SCALE RETAIL STORE LAW, AS WELL AS THE LIQUOR TAX ISSUE. AMERICAN COMPANIES, WHICH HAVE STEPPED UP THEIR
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INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS THROUGH STREAMLINING EFFORTS, HAVE AGAIN POINTED TO JAPANESE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AS BLOCKING THEIR MARKET ACCESS. THE GOAL THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW PUT FORTH IS TO REMOVE THOSE IMPEDIMENTS WITHIN JAPAN.

(HIROAKI ITO IN THE AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU)

AFTER A LONG INTERVAL, THERE HAVE APPEARED A LARGE NUMBER OF PENDING ISSUES TO RESOLVE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. THIS SPRING.

THE DEADLINE SET BY THE U.S. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION (FMC) TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN OVER THE ISSUE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS IN CARGO-HANDLING SERVICES IS APRIL 14. ON TWO ISSUES -- ABOLISHING THE CEILING FOR PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF NTT, AND THE AMERICAN COMPANY

MOTOROLA'S FAILURE IN BIDDING FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEXT-GENERATION POLICE WIRELESS SYSTEM TO BE INTRODUCED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY -- THE U.S. MAY RESORT TO INVOKING ARTICLE 1377 OF THE TRADE ACT (PROVISION ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS), WHICH STIPULATES THAT SANCTIONS ARE TO BE IMPOSED WITHIN 60 DAYS.

IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), THE DISPUTE OVER THE PHOTOFILM AND PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTING PAPER MARKETS IS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. IN THE DISPUTE OVER CORRECTION OF THE DIFFERENTIALS IN JAPANESE

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LIQUOR TAX RATES, IN WHICH A JUDGMENT WAS GIVEN AGAINST THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW UNDER PRESSURE TO CHOOSE AN EARLY CORRECTION OR U.S. SANCTIONS.

WIDER VIEWPOINTS UNDER SECOND-TERM ADMINISTRATION

IN RECENT CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S., SOME TIDAL CHANGES CAN BE OBSERVED.

ONE REASON HAS BEEN THE SHIFT TO OTHER RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. WHEN THE "TRADE WAR" (PRESIDENT CLINTON) ERUPTED OVER AUTOMOBILES AND AUTO PARTS AND OVER SEMICONDUCTORS DURING THE FIRST TERM OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, MITI PLAYED THE MAJOR ROLE. BUT NOW, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MAINLY IN CHARGE OF DOMESTIC AFFAIRS ARE INVOLVED IN THE BILATERAL DISPUTES, INCLUDING THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, THE MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND THE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY.

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COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
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JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION
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CHANGES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ALSO IN BOTH SIDES' NEGOTIATING STYLES. IN THE PAST TALKS, JAPANESE AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS PRESENTED THEIR COMPROMISE PROPOSALS TO THE OTHER SIDE. BUT IN THE ON-GOING CARGO DISPUTE OVER THE JAPANESE PRIOR CONSULTATION SYSTEM, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHILE BRANDISHING SANCTIONS, HAS SIMPLY WATCHED TO SEE HOW NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE JAPAN HARBOR TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION AND OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED ARE PROCEEDING. ON THE LIQUOR TAX ISSUE, EFFORTS HAVE BEEN PUT INTO DOMESTIC COORDINATION, FOCUSING ON

SHOCHU SPIRITS BREWERS, POTATO-PRODUCING FARMERS AND POLITICIANS.

CHANGES OCCURRED ALSO BECAUSE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY SUMMERS, WHO SEES JAPAN ISSUES FROM THE MACRO-ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT, ASSUMED THE POLICY HELM IN PLACE OF FORMER NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(NEC) HEAD TYSON, WHO JUSTIFIED "MANAGED TRADE" TO SOME EXTENT, AND FORMER USTR KANTOR, WHO, AS A LAWYER SPECIALIZING IN LABOR PROBLEMS, COMPARED TRADE ISSUES TO COURT BATTLES.

RECOVERY OF COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MARKET

ANOTHER MAJOR CAUSE IS THE RECOVERY OF AMERICAN COMPANIES' COMPETITIVENESS. ALTHOUGH THE TARGETED SHARE OF FOREIGN SEMICONDUCTORS IN THE JAPANESE MARKET BASED ON THE JAPAN-U.S. ACCORD HAS BEEN REMOVED, THE SHARE OF U.S.-MANUFACTURED SEMICONDUCTORS IS STEADILY INCREASING, MAINLY IN THE MICRO PROCESSOR UNITS (MPU) MARKET.

DURING THE FOUR YEARS OF THE FIRST-TERM CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, EXPORTS OF GOODS TO JAPAN CLIMBED 43 PERCENT. DURING THAT PERIOD, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT "CONCLUDED 24 TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN" (USTR), BUT OPPORTUNITIES HAVE BEEN DWINDLING FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO APPEAR ON THE MAIN STAGE TO SUPPORT ITS COMPANIES FROM THE POLITICAL SIDE.

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COMMENTING ON THE CAUSES FOR THE CHANGING NATURE OF BILATERAL DISPUTES WITH JAPAN, A SENIOR USTR OFFICIAL POINTED OUT: "WITH CHANCES EXPANDING FOR AMERICA FIRMS TO EXPORT GOODS TO JAPAN, MORE COMPANIES NOW FACE THE BARRIERS ERECTED BY JAPAN'S UNIQUE (DOMESTIC) SYSTEMS."

FOR EXAMPLE, AMERICAN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES, WHICH HAVE DRAWN PUBLIC ATTENTION IN THE WAKE OF THE REVISION OF THE CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS LAW, HAVE EXPERIENCED THE UNEXPECTED PROBLEM THAT IT IS MORE EXPENSIVE TO TRANSPORT FROM THE JAPANESE PORT TO THE CUSTOMER THAN IT IS TO DO SO FROM THE U.S. ACROSS THE PACIFIC OCEAN TO JAPAN. IN THE COURSE OF TALKS ON DEREGULATION WITH JAPAN, THE USTR OFFICE CRITICIZED THE MOT'S REGULATION TO "SET THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF TRUCKS FOR AN ENTITY TO ENTER THE TRUCKING BUSINESS" AS BLOCKING NEW ENTRIES AND JACKING UP TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 03/27/97

THE CARGO DISPUTE ALSO REFLECTS THE U.S.' DISSATISFACTION THAT "TRANSPORTATION COSTS AT JAPANESE PORTS ARE 20 PERCENT HIGHER DUE TO THE PRIOR CONSULTATION SYSTEM."

PERCEPTION OF FRAMEWORK TALKS AS FRUITLESS SETTLED IN U.S.

THREE YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE DRAMA OF "A BILATERAL RUPTURE IN NEGOTIATIONS" WAS PLAYED OUT BY THEN PRIME MINISTER MORIHIRO HOSOKAWA AND PRESIDENT CLINTON IN THEIR SUMMIT MEETING IN

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FEBRUARY 1994. IN THE FRAMEWORK TALKS, THE U.S. AIMED AT ACHIEVING RESULTS IN SPECIFIC SECTORS AND AS A RESULT, BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES THREATENED TO

INTENSIFIED TO THE LEVEL OF CREATING CRACKS IN THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE AWARENESS OF SUCH TALKS AS BEING FRUITLESS IS GRADUALLY SETTLING IN WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

THE FRAMEWORK TALKS ARE STILL ON THE BOOKS, BUT TRADE POLICY UNDER THE SECOND CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN INCLINING TOWARD THE POINTS OF VIEW ADOPTED IN THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE TALKS IN THE DAYS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, FOCUSING ON JAPAN'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES.

SUCH AN APPROACH OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN HAILED EVEN BY JAPANESE PARTIES CONCERNED.

JAPANESE FREIGHTERS ALSO HAVE DESIRED THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRIOR CONSULTATION SYSTEM IN PORT SERVICES. JAPANESE CONSUMERS WELCOME THE REDUCTION OF AIRFARES OWING TO THE LIBERALIZATION OF CIVIL AVIATION SERVICES AND TELEPHONE CHARGES BECAUSE OF DEREGULATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AREA.

DESPITE OUTCRIES FOR DEREGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION WITHIN THE RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS REMAINED SLOW TO TAKE ACTION. IN ORDER TO GIVE MOMENTUM TO THE

EFFORT, THE ONLY MEANS AT THIS POINT IS UNFORTUNATELY BY FOREIGN PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT. TAKING THIS AS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY, JAPAN SHOULD REBUILD ITS OWN STRENGTH TO THE LEVEL OF BEING ABLE TO CHALLENGE THE U.S. THERE IS NO OTHER OPTION FOR JAPAN, WHICH IS NOW BEING TOSSED

ABOUT LIKE A SHIP BY THE WAVES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.

JAPAN-U.S. TRADE TASKS UNDER SECOND CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

-- CIVIL AVIATION TALKS: THE U.S. HAS CALLED FOR COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ROUTES, WHILE JAPAN HAS INSISTED ON THE NEED TO REDRESS THE CURRENT INEQUITIES

-- CARGO-HANDLING TALKS: SEEKING REFORM OF JAPAN'S PRIOR CONSULTATION SYSTEM, THE U.S. HAS SET APRIL 14 AS THE DEADLINE FOR SANCTIONS.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 03/27/97

---PHOTOFILM: MITI'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY MEASURES
AND THE LARGE-SCALE RETAIL STORE LAW ARE NOW UNDER
EXAMINATION IN THE WTO

-- JAPAN-U.S. PAPER ACCORD. WITH THE APRIL 6 DEADLINE COMING CLOSER, THE U.S. HAS CALLED FOR "A NEW MEASURE"

-- CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN WTO: THIS ISSUE IS UNDER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA AND BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA. CHINA'S POLITICAL

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DONATIONS TO THE U.S. DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS MUDDLED THIS ISSUE.

-- ABOLITION OF THE CEILINGS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF NTT AND KDD: THE U.S. PUT PRESSURE BY WITHHOLDING (U.S.) LICENSING OF NTT'S START OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

-- JAPAN-U.S. AGREEMENT ON NTT PROCUREMENT: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED AN EXTENSION OF THE THREE-YEAR ACCORD, WHICH EXPIRES IN SEPTEMBER.

-- POLICE WIRELESS SYSTEM: MOTOROLA FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR ITS FAILURE TO WIN A CONTRACT IN THE BIDDING HELD BY THE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY.

-- LIQUOR TAX ISSUE: RESPONDING TO ITS DEFEAT IN THE WTO RULING, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS RESISTED, CITING THE ISSUE OF SMALL SHOCHU MANUFACTURERS.

-- APPLES: JAPAN HAS REJECTED THE U.S.' CALL FOR INCREASING THE VARIETIES OF APPLES EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE ISSUE TO THE WTO.

-- RICE: THE U.S. HAS REQUESTED FRONT-LOADING IN TALKS AT THE WTO. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE TASKS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY IN 1997.

(4) IS DEREGULATION A PANACEA? (PART 4) --

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UPHOLDING CULTURE; SENSE OF ALARM TOWARD AMERICANIZATION

YOMIURI (PAGE 1) (FULL)
MARCH 14, 1997

DEREGULATION POLICY MEASURES WHOSE THEORETICAL FOOTING IS ON MARKET MECHANISMS ARE VULNERABLE TO CERTAIN DEFECTS.

EMPHASIS TENDS TO BE PLACED ON VISIBLE, NEAR-TERM BENEFITS IN A NARROW SENSE OF THE TERM SOLELY FROM THE ECONOMIC ASPECT. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS, WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO SEE, TEND TO BE TRIVIALIZED.

THE ADVANCE OF DEREGULATION AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS HAS USHERED IN THE AGE OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. AMID SUCH A CLIMATE, HOW CAN JAPAN KEEP UP ITS OWN CULTURE?

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WHEN FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC VISITED JAPAN, HE GAVE A COMMEMORATIVE SPEECH AT KEIO UNIVERSITY. IN IT, HE HINTED THAT HE ALSO FELT SIMILARLY ALARMED.

"THE OPENING OF NATIONAL BORDERS HAS TO BE IMPLEMENTED, WHILE HONORING EACH COUNTRY'S IDENTITY AND CULTURE. WHAT IS VITAL IS TO SUSTAIN EACH COUNTRY'S CULTURE, THOUGHT, THE LANGUAGE SPOKEN TO EXPRESS SUCH, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE VALUES OF THAT CIVILIZATION." "LET US GET TOGETHER IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN OUR MOTHER TONGUE, WHICH IS ANOTHER

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HOMELAND. THE STANDARDIZATION OF CULTURES IS ONE OF THE DANGERS THREATENING THE 21ST CENTURY."

IN THE FORMER GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAD PROMOTED THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS, FRANCE HAD THE U.S., WHICH PRESSED IT TO LIBERALIZE ITS AUDIO-VISUAL MARKET, TO APPROVE "SPECIAL-EXCEPTION REGULATIONS FOR CULTURE."

IN ORDER TO PROTECT FRENCH-MADE TELEVISION PROGRAMS AND MOVIES FROM A FLOOD OF AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS, FRANCE MADE IT AN OBLIGATION THAT "MORE THAN 40 PERCENT OF DRAMAS AND MOVIES SCREENED ON TV BE FRENCH-MADE." THE STATE SUBSIDIZES THE PRODUCTION OF FRENCH MOVIES.

THE ISSUE OF "CULTURAL SPECIAL-EXCEPTION REGULATIONS" WAS REHASHED AT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENTS (MAI), WHICH WERE HELD UNDER THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). FRANCE ASKED THAT CULTURAL INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS MOVIES, BE MADE

AN EXCEPTION TO LIBERALIZATION. THE U.S., WHICH HAS OVERWHELMING COMPETITIVENESS IN THE VISUAL AND LITERARY ARTS MEDIA, IS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO SUCH A PROPOSAL.

CANADA IS IN LINE WITH FRANCE. THE THREE MAJOR U.S. TELEVISION NETWORKS, SUCH AS ABC AND NBC, AND AMERICAN CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMS ARE CONSTANTLY

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AIRED IN CANADA.

DUE TO THE RAPID GLOBALIZATION OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND THE SPREAD OF THE INTERNET SYSTEM IN WHICH ENGLISH IS HEAVILY IS USED, AMERICAN CULTURE IS SPREADING WITH SUCH A SPEED AS TO ALMOST DOMINATE THE WORLD. NEGATIVE REACTION TO SUCH A TREND IS ARISING IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES.

WHAT THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE IN COMMON IS THAT "CULTURE SHOULD NOT BE TREATED ON THE SAME PLANE AS THE ECONOMY." SUCH A PERCEPTION IS LACKING IN JAPAN'S EFFORTS TO FACILITATE DEREGULATION.

GERMANY REVISED THE LAW THAT BANS COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS, BUT IT HAS DECLARED THAT IT WOULD FIRMLY MAINTAIN THE RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM APPLIED TO PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES.

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THERE, MOST OF ANTI-MONOPOLY EXPERTS ARE SUPPORTING THAT POLICY LINE. HOWEVER, IN JAPAN, MANY EXPERTS ARE CALLING FOR DEREGULATION WITHOUT EXCEPTION, FALLING IN STEP WITH THE U.S. MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLICY MEASURES.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC, THE PREDECESSOR TO THE EUROPEAN UNION) COMPILED A REPORT ON BOOK POLICY IN 1985. THE REPORT POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE SAME PRICES FOR THOSE PUBLISHED IN THE SAME LANGUAGE AND SUBSIDIES TO LIBRARIES.

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ECONOMICS CENTERED ON MARKET MECHANISMS TEND TO ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO PORTIONS THAT CAN BE COVERED BY THEORY AND RULE OUT THOSE THAT CANNOT BE SCHEMATIZED OR MEASURED. MANY OF EXPERTS WHO ARE IN FAVOR OF PROMOTING DEREGULATION MAY BE CAUGHT IN SUCH A TRAP.

(ADMINISTRATIVE, FISCAL AND POLITICAL REFORM INFORMATION-GATHERING TEAM)

(5) "AINU BILL" SUBMITTED, BUT NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THEIR BEING "AN ABORIGINAL PEOPLE"; CONTENT ONLY SHOWS CULTURAL PROMOTION

YOMIURI (PAGE 23) (FULL)
MARCH 25, 1997

THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN ITS APPROVAL TO A "NEW AINU BILL" AT A CABINET MEETING AND HAS SENT IT ON TO THE DIET. ALTHOUGH SOME HAD EXPECTED THE BILL TO CLARIFY THE AINU PEOPLE AS AN ABORIGINAL PEOPLE, WHAT THE BILL SHOWS ARE ONLY "DETAILS AS ARE OFTEN SEEN IN A CULTURAL PROMOTION LAW," PLACING EMPHASIS ON PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADITIONAL CULTURE OF THE AINU PEOPLE.

(YUTAKA SHIMIZU OF THE LOCAL NEWS DEPARTMENT)

THE BILL IS FORMALLY CALLED A LAW TO PROMOTE THE AINU CULTURE AND TO DISSEMINATE KNOWLEDGE AND ENLIGHTEN (PEOPLE) REGARDING ON AINU TRADITIONS,

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ETC." THE OBJECTIVE IS TO "BRING TO FRUITION A SOCIETY IN WHICH THE PRIDE THAT THE AINU PEOPLE HAVE WILL BE RESPECTED." THE BILL, IF ENACTED AS A LOW, OBLIGES THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE AINU CULTURE.

IT HAS BEEN ALREADY 13 YEARS SINCE THE HOKKAIDO UTARI ASSOCIATION IN 1984 ASKED FOR SUCH LEGISLATION. THE AINU PEOPLE CAN NOW SEE THEIR REQUEST HAS BEEN ANSWERED IN SOME FASHION. WHEN THE BILL IS ENACTED AS LAW, ALL EXISTING LAWS -- THE LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF FORMER NATIVES (KYUU-DOJIN) IN HOKKAIDO AND THE LAW TO DISPOSE OF RESERVATION LAND HELD BY FORMER NATIVES IN ASAHIKAWA CITY -- WILL BOTH BE SCRAPPED.

"ALTHOUGH THE BILL IS FAR FROM WHAT WE AT THE BEGINNING HAD CALLED FOR (SUCH AS DESCRIPTIONS ABOUT AINU PEOPLE BEING ABORIGINES AND PROTECTION OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS), LEGISLATION RELATED TO US

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AS AN ETHNIC GROUP IS SIGNIFICANT INDEED," SAYS JIRO SASAMURA (63) OF THE ABOVE ASSOCIATION. "AS FOR THE ABORIGINES PROBLEM, WE WANT TO MAKE IT A FUTURE TASK WHILE WATCHING HOW DISCUSSION WILL BE UNFOLDED AT THE UNITED NATIONS' CONFERENCE. THIS IS NOT THE TERMINAL POINT BUT THE FIRST STEP FORWARD," HE STRESSED.

IN DEBATE ON THE BILL, WHETHER TO ADOPT OR REJECT THE QUESTION OF THEIR ABORIGINAL NATURE WAS A MAJOR POINT AT ISSUE FROM THE START. THE FORUM OF KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS ON POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE
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UTARI" (CHAIRED BY TOKYO UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS MASAMI ITO), A PANEL THAT WORKED OUT A BASIS FOR THE BILL, ACKNOWLEDGED IN ITS REPORT ISSUED IN LAST APRIL THAT (THE AINU PEOPLE) WERE ABORIGINES, SPECIFYING THAT "NO ONE CAN DENY THAT THEY WERE NATIVE RESIDENTS, PARTICULARLY IN HOKKAIDO."

HOWEVER, THE BILL GOES NO FARTHER THAN TO STIPULATE "PRIDE AS AN ETHNIC GROUP." IN ADDITION, THE WORDING, "AINU ETHNIC GROUP," WHICH THE ASSOCIATION CALLED FOR, WAS CHANGED INTO "AINU PEOPLE," RESULTING IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE BILL HAS BEEN WATERED DOWN SINCE THE INITIAL REPORT.

THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION IS: "A CLEAR DEFINITION FOR ABORIGINES HAS YET TO BE MADE IN ANY COUNTRY, ALLOWING A VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS, SO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY FOR SUCH A MATTER" (HOKKAIDO DEVELOPMENT AGENCY DIRECTOR GENERAL INAGAKI). IN TRUTH, INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION OVER THE RIGHTS OF ABORIGINES HAS JUST BEGUN. THE UN HELD ITS WORKING GROUP MEETING ONLY TWICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAFTING A UN DECLARATION."

SHOWA WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR STUART HENRY (CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY) POINTS OUT RESPECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES, EXPLAINING: "CANADA AND AUSTRALIA, WHERE LAND WAS RETURNED TO ABORIGINES, ARE COUNTRIES THAT BECAME NATION STATES AFTER BEING

COLONIZED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK). THE UK HAS THE LEGAL TRADITION THAT ALLOWS 'NATIVES' TO HAVE VARIOUS RIGHTS. BUT JAPANESE LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS DIFFER, SO WE HAVE TO TAKE THEM INTO CONSIDERATION."

ACCORDING TO A UN ESTIMATION, THERE ARE ABOUT 300 MILLION ABORIGINES IN MORE THAN 70 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, BUT THE WAY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE AINU PROBLEM HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY NEGATIVE.

IT IS NATURAL THAT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE TO SERIOUSLY GRAPPLE WITH PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THEIR UNIQUE LANGUAGE, DANCING, HANDICRAFTS AND THE LIKE, ALL OF WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN THE BILL, AND TO ADD TO THAT, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES LYING BEHIND SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN AFTER THE MEIJI RESTORATION (1868) IS REPLETE WITH NOT A FEW

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"NEGATIVE LEGACIES" FOR THE AINU PEOPLE, SUCH AS THEIR BEING FORCED TO USE THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND PROHIBITING THEM FROM FOLLOWING THEIR OWN CULTURE AND CUSTOMS. IN DIET DELIBERATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY TO DEBATE THE BILL, TAKING THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES INTO CONSIDERATION.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 01-23-01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

TAGS: PSDC, PEPR, UR, US, PL, IR, AF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO GROMYKO

1. [redacted] - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO GROMYKO SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO MFA ASAP: BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. MINISTER: I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON MY APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY OF STATE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR HOPES FOR STRENGTHENING THE PEACE AND THAT AS SECRETARY I WILL WORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELA-

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TIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF RESTRAINT

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AND RECIPROCITY.

IF THESE GOALS ARE TO BE REALIZED, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL FROM THE START THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS FULLY COMPREHEND EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS AND INTENTIONS. FOR THIS REASON I WOULD LIKE IN THIS INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE TO ADDRESS TWO ISSUES WHICH I CONSIDER OF IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE.

THE FIRST DEEPLY AFFECTS AMERICAN OPINION AND THUS THE ENTIRE CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONS. I REFER TO THE TREATMENT BYTHE OFFICIALSOVIETMEDIAOF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE RELEASE BY IRAN OF THE 52 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

ILLEGALLY HELD CAPTIVE IN TEHRAN FOR OVER A YEAR. THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR THROUGHOUT OUR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE HOSTAGE CRISIS HAS ALREADY CONTRIBUTED TO STRAINS IN OUR RELATIONS. CONTINUED DISTORTION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES AND OF OUR POLICY TOWARD IRAN CAN ONLY RAISE FURTHER DOUBTS IN THIS COUNTRY CONCERNING SOVIET INTENTIONS.

THE SECOND IS A MATTER OF UTMOST POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS-- THE SITUATION IN POLAND. I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION OF NONINTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP POLAND RESOLVE ITS SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. AND WE ARE CONVINCED THAT, IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES, THE POLES ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS THEMSELVES.

NOR DO I WISH TO LEAVE ANY DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US WOULD VIEW EFFORTS BY THE SOVIET UNION

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TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND THROUGH MILITARY PRESSURE OR DIRECT INTERVENTION. THIS ADMINISTRATION FULLY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE DECEMBER 12 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE. ANY INTERVENTION IN POLAND WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND THE US WITH ITS ALLIES WOULD BE COMPELLED TO ACT IN A MANNER WHICH THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION WOULD REQUIRE.

MR. MINISTER, I CANNOT IN THIS INITIAL LETTER ADDRESS

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ALL OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN US. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME I WOULD HOPE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON A WIDER RANGE OF SUBJECTS, PARTICULARLY THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE NEED FOR AN EARLY AND COMPLETE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT COUNTRY. THE POINTS I HAVE RAISED ARE THOSE WHICH I BELIEVE DESERVE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THEM IN THAT SPIRIT.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER HAIG. END TEXT.
HAIG

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81MOSCOW015919

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/17/91 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR BEARISH ON POLAND

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 15362, (B) MOSCOW 15204

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: POLISH AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW OLSZEWSKI WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND AND TOOK A TOUGH, SOVIET-SOUNDING LINE IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN NOVEMBER 17. IN ADDITION TO

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BEMOANING THE DROP IN POLAND'S INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, OLSZEWSKI ATTACKED SOLIDARITY, DERIDED THE IDEA OF THREE-WAY POWER SHARING, PRAISED SOVIET AID, AND CRITICIZED WESTERN RADIO STATIONS--IN SHORT, HE HEWED TO A LINE THAT WOULD PLEASE SOVIET EARS, WHICH MAY WELL HAVE BEEN LISTENING. FOR WHATEVER REASON, OLSZEWSKI'S PESSIMISTIC VIEW CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE TOLERANT, HOPEFUL LINE ANOTHER POLISH EMBASSY OFFICER HAS BEEN PURVEYING TO US

AND OTHER WESTERN DIPLOMATS THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS (REFTELS). END SUMMARY.

3. POLISH AMBASSADOR KAZIMIERZ OLSZEWSKI (PROTECT) BEGAN BY DISCUSSING AT LENGTH HIS COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. EXHIBITING LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THE CHANGES THAT HAVE COME ABOUT IN POLAND DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN MONTHS, HE ATTACKED SOLIDARITY--WITHOUT MENTIONING THE UNION BY NAME--FOR THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT HE SAID IT HAD HAD ON THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WELL-BEING. HE NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF ONE YEAR, POLAND'S INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT HAS DROPPED BACK TO THE LEVEL OF 1968, AND "NOT A DAY PASSES" WITHOUT A STRIKE BEING CALLED SOMEWHERE IN POLAND.

4. OLSZEWSKI BEMOANED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO CONSULT WITH SOLIDARITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO SHARE POWER WITH THE CHURCH WAS REMINISCENT OF THE MIDDLE AGES, WHEN POWER IN POLAND WAS--INEFFECTIVELY--SHARED BY THE KING, THE SLECHTA, AND THE CHURCH. THE ONLY OTHER STATE IN THE MODERN WORLD IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES HAVE SO MUCH POWER, HE

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SAID, WAS IRAN. THUS, HE CONTINUED, THERE ARE THREE CENTERS OF POWER IN POLAND, NONE OF THEM WITH ANY POWER. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE NOTHING BUT TALK, YET NOBODY LISTENS. DISCIPLINE WITHIN SOLIDARITY IS COLLAPSING, AND THE NEW POLISH PRIMATE, ARCHBISHOP GLEMP, SAYS ONE THING, WHILE "HIS SUBORDINATES DO QUITE ANOTHER." IN SHORT, HE SAID, THERE IS "NO END IN SIGHT" TO THE CURRENT CRISIS.

5. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN POLAND. OLSZEWSKI SAID THERE ARE TWO PLANS, ONE ECONOMIC AND THE OTHER POLITICAL. THE ECONOMIC PLAN, HE SAID, CALLS FOR REFORMS IN MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, "EXTREME" DECENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWER, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER INCENTIVES FOR WORKERS. THE POLITICAL PLAN CALLS OR AVOIDING THE USE OF FORCE BY THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND CREATION OF A "FRONT OF NATIONAL AGREEMENT," O ACCOMPLISH POWER-SHARING WITH THE CHURCH AND THE UNION.

6. ASKED BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ABOUT THE REACTION OF POLISH WORKERS TO "ADVICE" THEY MIGHT GET FROM THE IMF TO INCREASE WORKER PRODUCTIVITY, OLSZEWSKI

DECLARED "THEY OF COURSE WILL NOT LIKE IT" AND THEY WILL NOT HEED IT ANY MORE THAN THEY CURRENTLY DO THE GOVERNMENT OR, INCREASINGLY, THEIR OWN UNIONS.

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7. ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET AID, OLSZEWSKI CLAIMED

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THAT, WITHOUT IT, POLAND WOULD BE COMPLETELY BANKRUPT IN "TWO OR THREE DAYS." CITING THE 1982 PLAN, HE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED ON A "BALANCED EXCHANGE, WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED TO DO UNDER THE TERMS OF THEIR AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND," THEN THE USSR COULD LEGALLY DELIVER, ON THE AVERAGE, LESS THAN ONE HALF OF THEIR COMMITMENTS OF OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, NATURAL GAS, AND COTTON, TO SAY NOTHING OF GOLD, INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS, AND SO FORTH. GIVEN THEIR SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC STAKE, IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SO INTERESTED IN WHAT IS HAPPENING IN POLAND, OLSZEWSKI

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SAID.

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8. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ASKED OLSZEWSKI IF HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS REALLY BELIEVED THEIR OWN CHARGE THAT THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S., WAS INTERFERING IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, OR IF THE ACCUSATIONS WERE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA. OLSZEWSKI REPLIED "IN ALL HONESTY" THAT IF ONE LISTENED TO THE WESTERN RADIOS, ESPECIALLY RADIO

FREE EUROPE, AS HE CLAIMED HE DOES "CONSTANTLY," ONE WOULD HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT THESE BROADCASTS CONSTITUTE "DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS," AND THAT MANY OF THEM CONTAIN "DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS" TO CERTAIN ELEMENTS ON "WHEN AND WHERE TO ACT." AMBASSADOR HARTMAN OBJECTED, STATING THAT HE KNEW THESE BROADCASTS WERE CAREFULLY EDITED TO AVOID APPEARING TO INTERFERE IN THE CRISIS, AND THAT THEY CONTAIN FACTUAL STATEMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN POALND. OLSZEWSKI REJOINED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND THE NEWS PROGRAMS, BUT RATHER COMMENTARIES AND EDITORIALS, AND THAT HE STOOD BY HIS CHARGE.

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9. IN CONCLUSION, OLSZEWSKI EMPHASIZED HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST IN AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, AND STATED HIS HOPE THAT HARTMAN WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN HELPING TO BRING THAT ABOUT.

10. COMMENT: LIKE MANY POLES THESE DAYS, BUT UNLIKE AT LEAST ONE YOUNGER MEMBER OF HIS OWN STAFF, OLSZEWSKI HAS A DESPARATE TONE. I HAVE MET HIM A NUMBER OF TIMES OVER THE YEARS AND HAVE ALWAYS FOUND HIM A PRAGMATIC, INTELLIGENT FELLOW; SOME

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OF WHAT HE SAID, I BELIEVE, WAS INTENDED FOR LISTENING SOVIET EARS. OLSZEWSKI HAS BEEN HERE SINCE 1978 AND SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LEFT RELATIVELY UNTOUCHED BY THE HISTORIC EVENTS OF 1980-81. HE TOLD ME THAT HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE "MANY FRIENDS: DOCTORS, PROFESSORS, ARTISTS AND ACTORS," BUT THAT NOW, WHEN THEY GO BACK TO WARSAW, "WE FIND WE CANNOT TALK WITH THEM." OLSZEWSKI SAID THAT HE WAS "EXILED" TO MOSCOW BECAUSE OF A FALLING OUT WITH THE OLD REGIME (GIEREK). LIKE MANY POLES BEFORE HIM, HE HAS A HANKERING FOR THE STRONG-MAN SOLUTION. SINCE HE DID NOT ONCE MENTION JARUZELSKI, EXCEPT TO SCOFF AT "TRI-LATERAL" GOVERNMENT, I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HIS PRESENT LEADER AS THE SOLUTION. END COMMENT.
HARTMAN

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, UR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING - JUNE 29, 1981

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING FOR JUNE 29, 1981. SPOKESMAN WAS DEAN FISCHER.

Q. OKAY. ON EVENTS IN IRAN, CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR ANALYSIS OF IT? DOES THIS POSSIBLY CREATE AN OPENING FOR THE LEFT WING TO TAKE OVER?

A. WE KNOW VERY LITTLE MORE NOW THAN WHAT HAS BEEN REPORTED BY THE IRANIAN PRESS ON THE RADIO, PLUS THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND WIRE SERVICES.

AS TO COMMENT, I WOULD ONLY SAY THAT THE POLITICAL TURMOIL
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IN THAT COUNTRY IS A CONTINUATION OF A POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN VARIOUS POLITICAL FACTIONS THAT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME.

THE DEATHS AND INJURIES SUFFERED BY NUMBERS OF THE DOMINANT ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY INTRODUCE FURTHER INSTABILITY TO AN ALREADY DIFFICULT INTERNAL POLITICALSITUATION IN IRAN.

IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO ASSESS DEVELOPMENTS NOW

TAKING PLACE IN IRAN BECAUSE OF THE CONFUSION THERE AND THE CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION THAT IS REACHING FOREIGN OBSERVERS.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY SOVIET INSPIRATION IN THIS?

A. I WOULD HAVE NO COMMENT ON THAT, AGAIN BECAUSE OF THE CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION AND THE ESSENTIAL LACK OF INFORMATION OTHER THAN IN THE NEWS SERVICE REPORTS THAT HAVE REACHED US.

Q. AT LEAST IN ONE STATEMENT BY THE RADIO, AMERICA IS BEING BLAMED FOR THE BOMB EXPLOSION. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

A. YES. ON THAT SUBJECT, I WOULD SIMPLY NOT WANT TO DIGNIFY SUCH ACCUSATIONS. THE ONLY THING I WOULD ADD IS THAT WE DEPLORE ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

Q. DEAN, COULD YOU ADDRESS THE QUESTION IN BROADER TERMS? THAT IS, WITHOUT HAVING ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVOLUTION TAKING PLACE IN IRAN RIGHT NOW, TO WHAT DEGREE IS THERE AN ANXIETY HERE THAT ANARCHY, CHAOS, DIS-

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ARRAY, WHATEVER, IN IRAN WILL IN FACT BE EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE TUDEH PARTY?

A. I DON'T WANT TO GO BEYOND WHAT I'VE SAID ON THIS. CLEARLY, WHEN WE SAY THAT WE DEPLORE ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM, WE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WELCOME THE PARTICIPATION OF ANY PARTY OR COUNTRY SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ACTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

Q. DEAN, WHEN YOU EARLIER SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT WELCOME PARTICIPATION OF ANY PARTY -- THAT IS TO SAY, THE TUDEH PARTY -- OR COUNTRY SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DISARRAY IN IRAN, DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY EVIDENCE AT THIS POINT THAT THERE ARE SUCH MOVES UNDERWAY?

A. IF YOU ASKED ME ABOUT THE TUDEH PARTY, PER SE, I DID NOT RECALL THAT THAT WAS PART OF THE QUESTION. WHEN I REFERRED TO A PARTY, I MEANT COUNTRIES OUTSIDE IRAN. I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THE POSITION HERE OF ATTEMPTING TO CHARACTERIZE WHAT GOES ON WITHIN IRAN INTERNALLY.

AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE ANY EVIDENCE, I AM NOT PREPARED TO SAY TODAY WHETHER WE DO OR NOT.

Q. IS THERE ANY CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION AROUND POLAND? DO YOU HAVE ANY OBSERVATIONS ON MR. GROMYKO'S

PLANNED VISIT?

A. WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR COMMENT ON MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT.

ON TH MILITARY SITUATION, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT OR UNUSUAL WARSAW PACT MILITARY ACTIVITIES EITHER IN OR AROUND POLAND, NOR HAVE WE SEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT LOW-LEVEL ROUTINE EXERCISES INVOLVING
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FORCES FROM ONE OR MORE OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES MAY BE UNDERWAY IN THE REGION.

Q. DEAN, DO YOU PLAN TO KEEP AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN PARIS FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, AS WAS REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND, RATHER THAN HAVE HIM GO TO MOSCOW?

A. I SAW THOSE REPORTS, BERNIE, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANY CONFIRMATION OF THEM TODAY. HAIG

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EO 12065: GDS 10/16/85 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, KS
SUBJECT: THINGS STILL UP IN THE AIR IN WAKE OF NDP RESIGNATION

REF: (A) SEOUL 15499 (B) SEOUL 15207

1. (U) BOTH OPPOSITION AND PRO-GOVERNMENT PARTIES ARE TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO IN WAKE OF OCTOBER 13 MASS RESIGNATION FROM ASSEMBLY BY NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) AND DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION PARTY (DUP). PRO-GOVERNMENT PARTIES DECIDED AT JOINT MEETING OCTOBER 15 TO CONTINUE ASSEMBLY RECESS UNTIL OCTOBER 24, BUT HAVE NOT DECIDED HOW TO HANDLE RESIGNATIONS. DRP AND YUJONGHOE SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZED HARD-LINE APPROACH AFTER OCTOBER 15 MEETING, SAYING THAT SOME PRO-GOVERNMENT PARTY MEMBERS ARE DETERMINED TO JUDGE RESIGNATIONS ON "SELECTIVE" BASIS, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT A FEW WOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE SPOKESMEN ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LAW SO THAT THOSE EXPELLED (ONLY KIM YONG-SAM IN KOREA'S POST-WAR HISTORY) WOULD

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HAVE TO WAIT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF YEARS BEFORE THEY COULD RUN AGAIN.

2. [redacted] THERE ARE SOME VOICES IN THE NDP WHICH QUESTION THE WISDOM OF THE MASS RESIGNATION. ONLY 34 OF THE 66 NDP ASSEMBLYMEN USED THE RESIGNATION THAT KIM YONG-SAM'S MEN HAD PREPARED, THE OTHERS INSISTING THAT THEY WOULD WORD THEIR OWN RESIGNATIONS. ONE EX-SUPREME COUNCILMAN WAS QUOTED AS SAYING "I'M SURE THAT THE PARTY WILL REGRET

THE MOVE", WHILE ONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE NOW-DEFUNCT SUPREME COUNCIL SAID "I'M RESIGNING TO PROTECT THE ILLEGAL EXPULSION OF THE NDP LEADER. IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT I RESIGNED ON KIM YONG-SAM'S ACCOUNT." THE NDP'S PARTY MACHINERY WILL REMAIN IN PLACE AND KIM'S ALLIES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE PARTY'S STRUGGLE WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY, ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFICS ARE GIVEN. NDP PRESIDENT KIM YONG-SAM CONTINUES TO PUSH THE GOVERNMENT. FBIS QUOTES A KYODO INTERVIEW IN WHICH KIM IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT, SINCE ONLY A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE SUPPORT PRESIDENT PARK AND 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE WANT HIM TO GIVE UP THE PRESIDENCY, HE SHOULD REVISE THE CONSTITUTION AND HOLD DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IF HE DOES NOT, FBIS QUOTES THE KYODO INTERVIEW, SOUTH KOREA WILL SEE A STUDENT REVOLUTION AS VIOLENT AS THAT WHICH TOPPLED SYNGMAN RHEE OR THAT WHICH OUSTED THE SHAH IN IRAN.

3. [redacted] WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENT ABOUT THE MASS RESIGNATION, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF GOVERNMENT ORDERS TO DOWNPLAY INTERPRETIVE COVERAGE (REF B). HOWEVER, TONGA ILBO TOOK THE RULING CAMP TO TASK IN VERY HARSH TERMS, SAYING THAT "EVEN WITH TWO-THIRDS OF THE SEATS THE RULING CAMP WAS UNABLE TO SEEK ANY OTHER MEANS BUT

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THE EXPULSION OF THE OPPOSITION LEADER. THIS MAKES US DOUBT THE POLITICAL CALIBER AND POWER OF SOUND JUDGMENT AMONG ITS LEADERS....THEY FAILED TO FORESEE THAT IT COULD BE A LOSS IN THE LONG RUN. THOSE WHO HAVE CAUSED SUCH A PLAGUE MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE....TO OUR REGRET, QUITE A FEW LEADERS OF THE RULING CAMP CONTINUE TO FAIL IN PROPERLY PERCEIVING THE SITUATION....WE CAN FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NDP ASSEMBLYMEN." (INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT LOCAL NEWSPAPER SOURCES SAY THAT THE CIRCULATION OF TONGA ILBO, WHICH HAS BEEN IN THE FRONT ON THIS COVERAGE, WENT UP 200,000 AFTER THE YH INCIDENT AND A FURTHER 20,000 AFTER KIM'S EXPULSION.)

4. [redacted] COMMENT: MANY OBSERVERS DOUBT THAT ANY OPPOSITION RESIGNATIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED, BUT THE HARD-LINERS CONTINUE CLAIMS THAT SELECTIVE ACCEPTANCE IS BEING CONSIDERED AND SUCH A MOVE PRESENTS CONSIDERABLE TEMPTATION TO THIS ELEMENT. THERE IS STILL TOO MUCH PULLING AND HAULING IN THE RULING CAMP FOR ANY CLEAR READING AND KIM YONG-SAM, THROUGH ACTIONS SUCH AS HIS KYODO INTERVIEW, DOES NOT MAKE SOLUTION EASIER. WHILE THE MODERATES COULD CARRY THE DAY, THE HARD-LINE, LOOKING TO PAST ACTION AND NOT TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, COULD STILL KEEP THE UPPER HAND. MONJO

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